Abstract of Systematic Theology

The word Theology means literally a discourse concerning God; but in analogy with other words, as geology, chronology and biology, it means the science which treats of God. It naturally concerns itself with such questions as these: Is there a God; can He be known; what is His nature, and character; what are the relations He sustains to the universe; particularly to intelligent beings possessed of spiritual natures; and above all, as most important to us, to men; in what ways has He made Himself known; and especially in what aspect does He reveal Himself to them as sinners. In connection with this last relation it treats, particularly, of man, as a creature of God, placed under the government of His moral law. It inquires into his original condition of innocence, and happiness; the manner in which he fell therefrom; and his present state of sinfulness, and condemnation; and inability for self rescue. It is thus led, also, to discuss the nature of the salvation which God has provided as seen in the person, and character of Jesus Christ, through whom it has come, and in the works of active, and passive obedience, by which he has wrought out reconciliation to God. In like manner, also, does it consider the nature, and work of the Holy Spirit, through whom man is led to accept the provisions of God's grace, and to attain through penitence, and faith unto a salvation in Christ, which consists, not in freedom from condemnation only, but also from the dominion and defilement of sin, and in attainment of the holiness, and happiness of children of the Heavenly Father. It follows man also beyond the death of the body, and makes known the future state of both the righteous, and the wicked, as well before, as after the resurrection of the body, together with the final judgment of both these classes, and the Heaven, and Hell which shall be their respective abodes forever. Finally it teaches the great end which God is accomplishing through all His works, in the manifestation to all His creatures of His own glory, as seen in its twofold aspect of mercy, and justice, in His dealings with this fallen race of man.

The term "theology" is applied, not only to the science itself, but to any treatise on that science. This is true, not only of a discourse upon the one true God, but even of one upon the many false gods of the Heathen. It is also true, though it be not a scientific discussion, but simply one in narrative, or poetic form, and descriptive of action, rather than of character, and nature. Thus "Orpheus and Homer were called theologians among the Greeks, because their poems treated of the nature of the Gods". (Charles Hodge Sys. Theol. Vol 1. p. 19.) Even the poems of Ossian, though probably written in England within the past century, is a book of theology. Mythology is not less theology because it treats of false gods, and in works of the imagination. The term "theology" is, however, especially applicable to learned, and scientific works upon God, or the Gods. Of these numbers are to be found connected with Heathenism. Such are the Vedas, the most ancient of the sacred books of the Hindoos. Such is the Zendavesta of the ancient Persians. The Edda which sets forth the Scandinavian mythology, consists of poetic songs, and also of dialogues on the origin of the gods, on the creation of the world, and other like topics. [See Gardner's Faiths of the World, Vol. 1, p. 795]. The most valuable discussions among the Heathen, however, are to be found in the works of the Greek philosophers, the greater part of which, when not directly upon the nature of the Gods, involved questions as to the origin of the world, and the presence therein of a Divine controlling Spirit, as well as upon the nature of the soul, and its duties, and its immortality. Of their works many have come down to us in fragments only, while a large portion of what they taught is found only in the records, and reports made by others among themselves; but there are also many complete works which profess to have been written by the authors of these speculations. Confessedly the most important of these Greek writings are Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates, and the works of Plato, and Aristotle. But from the beginning of Grecian philosophy in Thales and Pythagoras to its culmination in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, was not quite two hundred years, while its whole history covers a period of six centuries and a half before, and five centuries after the coming of Christ. No human estimate can be placed upon the value of these contributions, nor upon the influence they have exerted even over those possessed of the Christian Revelation. The Latin writers also produced several works of a theological character, preeminent among which is that of Cicero "Concerning the nature of the Gods." Theology is, also, frequently used for the set of opinions exhibited by a writer, or class of writers, in any one, or more productions. Thus we have the theology of Calvin, or of Arminius, or of Baxter, that of the Reformation, Princeton theology, and New England theology. Men also speak of the theology of the Old, or of the New Testament, of the theology of the Psalms, of the various Evangelists, especially of John, and of Petrine, and Pauline theology.

Theology is defined as a science. It is eminently worthy of that name. It lacks nothing that constitutes a science. It is concerned in the investigation of facts. It inquires into their existence, their relations to each other, their systematic arrangement, the laws which govern them, and the great principles which are the basis of their existence, and relations. As in other sciences, there is much that is absolutely known, much beyond this that is little questioned, much that is still matter of speculation, and much, as to which there is decided difference of opinion. New facts are constantly developing in this science, as in others, which enable us to verify the facts, and principles heretofore accepted, when correct, and to modify them when erroneous. New theories present themselves for the better explanation of facts already known, and are tested by these, and others subsequently discovered, and are received, or rejected, according to their ascertained correctness. The knowledge of the past is built upon for progression towards the future. The discovery of the facts is conducted, as in all other sciences, by study of what the field affords. Geology examines the earth, and derives its facts from the structure of that earth. Astronomy investigates the stars. Theology, likewise, studies the sources of its knowledge. Each science seeks to arrive at the truth. The votaries of each are certain that it is to be found in their fields, either partially, or completely. The perfect attainment of all facts prepares for the exactness of scientific knowledge. The absence of any must make the knowledge incomplete. The proper generalization of all is essential in this, as in all other kinds of science. A full knowledge of all the facts, and a perfect generalization of them, will constitute theology an exact science. Theology is also as sensitive to the absence of facts as is any other science. The astronomer finds that his calculations, based upon correct theories, are not exactly verified, and at once suspects the presence of some disturbing body as the cause of this variation. So, also, in theology. The omission of a single fact, however small, must affect the whole universe of doctrine. The common mind does not perceive this, and, hence, is not prepared to value the discovery of the new fact. But the theologian finds in the new and more exact adjustment, thus made possible, the proof of the truth of his whole system, and, therefore, prizes it, even sometimes beyond what he ought.

Regarded as a science, theology may be classified in various forms. 1. According to the method of revelation; into natural and supernatural theology. Natural theology embraces what man may attain by the study of God in Nature. This extends not only to what is beheld of Him in the Heavens and the Earth, but also in the intellectual, and spiritual nature of man himself. Supernatural theology is that derived from such special information as God has given by what we commonly call Revelation. 2. According to the purpose which it contemplates; into Systematic theology, also called Didactic, or Dogmatic; Polemic or Controversial; and Practical or Experimental. 3. According to the main religious idea associated with it; as Pantheistic Theology, Deistic Theology, Rationalistic Theology, &c. 4. According to the name of its founder, or the race in which it originated, or flourishes, as Christian Theology, Judaistic Theology, Mohammedan Theology, &c. 5. According to the sources from which it is derived; into Biblical Theology, Christian Dogmatic Theology, and Ecclesiastical Dogmatics.

Biblical theology consists in the facts of the Bible, harmonized by scriptural comparison, generalized by scriptural theories, crystalized into scriptural doctrines, and so systematized as to show the system of truth taught, to the full extent that it is a system, and no farther. As in Botany, one gathers all the plants of the world, and arranges them without attempting to introduce new plants, even to fill up manifest gaps, so Biblical theology, duly presented, shows scriptural truth in all the perfection, and in all the imperfection which God has given it. True Biblical Theology should recognize the inspired source whence come its teachings. But, as now technically used, Biblical Theology refers to the statement, and development of Doctrine by the various Biblical writers, or in other words to the development of Jewish religious thought, without assuming, or denying the inspiration of the Bible. Christian Dogmatics adds to Biblical theology such philosophical explanations, as seem necessary to make the system of truth complete, or to enable men better to understand the facts. These are not necessarily non scriptural, as they should never be unscriptural. They may be as much a part of Scripture, as the theory of gravitation is a part of the revelation of nature. They are applied to explain phenomena. So far as able to do so, as to most of the facts, in a way not inconsistent with any of them, they prove their probable, even in some cases, their certain correctness. A failure to explain all does not deprive them of confidence. But the direct opposition of even one fact, seen to be inconsistent with the theory, is sufficient to show that it is incorrect. Christian Dogmatics differs from Ecclesiastical Dogmatics in two particulars. (1.) The latter are the authoritative statements of doctrine, put forth by some body of Christians claiming to be a church. They are found in creeds, symbols, decrees, resolutions, and apologies. They may also appear in authoritative discussions of its creeds, or systems of doctrine. (2.) Ecclesiastical Dogmatics should treat only of ascertained facts which may be laid down as a basis of union, and agreement. It ought not to touch merely speculative questions. Christian Dogmatics treats of speculative, as well as ascertained questions. It thus appears that a perfect system of theology will combine all of these classes. It would be based upon Biblical Dogmatics, which shall have so collected, and systematized, all the teachings of a full revelation as to be concurrent with the facts, and doctrines of Christian Dogmatics. The Ecclesiastical Dogmatics will have gone no farther than fully authorized by the Word of God, and therefore concurs with Biblical Dogmatics, while the fulness of revelation will have left to Christian Dogmatics no speculative questions; but in all its discussions it will have been able to attain unto full knowledge of the facts, and ascertainment of all the doctrines. But this concurrence can only be when Theology has been reduced to an exact science. This can never be looked for in this life. The causes of doctrinal variation will therefore be apparent. If men came to the study of Biblical Theology, with minds entirely unprejudiced, capable of examining its truths with the same mental powers, and with the same amount of study, all would concur as to its facts, and doctrines. But this cannot be done. Mental capacities vary. All men have their prejudices. All have not equal time for study, and all use not equally the time that they have. Thus variety is certain even in studying Biblical Theology. The same causes increase this in Christian Dogmatics, because here the human element enters more largely than in the Biblical; while reverence for antiquity, opposition to change, and the influence of the learned of the past and the present, prevent the alteration of Ecclesiastical creeds, which underlie Ecclesiastical Dogmatics, and thus lead men constantly to continuance in error, and refusal to accept truth.

These facts show with what spirit we should study Theology. 1. With reverence for truth, and especially for the truth taught in the word of God. 2. With earnest prayer for divine help. 3. With careful searching of heart against prejudice. 4. With timidity, as to the reception, and propagation of new doctrines. 5. But with a spirit willing, and anxious to examine, and to accept whatever we may be convinced is true. 6. With that teachable humility, which, knowing that God has not taught us, in His Word, all the truth that exists, not even all the truth on many a single point, accepts with implicit faith all that He has taught, and awaits His own time for that more full revelation which shall remove all our present perplexities.

The advantages of studying theology systematically are several. 1. We thus ascertain all that nature and the Scriptures teach on each point. 2. We compare all these teachings one with another, and are enabled to define their mutual limitations. 3. We are brought, face to face, with the fact that our knowledge is bounded by God's Revelation, and are led to acknowledge it as its source. 4. We are consequently warned not to omit any of the truth, ascertained from any source, nor to add to it anything, not properly embraced therein. A departure from this rule will lead into inevitable error. 5. The harmony, and consistency, which will be found in all God's teachings, from whatever source we may draw them, will become conclusive proof of the divine origin of revelation. This will result, not only from a comparison of what Reason, and Nature teaches, with the revelations of God's Word, but from one of the several books of the Bible with each other, and especially of the body of the Old Testament, as one book, with that of the New Testament, as another. 6. We are thus led to value each of the doctrines of the word of God. Each is true. Each has been revealed that it might be believed. We cannot therefore, omit any one, because of its forbidding aspect, or its seeming unimportance, or its mysterious nature, or its demand for great personal sacrifice, or its humiliating assertions, or requirements, or the free terms upon which it assures of life and salvation.

It is objected, however, to any science of God, that, if there is a God, He cannot be known, and, therefore, cannot be a true object of worship. If this means that we cannot know the essential nature of God, then upon this principle we can know nothing, for we do not know the essential nature of anything. We know not our own essence. We cannot ascertain that of any existence, not even of the smallest atom of matter. We can only judge from the qualities anything is perceived to possess, or by its manifestations, what it must be. So as to God; we can find out what He is, in the different ways in which He has manifested Himself in ourselves, and in the World around us. Is it meant that we cannot know Him, because His nature may be, or must be, so different from ours? But we do know many things which differ greatly in nature from what we are. Our bodies are material, but it is our mind which knows them; and mind, and matter are believed to be essentially diverse. We know also our mode of existence, and that of other objects in time, and space, but these modes of existence are essentially different from the things which exist in them. Besides, until we know what God is, we cannot be sure that He is in all respects different from ourselves. If there be any points of similarity, we can know Him so far as these exist; and, if it be true that we have been made, in any respect, in the likeness, and image of God, our knowledge of God may approach at least to such completeness as to enable us to recognize His more manifest perfections, and to perceive that because of these He ought to be reverenced, and worshipped. Guided by the analogy of our own natures we expect to find in Him a personal, conscious, intelligent, and moral being, and this expectation is confirmed by the manifestations of His presence, and workings in the universe. This analogy alone will not tell everything about God. Nor does it limit the knowledge we are able to acquire. It has led some to believe that God has a material body as has man. That He has not, is to be ascertained from other facts. But it so far teaches us, that we know that God must either be a spirit, such as we are, or that He must have a higher nature, to which belong all those attributes of spirit which constitute conscious personality, and intelligent purpose. Does it mean that we cannot know Him because we cannot come in contact with Him through the senses, as we do with our fellow men, and cannot learn His nature through His conduct, and action, as we do theirs? But it is not alone through personal contact with our fellows that we know that they are, and what they are. We judge of this also, by their works, which we may examine, though we have never seen, or known them personally. In like manner, through our senses, are we brought into contact with God, Who, though not material, is an artificer in material things, and has displayed before us, in the universe around, the evidences of His wisdom, power, and goodness. Surely, so great a structure as this, which manifests a grasp of thought, and a power of performance, so wonderfully beyond that of any human being, and a minuteness of detail, and execution, and finish, the limitations of which defy the most powerful microscopical examination, demands that we should seek to know its author, and that, until known, we should at least recognize the evidence that He is immeasurably greater, and wiser, than ourselves. Is it meant, that the outward phenomena of the universe cannot give such mental, and spiritual knowledge of God, as is essential to our mental, and spiritual relations to Him? This is true; but we find that knowledge conveyed to us by our own spiritual, and mental phenomena. We find in ourselves consciousness of existence, of thought, and of purpose, and from the manner in which these operate in us, we know the nature of their operation in any being of intelligence. We find that the mind has its laws, no less binding and effective, no less regular and permanent, than those of matter. We must ascribe these to its author no less than those of matter to its creator. In their study, we perceive the nature of mind, and spirit, not by learning the essence, but as in matter by studying the phenomena. That nature we ascribe to the Divine Mind, and Spirit, which must, at least, possess a nature equal to this. The differences of mental, and spiritual capacities in men assure us that these exist in degrees of greater, or less. Hence we assign them to God in the highest degree; because as their author He must Himself be greater than all His mental and spiritual creations. But, in addition to this, we have a peculiar source of information. We find our minds capable of intuitive knowledge. Some abstract facts need only to be understood, and the conviction that they are true immediately follows. That "the whole is greater than any one of its parts" is perceived to be true as soon as understood. So also of the statement that "a thing cannot be, and not be, at the same time." Whence is this knowledge? We say that the mind is so constituted that it cannot believe otherwise. Who has so constituted it? It must proceed from some one upon whose veracity we rely, when we accept what our nature teaches. But, if from any one, then there is a creating mind, and that mind operates directly upon mind without the intervention of matter, and thus teaches us truth. When, then, we find other convictions of like nature relative to our dependence upon a higher being, our obligations of duty to Him, our sense of right, and wrong, and the duty to do the right, and not to do the wrong, we cannot avoid believing that these intuitions come from the same source, and are His instructions to us as to our moral relations, and duties to Him. But it is objected that in all these ways we only attain partial knowledge of God. This is readily admitted. But partial knowledge is actual knowledge as far as it goes. We have complete knowledge of nothing. All our knowledge is partial. The child only partially knows its parent. The subject only partially knows his sovereign. Yet enough is known for the recognition of dependence, and of the duties of obedience, and love. So, also, with the Heavenly Father, the King of Kings. The questions of Zophar have been, with full reverence for God, and earnest worship for such an one as it is believed that He must be, the language of the pious of all ages. "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection? It is as high as Heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than Hell; what canst thou know." Job 11:7,8. But it is further objected that, if there is a God, He must be the Absolute, the Infinite, the Unconditioned, and, therefore, cannot be an object of comprehension to us, whose nature is finite, and whose mode of existence is only relative, finite, and conditioned. But the objection itself presents its own refutation. How do we know that God must be such, if there is a God? In whatever way we know this, we know at least that much of God that He must be the Absolute, the Infinite, the Unconditioned. Even before we are supposed to know that He exists, therefore, we know this much of the nature which must be His, and upon the first evidence of His existence have the right to attribute to Him all that is therein contained. The characteristics, thus ascribed to Him, reveal Him, therefore, to us, as an infinite existence, without other limitations than are found in His own nature, or essence, who, as Absolute, cannot be dependent, but must be the source, and Sovereign of all else; and, as the Unconditioned, cannot be subject to time, and space, and matter; and must exist, therefore, without possibility of growth, or increase, and without the succession of periods, such as yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow, and without those measures of space, and location, which belong to matter. The God, therefore, Who is thus proclaimed to be unknowable is at least known as a self-existent Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in all the perfections that belong to His nature. Let but the least evidence appear that there is a God, and at once this nature may be ascribed to Him.

Belief in the existence of God has been almost universal among men. The same ideal of perfection has not everywhere been found. Some have gone no farther than to be moved by the sense of the supernatural, and to believe in a power to which they are subject, and upon which they depend. But, at least, this much is to be found in the lowest forms of fetish worshippers. Others have multiplied the numbers, and forms, of those towards whom they have felt this sense of dependence, and have accepted the existence of many gods. Yet, among these, the traces of the One God have not entirely disappeared, for they have referred the gods themselves to one originating source. Some, following too closely the analogy of man's nature, have believed God to be the animating soul of the world. The highest spiritual conception of God has been found only in those nations which have been recipients of His Revelation. But the most ancient records show that, in the earliest times, the knowledge possessed by all was comparatively simple, and pure. So universal has been this belief, that but very few of the millions of the race in all its ages have denied the existence of God. It has been questioned whether these few have been deceived as to their actual convictions, or have been insincere in their avowal of Atheism; because it has seemed so impossible for man not to believe in a God. A greater number still have been skeptical; sometimes led by wishes born of depravity, and sin, but, also, sometimes misled by philosophical speculations, and apparently earnestly desirous to know the truth. But the firm conviction of mankind in general that this belief is unavoidable in any man in his normal condition, and that its absence is due to some crushing out, or erasure of his necessary moral capabilities, is seen, not only in the general horror which men have for those who profess Atheism, but in the denial to such men of the right to testify in the courts of justice. 1. This almost universal concurrence of men ought to be ascribed primarily to Tradition. It has been handed down, from parent to child, throughout all the generations of the past. Some theologians of the present day have been unwilling to recognize this fact. Some have sought the source of this general prevalence in the idea of God as innate in the mind. Others have simply rested upon other arguments for God's existence, and taken the universal consent of mankind as evidence that this is not an idea unnatural to them, since they have yielded ready assent to the proofs of it commonly given. But a recognition of the traditional teaching will not weaken the argument. Even if it does, it is a fact which must be acknowledged. In favour of this as the primary source of this general belief it may be said, (1.) That this is the natural manner in which every child among us learns about God. Its own questionings, or its parent's convictions of the importance of this knowledge, cause it to be imparted at an early period, and by such direct teaching. (2.) Information obtained by travelers, and especially by Christian missionaries, teach that our own customs agree with those of heathen nations as they also do with those of Christendom in general. (3.) This accounts for the fact, that, while the belief has varied at different times, and places, it is held in the same form by almost every one within a single nation at a single period. (4.) The uniformity, too, in which it has continued among any one people for many generations, is also proof of this truth. (5.) The general existence of it in a purer form, the nearer we approach the origin of the race, shows that this was the primeval belief of man, and has thence been handed down from father to son, until it has reached our own age, and ourselves. (6.) This accounts also for the fact that, when it has been corrupted, it has continued in that corrupted form until some new mental, or spiritual force has arisen to introduce change, and to give new form to the belief for some time to come. The belief thus dependent on this traditional teaching is of great value as proof of the truth of this doctrine. (1.) Its general prevalence shows that this doctrine is suitable to all mankind. It is one that, though worthy of the wisest thought, is not dependent upon philosophical conceptions, or abstract, or logical reasoning, for its acceptance. The most ignorant of men have been able to grasp it. It is like that teaching of the Great Master, whom "the common people heard gladly." There has been something in it, or connected with it, that has made all men believe it. What that is, will be hereafter shown. But the fact that this simple teaching, from father to son, throughout all the ages, has been enough to make it dwell as a powerful, and controlling influence in the hearts of the masses of mankind, is a strong proof not only of its truth, but also that it has come from God, whose universal gifts are of this simple nature, common to all. 2. That it has come down through all the ages, shows that it has come in contact with all the best thoughts of the wisest of mankind. That, in its study, the wisest, and best, even among the heathen, have approached, in their noblest conceptions of it, to what we believe we have received through the revelation of God, affords a convincing argument, not only in favour of this noblest conception, but of the Divine Word which reveals it. The least that can be said is, that, after being subjected to every variety of thought, and philosophical speculation, this traditional belief has maintained itself as truth, and convincingly withstood every objection that has been brought against it. 3. The varied forms in which it has appeared show that there is some simple truth, or truths, common to all, and of which all men have perceived the correctness, which lie at its foundations, though other truths have been perceived through the light of nature, by some only, by which they have been able to form a better idea of God than others. 4. These simplest truths are seen not only to be embraced in the higher Heathen ideal, but to enter also into the conception given by Revelation itself. 5. There is thus manifested, also, the existence of that knowledge of God in all men, which enforces the duty of worship, and reverence, and causes accountability to Him. 6. The continuance of this belief among those, whose self interest, because of sin, would naturally have led them to reject it, is a strong proof of the sincerity with which it has been held.

