Commentari biblici

Εὐαγγέλιον κατὰ Ἰωάννην

B. א. have merely κατὰ Ἰωάνν. Others: τὸ κατὰ Ἰωάνν. (ἅγιον) εὐαγγ. Others: ἐκ τοῦ κ. Ἰωάνν. Others: εὐαγγ. ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ Ἰωάνν. See on Matthew.

CHAPTER 1

John 1:4. ζωὴ ῆν] D. א. Codd. in Origen and Augustine, It. (Germ. Foss. excepted), Sahidic, Syr.cu Clem. Valentt. in Ir. Hilary, Ambrose, Vigil.: ζωή ἐστιν. So Lachm. and Tisch. Generalization in connection with the words: ὁ γέγ. ἐν αὐτῷ, ζωὴ ἦν, and perhaps in comparison with 1 John 5:11.

John 1:16. καὶ ἐκ] B. C* D. L. X. א. 33. Copt. Aeth. Arm. 1 Verc. Corb. Or. and many Fathers and Schol.: ὅτι ἐκ. So Griesb., Lachm., Tisch.; ὅτι is to be preferred on account of the preponderating evidence in its favour, and because John 1:16 was very early (Heracl. and Origen) regarded as a continuation of the Baptist’s discourse, and the directly continuous καὶ naturally suggested itself, and was inserted instead of the less simple ὅτι.

John 1:18. νἱός] B. C.* L. א. 33. Copt. Syr. Aeth. and many Fathers: θεός. Dogmatic gloss in imitation of John 1:1, whereby not only υἱός, but the article before μονογ. (which Tisch. deletes), was also (in the Codd. named) suppressed. The omission of υἱός (Origen, Opp. IV. 102; Ambrose, ep. 10) is not sufficiently supported, and might easily have been occasioned by John 1:14.

John 1:19. After ἀπέστειλαν, B. C.* Min. Chrys. and Verss. have πρὸς αὐτόν. So Lachm., an addition which other Codd. and Verss. insert after Λευΐτας.

John 1:20. οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐγώ] A. B. C.* L. X. Δ. א. 33. Verss. and Fathers have: ἐγὼ οὔκ εἰμι. So Lachm., Tisch. Rightly, on account of the preponderating evidence. Comp. John 3:28, where οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐγώ is attested by decisive evidence.

John 1:22. The οὖν after εἶπον (Lachm. Tisch. read εἶπαν) is deleted by Lachm., following B. C. Syr.cu,—testimonies which are all the less adequate, considering how easily the οὖν, which is not in itself necessary, might have been overlooked after the final syllable of εἶπον.[60]

John 1:24. The article before ἀπεσταλμ. is wanting in A.* B. C.* L. א.* Origen (once), Nonn. Perhaps a mere omission on the part of the transcriber, if ἀπεστ. ἦσαν were taken together; but perhaps intentional, for some (Origen and Nonn.) have here supposed a second deputation. The omission is therefore doubly suspicious, though Tisch. also now omits the art.

John 1:25. Instead of the repeated οὔτε, we must, with Lachm., Tisch., following A. B. C. L. X. א. Min. Origen, read οὐδέ.

John 1:26. δέ after μέσος must, with Tisch., on weighty testimony (B. C. L. א. etc.), be deleted, having been added as a connecting particle.

John 1:27. Against the words αὐτός ἐστιν (for which G. Min. Chrys. read οὗτός ἐστιν) and ὃς ἔμπροσθέν μου γέγονεν the testimonies are so ancient, important, and unanimous, that they must be rejected together. Lachm. has bracketed them, Tisch. deletes them. αὐτός ἐστιν is an unnecessary aid to the construction, and ὃς ἔμπρ. μου γέγονεν (though defended by Ewald) is a completion borrowed from John 1:15; John 1:30.

John 1:28. Βηθανίᾳ.] Elz.: Βηθαβαρᾷ (adopted of late by Hengstenberg), against conclusive testimony, but following Syr.cu and Origen (Opp. II. 130), who himself avows that ΣΧΕΔῸΝ ἘΝ ΠᾶΣΙ ΤΟῖς ἈΝΤΙΓΡΆΦΟΙς is found ΒΗΘΑΝΊᾼ, yet upon geographical grounds decides in favour of ΒΗΘΑΒΑΡᾷ,—a consideration by which criticism cannot be bound. See the exegetical notes.

John 1:29. After ΒΛΈΠΕΙ Elz. has Ὁ ἸΩΆΝΝ., against the best testimonies. Beginning of a church lesson.

John 1:32. Ὡς] Elz.: ὩΣΕΊ, against the oldest and most numerous Codd. See Matthew 3:16; Luke 3:22.

John 1:37. ἬΚΟΥΣ. ΑὐΤΟῦ] Tisch., following B. א., puts ΑὐΤΟῦ after ΜΑΘΗΤ.; C.* L. X. T.b have it after ΔΎΟ. The Verss. also have this variation of position, which must, however, be regarded as the removal of the ΑὐΤΟῦ, made more or less mechanically, in imitation of John 1:35.

John 1:40. ἼΔΕΤΕ] B. C.* L. T.b Min. Syr. utr. Origen, Tisch.: ὌΨΕΣΘΕ. Correctly; the words which immediately follow and John 1:47 (comp. John 11:34) make it much more likely that the transcriber would write ἼΔΕΤΕ for ὌΨΕΣΘΕ, than vice versa. After ὥρα Elz. has δέ, against which are the weightiest witnesses, and which has been interpolated as a connecting link.

John 1:43. Ἰωνᾶ] Lachm.: Ἰωάνου, after B.; the same variation in John 21:15-17. We must, with Tisch., after B.* L. א. 33, read Ἰωάννου. Comp. Nonnus: υἱὸς Ἰωάνναο. The Textus Receptus has arisen from Matthew 16:17.

John 1:44. After ἠθέλησεν Elz. has ὁ Ἰησοῦς, which the best authorities place after αὐτῷ. Beginning of a church lesson.

