Dogmatic Theology

that require to be discussed prepar atory to the investigation of the several divisions in theolog ical science. Some writers bring them under the head of Prolegomena, and others under the general title of Intro duction.

The principal of these introductory topics are: 1. The true method in theological science. 2. The plan, divisions, and subdivisions. 3. The nature and definition of theologi cal science.

1. The true method of investigation in any science is natural. It coincides with the structure of the object. The method in anatomy is a good example. It follows the veins, if veins are the subject-matter ; the muscles, if muscles are ; the nerves, if nerves are. It does not cross and recross, but pursues a straight-onward course. The nat ural method, consequently, is marked by ease and freedom. There is no effort to force a way through. " He winds into his subject like a serpent," said Goldsmith of Burke's oratorical method.

The natural method necessitates a thorough knowledge of the nature and structure of the object. It is therefore generally the result of much study, and perhaps of many

4 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

attempts. The first investigator is not so likely to strike upon the intrinsic constitution of a thing as the last one, because he has not the light of previous inquiries. Meth ods of investigation are continually undergoing correction and modification, and are thus brought closer to the organi zation of the object. Sometimes scientific genius hits by intuition immediately upon the method of nature. But such genius is rare. Ordinary talent must make many trials, and correct many errors of predecessors. The botan ical method of Linnaeus, excellent as it is, has been modi fied by Le Jussieu and De Candolle. Goethe adopted the theory that all the parts of a plant are varieties of the leaf — a theory that had been suggested by Linnaeus himself, but rejected by that great naturalist. Oken, in physiology, advanced the view that all the parts of the skeleton are varieties of the vertebra. It is evident that the correctness of the methods of these investigators depends upon whether the view taken of the intrinsic nature and constitution of the plant or the skeleton is a correct one.

2. The true method of investigation is logical. Nature is always logical, because in nature one thing follows another according to a preconceived idea, and an established law. The inquirer, therefore, who perceives the natural structure and organization of an object will exhibit it in a logical or der. Everything in the analysis will be sequacious, and the whole will be a true evolution.

Theological science, like others, presents some variety in its methods of investigation, though less than most sciences. In the Ancient, Mediaeval, and Reformation periods the method commonly adopted was the theological. The Trin ity was the basis. Beginning with the divine existence and trinal nature, the investigator then discussed the acts and works of God in creation, providence, and redemption. This is the method of John of Damascus, the Greek theologian of the seventh century, in his "E«$e

tems ; that of Melanchthon, Calvin, and Tnrrettin, and of Lutheran and Calvinistic divines generally. The system sometimes followed the order of an accepted creed ; that of Calvin, the Apostles' Creed ; that of Ursinus, the Heidelberg Catechism. Calvin's Institutes are a fine example of the theological method. No system exceeds it in comprehen siveness, precision, lucidity, and literary elegance. For an analysis of it, see the general syllabus in the Presbyte rian Board's edition, pp. 41-44.

During the present century another method has been adopted by some theologians, namely, the christological. God incarnate is made the basis of theological science, and the work of redemption controls the investigation. This is virtually Schleiermacher's method. He derives the ma terial of theological science from the Christian conscious ness ; and this is shaped by the feeling of dependence : (a) as related to God generally ; (b) as related to the fact of sin ; (

While this method is interesting because it makes sin and salvation the principal theme and brings Christ the Re deemer into the foreground, yet it is neither a natural nor a logical method. God incarnate is only a single person of the Godhead ; redemption is only one of the works of God ; and sin is an anomaly in the universe, not an original and necessary fact. The christological method, therefore, is fractional. It does not cover the whole ground. It is pref erable to construct theological science upon the Trinity ; to begin with the trinal nature and existence of the God head, and then come down to his acts in incarnation and

redemption. It is not logical or natural to build a science upon one of its divisions. Christology is a division in the ology.

The true method of investigation in theological science being structural, the divisions in it will be suggested by the principal objects themselves. In theology the investigator has to do with God, Man, and the God-man. These are the beings who are concerned, and to whom the various

?D

topics refer. Theological themes relate sometimes to the divine being, sometimes to the human being, and sometimes to the divine-human. They bring to view sometimes the works and ways of the creator, sometimes the works and ways of the creature, and sometimes the works and ways of the redeemer.

In this threefold series man stands for the creature gen erally, including angels and the material world. Man is the head of the material creation, and a representative of the world of finite spirits. Angels and the material uni verse are neither God nor the God-man, and belong under the category of the finite and created, which man may very well stand for.

Besides the divisions and subdivisions which spring out of God, man, and the God-man, there are some that relate to the Scriptures, and come under the general head of Bibliology. Whether these should be discussed in connec tion with dogmatic theology is somewhat disputed. The Bible, as the source of man's knowledge of God, man, and the God-man, does not, strictly speaking, constitute one of the objects of theological investigation, and some, conse quently, would separate bibliology entirely from theol ogy. Since bibliology is concerned with demonstrating that the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures are the inspired word of God, leaving their contents to be explained by exegetical and dogmatic theology, it is contended that it should not constitute a division in theological science.

While there is some truth in this, it must be remembered

THE TRUE METHOD. 7

that it is impossible to demonstrate the inspiration of the Bible, without proving that its teachings are in harmony with the true idea of God, and present rational and credible views of his works and ways. Bibliology, consequently, cannot be wholly severed from theology and investigated separately and in isolation from it, like mathematics or physics. It is organically connected with the several divi sions of theological science, and in some of its parts, cer tainly, is best discussed in connection with them.1

We shall, therefore, regard Bibliology as an introduc tory division in a complete theological system. At the same time it is obvious that as such an introductory division, the topics belonging to it cannot be discussed in much de tail. The examination of the several books of the Old and New Testaments, for example, for the purpose of demon strating their canonicity or their authenticity, can be made only in the briefest manner. The bibliological topics that require most discussion by the dogmatic theologian are Revelation and Inspiration.

' Systems of theology since the Reformation generally include it. It is fonnd in those of Calvin, Turrettin, De Moor-Marck, Gerhard, Chemnitz, Quenstedt, Hntter, Hollaz, Buddeus, Doderlein, Baier, Bretschneider, Knapp, Ebrard, Scbleiermacher, Twesten, Watson, Hill, Hodge, et alia.

DIVIDING, then, the topics that fall under the general title of Theological Science, in accordance with the four principal themes that have been mentioned, we have the following divisions : Bibliology, Theology (Doctrine of God), Anthro pology, Christology, Soteriology, and Eschatology.

Bibliology (fiCfiXiov \6yos) includes those subjects that re late to the Bible. 1. Revelation and Inspiration. 2. The Authenticity of the Scriptures. 3. Their Credibility. 4. Their Canonicity.

Theology (Scov \6yos) as a division in Theological Science, is employed in a restricted signification. It denotes that branch of the general science of theology which discusses the divine being. It includes : 1. The Nature and Defi nition of God. 2. The Innate Idea of God. 3. The Argu ments for his Existence. 4. His Trinitarian Existence. 5. His Attributes. 6. His Decrees. 7. His Works of Crea tion and Providence, and his Miraculous Works.

It is to be noticed that the doctrine of the trinity is an integrant part of theology, in the restricted signification of the term, because according to revelation trinality as neces sarily marks the deity as unity. Here is one of the points of difference between Christianity and deisin, or theism, as this term was used by Cudworth and Warburton. Deism discusses the divine nature as mere unity, by itself and alone, because it denies trinality in the divine constitution ; but Christianity, following the revealed idea of God, dis cusses the divine unity only as triunity or trinity. TrimPLAN, DIVISIONS, SUBDIVISIONS. 9

tarianism, according to Scripture, is not a subject separate from theology proper, but enters into it as a necessary constituent. The revealed idea of God as much implies his trinity as his eternity. The Socinian and the Mohammedan doctrine of God is deistical, in distinction from Christian, Each alike denies interior distinctions in the divine essence, and is anti-trinitarian.

This intrinsic and necessary connection of trinality with unity in God is indicated in the patristic use of the terra "theologian," as the synonym of " trinitarian." In the patristic age, the apostle John was denominated 6 $€0X0709, because of the fulness with which he was inspired to teach the doctrine of the trinity. Gregory of Nazianzurn also ob tained the same designation by reason of the ability of his trinitarian treatises. In modern phrase it would have been, St. John the trinitarian, and Gregory the trinitarian.

Anthropology (av^pcoTrov Xoyo?) treats of man in his orig inal, and in his fallen condition. It comprises the following subjects : 1. Man's Creation. 2. His Primitive State, 3. His Probation and Apostasy. 4. Original Sin : its nature, transmission, and effects. 5. Actual Transgression. This division is concerned mainly with the subject of moral evil. Man as a holy being has but a brief history, because his apostasy occurred at the beginning of his career. Hence, anthropology discusses sin principally,

Christology (Xpia-rov \o

Soteriology (crwT^pifa? \6yos) discusses the work of the Redeemer. It naturally follows Christology. Having in vestigated the complex person and characteristics of the redeemer, we are prepared to examine redemption itself. Since soteriology covers the whole field of the divine agency in the salvation of the human soul, it is abundant and varied in its contents. The work of Christ in atoning for sin, and

10 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

the application of this work to the individual by the Holy Spirit, both belong to soteriology. The entire process of re demption is included, from the foundation laid in the sacri fice of the Son of God, to the superstructure reared upon it by the operation of the Holy Ghost. And as the Holy Ghost in effectually applying the work of Christ makes use of instru mentalities, as well as employs his own immediate energy, the means of grace come under the head of soteriology.

Soteriology, then, comprises the following subdivisions : 1. The Mediatorial Offices of Christ, as prophet, priest, and king. Since the second of these offices holds a promi nent place in the economy of redemption, it naturally fur nishes much material. The doctrine of atonement is central in soteriology. Hence we have, 2. Vicarious Atonement : its nature and extent. As this atoning work is made effect ual in the case of the individual by the Holy Spirit, so teriology passes to : 3. Regeneration and its consequences, viz. : 4. Conversion ; 5. Justification ; 6. Sanctification. But as sanctification is a gradual process carried on by the Holy Ghost in the use of means, we have to consider : 7. The Means of grace, viz. : the word and the sacraments. And since these are employed only in connection with the Christian Church, this also comes into consideration with them. Some methods make a separate division of this last, under the title of Ecclesiology.

Eschatology (ea"xarwv Xo'yo?) discusses the final issue and result of redemption in the winding up of human history. It treats of the last events in the great process, and em braces the following subjects : 1. The Intermediate State. 2. The Second Advent of Christ. 3. The Resurrection. 4. The Final Judgment. 5. Heaven. 6. Hell.

The proper mode of discussing any single theological topic is.: 1. Exegetical. 2. Rational. The first step to be taken is, to deduce the doctrine itself from Scripture by careful exegesis ; and the second step is, to justify and de« fend this exegetical result upon grounds of reason.

