圣经注释书

2 Peter 1:1-2. Συμεὼν Πέτρος] The form most in harmony with the Semitic language: Συμεών, as a name of Peter, is to be found, besides here, only in Acts 15:14; otherwise, cf. Luke 2:25; Luke 3:30; Revelation 7:7; Acts 13:1. From the addition of the name itself, as little as from its form, can anything be concluded as to the genuineness (in opposition to Dietlein, Schott, Steinfass) or the non-genuineness of the epistle. The two names Σίμων Πέτρος are directly conjoined also in Matthew 16:16; Luke 5:8, etc.; elsewhere, too, the apostle is called: Σίμων ὁ λεγόμενος Πέτρος. The addition of Συμεών serves to mark the author as a Jewish-Christian.[19]

δοῦλος καὶ ἀπόστολος Ἰ. Χρ.] cf. Romans 1:1; Titus 1:1 (Php 1:1). δοῦλος expresses the more general, ἀπόστολος the more special official relation; cf. Meyer on Romans 1:1; Schott unjustly denies that δοῦλος has reference to the official relation. According to de Wette, the author has here combined 1 Peter 1:1 and Judges 1:1.

τοῖς ἰσότιμον ἡμῖν λαχοῦσι πίστιν] ἰσότιμος is inexactly translated in the Vulgate by coaequaliter; it is not equivalent to ἴσος (Acts 11:17 : ἴση δωρεά), but means: “having equal honour or worth.” De Wette’s interpretation is as incorrect: “to those who have obtained the same right to participate in faith with us.” The use of the words τιμή, τιμάω, in Peter’s epistle, does not prove that the expression has here reference specially to the divine privileges of the kingdom (Dietlein). By this word the author gives it to be understood, that the faith of those to whom he writes, has the same worth as that of those whom he designates by ἡμῖν; both have received one and the same faith (as to its objective contents) (Brückner, Besser, Wiesinger); Hornejus: dicitur fides aeque pretiosa, non quod omnium credentium aeque magna sit, sed quod per fidem illam eadem mysteria et eadem beneficia divina nobis proponantur.

The connection shows that by ἡμῖν all Christians (de Wette) cannot be understood; the word must only refer, either to Peter (Pott), or to the apostles (Bengel, Wolf, Brückner, Steinfass, Fronmüller), or to the Jewish-Christians generally (Nic. de Lyra, Dietlein, Besser, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofm.); the last is the correct application (cf. Acts 11:17; Acts 15:9-11). Wiesinger: “That the faith of the apostles should have a different value from that of those who through their preaching had become believers, is an idea totally foreign to the apostolic age.”

λαχοῦσι points out that faith is a gift of grace; Huss: sicut sors non respicit personam, ita nec divina electio acceptatrix est personarum (cf. Acts 1:17).

On the breviloquence of the expression, cf. “Winer, p. 579 [E. T. 778].

ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ κ.τ.λ.] Luther translates: “in the righteousness, which our God gives;” thus δικαιοσύνη would here mean that gift of God’s grace which is the result of faith, whether it is to be understood of the state of justification (Schott), or the Christians’ manner of life conformed to the commandments of God (Brückner). If this view be adopted, however, δικαιοσύνη cannot be connected with πίστιν, for though ἐν may be regarded as equal simply to cum, or be taken in the sense of, being furnished with (thus Brückner formerly), it would always denote that πίστις is contained in δικαιοσύνη, which certainly does not correspond with the relation in which the two stand to each other; faith is not bestowed on the Christian in righteousness, but righteousness in faith. Hofmann joins ἐν δικ. directly with πίστιν, and understands by δικαιοσύνη here: “the righteousness which makes Christ our Saviour; that in which the world has the propitiation for its sins.” This interpretation assumes that Θεοῦ is predicate to Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (see below); besides, it is opposed by the circumstance that the context makes no allusion to any such nearer definition of the idea, whilst it is arbitrary to render πίστιν ἐν δικ.: “that faith which trusts in the righteousness of Jesus Christ.” Schott, Steinfass, and now, too, Brückner, connect δικ. with ἰσότιμον; the position of the words, however, is opposed to this, for were ἐν δικ. the closer definition of ἰσότιμον, it must have been placed directly beside it. Besides, a somewhat obscure thought results from this combination. The simple addition of ἐν δικ. does not assert that the faith of the one has equal value with the faith of the other in this, that in both cases it effects a δικαιοσύνη. δικαιοσύνη is here not a gift, but an attribute of God, or a characteristic of His dealings. Still the expression must not be taken as equivalent either to “kindness” (Eman. a Sa., Pott), or to: “faithfulness,” as regards the promises given by Him (Beza, Piscator, Grotius); for although δικαιοσύνη may sometimes come near to the above meanings, it is never identical[20] with them, cf. Meyer on Romans 3:25. Still less warrant is there for Dietlein’s view, that righteousness is here “as a kingdom, the totality of the divine action and revelation in contrast to this world full of sin and of uncompensated evil.” Wiesinger (and thus also Fronmüller) understand by δικαιοσύνη, “the righteousness of God and Christ, which has manifested itself in the propitiation for the sins of the world;” in opposition to which Brückner correctly remarks, that Christ’s work of atonement is not an act of His righteousness; further, “the righteousness of God which demands the death of the sinner” (Fronmüller), may be considered as causing the death of Christ, but not as producing faith. ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΎΝΗ, in harmony with ἸΣΌΤΙΜΟΝ, is rather that righteousness of God—opposed to every kind of ΠΡΟΣΟΠΩΛΗΨΊΑ—according to which He bestows the same faith on all, without respect of persons (cf. Acts 10:34 f.). ἘΝ is in meaning akin to ΔΙΆ, but it brings out more distinctly than it, in what the obtaining of the πίστις ἰσοτ. is grounded. The author’s thought is accordingly this: “in His righteousness, which makes no distinction between the one and the other, God has bestowed on you the same like precious faith as on us.”[21]

τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμ. καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰ. Χρ.] Many interpreters (Beza, Hemming, Gerhard, and more recently Schott and Hofmann) take τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμ. and σωτῆρος as a double attribute of Ἰησοῦ Χρ. Others (Wiesinger, Brückner, Fronmüller, Steinfass) separate the two expressions, and understand τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν of God the Father; and rightly so, although in the similar combination, 2 Peter 1:11; 2 Peter 3:18, there be but one subject. For Θεός differs from κύριος in this, that it is never conjoined with Χριστός as a direct attribute, whilst κύριος is very often thus employed, as in the very next verse; see my commentary to Titus 2:13. There need be no hesitation in taking the article which stands before Θεοῦ with σωτῆρος also, as a second subject,—a statement which Schott and Hofmann have wrongly called in question; cf. (Winer, p. 118 [E. T. 162]) Buttmann, p. 84 ff. Dietlein, in his interpretation, adopts a middle course: “of our God and Saviour; and when I speak of God the Saviour, I mean the Saviour Jesus Christ.” But only this much is correct here, that the close conjunction points to the oneness of God and Christ of which the author was assured.—2 Peter 1:2. χάρις … πληθυνθείη] as in 1 Peter 1:2. In this passage ἐν ἐπιγνῶσει τοῦ Θεοῦ κ. Ἰησοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν is added. Here, too, ἐν is not, cum, but states in what the increase of grace has its origin, and by what it is effected (de Wette). This is the knowledge of God and Jesus, our Lord; cf. on this John 17:3; 2 Peter 2:20. Calvin: Dei et Christi agnitionem simul connectit, quia rite non potest, nisi in Christo, Deus agnosci. Although the ἐπίγνωσις here spoken of includes in it acknowledgment, yet it is erroneous to distinguish between ἐπίγνωσις and γνῶσις, by holding the former to be equivalent to acknowledgment; cf. the further discussions on the term ἐπίγνωσις in Wiesinger and Schott, which, however, especially in the case of the latter, are not without the mixing up of thoughts foreign to the idea. It is wrong to interpret ἐν by εἰς; Aretius: ut colant Deum, quemadmodum sese patefecit in Scripturis et ut coli vult. According to Dietlein, the thought intended to be expressed is that “grace and peace grow and increase from within the soul, outwards, and in thus growing they became ever more and more knowledge of the revealed God”(!).

[19] Bengel, assuming the authenticity of the epistle, observes not inaptly that Peter adds Συμεών, extremo tempore admonens se ipsum conditionis pristinae, antequam cognomen nactus erat.

[20] De Wette thinks that the author, in approximation to the Pauline views, may perhaps have understood the righteousness of God as bringing in righteousness,—or salvation,—or as redemptive righteousness, otherwise termed grace; and the righteousness of Christ as that love by which He undertook the work of salvation. But δικ. means neither grace nor love; and besides, it is altogether arbitrary to give the expression a different meaning with respect to Christ from that which it has when applied to God.

[21] Hofmann most unwarrantably maintains that, in this interpretation, ἐν is taken “in a sense which cannot be justified.”

2 Peter 1:3. The first paragraph, extending as far as 2 Peter 1:11, contains exhortations. The first of these is expressed in 2 Peter 1:5-7, and to it 2 Peter 1:3-4 serve as an introduction.

ὡς] Lachmann connects ὡς directly with what precedes, and puts a full stop after φθορᾶς at the end of 2 Peter 1:4; thus also Vulg., Beza, Erasmus, Hornejus, Grotius. This combination, however, is against the analogy of the N. T. epistles, in which the superscription closes with the benediction (in the Epistle to the Galatians alone a relative clause is subjoined, ending, however, with a doxology that marks the conclusion), and is also opposed to the contents of 2 Peter 1:3-4, which serve as the basis for 2 Peter 1:5 (Wiesinger). Gerhard and others consider ὡς as equivalent to καθώς (which Gerhard explains by ἐπεί, i.e. “postquam” vel “siquidem”), and supply οὕτως to 2 Peter 1:5; arbitrarily: ὡς belongs much more to the genitive absolute (not pleonastically, Pott). The objective reason expressed in this phrase for the exhortation contained in 2 Peter 1:5 is by ὡς characterized as a subjective motive; Winer: “convinced (considering) that the divine power,” etc.; Dietlein: “in the consciousness that;” so, too, de Wette, and the more recent commentators generally; the construction in 1 Corinthians 4:18, 2 Corinthians 5:20, is similar; cf. Matthiä, ausf. Gr. 1825, § 568, p. 1120.

πάντα … δεδωρημένης] The Vulg. incorrectly: quomodo omnia vobis divinae virtutis sunt, quae ad vitam et pietatem, donata est (another reading is: sunt); and Luther: “since everything of His divine power, that pertains unto life and godliness, is given us;” δεδωρημένης is here not passive, but middle (cf. Genesis 30:20, LXX.; Mark 15:45), and τῆς θ. δυνάμεως: does not depend on πάντα, but is the subject (thus all modern commentators).

According to the position of the words, αὐτοῦ refers back to Ἰησ. τ. κυρίου ἡμῶν (Calvin, Schott, Steinfass), and not to Θεοῦ;[22] if it be applied to Θεοῦ (de Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger), then θείας (which occurs here only and in 2 Peter 1:4; Acts 17:29 : τὸ θεῖον, as subst.) is pleonastic. Dietlein and Fronmüller refer αὐτοῦ to God and Jesus, which linguistically cannot be justified.[23]

τὰ πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν] the ζωὴ καὶ εὐσέβεια are not spoken of as the object, but: τὰ πρὸς ζωὴν κ.τ.λ. For the attainment of the former is conditioned by the Christian’s conduct; but in order that it may be put within his reach, everything is granted him which is serviceable to ζωή and εὐσέβεια (cf. Luke 19:42 : τὰ πρὸς εἰρήνην σου). The difference between the two ideas is in itself clear; ζωή: “blessedness,” indicates the condition; εὐσέβεια: “godliness” (except in Acts 3:12, occurring only in the Pastoral Epistles and Second Peter), the conduct. Grotius incorrectly interprets ζωή as equivalent to vita alterius seculi, and εὐσέβεια as pietas in hoc seculo. Both together they form the antithesis to ἡ ἐν κόσμῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ φθορά. πάντα is by way of emphasis placed first, in order to show distinctly that everything, which is in any way serviceable to ζωή and εὐσέβ., has been given us by the divine power of the Lord. Hofmann is wrong in defining this πάντα as faith, hope, and charity, for this triad does not pertain πρὸς εὐσέβειαν, but is the εὐσέβεια itself.