John 1:51. ἀπάρτι] wanting in B. L. א. Copt. Aeth. Arm. Vulg. It. and some Fathers, also in Origen. Deleted by Lachm. Tisch. Omitted, because it seemed inappropriate to the following words, which were taken to refer to actual angelic appearances.

[60] Matthaei, ed. min. ad x. 39, well says: “In nullo libro scribae ita vexarunt particulas καί, δέ, οὖν, πάλιν … quam in hoc evangelio. Modo temere incul carunt, modo permutarunt, modo omiserunt, modo transposuerunt. Accedunt interpretes, qui cum demum locum aliquem tractant, illas particulas in principio modo addunt, modo omittunt.”

John 1:1. Ἐν ἀρχῇ] John makes the beginning of his Gospel parallel with that of Genesis;[61] but he rises above the historical conception of בְּרֵאשִׁית, which (Genesis 1:1) includes the beginning of time itself, to the absolute conception of anteriority to time: the creation is something subsequent, John 1:3. Proverbs 8:23, ἘΝ ἈΡΧῇ ΠΡῸ ΤΟῦ ΤῊΝ ΓῆΝ ΠΟΙῆΣΑΙ, is parallel; likewise, ΠΡῸ ΤΟῦ ΤῸΝ ΚΌΜΟΝ ΕἾΝΑΙ, John 17:5; ΠΡῸ ΚΑΤΑΒΟΛῆς ΚΌΣΜΟΥ, Ephesians 1:4. Comp. Nezach Israel, f. 48, 1 : Messias erat מפני חוהו (ante Tohu). The same idea we find already in the book of Enoch 48:3 f., 48:6 f., 62:7,—a book which (against Hilgenfeld and others) dates back into the second century B.C. (Dilm., Ewald, and others). The notion, in itself negative, of anteriority to time (ἄχρονος ἦν, ἀκίχητος, ἐν ἀῤῥήτῳ λόγος ἀρχῇ, Nonnus), is in a popular way affirmatively designated by the ἘΝ ἈΡΧῇ as “primeval;” the more exact dogmatic definition of the ἀρχή as “eternity” (Theodor. Mopsuest., Euthym. Zig.; comp. Theophylact) is a correct development of John’s meaning, but not strictly what he himself says. Comp. 1 John 1:1; Revelation 3:14. The Valentinian notion, that ἀρχή was a divine Hypostasis distinct from the Father and the ΛΌΓΟς (Iren. Haer. i. 8. 5), and the Patristic view, that it was the divine σοφία

[61] See Hoelemann, de evangelii Joh. introitu introitus Geneseos augustiore effigie, Leipsic 1855, p. 26 ff.

(Origen) or the everlasting Father (Cyril. Al.), rest upon speculations altogether unjustified by correct exegesis.[62]

ἦν] was present, existed. John writes historically, looking back from the later time of the incarnation of the λόγος (John 1:14). But he does not say, “In the beginning the ΛΌΓΟς came into existence,” for he does not conceive the generation (comp. μονογενής) according to the Arian view of creation, but according to that of Paul, Colossians 1:15.

