Commentaires bibliques

Chapter III

Contents

This chapter may be divided into three parts. The first contains a brief statement and refutation of the jewish objections to the apostle’s reasoning Romans 3:1-8. The second a confirmation of his doctrine from the testimony of scripture; and a formal drawing out and declaration of his conclusions that by the works of the law no flesh living can be justified before god, Romans 3:9-20. The third, an exposition of the gospel method of justification Romans 3:21-31

Romans 3:1-8.

Analysis

The first objection to Paul’s reasoning here presented is, that according to his doctrine the Jew has no advantage over the Gentile, Romans 3:1. The apostle denies the correctness of this inference from what he had said, and admits that the Jews have great advantages over all other people, Romans 3:2. The second objection is, that God having promised to be the God of the Jews, their unfaithfulness, even if admitted, does not release him from his engagements, or make his promise of no effect, Romans 3:3. Paul, in answer, admits that the faithfulness of God must not be called in question, let what will happen, Romans 3:4, Romans 3:5; but he shows that the principle on which the Jews expected exemption from punishment, viz., because their unrighteousness commended the righteousness of God, was false. This he proves by showing first, that if their principle was correct, God could not punish any one, Gentile or Jew, Romans 3:5-7; and secondly, that it would lead to this absurdity, that it is right to do evil that good may come, Romans 3:8.

Commentary

Romans 3:1

What then is the advantage of the Jew? The conclusion at which the apostle had arrived at the end of the preceding chapter was, that the Jews, no less than the Gentiles, are to be judged according to their works, and by their knowledge of the divine will; and that being thus judged, they are exposed to condemnation, notwithstanding their circumcision and all their other advantages. The most obvious objection in the mind of a Jew to this conclusion must have been, that it was inconsistent with the acknowledged privileges and superiority of his nation. This objection the apostle here presents; the answer follows in the next verse: Περισσός, over and above, abundant; and in a comparative sense better, and substantively, as in the present instance, excellence, pre-eminence. What is the pre-eminence or superiority of the Jew? Comp. Ecclesiasticus 6:11, τί περισσὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ; what advantage has man? The second question in this verse, what is the benefit of circumcision? is by some considered as a repetition of the first; circumcision being taken as the mere sign of Judaism. ‘What is the advantage of the Jew? or what is the benefit of Judaism?’ But circumcision as a rite was so important in the estimation of the Jews, and is made so prominent by the apostle in the preceding context, that it is better to consider the second question as referring to the rite itself.

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Romans 3:2

Much, in every way. The answer to the objection implied in the preceding verse, is a denial of its correctness as an inference from the apostle’s reasoning. It does not follow, because the Jews are to be judged according to their works, that there is no advantage in being the peculiar people of God, having a divine revelation, etc. Πρῶτον μὲν γάρ. These words are rendered by Beza, primarium enim (illud est); comp. Luke 19:47; Acts 25:2. Calvin says, “πρῶτον significat praecipue vel praesertim, hoc sensu, Etsi unum istud esset, quod habent Dei oracula sibi commissa, satis valere debet ad eorum dignitatem.” Our translators adopt the same view. But to both of the interpretations the particle γάρ furnishes an objection. The third and simplest view is, that the words in question mean first, in the first place, as in 1 Corinthians 11:18; γάρ is then namely, for example. That the enumeration is not carried on, is no serious objection to this explanation, as we have other examples of the same kind. See Romans 1:8. Because they were entrusted with the oracles of God. The subject of ἐπιστεύθησαν, viz. Ἰουδαῖοι is implied by the connection; τὰ λόγια is the accusative; comp. Galatians 2:7; πεπίστευμαι τὸ ευσαγγέλιον, 1 Corinthians 9:17; 1 Thessalonians 2. Some, as Theodoret, Beza, etc., understand by τὰ λόγια τοῦ Θεοῦ, the law; others, as Grotius, Tholuck, etc., the Messianic promises; others, as Calvin, Rosenmüller, De Wette, the whole Scriptures. In favor of this last is the usage of the phrase which in the Old Testament is used for the revelation of God in general, and in the New Testament, for any divine communication. Hebrews 5:12; 1 Peter 4:11. The words therefore are general in their meaning, and there is nothing in the context to limit them; for the apostle is speaking of the treasure committed to the safe custody of the Jews; that deposit of divine knowledge by which they were distinguished from all other nations. Here, as in innumerable other places, the sacred writers of the New Testament use forms of expression which clearly imply that they regarded the sacred writings of the Jews as really the word of God.

