Chú giải Kinh Thánh

Chapter XIII

Contents

The chapter treats mainly of our political duties. From Romans 13:1 to Romans 13:7 inclusive, the apostle enforces the duties which we owe to civil magistrates. From Romans 13:8 to Romans 13:10, he refers to the more general obligations under which christians are placed, but still with special reference to their civil and social relations. From Romans 13:11 to the end of the chapter, he enjoins an exemplary and holy deportment.

Romans 13:1-14

Analysis

The duty of obedience to those in authority is enforced,

1. By the consideration that civil government is a divine institution, and, therefore, resistance to magistrates in the exercise of their lawful authority is disobedience to God, Romans 13:1, Romans 13:2.

2. From the end or design of their appointment, which is to promote the good of society, to be a terror to evil doers, and a praise to them that do well, Romans 13:3, Romans 13:4.

3. Because such subjection is a moral as well as civil duty, Romans 13:5. On these grounds the payment of tribute or taxes, and general deference, are to be cheerfully rendered, Romans 13:6, Romans 13:7.

Christians are bound not only to be obedient to those in authority, but also to perform all social and relative duties, especially that of love, which includes and secures the observance of all others, Romans 13:8-10. A pure and exemplary life as members of society is enforced by the consideration that the night is far spent and that the day is at hand, that the time of suffering and trial is nearly over, and that of deliverance approaching, Romans 13:11-14.

Commentary

Romans 13:1

Let every soul be subject to the higher powers. The expression every soul is often used as equivalent to every one; it is at times, however, emphatic, and such is probably the case in this passage. By higher powers are most commonly and naturally understood those in authority, without reference to their grade of office, or their character. We are to be subject not only to the supreme magistrates, but to all who have authority over us. The abstract word powers or authorities (ἐξουσίαι) is used for those who are invested with power, Luke 12:11; Ephesians 1:21; Ephesians 3:10, etc. etc. The word (ὑπερέχων) rendered higher, is applied to any one who, in dignity and authority, excels us. In 1 Peter 2:13, it is applied to the king as supreme, i.e. superior to all other magistrates. But here one class of magistrates is not brought into comparison with another, but they are spoken of as being over other men who are not in office. It is a very unnatural interpretation which makes this word refer to the character of the magistrates, as though the sense were, ‘Be subject to good magistrates.’ This is contrary to the usage of the term, and inconsistent with the context. Obedience is not enjoined on the ground of the personal merit of those in authority, but on the ground of their official station.

There was peculiar necessity, during the apostolic age, for inculcating the duty of obedience to civil magistrates. This necessity arose in part from the fact that a large portion of the converts to Christianity had been Jews, and were peculiarly indisposed to submit to the heathen authorities. This indisposition (as far as it was peculiar) arose from the prevailing impression among them, that this subjection was unlawful, or at least highly derogatory to their character as the people of God, who had so long lived under a theocracy. In Deuteronomy 17:15, it is said, “Thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose; one from among thy brethren shalt thou set king over thee; thou mayest not set a stranger over thee, which is not thy brother.” It was a question, therefore, constantly agitated among them, “Is it lawful to pay tribute unto Caesar, or not?” A question which the great majority were at least secretly inclined to answer in the negative. Another source of the restlessness of the Jews under a foreign yoke, was the idea which they entertained of the nature of the Messiah’s kingdom. As they expected a temporal Prince, whose kingdom should be of this world, they were ready to rise in rebellion at the call of every one who cried, “I am Christ.” The history of the Jews at this period shows how great was the effect produced by these and similar causes on their feelings towards the Roman government. They were continually breaking out into tumults, which led to their expulsion from Rome,‹68› and, finally, to the utter destruction of Jerusalem. It is therefore not a matter of surprise, that converts from among such a people should need the injunction, “Be subject to the higher powers.” Besides the effect of their previous opinions and feelings, there is something in the character of Christianity itself, and in the incidental results of the excitement which it occasions, to account for the repugnance of many of the early Christians to submit to their civil rulers. They wrested, no doubt, the doctrine of Christian liberty, as they did other doctrines, to suit their own inclinations. This result, however, is to be attributed not to religion, but to the improper feelings of those into whose minds the form of truth, without its full power, had been received.

