聖書注解書

CHAPTER 13

Romans 13:1. ἀπό] Lachm. and Tisch. 8 : ὑπό, which Griesb. also approved, according to preponderant evidence. But ἀπό also retains considerable attestation (D* E* F G, min., Or. Theodoret, Dam.), and may easily have been displaced by a ὑπό written on the margin from the following. After οὖσαι Elz. has ἐξουσίαι, which, according to a preponderance of evidence, has been justly omitted since Griesb. as a supplement; and τοῦ also before the following Θεοῦ is too feebly attested.

Romans 13:3. τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἔργῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ κακῷ] commended by Griesb., adopted by Lachm., Tisch., Fritzsche, according to A B D* F G P א, 6. 67**, several VSS., and Fathers. But Elz., Matth., Scholz have τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργων, ἀλλὰ τῶν κακῶν. A presumed emendation in case and number.

Romans 13:5. ἀνάγκη ὑποτάσσεσθαι] D E F G, Goth. It. Guelph. Ir. have merely ὑποτάσσεσθε. Commended by Griesb. A marginal gloss, as the reading ἀνάγκη (or ἀνάγκῃ) ὑποτάσσεσθε (Lect. 7, 8, Aug., Beda, Vulg.: necessitate subditi estote; so Luther) plainly shows.

Romans 13:7. οὖν] is wanting in A B D* א*, 67**, Copt. Sahid. Vulg. ms. Tol. Damasc. Cypr. Aug. Ruf. Cassiod. Omitted by Lachm., Tisch., Fritzsche. Rightly; for there was no ground for its omission, whereas by its insertion the logical connection was established.

Romans 13:9. After κλέψεις Elz. has οὐ ψευδομαρτυρήσεις, against decisive evidence. Inserted with a view to completeness.

ἐν τῷ] bracketed by Lachm., is wanting in BFG, Vulg. It. and Latin Fathers. But its striking appearance of superfluousness might so readily prompt its omission, that this evidence is too weak.

Romans 13:11. The order ἤδη ἡμᾶς is decisively supported. So rightly Lachm. and Tisch. 8. Yet the latter has instead of ἡμᾶς: ὑμᾶς, according to A B C P א*, min. Clem., which, however, appeared more suitable to εἰδότες and more worthy of the apostle.

Romans 13:12. καὶ ἐνδυς.] Lachm. and Tisch.: ἐνδυς. δέ, which also Griesb. approved, according to important witnesses; but it would be very readily suggested by the preceding adversative connection.

Romans 13:1. Πᾶσα ψυχή] In the sense of every man, but (comp. on Romans 2:9) of man conceived in reference to his soul-nature, in virtue of which he consciously feels pleasure and displeasure (rejoices, is troubled, etc.), and cherishes corresponding impulses. There lies a certain pathos in the significant: every soul, which at once brings into prominence the universality of the duty. Comp. Acts 2:43; Acts 3:23; Revelation 16:3.

ἐξουσίαις ὑπερεχ.] magistrates high in standing (without the article). ὑπερεχ. (see Wis 6:5; 1 Peter 2:13; 1 Timothy 2:2; 2Ma 3:11) is added, in order to set forth the ὑποτάσς.

ὑπέρ and ὑπό being correlative—as corresponding to the standpoint of the magistracy itself (comp. the German: hohe Obrigkeiten); the motive of obedience follows.

There is no magistracy apart from God expresses in general the proceeding of all magistracy whatever from God, and then this relation is still more precisely defined, in respect of those magistracies which exist in concreto as a divine institution, by ὑπὸ Θεοῦ τεταγμ. εἰσίν; comp. Hom. Il. 2:204 ff., ix. 38, 98; Soph. Phil. 140, et al.; Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 2. Thus Paul has certainly expressed the divine right of magistracy, which Christian princes especially designate by the expression “by the grace of God” (since the time of Louis the Pious). And αἱ δὲ οὖσαι, the extant, actually existing, allows no exception, such as that possibly of tyrants or usurpers (in opposition to Reiche). The Christian, according to Paul, ought to regard any magistracy whatever, provided its rule over him subsists de facto, as divinely ordained, since it has not come into existence without the operation of God’s will; and this applies also to tyrannical or usurped power, although such a power, in the counsel of God, is perhaps destined merely to be temporary and transitional. From this point of view, the Christian obeys not the human caprice and injustice, but the will of God, who—in connection with His plan of government inaccessible to human insight—has presented even the unworthy and unrighteous ruler as the οὖσα ἐξουσία, and has made him the instrument of His measures. Questions as to special cases—such as how the Christian is to conduct himself in political catastrophes, what magistracy he is to look upon in such times as the οὖσα ἐξουσία, as also, how he, if the command of the magistrate is against the command of God, is at any rate to obey God rather than men (Acts 5:29), etc.