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Romans 3:3

Τί γάρ; What then? See Philippians 1:18 — a formula used to introduce an explanation, confirmation, or vindication of a preceding assertion; or to start an objection for the purpose of answering it. In the present instance it is agreed that the apostle designs to vindicate what he had previously taught; but whether Romans 3:3 refers to Romans 3:2, or to the conclusion that the Jews were as much exposed to condemnation as the Gentiles, is not so plain. According to the former view, the design of this verse is to confirm what is said in Romans 3:2 : ‘To the Jews were committed the promises of God, or oracles of God. This is a great advantage; for if some of them disbelieve those promises, and reject the Messiah, God remains faithful, and will accomplish all his gracious purposes.’ Thus substantially, Calvin, Beza, Tholuck, Fritzsche, Rückert, Meyer, and many others. According to the other view, the apostle here presents and answers another objection to his previous reasoning: ‘What if we are unfaithful,’ says the Jew, ‘does that invalidate the faithfulness of God? Has he not promised to be a God to Abraham and to his seed? Has he not entered into a solemn covenant to grant his people all the benefits of the Messiah’s kingdom? This covenant is not suspended on our moral character. If we adhere to the covenant by being circumcised and observing the law, the fidelity of God is pledged for our salvation. We may therefore be as wicked as you would make us out to be; that does not prove that we shall be treated as heathen.’ For the latter view it may be urged,

1. That it is better suited to the context. It is plain that the whole of the first part of this chapter is an answer to the objections of the Jews to the apostle’s doctrine that they were exposed to condemnation. This is clear as to the first verse, and to the fifth and those that follow it. It is, therefore, more consistent with the design of the passage, to make this verse an answer to the main objection of the Jews, than to consider it a mere confirmation of what is said in Romans 3:2. This consideration has the more force, since, on the other view of the passage, the principal ground of confidence of the Jews, viz., their peculiar relation to God, is left unnoticed. Their great objection to Paul’s applying his general principles of justice to their case was that their situation was peculiar: ‘God has chosen us as his people in Abraham. If we retain our relation to him by circumcision and the observance of the law, we shall never be treated or condemned as the Gentiles.’ Traces of this opinion abound in the New Testament, and it is openly avowed by the Jewish writers. “Think not,” says the Baptist, “to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father,” Matthew 3:9. “We be Abraham’s seed,” John 8:33. Comp. Romans 2:17; Romans 9:6, and other passages, in which Paul argues to prove that being the natural descendants of Abraham is not enough to secure the favor of God. That such was the doctrine of the Jews is shown by numerous passages from their writings. “If a Jew commit all manner of sins,” says Abarbanel, “he is indeed of the number of sinning Israelites, and will be punished according to his sins; but he has, notwithstanding, a portion in eternal life.” The same sentiment is expressed in the book Torath Adam, fol. 100, in nearly the same words, and the reason assigned for it, “That all Israel has a portion in eternal life.”‹9› This is a favorite phrase with the Rabbins, and frequently occurs in their writings. Justin Martyr, as quoted by Grotius on Romans 2:13, attributes this doctrine to the Jews of his day: “They suppose that to them universally, who are of the seed of Abraham, no matter how sinful and disobedient to God they may be, the eternal kingdom shall be given.” This interpretation, therefore, makes the verse in question present the objection which the Jews would be most likely to urge.