III. Is the Knowledge of God innate. The knowledge of the insufficiency of mere tradition to prove the truth of any doctrine leads us to seek some other ground of this universal belief of mankind. Tradition has been pointed out as the primary source of this faith. But it is primary, in point of time only, not as the real cause of the general acceptance of the doctrine. Neither does the belief in a God arise from any of the various arguments which have been devised for its support. All men reach conviction on this subject before they ever hear any discussion about it. To the mass of men the arguments have been utterly unknown. While these arguments are, therefore, to be presented as confirmatory proof, we must seek some other cause for this continued general belief of man. The true reason for this is that such is the constitution of the human mind that it naturally accepts as true, the idea it has attained of God, and rests upon belief in His existence, as a fact that ought not to be doubted. 1. This is generally expressed by the statement that the idea of God is "innate". But the expression seems to be unfortunate. (1.) There are no innate truths in the ordinary acceptation of the word innate. The mind possesses no ideas independent of all suggestion, or inward contemplation. No truth becomes truth to the mind, until it is perceived to be truth. (2.) If the idea of God were in the mind, as innate is commonly understood, that idea would be as perfect in one man as in another. But there are evidently various degrees of that perfection. These, therefore, must arise from the different measures of cultivation, and thought as well as from the different circumstances, by which the elements which compose that idea in its perfection, are suggested. (3.) Inasmuch as that idea of God, possessed by most men in Christian lands, is the result of the teachings of the Scriptures, or at least of the philosophical conceptions of men of thought, when the innateness of this idea is urged as a reason for belief in God, we are naturally met by the avowal, on the part of many, if not all, that they have no such innate idea. (4.) Any idea of God which we have is not an idea of Himself, but of certain relations existing between Him, and man, or the universe, or of His relation to certain facts which we perceive in connection with these.

2. A better statement, therefore, is that the belief in God is based upon the intuitive perception by the mind of certain truths, which necessarily involve the existence of God of the verity of which it attains absolute conviction. It has been already stated that man attains intuitive conceptions. He is not confined to a single method of obtaining knowledge. He arrives at truth through sensation. He is taught it by experience. He believes testimony. He is conscious of Himself. But he is also so constituted, as to certain truths, that they are self evident upon an intelligent conception of what is meant by them. No reasoning about them can make them more convincing. No study of them, except as to the nature of the things affirmed, gives deeper conviction of their truth. No personal experience, nor testimony of others, gives stronger witness of their reliability. In each individual mind, according to its comprehension of what is meant by the things spoken of, there arises personal conviction of their indubitable truth. This is really what is meant, when it is affirmed that these ideas are innate in man. All that is necessary, prior to such intuitive conception, is a knowledge of the meaning of the truth, which is to be intuitively perceived. Take, for example, the mathematical axiom before quoted "the whole is greater than any one of its parts." Before the truth of this is perceived, it is necessary to know what is meant by "whole", and "part", and "greater". As soon as these are known, the truth of the affirmation at once appears. It is on this account that the term "God", or the expression "the true idea of God", cannot be a part of an intuitive conception. We cannot know "God." We may know certain things about God. We have not "the true idea of God." We only have some true idea of God. Hence our statement was limited to the assertion, that "such is the constitution of the human mind that it naturally accepts the idea it has attained of God as true." These intuitive conceptions are originally single. Sir William Hamilton makes simplicity a characteristic of intuitive truth. In opposition to this statement which he quotes, Dr. Charles Hodge contends that "all of the propositions of the First Book of Euclid were as plain at first sight to Newton as the axioms, and the same is true in our moral and religious nature. The more that nature is purified, and exalted, the clearer is its vision, and the wider the scope of its intuitions. * * * * If a proposition be capable of resolution into simpler factors, it may still to a powerful intellect be seen as self-evidently true. What is seen immediately, without the intervention of proof, to be true, is, according to the common mode of expression, said to be seen intuitively." Sys. Theol. Vol. 1, p. 193. Both of these writers appear to be right, and both wrong. Hamilton is correct in stating that simplicity is a characteristic of intuitive truth, but incorrect in maintaining as a consequence that no complex truth can be intuitively perceived. For the mind, in perceiving separately the correctness of two intuitive truths, may at the same time combine them into a single conception, if they are homogeneous, just as we unite the different qualities of any object, as a table, or chair, and express them by a single term. But the mind apprehends these separately before it thus connects them. Indeed, it never so unites them, as not still to preserve their separable character, and to cognize them as such. "The clearer is its vision," and "the wider the scope of its intuitions," to use the figurative language of Hodge, the more distinctly separate, and the more plainly plural do these intuitions appear. 3. In seeking, therefore, for the intuitive conceptions which enter into the idea of God, we ought not to be surprised that they are simple, and yet that two, or more of them, may unite in the proof of His existence. Thus is it, that so far as God is known, His existence is intuitively known, however few, or many, may be the intuitions involved ; for the mind while originally perceiving them separately, still combines them together, and as the result of all, as of each, believes that God exists. But the meaning of what is thus affirmed, in relation to a single intuition only, is far less than in relation to two, or three, or all. Of these intuitive conceptions we shall find that only the simplest are universally accepted. Greater intelligence, cultivation, and thoughtfulness lead to the knowledge of others by some. Were these so stated to all as to be comprehended, they would be as fully acceptable to all as to any. They are limited, as to their reception, not because they are less true, nor because the nature of one man accepts, while that of another rejects them, but because they have either not been suggested to the intellect, or, if suggested, their meaning has not been understood. The more of these that we know, and the higher the nature of the thought conveyed by them, the purer, and the greater, will be the meaning to us of the Being of God. 4. Some of the more manifest of these may be taken as examples of their nature, and of the manner in which men arrive, through them, at the knowledge of God's existence. (1.) That which is dependent must have its final support in something purely independent. (2.) Derived existence must have its ultimate origin in that which is self existent. (3.) Every effect must have its cause, either within, or without itself. The truth of the above affirmations must be admitted as soon as their meaning is perceived. But, if the first be true, there is some being upon whom men depend, and to whom, therefore, they are under obligations of duty, and obedience, whom they must fear, and whose protection they must seek. This is the most general idea of God. If the second be true, the being upon whom men depend, is, also, the one through whom they exist; or there are two beings, the one the source of life, the other the cause of its preservation, and support. One of these will be independent, and the other self existent. That the uncultivated should not perceive that these two are necessarily one is not a matter of surprise. The possibility of this has allowed the existence of polytheism. But, when they are thus united, the idea of God has been that of an independent self existent Being, which is a complex idea, and is consciously based upon, not one, but two intuitive conceptions, though they are now united together. In like manner, the third of these is accepted as soon as comprehended. It is only necessary, to know what is meant by the terms "effect," and "cause within, and without itself." This is attained through observation, and experience. The idea of cause, and effect is found even in very young children, who cannot be persuaded that anything has happened without a cause. Nor is it difficult to teach what is meant by "having the cause within, and without itself." It may be illustrated by the difference between a clock, moving its own hands because of its own mechanism, and the hands of the same clock, moved by some person ; or by that between a horse, which has the power of self motion, and the cart which moves only because he draws it. The meaning of the terms of this intuitive suggestion has not been difficult to comprehend; consequently the existence of God, as based upon it, has been generally accepted. To the common mind, especially, it has commended itself, as teaching that God is the creator of the world, and thus accounting for the existence of all things He has made. In this case, also, men have not always associated the things which we see, with the one God. In some forms of belief, they have divided the universe among more gods than one. In others, they have conceived of it as made by a god inferior to the Great Supreme, whom they recognized. But, in these varied ways, they have shown a universal acceptance of the idea of causality, and of the intuitive conception which arises upon its comprehension. The only objection made to it, is that of Hume, and Kant, who have thought that the knowledge of causation must be limited by our experience. But evidently experience only teaches the meaning of the terms of that law, not the law itself. 5. Other intuitive conceptions might be added which are not so simple, but which are as truly believed by those who comprehend them. Take for example some of those which enter into the idea of God as the perfect Being. (1.) The distinctions of right, and wrong must have some absolute standard, which is personal, conscious, unchangeable, and without limitations of time or space. But this is God. (2.) Moral perfection cannot be merely ideal, but must have some real embodiment; else there could be no imperfection, and, especially, no degrees of imperfection, since degrees imply the existence of that to which imperfection approaches, or, from which it recedes, and this can only be absolute perfection. But absolute Perfection is itself God.

IV. The arguments which confirm this belief. The theistic proofs have been divided into arguments a priori, and a posteriori. This is a convenient division, although some of those a priori have in them some elements of an a posteriori nature, and some of those a posteriori depend upon a priori principles. As to some of them, also, it is difficult to draw an exact line, and assign them to the one class, or to the other. An argument a priori is one to prove the existence of some effect, or fact, from the knowledge we have of an antecedent cause, or of some reason, or principle, in the nature of things, which necessarily involves the existence of a certain consequence. 1. Some of the arguments a priori in proof of God's existence. An argument a priori, for the being of God, is one based upon some reason in the nature of things, or some principle cognized by the human mind, by which, independent of any examination of the works of God, we are led to infer His existence. (1.) The most celebrated of all of these is that which argues the being of God from the idea we have of Him in the mind. It is supposed to have been first presented by Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, England, in his work called Proslogium seu Allogium de Dei natura, chap. 2.3.4. His form of the argument may be briefly stated thus. By definition God is a Being such as no greater can be conceived. But we can conceive of a being whose non-existence is impossible. If God, then, does not necessarily exist, we can conceive of a greater than God, which is contrary to the definition. Therefore, God must exist. This argument, from the idea of God in the mind, was a favorite one of the Schoolmen. It appears in various forms in many of their works. It has, however, been commonly called the Cartesian argument, having been set forth with signal ability by Des Cartes. One form in which he gives it is based upon the idea in the mind of Supreme Perfection. To this we attain, though ourselves only creatures of imperfection. Whence is it? It must come from the All Perfect, who has stamped it on our being, as the artificer sets his trade-mark on the work of his intelligence. He also presents, in the following syllogism, an argument more closely resembling that of Anselm. "To affirm that any attribute is contained in the nature, or conception of a thing, is to affirm that such attribute is true of the thing, and that it is surely contained in it ; But, necessary existence is contained in the nature, and conception, of the Deity ; Therefore, necessary existence is a true attribute of the Deity ; or God of necessity exists." [See Blunt's Theological Dictionary, Art. Theism: in which are also more full statements of all the above mentioned forms of this argument.] But the most complete, and clearest presentation of this argument is given by Bishop Stillingfleet. Origines Sacrae, vol. 1, pp. 484-492. The following is a mere statement of the syllogistic form presented, without the arguments that support it. That, which we do clearly, and distinctly, perceive to belong to the nature, and essence of a thing, may be with truth affirmed of the thing; a clear and distinct perception in the mind being the greatest evidence we can have of its truth. But we do have a clear and distinct perception that necessity of existence doth belong to the nature of God. Therefore, He must exist. This argument, from the idea of God, has been strenuously objected to. Kant opposed it on the ground that "the mere supposableness, or logical possibility, of a perfect being is no proof of the objective, or real possibility of such a being, and existence cannot be inferred from a mere idea." Knapp's Theology, p. 86. But, in reply to this objection, it may be said that the argument against which it is presented, does not prove the mere logical possibility, but the logical certainty, or necessity, for such a being. Moreover, that it is not contended that every subjective conception must have an objective reality ; but only that certain ones may have such a reality, and that this one, the idea of a God, which itself involves the idea of necessary existence, must, in consequence of the idea thus involved, possess that reality. Hodge objects that if it "has any validity it is unimportant. It is only saying that what must be actually is.'' But this is not merely such an abstract statement. It is a proof that something, namely, the being of God, actually is, because of the proof of the correctness of our conception that necessary existence belongs to His nature. It has also been objected to it that "it confounds ideal existence with real existence." But certainly there is no confounding of ideal existence, and real existence, abstractly, nor of forms of ideal, and real existence, generally, but the arguments only show the actuality of a single form of ideal existence, because the very nature of the idea involves its correspondent reality. (2.) A second a priori argument for the existence of God was devised by Moses Lowman, and is from the nature of existence, and the relation between necessary and contingent existence. The following is a still more brief statement of the points of the argument, given by Dr. J. Pye Smith, in his First Lines of Christian Theology, pp. 99-101. 1. Positive existence is possible, for it involves no contradiction. 2. All possible existence is either necessary, which must be, and in its own nature cannot but be, or contingent, which may be, or may not be. 3. Some existence is necessary ; for if all existence were contingent, all existence might not be as well as might be; and that thing which might not be never could be without some other thing as the prior cause of its existence, since every effect must have a cause. If, therefore, all possible existence were contingent, all existence would be impossible; because the idea, or conception of it would be that of an effect without a cause, which involves a contradiction. 4. Necessary existence must be actual existence. 5. Necessary existence must be always. 6. Necessary existence must be wherever any existence is possible. 7. There can be but one necessarily existent being, for two could in no respect differ from each other, that is, they would be one, and the same being. 8. The one necessarily existent Being must have all possible perfections. 9. The one necessarily existent Being must be a free agent. 10. Therefore, there is one necessarily existent Being, the cause of all contingent existence, that is of all other existences besides Himself; and this Being is eternal, infinite, possessed of all possible perfections, and is an intelligent free agent; that is this Being is God. (3.) A third argument a priori is that of Dr. Samuel Clarke, in the Boyle Lectures which he delivered. It may be briefly presented thus. Some thing must have existed from all eternity, for since something now exists, it is evident that some thing always was, — otherwise the things which now are must have been produced out of nothing, absolutely, and without cause, which is absurd, for nothing can be produced, and yet be without cause. But now if something has existed from all eternity, either there must always have been some unchangeable and infinite being, or else an infinite succession of changeable, and dependent beings, without any original cause, which is absurd. Dr. Clarke does not discuss the absurdity of an infinite series in the past. The impossibility of such a series appears, however, from its very nature. There can be no past infinite series, because an infinite series is one, the last term of which can never be attained, or completed. But, in an infinite series, going backward, the term now present is the first of the series, and not the last. The last term of the series is really the first in existence. But that first was completed before the second. It has already existed. The series, therefore, as now before us is one, all of whose terms have already appeared, and the series, therefore, however indefinite in the numbers of its terms, is still a completed, and, therefore, a finite series. [See this matter ably discussed by Rev. Joseph Tracy, in the Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. 7 pp. 613-626. Also Turretine. Theol. Vol. 1, Book 3, Ques. 1, par. 6, p. 154.] The value of the arguments a priori has been questioned. But on the other hand they have seemed to some eminently satisfactory. To these they have appeared to be clothed with the authority of God Himself speaking through the constitution He has given to the mind, and its capacity for the intuitive conception of underlying principles. To those who perceive these principles, the proofs are as conclusive as the consciousness of their own existence, and as authoritative as the dictates of conscience. These principles are accepted, and arguments are formed upon them in the same way as in mathematical demonstrations, and afford those who perceive the truth of them actual demonstrations of the fact that God exists. But many have thought them fallacious, and have denied the possibility of demonstrative proof that there is a God. To such the arguments a posteriori have alone seemed to be valuable. Whether or not this be true they are certainly of much greater value in general, because they are much more simple, and better adapted to force conviction upon the minds of the masses of mankind.

2. The arguments a posteriori. The value of these arguments has not been duly appreciated. Men have looked for that kind of demonstration of God's existence, called mathematical, which alone can arise from arguments based upon admitted axioms, and proceeding thence to their conclusions by invincible logical processes. Such arguments, if they exist, can only be of the nature of those a priori already considered. But while these may not exist, the arguments for God a posteriori are as conclusive as similar ones on any other subject. Their nature is precisely like that of those upon which all physical science is based, and upon which men act in all the affairs of life. Physical science pursues the inductive method. It gathers all the facts in any matter. It recognizes that there are general laws which unite these facts in some one principle, and those who study them devise a theory to explain them. Such a theory must account for all the facts, and not be opposed by any one of them. If the series of facts can be traced very generally, and any theory universally accounts for them, while no other can, that theory which, at first, in the presence of a few facts, was only probable, becomes more and more certain, and finally unquestionable. Thus, the theory of gravitation has been accepted as a great law of the universe binding it together, keeping all its parts in all their courses, and everywhere equally effective according to a fixed proportion of numbers, and yet it is seen only in its effects. In like manner we arrive, according to the strictest scientific method of induction, at the existence of God. The only theory which accounts for the universe with all its phenomena is that which asserts that it has proceeded from Him. This alone has been satisfactory, in the eyes of most men, from the beginning of all historic records. Mankind have been incredulous as to the sanity, or sincerity of those who have denied it. No scientific theory has been about facts so universally existent, and so generally known. None has dealt with matters of more vital importance, or absorbing interest. None has been, as has this, an object of thought to every intelligent human being. None has so commended itself at once to practical men, and philosophers. None, after having been so far forgotten, because of sin, and ignorance, as to be remembered only in its name, and, as to its simplest facts, has risen to a beauty of conception, which beyond all else constitutes the glory of Grecian philosophy, while at the same time its belief has been preserved in another race, in its purity, by a literature, which despite all tendencies to corrupt the theory, has maintained it in its purest form for generation after generation. (1.) The first argument a posteriori to be considered is commonly called the cosmological, because it argues the existence of God, as a First Cause, from the effects seen in the world. It should, however, be named the argument from Causation, to distinguish it from the teleological argument, and others which are equally cosmological. A very striking form of it was put forth by Bishop Berkeley and is quoted in Dwight's Theology, Vol. 1, pp. 79 and 80, who gives it thus: "We acknowledge the existence of each other to be unquestionable. We say that we know this from our senses. Yet, after all, it is intuitively certain that what we see is not the living, thinking being, which we call man. On the contrary they are merely effects of which that living, acting thing is the cause. We conclude the existence of the cause from the effects. So, in the Universe around us, we perceive a great variety of effects, produced by some cause, adequate to their production. This cause is God, or a being possessed of sufficient intelligence, and power to contrive and bring them to pass. If it be said that these are only the effect of certain inherent powers of matter, and mind and, therefore, demand no extrinsic agency, the answer is that this affects the conclusion only by removing it one step farther back in the course of reasoning." By this is meant that these inherent powers are only effects which themselves demand an adequate cause. It will be seen that this argument is based upon the law of causality. Hence it should be called the argument from causation. I proceed now to give this argument in another form, simpler indeed, but yet more complete. It may be stated syllogistically thus: A. Every fact or effect must have its adequate cause, either within or without itself. B. There are effects in the Universe which have no adequate cause, either in themselves or in the Universe. C. Therefore, there must be an adequate cause for their existence individually, and as a whole, in some being without, which is the Supreme Being, the cause of all things. We consider first the proof of the major premiss of the syllogism, namely A., that every effect must have its adequate cause, either within or without itself. Objection 1. It has been objected to this that there is no such thing as causation, and that all of which we have any experience is mere antecedence and consequence. But it may be replied that experience teaches us that there are effects in some consequents which are the result of relation to and power in certain antecedents. We admit the existence of many antecedents and consequents between which there is no relation of cause and effect, but experience plainly teaches that relation in others. This has been so far admitted that Hume and Kant have simply attempted to confine the law of causation to our experience. But (1.) It is evident that causes must exist independently of our experience, and, that, when we see an effect, (namely, something evidently requiring some power for its production), we know that it has had its adequate cause, even though we have never had experience of its special cause. Indeed one of the most important branches of scientific enquiry is into the unknown causes of existing phenomena, which without experience we know must be effects of adequate causes. [Thus in Geology, the stratification of the rocks, the existence of fossil remains, the broken up upheavals of stratification, &c, are illustrations of this. So in astronomy, the perturbations of planets, the movement of the stars, the disappearance of stars, the spots upon the sun, and the rugged volcanic condition of the moon, &c, &c, are similar illustrations. So also in medicine, the production of disease — as yellow fever. Even in matters in which the human will or accident seems to have been most free from external cause, as in the building of cities, in the number of marriages, &c, Social science seeks adequate physical causes.] (2.) It might also with justice be added, that this point needs no proof, because the idea that every effect must have its cause is an intuitive conception of the human mind. It arises upon the first perception of what is meant by power. The conviction of its truth is seen in the very earliest stages of infancy. Objection 2. It is again objected that we ought to carry this idea of causation farther back and apply it to the great First Cause. If subsequent effects, or facts, or existences must have had a cause, why should not this Being, whom we call God, and who is more wonderful in His nature than all others, be Himself an effect and Himself have a cause. The reply to this is, that experience does not teach us that every thing has a cause without itself, but only every thing which has not its cause in itself. Wherever there is the principle of life there is, to a limited extent at least, self-causation in its development. (1.) Thus the tree puts forth its own leaves, and flowers, and fruits. It is true that it needs to have had its seed planted in a favourable position and to be surrounded by favourable circumstances. Yet, despite this, even here, though in a very limited way, there is self-causation. So with the motion in a watch, the cause of which is in its own mechanism. (2.) This is more distinctly seen as we reach higher forms of life. Here the movement is self caused. Such is the movement of a bird as it shoots into the air, or of a beast as it springs upon its prey. The higher form of this is apparent. The watch needed some action upon it from without, before its springs within would act, but no outward impelling cause here originates the power. [This may be illustrated by the difference between a steamboat, moved by its machinery under the guidance of men, and the movement of a fish which by its own powers swims through the seas.] (3.) In a still higher degree is this seen in man. Here is found a self-determining will which puts forth effects which may be more confidently spoken of as self-originated. We have not here the mere instinct which perhaps blindly prompts the mere animal to act, but a will which, through liberty of choice, acts as it pleases, and is governed only by motives to which it yields of its own self-choice. We do not presume to say that this explains to us God's self-existence, and independence, or how he is self-caused, having the cause of causes in Himself, but we simply assert (a) that our experience of causes does not force us to find an outside cause for every effect, and, therefore, a cause for what we call the first or final cause, but simply a cause for every thing which has not its cause of existence and action in itself. (b) We may also claim from this, however, that if, between the lifeless clod and the man made from it, such difference exists, that the one is no cause at all in itself, and the other capable of such self-causation, then, when we rise to the Great Being, who has made the Universe, we have the right to expect such infinite superiority to man that He should be, not only the cause of all things, but, being Self-existent, should have within Himself the cause or ground of His own existence. That there may not be and is not such a Great First Cause is beyond the denial of any. That which satisfies the mind of His existence is, that it is so constituted that it cannot rest under this conviction of causation, until the idea is presented of a Great First Cause having self-existence or the cause of His own existence in Himself. If this be not true, then there has been an infinite series of finite causes from Eternity, or an infinite succession of such series, each of which is both impossible and absurd. B. There are effects in the Universe which have no adequate cause in themselves, nor in the Universe as a whole. 1. This may be argued from the Universe as a whole, as an existing substance, (an entity), or from its component parts as existing substances (entities). We have the phenomena of the material world about us. As presented to our eyes, it is a wonderful mechanism, more so than the most perfect machinery man can devise, and presents an effect in itself, and in its parts, which demands a cause of more power and skill than we can conceive. Was it made as it is? If so, how great the cause which will account for its phenomena? But it is asserted that it was not thus made, but is a growth which has been reached by long ages of gradual development, accompanied by destruction, and renewal, and modification until it has attained its present form. We shall not deny this, but admit the force of all the evidence which suggests it. But, after all, this growth is also an effect. It has proceeded either from some inherent power of self-development, or has been produced by the power and will of some outward cause. It is claimed by anti-theists that it is a self-development of matter which has taken upon itself form after form until this result has been attained. This theory involves the idea that all growth, and life, and mind, are the outcome of original inorganic matter. It claims that in the ultimate analysis we reach simple molecules of matter, and that, from the development of these, we have this whole universal structure. Admit now all that is thus claimed as fact by anti-theists, even go so far as to suppose that there has been a time when nothing existed but molecules, even a few, even two only, even one, if it should be desired; reduce the whole material universe to a speck the one millionth part of a grain of sand, — and still we have in that molecule an effect entirely unaccounted for, except as it with all its vast possibilities was made by some creative energy. There is, therefore, even here a demand for the self-existent cause. Yet, to admit all of the above, is to admit more than we ought, more than there is the slightest reason to suppose to be true; for there is no evidence that any matter has been added to the Universe since its creation. Matter is seen to expand, and contract, to take on one form, and then another, but there is evidence neither of waste on the one hand, nor of increase on the other. But there must have been such increase of matter unless the world had in its molecule period as many molecules containing in themselves as much material as is now existent. Whatever growth or development, therefore, may be ascribed to the world, the whole of it has existed from the beginning, whether in an organized form or in simple molecules. It is, however, as difficult, without admitting a producing cause, to account for the world-mass of molecules, even for a single molecule, as for the Universe created in the forms in which it appears to-day.