Ὁ ΛΌΓΟς] the Word; for the reference to the history of the creation leaves room for no other meaning (therefore not Reason). John assumes that his readers understand the term, and, notwithstanding its great importance, regards every additional explanation of it as superfluous. Hence those interpretations fall of themselves to the ground, which are unhistorical, and imply anything of a quid pro quo, such as (1) that ὁ λόγος is the same as Ὁ ΛΕΓΌΜΕΝΟς, “the promised one” (Valla, Beza, Ernesti, Tittm., etc.); (2) that it stands for ὁ λέγων, “the speaker” (Storr, Eckerm., Justi, and others). Not less incorrect (3) is Hofmann’s interpretation (Schriftbeweis, I. 1, p. 109 f.): “ὁ λόγος is the word of God, the Gospel, the personal subject of which however, namely Christ, is here meant:” against which view it is decisive, first, that neither in Revelation 19:13, nor elsewhere in the N. T., is Christ called ὁ λόγος merely as the subject—matter of the word; secondly, that in John, ὁ λόγος, without some additional definition, never once occurs as the designation of the Gospel, though it is often so used by Mark (John 2:2, John 4:14, al.), Luke (John 1:2; Acts 11:19, al.), and Paul (Galatians 6:6; 1 Thessalonians 1:6); thirdly, that in the context, neither here (see especially John 1:14) nor in 1 John 1:1 (see especially ὃ ἑωράκαμεν … καὶ αἱ χεῖρες ἡμῶν ἐψηλάφησαν) does it seem allowable to depart in Ὁ ΛΌΓΟς from the immediate designation of the personal subject,[63] while this immediate designation, i.e. of the creative Word, is in our passage, from the obvious parallelism with the history of the creation, as clear and definite as it was appropriate it should be at the very commencement of the work. These reasons also tell substantially against the turn which Luthardt has given to Hofmann’s explanation: “ὁ λόγος is the word of God, which in Christ, Hebrews 1:1, has gone forth into the world, and the theme of which was His own person.” See, on the other hand, Baur in the Theol. Jahrb. 1854, p. 206 ff.; Lechler, apost. u. nachapost. Zeit. p. 215; Gess, v. d. Person Chr. p. 116; Kahnis, Dogmat. I. p. 466. The investigation of the Logos idea can only lead to a true result when pursued by the path of history. But here, above all, history points us to the O. T.,[64] and most directly to Genesis 1, where the act of creation is effected by God speaking. The reality contained in this representation, anthropomorphic as to its form, of the revelation of Himself made in creation by God, who is in His own nature hidden, became the root of the Logos idea. The Word as creative, and embodying generally the divine will, is personified in Hebrew poetry (Psalm 33:6; Psalm 107:20; Psalm 147:15; Isaiah 55:10-11); and consequent upon this concrete and independent representation, divine attributes are predicated of it (Psalm 34:4; Isaiah 40:8; Psalm 119:105), so far as it was at the same time the continuous revelation of God in law and prophecy. A way was thus paved for the hypostatizing of the λόγος as a further step in the knowledge of the relations in the divine essence; but this advance took place gradually, and only after the captivity, so that probably the oriental doctrine of emanations, and subsequently the Pythagorean-platonic philosophy, were not without influence upon what was already given in germ in Genesis 1. Another form of the conception, however, appears,—not the original one of the Word, but one which was connected with the advanced development of ethical and teleological reflection and the needs of the Theodicy,—that of wisdom (חָבְמָה), of which the creative word was an expression, and which in the book of Job (Job 28:12 ff.) and Proverbs (Proverbs 8, 9), in Sir 1:1-10; Sir 24:8, and Bar 3:37 to Bar 4:4, is still set forth and depicted under the form of a personification, yet to such a degree that the portrayal more closely approaches that of the Hypostasis, and all the more closely the less it is able to preserve the elevation and boldness characteristic of the ancient poetry. The actual transition of the ΣΟΦΊΑ into the Hypostasis occurs in the book of Wis 7:7-11, where wisdom (manifestly under the influence of the idea of the Platonic soul of the world, perhaps also of the Stoic conception of an all-pervading world-spirit) appears as a being of light proceeding essentially from God,—the true image of God, co-occupant of the divine throne,—a real and independent principle revealing God in the world (especially in Israel), and mediating between it and Him, after it has, as His organ, created the world, in association with a spirit among whose many predicates ΜΟΝΟΓΕΝΈς[65] also is named, John 7:22. The divine λόγος also appears again in the book of Wis 9:1, comp. Wis 9:2, but only in the O. T. sense of a poetically personified declaration of God’s will, either in blessing (John 16:12, comp. Psalm 107:20) or in punishing (John 18:15). See especially Grimm, in locc.; Bruch, Weisheitslehre d. Hebr, p. 347 ff. Comp. also Sir 43:33. While, then, in the Apocrypha the Logos representation retires before the development of the idea of wisdom,[66] it makes itself the more distinctly prominent in the Chaldee Paraphrasts, especially Onkelos: see Gfrörer, Gesch. d. Urchristenth. I. 1, p. 301 ff.; Winer, De Onkel. p. 44 f.; Anger, De Onkel. II. 1846. The Targums, the peculiarities of which rest on older traditions, exhibit the Word of God, מֵימְרָא or דִּבּוּרָא, as the divinely revealing Hypostasis, identical with the שְׁבִינָה which was to be revealed in the Messiah. Comp. Schoettg. Hor. II. p. 5; Bertholdt, Christol. p. 121. Thus there runs through the whole of Judaism, and represented under various forms (comp. especially the מַלְאַךְ יְהֹוָה in the O. T. from Genesis 16, Exodus 23 downwards, frequently named, especially in Hosea, Zechariah, and Malachi, as the representative of the self-revealing God), the idea that God never reveals Himself directly, but mediately, that is, does not reveal His hidden invisible essence, but only a manifestation of Himself (comp. especially Exodus 33:12-23); and this idea, modified however by Greek and particularly Platonic and Stoic speculation, became a main feature in the Judaeo-Alexandrine philosophy, as this is set forth in PHILO, one of the older contemporaries of Jesus. See especially Gfrörer, I. 243 ff.; Dähne, Jüdisch-Alex. Religionsphil. I. 114 ff.; Grossmann, Quaestion. Philon., Lpz. 1829; Scheffer, Quaest. Phil. Marb. 1829, 1831; Keferstein, Philo’s Lehre von dem göttl. Mittelwesen, Lpz. 1846; Ritter, Gesch. d. Philos. IV. 418 ff.; Zeller, Philos. d. Griechen, III. 2; Lutterb. neut. Lehrbegr. I. 418 ff.; Müller in Herzog’s Encykl. XI. 484; Ewald, apost. Zeit. 257; Delitzsch in d. Luther. Zeitschr. 