Paul here leaves unnoticed, and only gives the main injunction of obedience, which he does not make contingent on this or that form of constitution. By no means, however, are we to think only of the magisterial office as instituted by God (Chrysostom, Oecumenius, and others), but rather of the magistracy in its concrete persons and members as the bearers of the divinely-ordained office. Comp. οἱ ἄρχοντες, Romans 13:3, and Romans 13:4; Romans 13:6-7; Dion. Hal. Antt. xi. 32; Plut. Philop. 17; Titus 3:1; also Martyr. Polyc. 10.

Observe, moreover, that Paul has in view Gentile magistrates in concreto; consequently he could not speak more specially of that which Christian magistrates have on their part to do, and which Christian subjects in their duty of obedience for God and right’s sake are to expect and to require from them, although he expresses in general—by repeatedly bringing forward the fact that magistrates are the servants of God (Romans 13:3-4), indeed ministering servants of God (Romans 13:6)—the point of view from which the distinctively Christian judgment as to the duties and rights of magistrate and subject respectively must proceed.

Romans 13:1-7. The proud love of freedom of the Jews (see on John 8:33; Matthew 22:17, and their tumultuary spirit thereby excited, which was peculiarly ardent from the time of Judas Gaulonites (see Acts 5:37; Josephus, Ant. xviii. 1. 1) and had shortly before broken out in Rome itself (Suetonius, Claud. 25; Dio Cassius, lx. 6; see Introd. § 2, and on Acts 18:2), redoubled for the Christians—among whom, indeed, even the Gentile-Christians might easily enough be led astray by the Messianic ideas (theocracy, kingdom of Christ, freedom and κληρονομία of believers, etc.) into perverted thoughts of freedom and desires for emancipation (comp. 1 Corinthians 6:1 ff.)—the necessity of civil obedience, seeing that they, as confessing the Messiah (Acts 17:6-7), and regarded by the Gentiles as a Jewish sect, were much exposed to the suspicion of revolutionary enterprise. The danger thus lay, not indeed exclusively (Mangold, Beyschlag), but primarily and mostly, on the side of the Jewish-Christians, not on that of the Gentile-Christians, as Th. Schott, in the interest of the view that Paul desired to prepare the Roman church to be the base of operations of his western mission to the Gentiles, unhistorically assumes. And was not Rome, the very seat of the government of the world, just the place above all others where that danger was greatest, and where nevertheless the whole Christian body, of the Jewish as well as of the Gentile section, had to distinguish itself by exemplary civil order? Hence we have here the—in the Pauline epistles unique—detailed and emphatic inculcation of obedience towards the magistracy, introduced without link of connection with what precedes as a new subject. Baur, I. p. 384 f., thinks that Paul is here combating Ebionitic dualism, which regarded the secular magistrate as of non-divine, devilish origin. As if Paul could not, without any such antithesis, have held it to be necessary to inculcate upon the Romans the divine right of the state-authority! Moreover, he would certainly not merely have kept his eye upon that dualism in regard to its practical manifestations (Baur’s subterfuge), but would have combated it in principle, and thereby have grasped it at the root.

The partial resemblance, moreover, which exists between Romans 13:1-4 and 1 Peter 2:13-14 is not sufficient to enable us to assume that Peter made use of our passage, or that Paul made use of Peter’s epistle; a view, which has been lately maintained especially by Weiss, Petrin. Lehrbegr. p. 416 ff., and in the Stud. u. Krit. 1865, 4; see, on the other hand, Huther on 1 Pet. Introd. § 2. Paul doubtless frequently preached a similar doctrine orally respecting duty towards the heathen magistracy. And the power of his preaching was sufficiently influential in moulding the earliest ecclesiastical language, to lead even a Peter, especially on so peculiar a subject, involuntarily to echo the words of Paul which had vibrated through the whole church. Compare the creative influence of Luther upon the language of the church.

Romans 13:2. Ὥστε] Since it is instituted by God.

ὁ ἀντιτασς.] Note the correlation of ἀντιτασς., ὑποτασς., and τεταγμ. The latter stands in the middle.

