Meyer's Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
Heinrich A.W. Meyer · 1880
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Meyer's Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
Heinrich A.W. Meyer · 1880
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Heinrich A.W. Meyer · 1880
신약 학술 정밀주해 (독일 — K&D 대응)
1 John Chapter 2 1 Meyer's Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
1 John Chapter 2 2 Meyer's Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
1 John 2:2. καὶ αὐτός = et ipse, idemque ille; καί is here also the simple copula, and is not to be resolved either into quia (a Lapide) or nam.
αὐτός refers back to Ἰησ. Χριστὸν δίκαιον, and the epithet δίκαιον is not to be lost sight of here; Paulus, contrary to the context, refers αὐτός to God.
ἱλασμός ἐστι] The word ἱλασμός, which is used besides in the N. T. only in chap. 1 John 4:10, and here also indeed in combination with περὶ τῶν ἁμ. ἡμῶν, may, according to Ezekiel 44:27 (= חַטָּאת), mean the sin-offering (Lücke, 3d ed.), but is here to be taken in the sense of כִּכֻּרִים, Leviticus 25:9, Numbers 5:8, and no doubt in this way, that Christ is called the ἱλασμός, inasmuch as He has expiated by His αἷμα the guilt of sin. This reference to the sacrificial blood of Christ, it is true, is not demanded by the idea ἱλασμός in itself,[84] but certainly is demanded by the context, as the apostle can only ascribe to the blood of Christ, in chap. 1 John 1:7, the cleansing power of which he is there speaking, because he knows that reconciliation is based in it.
[84] In the Septuagint not only does ἱλασμός appear as the translation of the Hebrew סְלִיחָה (Psalm 129:4; Daniel 9:9), but ἱλάσκεσθαι is also used = to be merciful, to forgive (Psalm 65:4; Psalm 78:38; Psalm 79:9),—quite without reference to an offering.—The explanation of Paulus, however: “He (i.e. God) is the pure exercise of compassion on account of sinful faults,” is not justifiable, because, in the first place, God is not the subject, and secondly, the ἱλασμός of Christ is not the forgiveness itself, but is that which procures forgiveness.
REMARK.
In classical Greek ἱλάσκεσθαι (as middle) is = ἱλεων ποιεῖν; but in scripture it never appears in this active signification, in which God would not be the object; but in all the passages where the Septuagint makes use of this word, whether it is as the translation of כִּפֵּר (Psalm 65:4; Psalm 78:38; Psalm 79:9), or of סָלַם (Psalm 25:11; 2 Kings 5:18), or of נִחַם (Exodus 32:14), God is the subject, and sin, or sinful man, is the object; in Hebrews 2:17, Christ is the subject, and the object also is τὰς ἁμαρτίας. The case is almost exactly similar with ἐξιλάσκεσθαι, which does not appear in the N. T. at all, but in the O. T., on the other hand, is used as the translation of כִּפֵּר much more frequently than the simple form; it is only where this verb is used of the relation between men, namely Genesis 32:21 and Proverbs 16:14, that the classical usus loquendi is preserved; but elsewhere with ἐξιλάσκεσθαι, whether the subject be God (as in Ezekiel 16:63) or man, especially the priest, the object is either man (Leviticus 4:20; Leviticus 4:26; Leviticus 6:7; Leviticus 16:6; Leviticus 16:11; Leviticus 16:16-17; Leviticus 16:24; Leviticus 16:30; Leviticus 16:33; Ezekiel 45:17) or sin (Exodus 32:30; both together, Leviticus 5:18, Numbers 6:11), or even of holiness defiled by sin (the most holy place, Leviticus 16:16; the altar, Leviticus 16:18; Leviticus 27:33, Ezekiel 43:22); only in Zechariah 7:2 is found ἐξιλάσκασθαι τὸν κύριον, where, however, the Hebrew text has לְחַלּוֹת אֶת־פְּנֵי יְהֹוָה. Ἰλασμός, therefore, in scripture does not denote the reconciliation of God, either with Himself or with men, and hence not placatio (or as Myrberg interprets: propitiatio) Dei, but the justification or reconciliation of the sinner with God, because it is never stated in the N. T. that God is reconciled, but rather that we are reconciled to God.[85]
[85] Comp. Delitzsch in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, on chap. 1 John 2:17, p. 94 ff. But it is to be noticed that Delitzsch, while he states correctly the Biblical mode of representation, bases his opening discussion on the idea of the “self-reconciliation of the Godhead with itself,” an idea which is not contained in scripture.—It is observed by several commentators that ἱλασμός, as distinguished from καταλλαγή = “Versöhnung” (reconciliation), is to be translated by “Sühnung” or “Versühnung” (both = Engl. expiation, atonement). It is true, Versöhnung and Versühnung are properly one and the same word, but in the usage of the language the distinction has certainly been fixed that the latter word denotes the restoration of the disturbed relationship by an expiation to be performed; only it is inexact to assert that the idea ἱλασμός in itself contains the idea of punishment, since ἱλάσκισθαι does not include this idea either in classical or in Biblical usage, and ἐξιλάσκεσθαι, though mostly indeed used in the O. T. in reference to a sacrifice by which sin is covered, is also used without this reference (comp. Sir 3:28).
Grotius, S. G. Lange, and others take ἱλασμός = ἱλαστήρ; of course that abstract form denotes the personal Christ, but by this change into the concrete the expression of the apostle loses its peculiar character; “the abstract is more comprehensive, more intensive; comp. 1 Corinthians 1:30” (Brückner); it gives it to be understood “that Christ is not the propitiator through anything outside Himself, but through Himself” (Lücke, 2d ed.), and that there is no propitiation except through Him.[86]
The relation of ἰλασμός to the preceding παράκλητον may be variously regarded; either παράκλητος is the higher idea, in which ἱλασμός is contained, Bede: advocatum habemus apud Patrem qui interpellat pro nobis et propitium eum ac placatum peccatis nostris reddit; or conversely: ἱλασμός is the higher idea, to which the advocacy is subordinated, as de Wette thus says: “ἱλασμός does not merely refer to the sacrificial death of Jesus, but, as the more general idea, includes the intercession as the progressive reconciliation” (so also Rickli, Frommann); or lastly, both ideas are co-ordinate with one another, Christ being the ἱλασμίς in regard to His blood which was shed, and the παράκλητος, on the other hand, in regard to His present activity with the Father for those who are reconciled to God through His blood. Against the first view is the sentence beginning with καὶ αὐτός, by which ἱλασμός is marked as an idea which is not already contained in the idea παράκλητος, but is distinct from it; against the second view it is decisive that the propitiation, which Christ is described as, has reference to all sins, but His intercession, on the other hand, has reference only to the sins of the believers who belong to Him. There remains, accordingly, only the third view as the only correct one (so also Braune). The relationship is this, that the intercession of the glorified Christ has as its presupposition the ἱλασμός wrought out in His death,[87] yet the sentence καὶ αὐτός is not merely added, ut causa reddatur, cur Christus sit advocatus noster (Hornejus, and similarly Beza, Lorinus, Sander, etc.), for its independence is thereby taken away; the thought contained in it not merely serves for the explanation or confirmation of the preceding, but it is also full of meaning in itself, as it brings out the relation of Christ to the whole world of sinners.
περὶ πῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν] περί expresses the reference quite generally: “in regard to;” it may here be observed that ἐξιλάσκεσθαι, in the LXX. is usually construed with περί, after the Hebrew כִּפֵּר עַל. The idea of substitution is not suggested in περί.
With τῶν ἁμαρτ. ἡμῶν, comp. chap. 1 John 1:9; it is not merely the sins of Christians (ἡμῶν, i.e. fidelium; Bengel) before their conversion that are meant, but also those which are committed by them in their Christian life; comp. chap. 1 John 1:7. Ebrard’s opinion, that these words are added to ἱλασμός merely as a preparation for the following additional thought, is inadmissible; they rather suggest themselves to the apostle—and without regard to what follows—inasmuch as it is only by virtue of them that the idea obtains complete expression.