1863, ii. 219; Riehm, Hebr. Brief, p. 249; Keim, Gesch. J.I. 212. Comp. also Langen, d. Judenth. z. Zeit Christi, 1867; Röhricht as formerly quoted. According to the intellectual development, so rich in its results, which Philo gave to the received Jewish doctrine of Wisdom, the Logos is the comprehension or sum-total of all the divine energies, so far as these are either hidden in the Godhead itself, or have come forth and been disseminated in the world (λόγος σπερματικός). As immanent in God, containing within itself the archetypal world, which is conceived as the real world—ideal (ΝΟΗΤῸς ΚΌΣΜΟς), it is, while not yet outwardly existing, like the immanent reason in men, the ΛΌΓΟς ἘΝΔΙΆΘΕΤΟς; but when in creating the world it has issued forth from God, it answers to the ΛΌΓΟς ΠΡΟΦΟΡΙΚΌς, just as among men the word when spoken is the manifestation of thought. Now the ΛΌΓΟς ΠΡΟΦΟΡΙΚΌς is the comprehension or sum-total of God’s active relations to the world; so that creation, providence, the communication of all physical and moral power and gifts, of all life, light, and wisdom from God, are its work, not being essentially different in its attributes and workings from ΣΟΦΊΑ and the Divine Spirit itself. Hence it is the image of the Godhead, the eldest and first-begotten (ΠΡΕΣΒΎΤΑΤΟς, ΠΡΩΤΌΓΟΝΟς) Son of God, the possessor of the entire divine fulness, the Mediator between 21 ΛΌΓΟς ΤΟΜΕΎς, ΔΗΜΙΟΥΡΓΌς, ἈΡΧΙΕΡΕΎς, ἹΚΈΤΗς, ΠΡΕΣΒΕΥΤΉς, the ἈΡΧΆΓΓΕΛΟς, the ΔΕΎΤΕΡΟς ΘΕΌς, the substratum of all Theophanies, also the Messiah, though ideally apprehended only as a Theophany, not as a concrete humanized personality; for an incarnation of the Logos is foreign to Philo’s system (see Ewald, p. 284 ff.; Dorner, Entwickelungsgesch. I. 50). There is no doubt that Philo has often designated and described the Logos as a Person, although, where he views it rather as immanent in God, he applies himself more to describe a power, and to present it as an attribute. There is, however, no real ground for inferring, with some (Keferst., Zeller), from this variation in his representation, that Philo’s opinion wavered between personality and impersonality; rather, as regards the question of subsistence in its bearing upon Philo’s Logos (see especially Dorner, Entwickelungsgesch. I. 21; Niedner, de subsistentia τῷ θείῳ λόγῳ apud Philon. tribute, in the Zeitsch. f. histor. Theol. 1849, p. 337 ff.; and Hölemann, de evang. Joh. introitu, etc., p. 39 ff.), must we attribute to him no separation between the subsistence of God and the Logos, as if there came forth a Person distinct from God, whenever the Logos is described as a Person; but, “ea duo, in quibus cernitur ΤΟῦ ὌΝΤΟς ΚΑῚ ΖῶΝΤΟς ΘΕΟῦ essentia s. deitas plenum esse per suam ipsius essentiam et implere cuncta hac sua essentia, primo diserte uni substantiae tribuuntur, deinde distribuuntur, sed tantum inter essentiam et hujus actionem, quemadmodum nomina ΤΟῦ ΘΕΟῦ et ΤΟῦ ΛΌΓΟΥ hujus ipsius dei” (Niedner). Accordingly, Philo’s conception of the Logos resolves itself into the sum-total and full exercise of the divine energies; so that God, so far as He reveals Himself, is called Logos, while the Logos, so far as he reveals God, is called God. That John owed his doctrine of the Logos—in which he represents the divine Messianic being as pre-existent, and entering into humanity in a human form—solely to the Alexandrine philosophy, is an assertion utterly arbitrary, especially considering the difference between Philo’s doctrine and that of John, not only in general (comp. also Godet, I. 233), but also in respect to the subsistence of the Logos in particular.[67] The form which John gave to his doctrine is understood much more naturally and historically thus, without by any means excluding the influence of the Alexandrine Gnosis upon the apostle;—that while the ancient popular wisdom of the Word of God, which (as we have above shown) carries us back to Genesis 1:1, is acknowledged to be that through which the idea of the Logos, as manifested in human form in Christ, was immediately suggested to him, and to which he appended and unfolded his own peculiar development of this idea with all clearness and spiritual depth, according to the measure of those personal testimonies of his Lord which his memory vividly retained, he at the same time allowed the widespread Alexandrine speculations, so similar in their origin and theme, to have due influence upon him, and used[68] them in an independent manner to assist his exposition of the nature and working of the divine in Christ, fully conscious of their points of difference (among which must be reckoned the cosmological dualism of Philo, which excluded any real incarnation, and made God to have created the world out of the ὕλη). Whether he adopted these speculations for the first time while dwelling in Asia Minor, need not be determined, although it is in itself very conceivable that the longer he lived in Asia, the more deeply did he penetrate into the Alexandrine theologoumenon which prevailed there, without any intermediate agency on the part of Apollos being required for that end (Tobler). The doctrine is not, however, on account of this connection with speculations beyond the pale of Christendom, by any means to be traced back to a mere fancy of the day. The main truth in it (the idea of the Son of God and His incarnation) had, long before he gave it its peculiar form, been in John’s mind the sole foundation of his faith, and the highest object of his knowledge; and this was no less the case with Paul and all the other apostles, though they did not formally adopt the Logos doctrine, because their idiosyncrasies and the conditions of their after development were different. That main truth in it is to be referred simply to Christ Himself, whose communications to His disciples, and direct influence upon them (John 1:14), as well as His further revelations and leadings by means of the Spirit of truth, furnished them with the material which was afterwards made use of in their various modes of representation. This procedure is specially apparent also in John, whose doctrine of the divine and pre-existent nature of Christ, far removed from the influences of later Gnosticism, breaks away in essential points from the Alexandrine type of doctrine, and moulds itself in a different shape, especially rejecting, in the most decided manner, all dualistic and docetic elements, and in general treating the form once chosen with the independence of an apostle. That idea of a revelation by God of His own essence, which took its rise from Genesis 1, which lived and grew under various forms and names among the Hebrews and later Jews, but was moulded in a peculiar fashion by the Alexandrine philosophy, was adopted by John for the purpose of setting forth the abstract divinity of the Son,—thus bringing to light the reality which lies at the foundation of the Logos idea. Hence, according to John,[69] by ὁ λόγος, which is throughout viewed by him (as is clear from the entire Prologue down to John 1:18)[70] under the conception of a personal[71] subsistence, we must understand nothing else than the self-revelation of the divine essence, before all time immanent in God (comp. Paul, Colossians 1:15 ff.), but for the accomplishment of the act of creation proceeding hypostatically from Him, and ever after operating even in the spiritual world as a creating, quickening, and illuminating personal principle, equal to God Himself in nature and glory (comp. Paul, Php 2:6); which divine self-revelation appeared bodily in the man Jesus, and accomplished, the work of the redemption of the world. John fashions and determines his Gospel from beginning to end with this highest christological idea in his eye; this it is which constitutes the distinctive character of its doctrine. Comp. Weizsäcker, üb. d. evang. Gesch. pp. 241 ff., 297; also his Abh. über d. Joh. Logoslehre, in d. Jahrb. f. D. Th. 1862, pp. 619 ff., 701 f. The Synoptics contain the fragments and materials, the organic combination and ideal formation of which into one complete whole is the pre-eminent excellence of this last and highest Gospel. Paul has the Logos, only not in name.