διὰ τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως τοῦ καλέσαντος ἡμᾶς] states the medium through which the gift is communicated to us; with ἐπίγνωσις, cf. 2 Peter 1:2. God is here designated as ὁ καλέσας ἡμᾶς, since it is only by the knowledge of the God who calls us that the πάντα τὰ πρ. ζ. κ.τ.λ. are appropriated by us,—the calling being the actual proof of His love to us. The subject to καλεῖν is not Christ (Vorstius, Jachmann, Schott, etc.), but God (Aretius, Hemming, de Wette, Hofmann, etc.), as almost always in the N. T.[24] Of course καλεῖν does not mean the mere outward, but the inward, effectual calling,

ἸΔΊᾼ ΔΌΞῌ ΚΑῚ ἈΡΕΤῇ] ΔΌΞΑ denotes the being, ἈΡΕΤΉ the activity; Bengel: ad gloriam referuntur attributa Dei naturalia, ad virtutem ea, quae dicuntur moralia; intime unum sunt utraque. It is arbitrary to understand δόξα as meaning: “that side the nature of the Almighty One that liveth, which is directed outwards,” and by ἈΡΕΤΉ: “the holy loving-kindness of God” (as opposed to Hofmann).

The nature of God represented as the instrumentality, as in Galatians 1:15 : ΚΑΛΈΣΑς ΔΙᾺ Τῆς ΧΆΡΙΤΟς ΑὙΤΟῦ; too, Romans 6:4. A wrong application is given to the words, if they be taken as referring to the miracles of Christ. It must be observed that this ἘΠΊΓΝΩΣΙς itself, too, is to be looked upon as wrought by Christ in us.

[22] Hofmann, indeed, applies it also to Christ, but by passing over ver. 2 to ver. 1, where, as already observed, he considers that it is not God and Christ, but Christ alone who is referred to.

[23] The application to Jesus is also supported by the fact, that otherwise this whole argument would contain no reference to Him; the application to both contains the correct idea, that the gift imparted by Jesus is the gift of God the Father.

[24] De Wette (with whom Brückner agrees) is accordingly wrong in supposing that τοῦ καλέσαντος ἡμ. stands in place of the simple pron. αὐτοῦ, and is inserted because by this circumlocution of the active subject the address gains in matter and range.—Schott’s remarks, in which he attempts to justify his assertion that τοῦ καλέσαντος applies to Christ, are only in so far correct, that καλεῖν might indeed be understood of an activity of Christ; cf. Matthew 9:13; Mark 2:17; on the other hand, it is certain that ὁ καλέσας is never applied to Christ, but always to God.

2 Peter 1:4 must not, as a simple intervening clause, be enclosed in parentheses; for although 2 Peter 1:5 is the principal clause standing related to the participial clause in 2 Peter 1:3, still the latter is determined, in the thought of it, by 2 Peter 1:4.

διʼ ὧν] ὧν does not refer to the immediately preceding ἰδίᾳ δόξῃ κ. ἀρετῇ (Dietlein, Wiesinger, Brückner, this comment.), for it cannot be said that Christ has given us the ἐπαγγέλματα through the δόξα κ. ἀρετή of His Father, but to πάντα τὰ πρὸς κ.τ.λ. (Hofmann). Beza inaccurately interprets διʼ ὧν by ex eo quod.

τὰ τίμια ἡμῖν καὶ μέγιστα ἐπαγγέλματα] ἐπάγγελμα, besides here, occurs only in chap. 2 Peter 3:13, where it is used in connection with the new heaven and new earth in the future. By it is to be understood, not the promises of the prophets of the O. C. fulfilled in Christ for us, nor those things promised us, of which we are made partakers in Christ (Hornejus: bona et beneficia omnia, quae Deus per Christum offert et exhibet omnibus, qui in ipsum credunt; Wiesinger, Schott); but, according to 2 Peter 1:12 ff., chap. 2 Peter 3:4, 2 Peter 3:12, the prophecies of the παρουσία of Christ and the future consummation of His kingdom, as contained in the gospel (Brückner). Dietlein is wrong in saying that ἐπαγγέλματα[25] are not only promises of what is future, but announcements of what is present and eternal. He goes still farther astray when he substitutes for this idea the different one: “the granting of favours which proclaim themselves.” The word ἘΠΑΓΓΈΛΛΕΙΝ (except in 1 Timothy 2:10; 1 Timothy 6:21) has constantly in the N. T. the meaning: “to promise,” never simply: “to proclaim.” These promises are called “precious,” not because they are “no mere empty words” (Schott), but because they promise that which is of the greatest value (Hofmann). The dative ἡμῖν from its position should be connected more probably with ΤΊΜΙΑ than with ΔΕΔΏΡΗΤΑΙ.

ΔΕΔΏΡΗΤΑΙ] is here also not passive (Dietlein), but middle (all modern interpreters). Gualther erroneously explains it: donatae i. e. impletae sunt. What is here referred to is the communication, not the fulfilment of the promises, which are a free gift of divine grace.

The subject to ΔΕΔΏΡ. is not Ὁ ΚΑΛΈΣΑς (as formerly in this commentary), but the same as that to the foregoing ΔΕΔΩΡΗΜΈΝΗς.

ἽΝΑ ΔΙᾺ ΤΟΎΤΩΝ] Calvin, de Wette-Brückner, Hofmann, understand ΤΟΎΤΩΝ to refer to ΤᾺ ΠΡῸς ΖΩῊΝ Κ.Τ.Λ. as the leading thought; this construction Wiesinger justly calls “a distortion of the structure, justifiable only if all other references were impossible.” Incorrect also is the application to ΔΌΞῌ ΚΑῚ ἈΡΕΤῇ (Bengel). From its position it can apply only to ἘΠΑΓΓΈΛΜΑΤΑ (Dietlein, Wiesinger, Schott), and not in like manner to ΔΌΞῌ ΚΑῚ ἈΡΕΤῇ (Fronmüller). ΔΙΆ has here its proper signification, not equal to “because of them” (Jachmann), nor to “incited by them;” as elsewhere the gospel is spoken of as the objective means through which the divine life is communicated, so here the ἘΠΑΓΓΈΛΜΑΤΑ, which, according to the conception of Second Peter, form the essential element of the gospel.