οὐ περὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων δὲ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου] Expansion of the thought, in reference to the preceding περὶ τ. ἁμ. ἡμῶν, in order to mark the universality of the propitiation. It is incorrect to understand by ἡμεῖς the Jews, and by κόσμος the Gentiles (Oecum., Cyril, Hornejus, Semler, Rickli, etc.); ἡμεῖς are rather believers, and κόσμος is the whole of unbelieving mankind; so Spener, Paulus, de Wette, Lücke, Sander, Neander, Düsterd., Braune, etc.
Baumgarten-Crusius agrees with this interpretation, only he understands by κόσμος not mankind together (extensive), but successively (protensive); but this distinction is unsuitable. It would be preferable to say that John was thinking directly of the κόσμος as it existed in his time, without, however, limiting the idea to it. The interpretation of Augustin and of Bede, by which κόσμος is = “ecclesia electorum per totum mundum dispersa,” is clearly quite arbitrary. The propitiatory sacrifice was offered for the whole world, for the whole of fallen mankind; if all do not obtain the blessing of it, the cause of that does not lie in a want of efficacia in it; Düsterdieck therefore rightly says: “The propitiation is of judicial nature; according to this, the propitiation for the whole world has its real efficacia for the whole world; to the believing it brings life; to the unbelieving, death.” Calvin quite improperly asserts: sub omnibus reprobos non comprehendit, sed eos designat, qui simul credituri erant et qui per varias mundi plagas dispersi erant (similarly Beza); against this the statement of Bengel is sufficient: quam late peccatum, tam late propitiatio. The expressly added ὅλου places the matter beyond all doubt.
With regard to the genitive περὶ ὅλ. τοῦ κόσμου, Winer says (p. 509, VII. p. 536): “instead of this, either περὶ τῶν ὅλου τ. κ., or, instead of the first words, περὶ ἡμῶν might have been written; similarly Hebrews 9:7;” many commentators, on the other hand, supply τῶν directly, as Grotius, Semler, Wilke (Hermeneutik, II. p. 145), de Wette, Düsterdieck; as the Vulg. renders: “pro totius mundi,” and Luther: “für der ganzen Welt.” On behalf of this, appeal is made to passages such as John 5:36,[88] Matthew 5:20; but the construction which appears in these passages is the well-known comparatio compendiaria, which does not occur here, as there is no comparison here at all; an oratio variata is therefore to be accepted, which was the more natural to the apostle, as the idea κόσμος includes in itself that of sin.[89]
[86] The case is the same with the expression ἱλασμός as with other abstractions by which Christ is described, as ζωή, ὁδός, ἁγιασμός, κ.τ.λ. Who does not feel that by these words something much more comprehensive is expressed than in the concrete forms: ὁ ζωοποιῶν, ὁ ὁδηγῶν, ὁ ἁγιάζων, κ.τ.λ.?
[87] Köstlin incorrectly says (p. 180): “Christ is παράκλητος, while He is ἱλασμός, i.e. high priest, and at the same time sacrifice, a high priest who offers himself; and ἱλασμός, while He is παράκλητος, i.e. a sacrifice which offers itself;” for neither does παράκλ. describe the high-priesthood of Christ, according to its full comprehension, nor does ἱλασμός mean “sacrifice.”
[88] This passage is cited by Ebrard further, in order to prove his assertion: “This abbreviation for περὶ τῶν ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου needs no explanation” (!).
[89] When Braune, who has accepted the explanation which is here given of the verse as a whole and in detail, says in reference to the oratio variata which occurs here: “it has not happened for the sake of the evil which attaches to the κόσμος, for this is true of Christians also (contrary to Huther),” he thereby shows that he has not correctly understood the above remark.
1 John Chapter 2 3 Meyer's Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
1 John 2:3. Semler would make a new section begin here: “after the foundation of salvation has been spoken of, there follows the exhortation to preserving the salvation;” incorrectly; 1 John 2:3 is closely connected with chap. 1 John 1:5-6, and states in what the Christian’s walk in light consists; therefore also it begins simply with καί.
ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν] ἐν τούτῳ refers to the following ἐάν; the object is stated by ὅτι; the same combination is found in the Gospel of John 13:35; similarly in chap. 1 John 4:13, where, however, the particle ὅτι is used instead of ἐάν, and chap. 1 John 5:2, where ὅταν is used. A Lapide wrongly weakens the force of γινώσκομεν: non certo et demonstrative, sed probabiliter et conjecturaliter; it is rather the anxiety of the apostle to bring out that the Christian has a sure and certain consciousness of the nature of the Christian life. This certainty is confirmed to him by unmistakeable facts, in which the truth of his knowledge attests itself.
ὅτι ἐγνώκαμεν αὐτόν] αὐτόν seems to refer to the last-mentioned subject in 1 John 2:2, therefore to Christ; so it is explained by Oecumenius, Erasmus, Grotius, Calov, Spener, Bengel, Semler, Johannsen, Sander, Myrberg, Erdmann, etc.; but the deeper train of thought is opposed to this; John is not continuing the idea of 1 John 2:2, but is going back to the fundamental thought of the whole section: “He who has fellowship with God walks in the light;” the principal subject is God, and to it, therefore, αὐτόν is to be referred; so Calvin, Beza, Lücke, Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald, de Wette, Brückner, Ebrard, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc.[90]
On ἘΓΝΏΚΑΜΕΝ, which is not, with Lange and Carpzov, to be interpreted = “love,” the commentators rightly remark that it is not a mere external, purely theoretical knowledge that is to be understood by it;[91] it is the living knowledge that is meant, i.e. a knowledge in which the subject (God) is really received into the inner life, and thought and action are determined by it,[92] so that ἐγνωκέναι is necessarily connected with the κοινωνίαν ἔχειν μετʼ αὐτοῦ (chap. 1 John 1:6); still it is inexact to render ὅτι ἐγνώκαμεν αὐτόν, with Oecumenius, directly by ὅτι συνεκράθημεν αὐτῷ, or, with Clarius, by societatem habemus cum eo. By ἐγνώκαμεν the element of consciousness in the fellowship, and with this its internal and spiritual side, is brought out.
ἐὰν τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν] The expression τ. ἐντολ. τηρεῖν[93] describes the obedience resulting from the internal faithful keeping of the commandments;[94] it is incorrect, with Braune, so to press the idea τηρεῖν here, in its distinction from ποιεῖν, that merely “attention to the commandments” is to be understood by it; it rather includes in itself the actual obedience. This obedience is not here regarded as the means of the knowledge of God, but as the proof of it; rightly Oecumenius: διὰ τῶν ἔργων ἡ τελεία δεδείκνυται ἀγάπη; only he should have said “γνῶσις” instead of ἀγάπη. Between both of those there is the same relationship as between fellowship with God and walking in light; for as the former is related to the knowledge of God, so is the latter related to the observance of the divine commandments, which is the concrete embodiment of ἐν τῷ φωτὶ περιπατεῖν.
[90] The reason brought forward by Ebrard: “it lies also in the idea of the commandments, that they are mentioned as commandments of the Father and not of the Son,” is not valid; comp. Gospel of John 14:15; John 14:21; John 14:23; John 15:10. Ebrard, on the other hand, rightly points to ver. 6, where ἐκεῖνος (Christ) is distinguished from αὐτός. From this verse it also follows that John, in this section, is considering Christ not as having given commandments, but as having walked according to the commandments of God.
[91] Lorinus: cognoscere cum quadam voluntatis propendentis approbatione.—A Lapide: cognitione non tantum speculativa, sed et practica, quae cum amore et affectu conjuncta est, ac in opus derivatur.—Spener: “This is not a mere knowing (1 Corinthians 8:1), such as may exist without love, but a knowledge which comes into the heart and fulfils His will with trust.”—De Wette: “Knowledge of the heart, not of the mind, wherewith activity is also assumed.”—Lücke: “the knowledge of God in the highest sense; not, however, in so far as it is identical with the love of God, but only in so far as it really impels men practically to fulfilment of the divine commands, and thus reveals itself in growing love to the God who is known as the Light.”
[92] Weiss not unjustly contends against the current view of γινώσκειν in John, in so far as the idea of knowledge is not kept pure in it from confusion with other ideas; but when Weiss says that in John only “the knowledge that rests on immediate contemplation is to be thought of,” and observes that “it lies in the nature of the case, that in this intuition and contemplation the object is received into the entire spiritual being of man as a—nay, as the determining power,” he not only agrees with the explanation given above, but defines the idea in such a way as not to deviate so very far from the commentators whom he opposes as his polemic would lead one to suppose.