The second and third ἦν is the copula; but καὶ ὁ λόγος, as the repetition of the great subject, has a solemnity about it.

πρὸς τὸν θεον] not simply equivalent to ΠΑΡᾺ Τῷ ΘΕῷ, John 7:5, but expressing, as in 1 John 1:2, the existence of the Logos in God in respect of intercourse (Bernhardy, p. 265). So also in all other passages where it appears to mean simply with, Mark 6:3; Mark 9:19; Matthew 13:56; Matthew 26:55; 1 Corinthians 16:6-7; Galatians 1:18; Galatians 4:18; and in the texts cited in Fritzsche, ad Marc. p. 202.[72] Upon the thing itself, comp. concerning Wisdom, Proverbs 8:30, Wis 9:4. The moral essence of this essential fellowship is love (John 17:24; Colossians 1:13), with which, at the same time, any merely modalistic conception is excluded.

καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος] and the Logos was God. This θεός can only be the predicate, not the subject (as Röhricht takes it), which would contradict the preceding ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, because the conception of the ΛΌΓΟς would be only a periphrasis for God. The predicate is placed before the subject emphatically (comp. John 4:24), because the progress of the thought, “He was with God, and (not at all a Person of an inferior nature, but) possessed of a divine nature,” makes this latter—the new element to be introduced—the naturally and logically emphasized member of the new clause, on account of its relation to πρὸς ΤῸΝ ΘΕΌΝ.[73] The omission of the article was necessary, because ὁ θεός after the preceding ΠΡῸς ΤῸΝ ΘΕΌΝ would have assigned to the Logos identity of Person (as, in fact, Beyschlag, p. 162, construes θεός without the art.). But so long as the question of God’s self-mediation objectively remains out of consideration, Ὁ ΘΕΌς would have been out of place here, where ΠΡῸς ΤῸΝ ΘΕΌΝ had laid down the distinction of Person; whereas θεός without the article makes the unity of essence and nature to follow the distinction of Person.[74] As, therefore, by θεός without the article, John neither desires to indicate, on the, one hand, identity of Person with the Father; nor yet, on the other, any lower nature than that which God Himself possesses: so his doctrine of the Logos is definitely distinguished from that of Philo, which predicates ΘΕΌς without the article of the Logos in the sense of subordination in nature, nay, as he himself says, ἘΝ ΚΑΤΑΧΡΉΣΕΙ (I. 655, ed. Mang.); see Hoelemann, I. 1, p. 34. Moreover, the name Ὁ ΔΕΎΤΕΡΟς ΘΕΌς, which Philo gives to the Logos, must, according to II. 625 (Euseb. praep. ev. vii. 13), expressly designate an intermediate nature between God and man, after whose image God created man. This subordinationism, according to which the Logos is indeed μεθόριός τις θεοῦ φύσις, but ΤΟῦ ΜῈΝ ἘΛΆΤΤΩΝ, ἈΝΘΡΏΠΟΥ ΔῈ ΚΡΕΊΤΤΩΝ (I. 683), is not that of the N. T., which rather assumes (comp. Php 2:6, Colossians 1:15-16) the eternal unity of being of the Father and the Son, and places the subordination of the latter in His dependence on the Father, as it does the subordination of the Spirit in His dependence on the Father and the Son. ΘΕΌς, therefore, is not to be explained by help of Philo, nor is it to be converted into a general qualitative idea—“divine,” “God-like” (B. Crusius),—which deprives the expression of the precision which, especially considering the strict monotheism of the N. T. (in John, see in particular John 17:3), it must possess, owing to the conception of the personal Logos as a divine being. Comp. Schmid, bibl. Theol. II. 370. On Sam. Crell’s conjecture (Artemonii initium ev. Joh. ex antiquitate eccl. restitut. 1726) that θεοῦ is a mere anti-trinitarian invention, see Bengel, Appar. crit. p. 214 ff.

[62] Quite opposed to correct exegesis, although in a totally different direction, is the rendering of the Socinians (see Catech. Racov. p. 135, ed. Oeder), that ἐν ἀρχῇ signifies in initio evangelii.

[63] See, with reference to 1 John 1:1 (in opposition to Beyschlag’s impersonal interpretation), besides Düsterdieck and Huther, Johansson, de aeterna Christi praeexist. sec. ev. Joh., Lundae 1866, p. 29 f.

[64] See Röhricht in the Stud. u. Krit. 1868, p. 299 ff.

[65] Comp. John 7:25, where it is said of wisdom, ἀπόῤῥοια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης εἰλικρινής. Μονογενές should not have been rendered single (Bauerm., Lücke, Bruch, after the early writers), which it neither is nor is required to be by the merely formal contrast to πολυμερές. This idea single, as answering to the following πολυμερές, would have been expressed by μονομερές (Luc. Calumn. 6). Even Grimm (exeget. Handb. p. 152) has now rightly abandoned this interpretation.

[66] Wisdom as appearing in Christ is mentioned in N. T. also, in Luke 11:49, comp. Matthew 11:19.

[67] It tells also against it, that in John the name λόγος is undoubtedly derived from the divine speaking (Word); in Philo, on the other hand, from the divine thinking (Reason). See Hoelemann as before, p. 43 ff.

[68] Comp. Delitzsch, l.c., and Psychol, p. 178 [E. T. pp. 210, 211]; Beyschlag, Christol d. N. T. p. 156; Keim, Gesch. J. I. p. 112 ff. If some attempt to deny the influence of the Judaeo-Alexandrine Gnosis on the Logos doctrine of John (Hoelemann, Weiss, J. Köstlin, Hengstenberg), they at the same time sever, though in the interests of apostolic dignity, its historical credibility from its connection with the circumstances of the time, as well as the necessary presumption of its intelligibility on the part of the readers of the Gospel. But it is exactly the noble simplicity and clearness of the Prologue which shows with what truly apostolic certainty John had experienced the influence of the speculations of his day, and was master of them, modifying, correcting, and utilizing them according to his own ideas. This is also in answer to Luthardt, p. 200, and Röhricht, l.c.

[69] In the Apocalypse also, chap. John 19:13, Christ is called the λόγος, but (not so in the Gospel) ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ. The writer of the Apocalypse speaks of the whole Person of the God-man in a different way from the evangelist,—in fact, as in His state of exaltation. (See Düsterdieck, z. Apok. Einl. p. 75 ff.) But the passage is important against all interpretations which depart from the metaphysical view of the Logos above referred to. Comp. Gess, v. d. Person Chr. p. 115 ff.

