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Matthew 5:22. I, on the other hand, as the fulfiller of the law, already declare unrighteous anger to be as worthy of punishment as the act of murder was declared to be to those of old time; as still more worthy of punishment, however, the expression of such anger in injurious language, to which I, in the worst cases, even assign the punishment of hell. Observe (1) that Jesus does not at all enter into the question of murder itself, by which He makes it to be felt that it was something unheard of amongst those who believed on Him; (2) that for the same reason He does not mention any outbursts of anger in acts, such as ill-usage and the like; (3) that the abusive words, which are quoted by way of example, represent different degrees of outbursts of anger in speech, in accordance with the malignity of the disposition from which they proceed; and (4) that κρίσις, συνέδριον, γέεννα, illustrate different degrees of greater culpability before God (for κρίσις and συνέδριον are also analogical representations of divine, although temporal, penal judgment), down to the everlasting damnation; so that (5) as the general moral idea in the concrete discourse, whose plastic ascent in details is not to be pressed, the highest and holiest severity appears in the point of unlovingness (comp. 1 John 3:15), and therein lies the ideal consummation of the law, οὐ φονεύσεις, not only in itself, but also in the antithesis of its traditional threat, ὃς δʼ ἂν φονεύσῃ, etc.

ὁ ὀργιζόμ.] has the emphasis of opposition to φονεύειν.

τῷ ἀδελφῷ] does not go beyond the popular conception (a member of the nation, comp. Matthew 5:47), out of which grew at a later time the representation and designation of Christian brotherly fellowship. The conception of the πλησίον from the point of view of humanity, Luke 10:29, is not contained in the ἀδελφός.

If εἰκῆ were genuine (but see critical remarks), then this idea would be contained in it, that Jesus does not mean simply being angry, but the being angry without a reason (Romans 13:4; Colossians 2:18), the anger of mere passionateness, without moral justification; εἰκῆ would stand as equivalent to ἀλογίστως (Polyb. i. 52. 2), παραλόγως (Polyb. i. 74. 14), ἀσκόπως (Polyb. iv. 14. 6). There is, moreover, a holy anger, which has its basis in what is right, and in its relation to the unholy world. Comp. on Ephesians 4:26. But never ought it to be unloving and hostile anger; and that such an anger is here meant is shown by the context, therefore εἰκῆ would not even be an appropriate closer definition.

ῥακά] as Jerome and Hesychius already correctly interpret it, is the Chaldee רֵיקָא, vacuus, that is, empty head!

At that time a very common word of opprobrium. Buxtorf, Lex. talm. p. 2254; Lightfoot, Hor. p. 264; Wetstein in loc. That it is, so far as regards its idea, of the same nature with μωρέ that follows, speaks rather in favour of than against this common interpretation. Comp. κενός (Jam 2:20; Soph. Ant. 709), κενόφρων (Aesch. Prom. 761), κενόκρανος (Sibyll. iii. p. 418). Ewald thinks of the Aramaic רקעא, and interprets it: rascal.

μωρέ] נָבָל, fool, but in the moral sense (Hupfeld on Psalm 14:1), as the virtuous man was rightly regarded as wise (comp. Xen. Mem. iii. 9. 4) and the wicked as foolish; therefore equivalent to “wicked,” and thus a stronger word of opprobrium, one affecting the moral character, than ῥακά; see Wetstein.

εἰς τὴν γέενναν] literally: into hell,[407] which is to be regarded as a pregnant expression from the idea of being cast down into hell. Winer, p. 200 [E. T. 267]; Buttmann, p. 148 [E. T. 170], Plastic representation with the increasing liveliness of the discourse, instead of the more abstract dative. No example elsewhere. γέεννα, properly גֵּיא הִנּם, or הִנֹּם) גֵּיא בֶן־הִנֹּם, name of a man otherwise unknown; other interpretations, as “valley of howling,” are arbitrary), a valley to the south of the capital, where the idolatrous Israelites had formerly sacrificed their children to Moloch (2 Kings 23:10; Jeremiah 7:32; Jeremiah 19:2); Ritter, Erdk. XVI. 1, p. 372; Robinson, Pal. II. p. 38, The name of this hated locality was transferred to the subterranean abode of the damned. Lightfoot, Hor.; Wolf on the passage; Eisenmenger, Entdecktes Judenthum, II. p. 323 ff. So always in the N. T., where, however, it is found only in the Synoptics and James.