2. Let us now consider certain actual effects seen in the Universe as farther proof of an external cause. (1.) Motion. The principle of motion in the Universe is beautifully developed. That Universe is regular. It is governed by fixed laws. There is harmony in its movements. The principles of centripetal and centrifugal action, governed by the law of gravitation not only regulate this motion, but cause the Universe to be self-balanced; so that we have a kind of mechanism not only impossible for man to imitate, but the principle of which he cannot comprehend though he sees and acknowledges it as a fact. Now whence this motion? Inert matter has no motion. A piece of rock, or a clod of soil, even a tree, remains always where it is, unless moved by some outward power. Our knowledge of this inertness in matter is such that we know that an infant's ball will remain forever, where it has been put, unless disturbed from without. Whence then this motion of the Universe which is not a simple movement, such as given to a ball by striking it, but a complex motion, involving the description of circles and ellipses and parabola, and so involving them as to keep each in its sphere without confusion or distraction? Can any one persuade himself that ten thousand balls laid upon a plain surface will have any more power of motion than one, or that a Universe of them created without motion, would not, unless influenced from without, remain utterly and forever at rest? Some thing, therefore, must account for the motion. Now our experience is that all motion primarily proceeds from mind or will. Thus I move a ball as the result of will influenced by my mind. Even if I accidentally kick it, not intending to do so, and even ignorant that I have done so, this is still true. I had willed to move my body and that body by its contact when in motion with the ball has moved it. Before motion then we have mind; before the motion of these atoms a directing mind; so that not only for the creation, but for the motion of molecules we must recognize God. If it be said that this motion was caused by wind, we inquire whence came that wind? Is not it itself produced by motion? If so, it cannot have been the primary cause of motion. We are still forced to the supposition that motion has proceeded from God. If it be claimed that it came from heat, whence was the heat? Heat is also the result of motion. What caused the movement which led to its existence? If it be said that the motion was a matter of chance, we ask what is chance? Is there any such reality? We apply the name variously, but in all cases the thoughtful mind knows that there is no "chance" in the sense of uncaused, unwilled forces present. Thus I place dice in a box and throw them. I say that the resultant numbers come by chance. But I know that that result has followed unerringly under law from the forces present. But law supposes the mind of the lawgiver, and the results of his law are from purpose, not from chance. Hence the proverb: "The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposition thereof is of the Lord." Prov. 16:33. So also when I meet in New York an acquaintance from Texas, I say: "we met by chance." By this I mean that the meeting was not because of the purpose of both, or either of us. But I do not deny the laws which have governed each of us, through which guided by a Higher Power we have met as He had purposed we should. In no usage of the word chance, therefore, do we mean to assert absence of purpose. There is no such kind of chance and by none such can we account for the existence of motion in the Universe. (2.) Form and life also appear among the effects of the Universe. Matter is not simply inorganic with the form and shape which might have been bestowed upon it by motion. But it takes special forms of life. Between the inorganic and this organic life there is a wide interval. Even in the very lowest forms of vegetable life there is movement and growth and capacity to absorb and increase, and give forth which shows a new kingdom in nature. It is admitted that here the whole substance is material and that the growth of vegetables is nothing more than the absorption into life of what has been already in inorganic nature. But this power of taking on form and life is very striking. If the change could be made into a single form only, it would be still surprising. But the forms are innumerable. Not only this, but the specific form, having been once assumed, attains not only fixedness in the original, but power continuously in the species to reproduce its like. Yet, nevertheless, there is a certain power of adaptation by which, within fixed limits, there is variation. This is the law of plants. In a still higher degree is it true of animals. Now whence this change from inorganic to such organic matter? Is it inherent in matter? Then matter would be constantly engaged in thus developing the organic from the inorganic. This is evident from what we see in crystallization. Here there is power in matter to assume special forms. The law under which this is done in each kind is known, and, in accordance with such law, and not otherwise, are the shapes in crystallization assumed. We can place the proper substances in their appropriate relations and produce the result. Why? Because here certain matter has inherent power to assume certain forms. But this matter can not assume other forms. Other matter cannot assume these forms. And thus is it seen that matter as such has not the inherent power to assume form, but that such power has been bestowed only on certain kinds of matter under the action of specific law and not of its own prompting. Yet from this power of crystallization has been argued the power of matter to produce both vegetable and animal life. The most that could be concluded is that some kinds of matter, (such as we now see to do so,) under circumstances, (under which it now so acts,) are capable of producing vegetable and animal life. But we see this done only by propagation and generation from like to like. Therefore, only thus are we authorized to infer that such life and form has been heretofore produced from matter alone. This still leaves necessary the creation of the first forms through which matter has this power. Various attempts have been made to produce animals and plants by spontaneous generation. But these attempts have thus far utterly failed. Because of this inability to produce by any means the organic directly from the inorganic, anti-theists have been driven to adopt the idea, (a mere idea without proof) that there is a substance which they call protoplasm, which common substance underlies all life forms vegetable or animal and that, in its varied changes, ordinary inorganic matter finally attains to this protoplasm. As to this we should remember (a) that protoplasm is not the name of a substance which has been found developed from inorganic matter. No such substance has as yet been discovered. This is only the name that would be given to it if it should be. (b) That the name is applied to the earliest forms of organic life as being what protoplasm would be if thus developed from inorganic matter. But the substance here found is really a part of organic life, produced by the process of propagation or generation through which matter of this kind becomes life and form. The whole idea of protoplasm, therefore, is a figment, except within the limits of organic life. But, admit this to be true, and that the first forms (the protoplasm) that we see are the result directly of inorganic matter and not of organic, it must still be acknowledged that in all the protoplasm yet examined there is no variation, that all of it is exactly alike, there being but one kind of protoplastic germs so far as investigation can perceive or material elements indicate. Yet, from a number of specimens of this protoplasm, come several different kinds of life. It is as though from seed, precisely the same, should come wheat and barley, and rice, and rye, and maize. Now, what is here the directing power which, from the same substance, apparently, produces different forms of life, some vegetable and some animal, and various vegetables, as well as various animals, and which so produces them without variation that the protoplasm taken from one species of animals always produces that species and not another? This can be understood, if this be organic life which is acting, and acting under the laws which propagate species; but how explain it of mere matter which has become mere protoplasm — a substance which differs in no respect in itself and, therefore, for difference in its results must be indebted to some other directing power? It is evident, therefore, that in protoplasm we have matter not in a process of self-development, but matter already organized in organic forms, under a law for reproducing species which law can in no respect account for the origin of the species, and, therefore, forces us back to the idea of direct creation of the species itself. But if this be true, the principle of form and life in the Universe speaks to us distinctly of a God. (3.) Mind also appears among the effects in the Universe which can only be accounted for upon the supposition of a God. The whole history of man teaches that, of which we are conscious in ourselves, and are taught by experience in others, namely, that the powers of the human mind are wonderful. Instinct in plants and animals is itself incomprehensible. We cannot tell why the vine should put forth entwining tendrils, or the root of a plant seek a piece of bone, or push forward to a well of water, nor why the birds should fly southward, or a horse or dog should dread danger which man cannot perceive, or an ox should utter cries of distress at the smell of blood, or a bee construct its cells of the most economical shape. We account for it by saying, that God has so constituted irrational beasts for their protection and happiness. But an anti-theist would say, these are qualities inherent in matter, so that it is the matter that acts in the beast as it does in the vine. But we have in mind something of which this cannot be said. Mind is not mere instinct. Indeed it differs widely from instinct. Thus: (a) Mind is individual will or purpose; instinct is common to the whole species. (b) The will or purpose is not a blind tendency, but is the result of mental perceptions, comprehensions of facts, logical reasoning, personal fancy, &c, &c. (c) Its governing principle, being its prevailing motive, is the desire of the individual himself, not of another, not even of God, not even the dictate of conscience, or of wisdom, but merely of self-choice. (d) It often acts contrary to appetite, and desire, and passion. The will refuses to do that to which the person is instinctively prompted. This is a peculiar mark of excellence, not merely in the wise use of the power, but in the possession of the power itself. Its value in wise exercise may be illustrated by the wise proverb of Solomon: "He that is slow to anger is better than the mighty, and he that ruleth his Spirit than he that taketh a city." Prov. 16:32. These are some of the most important particulars in which mind is seen to be far superior to instinct. They have been presented as though admitting that instinct is a quality of matter. But there is no reason for such admission. Instinct is a governing power over animals. But whence comes it? Is it a growth in them, or is it something bestowed on them by God for their control, just as He gives us conscience; or for their guidance, as He gives us intuitive conceptions? It is doubtless not the former, but, admit it to be a growth, whence the power for such growth in some matter and not in all. If it is a property of some of these united molecules, or of these particles of protoplasm, why has all matter not attained this growth, and why does not the growth develope itself alike in all? No reason can be given for the phenomena of instinct which does not reject the idea of mere matter alone thus developing. Either (1.) The power was first bestowed on some molecules to germinate this instinct, or (2.) It was more directly given in connection with the development of the animal life, or (3.) The animal was originally created with these functions, and they have continued by propagation to appear throughout the species. If originating in either of these ways the existence of the instinct proves that of a regulating, and originating, or creating mind. But, as we have seen, mind is still higher than instinct, and, if instinct cannot be accounted for as a material growth, very much less so can mind. Even the most persistent advocates for the development of life from matter, admit that between the mind and the body which it inhabits there is a wide interval, and while they contend for the development of the latter through protoplasm as the work of unaided matter, they admit that they have never been able to discover anything which can account for the existence of mind. But, if mind has no cause for its existence in the material Universe, it must be the direct product of the Infinite mind, the Intelligent Personal God. There is an old book called Genesis of Jewish origin, in which, long before the days of scientific inquiry into the origin of man, was given the only account which has ever satisfied, or will ever satisfy the inquirer into that origin. "The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul;" Gen. 2:7. This was in fulfilment of the divine counsels. "Let us make man in our image after our likeness, &c," Gen. 2:26. Strange that any writer of that day should have known that the body of man is of the same material as the inorganic matter of the earth, and stranger still that he should ascribe such origin to his mind and soul as fully accounts for its union with matter and for the soul's existence, and, strangest of all, that he should have put forth a theory such as the world, with all the wisdom of the intervening ages to this day, has not bettered; but which has forced acceptance of its truth on all. Is not this God telling us what God did and informing us of the true origin of mind? (4.) Among the many other phenomena of the world which might be selected, one other only, namely, Conscience need be mentioned. Of what is this an effect? Is it the result of matter, or of mind? What is it but a controlling power, located in each man, and made a part of his nature, which commands him to do the right and avoid the wrong, and reproves, rebukes, and punishes him for disobedience to its dictates. Upon the theory that it is God given, its presence and its phenomena may be explained, but upon no other. If there be a God, (a) There must be eternal principles of right and wrong which may form a foundation for conscience. (b) There must be obligation to act in accordance with these principles, the non-fulfilment of which would involve punishment by God, and a reason for the apprehensions of conscience. (c) If there be a God, who has created man with his fellows, that God would seek the happiness of the race as such, which cannot be attained if moral obligations be ignored, and hence would place conscience in each man to enforce these obligations. (d) If there be a God He must love the right and hate the wrong. How naturally would He seek through conscience to have man do right and avoid wrong. If on the other hand, there be no God, then (a) Is there any right and wrong as conscience teaches there is? (b) Are we under any obligation to our fellow men? Have they any rights we should respect? Is not our power to obtain that alone which should limit our right to possess? (c) How can we account for the terror which strikes men for crimes which have been committed, terror not of punishment here, but hereafter? Conscience, therefore, argues the existence of God perhaps even more wonderfully than mind; for conscience is the law which keeps the moral Universe in being and fixes the limits of its wanderings, as much, and as truly, as the law of gravitation does the material. Even the defects of it in our race caused by sin only prove the more conclusively the power of its law and its necessity to human existence. It is at once, in connection with the understanding, the guide to what is right and wrong, the authority which enforces the right and forbids the wrong, and the avenging judge inflicting punishment on those who disobey. In the state of innocence it was perfect in its guidance, and authority, and peaceful in its approval. In our present state, it is imperfect in its guidance and has only partial authority and limited punitive power. In the future it shall be like the worm that dieth not, and the fire that is not quenched. Now, whence this conscience, if it be not the messenger God sets in the heart, teaching man more plainly than the starry heavens show His glory, that there is a God, that He rules over man, and governs him by laws of right and wrong, and punishes the sinful and disobedient, and rewards the obedient and righteous. The four effects in the Universe which have been mentioned, namely, motion, form and life, mind, and conscience, prove this second point [B] of our syllogism, namely, that there are effects in the Universe which have no adequate cause either in themselves or in the Universe; and from A. and B. follows the conclusion C, viz. therefore, there must be an adequate cause for the existence of the Universe and its facts individually and as a whole in some being without, who must be a Supreme Being and the First Cause of all things. It can only be objected to this conclusion that the Being who has made our Universe may Himself have been created by some other and that He is not the Supreme Mind. But if He were not, then there must be some being who created Him, and thus we are led to look one step further back until we reach an infinite being not created, but having self-existence, and Himself the cause of all other beings and things. We are shut up by the argument from causation to this result, or to the adoption of the idea of an infinite succession of finite beings which is absurd and impossible.

The remaining a posteriori arguments may be more briefly presented than this first one from causation, for the principles involved in this to some extent underlie all the rest. The second a posteriori argument is that from design, commonly called the teleological argument. It may be expressed as a syllogism thus : A. Whatever gives proof of design must have had a designer. B. The Universe gives proof of design. C. Therefore, it must have had a designer. Design may be seen either in arrangement or adaptation. In both these respects the Universe gives proof of design. In its arrangement the specific purpose may not be evident as it is in special adaptation. But, evidence is given in that arrangement of the Unity and Universality which mark design throughout the whole Universe. The syllogism of Principal Tulloch presents the argument in a convenient form. [Burnett Prize Essay on Theism, p. 147.] I. Order universally proves mind. II. The works of nature discover order. III. The works of nature prove mind. The point here to be proved is the major premiss. There can be no question about the existence of order and arrangement throughout the Universe. This is a matter of universal experience. It is also the testimony of all science. But does order universally prove mind? We shall ascertain that it does by noticing that order always proceeds from law by which arrangement occurs, or from direct arrangement. In either event mind is the cause of the order and, therefore, is proved by it. That the origin of order, is in one of these ways is a matter of universal experience, and we may from experience argue at least that such is everywhere true. There is no exception to the rule. But, again, we may argue this to be true from the fact that such is the constitution of the human mind that "we cannot help apprehending everywhere in phenomena of order the operation of a rational will or mind, * * * the laws of our rational nature compel us to do so. These will not permit us to rest short of mind as an ultimate explanation of such phenomena." Tulloch, p. 50. Having proved the existence of causation in the preceding argument we have also the right here to apply its principles. The order is an effect, and as every effect must have its adequate cause so, as this is an effect of mind, we argue from it the existence of the Supreme Mind, which is alone sufficient to account for such harmony and arrangement. Finally we may argue this from the very meaning of the word order. If order means arrangement then it involves the existence of one who arranges. If order means plan, this demands mind to devise such plan. If order means laws or regulation, the word involves the idea of a lawgiver. Thus is it that simply considering design as order or arrangement we prove from it the existence of mind. But the proof is much stronger when we look at design as adaptation to the object in view. The same arguments here as in the syllogism by Tulloch prove the major premiss — whatever shows marks of design must have had a designer. The illustrations of the minor premiss are numerous and convincing. 1. In the vegetable world, in the structure and arrangement of plants, in their connection with soil, climate, atmosphere, in their relations to the necessities of surrounding animal life, in their material structure, fitting them to receive and assimilate food, and to breathe the atmosphere and absorb its gases, and to reproduce themselves. 2. In the animal world ; in adaptation to climate, vegetable productions for food, and all the circumstances which make life possible at various places for some animals and not for all, especially in the peculiarity that man is fitted for all climates, and that the animals necessary to be present with him are capable of equal variety of climate. 3. It is also seen in the formation of the various parts of the body, especially the eye which presents signal evidences of design, in its structure for seeing, in its capacity for motion, in its instinct against danger and in its protective apparatus. So also in the hand, and foot, especially the thumb in man which gives him such superiority over all other animals, even over the ape which approaches him most closely, in felling trees, chopping wood, sewing clothes, use of mechanic's tools, and numberless other respects, intimately and essentially connected with a condition of high civilization, as well as of mere physical capacity to prevail over brute force. So with a thousand times a thousand marks of special design in the forms of life in this world. All prove a designer and that designer to be the Creator of the world and its forms of life. It is vain to say that all these have grown from inferior attainments by exercise of powers. There is no evidence of any different structure in these particulars in the individuals of to-day than in those which earliest appear. On page 18 of the Independent for September 26th, 1878, may be found an advertisement in the form of an article headed : The Romance of a Windmill. How it grew from a shingle to a machine indispensable to the world's progress. The article relates how a small windmill, sufficient to grind corn, was made under circumstances of necessity from a shingle — and how this grew from time to time until one of the finest windmills of the Western Country resulted. Now, tell any one that that grew in any other sense than that mind carried on the processes from step to step until the final result was the final machine, and who will, or who can believe any such nonsense? But as well tell any one that, as that the marks of design in this world have come from any other source than mind.