ἑαυτοῖς] Dativus incommodi: their resistance to the divinely-ordained magistracy will issue in their own self-destruction; comp. Romans 2:5; 1 Corinthians 11:29. According to Hofmann (who in his Schriftbew. II. 2, p. 443, even imported a contrast to τῷ κυρίῳ, as in Romans 14:6-7), ἑαυτοῖς is to be viewed as in contrast to the Christian body as such; the punishment to be suffered is a judgment which lights on the doers personally, and is not put to the account of their Christian standing. This explanation (“they have to ascribe the punishment to themselves solely”) is incorrect, because it obtrudes on the text a purely fictitious antithesis, and because the apostle lays down the relation to the magistracy quite generally, not from the specific point of view of Christian standing, according to which his readers might perhaps have supposed that they had become foreign to the political commonwealth. Had this comprehensive error in principle been here in Paul’s view, in how entirely different a way must he have expressed what he intended than by the single expression ἑαυτοῖς, into which, moreover, that alleged thought would have first to be imported!

κρῖμα] a judgment, is understood of itself, according to the connection, as a penal judgment. Comp. Romans 2:2-3, Romans 3:8; 1 Corinthians 11:29; Galatians 5:10; Mark 12:40. From whom they will receive it, is decided by the fact that with οἱ δὲ ἀνθεστηκότες, according to the context, τῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ διαταγῇ is again to be supplied. It is therefore a penal judgment of God, as the executors of which, however, the ἄρχοντες are conceived, as Romans 13:3 proves. Consequently the passage does not relate to eternal punishment (Reiche and others), but to the temporal punishment which God causes to be inflicted by means of the magistrates. Philippi prefers to leave κρῖμα without more special definition (comp. also Rückert); but against this is the consideration, that Romans 13:3 can only arbitrarily be taken otherwise than as assigning the ground of what immediately precedes.

Romans 13:3. Οἱ γὰρ … κακῷ] Ground assigned for ἑαυτοῖς κρῖμα λήψονται.

τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἔργῳ] The good work and the evil work are personified. We are not here to compare Romans 2:7 or Romans 2:15 (Reiche, de Wette).

φόβος] a terror, i.e. formidandi. For examples of the same use, see Kypke, II. p. 183. Comp. Lobeck, Paralip. p. 513; just so the Latin timor, e.g. Propert. iii. 5. 40.

δέ] the simple μεταβατικόν. The proposition itself may be either interrogatory (Beza, Calvin, and others, including Lachmann, Tischendorf, Ewald, Hofmann), or as protasis in categorical form (see on 1 Corinthians 7:8, and Pflugk, ad Eur. Med. 386). So Luther and others, including Tholuck and Philippi. The former is more lively, the latter more appropriate and emphatic, and thus more in keeping with the whole character of the adjoining context.

ἔπαινον] praise, testimony of approbation (which the magistrate is wont to bestow; see also Philo, Vit. M. i. p. 626 C); not any more than in Romans 2:29, 1 Corinthians 4:5, reward (Calvin, Loesner, and others). Grotius rightly remarks: “Cum haec scriberet Paulus, non saeviebatur Romae in Christianos.” It was still the better time of Nero’s rule. But the proposition has a general validity, which is based on the divinely-ordained position of the magistracy, and is not annulled by their injustices in practice, which Paul had himself so copiously experienced. Comp. 1 Peter 2:14.

Romans 13:4. Θεοῦ … ἀγαθόν] Establishment of the preceding thought—that the well-doer has not to fear the magistrate, but to expect praise from him—by indicating the relation of the magistracy to God, whose servant (διάκονος, feminine, as in Romans 16:1; Dem. 762. 4, and frequently) it is, and to the subjects, for whose benefit (defence, protection, blessing) it is so. The σοί is the ethical relation of the Θεοῦ διάκον. ἐστι, and εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν adds the more precise definition.

οὐ γὰρ εἰκῆ] for not without corresponding reason (frequently so in classical Greek), but in order actually to use it, should the case require.

τὴν μάχαιρ. φορεῖ] What is meant is not the dagger, which the Roman emperors and the governing officials next to them were accustomed to wear as the token of their jus vitae et necis (Aurel. Vict. 13; Grotius and Wetstein in loc.); for μάχαιρα, although denoting dagger = παραξιφός in the classics (see Spitzner on Hom. Il. xviii. 597; Duncan, Lex. ed. Rost, p. 715), means in the N. T. always sword, viii. 35, according to Xen. r. eq. xii. 11 (but comp. Krüger, Xen. Anab. i. 8. 7), differing by its curved form from the straight ξίφος; and also among the Greeks the bearing of the sword (Philostr. Vit. Ap. vii. 16) is expressly used to represent that power of the magistrates. They bore it themselves, and in solemn processions it was borne before them. See Wolf, Cur. On the distinction between φορέω (the continued habit of bearing) and φέρω, see Lobeck, ad Phryn. p. 585.

