성경 주석서

CHAPTER 8

The section treating of the woman taken in adultery, John 8:1-11, together with John 7:53, is a document by some unknown author belonging to the apostolic age, which, after circulating in various forms of text, was inserted in John’s Gospel, probably by the second, or, at latest, by the third century (the Constitutt. Apost. ii. 24. 4, already disclose its presence in the canon), the remark in John 7:53 being added to connect it with what precedes. That the interpolation of this very ancient fragment of gospel history was derived from the Evang. sec. Hebraeos cannot, as several of the early critics think (comp. also Lücke and Bleek), be proved from Papias, in Euseb. H. E. 3. 39; for in the words ἐκτέθειται (Papias) δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ἱστορίαν περὶ γυναικὸς ἐπὶ πολλαῖς ἁμαρτίαις διαβληθείσης ἐπὶ τοῦ κυρίου, ἣν τὸ καθʼ Ἑβραίους εὐαγγέλιον περιέχει, the general expression ἐπὶ πολλαῖς ἁμαρτίαις and the word διαβληθ. merely are not favourable to that identity between the two which Rufinus already assumed. It is, however, only its high antiquity, and the very early insertion of the section in the Johannean text, which explain the fact that it is found in most Codices of the Itala, in the Vulgate, and other versions; that Jerome, adv. Pelag. ii. 17, could vouch for its existence “in multis et Graecis et Latinis Codd.;” and that, finally, upwards of a hundred Codices still extant, including D. F. G. H. K. U., contain it. Its internal character, moreover, speaks in favour of its having originated in the early Christian age; for, although it is, indeed, quite alien to the Johannean mode of representation, and therefore not for a moment to be referred to an oral Johannean source (Luthardt), it is, nevertheless, entirely in keeping with the tone of the synoptical Gospels, and does not betray the slightest trace of being a later invention in favour either of a dogmatic or ecclesiastical interest. Comp. Calvin: “Nihil apostolico spiritu indignum continet.” The occurrence related bears, moreover, so strong a stamp of originality, and is so evidently not compiled in imitation of any other of the Gospel narratives, that it cannot be regarded as a later legendary story, especially as its internal truthfulness will be vindicated in the course of the exposition itself, in opposition to the manifold doubts that have been raised against it. But the narrative does not proceed from John. Of this we are assured by the remarkable and manifestly interpolated link, John 7:53, which connects it with what precedes; further, by the strange interruption with which it breaks up the unity of the account continued in John 8:14 ff.; again by its tone and character, so closely resembling that of the synoptic history, to which, in particular, belongs the propounding of a question of law, in order to tempt Christ,—a thing which does not occur in John; still further, by the going out of Jesus to the Mount of Olives, and His return to the temple, whereby we are transported to the Lord’s last sojourn in Jerusalem (Luke 21); also by the entire absence of the Johannean οὖν, and in its stead the constant recurrence of δέ; and, lastly, by the non-Johannean expressions ὄρθρου, πᾶς ὁ λαός, καθίσας ἐδίδασκεν αὐτούς, οἱ γραμματ. κ. οἱ Φαρισ., ἐπιμένειν, ἀναμάρτητος, καταλείπεσθαι and κατακρίνειν, πλήν also, in John 8:10 (Elz.). With these various internal reasons many very weighty external arguments are conjoined, which show that the section was not received by any means into all copies of John’s Gospel; but, on the contrary, that from the third and fourth centuries it was tacitly or expressly excluded from the canonical text. For Origen, Apollinarius, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Cyril, Chrysostom, Nonnus, Theophylact, Tertullian, and other Fathers (except Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, Sedulius, Leo, Chrysologus, Cassiodorus), as well as the Catenae, are altogether silent about this section; Euthymius Zigabenus, however, has it, and explains it, indeed, but passes this judgment upon it: Χρὴ δὲ γινώσκειν, ὅτι τὰ ἐντεῦθεν (John 7:53) ἄχρι τοῦ· πάλιν οὖν ἐλάλησεν, κ.τ.λ. (John 8:12) παρὰ τοῖς ἀκριβέσιν ἀντιγράφοις ἢ οὐχ εὕρηται, ἤ ὠβέλισται. Διὸ φαίνονται παρέγγραπτα καὶ προσθήκη· καὶ τούτου τεκμήριον, τὸ μηδὲ τὸν Χρυσόστομον ὅλως μνημονεῦσαι αὐτῶν. Of the versions, the Syr. (in Codd., also of the Nestorians, and in the first edd.), Syr. p. Copt. (in most MSS.) Ar. Sahid. Arm. Goth. Verc. Brix. have not the section. It is also wanting in very old and important Codices, viz. A. B. C. L. T. X. Δ. א., of which, however, A. and C. are here defective (but according to Tisch., C. never had it; see his edition of Codex C., Proleg. p. 31), while L. and Δ. leave an empty space; other Codices mark it as suspicious by asterisks or an obelus, or expressly so describe it in Scholia (see especially Scholz and Tisch.). Beyond a doubt, this apocryphal interpolation would have seemed less surprising to early criticism had it found a place, not in John’s Gospel, but in one of the Synoptics. But wherefore just here? If we decline to attribute this enigma to some accidental, unknown cause and thus to leave it unsolved, then its position here may be accounted for in this way: that as an abortive plan of the Sanhedrim against Jesus had just before been narrated, it appeared to be an appropriate place for relating a new, though again unsuccessful, attempt to trip Him; and this particular narrative may have been inserted, all the more, because the saying about judging and not judging, in John 8:15, might find in it an historical explanation; while, perhaps, an old uncritical tradition, that John was the author of the fragment, may have removed all difficulty. But even on this view the attempts of criticism to correct the text very soon appear. For the Codd. i. 19, 20 et al., transfer the section as a doubtful appendix to the end of the Gospel; others (13, 69, 124, 346) insert it after Luke 21:38. where, especially considering John 8:1-2, it would appropriately fit in with the historical connection; and possibly also it might have had a place in one of the sources made use of by Luke. How various the recensions were in which it was circulated, is proved by the remarkable number of various readings, which for the most part bear the impress, not of chance or arbitrariness, but of varying originality. D., in particular, presents a peculiar form of text; the section in it runs thus: Ἰησ. δὲ ἐπ. εἰς τ. ὄρ. τ. ἐλ. Ὄρθρ. δὲ π. παραγίνεται εἰς τ. ἱερ. κ. π. ὁ λ. ἤρχ. πρὸς αὐτ. Ἀγ. δὲ οἱ γρ. κ. οἱ Φ. ἐπὶ ἁμαρτίᾳ γυν. εἰλημένην, κ. στ. αὐτ. ἐν μ. λ. αὐτῷ ἐκπειράζοντες αὐτὸν οἱ ἱερεῖς, ἵνα ἔχωσι κατηγορίαν αὐτοῦ· διδ., αὕτ. ἡγ. κατείληπται ἐπ. μοιχ. Μωϋσῆς δὲ ἐν τ. νόμῳ ἐκέλευσε τὰς τοιαύτ. λιθάζειν· σὺ δὲ νῦν τί λέγεις; Ὁ δὲ Ἰησ. κ. κ. τ. δ. κατέγραφεν εἰς τ. γ. Ὡς δὲ ἐπ. ἐρωτ., ἀνέκυψε καὶ εἶπεν αὑτοῖς· ὁ ἀν. ὑμ. πρ. ἐπʼ αὐτὴν βαλλέτω λίθον. Κ. π. κατακύψας τῷ δακτύλῳ κατέγραφεν εἰς τ. γ. Ἕκαστος δὲ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἐξήρχετο, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, ὥστε πάντας ἐξελθεῖν, κ. κατελ. μόν. κ. ἡ γυνὴ ἐν μ. οὖσα. Ἀνακ. δὲ ὁ Ἰησ. εἶπ. τῇ γυναικί· ποῦ εἰσιν; οὐδείς σε κατεκρ.; Κἀκείνη εἶπεν αὐτῷ· οὐδεὶς, κύρ. Ὁ δὲ εἶπεν· οὐδὲ ἐγ. σ. κ. Ὕπαγε, ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν μηκέτι ἁμάρτανε.