3. Another argument a posteriori may be drawn from the evidences of God's Providential care and control of the world. It may be thus stated: Man perceives in his own life and in the lives of others, in the history of nations and of the race, evidence of a superintending power, governing, guiding, and protecting, and, by means sometimes most insignificant, or minute, accomplishing ends of greater, or less magnitude. In the workings of this power there are traceable evidences of designing purpose which are so marked as to show it to be not mere blind force or established law, but an intelligent agent exercising such oversight as is rendered necessary by the presence of free will in man, which, but for such oversight, would prevent the accomplishment of purposes, which could with certainty be attained through mere laws alone, were the Universe with its inhabitants a mere machine governed only by purely mechanical laws, — and such oversight also as supplies to man the information and resources needed at particular stages in the world's progress, and as preserves from excess or deficiency the equilibrium of food and work in the world and its various parts. As none but the Supreme Mind, which is omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent, can exercise such care, the proof that this care is exercised is a proof of the existence of God. It will be seen from this that all the proof which can be presented of Providential care becomes a proof of a God. This is very strong and conclusive, and is to be found in the historical accounts of mankind, as well as in the constant testimony of individual men. The fourth argument a posteriori is from the miracles wrought by messengers from God. A miracle is an extraordinary act performed, or event brought to pass, by God, not through the established laws of nature, nor mere Providential control, but by direct action without the use of efficient means. The working of a miracle, therefore, shows the presence and act of a power superior to nature which can be no other than its creator and lawgiver. A miracle is, therefore, evidence of the existence of God. This argument rests upon the proof that miracles have been wrought. Of this fact it is universally acknowledged that we have abundant testimony. But the credibility of the testimony, as for example of the New Testament miracles, has been questioned. If it be credible then the fact has been proved. (1.) It is charged that the witnesses are not credible, because they were not disinterested. (a) But disinterestedness is not necessary in a witness. Formerly courts required this; but now, in the more civilized communities, all evidence is heard and due weight is given to each part of it in connection with all the other circumstances and facts testified to. (b) None of the witnesses for miracles were interested except upon the supposition that the facts which they attested were true. They could have no purpose, therefore, in testifying falsely. (c) They published their testimony at a time when multitudes were alive who had been present at the times and places when the miracles were said to have been wrought. Had the facts not been believed by all present on such occasions they would have been disputed and the witnesses exposed. This was especially true of the miracles wrought by Christ and his apostles. (d) To the above may be added, that the statements made about these miracles were such as to affect the character and position of men in public authority, and in some cases appealed to acts of the rulers in council by whom the miracles were admitted. None could have dared to make such statements, unless they knew they spoke the truth. (2.) It is charged that the witnesses were themselves deceived. But it was impossible that deception could take place in many of the miracles. Could Israel be deceived about the plagues in Egypt, or the passage through the Red Sea, or that of the Jordan, or the fall of the walls of Jericho, or the guidance of the pillar of cloud and fire, &c, &c. But the rationalist will say that the history of these events was not written at the same time with the events themselves, and that the people in the wilderness never saw, nor heard the record. While this is not admitted of the Old Testament it cannot be justly said of the New Testament histories. The statements are by eye witnesses. Could they have been deceived about the stilling of the waves, the feeding of the five thousand on one occasion, and of the four thousand on another, about the raising from the dead of the daughter of Jairus, of the son of the widow of Nain, especially of Lazarus, and still more wonderfully of Christ himself. One who looks at these facts is obliged to deny that these witnesses were deceived. They have either knowingly stated what is false, or their testimony is true. (3.) But it is maintained by Hume and others, that even if a miracle had been wrought it would be proof only to those who saw it. No testimony could convince others of the fact. The argument is, that the uniformity of the laws of nature is a matter of universal experience, and that such is our knowledge of that uniformity that no testimony can convince us of the existence of a fact which is not consistent with it. But the history of the world shows the contrary. Hume is actually presenting his argument, that no such proof could or would be accepted, to men who have already actually accepted it. There are many events in the world which seem contrary to the uniformity of nature, as much so to the ignorant mind as the most wonderful miracle to the educated. Are such not accepted? [Examples are eclipses of the sun or moon predicted; and the rise and fall of the tides to those who have never seen the sea, being a phenomenon of water thus running or swelling upwards.] Yet testimony of the facts is readily taken as evidence. The truth is that men almost universally believe in the truthfulness of their fellows and in their capacity to perceive what has happened, where there is no apparent reason to the contrary. Even strangers are trusted to this extent. But when men of known probity, having no motive to deceive and who cannot be self-deceived, testify to any fact, however incredible, conviction of the truthfulness of such persons is stronger than belief in the uniformity of nature. [What would appear more wonderful than that a world, the greater part of the surface of which is water, should be burned up with fire, yet has a whole audience, to nine tenths of whom previously such a thing would have seemed incredible, been known to accept it as a fact upon the mere statement of a single scientific man.] In this argument the statements of the Bible have been used not as inspired truth, but merely as containing human testimony. In like manner in the succeeding argument the Bible is treated merely upon its own apparent merits as a book, without reference to its divine character.

5. The fifth argument a posteriori is from the contents of a book we call the Bible, which claims to have come from God. If these contents show a supernatural origin they prove the existence of a mind, supreme above nature. This proof may be presented: (1.) With respect to the prophecies of the Bible. Events were predicted and recorded by its writers long periods, even centuries, before they took place. Many of them were minutely described, as to their nature, locality, persons, times, circumstances, and causes. Such descriptions show such knowledge as belongs only to one who uses no conjectural knowledge, but knows certainly what will come to pass. But such knowledge of the far future can arise not otherwise than from full knowledge of the eternal purpose of God. (2.) It may be presented with reference to the great central figure of the Bible, our Lord Jesus Christ. The Scriptures taken as a whole is his biography. The causes of his existence as seen in the original and fallen state of man and in God's mercy to our sinful race, the preparation for his coming, the gradual development of the doctrine of his person and work, the prophecy of his kingdom, his appearance, life, death, resurrection, the establishment of his throne in Heaven upon his ascension from earth, the gift of the Holy Ghost, the power and progress of his religion and its suitableness to our sinful race, all present a life of developed growth as plainly the result of a creative mind as the most wonderful creation of fiction. The Unity of purpose is seen throughout. In the beginning we see but dimly what is taught and catch but feebly the outlines of the plot; but as we progress it grows upon us as a genuine creation. Whatever was at first dim is cleared up by the final record, and as we begin to read it over once more, its perfect unity, its exactness of detail without superfluity, its development in the far future of the importance of facts which at first were only casually stated, as though of no special importance, its skilful interweaving of the minor characters and events, and its use of them in all their fulness to bring on the final catastrophe and its results, the great power with which the theme is handled, the majestic simplicity which everywhere pervades it, all show a master artist creating a character and work, through the instrumentality of writers so numerous, of such different capacities, under such various circumstances, with such manifest unity, as proclaims the mind of God which alone could conceive of such a character and work, and alone could thus reveal it to man, as He alone could create the real persons and events which embody the idea presented. (3.) A further proof from the Bible is suggested by Nitsch, which is the revelation which it makes of God in Christ. He says, "The proof which is peculiar to Christianity, independent and historical, is not indeed, as some designate it, miracle, but the accomplishment of the passage in Isaiah 40:9. "Behold your God." It is revelation in an eminent sense, the existence of God in Christ, John 14:9." [Nitsch System of Christian Doctrine, p. 140.] This is not the same argument as the last. That was an argument from a development extending over so many thousand years, and proving the existence of one, who was contemporaneous with all those years, working out the character of Christ as the Saviour of mankind. This is based upon the evidence of divine perfection seen in Christ while here on earth. "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father." The Revelation of the nature of God seen in the Universe commends to us the fact that He exists, for the nature indicated is one worthy of such a Being. Hence the force of Paul's language in Rom. 1:20. "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his Eternal power and Godhead." So also with equal self-recommendation comes the character of God set forth in the words of the Bible in which He tells us what He is, and commends His spiritual nature with His unspeakable holiness, justice, goodness, and truth, with His infinite power and wisdom, as the character alone worthy of a God, and which makes us say at once: This is the true character of God. If He exists, He must be such as is thus described. But in His incarnate Son we see the embodiment of that which before had appeared as but an ideal. Although appearing here on earth most obviously as a man, yet the divine attributes and character were so exhibited in him that we perceive the truthfulness with which Christ said to Philip. "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father." John 14:9. 6. and 7. arguments a posteriori. To the above arguments for the existence of God may be added two which by proving the non-eternity of matter and that there has not been an infinite succession of finite beings show that there is a God. 6. The first is the Historical argument based upon the fact that the records of History cover so brief a period of time. If man has lived forever, where is the record of that life. It is strange that we find no historical monuments which go beyond a few thousand years. 7. The second is from Geology. This science teaches: (1.) That there was a time when life, both vegetable and animal, began upon this globe. (2.) That the remoteness of the period of that beginning, even according to the wildest hypothesis, is capable of calculation. (3.) That, in both the vegetable and animal life, of which we have fossil remains, there have been distinct successive genera which began with small numbers, gradually increased to their culminating points and then as gradually decreased. All of this is at least proof against Eternity of form, and against an infinite succession of finite beings, if it be not proof of an actual direct creation of each of these genera.

Having proved the existence of God before we study His nature, and attributes, and relations to us, we should consider in what ways He has made Himself known. These constitute the sources of our knowledge of Theology, which are two, Reason and Revelation. Reason is that power in man, which enables him to have mental perceptions, to exercise thought, and reflection, to know facts, to inquire into their mutual relations, and to deduce, logically, the conclusions which may be drawn from them. It may be exercised either with reference to the natural, or supernatural means of knowledge conferred by God. When we refer to reason, as a source of knowledge distinct from revelation, we mean the information attained, by the use of this faculty, in connection only with the natural. By revelation, we mean the knowledge which God conveys by direct supernatural instruction, preeminently, that made known in the book known as the Bible. Reason involves all the cognitive powers of man, which are the faculties through which the mind attains knowledge. These faculties are not separate, and independent, but are merely the instruments of the mind. The mind is not itself an original source of knowledge, like the Scriptures, but is merely an instrument by which the man attains knowledge through the exercise of its appropriate faculties. There are no such things as innate ideas, which exist, without the exercise of proper thought, and reflection, in connection with some perceived facts. The means, by which the mind attains knowledge in the exercise of its faculties, are five. 1. Through consciousness, by which we learn our own existence, and the fact that we think, and are personal beings, possessing personal identity during the term of our natural life. 2. Through the senses, by observation, and experience of the world about us. 3. Through intuitive conceptions, by which, upon the suggestion, through some external object, of some principle, we find ourselves at once convinced of its correctness. 4. The dispositions instincts and tendencies of our natures. 5. The course of events in nature, as tending to good, or evil, to what is desirable, or disastrous.

It is manifest that the knowledge, obtained from these various sources, must be abundant to teach man the simple facts, upon which rest his duty to God; namely, that there is a God to whom he owes existence, and consequent reverence, service, and love, and whose greatness, and goodness enforce this obligation; also to show him, that that duty has not been discharged, and that he has not the disposition to discharge it; and consequently to render him uneasy in his relations to God, and anxious to appease Him, and secure some assurance of His pardon, and approval. It has also been thought by many, that through reason alone man attains the conviction of immortality, and of a future state of rewards, and punishments. However abundant, may be the information thus conveyed to man, it is nevertheless, clear that his knowledge, in these directions, must still remain very imperfect. This must have been true of him, even in a state of innocence. His finite nature, and the finite conditions, which surrounded him, must still have left him ignorant upon many desirable matters. It is natural, therefore, to believe that, in that condition, He received direct communications from God, which are properly esteemed revelations. But this imperfection must have been greatly increased by any subsequent fall from innocence. By this, the perceptions of right, and wrong would be dimmed, the power of conscience to enforce the right would be impaired, the desire to do the right would be diminished, prejudices against the right would be created, and affection for God would be greatly decreased, if not entirely obliterated. Upon these grounds we may infer the necessity of some further source of knowledge of God, and of His will with respect to man. We may also argue a priori, as to the nature of this revelation. 1. It must come from God the source of all our other knowledge. No other could give it, and it is fit that no other should do so. 2. It must be suited to our present condition, confirming the truth already known, and teaching that practically useful, to man as a sinner before God. 3. It must be secured from all possibility of error, so that its teachings may be relied on, with equal, if not greater confidence, than those of reason. 4. It must come with authority; claiming, and proving its claim, to be the word of God, who has the right to command, and to punish those who disobey His commands; with authority also that man may with confidence believe, and trust the promises, and hopes of pardon, and peace, it may hold out. 5. That it will be accompanied by difficulties, and mysteries, is what may be expected, since these are found frequently attending the knowledge derived from reason. The gift of such a revelation must of course, depend absolutely upon the will of God. It is not for man to say, prior to its gift, whether it certainly will, or will not be bestowed. That it is not improbable, may be inferred from the fact, that God has already made Himself known to us in various ways in ourselves, and in nature. If we need further revelation we may hope for it. The only reason, to the contrary, is that we have sinned against God, and He may have chosen to abandon us to our fate. But this is not so truly understood, until revelation has confirmed our conviction of our sinful estate. On the other hand, the favours which God still bestows, and the means of continued knowledge of Him, which He affords, indicate, that He has not yet consigned us to our deserved fate, and that He may have purposes of mercy towards us. That which renders it highly probable is the expectation, seen in man, in the conceptions He has formed of God, as one to be propitiated by sacrifices, and approached with prayer.

If the expectations, thus formed, are to be verified, the important question arises, in what way can God make known to us the new truth He wills to teach. They, manifestly, speak unadvisedly who assert, that this can, in no wise, be done. If He so choose, He could impress it on each one, in like manner as we attain intuitive conceptions. He might reveal it to individuals in dreams, and visions, so as to make each one feel, and know, that the vision is from God. Those through whom He has revealed Himself, have, in some such way, attained absolute conviction that God has spoken to, and through them, and, with God, there is neither impossibility, nor difficulty in producing like certainty upon the mind of each individual of the race. But, as God usually acts through means, so He has revealed Himself to a few, and through them, to mankind in general. The only question then is, how can He give, to the race at large, evidence, that the men He has inspired are indeed His messengers? This, also, might be done in various ways, but, He has chosen to do it by attesting their mission by miracles wrought through them. As to the measure of authority to be ascribed to these miracles, men differ in opinion. Some teach that any miracle wrought is, of itself, sufficient attestation of the messenger, and of the truth which He teaches. Others, that miracles are only proofs to those who behold them, and dubious proof even then, and that the true purpose of them is not to set the seal of God's authority, but simply to awaken attention, and excite awe, and thus prepare the way for a proper hearing of the divine message. These assert that the revelation comes to us with the authority only of the self convincing nature of the truth made known. It is necessary, in this difference of opinions, to seek carefully after the true theory. From no source can we better obtain it, than from the revelation itself, the teaching of which will be seen to be fully corroborated otherwise.

The Scripture theory seems to be this, that, in any new revelation, the prophet of God must present a doctrine, perfectly consistent with any past revelation, and with the knowledge conveyed by nature, and must, at the same time, confirm His authority, as a teacher from God, by miracle. Without the miracle, the new truth has no evidence that it is not simply the product of human reason, or imagination. The coincidence in doctrine is necessary to protect against pretended miracles, and the tricks of unprincipled men. Besides, the new truth can have no higher authority than the old, and therefore cannot supersede it, for the old also has come from God. 1. The scriptural authority for this theory is conclusive. Moses announced the law which shows the miracle alone not to be conclusive. See Deut. 13:1,2,3. "If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign, or a wonder, and the sign, or the wonder, come to pass, whereof He spake unto thee, saying, let us go after other Gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them; thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams, for the Lord your God proveth you, to know, whether ye love the Lord your God, with all your heart, and with all your soul." This passage shows that even a miracle, wrought by one teaching doctrine not in accordance with that already received, should not tempt to belief in the divine authority, of him who should work it. The Apostle Paul gives similar instruction to the Galatians. Gal. 1:8. "Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you, than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed." Whatever might be the accredited authority of the messenger, his teachings were not to be received. Yet, with all this, the Scriptures do not disparage the miracle. The miracles of Mosaic times are constantly referred to, as indubitably marking it as divine. Nicodemus recognized the high position assigned to them by the Jews. John 3:2. "No man can do these miracles, which thou doest, unless God be with him." Christ himself says: John 10:25. "The works that I do, in my Father's name, they bear witness of me." This theory of the Scriptures is not necessarily based upon the idea, that real miracles can be wrought otherwise, than by divine power. Still the language, sometimes used, is liable to this construction. And much depends upon the definition of a miracle. If a miracle be a suspension of the fixed laws, which God has established for the world, that suspension can only occur through His special permission. Taking this, as the true meaning of the word, we can understand, why such stress is laid in the Scriptures upon the Mosaic miracles, and those of Christ, since many of them are such as nothing, but divine power could accomplish. But the word miracle in the Scriptures has not this restricted meaning, but is applied, likewise, to any marked supernatural event. Because men are liable to put these upon a level with the miracles which God alone can work, they are warned not to follow after what is thus supernaturally done, if it be accompanied by such teaching as is contrary to truth already received. See the apparent reality of such miracles in connection with the magicians of Egypt, commencing with Ex. 7:11, and continuing to Ex. 8:7. See also the conviction expressed by the magicians, Ex. 8:19, when they failed to produce lice from the dust, "This is the finger of God." See also what Christ says. Mark 13:22. "For false Christs, and false prophets shall rise, and shall shew signs, and wonders, to seduce if it were possible, even the elect." See also, Rev. 16:13,14. "And I saw three unclean spirits, like frogs, come out of the mouth of the dragon, and out of the mouth of the beast, and out of the mouth of the false prophet. For they are the spirits of devils, working miracles, which go forth unto the kings of the earth, and of the whole world, to gather them to the battle of that great day of God Almighty." It is because of this liability to be deceived, that the Scriptures require the miracle, and the concurrent doctrine, as both essential to the reception of a new revelation.

2. This theory alone concurs with the course, to which nature necessarily impels us. To the extent that we are fully convinced of the truth of a doctrine, no subsequent revelation could change our belief. It is true, that this does not apply when we have doubts; but, when our knowledge is fixed, we cannot be moved. No amount of miracle could convince those, who have attained this knowledge, that, the nature of God is otherwise than pure, and holy, or that He delights in worship not of the heart, or that He is not infinite in justice, and holiness, goodness, mercy, and truth, or that He will pardon sin, without due satisfaction to His law. 3. This theory accords with the progressive character of divine revelation. The earliest revelation came to those, who had heretofore been guided by reason only. This was true, even down to the beginnings of the Old Testament Scriptures, and, in that economy, only preparation was made for the future glory of the New Testament revelation. Hence, the truths taught, were, for the most part, only those which come within the compass of discovery by reason, or acceptance by it, upon due suggestion, namely: the existence of one God, the fact of creation, the law of moral obligation to God, and man, the punishment of sinners, the duty of repentance, the pardoning mercy of God, and the law of sacrifices, with substitution and satisfaction. The new economy goes further in its clear instructions; it teaches the vicarious atonement of Christ, involving representation in Him, and also in Adam, the doctrine of the Trinity in the Godhead, the mysterious union in the person of Christ, and many other truths heretofore only very indistinctly revealed. These could not have been presented to those only taught heretofore by reason. But the revelation, which stood between, foreshadowed them in different ways. From it alone, originally, they would not have been discovered. But now that they are made known, that revelation is seen to concur with the new statements, and, the conformity, of the clearly expressed doctrines, to the mere outlines of them in the past, sustains the fact, that they have a common author, and that the divine revealer is the same. It is like the presence in animals of the same genus in earlier days, of germs, which find their development in species which come later. 4. This accords with our means of judging what course of action, infinite wisdom would have devised. The conviction we have of past truth, renders it impossible, that we should throw it aside. We must therefore, still hold it fast. That conviction has come from God, and we can have no higher evidence. Yet, other statements, and doctrines, which may be very probably, or even certainly true, may be taught by men, as revealed to them, when they are either self deceived, or attempting to deceive others. Hence, we must have the attesting miracle. On the other hand, we are liable to be deceived, as to what is supernatural, and especially, in the supernatural, as to what is within the limits of created power. Hence we may be misled by the craft of men, or by the superhuman power of wicked spirits. Therefore, no doctrine must be accepted contrary to a truth already received.

A revelation, such as we have described, having been given, and proved, another question arises; what is the relation, which reason bears towards it? We may lay down the following facts. 1. That reason is the first revelation, and is consequently presupposed in any other. 2. That the facts of reason cannot be denied by any subsequent revelation. No truth can destroy other truth. A limitation must, however, be put on the province of reason. The doctrines of which it may judge, are those only which come within its sphere. Upon the presentation of a new doctrine, reason may decide, whether it agrees with former knowledge. If agreeable thereto, it must be accepted. If opposed, it must be rejected. But, if it be above reason, it must stand, or fall with the rest of the revelation. God may, in His mercy, refrain to try faith by a revelation of supernatural doctrine, but, if He reveals it, it must be no barrier to the reception of that doctrine itself, or of the revelation which accompanies it. In an able article in the Southern Presbyterian Review, Vol. 1, pp. 1-34, on Reason and Revelation, Dr. Thornwell, puts this limitation upon reason, that it is sole arbiter, within its own bounds, but no judge beyond them. He thinks that in this way, only, can it be applied as a test of doctrine. The theory is undoubtedly correct. It errs, only, in not recognizing the precise manner in which Scripture brings it in, as an arbiter; not as the judge of truth, as disconnected from the past, but, as related to the various times, and forms, in which God has taught it. Reason may not only judge a new revelation, by the truths taught by reason alone, but also by those which have been made known in some previous revelation. The office of reason with respect to revelation, is therefore seen to be: 1. To examine the evidence of the miracles upon which it rests. 2. To compare its doctrines with the teaching of the past, and recognize their correspondence with, or opposition to that teaching. 3. To adopt, or reject the revelation, according to the evidence afforded that it is God's truth. 4. To interpret its contents, according to the best light, which learning affords.

The arguments by which we have proved the existence of God have shown us: 1. From that of causation — that He is self existent — having the cause of His existence in himself. 2. From the proof of design, and from His creation of spirit, that He is an intelligent personal and spiritual Being. 3. From the non-eternity of matter, that He alone is eternal. 4. From Providence and Miracles that He continues to rule and govern the world which He has created. In them all, have been the foundations upon which proofs of his wisdom, power, and goodness, as well as many other attributes are based. The information thus received is however insufficient, and is capable of being greatly increased by further examination. Having proved that God is, we naturally desire to know more of what He is, and who He is. This leads to an inquiry into His nature or essence, and since the nature and essence of all being, even of ourselves, can be known only by considering its mode of existence, its qualities and its manner of manifestation, we are led to inquire into the mode of God's existence and into the attributes and works by which He has made Himself known to us. Preliminary to this however are two subjects which first demand attention, viz: The Unity and the Spirituality of God. 1. The proof thus far attained, to say the least of it, is not inconsistent with that unity. Indeed one God is all that is demanded by or involved in that proof. But one first cause is needed; but one designer is suggested; one being alone meets all the conditions arising from our sense of dependence on another; but one is required to account for the evidences of providential care over the world; but one for the wonders in miracles. But one for the scriptures with their prophecies and their revelation of Christ and God; and but one for the common consent of mankind. This last point is the only apparent exception, But 1. Universal consent only goes so far as to admit the existence of one God. Many have in one way or another assumed there are more, but the belief in more than one is not universal. 2. The belief of more than one God was not the earliest type, but has been the result of corruption of the truth. This may be accounted for either from reverence for objects as representations of the divinity, as of the heavenly lights or of animals or statues representing deified attributes of God, or for men after death regarded as exponents of the same. 3. The belief of one God thus found in the earliest records of all nations was maintained among most men of intelligence even in the days of Heathenism. See Cudworth's Intellectual System of the Universe, Vol. I. pp. 293 to 638, for ancient Latin, Greek, Persian and Egyptian. As to Brahminism, see Maurice's Religions of the world, p. 59. As to Buddhism, see Maurice p. 102-3. As to the classic writers, see also the testimony of Cicero de Natura deorum, pp. 11-13 of translation in Bohn's library. As to the mass of Heathenism we have this testimony from Tertullian, quoted by Tholuck on Heathenism, p. 23. "In the deepest emotions of their minds they never directed their exclamations to their false Gods, but employed the words "By God", "As truly as God lives", "God help me". Moreover they do not have their eyes directed to the capitol, but to heaven." This belief in one God is true, even of that dualism which arose among the Persians, because of their knowledge of the struggle between good and evil connected with the presence of sin in the world, for they believed in a God superior to the two contestants in this struggle and thus may be claimed as accepting the idea of the unity of God. See Cudworth, Vol. 1, p 411, &c. The argument for universal consent therefore does not demand more than one God.