[93] It is to be noticed, that to describe the Christian commandments John never uses νόμος (which by him is only used in reference to the Mosaic Law), but generally ἐντολαί (only now and then λόγος Θεοῦ or Χριστοῦ); and as verb, τηρεῖν, never ποιεῖν (except in Revelation 22:14).—In the writings of Paul, τηρεῖν ἑντολήν appears only in 1 Timothy 6:14, and besides in the N. T. in Matthew 19:17 (Matthew 28:20 : τηρεῖν πάντα ὅσα ἐνετειλάμην ὑμῖν).
[94] The paraphrase of Semler may be given here merely for its curiosity: Si (nos Apostoli) retinemus et magnifacimus hanc ejus doctrinam: Deum esse pariter omnium gentium.
1 John 2:3-11. Further antithetical statement of the believers’ walk in light; it is described as τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολὰς Θεοῦ (1 John 2:3-6); this then is further defined as a περιπατεῖν καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησε (1 John 2:6), and ἀγαπᾷν τὸν ἀδελφόν is emphasized as being the essence of this walk (1 John 2:7-11).
1 John Chapter 2 4 Meyer's Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
1 John 2:4. Inference from 1 John 2:3, expressing the antithetical side.
ὁ λέγων κ.τ.λ.] is used in the same sense as ἐὰν εἴπωμεν, chap. 1 John 1:6. Without reason, Braune considers that “in the singular there lies a progress in the development of the thought.” The statement that ἔγνωκα is used “with manifest regard to the Gnostics” (Ebrard), is not to be accepted; ὁ λέγων is rather to be taken in a quite general sense, comp. 1 John 2:6, at the same time referring to the appearance of such a moral indifferentism among the churches, αὐτόν, as in 1 John 2:3 = Θεόν.
ψεύστης ἐστί] = ψεύδεται, chap. 1 John 1:6; but in such a way that the idea is more sharply brought out by it (Braune).
καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κ.τ.λ.] as in chap. 1 John 1:8.
From the connection between the knowledge of God and the observance of His commandments, it follows that he who boasts of the former, but is wanting in the latter, has not the truth in him, but is a liar.
1 John Chapter 2 5 Meyer's Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
1 John 2:5. In this verse the apostle confirms the idea of 1 John 2:3, in the form of an antithesis to 1 John 2:4, and with the introduction of a new element.
ὃς δʼ ἂν τηρῇ αὐτοῦ (i.e. Θεοῦ) τὸν λόγον] The particle δέ, which refers not to 1 John 2:3 (Lücke), but to the words καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ μὴ τηρῶν, 1 John 2:4, shows that this verse stands in the same relationship to 1 John 2:4 as chap. 1 John 1:7 to 1 John 2:6; “τηρῇ is with emphasis put first, and similarly αὐτοῦ before τὸν λόγον” (Braune).
αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγος is synonymous with αἱ ἐντολαὶ αὐτοῦ, 1 John 2:3-4 : “the essence of the divine commandments;” a Lapide: Dicit verbum ejus in singulari, quia praecipue respicit legem caritatis; haec enim caeteras omnes in se comprehendit.
The predicate does not run: οὗτος ἔγνωκεν αὐτόν, but: ἀληθῶς ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ τετελείωται, whereby “a new side of the thought comes into view” (Ebrard).
ἀληθῶς] “in truth,” opposed to appearance and mere pretence; it is emphatically put first, as in John 8:31; with reference to the preceding ἡ ἀλήθεια (de Wette); and serves to bring out not a quality of the τετελείωται (Ebrard), but the actuality of the ἐν τούτῳ … τετελείωται (so also Brückner).
ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ τετελείωται] ἡ ἀγάπη τ. Θεοῦ is not here, as in chap. 1 John 4:9 : “the love of God to us” (Flacius, Calovius, Bengel, Spener, Russmeyer, Sander, Lange, etc.), nor: “the love commanded by God” (Episcopius), nor: “the relationship of mutual love between God and man” (Ebrard: “the mutua amicitia et conjunctio between God and the Christian”);[95] but: “love to God,” as in chap. 1 John 2:15, 1 John 3:17, 1 John 4:12, 1 John 5:3 (Bede, Oecumenius, Luther, Calvin, Beza, Lorinus, Hornejus, Paulus, de Wette-Brückner, Baumgarten-Crusius, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Braune, etc.). This interpretation is required by the context; for “the love of God” appears here in place of the “knowledge of God,” 1 John 2:3-4. As in the latter, so in the former also, consists fellowship with God. Both, love and knowledge, are so inseparably connected, and are so essentially one in their principle and nature, that the one is the condition of the other.[96]
The idea ΤΕΤΕΛΕΊΩΤΑΙ is not to be weakened, as in Beza: ΤΕΛΕΙΟῦΝ hoc in loco non declarat perfecte aliquid consummare, sed mendacio et simulationi opponitur, ut hoc plane sit, quod dicimus: mettre en exécution; but it is to be taken in its constant meaning: “has been perfected,” as in chap. 1 John 4:12; 1 John 4:17-18.[97] The objection, that nevertheless no Christian can boast of perfect love to God, does not justify an arbitrary change of meaning. The absolute idea τηρεῖν αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον demands for its counterpart an idea quite as absolute (so also Brückner).[98] Where the word of God is perfectly fulfilled, there love to God is perfect; in perfect obedience perfect love is shown. That the Christian has not attained this perfection at any moment of his life, but is ever only in a state of progress towards it, is no doubt true; but John is not here considering that aspect (so also Braune).[99]
ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν] ἐν τούτῳ refers neither to the thought contained in 1 John 2:6 (Socinus, Ewald), nor to ἡ ἀγάπη … τετελ., but to the keeping of the commandments (so also Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Brückner, Braune). Obedience is the evidence for the knowledge that we are ἐν αὐτῷ.
ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐσμεν] The expression signifies the inward fellowship of life (differently Acts 17:28); it combines the preceding ἐν τούτῳ … τετελ. and the former ἐγνώκαμεν αὐτόν, and is identical with κοινωνίαν ἔχομεν μετʼ αὐτοῦ (chap. 1 John 1:6), which it defines in its internal character. The knowledge and love of God is being in God (so also Brückner).[100]
Grotius, who understands αὐτῷ of Christ, enfeeblingly explains: Christi ingenii discipuli sumus.
[95] Similarly Besser: “ ‘The love of God in us’ usually embraces both God’s love to us, by which, and our love to God, in which we live. This is the case in this passage also.” This interpretation can be just as little grammatically justified as that of Ebrard; neither a duplicity nor a mutual relationship is expressed in the phrase ἡ ἀγ. τοῦ Θεοῦ.
[96] Grotius, it is true, is not wrong when he says: Amor praesupponit cognitionem; but it is just as correct to say: Cognitio praesupponit amorem.
[97] Even Bengel’s interpretation: perfectum regimen nactus et perfecte cognitus est (viz. amor Dei erga hominem), does not correspond to the idea of the word.
[98] Ebrard, it is true, wants the idea τετελείωται to be retained unweakened, but finds himself compelled by his interpretation of ἡ ἀγ. τ. Θ. to agree with Beza’s explanation, because “in the case of a relationship its perfection is nothing else than its conclusion.” Ebrard’s opinion, that if ἡ ἀγ. τ. Θ. = “love to God,” John must have written τελεία ἐστίν instead of τετελείωται, is—besides being contrary to John’s usus loquendi—without foundation.
[99] In Calvin’s explanation: Si quis objiciat, neminem unquam fuisse repertum, qui Deum ita perfecte diligeret, respondeo: sufficere, modo quisque pro gratiae sibi datae mensura ad hanc perfectionem aspiret, and in that of Socinus: “Est autem perfectio ista earitatis in Deum et obedientia praeceptorum ejus ita intelligenda, ut non omnino requiratur, ne ei quiequam deesse possit, sed tantum ut ejusmodi sit, qua Deus pro sua ingenti erga nos bonitate contentus esse voluit,” limitations are introduced which are foreign to the apostle’s train of thought.
