Bible Commentaries

Matthew 5:34-36. Μὴ ὀμόσαι ὅλως] to swear not at all (the adverb placed emphatically at the end, compare Matthew 2:10), dependent upon λέγω ὑμῖν (comp. Plat. Phaed. p. 59 E, Menex. 240 A), in which the command is implied (Jacobs, ad Anthol. X. p. 200; Kühner, ad Anab. v. 7. 34; Wunder, ad Soph. O. C. 837), interdicts all kinds of swearing in general;[415] not merely that of common life, which is at variance with reverence for God (Luther, Calvin, Calovius, Bengel, Fritzsche, Ewald, Tholuck, Harless, Hilgenfeld, Keim, and others), nor even merely oaths regarded “ex Judaeorum sensu” (thus Matthaei, doctrina Christi de jurejur. Hal. 1847). The simple prohibition,—given, however, to the disciples, and for the life of fellowship of true believers,—and in so far not less ideal than the requirements that have preceded, appears from the words themselves (comp. Jam 5:12), and also from Matthew 5:37. Christianity as it should be according to the will of Christ, should know no oath at all: τὸ μὴ ὀμνύειν ὅλως ἐπιτείνει μάλιστα τὴν εὐσέβειαν, Euth. Zigabenus. To the consciousness of the Christian, God should always be so vividly present, that, to him and others in the Christian community, his yea and nay are, in point of reliability, equivalent to an oath. His yea and nay are oath enough. Comp. on ὅλως, prorsus (= παντελῶς, Hesychius), Xen. Mem. i. 2. 35: προαγορεύομεν τοῖς νέοις ὅλως μὴ διαλέγεσθαι, Oecon. Matthew 20:20. Accordingly, it is only in the incomplete temporal condition of Christianity, as well as in the relation to the world in which it is placed, and to the existing relations of the department of public law, to which it conforms itself, that the oath has its necessary, indeed (comp. Hebrews 6:16), but conditional and temporary existence. Christ Himself has sworn (Matthew 26:63 f.); Paul has frequently sworn (Romans 1:9; 2 Corinthians 1:23; 2 Corinthians 11:3 f.; Galatians 2:20; Php 1:8); nay, God swears to His own people (Genesis 22:16; Genesis 26:3; Numbers 14:23; Isaiah 45:23; Luke 1:73; Acts 7:17; Hebrews 6:13). Therefore Anabaptists and Quakers are wrong in rejecting an oath without any exception, as was already done by Justin, Irenaeus, Clement, Origen, Chrysostom, Jerome, and other Fathers. The various but altogether arbitrary explanations of those who here recognise no absolute prohibition may be seen in Tholuck. The direct oath, by God, is not indeed expressly mentioned along with others in what follows; its prohibition, however, is implied, just as a matter of course, and entirely, first of all in the general μὴ ὀμόσαι ὅλως, as it is the reference to God which constitutes precisely the fundamental conception and nature of the oath, and, as in the doctrine here discussed, Matthew 5:33, the direct oath is contained not only in οὐκ ἐπιορκ., according to Leviticus 19:12, but also expressly in ἀποδώσεις τῷ κυρίῳ, etc. If Christ, therefore, had intended to forbid merely the oaths of common life, He would, instead of the altogether general statement, μὴ ὀμόσαι ὅλως, have made use of a form of expression excluding oaths to be taken in relation to the magistracy (probably by a παρεκτός, as in Matthew 5:32). It is true, indeed, that in the special prohibitions which follow, He mentions only indirect oaths,—consequently not those that are valid in a court of justice,—but just because the prohibition of the direct oath was already contained in μὴ ὀμός. ὅλως, first of all and before all other kinds of oaths; and His object now is simply to set forth that even indirect swearing fell under the general prohibition of swearing. And He sets this forth in such a way, that in so doing the prohibition of the direct oath forms the presupposition of His demonstration, as it could not otherwise be expected after μὴ ὀμόσαι ὅλως. What a scanty πλήρωσις of the law—and one altogether out of keeping with the ideal character of the points which preceded—would it have been had Jesus only intended to say: I forbid you “the wanton oaths of the streets, of the markets” (Keim), in all their forms!