For there is no power but of God; and the powers that be are ordained of God. Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐξουσία εἰ μὴ ἀπὸ θεοῦ. This is a very comprehensive proposition. All authority is of God. No man has any rightful power over other men, which is not derived from God. All human power is delegated and ministerial. This is true of parents, of magistrates, and of church officers. This, however, is not all the passage means. It not only asserts that all government (ἐξουσία, authority) is (ἀπὸ θεοῦ) derived from God, but that every magistrate is of God; that is, his authority is jure divino. The word ἐξουσία is evidently, in this connection, used in a concrete sense. This is plain from the use of the word in the other clauses of the verse. “The higher powers,” and “the powers that be,” are concrete terms, meaning those invested with power. Compare Romans 13:3, Romans 13:4, where “rulers” and “ministers” are substituted for the abstract “powers.” The doctrine here taught is the ground of the injunction contained in the first clause of the verse. We are to obey magistrates, because they derive their authority from God. Not only is human government a divine institution, but the form in which that government exists, and the persons by whom its functions are exercised, are determined by his providence. All magistrates of whatever grade are to be regarded as acting by divine appointment; not that God designates the individuals, but it being his will that there should be magistrates, every person, who is in point of fact clothed with authority, is to be regarded as having a claim to obedience, founded on the will of God. In like manner, the authority of parents over their children, of husbands over their wives, of masters over their servants, is of God’s ordination. There is no limitation to the injunction in this verse, so far as the objects of obedience are concerned, although there is as to the extent of the obedience itself. That is, we are to obey all that is in actual authority over us, whether their authority be legitimate or usurped, whether they are just or unjust. The actual reigning emperor was to be obeyed by the Roman Christians, whatever they might think as to his title to the sceptre. But if he transcended his authority, and required them to worship idols, they were to obey God rather than man. This is the limitation to all human authority. Whenever obedience to man is inconsistent with obedience to God, then disobedience becomes a duty.

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Romans 13:2

Whoso, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. This is an obvious inference from the doctrine of the preceding verse. If it is the will of God that there should be civil government, and persons appointed to exercise authority over others, it is plain that to resist such persons in the exercise of their lawful authority is an act of disobedience to God.

And they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. This also is an obvious conclusion from the preceding. If disobedience is a sin it will be punished. The word (κρίμα) rendered damnation, means simply sentence, judicial decision; whether favorable or adverse, depends on the context. Here it is plain it means a sentence of condemnation. He shall be condemned, and, by implication, punished. As the word damnation is by modern usage restricted to the final and eternal condemnation of the wicked, it is unsuited to this passage and some others in which it occurs in our version; see 1 Corinthians 11:29. Paul does not refer to the punishment which the civil magistrate may inflict; for he is speaking of disobedience to those in authority as a sin against God, which he will punish.

It is clear that this passage (Romans 13:1, Romans 13:2) is applicable to men living under every form of government, monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical, in all their various modifications. Those who are in authority are to be obeyed within their sphere, no matter how or by whom appointed. It is the οὖσαι ἐξουσίαι, the powers that be, the de facto government, that is to be regarded as, for the time being, ordained of God. It was to Paul a matter of little importance whether the Roman emperor was appointed by the senate, the army, or the people; whether the assumption of the imperial authority by Caesar was just or unjust, or whether his successors had a legitimate claim to the throne or not. It was his object to lay down the simple principle, that magistrates are to be obeyed. The extent of this obedience is to be determined from the nature of the case. They are to be obeyed as magistrates, in the exercise of their lawful authority. When Paul commands wives to obey their husbands, they are required to obey them as husbands, not as masters, nor as kings; children are to obey their parents as parents, not as sovereigns; and so in every other case. This passage, therefore, affords a very slight foundation for the doctrine of passive obedience.

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Romans 13:3

For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to evil. This verse is not to be connected with the second, but with the first, as it assigns an additional reason for the duty there enjoined. Magistrates are to be obeyed, for such is the will of God, and because they are appointed to repress evil and promote good. There is a ground, therefore, in the very nature of their office, why they should not be resisted.

Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shall have praise of the same. That is, government is not an evil to be feared, except by evil doers. As the magistrates are appointed for the punishment of evil, the way to avoid suffering from their authority is not to resist it, but to do that which is good. Paul is speaking of the legitimate design of government, not of the abuse of power by wicked men.

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Romans 13:4

For he is the minister of God to thee for good, etc. This whole verse is but an amplification of the preceding. ‘Government is a benevolent institution of God, designed for the benefit of men; and, therefore, should be respected and obeyed. As it has, however, the rightful authority to punish, it is to be feared by those that do evil.’ For good, i.e. to secure or promote your welfare. Magistrates or rulers are not appointed for their own honor or advantage, but for the benefit of society, and, therefore, while those in subjection are on this account to obey them, they themselves are taught, what those in power are so apt to forget, that they are the servants of the people as well as the servants of God, and that the welfare of society is the only legitimate object which they as rulers are at liberty to pursue.