Θεοῦ γὰρ διάκ. κ.τ.λ.] ground assigned for the assurance οὐκ εἰκῆ τ. μ. φ., in which the previously expressed proposition is repeated with emphasis, and now its penal reference is appended.

ἔκδικος εἰς ὀργὴν κ.τ.λ.] avenging (1 Thessalonians 4:6; Wis 12:12; Sir 30:6; Herodian, vii. 4. 10; Aristaenet. i. 27) in behalf of wrath (for the execution of wrath) for him who does evil. This dative of reference is neither dependent on ἐστίν, the position of which is here different from the previous one (in opposition to Hofmann), nor on εἰς ὀργήν (Flatt); it belongs to ἔκδικος εἰς ὀργ. Εἰς ὀργήν is not “superfluous and cumbrous” (de Wette), but strengthens the idea.

We may add that our passage proves (comp. Acts 25:11) that the abolition of the right of capital punishment deprives the magistracy of a power which is not merely given to it in the O. T., but is also decisively confirmed in the N. T., and which it (herein lies the sacred limitation and responsibility of this power) possesses as God’s minister; on which account its application is to be upheld as a principle with reference to those cases in law, where the actual satisfaction of the divine Nemesis absolutely demands it, while at the same time the right of pardon is still to be kept open for all concrete cases. The character of being unchristian, of barbarism, etc., does not adhere to the right itself, but to its abuse in legislation and practice.

Romans 13:5. The necessity of obedience is of such a character, that it is not merely externally suggested (by reason of the punishment to be avoided), but is based also on moral grounds; and these two considerations are exhibited by διό as the result of all that has been hitherto said (Romans 13:1-4). It is clear, accordingly, that ἀνάγκη is not specially the moral necessity, but is to be taken generally, as it is only with the second διά that the moral side of the notion is brought forward.

διὰ τὴν ὀργήν] on account of the magistrate’s wrath, Romans 13:4.

διὰ τὴν συνείδ.] on account of one’s own conscience, διὰ τὸ πληροῦν τὰ προσήκοντα, Theodoret. It is with the Christian the Christian conscience, which as such is bound by God’s ordinance. Hence 1 Peter 2:13 : διὰ τὸν κύριον. Aptly Melanchthon: “Nulla potentia humana, nulli exercitus magis muniunt imperia, quam haec severissima lex Dei: necesse est obedire propter conscientiam.” Both definitions given with διά belong, however, to ἀνάγκη (sc. ἐστί), which bears the emphasis, like Hebrews 9:23.

Romans 13:6. For on this account you pay taxes—this is the confirmation of Romans 13:5, from the actually subsisting payment of taxes; γάρ retains its sense assigning a reason, and the emphatic διὰ τοῦτο (from this ground) is exactly in accordance with the context: ὅτι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ὀργὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν ἀνάγκη ἐστιν ὑποτάσσεσθαι. At the basis of the argument lies the view, that the existing relation of tax-paying is a result of the necessity indicated in Romans 13:5, and consequently the confirmation of it. If διὰ τοῦτο be referred to Romans 13:1-4 : “ut magistratus Dei mandatu homines maleficos puniant, proborum saluti prospiciant,” Fritzsche (comp. Calvin, Tholuck, de Wette, Borger), Romans 13:5 is arbitrarily passed over. It follows, moreover, from our passage, that the refusal of taxes is the practical rejection of the necessity stated in Romans 13:5. Others take τελεῖτε as imperative (Heumann, Morus, Tholuck, Klee, Reiche, Köllner, Hofmann). Against this the γάρ, which might certainly be taken with the imperative (see on Romans 6:19), is not indeed decisive; but Paul himself gives by his οὖν, Romans 13:7, the plain indication that he is passing for the first time in Romans 13:7 to the language of summons, which he now also introduces, not with the present, but with the aorist.

καί] also denotes the relation corresponding to Romans 13:5. It is not “a downward climax” (Hofmann: “even this most external performance of subjection”), of which there is no indication at all either in the text or in the thing itself. The latter is, on the contrary, the immediate practical voucher most accordant with the experience of every subject.