The Johannean authorship was denied by Erasmus, Calvin (?), Beza, Grotius, Wetstein, Semler, Morus, Haenlein, Wegscheider, Paulus, Tittmann (Melet. p. 318 ff.), Knapp, Seyffarth, Lücke, Credner, Tholuck, Olshausen, Krabbe, B. Crusius, Bleek, Weisse, Lücke, De Wette, Guericke, Reuss, Brückner, Luthardt, Ewald, Baeumlein, Hengstenberg (who regards the section as a forgery made for a particular purpose), Schenkel, Godet, Scholten, and most critics: Lachmann and Tischendorf also have removed the section from the text. Bretschneider, p. 72 ff., attributing it to the Pseudo-Johannes, endeavours to establish its spuriousness, and so uses it as an argument against the genuineness of the Gospel; Strauss and Bauer deal with it in the same way, while Hitzig (on John Mark, p. 205 ff.) regards the evangelist Mark as the author, in whose Gospel it is said to have stood after John 12:17 (according to Holtzmann, in the primary Mark). Its authenticity, on the contrary, was defended in early times especially by Augustine (de conjug. adult. 2. 7),1[1] whose subjective judgment is, that the story had been rejected by persons of weak faith, or by enemies of the true faith, who feared “peccandi impunitatem dari mulieribus suis;”—in modern times by Mill, Whitby, Fabricius, Wolf, Lampe, Bengel, Heumann, Michaelis, Storr, Dettmers (Vindiciae αὐθεντίας textus Gr. peric. Joh. vii. 53 ff., Francof. ad Viadr. p. 1, 1793); Stäudlin (in two Dissert., Gott. 1806) Hug (de conjugii Christ. vinculo indissolub., Frib. 1816, p. 22 ff.); Kuinoel, Möller (neue Ansichten, p. 313 ff.); Scholz (Erklär. der Evang. p. 396 ff., and N. T. I. p. 383); Klee and many others, in particular, also Maier, i. p. 24 f.; Ebrard, Horne, Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the N. T., ed. Tregelles, p. 465; Hilgenfeld, Evang. p. 284 ff., and again in his Zeitschrift, 1863, p. 317, Lange. Schulthess, in Winer and Engelhardt krit Journ. v. 3, pp. 257–317, declares himself in favour of the genuineness of a text purified by the free use of various readings.