But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath (εἰς ὀργήν, i.e. for the purpose of punishment) upon him that doeth evil. As one part of the design of government is to protect the good, so the other is to punish the wicked. The existence of this delegated authority is, therefore, a reason why men should abstain from the commission of evil. He beareth not the sword in vain, i.e. it is not in vain that he is in vested with authority to punish. The reference is not to the dagger worn by the Roman emperors as a sign of office, μάχαιρα in the New Testament always means sword, which of old was the symbol of authority, and specially of the right of life and death. As the common method of inflicting capital punishment was by decapitation with a sword, that instrument is mentioned as the symbol of the right of punishment, and, as many infer from this passage, of the right of capital punishment. “Insignis locus ad jus gladii comprobandum; nam si Dominus magistratum armando gladii quoque usum illi mandavit, quoties sontes capitali poena vindicat, exercendo Dei ultionem, ejus mandatis obsequitur. Contendunt igitur cum Deo qui sanguinem nocentium hominum effundi nefas esse putant.” — Calvin.

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Romans 13:5

Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience’ sake. That is, subjection to magistrates is not only a civil duty enforced by penal statutes, but also a religious duty, and part of our obedience to God. For wrath, i.e. from fear of punishment. For conscience’ sake, i.e. out of regard to God, from conscientious motives. In like manner, Paul enforces all relative and social duties on religious grounds. Children are to obey their parents, because it is right in the sight of God; and servants are to be obedient to their masters, as unto Christ, doing the will of God from the heart, Ephesians 6:1, Ephesians 6:5, Ephesians 6:6.

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Romans 13:6

For, for this cause, pay ye tribute also. This verse may be connected, by the words (διὰ τοῦτο) rendered for this cause, with the preceding, thus, ‘Wherefore (i.e., for conscience’ sake) ye should pay tribute also.’ But it is better to consider this clause as containing an inference from the foregoing exhibition of the nature and design of civil government: ‘Since civil government is constituted for the benefit of society, for the punishment of evil doers and for the praise of those that do well, ye should cheerfully pay the contributions requisite for its support.’

For they are the ministers of God, attending continually on this very thing. This clause introduces another reason for the payment of tribute. They, not the tax-gatherers, but οἱ ἄρχοντες, the rulers, to whom the tribute is due. Magistrates are not only appointed for the public good, but they are the ministers of God, and consequently it is his will that we should contribute whatever is necessary to enable them to discharge their duty. The word (λειτουργοί) rendered ministers, means public servants, men appointed for any public work, civil or religious. Among the Greek democratical states, especially at Athens, those persons were particularly so called, who were required to perform some public service at their own expense. It is used in Scripture in a general sense, for Servants or ministers, Romans 15:16; Hebrews 1:7; Hebrews 8:2. The words εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, to this very thing, may refer to tax-gathering. The magistrates are divinely commissioned, or authorized to collect tribute. This is necessary to the support of government; and government being a divine institution, God, in ordaining the end, has thereby ordained the means. It is because magistrates, in the collection of taxes, act as the λειτουργοὶ θεοῦ, the executive officers of God, that we are bound to pay them. Others make the αὐτὸ τοῦτο refer to the λειτουργία, or service of God, which is implied in magistrates being called λειτουργοί. ‘They are the ministers of God attending constantly to their ministry.’ The former interpretation is the more consistent with the context.

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Romans 13:7

Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor. ‘Such being the will of God, and such the benevolent design of civil government, render to magistrates (and to all others) what properly belongs to them, whether pecuniary contribution, reverence, or honor.’ The word all seems, from the context, to have special reference to all in authority, though it is not necessary to confine it to such persons exclusively. The word (φόρος) tribute is applied properly to land and capitation tax; and (τέλος) to the imposts levied on merchandise. The words (φόβος) fear, and (τιμή) honor, are generally considered in this connection as differing only in degree; the former expressing the reverence to superiors, the latter the respect to equals.

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Romans 13:8

Owe no man any thing, but to love one another, etc. That is, acquit yourselves of all obligations, except love, which is a debt that must remain ever due. This is the common, and considering the context, which abounds with commands, the most natural interpretation of this passage. Others, however, take the verb (ὀφείλετε) as in the indicative, instead of the imperative mood, and understand the passage thus: ‘Ye owe no man any thing but love, (which includes all other duties,) for he that loves another fulfills the law.’ This gives a good sense, when this verse is taken by itself; but viewed in connection with those which precede and follow, the common interpretation is much more natural. Besides, “the indicative would require οὐδενὶ οὐδέν, and not μηδενὶ μηδέν. The use of the subjective negative shows that a command is intended.” Meyer. The idea which a cursory reader might be disposed to attach to these words, in considering them as a direction not to contract pecuniary debts, is not properly expressed by them; although the prohibition, in its spirit, includes the incurring of such obligations, when we have not the certain prospect of discharging them. The command, however, is, ‘Acquit yourselves of all obligations, tribute, custom, fear, honor, or whatever else you may owe, but remember that the debt of love is still unpaid, and always must remain so; for love includes all duty, since he that loves another fulfills the law.’‹69› He that loveth another hath fulfilled (πεπλήρωκε) the law. It is already done. That is, all the law contemplated, in its specific commands relating to our social duties, is attained when we love our neighbor as ourselves.

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