[100] In substantial agreement with this Weiss says: “In vv. 3 and 4 it was stated that in the keeping of God’s commandments we recognise that we have known God. If, therefore, there is a continuous train of thought here, the being in God must only be a new expression for the knowing of God, or must be directly given along with it.”
1 John Chapter 2 6 Meyer's Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
1 John 2:6 gives the more particular definition of what the τηρεῖν of God’s commandments, and therefore the Christian’s walk in light, consists in.
ὁ λέγων] as in 1 John 2:4; here, however, with the infinitive construction.
ἐν αὐτῷ μένειν] ἐν αὐτῷ does not refer to Christ (Augustin, Hornejus, Wolf, Lange, Neander, etc.), but to God.
μένειν] instead of εἶναι, 1 John 2:5. Both expressions are synonymous, it is true, but not identical (Beza); in μένειν the unchangeableness of the being is brought out. Bengel: Synonyma cum gradatione: ilium nosse, in illo esse, in illo manere. Frommann (p. 187): “The being and abiding in God signifies one and the same fellowship with God. The latter describes it merely as something constant, lasting, which accessory notion is not contained in the former expression.”
ὀφείλει] comp. chap. 1 John 3:16, 1 John 4:11, “is in duty bound,” refers back to ὁ λέγων; it is not meant to be indicated here what is demanded in regard to the μένειν ἐν Θεῷ, but what is the duty of him who says that he abides in God—if he does not want to be a liar, in whom the truth is not, 1 John 2:4.
καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησε, καὶ αὐτὸς [οὕτως] περιπατεῖν] By these words Christ is placed as a pattern before Christians, i.e. in regard to His whole walk (which is elsewhere done in the N. T. only in regard to His self-abasement and to His conduct in suffering; see this commentary on 1 Peter 2:21); of what sort this was, John does not here say; from the connection with what precedes, however, it is clear that the apostle points to Him in so far as He kept the commandments of God, and therefore walked in the light.[101] This reference to Christ as an example is frequently found in the same form (καθὼς ἐκεῖνος) in our Epistle; so 1 John 3:3; 1 John 3:7; 1 John 4:17; comp. also John 13:15; John 15:10, and passim.
περιπατεῖν describes not merely the disposition, but the action resulting from it. In the fact that John brings just this out (comp. especially chap. 1 John 3:17-18), it is evident how far his mysticism is removed from mere fanaticism.
On οὕτως, see the critical notes.
[101] Semler paraphrases: Si quis gloriatur, se suamque doctrinam semper convenisse cum doctrina ilia Christi, is sane debet etiam in humanae vitae modo non Judaismum praeferre (!).
1 John Chapter 2 7 Meyer's Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
1 John 2:7. ἀγαπητοί] Such a form of address does not necessarily indicate the commencement of a new section, but is also used when the subject of the discourse is intended to be brought home to the hearers or readers; this is the case here.
οὐκ ἐντολὴν καινὴν γράφω ὑμῖν] certainly does not mean: “I do not write to you of a new commandment;” neither, however: “I write (set) before you” (Baumgarten-Crusius); for γράφειν has not this signification; it simply means: to write; when connected with an object, as here, it is = to communicate or announce anything by writing; comp. chap. 1 John 1:4. The subject of his writing the apostle calls an ἐντολή; it is arbitrary to take the word here in a different meaning from that which it always has; thus Rickli: “the whole revelation of divine truth as it has been brought to us in Jesus Christ”[102] (similarly Flacius, Calovius, etc.); and Ebrard: “the announcement, that God is light, chap. 1 John 1:5;” ἘΝΤΟΛΉ means “commandment;” this idea must not be confounded with any other. Most of the commentators (Augustin, Bede, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Luther, Calvin, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette-Brückner, Neander, Sander, Erdmann, Myrberg, Ewald, etc.) understand by it, according to 1 John 2:9-11, the commandment of brotherly love; others, on the other hand (Socinus, Episcopius, Calovius, Schott, Lücke, Fritzsche, Frommann, etc.), according to 1 John 2:6, the commandment of following Christ. These two views seem to be opposed to one another, but they really are so only if we assume that John here wants to emphasize a single special commandment—in distinction from other commandments. This supposition, however, is erroneous; the command to keep the commandments (or the word) of God after the example of Christ, or to walk in the light, is no other than the command to love one’s brother. From chap. 1 John 1:5 on, John is speaking not of different commandments, but of the one general commandment of the Christian life which results from the truth that God is light. It is to this commandment that reference is made when John, in order to bring it home to his readers, says: ΟὐΚ ἘΝΤΟΛῊΝ ΚΑΙΝῊΝ ΓΡΆΦΩ ὙΜῖΝ, so that by ἘΝΤΟΛΉ he does not indicate a commandment which he then for the first time is about to mention, but the commandment which he has already spoken of in what precedes (only not merely in 1 John 2:6), but defines more particularly in what follows, namely, in regard to its concrete import.[103] Of this commandment John says, that it is not an ἐντολὴ καινή;[104] in what sense he means this, the following words state: ἈΛΛʼ ἘΝΤΟΛῊΝ ΠΑΛΑΙΆΝ, ἫΝ ΕἼΧΕΤΕ ἈΠʼ ἈΡΧῆς; it is not new, but old, inasmuch as his readers did not first receive it through this writing, but already had it, and indeed ἈΠʼ ἈΡΧῆς, i.e. from the very beginning of their Christian life; comp. chap. 1 John 3:11; 2 John 1:5-6; and, for the expression ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς, 1 John 2:24 (Calvin, Beza, Socinus, Episcopius, Piscator, Hornejus, Lange, Rickli, Lücke, de Wette-Brückner, Sander, Neander, Besser, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Ewald, Braune, etc.). The imperfect ΕἼΧΕΤΕ, instead of which we should expect the present, either refers back to the time before John had come to his readers, or is to be explained: “which ye hitherto already had.” The latter is the more probable. Some commentators weaken this interpretation, which is demanded by the context, and hold that John calls the commandment (namely, “the commandment of love”) an old one, because it was already given by Moses; thus Flacius, Clarius, etc.; the Greek commentators even go beyond that, and refer it at once to this, that it was written from the very beginning in the heart of man;[105] the latter Baumgarten-Crusius maintains, and says: “here, therefore, the ethics of Christianity are represented as the eternal law of reason,” in which he explains ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς “from the beginning of the history of man,” and regards “ye as men” as the subject of εἴχετε.
ἡ ἐντολὴ ἡ παλαιά ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ὃν ἠκούσατε] This addition serves for a more particular definition of the preceding; ἡ παλαιά is repeated in order to accentuate this idea more strongly. By εἴχετε it was only stated that the readers were in possession of the commandment; now the apostle defines it more particularly in this respect, that it is the word (not: “the chief substance of the word,” de Wette) which they had heard (comp. 1 John 2:24; 1 John 3:11; 1 John 4:3), which, therefore, was proclaimed unto them (comp. chap. 1 John 1:2-3), namely, by the apostolic preaching. The clause is therefore not to be taken, as Baumgarten-Crusius holds, as a correction of γράφω: “not by him was it first given; it is from the beginning of Christianity, the λόγος, ὃν ἠκούσατε, namely, from Christ;” for ἠκούσατε does not refer directly to γράφω (Bengel), but to εἴχετε.[106] On the addition ἈΠʼ ἈΡΧῆς (Rec.) after ἠκούσατε, which Ewald regards as genuine, see the critical notes.
[102] Ebrard wrongly maintains that ἐντολή is “a truth including directly in itself practical requirements.” Only the practical requirements contained in a truth can be—when regarded as a unity—called ἐντολή, but not the truth which contains them in itself. It is true the demand of faith in the message of salvation may be described as ἐντολή, but not the message of salvation itself; here, however, the context forbids us to take the expression in that sense (as Weiss), since neither in what precedes nor in what immediately follows is there a demand for faith expressed.