[70] Comp. Wörner, d. Verhältn. d. Geistes zum Sohne Gottes, 1862, p. 24; also Baur, neutest. Theol. 352; Godet, I.c.

[71] That is, the subsistence as a conscious intelligent Ego, endued with volition. Against the denial of this personal transcendency in John (De Wette, Beyschlag, and others), see in particular Köstlin, Lehrbegr. 90; Brückn. 7 f.; Liebner, Christol. 155 f.; Weiss, Lehrbegr. 242 f. When Dorner (Gesch. d. prot. Theol. 875 ff.) claims for the Son, indeed, a special divine mode of existence as His eternal characteristic, but at the same time denies Him any direct participation in the absolute divine personality, his limitation is exegetically opposed to the view of John and of the Apostle Paul.

[72] The expressions, in the language of the common people, in many districts are quite analogous: “he was with me,” “he stays with you” (bei mich, bei dioh), and the like. Comp. for the Greek, Krüger, § 68. 39. 4.—As against all impersonal conceptions of the Logos, observe it is never said ἐν τῷ θεῷ. Röhricht (p. 312), however, arrives at the meaning ἐν τῷ θεῷ, and by unwarrantably comparing the very different usage of πρός, takes exception to our explanation of πρὸς τὸν θεόν.

[73] There is something majestic in the way in which the description of the Logos, in the three brief but great propositions of ver. 1, is unfolded with increasing fulness.

[74] “The last clause, the Word was God, is against Arius; the other, the Word was with God, against Sabellius.”—LUTHER. See also Thomasius, Chr. Pers. u. Werk, I. 83 ff.

John 1:2 again emphatically combines the first and second clauses of John 1:1, in order to connect with them the work of creation, which was wrought by the λόγος.[75] In this way, however, the subject also of the third clause of John 1:1 is included in and expressed by οὗτος. On this οὗτος—to which, then, πάντα standing at the beginning of John 1:3 significantly corresponds—lies the emphasis in the continuation of the discourse. In John 1:2 is given the necessary premiss to John 1:3; for if it was this same Logos, and no other than He, who Himself was God, who lived in the beginning in fellowship with God, and consequently when creation began, the whole creation, nothing excepted, must have come into existence through Him. Thus it is assumed, as a self-evident middle term, that God created the world not immediately, but, according to Genesis 1, through the medium of the Word.

[75] Who accordingly now worked as λόγος προφορικός.

John 1:3. Πάντα] “grande verbum, quo mundus, i.e. universitas rerum factarum denotatur, John 1:10,” Bengel. Comp. Genesis 1; Colossians 1:16; Hebrews 1:2. Quite opposed to the context is the view of the Socinians: “the moral creation is meant.” Comp. rather Philo, de Cherub. I. 162, where the λόγος appears as the ὄργανον διʼ οὗ (comp. 1 Corinthians 8:6) κατεσκευάσθη (ὁκόσμος). The further speculations of Philo concerning the relation of the λόγος to the creation, which however are not to be imputed to John, see in Hoelemann, l.c. p. 36 ff. John might have written τὰ πάντα (with the article), as in 1 Corinthians 8:6 and Colossians 1:16, but he was not obliged to do so. Comp. Colossians 1:17, John 3:35. For his thought is “all” (unlimited), whereas τὰ πάντα would express “the whole of what actually exists.”

καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ.] an emphatic parallelismus antitheticus, often occurring in the classics (Dissen, ad Dem, de Cor. p. 228; Maetzner, ad Antiph. p. 157), in the N. T. throughout, and especially in John (John 1:20; John 10:28; 1 John 2:4; 1 John 2:27, al.). We are not to suppose that by this negative reference John meant to exclude (so Lücke, Olshausen, De Wette, Frommann, Maier, Baeumlein) the doctrine of a ὕλη having an extra-temporal existence (Philo, l.c.), because ἐγένετο and γέγονεν describe that which exists only since the creation, as having come into existence, and therefore ὕλη would not be included in the conception. John neither held nor desired to oppose the idea of the ὕλη; the antithesis has no polemical design—not even of an anti-gnostic kind—to point out that the Logos is raised above the series of Aeons (Tholuck); for though the world of spirits is certainly included in the πάντα and the οὐδὲ ἕν, it is not specially designated (comp. Colossians 1:16). How the Valentinians had already referred it to the Aeons, see in Iren. Haer. i. 8. 5; Hilgenfeld, d. Ev. u. d. Briefe Joh. p. 32 ff.

οὐδὲ ἕν] ne unum quidem, i.e. prorsus nihil, more strongly emphatic than οὐδέν. Comp. 1 Corinthians 6:5; see Stallbaum, ad Plat. Sympos. p. 214 D; Kühner, ad Xen. Mem. i. 6. 2. As to the thing itself, comp. Philo, II. p. 225: διʼ οὗ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἐδημιουργεῖτο.

ὃ γέγονεν] Perfect: what has come into being, and now is. Comp. ἔκτισται, Colossians 1:16. This belongs to the emphatic fulness of the statement (Bornemann, Schol. in Luc. p. xxxvii.), and connects itself with what precedes. The very ancient connection of it with what follows (C. D. L. Verss., Clem. Al., Origen, and other Greeks, Heracleon, Ptolemaeus, Philos. Orig. v. 8, Latin Fathers, also Augustine, Wetst., Lachm., Weisse), by putting the comma after either γέγ. or αὐτῷ (so already the Valentinians),[76] is to be rejected, although it would harmonize with John’s manner of carrying forward the members of his sentences, whereby “ex proximo membro sumitur gradus sequentis” (Erasmus); but in other respects it would only be Johannean if the comma were placed after γέγ. (so also Lachm.). The ground of rejection lies not in the ambiguity of ζωή, which cannot surprise us in John, but in this, that the perfect γέγονεν, as implying continuance, would have logically required ἐστί instead of ἦν after ζωή; to ἦν not γέγονεν but ἐγένετο would have been appropriate, so that the sense would have been: “what came into existence had in Him its ground or source of life.”