PLAN, DIVISIONS, SUBDIVISIONS. 11

Christian theology differs from every other branch of knowledge, by being the outcome of divine revelation. Consequently the interpretation of Scripture is the very first work of the theologian. When man constructs a sys tem of philosophy, he must look into his own mind for the data ; but when he constructs the Christian system he must look in the Bible for them. Hence the first procedure of the theologian is exegetical. The contents and meaning of inspiration are to be discovered. Christian dogmatics is what he-finds, ngt^what he^originates.

The term "dogma" has two significations: 1. It de notes a doctrinal proposition that has been derived exegetically from the Scriptures. 2. It denotes a decree or decision of the Church. The authority of the dogma, in the first case, is divine ; in the latter, it is human. Dogmatic the ology, properly constructed, presents dogmas in the first sense ; namely, as propositions formulated from inspired data. It is, therefore, biblical, not ecclesiastical in its sub stance. There is no difference between it and the so-called "biblical" theology in this respect. If a dogmatic system imports matter from uninspired sources — say a school of philosophy, or a theory in physics — and makes it of equal authority with what it gets from the Scriptures, it is a spu rious system. No tenets can be incorporated into syste matic theology any more than into exegetical, that are contrary to revelation. The only difference between " bib lical " and dogmatic theology is in thejorm. The first ex amines the Bible part by part, writer by writer. The last examines it as a whole. Should " biblical " theology examine the Bible as a whole, it would become systematic theology. It would bring all the varieties under one scheme. The socalled " higher unity," to which the exegete endeavors to reduce the several " types " of " biblical " theology is really a dogmatic system embracing the entire Scriptures.

Dogmatic theology may be thoroughly biblical or unbiblical, evangelical or rationalistic; and so may "biblical"

12 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

theology. The systematic theology of Calvin's Institutes is exclusively biblical in its constituent elements and sub stance. Calvin borrows hardly anything from human phi losophy, science, or literature. His appeal is made continu ally to the Scriptures alone. No theologian was ever less influenced by a school of philosophy, or by human science and literature, than the Genevan reformer. Dogmatic the ology, as he constructed it, is as scriptural a theology as can be found in the ancient or modern church. " The first dog matic works of the Reformers, Melanchthon's Loci, Zwingli's Fidei Ratio, Calvin's Institutes, are in the proper sense biblical theology. They issued from the fresh, vital under standing of the Scriptures themselves." Schenkel : On Biblical Theology, Studien und Kritiken, 1852. On the other hand the Institutes of Wegscheider is rationalistic and unbiblical. This system, while appealing to the Scriptures, more or less, yet relies mainly upon the data of reason, and the principles of ethics and natural religion.

And the same remark is true of the so-called " biblical " theology. This method, like the systematic, may con struct a biblical or an unbiblical book ; an evangelical or a rationalistic treatise ; a theistic or a pantheistic scheme. As matter of fact, all varieties of orthodoxy and of heterodoxy are to be found in this department. In Germany, in par ticular, where this method has been in vogue for the last half century, both the theist and the pantheist, the evangel ical and the rationalist, have been fertile in the use of it. Under the pretence of producing an eminently scriptural theology, a class of theologians and critics like Baur and Strauss have subjected the Scriptures to a more capricious and torturing exegesis than they ever received before. They contend that tho idea of Christ and of Christianity, as it is enunciated in dogmatic theology and the creeds, is errone ous ; that the Gospels must be re-examined under higher critical principles, and the true conception of Christ and his religion be derived from the very text itself ; that is, what

PLAN, DIVISIONS, SUBDIVISIONS. 13

of the text is left after they have decided what is spurious and what is genuine. Baur was active and prolific in the department of "biblical" theology, as distinct from syste matic. He composed a Theology of the New Testament (Vorlesungen liber neutestamentliche Theologie), but it is biblical neither in substance nor spirit. Strauss's Leben Jesu professes to present the theology of the Gospels — the true biography, opinions, and religion of Jesus Christ ac cording to a scientific exegesis. But it is an intensely antibiblical treatise. The disciples of Baur, the so-called Tu bingen school, have produced a body of " biblical theology " that is marked by great caprice in textual criticism, and ingenuity in interpretation, but is utterly antagonistic to what the Christian mind of all ages has found in the Bible. The school of Kuenen and Wellhausen have employed this method in the same general manner in interpreting the Old Testament.

But another class of German theologians and critics, like Neander, Tholuck, Ebrard, Weiss, and others, handle the " biblical " method very differently. The results to which they come in their Lives of Christ, and their study of John, Paul, Peter, and James, are drawn from an unmutilated text, and agree substantially with the historical faith of the church, and with systematic theology as contained in the creeds. As, therefore, we have to ask respecting systematic theology, whose system it is ; so, also, in regard to " bib lical " theology, we must ask whose " biblical " theology it is.

Systematic theology should balance and correct " biblical " theology, rather than vice versa, for the following reasons : 1. Because " biblical theology " is a deduction from only a part of Scripture. Its method is fractional. It examines portions of the Bible. It presents the theology of the Old Testament, apart from the New : e.g., Oehler's Biblical Theology of the Old Testament ; of the New Testament apart from the Old : e.g., Schmid's Biblical Theology of the New Testament ; of the Gospels apart from the Epistles ;

14 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

of the Sjnoptists apart from John's gospel; the Petrine theology in distinction from that of the Pauline ; the Pauline in distinction from that of James, etc. Now this mothod, while excellent as a careful analysis of materials, is not so favorable to a comprehensive and scientific view as the other. Science is a survey of the whole, not of a part. True theological science is to be found in the long series of dogmatic systems extending from Augustine's City of God to the present day. To confine the theologian to the fragmentary and incomplete view given in " bibli cal " theology, would be the destruction of theology as a sci ence. 2. A second reason why "biblical" theology requires the balance and symmetry of systematic theology, is the fact that it is more easy to introduce subjective individual opinions into a part of the Bible, than into the whole of it. It is easier (we do not say easy) for Baur to prove that Christianity was originally Ebionitisrn, if he takes into view only the Gospels, and excludes the Epistles, than it is if he takes the entire INew Testament into the account. It is easier to warp the four Gospels up to a preconceived idea of Christ and Christianity, than it is to warp the whole Bible. This is the danger to which all interpretation of Scripture is exposed, which does not use the light thrown by the inter connection and harmony of all the books of the Old and New Testaments ; and perhaps this is the reason why the pantheistic and rationalistic critic is more inclined to com pose a " biblical," than a systematic theology. The attempt to understand revelation piecemeal, is liable to fail. In every organic product — and the Bible is organized through out — the whole explains the parts, because the parts exist for the whole, and have no meaning or use separate from it. The interpretation of Scripture should be " according to the proportion of faith " (Kara rrjv ava\oylav -n}? 7Ti9). Rom. 12 : 6.

When the work of deriving doctrines from Scripture has been done, the theologian must defend them against attacks,

PLAN, DIVISIONS, SUBDIVISIONS. .15

answering objections, and maintaining the reasonableness of revealed truth. The elder Protestant divines devoted great attention to this part of theological science, under the title of Theologia Polemica. Here is where religion and philosophy, faith and science meet. Human reason cannot reveal anything, but it can defend what has been revealed.

It is important to notice at this point, that in respect to the doctrines of Christianity the office of reason is dis charged, if it be shown that they are self -consistent. A ra tional defence of the doctrine of the trinity, for example, consists in demonstrating that there is no contradiction be tween the several propositions in which it is stated. To require of the theologian a complete explanation of this truth in proof of its rationality, is more than is demanded of the chemist or the astronomer in physical science.

When the individual doctrines have been deduced, con structed, and defended by the exegetico-rational method, they are then to be systematized. Systematic theology aims to exhibit the logical order and connection of the truths of Revelation. Schleiermacher mentions as a rule that is to guide in the construction of a system of Christian doctrine, the exclusion of all heretical matter, and the retention of only what is ecclesiastical. Glaubenslehre, § 21. Only the historical and catholic faith belongs to the Christian sys tem, because it is more probable that the one catholic Church has correctly understood and interpreted the Script ures, than that the multitude of heretical schools and par ties have. The substantial unity of the Church upon the cardinal doctrines of the trinity, the apostasy, the incarna tion, and the redemption, can be expressed in one self-con1 sistent system. But the diversity and contrariety of the numerous heretical sects cannot be.

THEOLOGICAL Introduction not only divides and arranges the parts of theological science, but also defines its general nature, and assigns it a place in the sum-total or encyclopaedia of knowledge. The important point of definition belongs here, and also the connection of theology with other sci ences. This brings us to consider the Nature and Definition of Theological Science.

Theology is a science that is concerned with both the In finite and the Finite, with both God and the Universe. The material, therefore, which it includes is vaster than that of any other science. It is also the most necessary of all the sciences. "Divinity," says Coleridge (Table-Talk, March 14, 1833), "is essentially the first of the profes sions, because it is necessary for all men at all times ; law and physics are only necessary for some men at some times."

Theology must not be identified with ethics. This is greatly to narrow it. Ethics, strictly, is the science of morals or duties, and is very limited compared with theol ogy. It includes : 1. Duties toward God. 2. Duties to ward man. Ethics is concerned only with the moral law in both tables. It does not properly include the gospel or re demption. Ethics is wholly legal. It is true that ethics is affected by Christian theology ; so that Christian ethics dif fers greatly from pagan ethics. It is more comprehensive, because pagan ethics is confined to duties between man and man. while Christian ethics embraces duties toward God.

DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 17

Christian ethics differs also from pagan in respect to the mo tive presented. In pagan ethics, the motive is legal and founded in fear ; in Christian ethics, the motive is evangeli cal and founded in love. St. Paul indicates the motive in Christian ethics, in Kom. 12:1: "I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God." Also in 2 Cor. 7:1: " Having therefore these promises, dearly beloved, let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit." The motive for the discharge of Christian duty is the love of God in Christ towards the forgiven sinner. There is no such motive as this in pagan ethics.

Yet theology contains immensely more than belongs even to Christian ethics, because it includes the doctrines of the trinity, the incarnation, the apostasy, and redemption, to gether with those of eschatology. ISTone of these divisions belong properly to ethics. Some of the systems of Christian ethics, like that of Rothe for example, are unscientific be cause they confuse and confound departments of science, erase the lines between law and gospel, morality and re ligion, and under the title of ethics discuss all the mysteries of revelation.

Theology ($eou XOYO?) is the science of God. The Su preme Being is the object and theme of theological investi gation. The term as we have before remarked has a wide and a restricted signification. In the wide and common meaning in which we now employ it, theology includes not only the trinitarian nature and existence of God, but also the relations of man and the universe to him. It is thus inclusive of religion ; and some define theology to be the science of religion. This definition has had considerable currency. It is defective however because it mentions God, the proper object of the science, only by implication and inference. But a technical definition ought to specify directly, not indirectly, the principal subject-matter.