μήτε ἐν τῷ οὐρ., κ.τ.λ.] not to swear in general, nor (specially) by heaven, nor by earth. See on μὴ … μήτε, Klotz, ad Devar. p. 709; Kühner, II. 2, p. 828 f.; Winer, p. 454 [E. T. 612]; also Baeumlein, Part. p. 222.

The kinds of swearing censured by Jesus were very common amongst the Jews; Philo, de Spec. Legg. p. 770 A; Lightfoot, l.c.; Meuschen, N. T. ex Talm. illustr. p. 58.

θρόνος θεοῦ and ὑποπόδιον … αὐτοῦ] (Isaiah 66:1; Matthew 23:22).

τοῦ μεγ. βας.] of Jehovah (Psalm 48:2; Psalm 95:4; Job 13:18 ff.; therefore the holy city, Matthew 4:5).

μήτε[416] ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ] Not merely the Jews (Berachoth, f. 3. 2; Lightfoot, Hor. p. 281), but also the heathen (Eur. Hel. 835), swore by their head. Dougtius, Anal. II. p. 7 f.; Wetstein on the passage. Comp. the exposition of Virg. Aen. ix. 300.

ὀμνύειν is by the Greek writers connected with κατά τινος, or with the accus. (Jam 5:12). Here, as in Matthew 23:16 ff., Jeremiah 5:7, Daniel 12:7, with ἐν (in harmony with the idea that the oath cleaves to the object appealed to, comp. on ὉΜΟΛΟΓΕῖΝ ἘΝ, Matthew 10:32), and with ΕἸς (directing the thought; comp. Plut. Oth. 18), after the Hebrew נִשְּׁבַּע ב׳.

ὅτι οὐ δύνασαι, κ.τ.λ.] for thou art not in a condition to make one single hair (if it is black) white or (if it is white) black. There is, of course, no allusion to the dyeing of hair. Wolf, Köcher, Kuinoel, and others incorrectly render it: thou canst not produce a single white or black hair. On such a signification, what means the mention of the colour? The meaning of the whole passage is: “Ye shall not swear by all these objects; for all such oaths are nothing less than the oath directly by God Himself, on account of the relation in which those objects stand to God.” In the creature by which thou swearest, its Creator and Lord is affected.

[415] Comp. West in the Stud. u. Krit. 1852, p. 221 ff.; Nitzsch, christl. Lehre, p. 393 ff.; Werner in the Stud. u. Krit. 1858, p. 711 ff.; Wuttke, Sittenl. II. § 277; Achelis in the Stud. u. Krit. 1867, p. 436 ff. Jerome had already remarked, with striking simplicity: “evangelica veritas non recipit juramentum cum omnis sermo fidelis pro jurejurando sit.” The emphatic ὅλως forbids, however, the limitation only to the forms of the oath that are afterwards mentioned (Althaus in d. Luther. Zeitschr. 1868, p. 504, and already Theophylact, 1), so that the oath by the name of God would remain unaffected; in like manner, the restriction of the prohibition to promissory oaths (Ficker in the same Zeitschr. 1870, p. 633 ff., and already Grotius).

[416] If μηδέ were here the reading (Fritzsche), then the meaning would be: not even by thy head; see Hartung, Partik. I. p. 196. But this reading is neither critically admissible—as it has only א** in its favour—nor exegetically necessary, since the series of negations is symmetrically continued with μήτε ἐν τ. κεφ. ς., which symmetry is not interrupted by ὀμόσῃς, because the latter does not stand before ἐν τῇ κεφ. ς. Matthew might have written μηδέ (comp. also Bornemann, ad Xen. Anab. iii. 2. 27; Ellendt, Lex. Soph. II. p. 123), but he was not obliged to do so.