[407] The attributive genitive τοῦ πυρός (Matthew 13:42; 2 Thessalonians 1:8), as an expression of the specific nature, is to be explained from the well-known popular representation of hell (comp. Matthew 3:11, Matthew 18:8 f., Matthew 25:41, and elsewhere). The explanation of Kuinoel, who follows the older interpreters, “is dignus est, qui in valle Hinnomi vivus comburatur,” is, irrespective of the illegality of burning alive, opposed to the constant usage of γέεννα as signifying hell, which usage also forbids us to think of the burning of the body in the valley of Hinnom (Michaelis) after execution, or at least of a casting forth of the latter into this detested place (B. Crusius, comp. Tholuck).

Matthew 5:23 f. Ἐὰν … προσφέρῃς] If thou, then, art about to present thy sacrifice (δῶρον, Matthew 8:4, Matthew 15:5, Matthew 23:18, also in the LXX., Apocrypha, and Greek writers); consequently, art already occupied with the preparation of the same in the temple.[408] This explanation is required by the words ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ θυς. (ad aram), Matthew 5:24.

ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστ.] to the altar, in order that the priests may offer it upon the same.

κἀκεῖ μνησθῇς, κ.τ.λ.] “inter rem sacram magis subit recordatio offensarum, quam in strepitu negotiorum,” Bengel. The injured part is the ἀδελφός; differently in Mark 11:25, where forgiveness is required.

ἔμπροσθ. τοῦ θυσιαστ.] A closer definition added to ἐκεῖ.

πρῶτον] in the first place (Matthew 6:33), before everything else, what thou now hast to do. Compare τότε afterwards. It is to be connected with ὕπαγε (Luther, Erasmus, Castalio, Bengel, and many others; also Gersdorf, p. 107; de Wette, Ewald, Arnoldi, Bleek). Comp. Matthew 7:5, Matthew 13:30, Matthew 23:26. The connection with διαλλάγ. (Beza, Calvin, Er. Schmidt, and many others; also Kuinoel, Fritzsche, Tholuck, and others) overlooks the essential moment which is contained in the connection precisely by the ὕπαγε, the unavoidable, surprising, nay, repellent removal of oneself from the temple. For that ὕπαγε is not here merely an appeal, age, is shown by the context through the words ἄφες ἐκεῖ, etc. In Matthew 18:15, Matthew 19:21, also, it means abi.

διαλλάγηθι] be reconciled, deal so that a reconciliation may begin with him who has been injured by thee. Comp. 1 Samuel 29:4, and on the passage 1 Corinthians 7:11. In this way the act of sacrifice receives the moral foundation of a disposition pleasing to God, by which it is no mere external work, but is at the same time λογικὴ λατρεία, Romans 12:1. Flacius well remarks, s.v. munus: “Vult primam haberi rationem moralium, secundum ceremonialium.” Moreover, the distinction asserted by Tittmann to exist between διαλλάσσειν and καταλλάσσειν, that the former denotes the removal of mutual hostility, the latter that of one-sided enmity (Synon. p. 102), is decidedly erroneous. Fritzsche, ad Rom. I. p. 276 ff.

[408] The severance of the Jewish believers from the temple service was only to begin at a later time, John 4:21. The Catholic exegesis knows, indeed, how to find here the permanent sacrifice of the Eucharist, regarding which Christ is said in the passage before us to have given a law which is for ever valid, Döllinger, Christenthum und Kirche, p. 250 f., ed. 2.

Matthew 5:25 f. The precept, to be reconciled with the injured person in order not to be cast into hell by God the judge, is made clear by the prudential doctrine of satisfying a creditor in order not to become liable to imprisonment. To abide merely by the prudential doctrine itself which the words convey (Theophylact, Vatablus, and others, including Paulus), is opposed to the context (Matthew 5:21-24); to take the φυλακή, however, as the representation of purgatory (many Catholics, not Schegg), or of Sheol (not Gehenna) (Olshausen), is forbidden by the idea of the judgment which also excludes the vague and indefinite “transference of that which is destructive for the external life to that which is destructive in a higher sense” (de Wette). Luke 12:58 has the precept in quite a different connection; but this does not justify us in not regarding it in the present passage as belonging to it (Pott, Kuinoel, Neander, Bleek, Holtzmann, Weiss, and others), since it may be given here and there as a popular symbolical proverb; while precisely here it is most clearly and simply appropriate to the connection.