Keligio, according to Cicero, is derived from relego, and

18 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

signifies a careful reflection or meditation of the mind. " Qni autem omnia quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent diligenter retractarent, et tanquam relegerent, sunt dicti religiosi, ex relegendo ; lit elegantes ex eligendo, a diligendo diligentes, ex intelligendo intelligentes." De natura deo rum, II. 28. According to this etymology, religion means reverence and worship. These result from reflection upon God and divine things. But Lactantius disputes this ety mology, and derives religio from religo. "Hoc vinculo obstricti deo et religati sumus : unde ipsa religio nomen repepit, non ut Cicero interpretatus est, a relegendo." Institutiones, IV. 28. According to this etymology, religion de notes duty, or the obligation of the creature towards the Creator. Man is bound or tied back to God. In this sense, Shakespeare speaks of "religion to the gods." Timon, IY. i. Lactantius asserts, further, that mere meditation would not distinguish religion from superstition ; the true God from false gods. Hence the notion of obligation afforded by religo is necessary. Augustine takes the same view with Lactantius. City of God, X. iii.

But whichever etymology be adopted, only the relations of man to God, not God himself, are indicated by the word " religion." To derive the definition of theology from this term, is to define a science from one of its parts or phases, rather than from its subject-matter or principal object of investigation. Religion, strictly, would discuss only the relations of man to the deity ; but theology treats first of the deity himself, and then inferentially of the relations of the creature to him.

Augustine (City of God, VIII. i.) defines theology to be "rational discussion respecting the deity;" de divinitate rationem sive sermonem. Turrettin (I. v. 1) defines the ob ject of any science to be " that which is principally treated of, and to which all the conclusions refer," and affirms that the object of theology is God and divine things. He argues that this is so from the names of the science, 3eo\oyia and

DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 19

and from the fact that the Scriptures, wr ich are the fountain-head of the science, treat principally of God. The Westminster catechism (Q. 5) also favors this defini tion of theology, in its statement that the " Scriptures prin cipally teach what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man." Here, the nature and at tributes of God are regarded as the primary matter, and man's relations and duty to him the secondary. Aquinas also adopts this definition. " Omnia pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione dei, vel quia sunt ipse deus, vel quia habent ordinem ad deum ut ad principium,et finem. Unde sequitur quod deus vere sit subjectum hujus scientiae." Summa, I. i. 7.

It has been objected by John of Damascus (De orthodoxa fide, III. xxiv.) that theology is not properly speak ing the science of God, because it is impossible to say what God is. Aquinas (Summa, I. i. 7) replies to this objection, that " if the qualities and relations of an object are the sub ject matter of any science, it is proper to call it the science of this object." And it is certain that there could be no science of anything, if it is asserted that there must first be a perfect comprehension. There is no science of matter any more than of God, if by science be meant a knowledge that excludes all mystery. The ultimate elements in chem istry are as much beyond complete apprehension as the divine attributes.

Science '^profound and self-consistent knowledge. Depth and logical coherence are the two characteristics of scien tific in distinction from popular apprehension. If state ments result from a superficial view, they are not scientific ; ar\d if they clash with one another, they are not science. The distinction between popular and scientific knowledge is founded upon this. The common mind oftentimes adopts errors and contradictions which the educated mind detects and rejects. Sometimes science itself is superficial, and un worthy of the name. Astronomy previous to Copernicus

20 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

was founded upon a superficial view of the heavens ; merely upon what every man's eyes saw when he looked abroad upon the surface of the earth, or above upon the surface of the sky. Space had no depth. It was only a plane surface. The result was a self-contradictory astronomy. ISTew mo tions in the heavens were continually appearing that con flicted with the old, and when they were described upon the map of the heavens, it was, in Milton's phrase, " with cycle and epicycle scribbled o'er." Astronomical science was science falsely so called. But the mathematical studies combined with the more careful observations of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, penetrated the abysses of space, introduced depth into astronomy, threw out these contradictions, and now the scientific astronomy is truly such.

Sometimes theories in physics pass for science for a gen eration or two, but are subsequently found to be superficial and self -contradictory. Examples of these are the theory of vortices invented by Des Cartes ; the theory of sponta neous generation advocated by Lamarck; and the theory of pseudo-evolution which just now has taken the place of the rejected doctrine of spontaneous generation, and is popular with the materialistic school of physicists. These theories are denominated scientific by their authors ; but true scien tific progress finally demonstrates their falsity.

The skeptical estimate of theology is unscientific, because it is founded upon a superficial knowledge of the sources and objects of the science. A few examples will show this. One of the most acute of modern skeptics was David Hume. His argument against miracles is the most ingenious of any that has been constructed, and is the arsenal from which modern infidelity obtains its keenest weapons. It was Hume's subtlety that awoke Kant's dogmatic slumbers, acco^ding to Kant's own statement. But Hume had no knowledge of Christianity that deserves the epithet sci entific. He was not versed in the Hebrew and Greek

DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 21

scriptures. According to Johnson (Boswell's Life, anno 1T66), " Hume owned to a clergyman in the bishopric of Durham that he had never read the New Testament with attention." No one would respect a critical estimate of Brahminism by one who had never carefully examined the Yedas, and the body of Hindoo literature growing out of them. Nor was Hume skilled in doctrinal theology. He was unacquainted with the careful analysis and close reason ing of the Nicene trinitarianism, of the Chalcedon christology, of the schoolmen, and of the Protestant divines. The whole immense body of patristic, mediaeval, and mod ern divinity was comparatively a terra incognita to him. His knowledge of the Christian religion did not go be yond what was floating in the atmosphere. He lived in a Christian country, among a theological people, and knew something of Christianity by absorption. But he never studied the documents and mastered the doctrines of the Christian religion as Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin stud ied and mastered them ; as Cudworth studied pagan the ology, and Schleiermacher studied Plato ; as Schlegel and Coleridge studied Shakespeare. The language of Bentley, the first classical scholar of his century, to Collins, is applicable to Hume in substance. Collins had remarked that the Bible " is the most miscellaneous book in the world, and treats of the greatest variety of things : creation, deluge, chronology and laws, ecclesiastical institutions, na ture, miracles, building, husbandry, sailing, physics, phar macy, mathematics, metaphysics, and morals," and draws the inference from this fact that " free thinking" is neces sary ; " for to understand the matter of this book, and to be master of the whole, a man must be able to think justly in every science and art." " Yery true ! " says Bentley, in reply, " and yet all he has here said of his sciences is requi site, were the English Bible supposed to be the very original. Add, therefore, to all the requisites here enumerated a sufficient skill in the Hebrew and Greek languages. Now

22 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

pass your verdict on the man from his own evidence and confession. ' To understand the Bible,' says he, ' requires all sciences ; ' and two languages besides, say I. But it is plain from his book that he has condemned the whole Bible for a forgery and imposition. Did he do this without under standing the matter of it? This is too scandalous for him to own. We must take it then that he professes himself accomplished in all sciences and arts, according to his own rule. But where has he, or any of his sect, shown any tolerable skill in science ? What dark passages of Scripture have they cleared ? Or of any book whatever ? Nay, to remit him to his ' sciences ' and l arts,' what have they done in the languages, the shell and surface of Scripture ? A great master of the whole Bible, indeed, that can scarce step three lines in the easiest classic authors cited by him self without a notorious blunder."1 Hume was not more learned than Collins in Christian theology, and these re marks of Bentley hold true of him in all essential points.

Another illustration of the superficial knowledge of the skeptic in the province of Christian theology is seen in Gibbon. Few writers have been more conscientious in their scholarship than the historian of the Decline and Fall. He had read with great thoroughness all the Greek and Latin pagan writers who treat of the period with which he was concerned. His quotations from the Byzantine historians are never second-hand. But when he derives historical material from the Christian fathers, he is not so conscien tious. He obtains much of his information in this instance from Tillemont : a very trustworthy authority, it is true, but still a secondary source. Gibbon's study of the Greek of Athanasius, and the Latin of Augustine, was not so thorough as his reading of Zosimusand Marcellinus. And the reason lay in his contempt for the former, as ecclesiastical writers. A church father ; though subtle like Athanasius, and pro1 Bentley : On Free Thinking, VIII. See Bp. Newton's exposure of the mis takes of Bolingbroke. Prophecies, Dissertation L

DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 23

found like Augustine ; though among the finest intellects of the race, and so reckoned in literary history ; was, in his view, a superstitions man, and therefore his writings did not deserve continuous and complete perusal, but might be examined cursorily, and through the eyes of others.1

These remarks apply with equal force to the skepticism of this generation ; for there are no names in it superior to those of Hume and Gibbon, whether regard be had to learning or mental power. Such products as the survey of Modern Civilization by Buckle, and of the Intellectual Development of Europe by Draper, are specimens of su perficial information and thinking concerning theological and metaphysical science. Almost exclusive attention is devoted to the material and physical aspects of civilization, the moral and religious elements in modern culture are over looked, and the great problems of philosophy and theology are either unnoticed or else denied to be problems at all. The judgment passed upon either doctrinal or practical Christianity from this point of view, is neither profound nor self -consistent.2

As an an example of the ignorance of a literary man in scientific theology, consider the following from Froude (Short Studies, 3d Series, 115). " To represent man as an automaton sinning by the necessity of his nature, and yet as guilty of his sins ; to represent God as having or dained all things, yet as angry with the actions of the pup pets whom he has created as they are ; is to insist on the acceptance of contradictory propositions from which reason recoils, arid to make Christianity itself incredible by a trav esty of Christian truth." Froude believes this to be a true account of Protestant theology as formulated by Luther

1 A writer in the Quarterly Review for Oct. 1838 shows that Gibbon's account of Gnosticism is superficial, and sometimes positively erroneous. The kuowledge of Gnosticism must be derived from the Christian fathers.

3 See a searching criticism of Draper, by Smith : Faith and Philosophy, 337357.

24 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

and Calvin. But it is pure misrepresentation ; not inten tional, but the misrepresentation of ignorance. A writer versed in the history of opinions would not have attributed such views to Calvin, and the creeds of the Keformation. An erudite skeptic like Baur, for example, does not so de scribe systematic Augustinianism and Calvinism.

And when we pass to the infidelity of the masses, the truth of our assertion is still more evident. In no quarter is there so little scientific knowledge of the most powerful and beneficent religion on earth, as in the popular infidelity represented not by the treatise, but by the magazine and newspaper. The unbeliever of this grade may be moder ately versed, perhaps, in some sections of natural science, and in the lighter parts of literature, but he is unacquainted with the loftier products in secular letters, and wholly ignorant of the systematic literature of the Christian Church.

The skeptical estimate of Christian theology, conse quently, is an unscientific one. A profound and accurate judgment must come from experts. As the scientific com prehension of law is expected from jurists and not from laymen, so that of theology must be sought among philoso phers and divines, and not among physicists and littera teurs whose studies are devoted to very different branches of knowledge from ethics and theology, and who make guerilla incursions into this field merely for the purpose of attack. Every branch of knowledge has its recondite and abstract side, and hence, as in the case of law and medicine, the popular and superficial judgment must be corrected by the professional and scientific. " No one," says Winckelmann (History of Art, I. i.), "can form a correct judg ment of Greek art, or of Greek literature, without having read repeatedly everything in the latter, and without having seen and examined if possible all the remains of the for mer." Such thoroughness is eminently requisite in order to a just estimate of theological science, because it extends

DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 25

over all spheres of being, and includes the deepest prob lems and mysteries of existence.