2. But the proof of God's existence is not only not inconsistent with the unity of God, but renders that unity highly probable and indeed almost certain. The unity of the first cause, and of the designer is naturally if not necessarily involved in the unity of will or purpose or design, seen in the effects produced in Creation and Providence. These show at least such perfect harmony and agreement between the wills of all Gods, if there be more than one, as can result only from one Being, or from several, as fully agreeing together as though they were but one. But the very idea of will involves choice, and choice involves such right and possibility to select between two or more things as forbids original agreement in choice between two different Beings. Either therefore there must be difference of choice which would destroy the uniformity or there must be a subordination of will one to another, which gives supremacy to one of the Beings. This result would be to make that one a first cause of will or action to the others, and therefore to make Him alone God. If therefore there be uniformity in the designs and works of nature, that is almost, if not quite, certain proof that there is but one God. That uniformity is seen 1. In the materials which compose it. 2. In the qualities possessed by these materials. 3. In the nature of the forces which they evolve. 4. In the unity of design between all living forms, fishes, reptiles, birds, mammalia in all parts of the world whether adapted for air, water or earth, whether in fossils of the past or living organisms of the present — and in germs seen in one species, only as germs and developed in another separated from it by a wide interval of time. 3. The only objection to the unity of God which can be drawn from the world arises from the presence of pain and ill, of sorrow and suffering, of guilt and sin, together with the violent and destructive forces of nature. 1. But these are not inconsistent with the unity of God. (a.) If they ought not to be and God could prevent them, they would prove lack of goodness, not of unity. (b) If they ought not to be and God cannot prevent them, then they would prove some other Being to exist greater than He, and then He would be God. 2. But there is no evidence that they ought not to be, and are not perfectly consistent with God's goodness. (a.) They may be part of a system which best exists in connection with them. We see this in part so far as the destructive forces of the world are concerned. (b.) We find among them traces of a working together for final and intermediate good ends, and hence they may safely be said neither to militate against goodness nor unity. (c.) The evils referred to, are as apparently under uniform general laws as any other things known to us. Hence their perfect consistency with unity. 4. But while some of the arguments for God are only consistent with His unity and highly suggestive of the same, and others make it so highly probable as to be almost certain, there are others which establish that absolute certainty. 1. The idea of God in the mind, to which is attached that of necessary existence, is the idea of one God, and one only. The notion of two or more Gods is self contradictory, for neither of them can be the absolute and perfect and independent Being which is our idea of God. All the evidence for God therefore contained in the first of the a priori arguments is for one God and one only. 2. In the argument from the nature of necessary existence, (the 2nd a priori,) the 7th point was: "There can be but one necessarily existent Being, for two necessarily existent Beings could in no respect whatever differ from each other; that is they would be one and the same Being." The nature of necessary existence therefore proves the unity of God.

5. The proofs we have thus far presented from nature for the unity of God are abundantly confirmed by the statements of Scripture. 1. The passages which declare explicitly that God is one. Deut. 6:4. Mal. 2:10. "Hath not one God created us." Mark 12:29, 32. Gal. 3:20. 1 Tim. 2:5. Eph. 4:6. James 2:19. 2. Those that assert that there is none else or none beside Him. Deut. 4:35, 39. Deut. 32:12. 1 Sam. 2:2. 2 Sam. 7:22. 1 Kings 8:60. 1 Chron. 7:20. Isa. 44:6,8. Isaiah 45:5,6,21,22. Isa. 46:5. Joel 2:27. 3. That there is none like Him nor to be compared with Him. Ex. 8:10. Ex. 9:14. Ex. 15:11. 2 Sam. 7:22. 1 Kings 8:23. 1 Chron. 7:20. 2 Chron. 6:14. Isaiah 40:25. Isa. 46:5. Isa. 45:22. Jer. 10:6. 4. That He alone is God. 2 Sam. 22:32. 1 Kings 19:15. Ezra 1:3. Neh. 9:6. Psalm 18:31. Ps. 86:10. Isaiah 37:16. Isaiah 43:10, 11, 12. Isaiah 45:22. Isa. 46:9. John 17:3. 1 Cor. 8:4, 5, 6. 5. That He alone is to be worshipped. Ex. 20:5. Ex. 34:14. Judges 13:16. 1 Sam. 7:3. 2 Kings 17:36. Matt. 4:10. Rom. 1:25. Rev. 19:10. 6. Which forbid any one else to be accepted as God. Ex. 20:3. Deut. 5:7. Isaiah 42:8. Hosea 13:4. 7. Which proclaim Him as supreme over all so-called Gods. Deut. 10:17. Josh. 22:22. Psalm 96:4,5. Jer. 14:22. 1 Cor. 8:4, 5, 6. 8. Which declare Him to be the true God. Jer. 10:10. 1 Thess. 1:9. (a.) The Scripture doctrine of the unity of God is not affected by those expressions, which seem to recognize other gods as when the gods of the heathen are spoken of as their gods in Judges 8:33, 9:27, 11:24, 16:23, 24. 1 Sam. 5:7. 1 Kings 11:33. 2 Kings 1:2, 16, and many other passages. Deut. 10:17. "The Lord your God is God of Gods and Lord of Lords." Josh. 22:22. The Lord God of Gods, the Lord God of Gods, he knoweth and Israel he shall know. Psalm 96:4, 5. For the Lord is great and greatly to be praised, He is to be feared above all gods. For all the gods of the Nations are idols but the Lord made the heavens. Jeremiah 14:22. Are there any among the vanities of the Gentiles that can cause rain? or can the heavens give showers? art not thou He, O Lord our God? 1 Cor. 8:4, 5, 6. As concerning therefore the eating of those things that are offered in sacrifice unto idols, we know that an idol is nothing in the world, and that there is none other God but one. For though there be that are called Gods whether in heaven or in earth (as there be gods many and lords many) but to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him. 1. Such Gods are only so-called Gods and exalted to such places by the false conceptions of men. 2. Many of them have solely imaginary existence. 3. Where there is any corresponding existence, they are but creatures of God dependent upon him for existence and even permission to exercise power and influence. 4. These Gods are identified in the New Testament with the devils which Christ cast out, and which were subject to him and his disciples, and who are only the angels or messengers of Satan, and therefore fallen created angels. Acts 17:18. Some of the philosophers who met Paul at Athens said of him, "He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods," (daemons) — This passage shows that the word which is constantly used in the New Testament for the Devils cast out, was a word properly used by these Greeks as applicable to their gods. But we have places in which the word is applied by the sacred writers themselves to these gods. 1 Cor. 10:20, 21. The things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils and not to God, and I would not that ye should have fellowship with devils. We cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils, we cannot be partakers of the Lord's table and of the table of devils. Rev. 9:20. And the rest of the men which were not killed by these plagues yet repented not of the works of their hands that they should not worship devils and idols of gold and silver, and brass and stone, and of wood, which neither can see, nor hear, nor walk. (b.) Such expressions as apply the word God to Moses as, Ex. 4:16. And he (Aaron) shall be thy spokesman unto the people, and he shall be, even he shall be to thee instead of a mouth, and thou shalt be to him instead of God. Ex. 7:1. And the Lord said unto Moses, see I have made thee a God to Pharaoh. John 10:34, 35. Jesus answered them, is it not written in your law, I said, ye are gods. If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came, and the Scripture cannot be broken. The reference is to Ps. 82:6, 7. I have said ye are gods (Elohim,) and all of you are children of the most High. But ye shall die like men and fall like one of the princes. As to these passages referring to Moses, the idea manifestly is that he stood before Aaron and Pharaoh as the representative of God, clothed with His authority and having the right to demand confidence in his utterances and obedience to his commands. But all of this not because of any partaking of divine nature, but because he was God's ambassador. As to the passage in the Psalms quoted by Christ it is equally manifest that this was a metaphorical use of the words to denote the recognition of exalted dignity and mighty power. In the psalm which records the word, it is said in the 1st verse, "God standeth in the congregation of the mighty; he judgeth among the gods." This language and the threat of death like men in the 6th verse show that it was applied to men who are only metaphorically spoken of as gods.

The Doctrine of the Trinity is not opposed to the unity of God, but only enables us to form just conceptions as to that unity. It presents to us three Persons who are not three gods, but one God, and as will hereafter be seen shows us that the unity of God is to be found in His nature or essence and not in the personal relations in that essence, so that there is but one divine nature or essence, one Being, one God, although there are three persons subsisting therein who by virtue of that subsistence are each God. We are not led by this doctrine of the unity of God, therefore to adopt the Arian notion that the Father is Supreme God and the Son only a divine Being in a subordinate sense. Nor is it proper to accept as teaching the Sabellian notion, that God is one person manifesting Himself sometimes as Father, sometimes as Son and sometimes as Holy Ghost. Neither does it at all teach Tritheistic unity by which these are really three gods, but considered one because they have the same nature just as three men may be said to be one because of the same human nature. See Gill, vol. 1, pp 183, 184 from which this is condensed.

I. The one God has undoubtedly a spiritual nature. 1. He is the creator of spirits. But Spirit is the highest order of existence and its creator must himself have the nature which belongs to that order. 2. The creation and government of the world give evidence of wisdom, skill, knowledge, and purpose; but these are attributes of Spirit. God therefore must have a spiritual nature. 3. We arrive at the idea of the perfect being by the exclusion of all imperfection and the ascription of all perfection. But spiritual nature is in every respect a perfection. Therefore we ascribe it to God. 4. The Scriptures ascribe a spiritual nature to God. It is involved in the abundant language about the spirit of God, in which however reference is had distinctively to the third person in the Trinity. It is also involved in all the intellectual, and moral, and emotional thoughts and acts ascribed to Him. But it is directly asserted in two places; John 4:24; the language of our Lord to the woman of Sychar; "God is a spirit and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth." Again in Heb. 12:9, where fathers of the flesh, and of the spirit are contrasted. "Furthermore we have had fathers of our flesh which corrected us, and we gave them reverence: shall we not much rather be in subjection to the Father of spirits, and live. Compare also Acts 17:24, 25. "God that made the world, and all things therein, seeing that He is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is worshipped with men's hands, as though he needeth anything," &c.

II. But when we ascribe spirituality to God, we do not intend simply to assert that He possesses a spiritual nature, but that His nature is exclusively spiritual. By this we mean that He has no material organization, that He has neither body, nor members of the body such as we have, no shape nor form, no passions nor limitations, but has only a spiritual nature. 1. This is evident from His immensity and eternity; (infinity in time and space.) To have an omnipresent and eternal mode of existence is possible for a spiritual nature, because spirit has not of necessity succession of time and specific limitation of location. But these of necessity belong to matter. It is of necessity that it has a here, and not an everywhere; spirit alone can combine the two, the here and the everywhere. It is also of necessity that matter exists in time; we know that it exists now, that it existed yesterday, that it may exist to-morrow. We know that it necessarily has this succession and difference of time. But with the eternal God there can be no succession of time, and consequently He can have no material nature, but must be purely spiritual. 2. It also follows from His independence and immutability. If God have body, He is capable of being influenced from without, for all matter is thus capable of being influenced, of being moved, divided, added to and diminished. But if thus capable of influence from without He is not independent. Therefore the independent God cannot be material. Again, if He is body, He is mutable, for all matter is capable of change. Therefore the immutable God cannot be material. 3. This may be proved from His absolute perfection. (a.) Negatively. From the idea of absolute perfection we exclude all that admits of limitation, or change. But body is both limited and changeable. Therefore the absolute perfection of God excludes a bodily organism. (b.) Positively. To absolute perfection we ascribe the possession of intelligence, will, and moral perception. But these do not belong to body. Therefore body cannot be either in part or whole the absolutely perfect one. 4. We realize in ourselves, the defects of a material organization, how it confines us, how it causes pain and suffering, how it imposes on us joy in sensual pleasures, how incapable it is of knowledge and power in itself. Hence we naturally disbelieve that in God is to be found an organism so necessarily imperfect. On the other hand we find our spiritual nature to be of wondrous power and capacity, endowed with intelligence, skill and wisdom, capable of knowing right and wrong, and the true and the false, and possessed of liberty of choice, and we therefore ascribe to God the possession of such a nature to an infinite extent, with infinite intelligence, skill and wisdom, and a will absolutely untrammeled from without. In apparent opposition to this doctrine of the pure spirituality of God is a large number of passages, which represent God in or with bodily form. This language is partly figurative, and partly used as an accommodation to human thought, and the incapacity of human language to express exclusively divine things. Such language is called anthropomorphic, and is generally so realized as such, as to make no false impression, even upon the most ignorant. It is true however, that some have held that God has body, as for example some of the early heretics and even Tertullian, who says: "Quis negabit Deum Corpus esse etsi Deus Spiritus est." Mohammed held the idea of bodily form in God. So also did some of the later Socinians, and this idea is taught in the Racovian Catechism. In forming such views they have been misled by these passages and by the Scripture statement, that man was made in the image of God.

The following is a list of the passages as collected in West's Analysis, pp. 17-19. Those which speak of Him as having location. Gen. 4:16. Ex. 19:17, 21. Ex. 20:21 and Ex. 33:14, 15. As having motion. Gen. 17:22. Gen. 18:33. Ex. 19:20. Num. 12:5. Num. 23:4. Deut. 33:2. Judg. 5:4. 1. Sam. 4:7. Ps. 47:5. Ps. 68:7, 8. Ezek. 11:23. Micah. 1:3. Hab. 3:3. Zech. 2:13. As using vehicles. 2. Sam. 22:11. (Cherub and wings of wind, Ps. 18:10.) Ps. 104:2. Clouds and wings of the wind, Hab. 3:8, 15. Zech. 9:14. Said to dwell on the earth. Ex. 25:8. Ex. 29:43, 44. 1. Kings 6:11, 12. 1. Kings 8:13. 2. Chron. 6:2. Ps. 132:14. Mic. 1:2. Heb. 2:20. Dwells with man. Ex. 29:45. Lev. 26:11, 12. 2. Chron. 6:18. Zech. 2:10. Rev. 21:3. Dwells in men. 1. Cor. 3:16, 17. As having face. Gen. 32:30. Ex. 33:11, 20. Deut. 5:4. Deut. 34:10. Rev. 20:11. Eyes. 2. Chron. 16:9. Prov. 22:12. Nostrils. 2. Sam. 22:9, 16. Ps. 18:15. Mouth. Num. 12:8. Ps. 18:8. Lips and Tongue. Isa. 30:27. Breath. Isa. 30:28. Shoulders. Deut. 33:12. Hand and Arm. Ps. 21:8. Ps. 74:11. Ps. 89:13. Ps. 118:16. Isa. 52:10. Hab. 3:4. Fingers. Ps. 8:3. Back. Ex. 33:21, 22, 23. Jer. 18:17. Feet. Ps. 18:9. Voice. Ex. 19:19. Ex. 20:22. Lev. id. Num. 7:89. Num. 12:4. Num. 22:9. Deut. 4:12, 36. 1. Kings 19:12, 13. Ps. 68:33. Jer. 25:30. Ezek. 43:6. Voice, (as dreaded.) Ex. 20:19. Deut. 4:33. Deut. 5:24, 25, 26. Joel 2:11. Joel 3:16. Amos. 1:2. Heb. 12:19, 26. To exercise laughter. Ps. 2:4. Ps. 69:8. Appears to men. Gen. 35:9. Gen. 48:3. Ex. 3:6. Ex. 19:9. 1. Kings 9:2. Job 42:5, 6. Amos 9:6. So that His appearance is described. Ex. 24:10. Deut. 31:15. Isa. 6:1. Isa. 60:1, 2. Ezek. 1:1. Ezek. 8:1, 2, 4. Ezek. 43:2. Dan. 7:9, 10. Rev. 4:5. In human form. Gen. 18:1. Ezek. 1:26, 27. Rev. 4:2, 3. Four Remarks further, 1. The Spirituality of God necessarily involves, 1. That He is invisible and intangible, or incapable of apprehension by the bodily senses. 2. That He is unchangeable, incorruptible and indestructible. 3. That He is simple and uncompounded. 4. That He is a living personal Being, intelligent, moral, free and active. 5. That He is infinite and eternal. 2. Upon the Spirituality of God depends. 1. His knowledge of all events, and especially of his Spiritual creatures. 2. His control of all events. 3. His purposing all things that shall come to pass. 3. Because of it, He must receive spiritual worship — 1. Not that of the body only, 2. Nor of the outward form, 3. Nor of presented service, 4. But of genuine emotion. 4. Because of it, He cannot be represented in that worship by outward forms or images. He is to be approached not with the bodily senses, but with the communings of the heart. Hence the second commandment, "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them." Ex. 20:4, 5.

The Attributes of God are those peculiarities which mark or define his nature and constitute his character. They are not separate from His essence or nature, and yet are not that essence, but simply have the ground or cause of their existence in it, and are at the same time the peculiarities which comprise the mode and nature of its existence. As they are not separable from His essence, so they are not to be regarded as so many different powers and peculiarities or faculties, which so belong to God that He is "composed of different elements." Hodge 1:369. This would take away the simplicity of the divine nature and make it compound and therefore divisible and changeable. But, on the other hand, they are not simply our different conceptions of God. They have existence independently of His creatures. There is some true foundation in God himself for the distinctions between them, so that, when we say that God is wise, we do not only say that we conceive of Him differently than when we say that He is just, but we mean that, there is that in God which makes it proper that we should conceive of Him under the different aspects of wisdom and justice. CLASSIFICATIONS. Various divisions have been made of the attributes of God. 1. One is into communicable and incommunicable. The communicable attributes are those, which, to a limited degree, He can also bestow upon His creatures. Such are power, knowledge, wisdom, love, holiness, &c. The incommunicable are those which cannot thus be bestowed, but which of necessity exist only in God. These are infinity, including immensity, eternity, and immutability. Two other divisions which arrange the attributes precisely like this, giving the same lists for the one and the other, are absolute and relative, immanent and transient. 2. Another is into natural, and moral. By the natural are meant, those which describe the nature of God as distinct from His character; by the moral, those which describe His character. Hodge objects to this division, because "the holiness and justice of God are as much natural as His power or knowledge. And on the other hand God is infinite and eternal in His moral perfections, although infinity and eternity are not distinctively moral perfections," "In the common and familiar sense of the word natural the terms natural and moral express a real distinction." Hodge 375:6. 3. Again divided into negative and positive. Dr. Hodge states the division thus. "Others arrange the attributes according to the mode in which we arrive at the knowledge of them." We form our idea of God, (1.) By the way of causation; that is by referring to Him as the great first cause, every virtue manifested by the effects which he produces. (2.) By the way of negation; that is by denying to Him the limitations and imperfections which belong to His creatures. (3.) By the way of eminence; by exalting to an infinite degree or without limit the perfections which belong to an infinite being. If this be so, the attributes conceived of by one of these methods belong to one class, and those conceived of, or, of which we attain the knowledge by another method belong to another class. This principle of classification is perhaps the one most generally adopted. It gives rise, however, really but to two classes, namely the positive and negative, i. e. those in which something is affirmed, and those in which something is denied concerning God. To the negative class are commonly referred, simplicity, infinity, eternity, immutability; to the positive class, power, knowledge, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." Hodge, vol. 1, p. 375.

The Simplicity of God. By this we mean, that the nature of God, comprising His essence and his attributes, is a simple or uncompounded pure spirit. It means more than His unity — for the latter expresses only the fact that there is but one Being, that is God. Were God both matter and spirit, or compounded in any other way, His unity would not be affected. Were there but one man in the world, we should ascribe to him unity, and if there could be but one, we should ascribe essential unity. It means more than the spirituality of God, for that includes only that He must be spiritual, and, also, as we have seen, that He should be purely spiritual. But there is nothing contradictory in the idea, that created spirits might have a composite spiritual nature, composed, for example, of mind, soul and spirit as three distinct essences, or that a spiritual nature should have a spiritual body as well as a spiritual soul. But in God there can be no composition, and therefore His spiritual nature must be uncompounded. Even His attributes and His nature must be in such a manner one that His attributes essentially inhere in that nature and are not capable of separation from it, which really makes them one with that nature. 1. Because composition (or a putting together,) involves possibility of separation. But this would involve destructibility, and changeableness, each of which is inconsistent with absolute perfection and necessary existence. 2. Composition involves a time of separate existence of the parts compounded. If so, then there was a time when God did not exist, because the parts of His nature had not been united, or, when He existed imperfectly, not having yet received to His essential nature the additions subsequently made; all of which is inconsistent with absolute perfection and necessary existence. 3. If the parts have been compounded, it has been done by some force from without or has been a growth in His nature. They have not been added from without; because God is independent and therefore cannot be affected from without. And besides all outward form and all else besides God had its origin in Him, and He existed as God before it. They have not been a growth in Him, for if so, he is not unchangeable. Any such addition to God or growth in Him is also inconsistent with absolute perfection and necessary existence. In ascribing simplicity to God, therefore we declare that His nature is so purely or simply one, as not to be compounded of separate substances as matter and spirit, or even of the same substances in different forms, or a substance with separable attributes, and we assert that even His attributes are one with His essence, and that He is not only essentially spiritual, but also essentially wise and good, and holy and just, and true, and almighty, and omnipotent.