[103] This view is in accordance with that of Düsterdieck, who rightly remarks: “The solution of the problem lies in this, that the holy command to walk as Christ walked, fully and essentially resolves itself into the command of brotherly love;” it is also accepted by Braune. The objection of Brückner, that brotherly love is only a principal element, and not the complete fulfilment of following Christ, can only be regarded as valid if brotherly love is not viewed in its full, complete character; comp. John 13:34, and also the statement of the Apostle Paul: πλήρωμα νόμου ἡ ἀγάπη, Romans 13:10.—The instances adduced by Ebrard against the reference to brotherly love can only have any force if the commandment which prescribes this is distinguished, as a special one, from the command to walk in light.
[104] Certainly what John here says reminds us of the statement of Christ in John 13:34; nor can it be denied that John was here thinking of that, as well as in the passage 2 John 1:5; but from this it does not follow that οὐκ ἑντολ. καιν. γράφω ὑμῖν does not refer to what precedes, but only to what comes after (ver. 9).
[105] In the scholia of Matthaei it is thus put: εἰ μὲν Ἰουδαίοις ταῦτα γράφει, εἰκότος, τὴν περὶ ἀγάπης ἐντολὴν οὐ καινὴν εἶναι φησί. πάλαι γὰρ αὐτὴν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν ἐπηγγείλατο. Εἰ δὲ οὐκ Ἰουδαῖοι ἦσαν, μήποτʼ οὖν ἐντολὴ παλαιά … ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ τὰς φυσικὰς ἐννοίας φιλικὴ διάθεσις, πάντες γὰρ φύσει ἥμερα καὶ κοινωνικὰ ζῶα ὄντες ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πλησίον.—Oecumenius and Theophylact combine the two together, holding that the Epistle was addressed to Jewish and Gentile Christians.
[106] Wolf assumes a peculiar antithesis between the two sentences: Ratio fortassis aliqua reddi possit, cur ἔχειν et ἀκούειν ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς sibi invicem subjungantur. Prius enim ad illos spectaverit, qui ex Judaeis ad Christum conversi erant; illi enim jam ante praeceptum hoc de amore mutuo ex lege Mosis et prophetis cognitum habebant; posterius respiciet ex-Gentiles, qui idem inter prima evangelicae doctrinae praecepta acceperant; this amounts, partly, if not altogether, to what the Greek commentators adduce for explanation of the expression παλαιά. The arbitrariness of such an antithesis is self-evident.
1 John 2:7-11. A more particular statement of the nature and import of τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ or of περιπατεῖν καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησε.
1 John Chapter 2 8 Meyer's Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
1 John 2:8. πάλιν ἐντολὴν καινὴν κ.τ.λ.] Almost all commentators hold that the ἐντολὴ καινή is the same ἐντολή as was the subject of 1 John 2:7; differently Ebrard, who explains as follows: “With 1 John 2:7 begins a new section which continues to 1 John 2:29, in which the leading thought is the position of the readers to the light as one which was already shining; by ἐντ. παλαιά is meant the clause, chap. 1 John 1:5 : ὁ Θεὸς φῶς ἐστι; by ἐντ. καινή, on the other hand, the following clause: ἡ σκοτία παράγεται καὶ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἤδη φαίνει;[107] the relative clause Ὅ ἙΣΤΙΝ ἈΛΗΘῈς Κ.Τ.Λ. belongs, by apposition, to the following sentence: ὍΤΙ Ἡ ΣΚΟΤΊΑ Κ.Τ.Λ., and states to what extent the essential true light has already begun to shine, namely, the fact that the light already shines has a double sphere in which it is ἈΛΗΘΈς, i.e. actually realized, first in Christ, but then also ἐν ὑμῖν, i.e. in the Ephesian readers themselves, and equally in all true Christians.” This explanation is, however, incorrect; for—(1) the truth ἡ σκοτία παράγεται κ.τ.λ. can just as little be called an ἘΝΤΟΛΉ as the sentence Ὁ ΘΕῸς Φῶς ἘΣΤΙ (see on 1 John 2:7); (2) the relative clause, if it was to be a preceding apposition to Ἡ ΣΚΟΤΊΑ Κ.Τ.Λ., would have had to come after ὍΤΙ; according to the structure of the verse, Ὅ must necessarily be connected with what precedes; (3) it is a false idea, that that which the clause ὍΤΙ Ἡ ΣΚΟΤΊΑ expresses was actually realized in Christ; the incorrectness of this idea is concealed in Ebrard’s interpretation in this way, no doubt, that he gives to ἘΝ ΑὐΤῷ a different relation from that which he gives ἘΝ ὙΜῖΝ, and changes the present ΠΑΡΆΓΕΤΑΙ into the perfect.[108] Nor is the opinion that we are to understand by ἘΝΤ. ΠΑΛ. the commandment of walking in light, and by ἘΝΤ. ΚΑΙΝΉ, on the other hand, that of brotherly love (1 John 2:9), tenable, because these commandments, according to their import, are not two distinct commandments, but one and the same commandment. Still more unjustifiable is the assumption of S. Schmid, that in 1 John 2:7 the fundamental law of Christianity, namely, justification by faith, but here the commandment of Christian sanctification, is meant; and that of Weiss, that by ἘΝΤΟΛΉ, 1 John 2:7, is to be understood the evangelical message of salvation, but here the commandment of love. The apostle, having in view here the same commandment as in 1 John 2:7, says: “Again a new commandment I write unto you, which thing is true in Him and in you: because the darkness is past, and the true light now shineth.” The relative clause ὅ ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. serves not merely to establish the statement that the commandment is a new one (Socinus, Flacius, Morus, Hornejus, de Wette-Brückner, Lücke, ed. 2 and 3, ed. 1 of this commentary, Erdmann, etc.);[109] but the apostle thereby describes the commandment, yet not in a material way, so that ὅ would be referred to the substance of it (Oecumenius, Luther, Baumgarten-Crusius, Semler, Frommann, Düsterdieck, etc.),[110] but only in a formal way, as that which is actually fulfilled in Christ and in his readers; as the commandment in 1 John 2:7 was also only defined in a formal way by ἣν εἴχετε ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς.
ὅ ἐστιν … ἐν ὑμῖν is the object belonging to ΓΡΆΦΩ, and ἘΝΤΟΛῊΝ ΚΑΙΝΉΝ is to be taken as the accusative of more particular definition; this construction of it is found in Ewald, only he explains ἘΝ ΑὐΤῷ incorrectly by: “in the last-mentioned (in 1 John 2:7) word of God;” most recently it has been accepted by Braune with the interpretation here given. The sense accordingly is: that which is already true, i.e. fulfilled, in Christ and in you, namely, the τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολὰς τοῦ Θεοῦ (comp. John 15:10, where Christ says of Himself: ἘΓῺ ΤᾺς ἘΝΤΟΛᾺς ΤΟῦ ΠΑΤΡΌς ΜΟΥ ΤΕΤΉΡΗΚΑ), I write unto you as a new commandment.[111] With this view it is self-evident that the apostle calls the old commandment a new one only in so far as he writes it anew to them. It is true a different reference has usually been given to καινή, by understanding it either of the constant endurance of the commandment of love (Calvin: novum dieit, quod Deus quotidie suggerendo veluti renovat; Joannes negat ejusmodi esse doctrinam de fratribus diligendis, quae tempore obsolescat: sed perpetuo vigere), or to indicate that this commandment first entered into the world along with Christianity—whether emphasis was put more upon the substance of it (Lücke, de Wette, ed. 1 of this comm.), or upon the mere time of it (Düsterdieck);[112] but these constructions, not being indicated in the context, are purely forced.
On πάλιν, Erasmus says: et contrarietatem declarat et iterationem; hic autem non repetitionis sed contrarietatis est declaratio; with this interpretation almost all commentators agree, referring πάλιν to the idea ἐντ. καινήν; but an antithetical construction is foreign to the word; it is = “again, once more,” is to be connected with γράφω, and is explained by the fact that the readers have already heard the commandment, nay, even are already fulfilling it. Lücke and de Wette connect it directly with the verb, but in such a way that even they give to it an antithetical reference.[113]
ἐστὶν ἀληθές] ἀληθής signifies here the actual reality, as in Acts 12:9 (see Meyer on this passage).