Theology, then, as the science of God, aims to obtain a knowledge of him that is free from contradictions, and is as profound as is possible, considering the nature of the sub ject and the limitations of the human mind. If therefore it makes a statement of an abtruse doctrine like the trinity, it continues true to science. It does not affirm and deny one and the same thing. It asserts that God is one in re spect to essence, and is three in respect to personal distinc tions. These two propositions do not clash, because the idea of essence is different from that of person. Could it be proved that essence and person are identical conceptions, trinitarianism would be shown to be self-contradictory and therefore unscientific. Again, the theological statements respecting the decree of God and the liberty of man are scientific, so far as self -consistence constitutes science. The theologian does not affirm that one and the same future event is necessitated for God and free for man, or free for God and necessitated for man. But he affirms, that one and the same future event may be certain for God and uncer tain for man ; and that for both God and man it may be a free event, like the decision of the human will, or for both God and man a necessitated event, like the fall of a stone to the ground. Such is the creed statement. " Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same providence he ordereth them to fall out according to the nature of second causes ; either necessarily, or freely and contingently." Westminster Confession, Y. ii. That is to say ; when the second cause is a free cause, such as the human will, then the future act, which is free for both God and man, is uncertain for man and certain for God ; and when the second cause is a necessary cause, such as the force of gravity, then the future event, which is necessi tated for both God and man, is certain for God and uncer26 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

tain for man. "Whether I shall exert a particular volition to-morrow is uncertain to me, but not to God. But if exerted, it is for both God and me alike a free act. Whether a particular stone shall fall to-morrow is uncertain to me, but not to God. But if it fall, it is for both God and me alike a necessitated event. There is no clashing or contra diction in these statements, and they contain the essential truth respecting divine sovereignty and human liberty.

When theology is denominated the science of God, it is not meant that God is completely comprehended. There may be science without omniscience. Otherwise, science would be impossible for any but the Infinite Intelligence. Yet the tendency of science is to explain exhaustively and completely. The longer a science is pursued, the more is known of the subject. The aim and endeavor is to reach a final and perfect comprehension. In theology, which em braces the infinite as well as the finite, the goal can never be reached, either in this world or the next ; but more and more will be known, and the progress of the science will be onward forever and forever-more. " The nature of a thing," says Aristotle (Politics, I. ii.), " is judged by its ten dency." The tendency and aim of science towards a com plete view evinces that it is profound in its nature. The superficial view is not rested in. Consider, for illustration, the anthropomorphic and materializing conception of God. This is unscientific. The descriptions of the deity borrowed from some resemblance to visible things, are taken literally by the anthropomorphist. But the theologian goes behind them to the real truth. " Thus, when the scriptures speak of God, and ascribe hands, eyes, and feet, to him, it is not designed that we should believe that he has any of these members according to the literal signification ; but the meaning is, that he has & power to execute all those acts, to the effecting of which these parts in us are instrumental : that is, he can converse with men as well as if he had a tongue or a mouth ; he can discern all that we do or say as

DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 27

perfectly as if he had eyes and ears ; he can reach us as well as if he had hands and feet ; he has as true and substantial a being as if he had a body ; and he is as truly present everywhere as if that body were infinitely extended." King : On Foreknowledge, 468.

1. In defining the nature of theology, we remark in the first place, that it is absolute science, in contradistinction to relative knowledge. Theological doctrine is not true merely or only for the human intellect, but for all rational intelli gence. The cognition, it is true, does not extend to the uttermost limits of the object, but so far as it does extend, and so far as the formulated statement is categorical and positive, it is conformed to the real nature and truth of the object. Man's conception of matter may be very different from that of the angel ; but man's conception of the divine holiness is the same in kind with that of the angel, and of God himself, though different in degree. The word "holy" conveyed the same idea to St. Paul that it would to the seraphim : and it conveys the same idea to us that it did to him. It is erroneous to assert that what man calls right eousness in God might be unrighteousness for the angels ; and that what the angels call wickedness in Satan might be moral excellence for man. The ideas of right and wrong are the same in kind in all rational intelligence. Two di verse and contradictory conceptions of sin and holiness are impossible. There may be diverse and contradictory judg ments as to whether a particular action is sinful or holy, but not as to whether sin is wrong and holiness is right. All rational beings have common principles of intelligence respecting moral truth, and this species of truth, if known at all, must be known absolutely. Relative knowledge is sufficient in the sphere of time and matter, but not of morals and eternity. There is too much at stake in the latter sphere. Whether man's knowledge of matter is ac curate or not is of little consequence, taking the whole of his endless existence into account ; but if his knowledge of

28 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

God and morals is erroneous, his immortality is ruined.1 The cognition, consequently, in such an important province as that of ethics and religion, must be absolute, not relative. " A relative notion of a thing," says lieid (Essay II. xviii.), " is, strictly speaking, no notion of the thing at all, but only of some relation which it bears to something else."

There is no science so rightly entitled to be denominated absolute, and metaphysically certain as theology. It is the assertion of materialistic schools in every age, that the sci ence of matter and physical nature alone is certain, and that the science of mind and of God is not science in the strict sense. But the fact is exactly the contrary ; and this be cause of the nature of the objects in each province. "That knowledge," says Milton (Reason of Church Government, II.), " that rests in the contemplation of natural causes and dimensions, must needs be a lower wisdom as the ob ject is low." It is clear that no science can be any more a priori and necessary than its subject-matter. If an edifice rests upon the solid ground, it must be stationary ; if it rests upon the waves, it must fluctuate. An a priori sci ence like geometry retracts no positions, and is immutable, because its data are mental axioms and the logical conclu sions from them. An a posteriori science like geology is continually altering its positions, because it derives its data from the notices of the senses, and new notices show that old deductions were errors. Whether, therefore, the sci ence of physical nature and matter is as necessary and im1 " Is a man," says Plutarch (On Superstition), " of opinion that indivisibles were the first origin of things ? It is indeed a mistaken view, but makes no ulcer, no shooting searching pain. But is a man of opinion that wealth is his chief good ? This error contains in it a canker ; it preys upon a man's spirits, ifc suffers him not to sleep, it makes him horn-mad." Similarly Frank (Christian Certainty, 105) remarks, " that it is of slight importance for the person of the observer, whether this physical object which I see before me is in truth as I see it, or other than I see it. But the whole constancy and strength and worth of the personality depends upon the question whether this moral good which I ex perience as real, has an actual existence or not ; the personality cannot free itself therefrom, without the innermost basis and supreme aim of its life being lost."

DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 29

mutable as the science of God and the human mind, will depend upon whether physical nature and matter are as necessary and immutable, in their substance and proper ties, as God and the rational soul of man. Let us com pare the two.

If there be anything fixed and uniform in the material world, it is the laws and forces that prevail there. These are sometimes denominated the necessary laws of matter. But when examined, the necessity of material laws is found to be only relative. They are necessary under the present arrangement, and in the existing system. Had the consti tution of the material universe been different, they would have been different. There is no contradiction in the sup position, that there might be a different system of nature from the present one ; that matter might have some differ ent properties from what it now has, and that material laws might be other tnan they are. There is no escaping this, unless we adopt the position that matter is eternal. In this case, the properties and laws of matter have absolute, not relative necessity. But if we adopt the position of the theist, and concede that matter with its properties and laws was created ex nihilo by omnipotent power, then we can conceive, without self-contradiction, that the Creator could have constituted the material world upon a law of attraction operating inversely as the cube of the distance, as easily as he has made it upon the existing law operating inversely as the square. If he could not, then he is conditioned. There is something in the nature of matter, such as was supposed in the ancient uA/?/, which compels him to establish and form the material universe in the manner he has. There is an insuperable limit set by nature and matter to the divine power, so that God is powerless in any other direction than the one actually taken. He is merely a Gnostic demiurge, not a Biblical creator.

The same is true of vegetable and animal types and forms. Granting that they are creations ex nihilo, there is

30 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

nothing to forbid the supposition that they might have been made upon a plan very different from the one actually employed by the Creator. It is absurd to suppose that the Omnipotent has exhausted his power in the existing uni verse, or that the Omniscient can have only one scheme within his ken.

These views of the sovereignty of God over the proper ties and laws of matter, and of his free power to constitute the system of nature differently from what he lias, are adopted by the leading minds in physical science. Newton, at the close of his Optics, remarks, that " the motions of the planets are marked by certain small irregularities which appear to come from the mutual action of the planets and cornets, and which will probably become greater and greater, in the course of time, until at last the system will again re quire its author to put it in order." Leibnitz (Theodicee, Partie II. 345) thus speaks concerning the laws of motion : " The laws of motion which are operative in nature, and are verified by experience and observation, are not abso lutely demonstrable like a geometrical proposition. They do not spring from a principle of necessity, but from a prin ciple of perfection and order ; they are an effect of the will (choix) and wisdom of God. Hence these laws are a won derful proof of the existence of an intelligent and free being, in opposition to the system of absolute and unreasoning (brut) necessity taught by Strato and Spinoza." '

Similarly, Whewell (Astronomy and General Physics, I. iii.) remarks that "the force of gravity, so far as we can judge, might have been different from what it now is. It depends upon the mass of the earth ; and this mass is one of the elements of the solar system which is not determined by any cosmical necessity of which we are aware. We can not see anything which would have prevented either the

1 Strato, B.C. 289, maintained that " there is inherent in nature an eternal and necessary principle of motion, or force, without intelligence, which is the only cause of the production or dissolution of bodies."

DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 31

size or the density of the earth from being different, to a very great extent, from what they are. We can very easily conceive the solar system so adjusted that the year should be longer or shorter than it actually is. If the earth were removed toward the solar centre by about one-eighth of its distance, the year would be shortened by about a month." After saying that the vegetable world has been adjusted to the year as it now is, "Whewell adds, that the length of either the solar or the vegetable year " might have been different from what it is, according to any grounds of neces sity which we can perceive." Only, if one were altered, the other would be adjusted accordingly.1

Statements to the same. effect are made by a writer in the London Quarterly Review for July, 1876. " The law of the inverse square is but the mathematical expression of a property which has been imposed on matter from the crea tion. It is no inherent quality, so far as we know. It is quite conceivable that the central law might have been dif ferent from what it is. There is no reason why the mathe matical law should be what it is, except the will of the Being who imposed the law. Any other proportion would equally well be expressed mathematically, and its results calculated. As an instance of what would occur if any other proportion than the inverse square were substituted as the attractive force of gravity, suppose at distances 1, 2, 3, the attractive force had varied as 1, 2, 3, instead of the squares of these numbers. Under such a law any number of planets might revolve in the most regular and orderly manner. But under this law, the weight of bodies at the earth's surface would cease to exist ; nothing would fall or wreigh downwards. The greater action of the distant sun and planets would exactly neutralize the attractive force of the earth. A ball thrown from the hand, however gently, would immediately become a satellite of the earth, and

1 See, especially, Whewell's recapitulation, I. xviii.

32 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

would for the future accompany its course, revolving about it for the space of one year. All terrestrial things would obey the general law of the system, but would acknowledge no particular relation to the earth." Again, to take an illus tration from optics. If the undulatory theory of light be adopted, there does not appear to be any eternal and abso lute necessity that exactly 458 million millions of vibrations, in a second, of the supposed ether, should produce the sensa tion of violet color for the human eye, and 727 million mil lions should produce the sensation of crimson. The Will that created the eye, and established these numbers and proportions, could have created a different eye, and estab lished different proportions.