Matthew 5:37. Let your manner of asseveration be affirmation or negation, without an oath. The repetition of the ναί and οὔ is intended to make prominent the earnest and decisive nature of the assurance.[417] Similar examples of חְן חְן and לֹא לֹא in the Rabbins, in Lightfoot, and Schoettgen, p. 41. Comp. the ΝΑῚ ΚΑῚ Οὒ ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΙΚΌΝ in Ausonius, Idyll. 17 : “Si consentitur, mora nulla intervenit Esther est; Si controversum, dissensio subjiciet non.” As a matter of course, by this representation other asseverations—made, however, without an oath—are not excluded.

τὸ δὲ περισς. τουτ.] whatever is more than yea and nay (τούτων), that is swearing.

ἘΚ ΤΟῦ ΠΟΝΗΡΟῦ] Euth. Zigabenus: ἘΚ ΤΟῦ ΔΙΑΒΌΛΟΥ: auctorem habet diabolum. So Chrysostom, Theophylact, Beza, Zwingli, Castalio, Piscator, Wetstein, and others; also Fritzsche, Keim. Comp. John 8:44; 1 John 3:8; 1 John 3:12. Others (Luther, Calovius, Bengel, Rosenmüller, Kuinoel, Paulus, Tholuck, de Wette, Baumgarten Crusius, Ewald, Bleek, and others) take ΤΟῦ ΠΟΝΗΡΟῦ as neuter, so that it would have to be explained: is in the category of evil, is sinful. Comp. the use of ἘΚ ΤΟῦ ἘΜΦΑΝΟῦς, ἘΚ ΤΟῦ ΕὐΠΡΕΠΟῦς, etc., Matthiae, p. 1334. But how insipid and devoid of meaning is the closing thought if this be the meaning! how energetic if Ὁ ΠΟΝΗΡΌς, Matthew 13:19; Matthew 13:38, is intended! And by this energetic rejection of the oath amongst the ideal people of God, to whom the completed law applies, there is no opposition to the Old Testament sacredness of an oath. But if under the completed law the mere yea and nay are to have the weight and reliability of an oath, then this highest moral standard and ordinance of truthfulness would be again taken away and perverted by him who nevertheless should swear; while the yea and nay would again be deprived of the guarantee of truthfulness, which, like all opposition to the truth, would be diabolical (John 8:44). The oath by God could not be rejected by Jesus, in and by itself, as ἘΚ ΤΟῦ ΠΟΝΗΡΟῦ, for it certainly rests upon the divine law; but (in answer to Keim) it has, upon the standpoint of the ΠΛΉΡΩΣΙς of the law, given way to the yea and nay, therefore its re-establishment would only be a desertion of these higher stages, a falling away from the moral ΤΕΛΕΙΌΤΗς, up to which Christ means to fulfil the law. This could not proceed from God, but only from the enemy of His will and kingdom. In a similar way, as Theophylact rightly saw, circumcision in the O. T. is ordained of God, and is worthy of honour; but to uphold its validity in Christianity to the injury of faith, and of righteousness by faith, is sinful, devilish; 2 Corinthians 11:3; 2 Corinthians 11:14. So also with sacrifices, festival days, prohibition of meats, and so on.

[417] In answer to Beza’s erroneous explanation, “let your affirmative discourse be yea, and your negative, nay;” and, in answer to Grotius (comp. also Erasmus), who takes the second ναί and οὔ to refer to the act which corresponds to the assurance, so that the meaning would be: “fidem a nobis praestari debere in promissis etiam injuratis,” see Fritzsche on the passage. According to Hilgenfeld, the original text is said to have been, in accordance with the quotations in Justin (Apol. i. 16, p. 63) and the Clementines (Rom. 3:55, 19:2): ἔστω δὲ ὑμῶν τὸ ναὶ ναὶ, καὶ τὸ οὒ οὔ. Comp. Jam 5:12; 2 Corinthians 1:17. Matthew would appear again to introduce an assurance like an oath. Keim also deems the form of statement as given by Matthew to be less correct.