ΓΈΝΗΣΘΕ ΘΕΊΑς ΚΟΙΝΩΝΟῚ ΦΎΣΕΩς] not: that ye may become partakers, but: that ye might be, etc. (Wiesinger). The aorist shows that the author does not look upon the κοινωνία, which for the Christian is aimed at in the bestowal of the promises, as something entirely future (Vorstius: quorum vi tandem divinae naturae in ilia beata immortalitate vos quoque participes efficiemini), but as something of which he should even now be partaker.[26] The thought that man is intended to be partaker of the divine nature, or to be transfigured into the divine being,—which is accomplished in him through faith in the promises,—is, though in other terms, often enough expressed in the N. T. (Hebrews 12:10; 1 Peter 1:23; John 1:12-13, and many other passages). Hemming justly remarks: vocat hic divinam naturam id quod divina praesentia efficit in nobis i. e. conformitatem nostri cum Deo, seu imaginem Dei, quae in nobis reformatur per divinam praesentiam in nobis. When Hofmann urges the expression ΦΎΣΙς against this view, because a distinction must be drawn between the ΦΎΣΙς of man and the personal life of man, the former remaining even in him who is regenerate always the same, until this σῶμα is changed from a ΣῶΜΑ ΨΥΧΙΚΌΝ to a ΣῶΜΑ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΌΝ, he fails to observe that it is not the human, but the divine φύσις that is here spoken of, and in God there can be no difference made between natural and personal life. The expression ΦΊΣΙς is here quite inappropriately pressed by Hofmann. As opposed to the mystic “deification,” it must be remarked, with the older interpreters, that the expression ΦΎΣΙς conveys the thought, not so much of the substantia, as rather of the qualitas. Grotius’ interpretation dilutes the idea: ut fieretis imitatores divinae bonitatis. The second person (ΓΈΝΗΣΘΕ) serves to appropriate to the readers in particular that which belongs to all Christians (ἩΜῖΝ).[27]

ἀποφυγόντες τῆς ἐν [τῷ] κόσμῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ φθορᾶς] These words do not express the condition on which the Christian becomes partaker of the divine nature, but the negative element which is most intimately connected with the positive aim. Accordingly, the translation is incorrect: “if you escape” (Luther, Brückner); ἀποφυγόντες is to be translated: “escaping, eluding;” the aor. part. is put because the verb is closely conjoined with the preceding aorist γένησθε. It is to be resolved into: in order that ye might be partakers of the divine nature, in that ye escape the φθορά.[28] With φθορά, cf. chap. 2 Peter 2:12, and especially Romans 8:21; Galatians 6:8 (see Meyer on the last passage). By it is to be understood not simply perishableness, but more generally corruption. The term φθορά is here more nearly defined as ἡ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ φθορά, i.e. the corruption which dwells in the (unredeemed) world, and to which all thereto belonging is a prey. The further more precise definition: ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ, states that this φθορά has its origin in the evil lust, opposed to what is divine, which has its sway in the world (1 John 2:16-17).

ἀποφί, here c. gen.; chap. 2 Peter 2:18; 2 Peter 2:20, cum accus. constr.

The sequence of thought in 2 Peter 1:3-4 is: Christ hath granted us everything that is serviceable to salvation and holiness, and that by the knowledge of God who hath called us by His glory; through it he has given us the most glorious promises, the design of which is the communication of the divine life.

[25] Schott’s assertion, that ἐπαγγέλματα, according to the form of the word, must mean: “promised things,” is opposed by chap. 2 Peter 3:13; but why the promises as such should not, as Wiesinger supposes, be the means of effecting the κοινωνία θείκς φύσεως, it is difficult to understand.

[26] Hornejus: incipit ea in hac vita per gratiam, sed perficietur in altera per gloriam; si enim jam hic in ista imbecillitate divinae naturae consortes sumus per fidem, quanto magis illic erimus per adspectum et si hic per gratiam id adipiscimur, quanto magis illic per gloriam, ubi Deus ipse erit omnia in omnibus.

[27] Hofmann arbitrarily objects to this interpretation, that a change of persons could not take place in a clause expressive of a design; rather does it simply depend on the will of the writer, where he wishes it to take place. When the writer of a letter wishes to state the purpose of anything which has been imparted to all, should he not in particular apply it to those to whom he addresses his letter?—Augusti strangely presses the change of persons, by applying ἡμῖν to the Jews, γένησθε to the heathen-converts, and understanding θεία φύσις of the divine descent of the Jews.

[28] Bengel: haec fuga non tam ut officium nostrum, quam ut beneficium divinum, communionem cum Deo comitans, h. l. ponitur. Dietlein: “ἀποφ. contains no demand and condition, but only the other side of the fact: Ye have entered the kingdom of the divine nature, therefore ye have left the kingdom of the worldly nature.”—By transferring γένησθε to the future, Schott gives an erroneous (linguistically) interpretation of ἀποφυγόντες as future also: “Ye shall become partakers of the divine nature, as such who have (shall have) precisely thus escaped τῆς … φθορᾶς.”

2 Peter 1:5-6. καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δέ] καὶ … δέ, equivalent to “but also,” “and also;” cf. Winer, p. 412 f. [E. T. 553 f.]; Buttmann, p. 312. καί adds something new to what goes before; δέ brings out that what is added is to be distinguished from what precedes.[29]

Neither ΠΕΡΊ nor ΚΑΤΆ nor ΠΡΌς is to be supplied to ΑὐΤῸ ΤΟῦΤΟ, which stands here absolutely, equivalent to ΔΙʼ ΑὐΤῸ ΤΟῦΤΟ: “for this very reason,” cf. Winer, p. 134 f. [E. T. 178], and refers back to the thought contained in ὡς πάντα … δεδωρημένης, and further developed in the clauses following: “since ye have been made partakers of all that, therefore,” etc. Grotius: Deus fecit quod suum est, vos quoque quod vestrum est faciete. Dietlein takes ΑὐΤῸ ΤΟῦΤΟ as a simple accusative dependent on ἘΠΙΧΟΡΉΣΑΤΕ (thus also Steinfass); but this combination, which would make ΤΟῦΤΟ refer to the subsequent ἘΝ Τῇ Π. ὙΜ. ΤῊΝ ἈΡΕΤΉΝ, or to Τ. ἈΡΕΤΉΝ alone, is opposed by the ΑὐΤΌ beside it, which looks back to what has gone before. Nor does Dietlein fail to see this, for he explains: “the announcements given are now to be produced in the form of Christian virtues;” this, however, results in a “straining” (Brückner) of the thought.