If these positions of Newton, Leibnitz, and Whewell are correct, it follows that absoluteness cannot characterize physical science, because the subject-matter of cognition within this province is not itself a priori and necessary. Knowledge, speaking generally, is the cognition of entity. Nonentity cannot be the subject-matter of human investiga tion. A substance, or real being of some kind, is requisite for this. It is evident, therefore, that the absoluteness and certainty of a science will depend upon that of its subjectmatter. If the subject-matter of a science has no necessity and absoluteness, the science will have none. Knowledge, then, that has physical and material substance and its prop erties for its basis must be marked by contingency and relativity. For since matter and its laws might have been different, or might not have been at all, the knowledge of them is the knowledge of the contingent, the conditioned, and the mutable. When the subject-matter has a priori necessity, cognition acquires absolute certainty from it. This is the case with geometry. The data here are the in tuitions of the mind, and the necessary conclusions from1 them. Geometry does not deal with matter and its phe nomena, but with ideal points, lines, and surfaces. It is absolutely necessary that the radii of a circle should be

DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 33

equal, but not that there should be a circular body like the sun. The laws of matter are not derived intuitively from the mind, like geometrical axioms, and then attributed to matter, but they are derived from matter, and then im pressed upon the mind. Physical laws, as formulated, are deduced from the outer world, and have only relative neces sity and certainty, because the outer world has only such. Axioms, on the contrary, are derived from the mind itself, and have a kind of certainty that cannot attach to a general ization drawn from the observation of material phenomena.

Ethics and pure mathematics have this in common, that they deal with ideas, not with substances. Right and wrong, like a mathematical point and line, are not objective beings. Physics, on the contrary, deals with physical sub stances. The former, consequently, are more certain sci ences than the latter ; because there is no dispute about the nature of an intuitive idea, but there is about the nature of a physical substance. There cannot be two different views of a triangle, or of right and wrong ; but there can be of a piece of protoplasm, or a bit of granite.

When we pass from the world of matter to that of mind and of morals, we find more than a relative necessity in the object of cognition. Unextended, incorporeal, spiritual substance is the entity in this case. The Divine mind and the human are the subject-matter of theological and meta physical science. But mind is reason, and reason is marked by necessary and immutable properties. It differs from matter in this respect. Matter, conceivably, may be of an indefinite variety ; but we can conceive of only one species of reason. When God creates a rational being, he makes him after his own image ; but when he creates a physical substance, he does not create it after his own image, but as he pleases. This makes reason to be one and invariable in its essential properties, while matter is variable. We can not conceive of God's creating two diverse kinds of rational mind, but we can conceive of his creating many kinds of

34r THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

matter. All finite reason must resemble the infinite reason in kind. When God creates a rational spirit, he must, from the nature of the case, make it after his own likeness, and after no other pattern. But when he creates physical sub stance, he is not thus restricted. God is immaterial, a pure spirit, without body parts or passions; therefore when he creates physical substance, he creates something that has no resemblance whatever to himself. Matter, consequently, has nothing a priori, or intrinsically necessary, in its proper ties. Even gravity, says Whewell (General Physics, II. x.), " is a property which we have no right to call necessary to matter, but have every reason to suppose is universal." Not being made after any original and eternal pattern drawn from the Divine essence, it may be made as God pleases, in an indefinite number of modes. But when finite mind and reason are created, they are made after the Divine image, and therefore can be of only one species and quality.

Accordingly, the laics of mind have more of necessity in them than the laws of material nature have. The laws of thought, as enunciated in logic, are more immutable than physical laws. Logic is a priori in its regulative principles. Mathematics is necessary and absolute in its axioms and conclusions. We cannot conceive of a different species of logic or mathematics; but we can conceive of a different astronomy, chemistry, and geology — a different physics gen erally. The movements of the planets might, conceivably, have been different; but the movement of the human intel lect in logical and mathematical processes could not have been otherwise.

This is true also of moral law, as well as of mental. When we pass from the world of physics to the world of ethics, and examine the laws that rule and regulate in this realm, we find more than a relative necessity. Take the decalogue as summed up by our Lord : " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thy self." This is for the rational universe what the law of

DEFINITION OP THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 35

gravitation is for the physical. And it is necessary and absolute for all intelligences. We cannot conceive that it might have been different from what it is ; that the com mand might have run thus : " Thou shalt hate the Lord thy God and thy neighbor." Neither can we conceive of such a modification of it, as to allow an equal degree of love toward the Creator and the creature. The golden rule, " Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them," is absolutely necessary. Neither the con trary, nor any modification of it, is conceivable. No other rule for the conduct of finite rational beings could have been laid down by the Supreme Reason.

Testing, then, the entity or substance which is the object of cognition in physics and metaphysics, respectively, by the properties and Jaws belonging to each, it is clear that absolute scientific certainty is to be claimed for the latter, not for the former.

1. There are three reasons, in particular, why physical science is relative knowledge. In the first place, it is to a great extent empirical or experimental. It is founded upon the observations of the five senses. But the senses never teach any a priori or absolute truth. They show what may be, and what actually is, but not what must be. They dis close what occurs under certain actual circumstances, but not under all conceivable circumstances. By the senses, we know as a present fact that the sun rises in the east once in every twenty-four hours ; but the senses do not teach that this could not possibly be otherwise, and that the sun must of necessity rise in the east from eternity to eternity. Says Hume (Inquiry V.) : " The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradic tion, and is conceived by the mind with equal facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will rise to-morrow, is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmative that it will rise. Similarly, Leibnitz (Nouveaux Essais, Avant36 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

propos) remarks: "Though the senses are necessary in or der to the knowledge of actual facts, yet they are not suffi cient in order to knowledge of all kinds ; since the senses give only present examples and instances, and teach only particular and individual truths. Ko matter how great the number of examples may be that establish a particular truth, they are insufficient to demonstrate the universal necessity of this truth ; because it does not follow that since a tiling has uniformly occurred up to this moment, it will continue to occur forever. The Greeks and Komans noticed that in twenty-four hours, day uniformly turned into night, and night into day. But they would have erred, had they con cluded that this fact is necessary and universal ; since it is not a fact in Kova Zembla. And it would be a yet more mistaken judgment, to conclude that this alternation of day and night is absolutely necessary at least within the temper ate zone ; because it is possible for both the earth and the sun to cease to exist."

2. Secondly, the judgments of the senses are relative and variable, from the nature of the sensuous organs themselves. Tested mathematically and absolutely, no two persons see the same-sized object. The tree is taller for one man than for another. The shade of red is deeper for one eye than for another ; and not red at all for the color-blind. Pascal, perhaps the most metaphysical of mathematicians, speak ing of the effect of magnifying glasses, asks : " After all, who is to take upon himself to affirm that these glasses have really altered the natural dimensions of the objects in ques tion, but that, on the contrary, they may not have had the effect of restoring them to their original proportions, which our eyes had altered and contracted, in the same way that is done by the action of diminishing glasses." The Geo metrical Spirit. The following experiment, from a trea tise on heat, illustrates the relativity of sensuous percep tions. Plunge the right hand into a vessel of tepid water, and the left hand into one of iced water. Then put both

DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 37

into water of ordinary temperature. The latter will now seem to be cold, if we decide according to the sensation ex perienced by the right hand ; but warm, if \ve judge by the left. Hence, says the author, it appears that there is no difference between heat and cold when we abstract our sen sations, and consider only the body that impresses us.

Thus it is evident that the sensuous data which enter so largely into natural and physical science are wholly subjec tive. They depend upon the structure and condition of the organ. Size and figure are all in the eye. Sound is in the ear. If human eyes and ears had been made upon one plan, Lilliput would have been the actual world. If they had been made upon another, Brobdingnag would have been. " Sensation," says Cudworth, " is not science or intellection, because the soul by sense does not perceive the things them selves, or the absolute natures of them, but only her own passions from them. Were sensation knowledge and under standing, then he that sees light and colors, and feels heat and cold, would understand light and colors, heat and cold ; and the like of all sensible things." '

" All that the optic nerve reports to us," says Helmholtz, " it reports under the form of a sensation of light, whether it be the beaming of the sun, or a blow on the eye, or an electric current in the eye. The acoustic nerve, again, transforms everything into phenomena of sound ; the nerve of the skin transforms all things into sensations of temper ature or touch. The same electric current, whose existence the optic nerve reports as a flash of light, which the nerve of taste reports as an acid, awakens in the nerve of the skin the feeling of burning. The same sunbeam, which we call light when it falls upon the eye, we call heat when it strikes the skin." This shows the relativity of sensuous perception. A material object appears to us only in accordance with the

1 Epicurus, on the contrary, carried the doctrine that the senses are the only measure of truth so far as to affirm, that the sun is no larger than it appears. Des Cartes : Preface to Principles of Philosophy.

38 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

sensuous organ which transmits the impression, and not as an immutable object independent of the organ of sensation. But it is altogether different in the instance of a spiritual object like God, or the soul. God makes only one and the same impression of holiness, or wisdom, or omnipotence, if any is made at all ; and the very same qualities are attrib uted to him by all intelligence that is not abnormal and vitiated. The list of the Divine attributes is one and inva riable. The same is true of the human soul as an object of knowledge, and of its qualities. The human spirit has only one conceivable set of properties, and these are the same for all who are self-conscious and make an accurate report of self-consciousness.

3. Thirdly, the inferences from sensible phenomena, in physical science, are relative and uncertain, because all the phenomena have not been seen. The material universe is too vast for all of it to come under the notice of men's senses. Though perhaps improbable, yet it is possible that some established and accepted generalizations, in the exist ing physics, may be overthrown by future observations and new phenomena. The following facts illustrate the uncer tainty of which we are speaking. Water in cooling con tracts down to forty degrees of Fahrenheit ; then if it con tinues to cool it begins to expand, and at thirty-two de grees freezes, which is very great expansion. Nature here reverses herself, and contradicts herself. The first part of her process would yield the generalization, that cold con tracts substances ; the second, that cold expands substances. He who should have observed only the phenomena above forty degrees, would have deduced the general law, that water invariably contracts in cooling ; and were he of a cer tain school of physicists, he would add to this, that it neces sarily contracts. If upon this planet there were no natural or artificial temperature below forty degrees, the law that cold uniformly contracts substances would be regarded as well established and indisputable as the law of gravitation.

DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 39

It is for this reason, that theories in physics are so un certain and changing. Geology furnishes abundant exam ples. Dr. Arnold (Life by Stanley, I. 142), speaking of the discussions of the British Association in 1839, says that " Murchison convinced Greenough and De La Beche that they must recolor their geological maps ; for what were called the Greywackes of North Devon, he maintains to be equivalent to the coal formation; and the limestones on which they rest are equivalent to the Old Red Sandstone which now is to be sandstone no more, but is to be called the Devonian system." Agassiz, in his eulogy upon Ilumboldt, remarks that " Humboldt's work upon the position of the rocks in the two hemispheres tells the history of that formation as it could be told in 1823, and is of course full of anachronisms." But what absolute certainty is there that the statements of any geologist in 1880, respecting the rocks of the globe, may not likewise be full of anachro nisms ? There would be more approach to scientific cer tainty in these empirical departments of knowledge which depend upon tentative experiments, and repeated observa tions, if all the facts could be observed, or even a ma jority of them. But the conclusions of the physicist are drawn from only a small, oftentimes infinitesimal portion of the phenomena. Only the testimony of an eye-witness, an actual observer with instruments, is regarded as of the first rate. But how little of such testimony enters into geological theories generally. "What observer was on the ground when the coal-beds were forming ? "We may grant that inferences that are plausible, and even probable, may be drawn from what is seen in a coal-mine to-day, as to what was being done in that spot ten million years ago, but absolute certainty is impossible. A convulsion by earth quake, a fusion by fire, a deposit by flood ; in other words, some sudden catastrophe of nature ; might so dislocate strata, and melt up materials, and overlay with sediment, as entirely to alter a previous plan upon which nature had

40 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

been working for a million of years. But the observer of the present day sees only the shattered debris, scoriae, mud or gravel, of the earth -quake, the fire, and the deluge, and knows nothing at all of that preexistent plan which lay be hind them, and which was entirely obliterated by them. Yet he assumes that he is beholding the very first and original plan of all, and upon the strength of what he sees at this moment lays down a theory respecting the very creation and beginning of the globe.

For these reasons, a theory in physics cannot have the completeness and certainty of a theory in ethics. There is no eternal and immutable physics, as there is an eternal and immutable morality. The principles that should govern the action of all moral agents throughout the universe are necessary ; but the principles that rule the material world are contingent. In this reference, the remark of Coleridge is correct. " The use of a theory in physical sciences is, to help the investigator to a complete view of all the hitherto discovered facts relating to the science in question. It is a collected view, Seapta, of all he knows, in one survey. Of course, so long as any pertinent facts remain unknown, no physical theory can be exactly true, because every new fact must necessarily, to a greater or less degree, displace the relation of all the others. The only necessarily true theo ries are those of geometry ; because in geometry all the premises are necessarily true and unalterable. But to sup pose that in our present exceedingly imperfect acquaintance with the facts, any theory in chemistry or geology is neces sarily correct, is absurd." Table Talk, June 29th, 1833. Compare Herschel : Discourse, § 183.

The skeptical attitude, then, which Hume asserted to be the proper one towards religion, is far more appropriate in reference to physical science, founded as it is upon the obser vations of the senses and deductions from them. " The whole subject of religion," he remarks, uis a riddle and an inexpli cable mystery ; doubt, uncertainty, and suspension of judgDEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 41

merit are the sole result of our closest examination." The way and manner in which the material universe arose from nonentity, and in which it is upheld from millennium to mil lennium, " is a riddle and an inexplicable mystery " to phys ical science. The deep and learned minds in this province acknowledge this. To the question, "How did man origi nate ? Quatrefages (Human Species, I. xi.) answers : '' I do not know." It is impossible to explain either the origin or the perpetuity of things by physical science. Neither self-motion nor perpetual motion belongs to matter. But the former is requisite in order to the origin, and the latter in order to the perpetuity of anything in nature. Respect ing the mode in which the material universe came into ex istence, the question of God to Job (38 : 4, 16-21) is con clusive : " Where wast tliou when I laid the foundations of the earth ? Hast thou entered into the springs of the sea ? or hast thou walked in the search of the depth ? Have the gates of death been opened to thee ? Hast thou perceived the breadth of the earth ? Where is the way where light dwelleth ? And as for darkness, where is the place thereof ? Knowest thou it because thou wast then born ? or because the number of thy days is great ? " Compared with the sum-total of phenomena in universal space and time, only a little is known of matter and its laws, and if the exclusive claim to an absolute cognition is set up for physical science, then it is proper to subject it to a skeptical criticism, and compel it to bring forth its proofs. Especially is this proper, when the theory is novel, and contradicts the his torical physics. " I am a skeptic in physics," said one to an enthusiastic "scientist" who was endeavoring to convince him that life is an evolution from the lifeless. Extremes produce extremes ; and if the fanciful biology of Ilaeckel shall succeed in driving out the sober biology of Agassiz, there will be more of scientific than there is of religious skepticism.

But skepticism in the bad sense of the term is an error

42 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

both in science and religion. If anything in the great do main of material nature has been demonstrated by valid reasoning, the human mind will accept it as truth. There is much of this in the higher departments of physical sci ence, such for example as astronomy. Copernicus, Kep ler, and Newton have conclusively established truths and facts within this province. Astronomy contains much of certain knowledge, because it contains much that is mathe matical. " The apparent motions of the sun, moon and stars," says "Whewell, " have been more completely reduced to their causes and laws, than any other class of phenom ena." And it should be observed, that in this instance more has been accomplished by mental and metaphysical processes, than by sensuous and physical. Mathematical calculation has enabled the astronomer to solve astronomical problems which the senses, even aided by instruments, could not have solved. Le Yerrier discovered Neptune by the calculus, not by the naked or the armed eye. Fresnel, by mathematical calculation, established certain facts re specting refraction which contradicted the results of pre vious experiment ; and certain other facts that had escaped experiment and observation. An eminent geometer dem onstrated by mathematical optics, that the centre of the shadow made by a small circular plate of metal in a beam of light coming through an aperture is in fact no shadow, but an illumination precisely as bright as if the metal plate were away. This is utterly contrary to what appears to the eye of the observer. Ilerschel : Discourse, §§ 23, 24. But as we descend to lower departments in natural science, like geology for example, we find nothing of this mathematical certainty, and much doubtful theorizing built upon sensi ble experiments and observations. Astronomy, moreover, is a comparatively certain science, not only because it em ploys the calculus, but because it confines itself to existing facts and phenomena. Its aim is to ascertain the present structure and motions of the solar system. Geology is unDEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 43

certain, because it proposes to describe a past state of things. It attempts to tell what existed millions of years ago, and even how the worlds were originally made ; which involves agencies and phenomena that occurred in " the dark back ward and abysm of time," and which may have been totally different from what the present phenomena and agencies would imply as interpreted by the theorist.

Still another reason for the greater certainty of astronom ical science is found in the fact of its greater simplicity. It is confined to its own problems, and does not attempt those of other sciences. Says Herschel (Discourse, § 183), " it can hardly be pressed forcibly enough on the attention of the student of nature, that there is scarcely any natural phenomenon which can be fully and completely explained without a union of several, perhaps all, of the sciences. The great phenomena of astronomy, indeed, may be considered exceptions ; but this is merely because their scale is so vast that one only of the most widely extended forces of nature takes the lead, and all those agents whose sphere of action is limited to narrower bounds, and which determine the pro duction of phenomena nearer at hand, are thrown into the background, and become merged and lost in comparative insignificance. But in the more intimate phenomena which surround us, it is far otherwise. Into what a complication of different branches of science are we led by the considera tion of such a phenomenon as rain, for instance, or flame, or a thousand others which are constantly going on before our eyes." By reason of this simplicity and comparative free dom from complication with other sciences, astronomy en ables the investigator to be more certain in his conclusions than does chemistry or geology. It does not, like these latter, burden him with a multitude of particulars, or tempt him to solve the difficulties arising from fanciful hypotheses and conjectures.

It is worthy of notice that astronomy generally speaking has been believing, while geology has often been skeptical.

44: THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

The Keplers and Xewtons were reverent minds, and the main current of astronomical science has corroborated both natural and revealed religion. It is also noticeable that none of the great discoveries in physics, like the laws of planetary motion, and the law of gravitation, have been made by materialists arid atheists. Skeptical sections in the history of physics are barren sections, so far as original discovery is concerned. This is conceded by Lange, in his History of Materialism (I. i. 4). The inventive and power ful intellects who discover laws, and make a positive addi tion to the knowledge of material nature, express their faith and worship in the language of Kepler : " Father of the universe, what moved thee to raise a little feeble creature of earth so high as to make him a king, and almost a God, in thinking thy thoughts after thee ? I thank thee, Lord and Creator of all, that thou hast filled me with rapture over the works of thy hand, and hast enabled me to disclose to men the glory of thy creation, so far as a finite mind can comprehend thy infinity." The skeptical naturalists, on the other hand, belong to the second and third class of investi gators, and have made few original contributions to science. The identification of matter and mind by the materialist blinds the human intelligence, so that its generalizations are false. The materialist may be an accurate observer of phenomena, but his conclusions from them are erroneous. The theories of spontaneous generation and the origin of species by natural selection are examples. Their authors were minute examiners of nature with both the naked arid the armed eye, but little more. The report of what they saw is trustworthy ; but what they inferred is not. This inferiority is explained by Whewell's distinction between inductive and deductive habits of mind. Astronomy and General Physics, III. vi. Investigators of the first rank, by induction dis cover hitherto unknown laws, and then those of the second rate by deduction draw conclusions, and construct schemes from them. The Newton or the Kepler, when the law of

DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 45

gravitation or of planetary motion bursts upon liis view with " the rapturous evprjica" is impressed with the idea of God as the author of it. But the investigator of a second ary grade, who merely uses the discovery and applies it, is sometimes a disbeliever in a personal creator, a preconceived purpose, and a final end, because he regards the law itself as the eternal first cause.1 He converts the law which has been discovered by his predecessors in science into a God ; as the African savages worshipped the plough which produced such wonderful effects in comparison with their rude mattock. The inventor of the plough never would have thought of deifying it.

It appears then, after this examination of the materials and subject-matter of physical and theological science respec tively, that in point of absolute validity and certainty the superiority is with the latter. Tested rigorously, the sphere of natural science is a region of only relative knowledge and certainty. There is nothing absolutely and eternally necessary in the laws and phenomena of matter. There is no absolute knowledge within this domain, because there is no absolute object to be known. Kant was correct in his celebrated but sometimes misapprehended position, that all cognition within the province of the natural and sensuous — within the region which falls to the understanding, in his nomenclature — is unaxiomatic and conditional, and that only within the domain of the moral and spiritual is there an absolutely certain intuition. What the practical rea son perceives to be true, is true for all intelligence. The metaphysical ideas of God and the soul, of free will and immortality, of right and wrong, are absolute ; and all sci ence that is founded upon them is of the same nature. But physical sensations and perceptions are individual, subjec" Him the Maker, we behold not ; calm He veils himself in everlasting laws, Which and not Him, the skeptic seeing, exclaims, 4 Wherefore a God ? The world itself is God. ' " SCHILLER : Don Carlos.