Matthew 5:38. Ὀφθαλμὸν … ὀδόντος] supply δώσει, which supplement is presupposed as well known from the saying referred to (see Exodus 21:24). In the usual formula (comp. also Leviticus 22:20; Leviticus 24:20; Deuteronomy 19:21) is expressed the jus talionis, the carrying out of which was assigned to the magistracy (comp. 12. Tab.: “si membrum rupit, ni cum eo pacit, talio esto”). Instead of seeking and asserting this right before the magistracy, the Christian, in the feeling of true brotherly love, free from all desire of revenge, is to exercise self-denial, and to exhibit a self-sacrificing spirit of concession. Comp. 1 Corinthians 6:7. This principle of Christian morality, laid down absolutely as an ideal, by no means excludes, under the determining circumstances of sinful life, the duty of seeking one’s legal rights, as is clear, moreover, from the history of Christ and His apostles. That Jesus, moreover, is speaking against the misuse by the Pharisees of the legal standard, as a standard within the sphere of social life, is a groundless supposition of Luther, Beza, Calvin, Calovius, Bengel, B. Crusius, Keim, and others, especially as in Matthew 5:40 κριθῆναι follows. But certainly the Pharisees may, unlovingly enough, in cases occurring in social life, have claimed those rights before the magistracy, and have influenced others also to practise similar unloving conduct. Glosses in reference to the payment in money of legal talio, see in Lightfoot.

Matthew 5:39-40. Τῷ πονηρῷ] is neither to be understood of the devil (Chrysostom, Theophylact), nor, as neuter (Augustine, Luther, Castalio, Calvin, Ewald, and others), of injustice; but, in accordance with the antithesis ἀλλʼ ὅστις σε ῥαπίζει, etc., and with Matthew 5:40-41 : homini maligno.

Christ names first the right cheek, although the blow most naturally strikes first the left, but after the common fashion of naming the left after the right.

κριθῆναι] to go to law. Vulgate well renders: in judicio contendere. Comp. on 1 Corinthians 6:1; Romans 3:4; and see Wetstein, Nägelsbach on the Iliad, p. 305, ed. 3. It refers to legal controversy, not to the extra-judicial beginnings of contention (de Wette; also Beza, Grotius, Kuinoel, and others), by which the distinction between the two cases, Matthew 5:39-40, is quite overlooked.

χιτῶνα] כְּחֹנֶת, the shirt-like under-garment, tunica; on the other hand, ἱμάτιον] שִׂמְלָה, בֶּגֶד, the mantle-like over-garment, toga, which also served for a covering by night, and might not therefore be retained as a pledge over night; Exodus 22:26; Deuteronomy 24:13. The ἱμάτιον was more valuable and more indispensable than the χιτών; that is the point which, according to Matthew, Jesus has in view. It is different in Luke 6:29 (according to the order of succession in covering the body).

λαβεῖν] by the lawsuit, which follows from κριθῆναι; whilst the pettiness of the object is not opposed to this, seeing that the method of illustration is by way of concrete example.

Matthew 5:41. Ἀγγαρεύειν, passed over from the Persian (see Gesenius, Thes. I. p. 23) into Greek, Latin (angariare, Vulgate, Augustine, Ephesians 5), and into the Rabbinical dialect (אַנְגַרְיָא, Buxtorf, Lex. Rabb. p. 131; Lightfoot on the passage), to force into transport service. The Persian arrangements respecting post messages, instituted by Cyrus, justified the couriers (ἄγγαροι) in making requisitions from station to station of men, or cattle, or carriages for the carrying on of their journey, Herodotus, viii. 98; Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 6. 17; Josephus, Antt. xii. 2. 3. See Dougtius, Anal. II. p. 9 f. Here it refers to continuing a forced journey, comp. Matthew 27:32.

μίλιον] One thousand steps, or eight stadia, one-fourth of a German mile. A late word found in Strabo.

REMARK.

The spirit of the ethics of Jesus, His own example (John 18:22 f.) and that of the apostles (Acts 23:3; Acts 16:35; Acts 26:25; Acts 25:9 f.), require us to recognise, in these manifestly typical representations, Matthew 5:39-41, not precepts to be literally followed, but precepts which are certainly to be determined according to their idea. This idea, which is that of love, yielding and putting to shame in the spirit of self-denial, and overcoming evil with good, is concretely represented in those examples, but has, in the relations of external life and its individual cases, the measure and the limitation of its moral practice. Comp. on Matthew 5:38. Luther appropriately lays emphasis here upon the distinction between what the Christian has to do as a Christian, and what as a worldly person (in so far as he is in a position or an office, and so on). The Lord leaves to the state its own jurisdiction, Matthew 22:21.