ἘΝ ΑὐΤῷ] ἘΝ is to be retained in its special meaning, not = “respectu, in reference to,” nor is it used “of the subject in which something true is to be recognized as true (1 John 2:3)” (de Wette), for there is no mention here of any knowledge. That by αὐτός here not God (Jachmann), but Christ is to be understood, is shown by the context. Socinus incorrectly explains ἘΝ ΑὐΤῷ = per se ac simpliciter. On the point that ἩΜῖΝ is not to be read, see the critical notes. Grotius unjustifiably understands by ἩΜῖΝ the apostles.
Neander has a wrong conception of the relation of ἘΝ ΑὐΤῷ and ἘΝ ὙΜῖΝ when he explains: “it takes place in reference to Christ and in reference to the church, therefore in reference to their mutual relationship to one another.”
ὅτι ἡ σκοτία κ.τ.λ.] ὅτι is not used declaratively, nor in such a way as to be dependent on ἀληθές (“it is true that the darkness,” etc.), or on ἘΝΤΟΛΉΝ (Castellio, Socinus, Bengel, Ebrard),—to both these views the structure of the verse is opposed,—but causally; this is rightly perceived by most of the commentators; but it is incorrect when they connect it with the immediately preceding ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς κ.τ.λ., for the double-membered clause: ὍΤΙ Ἡ ΣΚΟΤΊΑ … ΦΑΊΝΕΙ, being a confirmatory clause, does not stand in a corresponding relationship to the thought: Ὅ ἘΣΤΙΝ ἈΛ.… ὙΜῖΝ, which it is intended to confirm.[114] By ὅτι κ.τ.λ. the apostle rather states the reason why he writes to them as a new commandment that which is true in Christ and in them (Düsterdieck, Braune); this reason is the already commenced disappearance of darkness and shining of the true light. The contrasted words Ἡ ΣΚΟΤΊΑ and ΤῸ Φῶς ΤῸ ἈΛΗΘΙΝΌΝ are to be taken in ethical sense (Braune);[115] the former idea signifies the darkness which consists in error and sin, as it exists outside the fellowship with God; the latter, the light which consists in truth and holiness, as it proceeds from Christ, who Himself is the true light. It is incorrect to understand here by ΤῸ Φῶς ΤῸ ἈΛ., Christ Himself (Bengel, Erdmann), as the contrast with Ἡ ΣΚΟΤΊΑ shows. ἈΛΗΘΙΝΌς is an expression which is almost confined to the writings of John; outside them it is only found in Luke 16:11, 1 Thessalonians 1:9, and three times in the Epistle to the Hebrews; it describes the light of which the apostle is speaking as the eternal, essential light, of which the earthly light is merely the transitory reflection; see especially Neander on this passage.
ΠΑΡΆΓΕΤΑΙ is translated by the Vulgate as perfect: quoniam tenebrae transierunt; similarly by Luther: “the darkness is past;” and Calvin directly says: Praesens tempus loco Praeteriti. This, however, is arbitrary; the present is to be retained as such; it is used in the same sense as in 1 Corinthians 7:31 : ΠΑΡΆΓΕΙ (see Meyer on this passage), so that we must interpret: “the σκοτία is in the state of passing away.” It is unnecessary to take παράγεται, with Bengel, with whom Sander and Besser agree, as passive (Bengel: non dicit ΠΑΡΆΓΕΙ transit, sed ΠΑΡΆΓΕΤΑΙ traducitur, commutatur, ita ut tandem absorbeatur); it is more natural to regard it as the middle form with intransitive meaning. With the meaning: “is in the state of passing,” corresponds the particle ἬΔΗ with ΦΑΊΝΕΙ, which is not = “now” (Luther), but by which the moment is described in which the darkness is retreating before the light, at which therefore neither has the darkness already completely disappeared, nor is the light completely dominant. Most of the commentators, both the older and more recent (Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette-Brückner, Lücke, Sander, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Ebrard), take this as referring to Christianity in general, in so far as by it, as the true light, the old darkness is being ever more and more overcome; but by the word ἬΔΗ the apostle shows that in these words he is looking forward to a future time at which that victory will have been completely won, and which he regards as close at hand (so also Braune). The moment in which he writes this is in his eyes, therefore, no other than that which immediately precedes the second coming of Christ, and which He Himself in 1 John 2:18 calls the ἘΣΧΆΤΗ ὭΡΑ,[116] in which it is of the greater importance for Christians, by keeping the commandment, to show themselves as children of the light. The same train of thought essentially occurs here as afterwards in 1 John 2:15-18; compare also the Pauline ἡ νὺξ προέκοψεν, ἡ δὲ ἡμέρα ἤγγικε, Romans 13:12.
[107] The same view is found in Castellio, Socinus, and Bengel. The latter remarks on ἐντολὴν καινήν: praeceptum novum, quod nobis nunc primum in hac epistola scribitur; and on ὅτι: quod hoc est illud praeceptum, to which he then very strangely adds: amor fratris, ex luce.
[108] Ebrard says: “The eternally existing light is one which has already appeared ἐν αὐτῷ, in so far as in Christ the light objectivized has arisen for the world and has overcome the darkness, and ἐν ὑμῖν in so far as also subjectively to the readers the light of the gospel has arisen, and they also subjectively have been drawn from darkness unto light.” By ἐν ὑμῖν he means, therefore, the readers, in whom, i.e. in whose souls, the transition from darkness to light has taken place; by ἐν αὐτῷ, however, not Christ, in whom, but the world, for which that has happened objectively, inasmuch as Christ entered as the light into the darkness of the world. Quite a different meaning, therefore, is here assigned to ἐν αὐτῷ from that which is given to ἐν ὑμῖν, as the difference in the relation from the antithesis of “objective” and “subjective” clearly shows.—It is not merely the change of the present παράγεται into the perfect that is the cause of this treatment, for it appears elsewhere in the commentary,—thus on p. 148: “that which is true in Christ and in you, that the darkness is past,” etc.; p. 150: “similar to the new announcement, that the darkness is past,” etc.; p. 155: “It is the truth, that the darkness is past;” against which, on the other hand, παράγεται is correctly explained on p. 150: “the darkness is passing by, is in a state of passing away, of disappearing.”
[109] For if ὅ ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. is, according to the intention of the apostle, to be referred to the idea of the newness of the commandment, he would—first, have given this idea a more independent form than he has given it as a simple attribute of the object ἐντολήν depending on γράφω; and, secondly, not have given the confirmation of the statement (that the commandment is a new one) in a sentence which does not so much show the truth of this idea as merely state the sphere in which that statement is true; to which may be added, that the idea so resulting is itself so indistinct, that it requires, in order to be understood, an explanatory circumlocution, such as: “that the commandment is a new one has its truth in Christ, inasmuch as it did not exist before Him,” etc. (ed. 1 of this comm.). Besides, an emphasis unwarranted by the context is placed on the idea of the newness of the commandment, especially if it is thought that the following ὅτι again serves to establish the thought expressed in the confirmatory clause (Lücke, de Wette, Brückner).
[110] Düsterdieck, it is true, approves of Knapp’s paraphrase, which agrees with the above explanation: πάλιν (ὡς) ἐντολὴν καιν. γρ. ὑμῖν τοῦτο ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθές κ.τ.λ.; but, with the idea of a constructio ad sensum, refers ὅ to the preceding ἐντολήν, so that this forms the object of γράφω, which by the relative clause obtains its more particular definition. In opposition to this construction, de Wette has rightly observed that it has grammatical difficulty. When Düsterdieck, in reply to Lücke’s objection, that with that interpretation it would need to run ἥ ἐστιν ἀληθής, says that it is not the ἐντολή itself as such, but its substance in Christ, etc., that has been fulfilled, Ebrard’s observation is a sufficient answer: “That which is required in the ἐντολή is nothing else than just the ἐντολή itself; the requirement itself is fulfilled in Christ when its substance is fulfilled in Him.”
[111] That John places before his readers anew as a commandment that which already has been fulfilled in them, is clearly not more strange than that he declares to them truths of which he himself says that they know them already (comp. ver. 21). Brückner admits that the construction here advocated is simple and clear, but groundlessly thinks that “the strangeness of this form of speech” is not mitigated by the reference to ver. 21.