As regards the connection of clauses, the apodosis belonging to 2 Peter 1:3 begins with 2 Peter 1:5, not, however, in quite regular construction. Hofmann, on the other hand, holds that the apodosis conveying the exhortations begins already with ἽΝΑ in 2 Peter 1:4. He looks upon ἽΝΑ as depending on ἘΠΙΧΟΡΗΓΉΣΑΤΕ, and considers that the two participial clauses, ἈΠΟΦΥΓΌΝΤΕς Κ.Τ.Λ. and ΚΑῚ … ΠΑΡΕΙΣΕΝΈΓΚΑΝΤΕς, are to be closely connected with each other, and both together joined with the imperative; accordingly he translates: “Considering that His divine power hath given us all that is serviceable to life and godliness … ye should, in order thereby to become partakers of the divine nature, having escaped the corruption in the world occasioned by lust, but for that very reason giving all diligence, supply virtue in and with your faith.” But opposed to this view is: (1) The intolerable cumbrousness of the construction; (2) The circumstance that although a dependent clause may precede the clause on which it depends, this may take place only when the clearness of the style does not thereby suffer, i.e. when the periods are so constructed that the dependent clause cannot, by any rule of language, be taken with a preceding clause,—but this is plainly not the case here; (3) The aorist γένησθε, instead of which the present would have been written; and finally, (4) The impossibility of here applying ΔΙᾺ ΤΟΎΤΩΝ to anything that goes before. This becomes the more obvious if the preceding secondary clause be considered as standing after the imperatival clause ἘΠΙΧΟΡΗΓΉΣΑΤΕ … ἈΓΆΠΗΝ.

ΣΠΟΥΔῊΝ ΠᾶΣΑΝ ΠΑΡΕΙΣΕΝΈΓΚΑΝΤΕς] cf. Judges 1:3 : ΠᾶΣΑΝ ΣΠ. ΠΟΙΟΎΜΕΝΟς (Jos. Arch. xx. 9. 2 Peter 2 : ΕἸΣΦΈΡΕΙΝ ΣΠΟΥΔΉΝ); ΠΑΡΆ points out that believers on their side (de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott) should contribute their part, namely, the ΣΠΟΥΔΉ, to what has here been given them. That ΠΑΡΆ has not here the implied idea of secrecy, is self-evident; but it is also unjustifiable when Hofmann asserts that ΠΑΡΕΙΣΦΈΡΕΙΝ ΣΠΟΥΔΉΝ means “the application of diligence, which endeavours after something already given in a different manner.”

ἘΠΙΧΟΡΗΓΉΣΑΤΕ ἘΝ Τῇ ΠΊΣΤΕΙ ὙΜῶΝ ΤῊΝ ἈΡΕΤΉΝ] ἘΠΙΧΟΡΗΓΕῖΝ, either “contribute,” i.e. your contribution to the work of salvation (de Wette), or more probably, according to the use of the word elsewhere in the N. T. (2 Corinthians 9:10; Galatians 3:5; cf. also 1 Peter 4:11), “to supply” (Brückner, Wiesinger, Hofmann); it is here placed as correlative to the term δεδώρηται, 2 Peter 1:4, and denotes “the gift which the believer gives in return for the gift of God” (Wiesinger, although the meaning of the word does not quite justify him in doing so, adds: “or more accurately, by which he again presents to God his own gift in the fruit it has produced”). Dietlein’s interpretation is erroneous: “to perform in dance.” This meaning the word never has. Even ΧΟΡΗΓΕῖΝ sometimes means “to lead a dance,” but not “to perform anything in dance.” The original meaning of ἘΠΙΧΟΡ. is: “to contribute to the expenses of a ΧΌΡΟς.” Schott’s assertion is arbitrary, “that ἘΠΙΧΟΡΗΓΕῖΝ signifies a supplying of what is due to one in virtue of an official or honorary position.”

Pott incorrectly explains the preposition ἘΝ by ΔΙΆ; de Wette inadequately by “in, with, of that which is already present, and to which something else should be added.” The sense is: since you have πίστις, let it not be wanting in ἈΡΕΤΉ. It is not meant: that to the ΠΊΣΤΙς, as something different from it, ἈΡΕΤΉ should be added; but ἈΡΕΤΉ belongs to ΠΊΣΤΙς, and for this reason the Christian must put it into practice. The same relation is preserved in the members which follow.[30] πίστις is presupposed as the origin (Oecumenius: θεμέλιος τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κρηπίς) of all Christian virtues, and in the first instance of the ἀρετή, by which Oecumenius understands τὰ ἔργα; Gerhard: generale nomen omnium operum et actionum bonarum; Calvin: honesta et bene composita vita; it is best explained by strenuus animae tonus ac vigor (Bengel): “moral efficiency” (de Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.).[31]

ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀρετῇ τὴν γνῶσιν] ἡ γυῶσις is not here ἡ τῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀποκρύφων μυστηρίων εἴδησις (Oecum.), nor is it “the knowledge of God which the Christians possess” (Dietl.); but as the matter in hand here is the practical proof of the Christian temper, it must be understood as denoting the perception of that which the Christian as such has to do in all relations of life, and of how he has to do it (Besser, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann; Brückner, in agreement with this: “discretion”).[32]—2 Peter 1:6. The three virtues here named are: the ἐγκράτεια, the ὙΠΟΜΟΝΉ, and the ΕὐΣΈΒΕΙΑ.