2. A second consideration in its favor is, that it best satisfies the meaning of the words. The other view makes Paul say that the unfaithfulness of some of the Jews, some here and there, could not render the promise of no effect. It would be natural for the Jews thus to soften down the statement of the case. But Paul had not said that some of the Jews were unfaithful, but that they were all under condemnation; that as to this point there was no difference between them and the Gentiles, since all had sinned and come short of the glory of God.

It cannot escape notice how completely the doctrine of the Jews has been transferred by ritualists to Christianity. They held that if a man was circumcised and remained within the Theocracy, he might be punished for his sins, but he would ultimately be saved. So ritualists hold that all who are baptized and remain within the pale of the true Church, though they may suffer for their sins here or hereafter (in purgatory) are certain to be finally saved.

If some did not believe? The word ἡπίστησαν may mean disbelieved, or were unfaithful. Tholuck, Fritzsche, Rückert (2nd edition) Meyer, say the former, and explain the passage thus: ‘The promises (τὰ λόγια) committed to the Jews are a great distinction; and though some of the Jews have not believed those promises, nor received the Messiah, still God is faithful.’ The great majority of commentators say the latter, and consider the apostle as stating the want of fidelity of the Jews to the trust committed to them, i.e., to the covenant made with their fathers, as no reason for assuming a want of fidelity on the part of God. That ἀπιστεῖν may have the sense here assigned to it is plain from 2 Timothy 2:13 : and from the sense of τία in Hebrews 3:12, Hebrews 3:19, and of ἄπιστος in Luke 12:46; Revelation 21:8. To understand the passage as referring to want of faith in Christ, seems inconsistent with the whole context. The apostle has not come to the exposition of the gospel; he is still engaged in the preliminary discussion designed to show that the Jews and Gentiles are under sin, and exposed to condemnation; an exposure from which no peculiar privileges of the former, and no promise of God to their nation, could protect them.

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Romans 3:4

Let it not be; the frequently recurring formula to express strong aversion or denial. The objection presented in the preceding verse is, that the apostle’s doctrine as to the condemnation of the Jews is inconsistent with the faithfulness of God. Is the faith of God without effect? asks the objector. By no means, answers the apostle; that is no fair inference from my doctrine. There is no breach of the promises of God involved in the condemnation of wicked Jews. How the condemnation of the Jews is consistent with the promises of God, he shows in a subsequent part of his epistle, chaps. 9-11; here he merely asserts the fact, and shows that the opposite assumption leads to an absurdity. Let God be true, but every man a liar. That is, the truth and fidelity of God must be acknowledged, whatever be the consequence. This is said to express the strongest aversion to the consequence charged on his doctrine. Γινέσθω has its proper sense, fiat, let him become, i.e., be seen and acknowledged as true. This disposition to justify God under all circumstances, the apostle illustrates by the conduct and language of David, who acknowledged the justice of God even in his own condemnation, and said, “Against thee only have I sinned; that thou mightest be justified in thy sayings, and overcome when thou art judged;” i.e., that thy rectitude, under all circumstances, might be seen and acknowledged. In the Hebrew, the last verb of the verse is active, when thou judgest; in the Septuagint, a passive form is used, when thou art judged. This latter Paul follows, because the sentiment in either case is the same. God is seen and acknowledged to be just. The sacred writers of the New Testament often depart from the words of the Old Testament in their citations, being careful only to give the mind of the Spirit. “Scimus,” says Calvin, “apostolos in recitandis Scripturae verbis saepe esse liberiores; quia satis habebant si ad rem apposite citarent; quare non tanta illis fuit verborum religio.”