John 8:14. ἢ τοῦ ὑπάγω] Elz. Lachm.: ΚΑῚ ΠΟῦ ὙΠ. But B. D. K. T. U. X. Λ. Curs, and many Vss. have Ἢ; and ΚΑῚ might easily have been repeated from what precedes, while there was nothing to occasion the change of ΚΑῚ into Ή.

John 8:16. ἈΛΗΘΉς] Lachm. and Tisch.: ἈΛΗΘΙΝΉ, after B. D. L. T. X. 33. Or. Rightly; ἈΛΗΘΉς was introduced from the context (John 8:14; John 8:17).

John 8:20. After ἘΛΆΛΗΣΕΝ Elz. has Ὁ ἸΗΣΟῦς, against decisive witnesses.

John 8:26. ΛΈΓΩ] Lachm. Tisch.: ΛΑΛῶ, following important witnesses; but from John 8:25; John 8:28.

John 8:28. Ὁ ΠΑΤΉΡ] Elz. Scholz: Ὁ ΠΑΤΉΡ ΜΟΥ. But ΜΟΥ is wanting in D. L. T. X. א. 13, 69, 122, al. Slav. Vulg. It. Eus. Cyr. Hilar. Faustin., and is a later addition, intended to mark the peculiar relation of the Ὁ ΠΑΤΉΡ.

John 8:29. After ΜΌΝΟΝ Elz. Scholz have Ὁ ΠΑΤΉΡ. A gloss which 253, 259 have inserted before μόνον.

John 8:34. τῆς ἁμαρτίας] wanting only in D. Cant. 8 :Clem. Faustin., witnesses which are too weak to justify our condemning it as a gloss. It was left out on account of the following general expression ὁ δὲ δοῦλος.

John 8:38. ἅ ἠκούσατε παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν] Elz. Scholz: ὃ ἑωράκατε παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ ὑμῶν. But B. C. D. K. X. א. Curss. Or. have ἅ; B. C. K. L. X. א.** Curss. and some Vss. and Fathers, even Or., read ἠκούσατε and τοῦ πατρός. The received text, of which Tisch. has inconsistently retained ἑωράκ., is a mechanical imitation of the first half of the verse. The pronouns μου and ὑμῶν must, with Lachm. and Tisch., following very important witnesses, he deleted as clumsy additions inserted for the purpose of marking the distinction. Finally, ἅ also in the first half has almost entirely the same witnesses in its favour as the second ἅ, so that with Lachm. and Tisch. we must read ἅ in both places.

John 8:39. ἦτε] B. D. L. א. Vulg. Codd. It. Or. Aug.: ἐστε. So Griesb. Lachm. Tisch.; rightly defended by Buttmann in the Stud. u. Krit. 1858, p. 474 ff. The seemingly illogical relation of the protasis and apodosis caused ἐστε to be changed into ἦτε, and ἐποιεῖτε into ποιεῖτε (Vulg. Or. Aug.).

After ἐποιεῖτε, Elz. Lachm. have ἄν, which is wanting in important witnesses, and is an unnecessary grammatical addition.

John 8:51. τὸν λόγ. τὸν ἐμόν] Lachm. Tisch.: τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον, which is preponderatingly attested, and therefore to be adopted.

John 8:52. Instead of γεύσηται Elz. has γεύσεται, against conclusive testimony.

John 8:53. After σεαυτόν Elz. has σύ, which the best Codd. unanimously exclude.

John 8:54. δοξάζω] Lachm. Tisch.: δοξάσω, after B. C.* D. א. Curs. Cant. Verc. Corb. Rd. Colb. Or. Chrys. Ambr. Rightly; the present (comp. the following δοξάζων) would involuntarily present itself to the copyists.

For ἡμῶν (so also Tisch.) Elz. has ὑμῶν (as also Lachm.). The testimonies are divided between the two; but ἡμῶν might easily have been changed into ὑμῶν, after the preceding ὑμεῖς, through not observing the direct construction.

John 8:57. The reading τεσσαράκοντα, which Chrysostom has, and Euthymius Zigabenus found in MSS., is still in Λ. and three Curs., but is nothing save an historical retouche.

John 8:59. After ἹΕΡΟῦ Elz. Scholz have: ΔΙΕΛΘῺΝ ΔΙᾺ ΜΈΣΟΥ ΑὐΤῶΝ, ΚΑῚ ΠΑΡῆΓΕΝ ΟὝΤΩς, words which are wanting in B. D. א.* Vulg. It. al. Or. Cyr. Arnob. An addition after Luke 4:30, whence also ἘΠΟΡΕΎΕΤΟ has been interpolated after ΑὐΤῶΝ in several witnesses.

[1] 1 Nikon, in the 13th century, attributed the omission to solicitude lest the contents should have an injurious effect upon the multitude. See Cotelerius, Patr. Apost. i. 235.