[112] On the basis of the right view of ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς, ver. 7, we find the nature of the newness of the commandment indicated just in this; this, however, is only the case if the temporal reference is retained in its purity. This Düsterdieck indeed insists on; but this relation has only force if we regard at the same time the substance of the commandment, as Düsterdieck does. But nothing in the context indicates this new substance, and it is therefore very differently defined by the commentators.
[113] Lücke does so when he says: “In ver. 8, John continues correctingly thus: Again a new commandment I write unto you.” (In the edition of 1851, Lücke agrees with the usual acceptation: “Again—in contrast—a new commandment I write unto you;” see ed. 3, p. 249, note 1.)—De Wette does not expressly give his opinion about πάλιν; but when he thinks that John should properly have written: “again a new commandment I call it,” and when he then paraphrases it: “The commandment of love is an old and long-known one to you; but (as it is altogether revealed as a new one by Christ) for you who partake in the newness of life it is in an especial manner a new one,” the antithetical reference is clearly brought out by him also.
[114] With this connection of the thoughts, the double-membered clause: ὅτι ἡ σκοτία … φαίνει, must confirm both ἐστιν ἀλ. ἐν αὐτῷ and also ἐστιν ἀλ. ἐν ὑμῖν. Now, when Lücke makes the apostle to say, as a proof that the commandment to walk in light shows itself in Christ and in his readers as a new one: “Not only in Christ Himself (ἐν αὐτῷ) has the true light appeared, but it has also shed itself abroad, dispelling the darkness in the minds of his readers (ἐν ὑμῖν), and is shining in them,” he attributes the thought really expressed by the apostle (ἡ σκοτία … φαίνει) only to ἐν ὑμῖν; while to ἐν αὐτῷ, on the other hand, he attributes an idea which the apostle has not expressed.—Brückner says: “The ἐν αὐτῷ refers to καὶ τὸ φῶς κ.τ.λ., the ἐν ὑμῖν rather to ἡ σκοτία κ.τ.λ.;” but this reference of the one member of the confirmatory clause to the one element of the thought to be confirmed must be regarded as unjustified, although Brückner thinks “it can easily be imagined that the apostle in the one part of the confirmation had in view rather the latter, and in the other rather the former part of the clause to be confirmed,” for such a different reference is in no way hinted at; besides, ἤδη is here altogether left out of view. Düsterdieck rightly establishes the proposition that the whole sentence: ἀληθ.… ὑμῖν, is to be regarded as confirmed by the whole sentence: ὅτι ἡ σκ.… φαίνει; but when he then, in interpretation, says: “Already the darkness is dispelled by the true light, which shines in truth in Christ and in His believers (in so far, namely, as brotherly love attained its most perfect manifestation in the walk of Christ, and is exercised by believers also),” it is only the second part of the confirmatory clause that is referred by him to ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν, but not the first part; and this indeed is quite natural, since in Christ a disappearance of darkness is not imaginable.
[115] It was to be expected that Weiss here also denies to the ideas σκοτία and φῶς the ethical meaning, and wants to be understood by the former only error, by the latter only the knowledge of God. Weiss himself, however, views them both so that they are of ethical—and not merely theoretical—character; and, moreover, as he admits that with the former error sin, and with the latter knowledge holiness, is necessarily connected, it is so much the more arbitrary to allege that John, in the use of these ideas, utterly ignored this necessary connection.
[116] Rickli: “John says this of the time in which they are living, and in which the great work of the Lord had had a wonderful, rapid progress of development. The true Light, the Lord in His perfect manifestation of divine truth, is already shining; … already the great morning is dawning for mankind. When the Lord shall return, then shall be the perfect day of God. Towards this manifestation all believers walk.”
1 John 2:1. The apostle had considered, in chap. 1 John 1:7, the blood of Christ, in 1 John 1:9 the faithfulness and justice of God—and both in reference to the forgiveness and purification of believers; now he comfortingly points to Christ as the Paraclete, whereby the previous thought now obtains its necessary complement. First, however, he mentions the object of his previous statement.
Τεκνία μου] Similarly chap. 1 John 3:18; without μου, 1 John 2:12; 1 John 2:28, 1 John 3:7. John chooses this form of address: tum propter aetatem suam, tum propter paternam curam, et affectum (Hornejus). In regard to the verbal form, Lorinus rightly says: diminutiva nomina teneri ac blandientis sunt amoris signa. The Apostle Paul, in Galatians 4:19, uses the same form of address, with special reference to the spiritual fatherhood in which he stood toward his readers.
ταῦτα γράφω ὑμῖν] ταῦτα is referred by Bengel to what follows, by Grotius to what follows and what precedes, by most commentators (Lücke, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Sander, Düsterdieck, Braune), correctly, to the latter only; it refers, however, not merely to the truth expressed in 1 John 2:6, normerely to the “exhortation to self-knowledge and penitence” (de Wette) which is contained in the preceding, nor merely to the statement about forgiveness and cleansing; but to the “whole in its vivid harmony” (Düsterdieck, so also Braune).[76]
ἵνα μὴ ἁμάρτητε] Statement of the object for which the apostle wrote what precedes; the direction which Calvin gives it: ne quis putet eum peccandi licentiam dare, quum de misericordia Dei concionatur, which is also found in Augustin, Bede, Calov, Bengel, Hornejus, Düsterdieck, Ewald, etc., is incorrect, since the sternness of the apostle against sin has already been sharply and definitely expressed, and the context, in which the subject previously was the forgiveness of sin, would not permit such a supposition to arise at all.[77]
ΚΑῚ ἘΆΝ ΤΙς ἉΜΆΡΤῌ] ΚΑΊ is neither = “however” (Baumgarten-Crusius), nor = sed (Vulg.); it connects as simple copula a new thought with the preceding one. By ἐάΝ the possibility of sinning is admitted; Calvin incorrectly explains it: Conditionalis particula “si quis” debet in causalem resolvi; nam fieri non potest quin peccemus. Whether it is possible for the Christian not to sin, John does not say. Under the influence of the new spirit of life which is communicated to the believer he cannot sin; but, at the same time, in his internal and external mechanism there lies for him the possibility of sinning—and it is this which the apostle has in view. Socinus perverts the idea of the apostle when he interprets: si quis peccat i. e. post Christum agnitum et professionem nominis ipsius adhuc in peccatis manet, necdum resipuit, etc.; for, on the one hand, the true Christian may indeed sin, but cannot remain in his sins; and, on the other hand, Christ is not the παράκλητος for him who remains in his sins. Besser correctly: “If any man sin—not with wilful doing of sin, but in spite of the will in his mind, which says no to sin.”
παράκλητον ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα] From the 1st pers. plur. it follows that the preceding ΤΙς is used quite generally; the apostle is speaking communicatively, and does not wish himself to be considered excluded.[78] It is unnecessary for the connection of this sentence to supply: “let him know that,” or: “let him comfort himself with the thought that,” or any similar expression; for it is precisely through the ἁμαρτάνειν of believers that Christ is induced to be their Paraclete. The verb ἜΧΕΙΝ indicates that Christ belongs to believers.[79]
The word ΠΑΡΆΚΛΗΤΟς has both a general and a special forensic meaning; in the former, in which it is = “assister,” or “helper,” it is used in Gospel of John 14:16; John 14:26; John 15:26; John 16:7, where the Holy Ghost is so called because by His witness He leads the disciples into all truth; see Meyer on John 14:16;[80] here, on the other hand, it is used in its forensic meaning = “advocatus, patronus causae,” or even more special = “intercessor,” and is in close connection with the following ἱλασμός, and refers back to the ἀφιέναι and καθαρίζειν of chap. 1 John 1:9; so that in Christ the typical action of the high priest interceding for the people has reached its complete fulfilment. The idea of the apostle therefore is—as almost all commentators recognise[81]—the same as is expressed in Romans 8:34 (ὃς καὶ ἐντυγχάνει ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν), in Hebrews 9:24 (ΕἸΣῆΛΘΕΝ Ὁ ΧΡΙΣΤῸς … ΕἸς … ΤῸΝ ΟὐΡΑΝΌΝ, ΝῦΝ ἘΜΦΑΝΙΣΘῆΝΑΙ Τῷ ΠΡΟΣΏΠῼ ΤΟῦ ΘΕΟῦ ὙΠῈΡ ἩΜῶΝ), and in Hebrews 7:25.[82]
ΠΡῸς ΤῸΝ ΠΑΤΈΡΑ] ΠΡΌς in the same sense as chap. 1 John 1:2.