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Romans 3:5

But if our unrighteousness commend the righteousness of God, what shall he then say? Ἀδικία is not to be taken in the restricted sense of injustice, nor as equivalent to ἀπιστία in the preceding verse, but in the comprehensive sense of unrighteousness, wickedness. It is the opposite of δικαιοσύνη, rectitude, righteousness, which includes all moral excellence. The righteousness of God is here, not his goodness, which the context does not require, and usage does not authorize, but rectitude, that attribute which is manifested in doing right. Συνίστημι in the New Testament, is to place with or before any one; and hence either to commend, to recommend, Romans 16:1; 2 Corinthians 3:1; 2 Corinthians 5:12; or to set forth, to render conspicuous; see Romans 5:8; 2 Corinthians 6:4. The latter is obviously the sense required in the present instance. That this verse is in answer to an objection is obvious; but that objection is not derived from the language of Romans 3:4. Paul had said nothing there to give any color to the suggestion, that he himself held that it would be unrighteous in God to punish the wicked. He had simply said, that the truth of God was to be admitted and acknowledged, though all men were liars. From this it could not be made an inference that we may do evil that good may come. It is not a false inference from Romans 3:4, but a new objection to his general conclusion that he is here answering: ‘Not only is God’s fidelity pledged to our salvation, but the very fact of our being unrighteous will render his righteousness the more conspicuous; and consequently it would be unjust in him to punish us for what glorifies himself.’ This is the thought; the form in which it is presented is determined by the fact that the apostle does not introduce the person of the objector, but states the objection in his own person, in the form of a question. It is plain, however, that the point of the argument is that God cannot consistently punish those whose unrighteousness serves to display his own rectitude; and this is supposed to be urged to show that the Jews, notwithstanding their sins, were not exposed to condemnation. If our unrighteousness commend the righteousness of God is the suggestion; the inference, which the Jews were disposed to draw, and which Paul asks, whether they would venture to make, is that God is unjust who taketh vengeance: ὁ Θεὸς ὁ ἐπιφέρων τὴν ὁργήν, God the taker of vengeance; he whose prerogative it is to inflict the punishment due to sin. That the apostle is not in this verse expressing his own sentiments, he intimates by saying, κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω, I speak as a man. This formula, which is of frequent occurrence, means to speak as men are accustomed to speak; and as men are in general wicked, to speak or act after the manner of men, is to speak or act wickedly. It depends, however, entirely on the context whether this idea is implied. When Paul asks, “Are ye not carnal, and walk as men?” 1 Corinthians 3:3 the case is plain. But when in Galatians 3:15 he says, “Brethren, I speak as a man,” he means merely to appeal to what is commonly acknowledged as true among men. See also 1 Corinthians 9:8. When in Romans 6:19 he says ἀνθρώπινον λέγω, it is plain from the context that he means, in a manner adapted to the comprehension of men. And in the present case, where he is not expressing his own sentiments, κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω is designed to declare that he is not speaking in his character of an apostle or Christian, but speaking as others speak, expressing their thoughts, not his own.