John 8:1-3. ʼΕπορ.] down from the temple.

εἰς τ. ὄρ. τ. ἐλ.] where He passed the night; comp. Luke 21:37. Displays the synoptic stamp in its circumstantiality of description and in the use of words; instead of ὄρθρου (Luke 24:1), John uses πρωΐ (John 18:28, John 20:1; comp. πρωῑìα, John 21:4); for πᾶς ὁ λαός John uses ὁ ὄχλος and οἱ ὄχλοι; καθίσας ἐδίδ. αὐτ. is synoptical; on ἐδίδασκεν, however, without mention of the topic, comp. John 7:14; the γραμματεῖς never appear in John; nor does he anywhere name the Mount of Olives.

The crowd of people, after the conclusion of the feast, would not be surprising, considering the great sensation which Jesus had caused at the feast.

The expression “Scribes and Pharisees” is the designation in the synoptic narrative for His regular opponents, answering to the Johannean οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι. They do not appear here as Zealots (Wetstein, Kuinoel, Staeudlin), whose character would not correspond either with their questioning of Jesus or with their subsequent slinking away; nor even as a Deputation from the Sanhedrim, which certainly would not have condescended to this, and whose delegates would not have dared to let the woman slip. It is rather a non-official tentative attack, like several that are narrated by the Synoptics; the woman has just been taken in the very act; has, as a preliminary step, been handed over to the Scribes and Pharisees for further proceedings; has not yet, however, been brought before the Sanhedrim, but is first made use of by them for this attempt against Jesus.

John 8:4-5. Observe especially here and in John 8:5-6 the thoroughly synoptical diffuseness of the account.

κατειλήφθη] with the augment of εἴληφα, see Winer, p. 60 [E. T. p. 84]. On the expression, comp. κατείληπτο μοιχός, Arrian. Epict. 2. 4.

ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ] in the very act. Herod. 6. 72, 137; Plato, Pol. 2, p. 359 C; Xen. Symp. 3. 13; Dem. 378. 12; Soph. Ant. 51; Eur. Ion. 1214. Comp. Philo, p. 785 A: μοιχεῖαι αὐτόφωροι. On λαμβάνειν ἐπί, of taking in adultery, see Toup. Opp. Crit. I. p. 101.

The adulterer, who in like manner was liable to death (Leviticus 20:10; Deuteronomy 22:24), may have fled.

λιθοβολεῖσθαι] This word cannot be called un-Johannean (in John 10:31 ff. λιθάζειν is used) because of its being taken from Deut. l.c. According to Deuteronomy 22:23-24 the law expressly appoints stoning for the particular case, when a betrothed maiden allows herself to be seduced by a man in the city, where she could have summoned help. The woman here taken must therefore necessarily be regarded as such an one, because the λιθοβολεῖσθαι is expressly referred to a command contained in the Mosaic law. From Deut. l.c., where the betrothed, in reference to the seducer, is termed אֵשֶׁת רֵעֵהוּ, it is clear that the crime in question was regarded as a modified form of adultery, as it is also called εἶδος μοιχεῖας by Philo, de legg. special. ii. p. 311. The rarity of such a case as this made it all the more a fit topic for a tempting question in casuistry. Accordingly, τὰς τοιαύτας is to be understood as denoting the class of adulteresses of this particular kind, to whom refers that law of Moses appointing the punishment of stoning: “adulteresses of this kind.” That Moses, in Deut. l.c., does not use the expression נאף (Lücke’s objection) is immaterial, because he has not this word at all in the connection, nor even in the other cases, but designates the thing in another way. Usually the woman is regarded as a married woman; and as in Leviticus 20:10 and Deuteronomy 22:22, not stoning specifically, but death generally is the punishment adjudged to adulteresses of this class, some either infer the internal falsehood of the whole story (Wetstein, Semler, Morus, Paulus, Lücke, De Wette, Baur, and many others; comp. also Hengstenberg and Godet), or assume that the punishment of death, which is not more precisely defined by the law (“to die the death”), must mean stoning (Michaelis, Mos. R. § 262; Tholuck, B. Crusius, Ebrard, Keil, Archæol. § 153, 1; Ewald, Brückner hesitatingly, Luthardt, Baeumlein). As to the last view, judging from the text in Deut. l.c., and also according to Rabbinical tradition, it is certainly an unsafe assumption; comp. Saalschütz, Mos. R. p. 571. Here, however, where the λιθοβολεῖσθαι is distinctly cited as a positive provision of the law, we have neither reason nor right to assume a reference to any other precept save that in which stoning is expressly named as the punishment, viz. Deuteronomy 22:24 (LXX.: λιθοβολήσονται ἐν λίθοις), with which also the Talmud agrees, Sanhedr. f. 51, 2 : “Filia Israelitae, si adultera, cum nupta, strangulanda,[2] cum desponsata, lapidanda.” The supposition of Grotius, that the severer punishment of stoning for adultery was introduced after the time of Ezekiel, cannot be proved by Ezekiel 16:38; Ezekiel 16:40; Sus. 45; the Μωϋσῆς ἐνετείλατο, moreover, is decidedly against all such suppositions.