ἘΓΚΡΆΤΕΙΑ, besides here, in Acts 24:25 and Gal. 6:22 (Titus 1:8 : ἘΓΚΡΑΤΉς; 1 Corinthians 7:9; 1 Corinthians 9:25 : ἘΓΚΡΑΤΕΎΟΜΑΙ), denotes the control of one’s own desires; ΤῸ ΜΗΔΕΝῚ ἈΠΟΣΎΡΕΣΘΑΙ ΠΆΘΕΙ (Oecumenius); cf. on Titus 1:8.[33] Compare this with the passage in Jes. Sir 18:30, where under the superscription ἘΓΚΡΆΤΕΙΑ ΨΥΧῆς there is the maxim: ὈΠΊΣΩ ΤῶΝ ἘΠΙΘΥΜΙῶΝ ΣΟΥ ΜῊ ΠΟΡΕΎΟΥ, ΚΑῚ ἈΠῸ ΤῶΝ ὈΡΈΞΕΏΝ ΣΟΥ ΚΩΛΎΟΥ.

ὙΠΟΜΟΝΉ is enduring patience in all temptations. Besser aptly recalls the proverb: abstine, sustine.

With ΕὐΣΈΒΕΙΑ, comp. 2 Peter 1:3; Dietlein, without sufficient justification, explains it here as: “the godly awe and respect in the personal, domestic relations of life.” If εὐσέβεια do not apply only to our relation to God (e.g. Dio Cass. xlviii. 5: διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν εὐσέβειαν), the other object of it must in this case be definitely stated.

[29] Hofmann, without any reason, ascribes two different meanings to καὶ … δέ, by saying that “καὶ … δέ is either equal to ‘but now,’ or else to ‘but also;’ in the first case καί adds something further, which δέ points out to be something different, and must be added to what precedes by way of explanation; in the second case δέ adds something different, and καί intimates that it is added on to what precedes, which cannot do without it.” καὶ … δέ has in itself always the same signification; δέ only emphasizes the new element added by καί, whether this be merely a different one from what goes before, or altogether antithetical to it.

[30] Steinfass remarks: “ἐν conceives the accusatives as involute accusatives, and as elements of the previous datives;” this certainly is correct, but must be supplemented thus far, that the element of the preceding conception, expressed by the accusative, stands forth as a special grace, and thus becomes, as it were, the complement of it.

[31] Hofmann: “that disposition which shows itself in the doing of what is right and good.”

[32] Besser is undoubtedly right in trying to prove that Luther’s “modesty” has another signification than that in which the word is at present employed; still that expression does not altogether coincide with γνῶσις, which Luther understands as meaning that “circumspectness” which knows how to maintain the right moderation in all things.

[33] Hofmann unwarrantably disputes this interpretation by saying that ἐγκρ. is “that quality by which a person denies himself all that is unprofitable;” for the denying oneself that which is unprofitable, for which there is no desire, surely gives no proof whatever of ἐγκράτεια.

2 Peter 1:7 adds φιλαδελφία and ἀγάπη to the virtues already named. These are to be distinguished thus, that the former applies specially to the Christian brethren, the latter to all—without distinction; 1 Thessalonians 3:12 : ἡ ἀγάπη εἰς ἀλλήλους καὶ εἰς πάντας (Galatians 6:10); with φιλαδελφία, cf. 1 Peter 1:22. While the apostle calls the love which is extended to all ἀγάπη, he gives it to be understood that what he means is not the purely natural well-wishing, but Christian love springing from the Christian spirit. Dietlein, without sufficient reason, thinks that φιλαδελφία is only the opposite of that which is forbidden in the eighth and ninth commandments, whilst the ἀγάπη is the complete antithesis to what is forbidden in the tenth commandment. In this way the conception φιλαδελφία is unjustifiably disregarded,—a proceeding to which the language of Scripture gives the less sanction, that where love in all its depth and truth is spoken of, the word φιλεῖν is not unfrequently used; cf. John 5:20; John 16:27, etc.

Although the different virtues here are not arranged according to definite logical order, yet the way in which they here belong to each other is not to be mistaken. Each of the virtues to be shown forth forms the complement of that which precedes, and thus gives rise to a firmly-linked chain of thought. ἀρετή supplies the complement of πίστις, for faith without virtue is wanting in moral character, and is in itself dead; that of ἀρετή is γνῶσις, for the realizing of the moral volition is conditioned by comprehension of that which is needful in each separate case; that of γνῶσις is ἐγκράτεια, for self-control must not be wanting to volition and comprehension; that of ἐγκράτεια is ὑπομενή, for there are outward as well as inward temptations to be withstood; that of ὑπομονή is εὐσέβεια, for only in trustful love to God has the ὑπομονή firm support; that of εὐσέβεια the φιλαδελφία, for “he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he has not seen?” (1 John 4:20); that of φιλαδελφία the ἀγάπη, for without the latter the former would degenerate into poor narrow-heartedness. Thus, in that the one virtue is the complement of the other, the latter produces the former of itself as its natural outcome; Bengel: praesens quisque gradus subsequentem parit et facilem reddit, subsequens priorem temperat ac perficit.[34]

[34] According to Dietlein, the three first graces, including πίστις, correspond to the first table of the law, the three first petitions of the Lord’s Prayer, the first article of the Creed, and to faith in the Pauline triad; the three following graces to the first half of the second table of the law, the fourth petition in the Lord’s Prayer, the second article of the Creed, and the second grace in the Pauline triad; the two last graces to the second half of the second table of the law, the three last petitions of the Lord’s Prayer, the third article of the Creed, and the third grace of that triad. Certainly there is here a good deal that coincides, but this by no means warrants a consistent parallelism of all the individual points, which can only gain an appearance of correctness by an arbitrary narrowing or extending of the ideas and their applications.—It is worthy of remark that the series begins with πίστις and ends with ἀγάκπ; in that, then, ver. 11 points to the future, ἐλπίς is added, so that the well-known triad is here alluded to (Schott).

2 Peter 1:8. Reason for the foregoing exhortation.

ταῦτα] i.e. the virtues above mentioned.