Infinity of God. When we say that, God is infinite, we deny to him all limitation in His nature or essence. We are conscious of the finite nature of our soul as well as of our body; it has limitations as to place, time and capabilities. In arriving at the idea of the perfect being by way of negation, we deny all such limitation in Him, and therefore ascribe to Him infinity as to time, and space, as well as infinite perfection, in His mode of existence, in His power, wisdom, goodness, justice, holiness and truth. The infinity of God as to time is called His Eternity. By this we mean, 1. That He has no beginning nor end. 2. That with Him there is no succession of moments. It is difficult to attain any conception of the mode of existence which is thus ascribed to Him. It is so different from our own. Yet a brief consideration of what is involved in the nature of God must convince us that the idea which we express by these statements is just and true. (1.) As to the statement that He has no beginning or end. When we say, that we shall live forever, we can understand how a life once begun, may never be completed. But it is difficult to conceive of a life which goes back equally forever as one may go forward. The past is always completed, and as completed must be measurable. That which has been by succession of moments, or days, must have had some first day, or moment with which it began. We can form no other conception of it. That division of eternity, therefore which is called eternity a parte post, we can comprehend; but the complement of it, the eternity a parte ante which is united with it to express infinite duration, is felt at once to be an attempted conception of the mind, to express something which we know must be true and yet which we perceive is inadequately conceived as well as expressed. While, therefore, we know that God has had no beginning, we see that His mode of existence cannot have been one in which He has had in the past, that infinite duration, which corresponds to what may be ours in the future. Again. When we say that, in reference to any period, any being has always existed, and will always exist, we mean, that there has not only been no moment in that period when he has not existed, but that during that period he has been and will be existent in a constant succession of moments. There is at all times, after the beginning, a past; and present, and will be, until the end, a future. One moment passes away, and another succeeds. But with God there can be no succession of moments. (1.) Because then He would have had a beginning, which is opposed to His infinity. (2.) Because then He would not be unchangeable, for that would be true of Him to-day, which was not yesterday and will not be tomorrow. (3.) He would not be perfect. Because something could be added to him from day to day, He would become older, He would have new experience. Indeed there would be either increase or diminution of His power, wisdom, &c, &c. The schoolmen attempted to express the eternity of God by saying that it is punctum stans, or nunc semper stans. The poet Cowley thus expresses it, "Nothing there is to come, and nothing past, But an eternal Now does always last." This is the conception of eternity which we strive to attain. Our difficulty in doing so is that we can no more conceive of duration without succession, than we can of an eternity a parte ante. But we see that, in this conception, we are not arriving at a thought in itself erroneous, as in the other case, but are simply recognizing the fact that God's mode of existence, as to time, is different from ours. Ours has succession of moments, increase in the length of the period, is not all of it possessed at the same time, has had beginning and might have an end, and has a past and future as well as present. God has no succession, no increase of life, is possessed of the whole of His existence at once, and eternally possessed, has had no beginning, can have no end, and lives in the present only, having no past or future. This accords with the statements of scripture. God is always spoken of in the present. He calls himself I am. His name Jehovah has been supposed mystically to express this. In Ps. 90:2. "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God." Thus our Lord when He would declare his equality with the father uses the present tense for each. "My father worketh hitherto, and I work." So also in like manner He declared His Divinity by saying "Before Abraham was, I am." A question arises, what then is the relation of time and eternity to each other. Time is not a part of eternity, for if it were, eternity must have succession, viz: before time, during time, after time. They are in reality different modes of existence which are unlike each other, time being suited to the measurement of creation periods and creature life. True eternity belongs only to the life of God. While time however is not a part of eternity it co-exists with it. Through the divine purpose all its events have been eternally present with God, and as well known and realized by Him, as though actually existent. And, in the actual existence of time, it has been present actually with God, and eternity, although not constituting a part of eternity. The nature of these relations we cannot understand. Our ideas are vague, and the language, in which we would convey them is incapable of expressing even what we perceive and know. But while this, is true, we have no question as to the possibility of better knowledge in the future on this point. The difficulty is in reality no greater than in the connection between the immensity and omnipresence of God. Yet, from the knowledge of the presence of our spirits, as compared with that of our bodies, we comprehend the fact of the omnipresence of God with all created things, while the space in which they exist is no more a part of His immensity than is time a part of His eternity.

Corresponding to the infinity of God in respect to time is His infinity, in respect to space which is called His Immensity. God is not confined to space any more than He is measured by time. Space must have its limitations because its existence is commensurate only with the universe. Where there is no creation, there can be no space nor time. But creation cannot be infinite, but must have its bounds, impossible as it may be for us to imagine the non-existence of space. In our mode of existence, space and time are so necessary that we cannot even deny their existence without using words which involve that existence. Thus if I say, "Where there is no universe, there is no space," the very words "where" and "there" involve the notion of space. But withal this, we know that, just as time is the period, so is space the location, in which creation exists. When therefore we speak of God's immensity, we mean more than his filling all space just as when we speak of His eternity, we mean more than His existing throughout all time. We can only express the idea by the fiction of infinite space as in the other, we have done by that of infinite time. Immensity is an absolute attribute of God to which corresponds the relative one His Omnipresence. By this word we express the relation of God as present with creation. He is present everywhere. He is present at one and the same time everywhere. His presence is not merely contact, but energy, and power. It is not merely through his knowledge of it, or the exertion of His power upon it, but He fills it with His essence. He fills it, not as part to part, but the whole infinite deity is entirely undividedly present, at each point of creation, in each moment of time. The following valuable questions and answers are taken from Hodge's Outlines of Theology, p. 141, of the new edition. "What are the different modes of the divine presence?" God may be conceived of as present in any place, or with any creature, in several modes; first, as to His essence; second, as to His knowledge; third, as manifesting that presence to any intelligent creature; fourth, as exercising his power in or upon His creatures. As to essence and knowledge His presence is the same everywhere and always. As to his self manifestation and the exercise of His power, His presence differs endlessly in different cases, in degree and mode. Thus God is present to the church as He is not to the world. Thus He is present in hell in the manifestation and execution of righteous wrath, while He is present in heaven in the manifestation and communication of gracious love and glory. How may it be proved that He is everywhere present as to his essence? That God is everywhere present as to His essence is proved from Scripture. 1. Kings 8:27. Ps. 139:7-10. Isaiah 66:1. Acts 17:27.28. And from reason. (1.) It follows necessarily from His infinitude. (2.) From the fact that His knowledge is His essence knowing, and His actions are His essence acting, yet His knowledge and His power reach to all things. State the different relations that bodies, created spirits and God sustain to space. Turretine says: "Bodies are conceived of as existing in space circumscriptively because, occupying a certain portion of space, they are bounded by space upon every side. Created spirits do not occupy any portion of space, nor are they embraced by any, they are however in space definitely as here and not there. God on the other hand is in space repletively, because in a transcendent manner His essence fills all space. He is included in no space; He is excluded from none. Wholly present to each point He comprehends all space at once.\"

The immutability of God makes him incapable of change, either in duration, which is involved in His eternity, or in nature, character, will, or happiness. In none of these, nor in any other respects is there possibility of change. 1. This is implied in His absolute perfection. Perfection permits neither increase, as though He lacked, nor decrease, as though He could lose. Change must be for the worse, or for the better, but God cannot become worse, nor better. 2. It arises, in like manner, from the pure simplicity of His nature. That which is not, and cannot be, compounded, cannot be changed. 3. It is expressly taught by the Scriptures in several particulars. (a.) They declare Him to be unchangeable in life. Gen. 21:33. He is called "the Lord the everlasting God." So also in Rom. 16:26. Deut. 32:39,40. "See now that I, even I, am He, and there is no god with me; I kill, and I make alive; I wound, and I heal; neither is there any, that can deliver out of my hand. For I lift up my hand to heaven, and say, I live forever." In Ps. 55:19, He is called "God, * * * even He that abideth of old." Also, Ps. 90:1, "From everlasting to everlasting thou art God." In Ps. 102:12, and in Ps. 9:7, we have, "Lord, shall endure for ever." In Habakkuk 1:12, the Prophet asks: "Art thou not from everlasting O Lord my God, mine Holy one?" 1 Tim. 1:17. "Unto the king eternal, immortal, invisible, the only wise and true God." 1 Tim. 6:16. "Who only hath immortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach." (b.) They declare Him unchangeable in His nature. Mal. 3:6. "I am the Lord, I change not." Rom. 1:23. "And changed the glory of the incorruptible God." James 1:17. "The Father of lights with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning." Ps. 104:31. "The glory of the Lord shall endure forever." (c.) Unchangeable in His will. Ps. 33:12. "The counsel of the Lord standeth forever, the thoughts of His heart to all generations." Prov. 19:21. "There are many devices in a man's heart; nevertheless, the counsel of the Lord, that shall stand." Being even independent of the will of others. Job 23:13. "But He is in one mind, and who can turn Him? and what His soul desireth, even that He doeth." (d.) Unchangeable in His character. In His Justice. Gen. 18:25. "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" Job 8:3. "Doth God pervert judgment? or doth the Almighty pervert justice?" Similar to this is Job 34:12. Rom. 2:2. "We are sure that the judgment of God is according to truth." In His Mercy. Mal. 3:6. "I am the Lord, I change not; therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed." Exodus 34:7. "Keeping mercy for thousands." Deut. 4:31. "For the Lord thy God is a merciful God; He will not forsake thee, neither destroy thee, nor forget the covenant of thy fathers which He sware unto them." Ps. 107:1. "For His mercy endureth forever." Lam. 3:22,23. "It is of the Lord's mercies that we are not consumed, because His compassions fail not. They are new every morning; great is thy faithfulness." In His Truth. Deut. 23:19. "God is not man that He should lie; neither the son of man, that He should repent." 1 Sam. 15:29. "The strength of Israel will not lie nor repent; for he is not a man that He should repent." Rom. 11:2. "God hath not cast away his people whom He foreknew." Rom. 3:3. "For what if some did not believe? shall their unbelief make the faith of God without effect." Micah 7:20. "Thou wilt perform the truth to Jacob, and the mercy to Abraham, which thou hast sworn unto our fathers from the days of old." 2 Tim. 2:13. "If we believe not, yet He abideth faithful, He cannot deny himself." Titus 1:2. "In hope of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world began." Rom. 11:29. "The gifts and calling of God, are without repentance." In His Holiness. Job 34:10. "Far be it from God that He should do wickedness, and from the Almighty, that He should commit iniquity." James 1:13. "God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man." Hab. 1:13. "Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquity." In His knowledge. Acts 15:18. "Known unto God are all His works from the beginning of the world." Isaiah 40:13,14. "Who hath directed the Spirit of the Lord, or being His counsellor, hath taught Him? with whom took He counsel, and who instructed Him, and taught Him in the path of judgment, and taught Him knowledge and shewed to Him the way of understanding." And so on, to the end of the 40th chapter, especially in verse 28, "there is no searching of His understanding"

I. It is objected to the immutability of God, that a change must have taken place in Him in the creation of the universe. It is claimed that He, then, must have formed a new purpose, and must have passed from a state of rest to one of activity. (a.) But this objection is based upon a forgetfulness of the fact, that in Him there is no succession, and no change from one moment to another. The creation of the universe is no less an outward act, than is the time in which it has existence. It appears in time and with time. But with God there is no time, and no relation of time, exclusive of time itself. There was not before its creation. There will not be when there shall be no more time in creation. We may not be able to understand how this is, but we know that the fact must be so. It is on this account, that the purpose of God to create, was not a new one formed at one time, and not at another. On the contrary, that purpose, and indeed His whole will is eternal. Whatever may have given rise to that purpose, does not exclude this fact. (b.) There was nothing outside to influence Him. He was moved entirely by His own will. Whether, that will was altogether voluntary, or arose from some necessity in His nature, we need not now consider. If it was either the one or the other, in either event it was eternal, for if His nature be eternal, then any necessity of His nature is an eternal necessity, and any purpose He forms of necessity, or voluntarily, must be an eternal volition. So much for the objection based upon a supposed new purpose. That from a transition from rest to labour is equally baseless. It supposes labour and toil in God. But the scripture account of creation, as well as the dictates of reason forbid this. There was no laborious work of God. There never is, there never can be. His infinite power compasses His infinite will, in the mere wishing. And, as in the creation, so also in the sustentation of the universe, there is in God none of that busy careful thought, and protracted weary effort by which man maintains government, or sustains the lives of those dependent on Him. This view of God's creation accords with reason. It alone is worthy of an all wise, all powerful, independent and self existent God. It is established by Scripture. Heb. 11:3. "Through faith we understand that the worlds were made by the word of God, so that things which are seen, were not made of things which do appear." The whole account of the creation in Genesis, Chap. 1:1 to chap. 2:3 is full of this truth. In every case it is simply, "And God said," &c. Psalm 33:9. "For He spake, and it was done, he commanded and it stood fast." When it is said, that He rested on the seventh day, no more is implied than that He ceased as to further creation; for the sustentation of the universe requires constantly the same exercise of power and will as its creation. II. It is again objected, that the Scriptures represent change in God, when they speak of Him as "repenting." Thus they say: Gen. 6:6. "And it repented the Lord that He had made man on the earth, and it grieved Him at His heart." 1 Sam. 15:35. "And the Lord repented that He had made Saul King over Israel." Ps. 106:45. "And He remembered for them, his covenant and repented according to the multitudes of His mercies." Amos 7:3. "The Lord repented for this: It shall not be saith the Lord." Jonah 3:10. "And God repented of the evil, that He had said, that He would do unto them." In reply to this objection it may be stated, that these are merely anthropopathic expressions, intended simply, to impress upon men his great anger at sin, and his warm approval of the repentance of those, who had sinned against Him. The change of conduct, in men, not in God, had changed the relations between them and God. Sin had made them liable to his just displeasure. Repentance had brought them within the possibilities of His mercy. Had He not treated them differently, then there would have been change in Him. His very unchangeableness makes it necessary that He shall treat differently, those who are innocent, and those who are guilty, those who harden themselves against Him, and those who turn toward Him for mercy with repentant hearts. So far as the first of these passages is concerned, it is simply a protest against the great wickedness into which the great race of man has fallen. The scriptures show that God has had a purpose, with reference to such sin, which from the beginning contemplated the fall of man, and the different stages of wickedness by which in various ages that fall has been accompanied.

III. Again it has been objected, that God must be changeable or He could not answer prayer. It is said, if His purposes stand forever and He changes not His will, then there is no place for prayer. It is unquestionably true, that God promises to answer prayer. It is also true, that prayers have been answered, and that the course of human events has thus been different from what it would have been, had there been no prayer and no answer to it. But the mistake arises from supposing that there has been change in God's purpose or action from what He always contemplated. The difficulty is not one that affects prayer only. It arises as well in connection with labour, or with any other act, by which through man, a new force is introduced into the universe. It proceeds from the fact that man, being a voluntary agent, may act according to choice at any moment of his life. That choice puts his action outside of the mere mechanical movements of the universe. Over these it is admitted that God has absolute control, and that His purpose relative to them has no change. But it is thought, that if man can choose one thing, or another, or can do, or not do, any special act he pleases, then so much of the future being dependent and resultant from his act or volition, God must change His purpose to correspond with that act or volition. To this it may be replied that even without explanation we know, that such cannot be the case, for this would take away the independence of God. It would make His volitions dependent upon those of man. If it be therefore true, that man cannot be a free agent, without such mechanical action, on his part, as would leave God free, we know that free agency does not belong to him. But we are so fully conscious of our free agency, that, that consciousness becomes to us the highest revelation from God that it has real existence. If prayer then be offered the only doubt about it, as a power and force, the effect of which does not change, is whether God answers it. And, in His word He has so plainly taught this, as to leave no room for doubt. In what aspect, then, are we to regard prayer. Evidently in this simple way, that it is a secondary cause, which has a place, like all other secondary causes, which, like other such, is necessary to produce the result, to which God has given means of efficient entrance into the working of the universe, the existence of which has been as fully known and purposed as any other secondary cause, and the presence of which can in no way take God by surprize, nor render any new purpose or action on His part necessary. So far then from changing His purpose when He answers prayer, God is in reality only carrying out that purpose. But, even, if we be not able to explain how any will, or act of ours, can be at the same time as fixed and certain with God, as if it were a decree about some mechanical action of the universe, or were his own personal purpose, and at the same time be perfectly voluntary with man, so that he can, either, will, or not will, do, or not do, as he may himself choose, we are perfectly sure that it must be so, from our consciousness of ourselves, and our certainty of what is the nature of God. IV. It is further objected, that there was change in God, in the act of the incarnation of the second person of the Trinity. I meet this objection here, because the most suitable place in our course to do so, though the explanations may not be comprehended fully, until we have discussed the Trinity, and the relations of the persons of the Godhead in it. It is based upon a misconception of the Scripture doctrine of the incarnation. 1. It was not the divine nature, which became incarnate, but simply one of the persons subsisting in it. 2. No change took place in the divine nature. The human and divine natures of the Son of God were so related to Him, and to each other, that while He was truly God and truly man, possessing every characteristic of each, the two natures remained entirely distinct, each, with its own peculiarities and properties. The divine nature was in no degree affected. The Son of God therefore, was as truly divine after, as before the incarnation. 3. So distinct were these natures, that in becoming man, the Son took not simply a human body, but also a human soul. These were united with the personality with which He subsists in the divine nature, but not with the divine nature itself. Christ lacked nothing to make Him as separate from God as any other man, except human personality. He united His human nature to himself by subsisting in it in the same personality with which He subsists in the divine nature. 4. The Son has not divine nature separate from the Father and the Spirit, so that we can say His divine nature in the exclusive sense, in which we speak of the human nature of Paul and Peter. Human nature is distributed among individual men, so that each one has his own, and in no wise partakes with another. But the one divine nature is common to the three persons. These statements will show, why God has not been changed in the act of incarnation. (1.) There would have been change, had the human nature been so united to the divine, as to add to it such qualities, properties and conditions as do not belong to God. These may be possessed by a divine person in the human nature He has assumed, for thus is there no change in His nature as God, but they cannot be transferred to the divine nature without making it finite as well as infinite, material as well as spiritual, fallible as well as infallible, mortal as well as immortal. These contradictory states may exist in the one person, but cannot in any such compounded nature. (2.) There would have been change, had the divine nature become the soul of the human nature. This would have made that nature subject to human passions, and appetites, to human frailties and imperfections, and liable to pain, suffering, and temptation and to limitation in goodness, knowledge, power and wisdom. The knowledge therefore of the true doctrine of the incarnation shows conclusively, that in it there has been no change in God.

V. It is alleged, that God cannot be without change, because He suffered during the incarnation of Christ. The argument is that the declarations about Christ's suffering are made, not simply of the human nature, but of both natures combined, and that thus we are taught, that it was not merely man, but God also that suffered. This position is assumed by some, who maintain that Christ had a complete human, as well as divine nature, not a mere human body, but also a rational soul. It is necessarily also the position of those, who claim that He had no human soul, but that His divine nature took the place of a rational soul. The reply to this argument is that the Scripture statements do not teach that the divine nature suffered. This is nowhere said. They teach that the second person of the Trinity, who became man, suffered. But they plainly refer that suffering to His human nature only. They teach us, that in the relations of His natures to His person, He preserved unchanged the properties and qualities, which belonged to them separately, and that this was especially true of the divine nature. There were indeed some communications from the divine nature to the human, but none from the human to the divine. But while thus distinct, they were united together in a single personality and by such a union, that whatever might be said, to be true or to be done, or to be suffered by either of the natures, might in like manner be affirmed of the person in whom they were united. It is because of this, that Christ, the son of God, is said to have suffered. He did this in His human, though not in His divine nature. The scripture declarations that Christ suffered, are no proof that God suffered, or that God can change in this respect. But there are those, who do not receive the above statements as an exposition of the teachings of Scripture on this point. They claim, as necessary, an interpretation which asserts suffering of the divine nature. Those indeed, who hold that the Divine nature is in the place of the human soul are forced to maintain such an interpretation. It is in reply to both of these, that the unchangeableness of the divine nature is presented as conclusive against any such interpretation. Against their position are adduced the numerous statements of Scripture asserting that God does not change, and that He is immutable in His nature, and in His various perfections, as well as the arguments from reason, by which the same truth is maintained. So incontestable are these statements and reasonings that the objectors readily admit, that there is no power or being, who can change God contrary to His will, and that the idea of enforced suffering is revolting. The possibility of change and suffering in God, they conceive therefore to result from His own will and His own voluntary choice. This raises the question of the possibility of voluntary suffering on the part of God. If this be possible, it must arise in one of two ways; either the nature of God is essentially such as to admit suffering, or the will of God is capable of so changing his nature for a time, as to enable it to suffer. In the first instance the essence of God itself is supposed to remain unchanged, but to be capable of existing in different states at the dictation of His will. In the other, the essence itself is changed by the will, and made capable of that, which otherwise it could not have. In the first case God could suffer, because of the contingent conditions of His life liable to the action of His will, just as we can inflict suffering upon ourselves. In the last case, the nature of God would be so dependent on His will that He could change it at pleasure. This last view however is based upon an erroneous conception of the relation of the will of God to His nature. That relation is not causal. The will does not create the nature nor confer upon it its powers, nor exercise a controlling influence upon it. It is the nature that influences the will. It is because He is holy, just and good that He wills holiness, justice and goodness, and wills these in Himself, because He alone is the infinitely holy, just and good. His will therefore, so far from causative is only approbative and complacent, and His essence can in no degree be affected by it. If this were not so, the nature of God, must be the effect of the will of God as a cause and must be dependent upon that will. The foundation of all excellence, righteousness and holiness would be, not what God is, but what He happens to will at one time, and would be yet again at another, should He will differently as to Himself. And such will would be capricious; for in making the will superior to the nature, there is taken away all reason for choice in God, to good or ill, or in one direction or another, and He is left, without motive, to accidental or capricious volition only. Moreover, if God is capable of this kind of change in any respect, He is so in all others, for the power of the will to effect one modification in the divine nature, necessarily involves the power to effect any or all other such.