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Romans 3:6

In answer to the question whether God is unjust in punishing those whose unrighteousness renders his own righteousness the more conspicuous, he says, By no means, since in that case how can God judge the world? There is here an answer to the question, and a proof of the correctness of that answer, There are three views which may be taken of the nature of this proof. The first supposes κόσμος; to mean the Gentiles as distinguished from the Jews. The sense then is: If God cannot punish sin under the circumstances supposed, he cannot even punish the heathen, for their unrighteousness serves to commend his righteousness. This view is clear and satisfactory as far as the argument is concerned, and is adopted by Koppe, Reiche, Olshausen, etc. Besides the pertinency of the argument as thus explained, this interpretation is supported by the frequent use of κόσμος to designate the world in distinction from the Theocracy, or the Church. 1 Corinthians 6:9; 1 Corinthians 11:32; Romans 11:12; John 12:31; 1 John 4:17 etc. The principal objection to it arises from the difficulties in which it involves the explanation of the following verse. The second view of the passage supposes the argument to rest on the admitted fact that God is the judge of all the earth; if so, he must be just. It is impossible that God should be unjust, if he is to judge the world; but he is to judge the world, therefore he is not unjust. “Sumit argumentum ab ipsius Dei officio,” says Calvin, “quo probet id esse impossibile; judicabit Deus hunc mundum, ergo injustus esse non potest.” To the same purpose Grotius says: “Nullo modo possumns Deum injustum imaginari quem cum Abrahamo judicem mundi agnoscimus.” This view is given also by Tholuck, De Wette, Rückert, Köllner and Meyer. The obvious objection to it is, that it makes the apostle assume the thing to be proved. He says, ‘God cannot be unjust, because he is the judge of the world, and the judge of the world must be just.’ But it is no more certain that the judge of the world must be just, than that God is just, which is the point to be established. Rückert, in his characteristic assumption of superiority to the apostle, admits that the argument is “weak, very weak;” but he not the less confidently ascribes it to the apostle. The misapprehension of the argument in this verse arises out of a misapprehension of the previous reasoning, and of the precise point of the objection which is here answered. Paul is not guarding against any false inference from his own reasoning; he is not teaching that though God is seen to be just when he speaks, and clear when he judges, we must not hence infer that he is unjust in punishing the sin which commends his own righteousness, which would be indeed “eine erbärmliche Einwendung,” (a pitiable subterfuge), as Reiche calls it; but he is answering the objections of the Jews to his doctrine, not their false inferences. To the declaration that they were exposed to condemnation, the Jews pleaded the promise of God, which their unfaithfulness could not render of no effect, and the less so because their unrighteousness would serve to render the righteousness of God the more conspicuous. Paul says on this principle God cannot judge the world. The ground assumed by the Jews might be assumed by all mankind, and if valid in the one case it must be in all. In this view the answer is complete and satisfactory; it is a reductio ad absurdum. The correctness of this explanation is confirmed by what follows.

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Romans 3:7, Romans 3:8

These verses are the amplification and confirmation of the answer given in the sixth to the objection of the Jews. These verses are designed to show that if the ground assumed by them was valid, not only may every sinner claim exemption, but it would follow that it is right to do evil that good may come. The connection by γάρ is therefore with the sixth verse: ‘God could not judge the world, for any sinner may say, If the truth of God more abounds through my lie, to his glory, why am I yet judged as a sinner?’ The truth of God. As ἀλήθεια is not unfrequently opposed to ἀδικία, it may have here the sense of δικαιοσύνη, and designate the divine excellence; then ψεῦσμα, in the following clause, must mean falsehood towards God, wickedness: ‘If the excellence of God is rendered more conspicuous by my wickedness.’ But as it was on the truth or veracity of God, his adherence to his promises, that the false confidence of the Jews was placed, it is probable that the apostle intended the words to be taken in their more limited sense. Hath more abounded unto his glory. Περισσεύειν, to be abundant, rich, or great; and by implication, in a comparative sense, to be more abundant, or conspicuous, Matthew 5:20; 1 Corinthians 15:58. The latter is the sense here, ‘If the truth of God has been made the more conspicuous;’ εἰς τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, so that he is glorified. Why am I also still judged as a sinner? Κᾀγώ, either even I, or I also; I as well as others; or even I, a Jew; or, according to another view of the context, even I a Gentile: ἔτι, yet, i.e. notwithstanding my falsehood is the means of displaying the glory of God. According to the view now given, the use of the first person is sufficiently explained by saying, as has often been done, “suam personam ponit pro quâvis aliâ.” I, therefore, stands for any one: ‘Any one may say, Why am I also judged as a sinner?’ Those however who understand κόσμος, in the preceding verse, to mean the Gentiles, suppose that the apostle here personates a heathen, who is made to ask, ‘If the divine majesty is the more displayed by my idolatry, why am even I judged as a sinner?’ This interpretation gives a very good sense, because the Jews readily admitted that the Gentiles were exposed to condemnation, and therefore any principle which was shown to exculpate them, the Jews must acknowledge to be false. The objections to this view of the passage are the unnecessary limitation which it imposes on the word κόσμος, Romans 3:6, and the unusual, if not unauthorized sense, which it requires to be given to the words ἀλήθεια and ψεῦσμα the latter not being elsewhere used for idolatry, and the former, in this connection at least, not admitting of the version, truth concerning God; i.e., the true God.