[2] According to the Talmudic rule: “Omnis mors, cujus et mentio in lege simpliciter, non alia est quam strangulatio,” Sanhedr. l.c. The incorrectness of this rule (Michaelis, l.c.) is a matter of no consequence, so far as the present passage is concerned.

John 8:6. Πειράζοντες αὐτόν] denoting, not a good-natured questioning (Olshausen), but, agreeably to the standing synoptical representation of the relation of those men to Jesus, and in keeping with what immediately follows, malicious tempting. The insidious feature of the plan consisted in this: “If He decides with Moses for the stoning, He will be accused before the Roman authorities; for, according to the Roman criminal law, adultery was not punishable with death, and stoning in particular was generally repudiated by the Romans (see Staeudlin and Hug). But if He decides against Moses and against stoning, He will then be prosecuted before the Sanhedrim as an opposer of the law.” That they expected and wished for the former result, is shown, by the prejudicial way in which they introduce the question, by quoting the express punishment prescribed by Moses.[3] Their plan here is similar in design to that of the question touching the tribute money in Matthew 22. It is objected that the Romans in the provinces did not administer justice strictly in accordance with their own laws; but amid the general immorality of the times they certainly did not conform to the rigour of the Mosaic punishment for adultery; and how easy would it have been before the Roman magistrates to give a revolutionary aspect to the hoped-for decision of Jesus in favour of Moses, even if He had in some way reserved the competency of the Roman authorities! If it be said that Jesus needed only to declare Himself in favour of execution, and not exactly for stoning, it is overlooked that here was the very case for which stoning was expressly appointed. If it be urged, lastly, that when Jesus was required to assume the position of a judge, He needed only to refer His questioners to the Sanhedrim, and to tell them to take the woman thither (Ebrard), that would have amounted to a declining to answer, which would, indeed, have been the surest way of escape from the dilemma, but inappropriate enough to the intellectual temperament of Jesus in such cases. Other explanations of πειράζειν—(1) They would either have accused him to the Romans imminutae majestatis, because they then possessed the jus vitae et necis, or to the Jews imminutae libertatis (Grotius), and as a false Messiah (Godet). But that prerogative of the Romans was not infringed by the pronouncing of a sentence of condemnation; it was still reserved to them through their having to confirm and carry out the sentence. Accordingly, B. Crusius gives this turn to the question: “Would Jesus decide for the popular execution of the law … or would He peradventure even take upon Himself to pass such a judgment” (so, substantially, Hitzig also, on Joh. Markus, p. 205 ff., and Luthardt), where (with Wetstein and Schulthess) the law of the Zealots is called in by way of help? But in that case the interrogators, who intended to make use of a negative answer against Him as an overturning of the law, and an affirmative reply as an interference with the functions of the authorities, would then have put no question at all relating to the thing which they really wanted (i.e. the execution, and that immediate and tumultuous). (2) As the punishment of death for adultery had at that time already fallen into disuse, the drift of their question was simply, whether or not legal proceedings should be instituted at all (Ebrard, following Michaelis). The words themselves, and the design expressed in the κατῃγορεῖν, which could not take place before the people, but before the competent judges, as in Matthew 12:10, are quite opposed to this explanation. (3) Dieck, in the Stud. u. Krit. 1832, p. 791, says: As the punishment of death for adultery presupposes liberty of divorcement, and as Jesus had Himself repudiated divorce, He would, by pronouncing in favour of that punishment, have contradicted Himself; while, by pronouncing against it, He would have appeared as a despiser of the law. But apart from the improbability of any such logical calculation on the part of His questioners as to the first alternative,—a calculation which is indicated by nothing in the text,—the ἵνα ἔχ. κατηγ. αὐτ. is decisive against this explanation; for a want of logical consistency would have furnished no ground for accusation.[4] (4) The same argument tells against Augustine, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Aretius, Jansen, Cornelius à Lapide, Baumgarten, and many other expositors: according to whom an affirmative reply would have been inconsistent with the general mildness of His teaching; a negative answer would have been a decision against Moses. (5) Euthymius Zigabenus, Bengel, and many others, Neander also, Tholuck, Baeumlein, Hengstenberg (who sees here an unhistorical mingling of law and gospel), are nearer the mark in regarding the plan of attack as based upon the assumption, which they regarded as certain, that in accordance with His usual gentleness He would give a negative answer: γινώσκοντες γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐλεήμονα κ. συμπαθῆ, προσεδόκων, ὅτι φείσεται αὐτῆς, καὶ λοιπὸν ἕξουσι κατηγορίαν κατʼ αὐτὸν, ὡς παρανόμως φειδομένου τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου λιθαζομένης, Euthymius Zigabenus. But this explanation also must be rejected, partly even on à priori grounds, because an ensnaring casuistic question may naturally be supposed to involve a dilemma; partly and mainly because in this case the introduction of the question by ἐν δὲ τῷ νόμῳ would have been a very unwise method of preparing the way for a negative answer. This latter argument tells against Ewald, who holds that Christ, by the acquittal which they deemed it probable He would pronounce, would have offended against the Mosaic law; while by condemning, He would have violated as well the milder practice then in vogue as His own more gentle principles. Lücke, De Wette, Brückner, Baur,[5] and many other expositors renounce the attempt to give any satisfactory solution of the difficulty.