As the will therefore cannot change the essence of God, but is itself controlled by that essence, it is not possible, that it can confer the power to suffer, which otherwise God would not have. If therefore this power of suffering be not inherent in the divine nature, it can have no existence. But if this be inherent in the divine nature, it must be a quality necessarily, and constantly belonging to the nature of God, and must therefore be destructive of the blessedness so fully, and eminently ascribed to God in the Scriptures, or it must exist there after the manner of the contingent conditions of our life because of which we can pass from a state of happiness into one of suffering, and back to happiness again; and its passage from one of these states to the other, must be the result of the exercise of a divine volition. But with God there can be no such contingent conditions. 1. The very nature of His necessary existence forbids it. The language of scripture "I change not," and "with whom there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning" is expressly contrary to such a supposition. 2. The contrast between God and men in respect to change, is distinctly based upon that contingency in man, to which there is no similarity in God. 3. The truth and faithfulness of God are magnified by the fact of their exercise where man would thus change, but where God does not, because He is fixed and constant. The passage, "I change not" is presented in a context, where the will of God might be presumed to induce change, and the assertion that this is His nature is made to show why that will would not so effect Him. 4. In addition to all of this, such contingent conditions or states are incompatible with the nature of His eternity, which, as being without succession, excludes change, as well as with His simplicity which denies separation between His essence and His attributes, and therefore gives no room for change, while they are absolutely excluded by the perfection of God, which cannot be always asserted of Him if the states or conditions of His being can be changed, unless in all these states, He could be equally perfect in all respects, which surely cannot be affirmed of the two states of happiness and suffering.

We derive our knowledge of power from the consciousness of our will, or purpose, to effect an end, and experience that we have accomplished that end. Over our own bodies, our will acts directly, without the intervention of any means known to us. Thus, when we will to move the arm, the arm is moved, but whatever necessity there may be, of nervous influence or muscular action, we know of no such connection between these and our will, save the fact, that the will puts these into operation. Over other material objects, we can only act through our bodies, and other necessary means of contact. Experience teaches us however, that mind can act upon mind without such contact, though the mode in which this is done is still mysterious. The action of our minds upon our material structure, and over other minds, also suggests that mind, by some subtle connection, may act upon outward matter, as we see, that our minds act upon our bodies. In this way many of the curious phenomena, which have been falsely used for the proof of the spiritualistic theories of the present day, will probably be accounted for. But, whatever may be the power of man, it is evident, that it is marked by limitations, not only as to what can be done, but also as to the way in which it may be done. In ascribing power to God however, we must exclude all such limitation. Not only is He all powerful, (Almighty) but He needs not instrumental contact. But, although this is true, God accomplishes much that He does through secondary means, which partake of the nature of instrumental contact. Such action however is, with Him, not a matter of necessity, but simply His economic way of doing what He could, as perfectly, and as easily, do by direct action. Power in God, therefore, may be defined to be the effective energy, inherent in His nature, by which He is able to do all things. The exercise of that power is dependent upon His will or purpose, and is limited not by what He can do, but by what He chooses to do.

We ascribe power to God. 1. Because we perceive that its possession is a perfection in us, and is therefore to be attributed to the all-perfect Being. 2. Because we cannot account for the existence and phenomena of the universe, without ascribing to God the power which has produced them. 3. Because our own sense of dependance assures us that there must be power to create, preserve, and protect us, in Him in Whom we live, and move, and have our being. 4. The Scriptures also teach us to ascribe power to God. (a.) In such passages as directly ascribe power to Him, as Jer. 32:17. "Ah ! Lord God, behold thou hast made the heaven and the earth by thy great power, and stretched-out arm, and there is nothing too hard for thee." Ps. 115:3. "But our God is in the Heavens: He hath done, whatsoever He hath pleased." Eph. 1:19. "And, what is the exceeding greatness of His power to us-ward, who believe according to the working of His mighty power." Eph. 3:20. "Now unto Him, that is able to do, exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think." (b.) By reference to His unlimited works. Jer. 10:12. "He hath made the earth by His power, He hath established the world by His wisdom, and hath stretched out the heavens by His discretion." John 1:3. "All things were made by Him, and without Him, was not anything made that was made." Acts 17:24. "God, that made the world and all things therein." (c.) By declaring that what He does is done by mere will, without labour, by His word, as in Gen. 1:1 to Gen. 2:3, the whole account of creation. Ps. 33:9. "For He spake, and it was done, He commanded, and it stood fast." (d.) By denying the necessity of great means, and asserting that what He does, can be done with the many or the few. 1. Sam. 14:6. "There is no restraint to the Lord, to save by many or by few." 2. Chron. 14:11. "Lord it is nothing with thee to help, whether with many, or with them that have no power." (e.) By figurative or anthropomorphic expressions, as "the hand," "the right hand of God," "the strong hand," "the arm," "the arm not shortened." Exodus 15:6. "Thy right hand, oh Lord, has become glorious in power ; thy right hand, O Lord, hath dashed to pieces the enemy." Numbers 11:23. "Is the Lord's hand waxed short?" Joshua 4:24. "That all the people of the earth might know the hand of the Lord, that it is mighty." Neh. 1:10. "Whom thou hast redeemed by thy great power, and by thy strong hand." Job 40:9. "Hast thou an arm like God?" Ps. 98:1. "His right hand, and His Holy arm, hath gotten Him the victory." Is. 50:2. "Is my hand shortened at all, that it cannot redeem?" Is. 59:1. "The Lord's hand is not shortened that it cannot save."

God's power may be described as, I. Absolute, which is equivalent to what He can do, and is measured by His nature. II. Actual, which is what He exercises, and is measured by His will. It is, what is put in action by Him. Knapp makes a division of absolute and ordinate, making the absolute that, by which He created the world out of nothing, and the ordinate that, by which He continues to create or produce according to the laws He has established, as by secondary causes, as in the production of plants, animals, &c. But these are different kinds of exercise of power, but not different kinds of power. Our power differs from that of God in three particulars. 1. We cannot do whatever we choose, even if it be right. 2. We cannot do it without intermediate means. 3. We cannot do it at any moment we please, but only when the circumstances favour. But, while God is not subject to the limitations which thus affect us, He also is limited in His power. These limitations, however, are such as arise, not from without, but from the excellence, and perfection of His own nature. Hence the limitations are concurrent with His will, which can never desire to do what His nature does not permit. 1. God cannot create a being or world to which His essential incommunicable attributes can be given, viz : Infinity, embracing eternity and immensity, and self existence. 2. He cannot create a being whose nature is sinful. 3. He cannot impose laws which are not accordant with righteousness and holiness. 4. He cannot deal with any of His creatures unjustly. 5. He cannot commit sin. 6. He cannot change His own nature. 7. He cannot change His decrees or purpose. 8. He cannot do impossibilities. If it be asked, why He can do none of these things, the answer is, because His own nature is to Him the law of what He does, as well as of what He wills, and of what He is. He is not just and holy because He wills to be so, but He wills to be just and holy, because He is so. His will does not make His nature. But His nature controls His will. An apparent objection to the infinite power of God is the presence of sin in the universe. The holiness, justice and even goodness of God render it impossible, that sin can be either created or permitted as something indifferent to God. He must hate it, and punish it wherever it appears. Its presence therefore is due, either to the fact that He could not prevent it, or that He has permitted it for some wise purpose. What that wise purpose is, ought properly to be shown in proof that the existence of evil is consistent with God's goodness. That its presence is due to such purpose, rather than to lack of power of God, appears from the fact, that He could have prevented it. 1. By not creating beings capable of sinning. 2. By not allowing them to be placed in circumstances, which would lead to sin. 3. By sustaining and fortifying them in those circumstances, so as to counteract the temptation and keep them from sinning. 4. And, as the objection is the rather to the continued existence of sin, than its origin, by the immediate destruction of those who have sinned. But so far from the presence of sin showing lack of power in God, it has served the more signally to display that power. 1. Over sin itself, in its destruction and punishment. 2. Over its final victims, by causing them to feel and acknowledge the terrible power of His wrath. 3. Over others, by their signal deliverance through His power, not only from the penalty, but from the presence of sin. 4. In the sin itself, by exhibiting that restraining and conquering power, by which God makes evil itself to work out His purposes of good and glory.

God is an intelligent Being possessed of knowledge. This may be proved, 1. From His spirituality; for intelligence is an essential element of spiritual existence. 2. From His perfection; for the perfect one must have intelligence as one of His perfections. 3. From His causal relations to other beings. (1.) As the cause of mental powers and action in others, He must Himself be possessed of mind. As the Scriptures aptly inquire, "He that planteth the ear, shall he not hear? he that formed the eye, shall he not see?" Ps. 94:9; so may we ask, He, that made the mind and gave the power of thought, and knowledge, shall He be without intelligence. (2.) The effects He has produced show that they are the result of conscious action in the fulfilment of purpose, which He has formed. His causation is not like that of mechanical, or chemical forces, which operate with blind productiveness, or effective operation towards ends unknown to them, and not predetermined. This is possible to secondary causes, because they are the instruments of some other cause, itself intelligent and purposing. But intelligence and purpose are necessarily present in Him, who is the great first cause, the prime mover and designer of all else that exists. All the evidences of design in creation therefore prove the intelligence of Him, who bears to it the relation of its first cause. (4.) It is sometimes argued from His omnipresence, but omnipresence alone would not prove intelligence. His intelligence however having been established, His omnipresence enables us to determine the extent of His knowledge. How does God know? or in what way does He possess knowledge? 1. Not as we gain it, by using faculties fitted to acquire it. There is in Him nothing corresponding to observation, comparison, generalization, deduction, processes of reasoning by which we pass from one step to another, or the contemplation, or conjecture of suppositions, or theories with which we would account for facts. 2. It is even improper to speak of His knowing by intuition, as is frequently done, 3. All that we can say, is that His knowledge is His essence or nature knowing. It is not something acquired, but something belonging to that nature itself and identical with it, in like manner as are His love, and truth, and justice. It is something so inherent in his nature, that it exists exclusively of any means of attaining, or perceiving it, which we call action. 4. The knowledge of God therefore not being acquired, cannot be increased. Time does not add to it. Succession of events does not bring it before God. All the objects of His knowledge are to Him eternally present and known.

What then are the objects of His knowledge. 1. Himself, His nature, or essence; the personal relations subsisting in that essence; all, that that nature is, and all that it can appear to be in its manifestations; all that the purposes of God include, and all that might be purposed by Him, whether to be done, or to be permitted. 2. His creation in all its fulness; in its whole extent, whether marked by magnitude, or minuteness, or variety. The whole universe with its innumerable worlds is ever before Him, while not an atom of dust, nor the most microscopic of sensitive existences is unperceived thoroughly. 3. Not merely inanimate matter, nor simple animal natures, but all spiritual beings, He knowing their essences which to them remain unknown, and having perfect perception of the intents and thoughts of their hearts. "When Thales was asked, if some of the actions of men were not unknown to God, he replied, "not even their thoughts." Knapp's Theology. An inspired writer has taught us, that God knows us even better, than we know ourselves; "For if our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things." 1. John 3:20. His knowledge is not limited to the manifestations and operations of spiritual beings, but extends to their essences, and includes not only what they are, but also those tendencies which indicate what they may be. 4. He knows all the past, present, and future of all things, knowing the future with the same certainty, and accuracy, with which He knows the present, and past; for that future is already as present to Him as though actually existing with the creatures, and time belonging to it, and is as distinctly perceived as it shall be then. But more specifically as to His knowledge of future events it may be said, 1. That He knows all events that, are certain or fixed. The certainty that they will come to pass, is based upon His decree. He therefore, knows all things that shall come to pass. 2. He knows all events that could possibly come to pass. This is based upon His infinite knowledge of Himself, and of all His creatures, by which all things, or events, which could at any time, or under any circumstances occur, are known to him. In these two classes are necessarily included all objects of knowledge.

Knapp lays down a third kind of knowledge, namely, the knowledge of contingent events, or events which might take place under certain circumstances; for example, that God foresees, that if James lives until he is grown, he will commit murder, he therefore, determines to prevent this by removing him from life. The knowledge of the murder, is here claimed to be that of a contingent event. And hence it is claimed to be another kind of knowledge. But to examine this. It is readily admitted, that the murder does not come under the classification of things certain, or decreed, because it will not take place. But, it does come under the head of things possible, and between it, and all other possible things, no distinction can be made. All possible things are contingent, until made certain by a decree. Every possible thing is only possible in connection with the circumstances under which it can happen. There is therefore no distinction, between possible things, and contingent things, and consequently no third class is to be added. The kind of knowledge, which he thus speaks of as contingent, is stated by Knapp, to be what is called Scientia Media. It is one form only, in which Scientia Media is presented by those who maintain it. Another form of Scientia Media, is however held by some. According to this, the future event to which it refers, is known to God as an event that will take place, but His knowledge of that fact is attained, not through His decree, but through His foreknowledge that, under certain circumstances, a man will pursue one course of action, rather than another. This kind of Scientia Media teaches, (1.) The future event as certain. (2.) That God knows it as such. (3.) That this knowledge does not arise from His decree. (4.) But, from His knowledge of the nature of the man, together with that of the circumstances that will surround Him, He knows that He will act in a particular way. The only question here, is as to the 3rd and 4th, for it agrees with the usual orthodox statement in saying, 1st, that it is certain, and 2nd, that God knows it as such. But the 3rd and 4th assert that this knowledge is the result of a foreknowledge of God as to how a man will act under certain circumstances, and this foreknowledge is necessarily accompanied by a determination to allow Him so to act. Now the question arises, is this universally the method of God's action? If it be so, then God has left the world entirely to itself, without any influence from Him. Everything has come to pass, not because of His will and action, but because He has left the general laws, under which He has placed the world, to work out their results, without any action, or influence on His part. But this is so manifestly untrue and unscriptural, that it never has been maintained by any christian men, and it is by christian writers only, that this idea of Scientia Media has been presented. This, therefore is denied to be meant by these; but they say that, while God does operate in, and interfere with the world, and carry on His own purposes, in certain matters, He does not choose in other events to exercise any influence, but simply refrains and leaves the events to work out their own effects, and that the knowledge which He has of these events is based upon the fact, that they will take place if He does not thus interfere. The theory thus presented, as will be seen, admits the continued preservation of all things, with all their powers. This can only result from God's providential action, and involves all that concurrence with events on the part of God, through which alone they preserve and exercise effectively the powers He has given them. This being admitted, then, the views held by these parties, stated in any form in which they could hold them, would involve no additional fact beyond the distinction, recognized by all orthodox divines, between the absolute and permissive decrees of God. But, in any event there is a decree, determination, intention, purpose, or whatever else men may call it, in the broadest language, a will, or volition, to leave these things so to operate. And upon this will, or decree, is based His knowledge, that these things will be, for without the knowledge of such a purpose, how could He know that He will not, at some time, choose to change the circumstances, or prevent their accomplishment of the event. It will be seen, that in neither of the forms of Scientia Media thus far referred to, is there any serious disagreement from the truth. The objection to them is more the lack of accuracy and the mistaken notion that some new idea is involved; or rather the great objection has been, the purpose by which men have been led; viz, a desire to lay down the distinction of conditional decrees in salvation. According to these decrees. (1.) God offers salvation to every man. (2.) But does not decree his salvation or damnation, (3.) But only decrees his salvation if he believes, (4.) Or his damnation, if he does not believe. (5.) That the knowledge, which God is admitted to have had of the event from the beginning, arises from foresight that, under the circumstances in which the man is placed, He will exercise, or will not exercise belief. The Scientia Media is therefore introduced, to show how an event can be known as something that will actually take place, and yet as something not fixed by a decree of God, and consequently known upon some other ground than because decreed. This we have shown to be a mistaken conception in the forms already examined.

But a third kind of Scientia Media, is by no means as harmless as the two already presented, although its absurdity is readily seen. It is given in Dr. J. Pye Smith's First lines of Christian Theology, p. 145, as follows: "That God foresees all future events, depending upon the will of His voluntary agents, (i. e. all possible beings, and all possible actions of all possible beings,) under a position of antecedents endlessly varied and that, then, in every case, certain consequents will follow. The Deity does not certainly know which, in the endless number of possible antecedents, a voluntary creature will choose and practice; but He knows, what will be the result under every possible variation of these antecedents; when therefore, the creature has made his election, and fulfilled his course of action, the Deity may say, that He foreknew the whole." The objections to this scheme are manifest. 1. It makes the God, whose purposes we see constantly manifested to us, a God of no purpose at all. He can have no end, He can only know, that, at any time given in the universe, some one end, of many myriads may be the one attained. 2. It is contrary to the power to prophesy the actual events which shall happen at a given time, which God has exercised through His prophets. 3. It is opposed to His independence, for it makes Him dependent upon the will of His creatures, and not their actions dependent upon Him. 4. It is opposed to His perfection, for that perfection forbids the idea of increase or addition from without, yet according to this view, His knowledge is constantly increasing, as to what is done by His creatures. Every moment that, which heretofore has been only one of many possibilities, becomes a certain event. 5. As there can be no reason, for God's will not being effective, at least in some respects in man, this Scientia Media which rests upon the idea, that God ought not thus to operate on the mind, even by a purpose, must be a misconception. Else how could God bestow such influences upon intelligent creatures as are fitted to affect their minds, as by the gift of Christ, or of the Spirit. Even the conscience within ought not to exercise its powers, nor even to exist in man. If it be said, that these would only operate with the free consent of the party, it may be replied, that such is the case with all the influences arising in connection with God's decrees. Is it said, that these are influences for good only? So also is it in connection with His decrees. The effective decrees of God, by which He changes in any respect the will of His creatures, are altogether connected with influences for good. In all other respects, men are left to act as they please. But their action is known, and known because of God's decree, to leave them thus to act. 6. That God should exert no influence over His intelligent creatures, also involves, that He be excluded from the physical universe. The very circumstances, under which men are supposed to act in Scientia Media, are circumstances arising from things around as well as within. Neither can He, who can control these circumstances, be shut out from the control of those physical events, which He knows will affect the will of a voluntary agent. If it be necessary to responsible freedom of the will, that man shall not be influenced at all, God must be excluded from the universe, yea every other being and thing than man. And every man must be completely, isolated from all others, even so far too, that he shall suppose, that He owes no obligations of obedience, and that none shall know His action. These absurd conclusions might even be further extended. The passages in Scripture, supposed to support Scientia Media, do not sustain it. These are Genesis 3:22. Ex. 4:8. 1. Sam. 23:5,14. Jeremiah 38:17,20. Matt. 11:21,23. See also, Acts 27:22.31.

Wisdom is that power, which enables one to put to practical use the knowledge, and skill, which He possesses, to choose wise ends of action, and to attain these ends by wise means. It is that guidance of the understanding, under which the will determines wisely its pleasure, and puts forth power to accomplish it. Wisdom in God, is infinite and unerring, choosing always the best end, and the best means of attaining it. It is seen in creation, and in providence, but is most signally manifested in redemption.