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Romans 3:7, Romans 3:8

These verses are the amplification and confirmation of the answer given in the sixth to the objection of the Jews. These verses are designed to show that if the ground assumed by them was valid, not only may every sinner claim exemption, but it would follow that it is right to do evil that good may come. The connection by γάρ is therefore with the sixth verse: ‘God could not judge the world, for any sinner may say, If the truth of God more abounds through my lie, to his glory, why am I yet judged as a sinner?’ The truth of God. As ἀλήθεια is not unfrequently opposed to ἀδικία, it may have here the sense of δικαιοσύνη, and designate the divine excellence; then ψεῦσμα, in the following clause, must mean falsehood towards God, wickedness: ‘If the excellence of God is rendered more conspicuous by my wickedness.’ But as it was on the truth or veracity of God, his adherence to his promises, that the false confidence of the Jews was placed, it is probable that the apostle intended the words to be taken in their more limited sense. Hath more abounded unto his glory. Περισσεύειν, to be abundant, rich, or great; and by implication, in a comparative sense, to be more abundant, or conspicuous, Matthew 5:20; 1 Corinthians 15:58. The latter is the sense here, ‘If the truth of God has been made the more conspicuous;’ εἰς τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, so that he is glorified. Why am I also still judged as a sinner? Κᾀγώ, either even I, or I also; I as well as others; or even I, a Jew; or, according to another view of the context, even I a Gentile: ἔτι, yet, i.e. notwithstanding my falsehood is the means of displaying the glory of God. According to the view now given, the use of the first person is sufficiently explained by saying, as has often been done, “suam personam ponit pro quâvis aliâ.” I, therefore, stands for any one: ‘Any one may say, Why am I also judged as a sinner?’ Those however who understand κόσμος, in the preceding verse, to mean the Gentiles, suppose that the apostle here personates a heathen, who is made to ask, ‘If the divine majesty is the more displayed by my idolatry, why am even I judged as a sinner?’ This interpretation gives a very good sense, because the Jews readily admitted that the Gentiles were exposed to condemnation, and therefore any principle which was shown to exculpate them, the Jews must acknowledge to be false. The objections to this view of the passage are the unnecessary limitation which it imposes on the word κόσμος, Romans 3:6, and the unusual, if not unauthorized sense, which it requires to be given to the words ἀλήθεια and ψεῦσμα the latter not being elsewhere used for idolatry, and the former, in this connection at least, not admitting of the version, truth concerning God; i.e., the true God.

Romans 3:8

Almost all the modern commentators are agreed in considering this verse as a continuation of the question commenced in the seventh, and in assuming an irregularity in the construction, arising from the introduction of the parenthetical clause in the middle of the verse: ‘If your principle is correct, why am I judged as a sinner; and why not let us do evil, that good may come?’ Having commenced the question, he interrupts himself to notice the slanderous imputation of this doctrine to himself — as we are slandered, and as some affirm we say, that we should do evil that good may come. Ποιήσωμεν, therefore, instead of being connected with the (τί) μή at the beginning of the verse is connected by οτί with the immediately preceding verb, See Winer, §66. Whose condemnation is just. Paul thus expresses his abhorrence of the principle that we may do evil that good may come. Tholuck and others refer ὧν to the βλασφημοῦντες, to the slanderers of the apostle; but that clause is virtually parenthetical, and it is not blaspheming the apostle, but teaching a doctrine subversive of all morality, that is here condemned. Calvin unites, in a measure, both views of the passage: “Duplici autem nomine damnabilis fuit eorum perversitas; primum quibus venire haec impietas in mentem potuerit usque ad ipsum assensum, deinde qui traducendo evangelio calumniam inde instruere ausi fuerint.”