τῷ δακτύλῳ ἔγραφεν εἰς τ. γῆν] as a sign that He was not considering their question, ὅπερ εἰώθασι πολλάκις ποιεῖν οἱ μὴ θέλοντες ἀποκρίνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἐρωτῶντας ἄκαιρα καὶ ἀνάξια. Γνοὺς γὰρ αὐτῶν τὴν μηχανὴν, προσεποιεῖτο γράφειν εἰς τ. γῆν, καὶ μὴ προσέχειν οἷς ἔλεγον, Euthymius Zigabenus. For instances of behaviour like this on the part of one who turns away from those around him, and becomes absorbed in himself, giving himself up to his own thoughts or imaginings, from Greek writers (Aristoph. Acharn. 31, and Schol. Diog. Laert. 2. 127) and from the Rabbins, see in Wetstein. Isaiah 17:13 does not here serve for elucidation. What Jesus wrote is not a subject even of inquiry; nor are we to ask whether, by the act, He was symbolizing any, and if so what, answer (Michaelis: the answer “as it is written”). There is much marvellous conjecture among the older expositors. See Wolf and Lampe, also Fabricius, Cod. Apocr. p. 315, who thinks that Jesus wrote the answer given in John 8:7 (after Bede; comp. also Ewald, Gesch. Chr. p. 480, ed. 3, and Godet). Suffice it to say, the strange manner in which Jesus silently declines to give a decisive reply (acting, no doubt, according to His principle of not interfering with the sphere of the magistracy (here a matter of criminal law, Matthew 22; Luke 12:13-14),[6] bears the stamp of genuineness and not of invention, though Hengstenberg deems this procedure unworthy of Jesus; the tempters deserved the contempt which this implied, John 8:9.

Observe in ἔγραφεν the descriptive imperfect. The reader sees Him writing with His finger. The additions in some Codd. καὶ τροσποιούμενος, and (more strongly attested) μὴ προσποιούμ., are glosses of different kinds, meaning “though He only pretended (simulans) to write;” and, “without troubling Himself about them” (dissimulans, Ev. 32 adds αὐτούς). See Matthaei, ed. min, in loc.

[3] Observe also, in reference to this, the οὖν in ver. 5, which logically paves the way for an answer in agreement with Moses.

[4] What they really wished was to accuse Him, on the ground of the answer He would give. Hilgenfeld therefore is in error when he thinks they sought to force Him to give a decisive utterance as the obligation of the Mosaic law. By an affirmative reply (he says) Christ would have recognised this obligation, and by His non-observance of the law (John 5:18, John 7:23) He would have been self-condemned; by a negative answer He would have been guilty of an express rejection of the law. Viewing the matter thus, they could not, indeed, have accused Him on account of His answer if affirmative; they could only have charged Him with logical inconsistency. This tells substantially also against Lange’s view, viz. that they wished to see whether He would venture, in the strength of His Messianic authority, to set up a new law. If in this case He had decided in favour of Moses, they could not have accused Him (to the Sanhedrim).

[5] According to Baur (p. 170 sq.), there is nothing historical whatever in the story; it has a purely ideal import. The main idea he holds to be the consciousness of one’s own sinfulness breaking the power of every sin, in opposition to the accusation brought against Jesus by the Pharisees, that He associated with sinners, and thus was so ready to forgive.

[6] According to Luthardt, to show that the malice of the question did not deserve an answer. But the numerous testing questions proposed to Him, according to the Synoptics, by His opponents, were all of them malicious; yet Jesus did not refuse to reply to them. According to Lange’s fancy, Jesus assumed the gesture of a calm majesty, which, in its playful ease, refused to be disturbed by any street scandal. Melancthon well says: “Initio, cum accusatur mulier, nihil respondit Christus, tanquam in aliam rem intentus, videlicet prorsus a sese rejiciens hanc quaestionem pertinentem ad cognitionem magistratus politici. Postea, cum urgetur, respondet non de muliere, sed de ipsorum peccatis, qui ipsam accusabant.”