After the consideration of the wisdom, and knowledge of God, which correspond to the characteristics of our mental organism, we take up that of those attributes sometimes called moral, because they correspond to those which form our moral character. These are holiness, goodness, truth, and justice. Holiness. Holiness is, however, not a distinctive attribute, but rather the combination of all these attributes. We may suppose a being, in whom there may be love without justice, or truth, or any one of these to the exclusion of the other two; but no being can be holy, who does not combine in himself all of these, and all other moral perfections. Nor, when we have such a combination, is there anything to be added to constitute holy character. It is evident, therefore, that holiness is the sum of all such excellence, the combination of all such attributes, and that these constitute its complete parts. In the study of these constituents, we first consider Goodness. In one aspect of this word, it is merely equivalent to holiness. If we look at it as marking the excellence of God's nature, as we often use it with reference to man, we mean by it simply holiness. Thus, when I say of any one, he is a good man, I mean to assert the combination of traits of character, such as have just been pointed out as constituting holiness. This is the goodness which terminates in God Himself. On the other hand, the goodness of God may be spoken of as kindness, benevolence, or beneficence towards others, in which it is seen to terminate outside of Himself. Thus we speak of Him, as being very good to us. Thus the Psalmist says: "Surely goodness and mercy, shall follow me all the days of my life." Ps. 23:6. It is on account of this ambiguity in this word, that it is best to consider it, in its first aspect, as merely holiness, and, therefore, as disposed of in what we have said of that, and to refer it in this second respect to one of the divisions, into which the love of God naturally falls. I therefore take up next

Love. Of this there are five kinds, which vary according to the object upon which love is exercised. The attribute in God is the same; but it is in its exit, or in its termination, that it assumes these different forms. 1. There is the love of complacency, or approbation. This is exercised towards a worthy object, in which excellencies are perceived. It is of the nature of the love of the beautiful, or the good, or the useful in us. It complacently or approvingly regards, because there is in the object something worthy of such regard. This is exercised by God, in its highest degree, in the love of Himself, of His own nature, and character, because the infinitely excellent must, to God, be the highest object of complacent love. Were God but one person, in this way only could such love be exercised. But in the Trinity of the Godhead, there is found, in the love of the separate persons towards each other, another mode in which this love of complacency may in this highest sense be exercised. Such love is also felt by God for His purposes. As He perceives them to be just, wise and gracious, He approves, and regards them with complacent love. But this love extends itself also to the creations, which result from this purpose. This is true of inanimate creation. It is perfect, as far as conformed to His will, and fitted to accomplish His end, and as such God can regard it and pronounce it good. Thus we find, that He did in the creation. Genesis, Chap. 1:10,12. The same record is made, in verse 25, as to the animal creation, before that of man; and, after the creation, and investiture of man in the dominion over the earth, with its plants and animals we are told, verse 31, "And God saw everything that He had made, and behold it was very good." The complacent love of God, therefore extends not only to Himself and His will, but to all His innocent creation and even to inanimate nature. This love of complacency, however, as it is exercised in its highest degree towards Himself, so, also, is it exhibited, in the nearest approach to that, towards those beings, who are most like Himself, having been made in His nature and likeness. Innocent angels, and innocent man are therefore by nature a joy to God, as is the child to the father who sees in it a peculiar likeness to himself. But the guilty cannot thus be loved. Sinful man cannot receive such love, so long as sinful. Even the penitent believer in Jesus, until the time of his perfect sanctification in the life to come, and perhaps even then, has access to God only through Christ, and, of himself, can in no respect secure the approbation of God. 2. The second kind of love, is the love of benevolence, which corresponds to the idea of God's goodness towards His creatures. This is the product of His wishes for their happiness. It is not dependent on their character, as is the love of complacency, but is exercised towards both innocent, and guilty. It is general in its nature, not special, and exists towards all, even towards devils, and wicked men, because God's nature is benevolent, and, therefore, He must wish for the happiness of His creatures. That that happiness is not attained, nor attainable, is due, not to Him, but to their own sin. When the benevolence of God is exercised actively in the bestowment of good things upon His creatures it is called His beneficence. By the former, He wishes them happiness, by the latter, He confers blessings to make them so. This is done also to the wicked, as well as to the righteous. It is to this, that Christ refers, Matt. 5:45, "He maketh the sun to rise on the evil, and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." 3. A third form of love is the love of compassion. This corresponds to our idea of pity. It is benevolent disposition to those who are suffering, or in distress. This also may be exercised towards the guilty, or the innocent; if it be possible to suppose that guilt, and suffering are separable. It has been very commonly held, that they are inseparable. Pain, suffering, and distress, have been believed to be the result of sin, and consequently inseparable from guilt. I do not believe them so. Man in a state of innocence was made capable of physical suffering. That capacity was necessary to the protection of his physical organism. The lower animals also suffer. Whatever addition to the capacity of suffering, has therefore been made by the fall, and is the consequence of sin, we are not, on that account, forced to the conclusion, that there can be no suffering, where there has been no sin. The capacity to suffer, may so belong to a higher organism, that we would naturally choose that organism, with that capacity, rather than a lower without it. If so, God can justly so create us. If misery, then, may be the lot of the innocent, God's love of compassion can be exercised towards such. It can, and is also exercised towards the guilty. We see this in the forbearance with which He delays their punishment, in His constant offers of mercy, in His yearnings after their salvation, and, most signally, in the gift of His only begotten son, that whosoever believeth on him might not perish, but have everlasting life.

4. A fourth form of the love of God, corresponds to what we call mercy. This can be exercised only towards sinners. Its very nature contemplates guilt in its objects. It consists, not only, in the desire not to inflict the punishment due to sin, and the neglect, and refusal to do so, but in the actual pardon of the offender. It cannot be exercised towards a righteous being, because in him is no sin or guilt to be pardoned. It is, however, no new attribute in God, which has arisen because of the existence of sin, and which is, therefore, an addition to His attributes. It is a virtue inherent in His nature, and is especially only one form in which His love exhibits itself, the same love, as that benevolence, which innocent creatures calls forth, and the same love which in another form of complacency, has been eternally exercised in the Godhead. When we say, that this mercy must be exercised in accordance with the truth, and justice of God, we say no more than is true of every attribute of God. No one can be exercised in such a way as to destroy another. Every one must be in harmony with the others. Or, remembering what we have before stated, that these attributes are not separate faculties, all that is meant in this case, as in all others, is that God must act in harmony with His nature. The objects of the exercise of this attribute, are all to whom God pardons offences of any kind. They are not to be confined to redeemed sinners, although this is the most signal exhibition. Under the ancient economy, God ruled as theocratic ruler over Israel. Sins of the nation, and sins of individuals in their capacity of citizens of the nation, were pardoned. Under that dispensation, God occupied to that people the position of an earthly ruler, and consequently might have pardoned sins against His government, at will, upon repentance, and upon merely governmental principles, that is, such as would secure obedience to the law, and peace, and order, and the welfare of the nation. These were offences against the mere person of the King or the laws of His state, and not against the fundamental principles of holiness and righteousness, hence sovereignty and expediency, could decide, in each case what might be done, and mercy was exercised, and justice dispensed accordingly. But this is very different from, the case of God the righteous judge, the dispenser, not of arbitrary law but of a law based upon His own nature, and that of man, essential obedience to which is necessary, not for maintaining government, but for preserving and maintaining the right, and preventing the violation with impunity of eternal law. In both cases, God must act in harmony with His whole nature. But in that of Israel, no obstacle was presented, by that nature to the pardon of individual, and national sins against the theocratic King. Hence mercy was extended, apparently at least, without compensation to justice. Yet, amid it all, there was a typical relation to the atonement made by Christ, through which God pardons sinners, in the sacrificial offerings, through which the people were required, to approach God seeking pardon for both individual, and national political sins, which shows that, in some way in that atonement, is, after all, found the reason, why God even in those cases could be just, and yet justify the offenders. 5. The fifth form of love is that of affection. This differs from that of complacency in as much, as it does not always demand a worthy object. This is exhibited in the parable of the "Prodigal Son". It differs from that of benevolence, in as much as its object is not viewed in general with all others, but is one of special interest. It differs from that of compassion, and that of mercy, because the object may neither be in distress, nor sinful. It arises from, 1. Mutual relationship; of the Father to the Son, and other persons in the Trinity; of God to Israel; of Christ to his apostles, disciples, church; of the adopted sons to God the Father. 2. From dependence; as of creatures on the Creator; of the redeemed upon the Redeemer. 3. From ownership; as of God over man; of God over Israel; of Christ over the redeemed. Illustrated in the coin in Luke 15:8,9. This kind of love arises in each of these ways in man, and, as the Scriptures show, is also found in God. It is from this aspect of God's love, that proceeds grace, which is to be distinguished from love, and pity, and mercy. Love, as we have seen, is the general characteristic, exhibiting itself in these five different forms. Mercy is one of these, but is given to the guilty only. Pity is given to guilty or innocent, who may be in distress, pain, or suffering. Grace is also given to guilty, or innocent, and does not necessarily suppose distress in the object, but involves an affectionate interest in it, arising either from peculiar relation to it, or ownership of it, or compassion for its dependence. Grace, is undeserved favour, (to innocent or guilty) arising from affection. Mercy, is undeserved compassion, (to the guilty only.)

The Truth of God. The expression, truth of God, is ambiguous, and must be considered under the specific terms which set forth its various meanings. I. His Verity. He is True God. By this is meant, the exact correspondence of the nature of God, with the ideal of absolute perfection. The foundation of that ideal may be indeterminable. But, whether it is in the nature of God Himself, or in His will proceeding from His nature, or in eternal principles of the fit, and the necessary, and the right, which exactly coincide with that nature, God and that ideal must be perfect counterparts. That ideal can only be partially comprehended by any of His creatures, because of their imperfections. But it is known by God in all its supreme excellence, and His nature must fully correspond to the ideal thus known. Otherwise He would not be God. It is in this aspect of God's truth, that the Scriptures call Him the true God. See 2. Chron. 15:3, Jer. 10:10, John 17:3, 1. Thes. 1:9, 1. John 5:20, Rev. 3:7. II. His Veracity. By this is meant, God's truthfulness or incapacity to deceive. It is an attribute of His nature, which, like His power, exists, and makes Him what He is, even though there be no outward relation to it. By virtue of it, He is the source of all truth, not moral only, but even mathematical. In its relation to God's creatures, it is the foundation of their confidence in the knowledge, obtained through the use of their own faculties, whether by intuition, observation or reason. Whatever imperfection there is in such knowledge, is perceived to be due to the creature, and not to God the creator. Upon it is also based belief in the revelations, God makes to man, of facts beyond the attainment of merely human power. The Scriptures affirm the veracity of God in the strongest terms. In addition to its assertion in numerous passages, we are told, Ps. 108:4, that His "truth reacheth unto the clouds". Tit. 1:2, calls Him "God that cannot lie." III. His Faithfulness. This consists in the truth of God viewed in its relation to His purposes whether secret, or revealed. When revealed, these become either promises, or threats. But as promises, the ground upon which these purposes must be fulfilled, is, not any obligation to the creature, for God can come under none, but simply because, of His own faithfulness to His purposes. Hence His faithfulness, demands equally the performance of His threatenings, as His promises. This faithfulness is based upon the veracity of His nature considered above. It is by virtue of that veracity, that God must be faithful; yet the faithfulness is a new aspect, in which God's truthfulness appears. This faithfulness is the ground both of hope, and fear. In the Scriptures it is more frequently presented as a reason for hope, and trust. But, it is also the foundation of judgment and punishment. The faithful God has been true to His threatenings, as well as His promises. His faithfulness assures us, that He will so continue.

By justice is meant that rectitude of character which leads to the treatment of others in strict accordance with their deserts. The justice of God, differs in no respect from this attribute, as seen among His rational creatures, except that His justice must be perfect while theirs is imperfect, and His must be impartial, while theirs is partial. These differences, however, exist in the exercise of justice, and not in the thing itself. They arise from the limited knowledge, reason, perception of right, and wrong, among men, and from the extent to which they naturally yield to their prejudices and passions. In the all perfect Being, however, justice has none of these deficiencies, and must be exercised according to its strictest nature, and in every conceivable form of perfection. To all, therefore, He must deal out the most absolute justice, whatever they deserve, only what they deserve, and the full measure of their deserts. Inasmuch as the justice of God may be considered as it exists in Himself, or as it is manifested towards His creatures, a distinction has been made in it as viewed in these aspects, into the absolute, and relative justice of God. By absolute justice is meant that rectitude of the divine nature, in consequence of which God is infinitely righteous in Himself. This rectitude is essential to Him, and existed before there was a creation in which to exhibit it. By the relative justice of God is meant that justice, as exhibited towards, and exercised upon, His creatures in the dispensation of the universe. It is seen in the nature of the laws He gives, in His impartiality in dealing with those subjected to them, in His maintenance of right, and virtue, by the threats and promises He attaches to them, and His punishment of those who violate them. To this form of justice is often applied the name of rectoral justice, inasmuch as it is justice exercised by a ruler, in the form of government, and by means of laws. There is a form of justice, known among men as commutative justice, which consists in giving to each one his due in the barter and exchange of commerce, or in any other of the mutual relations of life. As it is based upon the ground of mutual obligation, and therefore, is not suited to a being entirely independent of others, it cannot properly be ascribed to God. The blessings, given in consequence of His promises to man, are not matters of obligation, but of grace. The only aspect, in which this could be connected with God, would be as between the Father and the Son, in conferring upon His people those blessings which the Son had purchased through His sufferings. It is in this sense that the Scripture says, that God is "faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." In the administration of the affairs of His creatures, God exercises distributive justice. By this is meant, the rewarding, and punishing His subjects, according to the sanctions of His law. His justice is here evinced in the maintenance of punishment, if the law be broken, but not in the bestowment of rewards, since these are given graciously as further inducements to duty. While, therefore, God gives all the rewards promised, they are given because promised, and not because due. These punishments further show forth the justice of God, as they are impartially inflicted. The grounds, upon which the offenders against God's law are punished, is not simply the fact, that a law of God has been broken, but, that in the breaking of that law, essential right has been violated and wrong committed. It would be sufficient to authorize punishment, that the law of the ruler is broken. Still it might appear that the will of the ruler might remit a punishment due to a mere violation of His will. But the law of God is based upon the immutable distinctions between right, and wrong, and sin, and holiness, as they exist in the nature of God. Its violation, therefore is sin. It is a destruction of the right. Hence, that which impels God to punish, is not His rectoral character, but His holy nature. It is when justice is regarded in this respect, that it is called punitive, or vindicatory.

But punitive justice is not admitted by all, nor that God punishes sin in any other respect, than as a violation of His will; nay it is even disputed, whether He even punishes the violations of His will. Three questions therefore, arises here. 1. Does God punish the violations of His law ? 2. Does He punish them, because they are merely violations, or because they are sin ? 3. Is this done because of anything essential in His nature, or because it is expedient for governmental, or other purposes? Upon these questions, there have been several opinions expressed. 1. The Universalists, and some of the Socinians deny that God punishes even the violations of His law. They regard the precepts of morality, and duty, set forth in His word, as merely intended to guide us in this life. When this life is ended, there may be no dealing with man for such violation. They are only for a temporary purpose, and having accomplished that purpose, will have no further effect. God looks now only to the good of His creatures, and if the same method of dealing be extended beyond this life, it will be only for a time, and only for the good of those who suffer. According to this, these are not punishments, but chastisements, and God is moved by goodness and not by justice. 2. A second theory is, that the laws given by God are merely exponents of His will; that the ground upon which He commands is simply His sovereignty; that, looking at the universe as a world to be created, and to be occupied by His moral creatures, He selected such a system of laws as seemed to Him best to secure the welfare of those creatures, and that these laws while seeking the happiness, not of the individuals, but of the mass, are such as are really best fitted to that end; and that the justice of God is seen in so administering these laws, by rewarding those who obey, and punishing those who disobey, as to maintain His government, and thus secure the welfare of the whole. God, punishes sin, therefore, under this system, but He punishes it, not because of its heinous nature, but because it is best that men should not sin, and thus the best interest of all is secured by preventing the commission of it. The end He has in view, therefore, is rather to furnish a spectacle which shall restrain sin, than to perform an act demanded by the inherent nature of sin. It is His rectoral justice, therefore, rather than His vindicatory justice, that is thus shown. This theory therefore, embraces four points. (1.) God punishes offences or sins. (2.) The object is, thus the better, to secure the welfare of His moral creatures. (3.) The laws of His government are based entirely upon His mere will. (4.) Consequently He punishes sin, not because of its inherent desert, but because the general happiness of His creatures, and not His own holiness demands it. 3. The third theory is different in all respects, except the first of these points. (1.) It agrees, that God punishes sin. (2.) But it makes His object, the maintenance of the right. (3.) His laws and action are based upon the immutable principles of right. (4.) He punishes sin, because, from its nature, it demands punishment from Him. The great difficulty, in attaining a right conclusion in this matter, is that whatever might have been the origin of these laws, they would have been the same. Hence, no conclusion can be drawn from the nature of the laws themselves. It is manifest, that God in the establishment of the government of the world for any purpose, will not give to it laws, contrary to His nature. It does not follow, however, that because the same effect may be produced by either of these causes, it is, therefore, unimportant to which of them it is assigned. There may be, and in the present case it is believed that there are, important reasons, why only one cause should be assigned, and that it should be ascertained to exist in the nature of God. Matters of great moment, in connection with the atonement especially, but also with other parts of the plan of salvation, demand the true answer. But this fact is not to be allowed, to warp our judgment or lead us away from the truth. It is only mentioned to show the importance of the subject now under consideration.

As to the first of these theories, it need only be said, that the objections to it are involved in those to the second, in part, and that those peculiar to it, are too plain to need presentation. As to the 2nd, it may be objected, 1. "That it makes happiness, and not holiness, and virtue, the great end of God. The dictates of nature teach us all plainly, that happiness does not occupy this place." Hodge : Manuscript lecture. 2. "It destroys the essential difference, between right and wrong, which conscience teaches us." Hodge : manuscript lecture. 3. It supposes, that God might have made a world, in which precisely opposite laws might have prevailed by His command, and that thus it would be His duty, in this world to reward, in that world to punish, His creatures for the same action. 4. It is opposed to the relation of the true will of God to His nature. It ascribes the laws of God to that will. It recognizes those laws as flowing from it alone. They are as God pleased. Now, it is not denied, that they come from the free will of God, and are such as please Him. But they have a higher basis even than His will. That will is influenced by His nature, and is its exponent. Now, whether, that nature is itself the basis of good and right, or whether good and right considered as distinct from it, in the nature of things, simply accord perfectly with that nature, the result is the same; the will is influenced, by the nature, to establish the laws of creation according to the immutable principles of right and wrong. 5. This theory is also opposed to the independence of God, who is thus forced to punish sin; not by any law of His own nature, which would still maintain that independence, but from a regard to the government of His creatures, which could not be otherwise maintained. (Altered from Hodge's Outlines.) 6. The instinctive sense of justice in man testifies to the ill desert of sin. This is the universal testimony of conscience. But conscience speaks for God, and therefore, testifies to the fact that, independent of the evil to society, the wrong doer deserves punishment proportioned to his offence. 7. Hodge in his Outlines, thus argues this from the love of holiness and hatred of sin in God. "If the reason for God's punishing, was founded only in God's arbitrary will, then He could not be said to hate sin, but only to love His own will, or, if His reason for punishing sin rested upon governmental considerations, then He could not be strictly said to hate sin, but only its consequences." But both, conscience and Scripture teach, that God does hate sin, and love holiness. Leaving these considerations, as to the second theory with the statement of these objections, I proceed to establish the third theory by the teachings of Scripture. It will be seen, that the Scriptures represent God as a just God, thus ascribing that character to Him; that they do it in such a way, as shows that His justice is not simply in His will, but is a part of His nature ; that they challenge denial of the position, that the acts of God are in accordance with right, and justice, and that not of His sovereignty, but because of His absolute justice; that they present Him as actually claiming vindicatory or avenging justice, speaking of His justice as hatred of sin, and not desire to maintain government; nay that they are constantly showing us instance after instance, in which God has exercised that avenging justice, commencing with the ejection of Adam from Paradise, and culminating in its highest and most signal example in the sacrificial work of Christ. It is remarkable, that all of this, can be established from the Scriptures in favour of vindicatory justice, and not a passage can be given, in proof that He is only active for the maintainance of His government, or the mere happiness of His creatures. Indeed, in the Scriptures everywhere, it is God's glory, and dishonour, His holiness, and sin, His love, and His justice, that are placed in fearful contrast.

1. Passages in which God is spoken of, as having a just character, and in which this is held forth as an excellence in Him. How can these be accounted for, if justice and will are the same or even if justice is no more than the administration of human affairs according to His plan ? While this is done, there are no passages in which He asserts His power, or choice, or justice in changing the essential laws laid down for our rule. Deut. 32:4. Job 8:3; 34:10,12,21; 36:3. Ps. 9:4; 11:7; 33:4,5; 71:19; 89:14; 92:15; 97:2; 99:4; 119:137,138. Zeph. 3:5. Rom. 2:2. 2. Passages in which God vindicates His claim to this character, by asserting His justice and His impartiality to all men. Gen. 18:16-33, Deut. 10:17. Job 37:24. Eccl. 3:17; 12:14. Ezek. 18:29. Acts 10:34,35; 17:31. Rom. 2:3-6, 11; 14:12; Gal. 2:6. Eph. 6:8. Col. 3:25. 1. Pet. 1:17. Jude. 15. 3. In those passages, in which God's justice is spoken of, it is never based upon His will, nor His economy, but, (a.) Judgment is always based upon His righteousness. Ps. 9:8; 50:4,6; 96:10,13; 98:9. (b.) His economy among the Jews is commended, not because of its setting forth His will, but because of its justice or righteousness. Deut. 4:8. Ps. 19:7-9. Ps. 119:138. 4. Passages in which God speaks of His justice, as being a hatred of sin. Ps. 5:4,5. Hab. 1:13. 5. Passages in which God is spoken of as a jealous God, exercising avenging justice. Ex. 20:5. Deut. 32:34,35,39,41,42,43. Ps. 94:1,2. Is. 34:8, 66:6. Heb. 10:26-31. 6. Passages in which the dealings of God with His enemies are spoken of, in connection with such words as anger, wrath, fury, &c. Num. 12:9. Deut. 32:22. Judges 10:7. 2. Sam. 22:8. Job 19:11. Ps. 2:5; 7:11; 21:9; 90:11. Is. 28:21. Is. 30:30; 65:15. Jer. 30:24. Lam. 2:3; 3:43. Ezek. 5:13; 38:18. Hos. 12:14. Nahum 1:6. 7. Passages in which angels are spoken of as ministers of such vengeance. These are not introduced as proof of the justice of God, but simply as parts of transactions, by which that justice is manifested. Num. 22:22,31. 2. Sam. 24:16. 1. Chron. 21:14,15,16,27. Ps. 35:5,6. Rev. 7:1,2,3; 9:15; 15:1; 16:17. 8. The instances given of the actual exercise of God's wrath are associated, not with the idea of producing effect in His moral government, nor with the exercise of His mere will, but as results produced by His emotions against sin, or in other words his avenging justice. Some of these are, (1.) The fallen angels, (2.) our first parents, (3.) Sodom and Gomorrah, (4.) the flood, (5.) the plagues of Egypt, (6.) the punishments of the children of Israel in the wilderness, (7.) the captivity of the Jews, (8.) God's punishment of heathen nations, because of their wicked instrumentality in the exercise of His wrath, against the delinquent Israelites and (9.) The threatened eternal punishment of the wicked. 9. Passages, which point out something in the work of Christ, as being essential before God could pardon sin. Matt. 26:39. Rom. 3:26. 2. Cor. 5:21.