εὐνοῶν] be well disposed—that is, inclined to satisfy him by making payment or composition.

τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ σου] The opponent (in a lawsuit) is to be conceived of as a creditor (Matthew 5:26). The injured brother is intended; comp. Matthew 5:23. Explanations of the Fathers referring it to the devil (Clement of Alexandria), to God (Augustine), to the conscience (Euth. Zigabenus), see in Tholuck.

ταχύ] without delay, without putting off, Matthew 28:7 f.; John 11:29; Revelation 2:16. “Tarda est superbia cordis ad deprecandum et satisfaciendum,” Bengel.

ἕως ὅτου] If by ταχύ it was intimated that the compliance should begin without delay, so it is now stated that it shall remain till the extreme termination: even until thou art with him on the road to the judge—even then still shalt thou yield compliance. Not of itself (in answer to Tittmann, Synon. p. 167), but, in virtue of the context, is ἕως the inclusive “until,” as according to the context it may also be exclusive (comp. on the passage, Matthew 1:25).

The servant of justice (ὑπηρέτης) belongs to the representative of the legal act; and who is meant thereby, is evident from Matthew 13:41 f.

βληθήσῃ] The future, which might be dependent on μήποτε (Winer, p. 468 f. [E. T. 629]; Buttmann, neut. Gr. p. 201 [E. T. 233]; see on the passage, Colossians 2:8), taken independently, gives the appropriate emphasis to the tragic closing act.

In Matthew 5:26 is by no means contained the finality of the condition of punishment, but its non-finality; since the ἀποδιδόναι, that is, the removal of the guilt of sin, is for him who is in this φυλακή an impossibility, Matthew 18:34, Matthew 25:41; Matthew 25:46, etc. ἕως states, then, a terminus which is never reached. Comp. Matthew 18:34.

The quadrans is ¼ As in copper, or 2 λεπτά, ¾ of a farthing (Mark 12:42); see an the Roman coins in circulation amongst the Jews, Cavedoni, bibl. Numismat. I. p. 78 ff.

Matthew 5:27 f. From Matthew 5:28-30 it appears that the tradition of the Pharisees limited the prohibition in Exodus 20:14 to adultery proper, and left out of consideration adulterous desires.

βλέπων] he who holes upon a woman, opposed to the actual μοιχεύειν.

γυναῖκα] woman in general, so that it may be a married (Erasmus, Grotius, Tholuck, de Wette, Bleek) or an unmarried one; for the βλέπων is conceived of as a married man, as is clear from the signification of οὐ μοιχεύσεις, which means adultery.

πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι αὐτήν] not ita ut, etc., not even in accordance with (Weiss), but, agreeably to the constant usage of πρός with the infinitive, to denote the telic reference (Matthew 6:1, Matthew 26:12, and elsewhere): in order to desire her. The βλέπειν, which terminates in lustful desire, which is kindled and felt to be strengthened by gazing on, is designated. Ὁ γὰρ σπουδάζων ὁρᾶν τὰς εὐμόρφους ὄψεις, αὐτὸς μάλιστα τὴν κάμινον ἀνάπτει τοῦ πάθους, Chrysostom. Comp. Augustine: “qui hoc fine et hoc animo attenderit, ut eam concupiscat, quod jam non est titillari delectatione carnis, sed plene consentire libidini.” He who looks upon a woman with such a feeling has already (jam eo ipso, Bengel), in virtue of the adulterous desire with which he does so, committed adultery with her in his heart, which is the seat of feeling and desire. Thus he is, as regards his moral constitution, although without the external act, already an adulterer. Similar proverbs from the Rabbinical writers in Lightfoot and Schoettgen; from the Greek and Roman writers, in Pricaeus. On μοιχεύειν with the accusative, comp. Plato, Rep. p. 360 B.