John 8:7. Ἀναμάρτητος] faultless, here only in the N. T., very often in the Classics. Whether it means freedom from the possibility of fault (of error or sin), as in Plato, Pol. I. p. 339 B, or freedom from actual sin (comp. γυνὴ ἀναμάρτητος, Herod. v. 39),—whether, again, it is to be understood generally (2Ma 8:4), or with reference to any definite category or species of ἁμαρτία (2Ma 12:42; Deuteronomy 29:19), is a matter which can be decided by the context alone. Here it must signify actual freedom from the sin, not indeed of adultery specially, for Jesus could not presuppose this of the hierarchy as a whole, even with all its corruption of morals, but probably of unchastity, simply because a woman who was a sinner of this category was here in question, and stood before the eyes of them all as the living opposite of ἀναμάρτητος. Comp. ἁμαρτωλός, Luke 7:37; ἁμαρτάνειν, Jacobs, ad Anthol. x. p. 111; in chap. John 5:14, also, a special kind of sinning is intended by μηκέτι ἁμάρτανε; and the same command, in John 8:11, addressed to the adulteress, authenticates the sense in which ἀναμάρτητος is used. The men tempting Him knew how to avoid, in outward appearance rather than in reality, the unchastity which they condemned. Taking the words to mean freedom from sin generally (Baur, who draws from the passage an erroneous doctrinal meaning, Luthardt, Ewald, Hengstenberg, Godet, following early expositors), we make Jesus propose an impracticable condition in the given case, quite unfitted to disarm His opponents as convicted by their own consciences; for it would have been a purelyideal condition, a standard impossible to man. If we take ἀναμάρτητος, however, in the concrete sense above explained, the condition named becomes quite appropriate to baffle the purpose of the tempting questioners; for the prescription of the Mosaic law is, on the one hand, fully recognised;[7] while, on the other, its fulfilment is made dependent on a condition which would effectually banish from the mind of His questioners, into whose consciences Jesus was looking, all thought of making His answer a ground of accusation to the authorities.

Observe, further, how the general moral maxim to be deduced from the text condemns generally in the Christian community, viewed as it ought to exist conformably to its ideal, the personal condemnation of the sins of others (comp. Matthew 7:1; Galatians 6:5), and puts in its place brotherly admonition, conciliation, forgiveness—in a word, love, as the πλήρωσις of the law.

τὸν λίθον] the stone which He would cast at her in obedience to the law.

ἐπʼ αὐτῇ] upon her. See Bernhardy, p. 249; Ellendt, Lex Soph. i. p. 467.

βαλέτω] not mere permission, but command, and therefore all the more telling. The place of stoning must be conceived as lying outside the city (Leviticus 24:14; Acts 7:56). We must further observe that Jesus does not say the first stone, but let the first (i.e. of you, ὑμῶν) cast the stone, which does not exclude that casting of the first, which was obligatory on the witnesses (Deuteronomy 17:7; Acts 7:58).

[7] The section cannot therefore be used, as Mittermayer uses it (d. Todesstr. 1862), as a testimony of Jesus against capital punishment.

John 8:8-9. Πάλιν, κ.τ.λ.] To indicate that He has nothing further to do with the case. According to Jerome[8] and Euthymius Zigabenus, “in order to give space to the questioners to take themselves away;” but this is not in keeping with John 8:6.

ἐξήρχοντο] descriptive imperfect.

εἷς καθʼ εἷς] Mark 14:19.

ἕως τ. ἐσχάτ.] is to be connected with εἷς καθʼ εἷς, ἀρξ. ἀπὸ τ. πρεσβ. being an intervening clause. See on Matthew 20:8.

The πρεσβύτεροι are the elders in years, not the elders of the people; for there would be no apparent reason why the latter should be the first who should have chosen to go away; besides, the elders of the people are not named along with the others in John 8:3. Those more advanced in years, on the other hand, were also thoughtful and prudent enough to go away first, instead of stopping to compromise themselves further.

ἕως τῶν ἐσχάτ.] attested as genuine by preponderating evidence. It does not refer to rank, the least (so most modern expositors, even Lücke, B. Crusius, De Wette, Maier, Lange), which the context does not sanction; the context (see εἷς καθʼ εἷς) leads us rather to render it ‘unto the last who went out,’ i.e. until all were gone. The feature that the eldest (who probably stood nearest to Jesus) were the first to go out, is characteristic and original; but that the going away took place in the order of rank, is a meaning imported into the words by the expositors. After ἀκούσ. the received text has καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς συνειδήσεως ἐλεγχόμενοι, a gloss opposed to very important witnesses; but as to the matter of fact, right enough.

μόνος ὁ Ἰησ., κ.τ.λ.] Augustine well says: “Relicta sunt duo, miseria et misericordia.” But it does not exclude the presence of the disciples and the crowds of lookers-on at a distance.

[8] According to whom Christ wrote the sins of His accusers and of all mortals!

John 8:10-11. Οἱ κατήγ.] who have accused thee to me, as if I were to be judge.

οὐδείς] is emphatic: Has no one condemned thee? Has no one declared that thou art to be stoned? Were it not so, they would not have left the woman to go free, and all of them gone away. The κατέκρινεν here designates the sententia damnatoria, not as a judicial sentence (for the γραμματεῖς and Pharisees had come merely as asking a question concerning a matter of law or right), but simply as the judgment of an individual.

οὐδὲ ἐγώ σε κατακρ.: I also do not condemn thee. This is not the declaration of the forgiveness of sin, as in Matthew 9:2, Luke 7:48, and cannot therefore justly be urged against the historical genuineness of the narrative (see, in particular, Hengstenberg); nor is it a mere declinature of judicial competency, which would be out of keeping with the preceding question, and with the admonition that follows: on the contrary, it is a refusal to condemn, spoken in the consciousness of His Messianic calling, according to which He had not come to condemn, but to seek and save the lost (John 3:17, John 12:46; Matthew 18:11); not to cast out sinners; “not to quench the smoking flax,” etc. He accordingly does in this case what by His office He is called to do, namely, to awaken and give room for repentance[9] in the sinner, instead of condemning; for He dismisses her with the admonition μηκέτι ἁμάρτανε. Augustine well says: “Ergo et Dominus damnavit, sed peccatum, non hominem.” How striking the force of the negative declaration and the positive admonition!