Matthew 5:42. A precept (in opposition to selfishness) which does not stand indeed in essential connection with what precedes, but which is still brought into connection with it through the natural connection of the thoughts. According to Ewald, who here lays weight (Jahrb. I. p. 132 f.) upon the number seven in the quotations of the O. T. laws, there must have stood after Matthew 5:41 in the original collection of sayings the following words: ἠκούσατε, ὅτι ἐῤῥήθη· οὐ κλέψεις, ἀποδώσεις δὲ τὸ ἱμάτιον τῷ πτωχῷ· ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν· τῷ αἰτοῦντι, and so on, and then, Matthew 5:40. The command that is wanting was put together from Exodus 20:15; Deuteronomy 24:12 f. A very thoughtful conjecture, which is followed by Holtzmann; but unnecessary, for this reason, that the contents and order of the sentences, Matthew 5:40-42, attach themselves to one fundamental thought; and improbable, because not merely an omission, but also a transposition, is assumed, and because τῷ αἰτοῦντι, κ.τ.λ., does not correspond to the prohibition of thieving as its fulfilment.

δανείς.] That Jesus did not think of lending out at interest, appears from Exodus 22:24; Leviticus 25:37; Deuteronomy 15:7; Deuteronomy 23:20; Ewald, Alterthumer, p. 242 f. [E. T. 181].

Matthew 5:43. Τὸν πλησίον σου] In Leviticus 19:18, רֵעֲךָ denotes a member of the nation, whereby the proselyte also is included with others; hatred towards the heathen, however, is not conceived of by the legislator as an antithesis that follows of itself, and therefore we may all the less assume that Jesus Himself introduced into the law hatred of one’s enemies, as an abstraction from the national exclusiveness, in which the law keeps Judaism towards heathenism, as if it commanded this hatred (Weiss, Bleek). The casuistic tradition of the Pharisees, however, explained Leviticus 19:18, as the antithetical τ. ἐχθρόν ς. shows, of a friend, and deduced therefrom (perhaps with the addition of passages like Deuteronomy 25:17-19, comp. Malachi 1:3) the antithesis (which confessedly was also a principle of the common Hellenism), see Stallbaum, ad Plat. Phil. 110, p. 154; Jacobs, ad Del. epigr. p; Matthew 144: καὶ μισήσεις τὸν ἐχθρόν σου, by which was meant not the national enemy (Keim), but the personal (σου) private enemy, in opposition to the law (Exodus 23:4 f.; Leviticus 19:18) and to the pious spirit of the Old Covenant (Psalm 7:5; Psalm 35:13 f.; Job 31:29; Proverbs 24:17; Proverbs 24:29; Proverbs 25:21 f.; comp. Genesis 45:1; 1 Samuel 24:7; 1 Samuel 18:5; 2 Kings 6:22). Jesus Himself also may have understood the Pharisaic addition only to refer to private enemies, as is clear from His antithesis, Matthew 5:44 ff.

Matthew 5:44. Observe the entire love which is here required: disposition, word, act, intercession; “primo fere continetur tertium, et secundum quarto” (Bengel). But it is as ἀγαπᾶν (to esteem highly), not as φιλεῖν (amare), that we are required to love our enemy. Comp. on John 11:5. It rests upon the clearness and strength of the moral will to separate between the person of the enemy and his hostile disposition towards us, so that the latter does not prevent us from esteeming the former, from blessing it, and applying to it acts of kindness and intercession. The Christian receives this moral clearness and strength, and the consecration of enthusiasm thereto, in his self-experience of the divine love of one’s enemy in Christ (Matthew 18:21 ff.; Ephesians 4:32; Php 2:1 f.; 1 John 4:10 f.).