ἐπιθυμεῖν] with the accusative, is rare and late. Comp. Exodus 20:17; Deuteronomy 5:20; Jdt 16:22; see Winer, p. 192 [E. T. 255]. Even if αὐτήν were spurious, it could not be explained with Fritzsche: “ut adsit mutua cupiditas.”

Matthew 5:29.[409] Unconditional self-denial, however, is required in order not to stumble against the prohibition of adultery in its complete meaning, and thereby to fall into hell. Better for thee that thou decidedly deprive thyself of that which is so dear and indispensable to thee for the temporal life, and the sacrificing of which will be still so painful to thee, than that thou, seduced thereby, and so on. In the typical expression of this thought (comp. on Colossians 3:5) the eye and hand are named, because it is precisely these that are the media of lust; and the right members, because to these the popular idea gave the superiority over the left, Exodus 29:20; 1 Samuel 11:2; Zechariah 11:17; Aristotle, de animal. incessu, 4. The non-typical but literal interpretation (Pricaeus, Fritzsche, likewise Ch. F. Fritzsche in his Nov. Opusc. p. 347 f., Arnoldi) is not in keeping with the spirit of the moral strictness of Jesus; and to help it out by supplying a limitation (perhaps in the extreme case, to which, however, it cannot come; comp. Tholuck) is arbitrary. The view, however, which is, indeed, also the proper one, but hyperbolical, according to which the plucking, out is said to represent only the restraining or limiting the use, does not satisfy the strength of the expression. So Olshausen, comp. already Grotius. Only the typical view, which is also placed beyond doubt by the mention of the one eye, satisfies the words and spirit of Jesus. Yet, having regard to the plastic nature of the figures, it is not the thought “as is done to criminals” (Keim), but merely that of thoroughgoing, unsparing self-discipline (Galatians 5:24; Galatians 6:14; Romans 8:13).

σκανδαλίζει] a typical designation, borrowed from a trap (σκανδάλη and σκανδάλεθρον, the trap-spring), of the idea of seducing to unbelief, heresy, sin, etc. Here it is the latter idea. The word is not found in Greek writers, but in the LXX. and Apocrypha, and very frequently in the N. T. Observe the present. What is required is not to take place only after the completion of the seduction.

συμφέρει γάρ σοι, ἵνα, κ.τ.λ.] not even here, as nowhere indeed, does ἵνα stand instead of the infinitive (comp. Matthew 18:6), but is to be taken as teleological: “it is of importance to thee (this plucking out of the eye), in order that one of thy members may be destroyed, and not thy whole body be cast into hell.” Thus Fritzsche alone correctly; comp. Käuffer. The alleged forced nature of this explanation is a deception arising from the customary usage of the infinitive in German.

καὶ μὴ ὅλον … γέενναν] namely, at the closely impending establishment of the kingdom; comp. Matthew 10:28. Matthew 5:30 is the same thought, solemnly repeated, although not quite in the same words (see the critical remarks). “Sane multos unius membri neglecta mortificatio perdit,” Bengel.

[409] Comp. Matthew 18:8 f.; Mark 9:43 ff. Holtzmann assigns the original form to Mark. On the other hand, see Weiss.

Matthew 5:31 f.[410] In Deuteronomy 24:1 there is stated as a reason for the dismissal which is to be carried out, עֶרְוַת דָּבָר, something hateful, loathsome (see Ewald, Alterthum. p. 272; Keil, Archäol. II. p. 74 f.; Gesenius, Thes. II. p. 1068). This was explained by the strict Rabbi Sammai and his adherents as referring to adultery and other unchaste behaviour; but the gentle Rabbi Hillel and his school as referring to everything in general that displeased the husband (Josephus, Antt. iv. 8. 23; Vita, 76). Lightfoot, p. 273 ff.; Ewald, Jahrb. X. p. 56 ff., 81. Rabbi Abika went still further, who allowed dismissal if the husband found a more beautiful woman; see Wetstein. To these and other (see Othonis, Lex. Rabb. p. 504) ill-considered principles—for Hillel’s doctrine had become the prevalent one

Christ opposes Himself, and draws out from the original and inmost nature of marriage (comp. Matthew 19:4 ff.) a firm rule, preserving the sanctity of the idea, and admitting only that as a ground of separation by which the nature of marriage and its obligations is, as a matter of fact, directly and immediately destroyed.[411]