[76] “Whatever originated in Him (self) is life.” The latter is said to be the Zoë, which with the Logos formed one Syzygy. Hilgenfeld regards this view as correct, in connection with the assumption of the later Gnostic origin of the Gospel. But the construction is false as regards the words, because neither ἐστί nor ἐγένετο stands in the passage; and false also as regards the thought, because, according to vv. 1–3, a principle of life cannot have first originated in the Logos, but must have existed from the very beginning. Even Bunsen (Hypol. II. 291, 357) erroneously preferred the punctuation of the Alexandrines and Gnostics.

John 1:4. An advance to the nature of the Logos[77] as life, and thereby as light.

ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν] in Him, was life, He was πηγὴ ζωῆς (Philo). Life was that which existed in Him, of which He was full. This must be taken in the most comprehensive sense, nothing that is life being excluded, physical, moral, eternal life (so already Chrysostom),—all life was contained in the Logos, as in its principle and source. No limitation of the conception, especially as ζωή is without the article (comp. John 5:26), has any warrant from the context; hence it is not to be understood either merely of physical life, so far as it may be the sustaining power (B. Crusius, comp. Chrysostom, Euthymius Zigabenus, Calvin), or of spiritual and eternal life,—of the Johannean ζωὴ αἰώνιος (Origen, Maldonatus, Lampe, Kuinoel, Köstlin, Hengstenberg, Weiss), where Hengstenberg drags in the negative notion that the creature was excluded from life until Christ was manifested in the flesh, and that down to the time of His incarnation He had only been virtually life and light.

καὶ ἡ ζωὴ, κ.τ.λ.] and the life, of which the Logos was the possessor, was the light of men. The exposition then passes over from the universal to the relation of the Logos to mankind; for, being Himself the universal source of life to the world made by Him, He was as such unable to remain inactive, least of all with respect to men, but shows Himself as operating upon them conformably to their rational and moral nature, especially as the light, according to the necessary connection of life and light in opposition to death and darkness. (Comp. John 8:12; Psalm 36:10; Ephesians 5:14; Luke 1:78-79.) The light is truth pure and divine, theoretical and moral (both combined by an inner necessity, and not simply the former, as Weiss maintains), the reception and appropriation of which enlightens the man (υἱὸς φωτός, John 12:36), whose non-appropriation and non-acceptance into the consciousness determines the condition of darkness. The Life was the Light of men, because in its working upon them it was the necessary determining power of their illumination. Comp. such expressions as those in John 11:25, John 14:6, John 17:3. Nothing as yet is said of the working of the Logos after His incarnation (John 14:6), but (observe the ἦν) that the divine truth in that primeval time came to man from the Logos as the source of life; life in Him was for mankind the actively communicating principle of the divine ἀλήθεια, in the possession of which they lived in that fair morning of creation, before through sin darkness had broken in upon them. This reference to the time when man, created after God’s image, remained in a state of innocency, is necessarily required by the ἦν, which, like the preceding ἦν, must refer to the creation-period indicated in John 1:3. But we are thus at the same time debarred from understanding, as here belonging to the enlightening action of the Logos, God’s revelations to the Hebrews and later Jews (comp. Isaiah 2:5), by the prophets, etc. (Ewald), or even from thinking of the elements of moral and religious truth to be found in heathendom (λόγος σπερματικός). In that fresh, untroubled primeval age, when the Logos as the source of life was the Light of men, the antithesis of light and darkness did not yet exist; this tragic antithesis, however, as John’s readers knew, originated with the fall, and had continued ever after. There follows, therefore, after a fond recalling of that fair bygone time (John 1:4), the painful and mournful declaration of the later and still enduring relation (John 1:5), where the light still shines indeed, but in darkness,—a darkness which had not received it. If that reference, however, which is to be kept closely in view, of ἦν to the time of the world’s creation, and also this representation of the onward movement of our narrative, be correct, it cannot also be explained of the continuous (John 1:17) creative activity of the Logos, through which a consciousness and recognition of the highest truth have been developed among men (De Wette); and just as little may we find in τὸ φῶς τ. ἀνθρ. what belongs to the Logos in His essence only, in which case the reading ἐστί would (against Brückner) be more appropriate; comp. φωτίζει, John 1:9. As in ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, so also by ἦν τὸ φῶς τ. ἀνθρ. must be expressed what the Logos was in His historical activity, and not merely what He was virtually (Hengstenberg). Comp. Godet, who, however, without any hint from the text, or any historical appropriateness whatever, finds in “life and light” a reminiscence of the trees of life and of knowledge in Paradise.

[77] The Logos must necessarily be taken as in vv. 1–3, but not from ver. 4 onwards in Hofmann’s sense, as no longer a person but a thing, viz. the Gospel, as Röhricht (p. 315) maintains, as if the verbum vocale were now a designation of Christ, who is the bearer of it. No such change of meaning is indicated in the text, and it only brings confusion into the clear advance of the thought.

John 1:5. Relation of the light to the darkness.

καὶ τὸ φῶς] and the light shineth;[78] not “and thus, as the light, the Logos shineth” (Lücke). The discourse steadily progresses link by link, so that the preceding predicate becomes the subject.

φαίνει] Present, i.e. uninterruptedly from the beginning until now; it embraces, therefore, the illuminating activity of the λόγος ἄσαρκος[79] and ἔνσαρκος. As it is arbitrary to supply the idea of “still present” (Weiss), so also is its limitation to the revelations by the prophets of the O. T., which would make φαίνει merely the descriptive praesens historicum (De Wette). For the assumption of this, however, in connection with pure preterites there is no warrant; comp. rather φωτίζωι, John 1:9. According to Ewald, Jahrb. V. 194 (see his Johann. Schr. I. 121), φαίνει represents as present the time in which the Light, which since the creation had enlightened men only from afar, had now suddenly come down into the world, which without it is darkness, and was shining in the midst of this darkness. An antithetic relation is thus assumed (“only from afar,—but now suddenly in the midst”) which has no support in the present tense alone, without some more distinct intimation in the text. The stress, moreover, is not on φαίνει, but the (tragic) emphasis is laid on the ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ, which with this object precedes it. It is the continuation of the discourse, John 1:7 ff., which first leads specially to the action of the Incarnate One (this also against Hengstenb.).