Such is the apostle’s argument against the grounds of confidence on which the Jews rested their hope of exemption from condemnation. ‘Our unfaithfulness serves to commend the faithfulness of God, therefore we ought not to be punished.’ According to this reasoning, says Paul, the worse we are, the better: for the more wicked we are, the more conspicuous will be the mercy of God in our pardon; we may therefore do evil that good may come.’ By reducing the reasoning of the Jews to a conclusion shocking to the moral sense, he thereby refutes it. The apostle often thus recognizes the authority of the intuitive moral judgments of our nature, and thus teaches us that those truths which are believed on their own evidence, as soon as presented to the mind, should be regarded as fixed points in all reasonings; and that to attempt to go beyond these intuitive judgments, is to unsettle the foundation of all faith and knowledge, and to open the door to universal skepticism. Any doctrine, therefore, which is immoral in its tendency, or which conflicts with the first principles of morals, must be false, no matter how plausible may be the arguments in its favor.

Doctrine

1. The advantages of membership in the external Church, and of a participation of its ordinances, are very numerous and great, Romans 3:1, Romans 3:2.

2. The great advantage of the Christian over the heathen world, and of the members of a visible ecclesiastical body over others not so situated, is the greater amount of divine truth presented to their understandings and hearts, Romans 3:2.

3. All the writings which the Jews, at the time of Christ and his apostles, regarded as inspired, are really the word of God, Romans 3:2.

4. No promise or covenant of God can ever be rightfully urged in favor of exemption from the punishment of sin, or of impunity to those who live in it. God is faithful to his promises, but he never promises to pardon the impenitently guilty, Romans 3:3, Romans 3:4.

5. God will make the wrath of men to praise him. Their unrighteousness will commend his righteousness, without, on that account, making its condemnation less certain or less severe, Romans 3:5, Romans 3:6.

6. Any doctrine inconsistent with the first principles of morals must be false, no matter how plausible the metaphysical argument in its favor. And that mode of reasoning is correct, which refutes such doctrines by showing their inconsistency with moral truth, Romans 3:8.

Remarks

1. We should feel the peculiar responsibilities which rest upon us as the inhabitants of a Christian country, as members of the Christian Church, and possessors of the word of God; as such, we enjoy advantages for which we shall have to render a strict account, Romans 3:1, Romans 3:2.

2. It is a mark of genuine piety, to be disposed always to justify God, and to condemn ourselves. On the other hand, a disposition to self-justification and the extenuation of our sins, however secret, is an indication of the want of a proper sense of our own unworthiness and of the divine excellence, Romans 3:4, Romans 3:5.

3. Beware of any refuge from the fear of future punishment, founded upon the hope that God will clear the guilty, or that he will not judge the world and take vengeance for our sins, Romans 3:6, Romans 3:7.

4. There is no better evidence against the truth of any doctrine, than that its tendency is immoral. And there is no greater proof that a man is wicked, that his condemnation is just, than that he does evil that good may come. There is commonly, in such cases, not only the evil of the act committed, but that of hypocrisy and duplicity also, Romans 3:8.

5. Speculative and moral truths, which are believed on their own evidence as soon as they are presented to the mind, should be regarded as authoritative, and as fixed points in all reasonings. When men deny such first principles, or attempt to push beyond them to a deeper foundation of truth, there is no end to the obscurity, uncertainty, and absurdity of their speculations. What God forces us, from the very constitution of our nature, to believe, as, for example, the existence of the external world, our own personal identity, the difference between good and evil, etc., it is at once a violation of his will and of the dictates of reason to deny or to question. Paul assumed, as an ultimate fact, that it is wrong to do evil that good may come, Romans 3:8.

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