γὰρ ὑμῖν ὑπάρχοντα καὶ πλεονάζοντα] For ὑπάρχειν c. dat. cf. Acts 3:6; πλεονάζοντα intensifies the idea ὑπάρχοντα; for πλεονάζειν, cf. my commentary to 1 Timothy 1:14; it means either: “to be present in abundance,” strictly, to exceed the measure (abundare), or: “to become more, to increase (crescere).” Here the first of these two meanings seems to deserve the preference; though not so in the judgment of Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, Steinfass, Hofmann. The participles may be resolved into “in that,” “since” (Dietlein), or “if” (Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott); the latter is to be preferred, inasmuch as this verse refers back to the exhortation 2 Peter 1:5, and in “2 Peter 1:9 the opposite is assumed as possible” (Brückner); thus: “for if these virtues exist in you, and that in rich measure;” Luther in his translation has combined the two translations.

οὐκ ἀργοὺς οὐδὲ ἀκάρπους καθίστησιν] ὑμᾶς is to be supplied. Hornejus: λιτότης est, cum ait: non inertes neque infructuosos pro operosos et fructuosos; Dietlein: “the οὐκ and οὐδέ belong to the adjectives, not to καθίστησιν.”

For ἀργός, cf. 1 Timothy 5:13; Titus 1:12; οὐκ ἀργός, equivalent to “active;” ἄκαρπος cannot mean only “without fruit,” but “barren” also; cf. Ephesians 5:11 (as against Schott).

καθίστησι: the present is not put here for the future (Hornejus). According to Dietlein, Wiesinger, and Schott, καθίστημι should mean “to cause to appear, to exhibit,” so that the sense would be: “he who possesses these virtues, he thereby appears as bringing forth fruit with regard to the ἐπιγν. τοῦ κυρίου Ἰ. Χρ.,” by which is meant that his knowledge manifests itself as an active one; this is, however, incorrect, for: (1) A meaning is thereby attributed to καθίστημι which it never has, either in the classics or in the N. T. (not even in Jam 3:6; Jam 4:4, and Romans 5:19); it means “to set up,” but not to set forth, to exhibit, to manifest, etc. (2) It gives a meaning to εἰς such as that word has nowhere else, since the object with which it is to be taken is always to be thought of as the end, and that even in the more loose connection in which εἰς is equal to “with regard, with respect to.” (3) It is a somewhat idle, because a self-evident reflection, that if knowledge produce the above-named virtues, it thereby manifests itself as a knowledge that is not inactive.[35] It is also inaccurate to translate with Luther: “where such is present in abundance in you, it will let you be neither idle nor unfruitful in the knowledge,” etc., for ΕἸς is not equal to ἘΝ. The verb ΚΑΘΊΣΤΗΜΙ denotes in connection with an adjective: reddere, to make into, to set one up as; cf. Pape, s.v.; and the preposition εἰς expresses the direction, so that the thought is: those virtues make you (or more exactly, place you as) active and fruitful with regard to knowledge, i.e. by them you are advanced with regard to knowledge; cf. Colossians 1:10 : ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ ἀγαθῷ καρποφοροῦντες καὶ αὐξανόμενοι εἰς τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ (cf. Meyer in loc.); de Wette: “The author considers all these virtues only as steps to the knowledge of Jesus Christ; and this knowledge he regards not merely as theoretical, but as one to be obtained practically, a living into Him, and, at the same time, perfect;” thus, too, Brückner, Fronmüller, Steinfass.

[35] This third reason also contradicts Hofmann’s interpretation, which he expresses thus: “The believer possesses the knowledge of Christ. If then, in aiming at it, he be neither inactive nor unfruitful, he makes this aiming the rule of all his actions, but so that they should be its work, its fruit.”

2 Peter 1:9 gives in negative form an explanation of the preceding verses.

ᾧ γὰρ μὴ πάρεστι ταῦτα] antithesis to ταῦτα … πλεονάζοντα, 2 Peter 1:8. The possession of these graces furthers knowledge, for he who does not possess them is τυφλός, that is, in so far as he is, and remains, without the true knowledge of Jesus Christ. μή is explained thus, that the idea which lies at the basis is: “he who is so constituted, that he is without these virtues” (Hofmann), or so that he must be judged as being without them.[36]

τυφλός ἐστι, μυωπάζων] ΜΥΩΠΆΖΕΙΝ (ἍΠ. ΛΕΓ.) means: to be a ΜΎΩΨ, i.e. one short-sighted:[37] accordingly μυωπάζων serves more nearly to define the term τυφλός as one who can see only what is near, not what is far off. Schott correctly explains μυωπάζων by “weak-sighted.” The older commentators, following Oecumenius, for the most part take μυωπάζειν as synonymous with τυφλώττειν; thus Calvin, Hornejus, etc.; but the identification in meaning of these two terms cannot be justified, whilst it gives rise to an intolerable tautology. The translation of the Vulgate: manu tentans (similarly Erasmus: manu viam tentans; Luther: “and gropes with the hand;” Calvin: manu palpans), has arisen probably from the gloss: ψηλαφῶν, perhaps with reference to Deuteronomy 28:28-29; Isaiah 59:10. Wolf interprets the word, after Bochart (Hierozoic l. l. c. 4), by καμμύειν oculos claudere;[38] but ΜΥΩΠΆΖΕΙΝ is not derived from ΜΎΕΙΝ ΤᾺς ὮΠΑς, but from ΜΎΩΨ. A ΜΎΩΨ, however, is not one who arbitrarily closes his eyes, but one who, from inability to see far enough, is obliged to blink with his eyes, in order to see a distant object. The same applies to Dietlein, who translates: “one who closes his eyes,” by which he conceives a voluntary closing of the eyes, precisely that which is opposed to the meaning of the word. If, then, μυωπάζων mean a short-sighted person, the question arises: What is that near at hand which he sees, and that far off which he does not see? The first expression is generally understood as applying to earthly, and the second to heavenly things. Hofmann, on the other hand, explains: “he sees only what is present to him: that he is a member of the Christian church; but how he has become so, that lies outside his horizon.” Here, however, the first thought is purely imported, and the second has only an apparent justification in the clause which follows.