ἀπολύσῃ] not repudiare constituerit (Fritzsche after Grotius), but will have dismissed. In this is implied the oral declaration of dismissal, the accomplishment of which as a fact is to take place by means of a letter of divorce. The command to give the letter of divorce, moreover, the use of which was already in existence before the law, is only indirectly implied in Deuteronomy 24:1; comp. on Matthew 19:7. The Greek expression for the dismissal of the woman is ἀποπέμπειν, Bekker, Anecd. p. 421; Bremi, ad Dem. adv. Onetor. iv. p. 92. On the wanton practice of the Greeks in this matter, see Hermann, Privatalterth. § 30.

ἀποστάσιον] departure, that is, by means of a βιβλίον ἀποστασίου, Deuteronomy 24:1; Matthew 19:7; Mark 10:4; Jeremiah 3:8. In Demosthenes, 790. 2, 940. 15, it is the desertion of his master, contrary to duty, by a manumitted slave; Hermann, l.c., § 57. 17.

The formula of the letter of divorce, see in Alphes. in Gittin, f. 600; in Lightfoot, p. 277. The object of the same was to prove that the marriage had been legally dissolved, and that it was competent to enter into a second marriage with another man (Ewald, l.c.). Observe, moreover, how the saying of the scribes, which has been quoted, is a mutilation of the legal precept, which had become traditional in the service of their lax principles, as if it, beside the arbitrary act of the man, were merely a question of the formality of the letter of divorce.

[410] The assertion that, if Jesus had delivered this declaration here, the discussion regarding divorce in ch. 19 could not have taken place (Köstlin, p. 47; Holtzmann, p. 176 f.), has no foundation, especially as in Matthew 19:3, Mark 10:2, the discussion is called forth by the Pharisees; comp. Weiss. Olshausen and Bleek also find in ch. 19 the historical position for the declaration, which Hilgenfeld regards as a non-original appendix to what precedes; which is also substantially the judgment of Ritschl, who regards the metabatic δέ in ver. 31 as introducing an objection to vv. 29, 30.

[411] Comp. Harless, Ehescheidungsfrage, p. 17 ff.

Matthew 5:32. Παρεκτὸς λόγου πορν.] that is, except (see on 2 Corinthians 11:28) if an act of whoredom, committed by the woman during marriage (consequently adultery, John 8:41; Amos 7:17; Hosea 3:3; Sir 26:9; Sir 14:12), is the motive (λόγος, comp. Thuc. i. 102, iii. 6, lxi. 4; and see on Acts 10:29). In spite of the point of controversy which lies at the foundation, Paulus and Gratz are of opinion—most recently especially, Döllinger, Christenthum und Kirche, p. 392 ff., 460 ff., ed. 2 (comp. Baeumlein in the Stud. und Krit. 1857, p. 336)—that by πορνεία, which does not mean adultery,[412] whoredom before marriage is meant, so that the man, instead of a virgin, receives one who is no longer so.[413] The correct view is already to be found in Tertullian, and in the whole old exegetical tradition, where, however, on the Catholic side, the permission was limited only to separation a toro et mensa. On the subject, comp. the explanation which was specially called forth on a later occasion, Matthew 19:3 ff. But in Mark 10:11, Luke 16:18 (also 1 Corinthians 7:10 f.), this exception is not expressed, not as if Jesus had at the beginning made greater concessions to the pre-Christian Jewish marriages, and only at a later time completely denied the dissolubility of marriage (Hug, de conjugii christ. vinculo indissolub. 1816, who therefore declares, in Matthew 19:9, μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ to be spurious), nor even as if that ΠΑΡΕΚΤῸς, Κ.Τ.Λ., were a later modification, and not originally spoken by Christ (Bleek, Wittichen, Weiss, Holtzmann, Schenkel, and others), but Mark and Luke regard this exception by itself, understanding it as a matter of course; and rightly so,[414] since adultery eo ipso destroys the essence of all marriage obligations; comp. Weiss in d. Zeitschr. f. christl. Wissensch. 1856, p, 261. But as the exception which Jesus here makes cannot become devoid of meaning by means of Leviticus 20:10 (in answer to Schegg, see John 8:3 ff.), so also it is not to be annulled on critical grounds, which in view of the witnesses is impossible (in answer to Keim here and on Matthew 19:9). The second half of the verse also, καὶ ὃς, κ.τ.λ., cannot be condemned with Keim on the authority of D and Codd. in Augustine.