τελεῖτε] Paul does not in this appeal to his readers’ own recognition of what was said in Romans 13:5 (the summons in Romans 13:7 is opposed to this), but to what subsists as matter of fact.

λειτουργοὶ γὰρ Θεοῦ κ.τ.λ.] justifies the fundamental statement, expressed by διὰ τοῦτο, of the actual bearing of the payment of taxes: for they are ministering servants of God, persevering in activity on this very behalf (on no other). The thought in Romans 13:4, that the magistracy is Θεοῦ διάκονος, is here by way of climax more precisely defined through λειτουργοί (which is therefore prefixed with emphasis) according to the official sacredness of this relation of service, and that conformably to the Christian view of the magisterial calling. Accordingly, those who rule, in so far as they serve the divine counsel and will, and employ their strength and activity to this end, are to be regarded as persons whose administration has the character of a divinely consecrated sacrificial service, a priestly nature (Romans 15:16; Php 2:17, et al.). This renders the proposition the more appropriate for confirmation of the διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ., which is a specifically religious one.

λειτουργοὶ Θεοῦ is predicate, and the subject is understood of itself from the context: they, namely magisterial persons (οἱ ἄρχοντες). Incorrectly as regards linguistic usage, Reiche, Köllner, Olshausen take προσκαρτ. to be the subject, in which case certainly the article before the participle would be quite indispensable (Reiche erroneously appeals to Matthew 20:16; Matthew 22:14).

εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο] Telic direction not of λειτουργ. (Hofmann), but of προσκαρτ.: for this very object, by which is meant not the administration of tax-paying (Olshausen, Philippi, and older interpreters), but the just mentioned λειτουργεῖν τῷ Θεῷ, in which vocation, so characteristically sacred, the magistracy is continually and assiduously active, and the subject gives to it the means of being so, namely, taxes. Thus the payment of taxes is placed by Paul under the highest point of view of a religious conscientious duty, so that by means of it the divine vocation of the magistracy to provide a constantly active sacrificial cultus of God is promoted and facilitated. If εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο was to be referred to the administration of taxes, this would not indeed be “nonsensical” (Hofmann), but the emphatic mode of expression αὐτὸ τοῦτο would be without due motive, nor could we easily perceive why Paul should have selected the verb προσκαρτ., which expresses the moral notion perseverare. The reference of it to the nearest great thought, λειτουργοὶ κ.τ.λ., excludes, the more weighty and appropriate that it is, any other reference, even that of Hofmann, that αὐτὸ τοῦτο points back to the same proposition as διὰ τοῦτο.

Instead of εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, Paul might have said αὐτῷ τούτῳ (Romans 12:12); he has, however, conceived προσκαρτ. absolutely, and given with εἰς the definition of its aim. Comp. on the absolute προσκατερεῖν, Numbers 13:20; Xen. Hell. vii. 5, 14.

Romans 13:7. Hortatory application of the actual state of the case contained in Romans 13:5-6 : perform therefore your duties to all (comp. on 1 Corinthians 7:3), etc.—a brief summary (ἀπόδοτε … ὀφειλ.) and distributive indication of that which is to be rendered to all magisterial persons generally (πᾶσι), and to individuals in particular (tax officers, customs officers, judicial and other functionaries), both really (φόρος, τέλος) and personally (φόβος, τιμή).

πᾶσι] to be referred to magistrates, not to all men generally (Estius, Klee, Reiche, Glöckler, comp. also Ewald); this is manifestly, from the whole connection—and especially from the following specification, as also from the fact that the language only becomes general at Romans 13:8—the only reference in conformity with the text.

τῷ τὸν φόρον] sc. ἀπαιτοῦντι, which flows logically from ἀπόδοτε πᾶσι τ. ὀφ. (Winer, p. 548 [E. T. 737]; Buttmann, p. 338), and is also suitable to τ. φόβον and τ. τιμήν; for, in fact, the discourse is concerning magistrates, who—and that not merely as respects the notions of that time—do certainly, in accordance with their respective positions of power and performances of service, demand fear and honour.

φόρος and τέλος are distinguished as taxes (on persons and property) and customs (on goods). See on Luke 20:22.

φόβος, τιμή, fear (not merely reverence), veneration. The higher and more powerful the magisterial personages, the more they laid claim, as a rule, to be feared; otherwise and lower in the scale, at least to be honoured with the respect attaching to their office.