God is called ΠΑΤΉΡ, because the ΠΑΡΆΚΛΗΤΟς is the Son of God, and we also (believing Christians) have become through Him ΤΈΚΝΑ ΤΟῦ ΘΕΟῦ, chap. 1 John 3:1-2.
ἸΗΣΟῦΝ ΧΡΙΣΤῸΝ ΔΊΚΑΙΟΝ] Christ is the Paraclete, not as the Logos, but as the incarnate Logos, who has shed His αἷμα (chap. 1 John 1:7) for the atonement,—and indeed inasmuch as He is ΔΊΚΑΙΟς; ΔΊΚΑΙΟς is here also neither = lenis et bonus (Grotius), nor = ΔΙΚΑΙῶΝ (see Wolf on this passage); but neither is it = fidelis atque verax, quatenus id praestat quod promisit, se scilicet suis adfuturum (Socinus); according to the usus loquendi, ΔΊΚΑΙΟς could be understood of (judicial) justice (Bede: justus advocatus, injustas causas non suscipit), but then the adjective would have had to be put with ΠΑΡΆΚΛΗΤΟΝ; Ebrard incorrectly explains it = ΔΊΚΑΙΟς ΚΑῚ ΔΙΚΑΙῶΝ; but this explanation is so much the more unwarrantable, as ΔΙΚΑΙΟῦΝ is the very business of the ΠΑΡΆΚΛΗΤΟς; by the epithet ΔΊΚΑΙΟς, Christ is held up before the ἉΜΑΡΤΆΝΟΥΣΙ as one who by His nature is fitted to be the Paraclete of sinners, i.e. as one who perfectly satisfies the will of God; who is “just and stainless, and without sin” (Luther). “Only as the Holy One, in whom the holy ideal of manhood is seen realized, can He intercede for sinners with the heavenly Father” (Neander).
[76] Ebrard refers ταῦτα to the two sentences, 1 John 1:6-10, in which these thoughts, involving an apparent contradiction, are contained—(1) “That we must by no means walk in darkness,” and (2) “that we must confess that we have and that we commit sin,” and thinks that this apparent contradiction is solved by 1 John 2:1, in this way, that in contrast to those theoretical statements these two practical conclusions from them are here given, namely, (1) “that we are not to sin;” (2) “that when we have sinned we are to reflect that in Christ we have an Advocate.” But against this it is to be observed—(1) that by such a changing of theoretical statements into practical precepts the problem mentioned above is really not solved; (2) that the ideas expressed in 1 John 1:6-7, and in 1 John 1:8-10, do not stand to one another in the relation of co-ordination, but the idea of 1 John 1:8-10 is subordinated to that of 1 John 1:6-7; (3) that it is herewith presupposed that the apostle should have written: καὶ ἵνα εἰδῆτε, ὅτι, ἐάν τις ἁμάρτῃ, παρά κλητον ἔχομεν, which, however, is incorrect, as the advocate-office of Christ is not mentioned in the preceding.
[77] Socinus incorrectly renders ἁμαρτάνειν = manere in peccatis; Löffler even more so = “to remain unbaptized.”
[78] Augustin: habemus dixit, non habetis; maluit se ponere in numero peccatorum, ut habeat advocatum Christum, quam ponere se pro Christo advocato et inveniri inter damnandos superbos.—Socinus thinks that the apostle speaks in the first person, non quod revera ipse esset unus ex illis, qui adhuc peccarent, sed ut melius indicet, id quod affirmat pertinere ad omnes, quibus evangelium annunciatum est; clearly erroneous. Grotius arbitrarily: habet ille advocatum, sed ecclesia habet, quae pro lapso precatur. Preces autem ecclesiae Christus more advocati Deo patri commendat.
[79] Besser: “He has made Himself ours, has given our faith an eternally valid claim on Him.”
[80] In the fact that in the Gospel of John the Holy Ghost, but here Christ, is called παράκλητος, there is so much the less a contradiction, as in John 14:16 it is expressly put: ἄλλον παράκλητον, by which Christ signifies that He Himself is the proper παράκλητος, and the Holy Ghost His substitute.
[81] Ebrard, who here gives the same explanation, explains the expression in the Gospel of John = “Comforter,” ὅς παρακαλεῖ (more correctly παρακαλεῖται, mid.), according to the Hebrew מְנַחֵם, LXX. Job 16:2; but in this passage it is not παράκλητος, but παρακλήτως, that is used; Hofmann’s explanation is also incorrect (Schriftbew. II. 2, p. 15 ff.) = “Teacher” (comp. Meyer and Hengstenberg on John 14:16).
[82] This idea is not, as it might appear, in contradiction with John 16:26; for even in this statement a lasting intercession by Christ is indicated, since Christ ascribes the hearing of prayer in His name to Himself (John 14:13) as well as to the Father.
REMARK.
How Christ executes His office of Advocate with the Father, John does not say; a dogmatic exposition of it is not in place here, still it is important to mark the chief elements which are the result of the apostle’s statement. These are the following:—1. The Paraclete is Jesus, the glorified Redeemer who is with the Father; therefore neither His divine nature alone, nor His human nature alone, but the Lord in His divine-human personality. 2. The presupposition is the reconciliation of men with God by His blood. 3. His advocacy has reference to believers, who still sin amid their walking in light; and 4. It is a real activity in which He intercedes for His people (that God may manifest in their forgiveness and sanctification His faithfulness and justice) with God, as His (and their) Father. If these points are observed, on the one hand, there is found in the apostolic statement no ground for a materialistic conception, which Calvin opposes in the following words: obiter notandum est, nimis crasse errare eos, qui patris genibus Christum advolvunt, ut pro nobis oret. Tollendae sunt eiusmodi cogitationes, quae coelesti Christi gloriae derogant;—but neither, on the other hand, is there any justification for doing away with the idea, as not a few commentators have been guilty of. Even Bede has not kept himself free from it, when he says that the advocacy consists in this, that Christ presents Himself as man to God, and prays for us non voce, sed miseratione, and therefore considers the intercessio, not as an actio realis, but only as an actio interpretativa. But the idea is even more done away with, when the intercession is viewed only as the permanent effect of the redemptive work accomplished by Christ in the giving up of His life to the death, which is no doubt the opinion of Baumgarten-Crusius when he says: “The apostles certainly did not think of a special oral intercession, but of an intercession by deed, in His work.”[83] Lücke rightly says: “The meaning of this form of representation is no other than this, that Jesus Christ also in His δόξα with the Father continues His work of reconciliation. If Christ were not the eternal Paraclete for us with God, His saving and reconciling work would be limited to His earthly life merely, and in so far could not be regarded as eternal and complete;” but it is not to the point when he further puts it: “Without the eternally active saving and reconciling spirit of Christ, without the πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ, Christ would not be a perfect, a living Christ;” for John is not here speaking of the πνεῦμα of Christ, but of the personal Christ Himself. The explanation of de Wette, that the advocacy of Christ is the combination of the idea of the glorified and of the suffering Messiah, is also unsatisfactory, because it changes the objective reality into a subjective representation. Neander rightly says: “When Christ is described as the Advocate, this is not to be understood as if only the effects of the work once accomplished by Him were transferred to Himself.
John considers the living Christ as personally operating in His work, as operating in His glorified position with His Father, with the same holy love with which He accomplished His work on earth as a mediation for sinful man. It is by Him in His divine-human personality that the connection between man, saved and reconciled to God by Him, and God as the Father, is always brought about.” Comp. also Meyer on Romans 8:34, and Braune in the fundamental dogmatic ideas of the passage.
[83] Similarly Köstlin (p. 61): “Christ is the eternal παράκλητος; He does not however, pray the Father, but the sense of His office of Advocate is simply this, that for His sake the Father also loves those who believe on Him.” Frommann also (p. 472 ff.) finds in the statement of the apostle only a symbolical form of expression, by which the continuation of the atoning work of Christ in His state of exaltation is indicated.
1 John 2:1-2 are most closely connected with what immediately precedes, and further determine and conclude it.