The σκοτία is the negation and opposite of the φῶς, the condition and order of things in which man does not possess the divine ἀλήθεια, but has become the prey of folly, falsehood, and sin, as a godless ruling power, with all its misery. Here the abstract term “darkness,” as the element in which the light shines, denotes not the individual subject of darkness (Ephesians 5:8), but, as the context requires, that same totality which had been previously described by τῶν ἀνθρώπων, consequently mankind in general, in so far as in and for themselves they have since the fall been destitute of divine truth, and have become corrupt in understanding and will. Melancthon well says, “genus humanum oppressum peccato vocat tenebras.” Frommann is altogether mistaken in holding that σκοτία differs in the two clauses, and means (1) humanity so far as it yet lay beyond the influence of the light, and (2) humanity so far as it was opposed thereto. But Hilgenfeld is likewise in error, when, out of a different circle of ideas, he imports the notion that “light and darkness are primeval opposites, which did not first originate with the fall;” see on John 8:44.

οὐ κατέλαβεν] apprehended it not, look not possession of it; it was not appropriated by the darkness, so that thereby the latter might have become light, but remained aloof and alien to it. Comp. Php 3:12-13, 1 Corinthians 9:24, and especially Romans 9:30; also expressions like καταλαμβ. σοφίαν, Sir 15:1; Sir 15:7. The explanation apprehended, i.e. ἔγνω, John 1:10 (Ephesians 3:18; Acts 10:34; Acts 4:13; Plato, Phaedr. p. 250 D; Phil. p. 16 D; Polyb. viii. 4. 6), is on one side arbitrarily narrowing, on another anticipatory, since it foists in the individual subjects of the σκοτία, which is conceived of as a realm. It is erroneous to interpret, as Origen, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Euthymius Zigabenus, Bos., Schulthess, Hoelemann, p. 60, also Lange: “The darkness did not hem it in, oppress it; it was invincible before it.” Linguistically this is allowable (see Schweighaüser, Lex. Herod. II. p. 18), but it nowhere so occurs in the N. T., and is here opposed to the parallels, John 1:10-11.

Observe that οὐ κατέλαβεν, which presupposes no Gnostic absolutism, but freedom of moral self-determination (comp. John 1:11-12), reflects the phenomenon as a whole, and indeed as it presented itself to John in history and experience; hence the aorist. Comp. John 3:19.

[78] φαίνει, lucet, not interchangeable with φαίνεται, which means apparet. See on Php 2:15. Godet’s criticism of the distinction is erroneous.

[79] Godet thinks that the law written in the heart, the light of conscience, is meant (Romans 2:14), which the Logos makes use of; and this His relation to all mankind is essential and permanent. But this would be utterly inadequate to the fulness of meaning expressed by φῶς, especially in its antithesis to σκοτία. The φῶς shines as divine light before Christ (by revelation and prophecy), and after Him. It is supernatural, heavenly. Comp. 1 John 2:8. There is no mention here of the λόγος σπερματικός.

John 1:6. In the painful antithesis of John 1:5 which pervades the entire Gospel, was included not merely the pre-human relation of the Logos to mankind, but His relation thereto after His incarnation likewise (see on φαίνει). This latter is now more minutely unfolded as far as John 1:11, and indeed in such a way that John, to strengthen the antithesis, adduces first the testimony of the Baptist (John 1:6-8) to the Light, on the ground of which he then designates the Logos as the true Light (John 1:9); and finally, thus prefaced, makes the antithesis (John 1:10-11) follow with all the more tragic effect. The mention of John’s testimony here in the Prologue is not therefore a mere confirmation of the reality of the appearance of the Logos (Brückner), which the statements of John 1:9-10 did not require; still less is it a pressing forwards of the thought to the beginning of the Gospel history (De Wette), nor even the representation of the idea of the first intervention in the antithesis between light and darkness (Baur), nor “an illustrious exception” (Ewald) to the preceding ἡ σκοτία, κ.τ.λ.; but introducing a new paragraph, and therefore beginning without a particle, it forms a historical preparation, answering to what was actually the fact, for that non-recognition and rejection (John 1:10-11) which, in spite of that testimony of the Baptist, the light shining in the darkness had experienced. John 1:15 stands to John 1:7 in the relation of a particular definite statement to the general testimony of which it is a part.

ἐγένετο] not there was (ἦν, John 3:1), but denoting the appearing, the historical manifestation. See on Mark 1:4; Luke 1:5; Php 2:7. Hence not with Chrys.: ἐγένετο ἀπεσταλμένος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπεστάλη; which Hengstenberg repeats.

Observe in what follows the noble simplicity of the narrative: we need not look out for any antithetical reference (ἐγένετο

ἄνθρωπος

ἀπεστ. π. θεοῦ) to John 1:1 (B. Crusius, Luthardt, and older expositors). With ἀπεσταλμ. π. θεοῦ, comp. John 3:28; Malachi 3:1-3. Description of the true prophet; comp. also Luke 3:2-3.

John 1:7. Εἰς μαρτυρίαν] to bear witness; for John testified what had been prophetically made known to him by divine revelation respecting the Light which had come in human form. Comp. John 1:33.

ἵνα πάντες, κ.τ.λ.] Purpose of the μαρτυρήσῃ, final end of the ἦλθεν.

πιστεύσ.] i.e. in the light; comp. John 1:8-9; John 12:36.

διʼ αὐτοῦ] by means of John, so far as he by his witness-bearing was the medium of producing faith: “and thus John is a servant and guide to the Light, which is Christ” (Luther); not by means of the light (Grotius, Lampe, Semler), for here it is not faith in God (1 Peter 1:21) that is spoken of.