ΠΟΙΕῖ ΑὐΤῊΝ ΜΟΙΧᾶΣΘΑΙ] “per alias nuptias, quarum potestatem dat divortium” (Bengel), although, according to that principle, she is still the wife of the first husband; therefore the man also, if he marries again, ΜΟΙΧᾶΤΑΙ (Matthew 19:9).

ΚΑΊ] not causal, but and, and on the other side.

μοιχᾶται] because he has intercourse with a person who, according to the divine law, is the wife of another. That by ἈΠΟΛΕΛΥΜΈΝΗΝ, a woman who is dismissed illegally, consequently not on account of adultery, is intended, was understood as a matter of course, according to the first half of the verse.

[412] It means in general every kind of whoredom (Dem. 403. 26, 433. 25, 612. 5). Where it specially refers to adultery (μοιχεία) this is clear from the context, as here and Matthew 19:9. Thus, for example, it means also the idolatry of the people of God, because that is adultery against Jehovah, πορνεία, as in Hosea 1:2; Ezekiel 16:15; Ezekiel 23:43.

[413] How can one seriously suppose that Jesus could have laid down so slippery an exception! indelicate, uncertain, unwise, a welcome opening to all kinds of severity and chicanery, especially considering the jealousy of the Jews. And the exception would have to hold good also in the case of marriages with widows!

[414] But by the circumstance that Jesus here expressly quotes as an exception this actual ground of separation, which was understood as a matter of course, He excludes every other (comp. especially Calovius); and it is incorrect to say that, while He grants one actual ground of separation, He still allows several others (Grotius, de Wette, Bleek, and others; comp. also Werner in d. Stud. u. Krit. 1858, p. 702 ff.), which is quite opposed to the point of view of moral strictness, from which He excepts only that case in which the actual dissolution of the marriage in its innermost nature is directly given.—That Christ bases His answer on the question of divorce purely upon the nature of the divine ordinance of marriage as it was already given at the creation (una caro, Matthew 9:5), not upon its object, is of decisive importance for the legislation in question, where we have also to observe that the altered form of divorce (the judicial) can make no change in the principles laid down by Jesus. Otherwise the legislation relating to marriage is driven on and on, by way of supposed consistency, to the laxity of the Prussian law and that of other lands (comp. the concessions of Bleek). Moreover, as regards malicious desertion, the declarations of Christ admit of application only so far as that desertion quoad formam, consequently according to its essential nature, is fully equivalent to adultery, which, however, must always be a question in each individual case. It cannot be shown from 1 Corinthians 9:15 that malicious desertion was regarded as a reason for dissolving Christian marriage. See on the passage.—Of that case of separation, where the man commits adultery, Christ does not speak, because the law, which does not know of any dismissal of the man on the part of the woman, presented no occasion to it. But the application of the principle in the case of adultery on the part of the woman to that of the man as a ground of divorce rightly follows in accordance with the moral spirit of Jesus; comp. Mark 10:12; Galatians 3:28; 1 Corinthians 11:11.

Matthew 5:33. Πάλιν] as in Matthew 4:7.

οὐκ ἐπιορκήσεις] Doctrinal precept, according to Exodus 20:7; Leviticus 19:12. It is not to the eighth commandment that Jesus refers (Keim, following an artificially formed scheme), but the second commandment forms the fundamental prohibition of perjury.

The Pharisaic tradition made arbitrary distinctions between oaths that were binding (by Jehovah) and those that were not binding (comp. also Philo, de Spec. Legg. p. 770 A). See Lightfoot, p. 280; Eisenmenger, II. p. 490; Wetstein on Matthew 5:36; Michaelis, Mos. Recht, V. p. 141 ff., upon their loose principles regarding this matter. The second half of the precept quoted (formulated after Numbers 30:3; Deuteronomy 33:22) was so weakened by them, that special emphasis was laid upon the words τῷ κυρίῳ, and other oaths were deprived of their obligatory powers.