ΛΉΘΗΝ ΛΑΒΏΝ] ἍΠ. ΛΕΓ. equal to oblitus; Vulgate: oblivionem accipiens; cf. ὙΠΌΜΝΗΣΙΝ ΛΑΒΏΝ, 2 Timothy 1:5 (cf. Joseph. Ant. ii. vi. 9; Wetstein, Lösner, Krebs in loc.); taken strictly, the translation is: “having received the λήθη.” Hofmann justly remarks: that this aoristic clause is not only co-ordinate with the preceding, but is added to it by way of explanation. He is wrong, however, when he thinks that it is intended to elucidate ΜΥΩΠΆΖΩΝ. By it the author refers not to the consequences (Steinfass, and formerly here), but rather to the reason of the blindness, or, more strictly, short-sightedness, which manifests itself in the want of the Christian graces. Dietlein arbitrarily emphasizes this forgetting as a voluntary act. This is justified neither by the expression itself nor by the connection of thought.

τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ τῶν πάλαι αὑτοῦ ἁμαρτημάτων] “the (accomplished) cleansing from the former sins;” not as Winer formerly, in the 5th ed. p. 214, conjectured: “the purification, i.e. the removal of sins;” cf. Hebrews 1:3. As πάλαι shows, ΚΑΘΑΡ. does not here mean a continuous (to be obtained by repentance perhaps, etc.), but a completed process. Not, however, the (ideal) ΚΑΘΑΡΙΣΜΌς of sins for the whole world of sinners, accomplished through Christ’s death on the cross;

ΑὙΤΟῦ is opposed to this; but the cleansing, i.e. forgiveness, procured by the individual in baptism (thus to Brückner, Schott, Hofmann; Wiesinger less aptly applies it to the calling), so that πάλαι denotes the time preceding baptism; cf. 1 Corinthians 6:11.

[36] Schott unwarrantably maintains, on the interpretation of ver. 8 here adopted, that the translation must be: “he becomes blind.”

[37] Aristotle interprets sec. 31: μνωπάζοντες: οἱ ἐκ γενετῆς τὰ μὲν ἐγγὺς βλέποντες, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀποστάσεως οὐχ ὁρῶντες· ἐναντία δὲ πάσχουσιν οἱ γερῶντες τοῖς μυωπάζουσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἐγγὺς μὴ ὁρῶντες τὰ πόῤῥωθεν βλέπουσιν.

[38] Τυφλὸς μυωπάζων is dicitur, qui ideo caecus est, quia sponte claudit oculos, ut ne videat.

2 Peter 1:10. Resumption of the exhortation.

διὸ μᾶλλον] διό is usually taken as referring to the truth expressed in 2 Peter 1:8-9, and μᾶλλον interpreted as equal to “all the more.” The meaning is then: that this truth should still more incite to zeal (thus Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.). Dietlein, on the other hand, takes μᾶλλον as “ushering in an antithesis,” equal to “rather;” thus also Hofmann. The former supplies the thought: “instead of following a virtueless endeavour after a so-called ἐπίγνωσις,” for which, however, in the context there is no warrant. The latter more correctly applies it to what immediately precedes, in this sense, “the readers should do the opposite of that which Peter calls a forgetting that they have received the pardon of sin.”[39] That the particle μᾶλλον frequently expresses an antithesis cannot be denied; cf. 1 Corinthians 5:2 : but as little can it be questioned that it may serve to express intensification; cf. Meyer on 2 Corinthians 7:7. In this way both interpretations are possible. Still that which is usually given appears to be preferable, inasmuch as it seems more natural to apply the very significant thought of this verse to 2 Peter 1:8-9, than only to the subordinate idea immediately preceding.

ἀδελφοί] makes the exhortation more urgent.

σπουδάσατε … ποιεῖσθαι] The exhortation here points back to 2 Peter 1:5 : σπουδὴν π. παρεισενέγκ. The relations of κλῆσις and ἐκλογή are thus stated by Gerhard: vocatio, qua in tempore ad regnum gratiae vocati estis; electio, qua ab aeterno ad regnum gloriae electi estis; in like manner Wiesinger, Fronmüller, etc.; cf. Lünemann also on 1 Thessalonians 1:4. But ἐκλογή can also denote the election effected by the κλῆσις, i.e. the separation of those who are called from the world, and the translation of them into the kingdom of God. And this latter view is supported not only by the position in which the two ideas stand to each other, but by the connection of thought (Grotius, Brückner, Schott, Hofmann[40]); for the summons βεβαίαν ποιεῖσθαι can apply only to something which has been realiter accomplished in man, not to the decree of God in itself unchangeable and eternal. For this reason Calvin feels himself compelled unwarrantably to paraphrase σπουδ. βεβ.… ποιεῖσθαι by: studete ut re ipsa testatum fiat, vos non frustra vocatos esse, imo electos.[41]

For βεβαίαν, cf. Hebrews 3:6; Hebrews 3:14. The making sure takes place then, when the Christians, by a conduct such as is directed in 2 Peter 1:5; 2 Peter 1:8, do their part to remain the called and elected people; the opposite of this is expressed in 2 Peter 1:9.

The reading: ἵνα διὰ τῶν καλῶν ὑμῶν ἔργων βεβ. κ.τ.λ. reproduces the thought in substance correctly.

ταῦτα γὰρ ποιοῦντες] ταῦτα refers not to the foregoing virtues, as Hofmann thinks, but to that which immediately precedes; “the plural shows that the apostle considered this making sure a very many-sided act” (Dietlein).

οὐ μὴ πταίσητέ ποτε] πταίειν means in Jam 2:10; Jam 3:2 : “to offend” (Vulg.: non peccabitis); here as in Romans 11:11 : “to forfeit salvation;” thus also Hofmann. It is unjustifiable to combine the two ideas (de Wette: “to fall and so to fail of salvation”). The double negation οὐ μή, and the ποτέ placed at the end, strengthen the statement.

[39] Hofmann interprets διό in harmony with his conception of ver. 2 Peter 2 : “for this reason, because he only, who is possessed of the aforenamed graces, is capable of putting his knowledge into practice.”

[40] Grotius: date operam, ut et vocatio quae vobis contigit per evangelium et electio eam secuta, qua facti estis Dei populus, ratae sint.

[41] Besser too is wrong: “the apostle exhorts in these words, that what is stable with God, be also stable with us.”