[9] In connection with the marriage law, it is clear from this passage that, in the case of adultery, repentance on the part of the guilty party makes the continuance of the marriage allowable.

John 8:12. The interpolated section, John 7:53 to John 8:11, being deleted, we must look for some connection with John 7:52. This may be found simply as follows. As the Sanhedrim had not been able to carry out their design of apprehending Jesus, and had, moreover, become divided among themselves (as is recorded in John 7:45-52), He was able, in consequence of this miscarriage in their plans against Him (οὖν), to come forth afresh and address the assembled people in the temple (αὐτοῖς, comp. John 8:20). This renewed coming forward to address them is not, however, to be placed on the last day of the feast, but is so definitely marked off by John 8:20 as a special act, and so clearly distinguished from the preceding, that it must be assigned to one of the following days; just as in John 8:21 the similar transition and the recurring πάλιν introduce again a new discourse spoken on another day. Others take a different view, putting the discourses in John 8:12-20, and even that also in John 8:21 ff., on the day named in chap. John 7:37; but against this is not only the πάλιν of John 8:12 and John 8:21, but the οὖν, which in both places bears an evident reference to some preceding historical observation. Though Lücke’s difficulty, that a single day would be too short for so many discourses and replies, can have no weight, there is yet no sufficient ground for De Wette’s supposition, that John did not know how to hold securely the thread of the history.

I am the light of the world, i.e. (comp. on John 1:4) the possessor and bearer of the divine truth of salvation (τ. φ. τῆς ζωῆς), from whom this saving truth goes forth to all mankind (κόσμος), who without Christ are dark and dead. The light is not identical with the salvation (Hengstenberg), but salvation is the necessary emanation therefrom; without the light there is no salvation. So also Isaiah 49:6; comp. Isaiah 42:6. To regard the figure which Christ here employs, in witnessing to Himself, as suggested by some outward object—for example, by the two colossal golden candlesticks which were lighted at the feast of Tabernacles (but certainly only on the first day; see Succah v. 2) in the forecourt of the women, where also was the γαζοφυλάκιον, John 8:20, on either side of the altar of burnt-offering (Wetstein, Paulus, Olshausen),—is a precarious supposition, as the feast was now over; at the most, we can only associate the words with the sight of the candelabra, as Hug and Lange do—the latter intermingling further references to spiritual darkness from the history of the adulteress. But the figure, corresponding as it essentially does with the thing signified, had been given long before, and was quite a familiar one in the prophetic view of the idea of the Messiah (Isaiah 9:1; Isaiah 42:6; Malachi 4:2). Comp. also Matthew 4:15-16; Luke 2:32; and the Rabbinical references in Lightfoot, p. 1041. There is really no need to suppose any special suggesting cause, not even the reading of Isaiah 42; for though the Scriptures were read in the synagogues, we have no proof that they were read in the temple. To find also a reference to the pillar of fire in the wilderness (Godet), according to which the ὁ ἀκολουθῶν, κ.τ.λ., has reference to Israel’s wanderings, is quite arbitrary; no better, indeed, than the reference of John 7:37 to the rock in the wilderness.

οὐ μὴ περιπατήσει] The strongly attested, though not decisively confirmed, subjunctive περιπατήσῃ (so Lachmann, Tischendorf) would be the most usual word in the N. T. after οὐ μή, and might therefore all the more easily have displaced the future, which could hardly have been introduced through the following ἕξει, seeing that the latter word has no connection with οὐ μή. Upon οὐ μή, with the more definitely assuring future, see on Matthew 26:35; Mark 14:31.

ἕξει τὸ φῶς τ. ζωῆς] As the antithesis of the divine ἀλήθεια, the σκοτία, is the causative element of death, so is the light the cause of life, i.e. of the true eternal Messianic life, not only in its consummation after the Parousia, but already also in its temporal development (comp. John 3:15). ἕξει, it will not be wanting to him, he will be in possession of it, for it necessarily communicates itself to him direct from its personal source, which he follows in virtue of his fellowship with Christ (“lux enim praeferri solet,” Grotius). The ἀκολουθεῖν takes place through faith; but in the believer, who as such walks no more in darkness (John 12:46; Ephesians 5:8; Colossians 1:13), Christ Himself lives (the Johannean “I in you,” and the Pauline Galatians 2:20; see on John 6:51), and therefore he has that light of life which proceeds from Christ as a real and inward possession (Nonnus, ὁμόφοιτον ἐν θὐτῷ); he is υἱὸς φωτός (John 12:36), and himself “light in the Lord” (Ephesians 5:8). This explanation, not merely the having Christ with him (Weiss), is required by the context; because ἕξει, κ.τ.λ., is the result of the ἀκολουθεῖν, and therefore of faith (comp. John 3:15; John 3:36, John 5:24, John 6:47), and accordingly τῆς ζωῆς is added.