46 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

tive, and relative. Even the conceptions of space and time are only forms of the finite understanding, under which these sensations are massed and unified. The finite mind when cognizing sensible phenomena must cognize them as successive in time, and located in space, and its cognition of them is consequently gradual and incomplete. But the Infinite Mind is untrammelled by this gradual and sequa cious mode of apprehension in time and space, and beholds all phenomena in the simultaneous and complete intuition of omniscience. Successive sensuous cognition is relative knowledge. It is true for man's senses, but not for the Di vine reason. Material and sensible things, which are the subject-matter of physical science, are in continual flux and change. And even in regard to the invisible principles or forces beneath them ; even in regard to the laws of nature themselves ; we have seen that we cannot ascribe to them such a necessary and immutable quality as we must to spir itual and metaphysical realities. For they are creations from nonentity, and are only one of the many various man ners in which the Divine Mind can express itself in a mate rial universe. But the mental and moral universe has no such conceivable variety. Reason is one and simple ; mat ter is manifold and complex. The whole domain of phys ical nature is only a means to an end. It was created to be subservient to mind. It cannot, therefore, like the do main of the moral and spiritual, which is an end in and of itself, have absolute and immutable characteristics, and there fore cannot be the object of an absolutely certain knowledge.1 "Moral certainty," says Frank (Christian Certainty, 104), " in distinction from natural certainty, is characterized by a firmness which in the latter case has its equal at most only as regards mathematical and logical certainty. A man may doubt the reality of the objects which he sees with bodily eyes and hears with physical ears, and still he does

1 Shedd : Literary Essays, p. 301-305. On the inferiority of natural science to moral, see Piato : Phaedo, 96-100.

DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 47

not on that account doubt the reality of the moral world, of which he is conscious. That is the abiding truth of the Kantian philosophy, which in the moral domain sets limits to the skepticism regarding objective realities; the truth also of Fichte's doctrine of the moral order of the world, the validity of which is not affected by the idealism in other respects."

2. A second characteristic of theology is, that it is pos itive science in contradistinction to negative knowledge. This ground is taken by theologians, in the affirmation that faith is intelligent, and not the blind and ignorant credu lity of superstition. There is some real and true knowledge of the object of faith, although the object is still a mystery in many respects. Some of its properties and relations are known, but not all of them. For example, man knows that God is spirit, and not matter. This is a positive and ab solutely true knowledge. Man also knows that spiritual substance is intelligent, and immortal, that is, incapable of dissolution by material causes. This also is a positive and absolutely true knowledge. But how the intelligence of God is eternal and omniscient, comprehending all things simultaneously and without succession, and how his omni presence is the presence of the whole deity at every point of space, and a multitude of other similar particulars — of these, he is ignorant. Man knows God " in part " with a true and valid knowledge ; but being also ignorant " in part," and by far the greater part, God is a mystery for him. But it would be absurd to say that because man knows only in part, therefore he does not know at all ; that because he does not know everything, he knows nothing. Faith, therefore, though relating to the mysteries of God and the universe, is yet an intelligent act. It is denominated, in Eph. 3 : 18, 19, a " comprehension " of the " breadth and length, and depth and height " of revealed truth ; a " knowledge " of "the love of Christ which passeth knowledge." Faith is defined, in Heb. 12 : 1, as the " evidence" of unseen things.

48 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

The word e\€y%o<; in this passage denotes a mental convic tion ; and a conviction is both intelligent and positive. Christian faith is a rational and confident conviction of the mind.

According! }r, Calvin (Institutes, III. ii. 14, 15) defines faith to be " a solid constancy of persuasion, and a certain and steady knowledge ; " and adds, that " the knowledge of faith consists more in certainty than in comprehension. When we call it knowledge, we intend not such a comprehension as men commonly have of those things which fall under the notice of their senses. The mind which attains to faith does not perfectly comprehend what it perceives, but, being persuaded of that which it cannot comprehend, it under stands (intelligit) more by the certainty of this persuasion, than it would comprehend (perspiciret) of any human ob ject by the exercise of its natural capacity." In this last statement, Calvin implies that a believer knows more cer tainly concerning some of the qualities of God, than he does concerning any of the properties of matter ; that religious cognition is closer to absolute truth than sensuous cognition is. It is more certain that God is holy and omnipotent, than that light is the undulation of an ether, and not a sepa rate substance by itself. "With this, the eminent school man Hales agrees. " If we compare," he says, " the way in which the relation of faith, or conviction, to knowledge, is determined in theology, with the way in which it is in the other sciences, we shall find that the order is a reverse one. In the other sciences, conviction is brought about by the activity of reason, or mediated by thought, and scientific knowledge precedes conviction ; while the reverse holds true of religious matters. It is not till we have appropriated them by faith, that we can attain to a knowledge of them conformable to reason. These things can be understood only by those who are of a pure heart ; and we get this purity by keeping God's commandments." Hales " distin guishes," says Neander (IY. 427), " a certainty of speculaDEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 49

tion, and a certainty of experience; a certainty grounded in the intellectual agency, and another grounded in the feel ings. Of the latter kind is the certainty of faith ; and with reference to this kind of certainty, theology is superior to the other sciences."

The term " positive " signifies that something is laid down (positum) respecting an object or idea. An affirmation is made that it is thus and so ; and not a mere denial that it is thus and so. To say that water is not fir 'e, conveys no information as to what water really is. But to say that water is a fluid resulting from the union of oxygen and hy drogen gas, imparts some real knowledge of the nature of water, though it does not explain all the mystery connected with it. This is a positive statement springing out of a positive yet not exhaustive cognition. Water really is a fluid, and really consists of two gases. Taking Aquinas's definition of science, as the knowledge of the qualities and relations of an object, it is evident that there may be posi tive without perfect comprehension. An object has, we will say, fifty qualities or properties. I know twenty of them, and do not know the remaining thirty. My knowl edge is valid and positive, so far. It is not merely negative and invalid in respect to the twenty known qualities. Again an object, we will assume, has twenty relations to other ob jects. I know ten of them. My knowledge to this extent is positive. I have so much true information upon the sub ject. To illustrate from the science of optics. The proper ties of transmission, reflection, and refraction of light were known before those of double refraction and polarization. Suppose that the latter were not known at all, at the pres ent time. It would not follow that the knowledge of light, so far as the properties of transmission, reflection, and re fraction are concerned, is merely negative, and not real and true cognition. The knowledge conforms, so far, to the real nature of light. Again, the final cause, or use, of these latter properties of light, is still unknown. They are

50 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

not needed in order that the eye may see the outer world of forms and colors. " So far as has yet been discovered," says Whewell (Astronomy and General Physics, I. xvi.), "these latter properties arid laws exert no agency whatever, and have no purpose in the general economy of nature." But the fact that the final cause and use of these properties and laws of diffraction and polarization is still unknown, does not prove that the existing knowledge which the phys icist has of light is a mere negation.

A negation may be employed after an affirmation has been made, in order to define an object or idea more care fully. Negative statements are of little value prior to af firmative. After affirming of God what is excellent in the creation, we may then remove from the affirmation any de fect by the negative method : as when it is said, that reason in God is the same in kind with reason in man, but not in degree. After saying that God is immanent in the uni verse, we may say negatively, in order to guard against a pantheistic interpretation of the term immanent, that God is not identical with the universe. And after saying that God is distinct from the world, we may add that he is not separate from it, in order to avoid a deistical interpretation of the term distinct.

The denial that theology is positive science, and that knowledge in morals and theology is positive cognition, is a skeptical position. Ilobbes took this ground, and was com bated by Cudwortli. Intellectual System, Oh. Y. i. The theologian Buddaeus, in his Theses de atheisrno et superstitione, opposed Ilobbes, "because he denied a positive conception of the Infinite and allowed only a negative one." The theologian Iluet, after having defended Christianity in the vigor of his life in his Demonstratio Evangelica, at the age of ninety wrote his treatise De la Faiblesse de PEsprit Humain, to prove that before we affirm any thing of an object we must perfectly comprehend it ; and that therefore we have less right to affirm anything respectDEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 51

ing the Supreme Being, because we have a less perfect knowledge of him than of any other subject. This view has been run out to its logical result in the recent agnos ticism, which contends that we know nothing concerning God, and therefore can affirm nothing concerning him.

Theology has been denied to be a positive science by some of its friends, as well as by its foes. The views of Hamilton and Mansel convert theology into a science of negations. In asserting that man has no positive cognition of the Infinite Being, and especially in contending that the human mind cannot logically think of the Infinite Being either as a per son or a cause, because these conceptions are said to be con tradictory to infinity, these philosophers, without intending it, lay the foundation for the same skepticism that Hobbes and Iluet maintained. And their speculations have un doubtedly strengthened the hands of the present generation of agnostics. If all that can be said by the theologian re specting God is, that he is not this or that, then the mind has in fact no object before it, and no cognition whatever. It may not affirm anything whatever respecting such a Being. It cannot assert either that he is holy or unholy ; mighty or weak; wise or foolish. The deity becomes the Unknown and the Unknowable: a position that cuts up religion by the root, and introduces atheism in theory and practice.

Mansel would save the mind from skepticism, by the re mark that the contradiction which he finds between the con ception of the Infinite and that of personality and causation is only relative. It is a contradiction for the human but not for the Divine mind. Hence man can believe in the exist ence of an Infinite Being who is also personal and a cause, though it is self-contradictory to human intelligence. " It is true," he says (Religious Thought, p. 106), " that we can not reconcile these two representations with each other ; as our conception of personality involves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion of Infinity. But it does not fol low that this contradiction exists anywhere but in our own

52 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

minds ; it does not follow that it implies any impossibility in the absolute nature of God." But this reasoning implies that a man can believe what appears to him to be self-con tradictory. This is impossible. It also implies that a con tradiction for the human mind may be rational and logical for the Divine mind. This makes reason in man to differ in kind from reason in God; so that what is logical and mathematical for one would be illogical and unmathematical for the other. If this be so, man was not created in the image of God.1

Let us test this theory of negative knowledge by some particulars. Theology defines God to be a spirit. The idea which the human mind has of "spirit" is not exhausted, when it is said that spirit is not matter, or substance occupy ing space. This would not distinguish it from a mathemati cal point; or from a thought ; or from a volition. We have over and above this negative definition a positive notion, which we proceed to enunciate by specifying certain definite properties of spirit, such as intelligence and self-determina tion ; and certain qualities, such as benevolence, justice, and veracity. These properties and qualities are as positively conceived as are the properties of matter ; hardness, color, shape, and the like. That our knowledge of spirit is not all expressed in the statement that spirit is not matter, is also proved by the fact, that if it should be asserted that spirit is something semi-material we should deny it. This evinces that we have a notion in our minds of the real nature of spirit which throws out an imperfect and inade quate definition like this.

Consider, again, the eternity of God. Of this, it is con tended we have only a negative apprehension. All that the human intellect can know, it is said, is that eternity is not time. But that our idea of eternity is not exhausted by this

i On Hamilton's and Hansel's views, see Smith : Faith and Philosophy, 297336 ; Porter : Human Intellect, 681-697 ; Hodge : Theology, I. 346-365 ; Muller : Science of Language, 2d Series, 596-600.

DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 53

negation is proved by the fact that we are not content to stop with it, but go beyond it, and endeavor to convey some f urtlier notion of eternity, by specifying positive characteris tics. We define it as duration ; as duration without begin ning or end ; and as duration without succession. We thus differentiate eternity from time; which is conceived of as duration beginning and ending, as a series of sequences, and as measured by the successive motions of the heavenly bodies. Again we define eternity as stationary ; time as flowing. These are figures it is true, but they are employed to illustrate a positive idea in the mind. If we were con tent with a negative definition ; with merely saying that eternity is not time ; we should not make use of any meta phors at all, because we should not attempt any further enunciation of our idea of eternity. On the theory of a negative knowledge, time might be as well defined by say ing that it is not eternity, as eternity would be by saying that it is not time ; and matter would be as well defined by saying that it is not mind, as mind would be by saying that it is not matter. But man's knowledge of either of these contraries, though imperfect in the sense of not exhaustive, is yet more than these negations express.

The doctrine of a merely negative knowledge of spiritual objects and ideas originates in a tendency to materialism. The theorist is prone to regard nothing as positive and real in human conceptions that cannot be imaged to the senses. Mansel defines a conception to be a "representative image;" and an image implies sensuous imagination. According to this view, positive knowledge is sensuous knowledge. But this is an error. Consider the common definition of God, as "an essence absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise, powerful, necessarily existent, and the cause of all other beings." There is not a word in this definition that is unin telligible, or that does not convey a positive notion, and yet there is no sensible idea, no idea that can be imaged to the senses, answering to any one of these words. " We have,"

54 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

says Cudworth (System, I. v.), "intelligible notions, or ideas, which have no phantasms [sensible images] belong ing to them. Of which, whosoever doubts may easily be satisfied and convinced, by reading a sentence or two that he understands in any book almost that shall come to his hand ; and reflexively examining himself whether he have a phantasm, or sensible idea, belonging to every word, or no. For whoever is ingenuous will quickly be forced to confess that he meets with many words which, though they have a meaning or intelligible notion, yet have no phantasm [image] belonging to them. And we have known some who were confidently engaged in the other opinion, being put to read the beginning of Tully's Offices, presently nonplussed and confounded in the first word quanquam : they being neither able to deny that there was a meaning belonging to it, nor yet to affirm that they had any phantasm thereof, save only of the sound or letters." Cudworth then gives the definition of God which we have just cited, in further proof of his position, and then adds that "it is nothing but want of meditation, together with a fond and sottish dotage upon corporeal sense, which hath so far imposed upon some, as to make them believe that they have not the least cognition of anything not subject to corporeal sense ; or that there is nothing in human understanding or conception which was not first in bodily sense : a doctrine highly favorable to atheism. But since it is certain, on the contrary, that we have many thoughts not subject to sense, it is manifest that what falls not under external sense is not therefore incon ceivable and nothing. Which whosoever asserts, must needs affirm life and cogitation itself, knowledge or understanding, reason and memory, volition and appetite, things of the greatest moment and reality, to be nothing but mere words without any signification."

It is indeed true that these positive definitions of eternity, of spirit, and kindred ideas, do not exhaust the subjects and leave them free from mystery. In the recent controversy

DEFINITION OP THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 55

respecting the knowledge of the Infinite and the Uncon ditioned, which was stimulated into life by the views of Hamilton, there was not sufficient care taken upon either side to distinguish a positive from a perfect and complete conception. It seemed to be taken for granted by both parties, that man's knowledge of the Finite is superior to his knowledge of the Infinite, in respect to exhaustiveness and absoluteness. But man's cognition of matter and sensi ble phenomena has limits and imperfection, as well as his cognition of God and the soul. " If anyone," says Jacobi (Fliegende Blatter), " will tell me what sense is, I will tell him what spirit is. We talk more easily about sense than about spirit, because there are at least five senses and only one spirit." The blade of grass which the naturalist picks up in his fingers and subjects to the microscope and chemical analysis, contains an ultimate mystery which he can no more clear away than he can the mystery of the Divine eternity or trinity. For the constitution of the smallest atom involves such baffling questions as, What is matter ? and, How does it originate ? Everything, be it finite or infinite, matter or mind, runs out into mystery. Speaking of law in material nature, Hooker (Polity, I. iii.), remarks that it " hath in it more than men have as yet at tained to know, or perhaps ever shall attain ; seeing the travail of wading herein is given of God to the sons of men, that perceiving how much the least thing in the world hath in it more than the wisest are able to reach unto, they may by this means learn humility." The natural philosopher Boyle entitles one of his essays thus : " Of man's great igno rance of the uses of natural things : or, that there is no one thing in nature whereof the uses to human life are yet thoroughly understood." Much advance has been made in the knowledge of physical nature since Boyle's day, but the title to his essay is still suited to all physical treatises. " What in fact," says Frederick Schlegel (Philosophy of Life, Lect. IV.), " is all our knowledge of nature considered

56 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

as a whole, and in its inmost essence, but a mere speculative conjecture, and guess upon guess ? What is it but an endless series of tentative experiments, by which we are continually hoping to succeed in unveiling the secret of life, to seize the wonderful Proteus and to hold him fast in the chains of science ? "

There is as much reason for asserting that man's concep tion of matter is merely negative because there is an un solved mystery in it, as there is for asserting the same re specting spirit and the supernatural. Perfect definitions are as difficult in one case as in the other. It is no easier to define time than to define eternity. "I know what time is," said Augustine, " when you do not ask me." That is to say, he had an intuitive notion of time that is trustworthy and valid, but not clear of all obscurity, and which he found it difficult to enunciate. The same is true of the definition of space. Is it a real object ? Or only a form of thought, a scheme under which the understanding masses and unifies phenomena ? If by a positive conception be meant a cog nition that is in accordance with the real nature of the object so far as the cognition extends; if the term "posi tive " be understood to refer to the quality not the quantity of the knowledge ; then man's knowledge of the Infinite, or of spirit, is no more a negation than his knowledge of the Finite, or of matter. But it is the quality not the quantity of an idea, or a cognition, that determines its validity and trustworthiness ; that is, its conformity to the real nature of the object. Man's knowledge of God is like his knowledge of the ocean. lie does not perfectly comprehend the ocean, but this does not render what knowledge he has of the ocean a merely negative knowledge. "When we affirm," says Cud worth (System, Book I. Ch. v.), "that God is incompre hensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect minds cannot have such a conception of his nature as doth per fectly master, conquer, and subdue that vast object under it ; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the

DEFINITION OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 57

same, as that it doth every way match and equalize it. Now, it doth not at all follow from hence, because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow understand ings, he is utterly inconceivable [unthinkable] by them, so that they cannot frame any idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a nonentity. For it is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we can not have such an adequate and comprehensive knowledge of the essence of any substantial thing, as that \ve can perfectly master and conquer it. Though we cannot fully comprehend the deity, nor exhaust the infiniteness of his perfection, yet we may have an idea or conception of a Being absolutely perfect; as we may approach near a mountain, and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it all round, and enclasp it in our arms. Whatsoever is in its own nat ure absolutely inconceivable is nothing ; but not whatso ever is not fully comprehensible by our imperfect under standing."

But while the deity is in one sense the most mysterious of all objects of knowledge, in another sense he is the most luminous. 'No idea so impresses universal man as the idea of God. Neither space nor time, neither matter nor mind, neither life nor death, not sun, moon or stars, so influence the immediate consciousness of man in every clime, and in all his generations, as does that " Presence " which, in Wordsworth's phrase, " is not to be put by." This idea of ideas overhangs human existence like the firmament, and though clouds and darkness obscure it in many zones, while in others it is crystalline and clear, all human beings must live beneath it, and cannot possibly get from under its allembracing arch. The very denial of the Divine Existence evinces by its eagerness and effort, the firmness with which the idea of God is intrenched in man's constitution. A chimaera or a nonentity would never evoke such a passion ate antagonism as is expressed in the reasonings of atheism. Were there no God, absolute indifference towards the notion

58 THEOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION.

would be the mood of all mankind, and no arguments either for or against it would be constructed.

In this reference, the striking remark of Cudworth (Sys tem, I. v.) applies. " It is indeed true, that the deity is more incomprehensible to us than anything else whatever ; which proceeds from the fulness of his being and perfection, and from the transcendency of his brightness ; but for this very same reason may it be said also, in some sense, that he is more knowable and conceivable than anything else. As the sun, though by reason of its excessive splendor it dazzle our weak sight, yet is notwithstanding far more visible, also, than any of the nebulosae stellae, the small misty stars. Where there is more of light there is more of visibility ; so where there is more of entity, reality, and perfection, there is more of conceptibility and cognoscibility ; such an object filling up the mind more, and acting more strongly upon it. Nevertheless, because our weak and imperfect minds are lost in the vast immensity and redundancy of the deity, and overcome with its transcendent light and dazzling brightness, therefore hath it to us an appearance of dark ness and incomprehensibility."

Augustine : City of God, XV. -XVIII. Calvin : Institutes, I. vii.ix. Gerhard : Loci (De Inspiratione). Lee : On Inspiration. Twesten : Dogmatik, I., $ 23-28. Nitzsch : Christian Doctrine, g 36-47. Herder : Spirit of Hebrew Poetry. Lewis : Divine-Human in Script ure. Smith, J. : Discourses (Of Prophecy). Gaussen: On Inspi ration. Rogers : Superhuman Origin of the Bible ; Reason and Faith. Martensen : Dogmatics, $ 24-36. Warrington : On Inspi ration. Given : Eevelation and Inspiration. Van Oosterzee : Dog matics, L, 388-394. Dorner : Christian Doctrine, \ 57-60. Bissell : Historic Origin of the Bible. Ladd : The Doctrine of Sacred Script ure. Wordsworth : On Inspiration. Neander : Church History, II., 388-394. Hengstenberg : Christology (Prophecy). Alexan der : Introduction to Isaiah (Prophetic Inspiration). Hayley : Dis crepancies of the Bible. Hodge : Theology, I., 151-187. Ulrici : Glauben und "Wissen. Christlieb : Modern Doubt, Lecture II. Bannerman : On Inspiration. Terry : Hermeneutics. Davidson : Hermeneutics, XII. Bawlinson : Introduction to Chronicles, | 10 (Bible Commentary). Coleridge: Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit. Smith : Faith and Philosophy, pp. 1-48. Guizot : Medita tions on Christianity, 1st Series. Briggs: Biblical Study. Hender son : On Inspiration. Taylor : Spirit of Hebrew Poetry. Bobson : The Bible, Its Bevelation, Inspiration, and Evidence. Horne-Tregelles : Introduction.

BIBLIOLOGY (ft i,{3\iov \6yos) includes all the topics relating to the written revelation of God : namely, the Inspiration,

62 BIBLIOLOGY.

Authenticity, Credibility, and Canonicity of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. As has already been ob served, this division is not so strictly necessary as are the others to the integrity of a theological system, yet since the ological science depends for its validity and credibility upon the contents of the Bible, it is requisite in order to compre hensiveness to devote some preliminary attention to the au thority of these contents. The subject of Inspiration, in particular, cannot well be omitted.

The Scriptures are entitled a revelation, and hence it is necessary first of all to define this term. It is employed in two senses : 1. General, or unwritten revelation ; 2. Special, or written revelation.

Revelation in its general and wide signification is any species of knowledge of which God is the ultimate source and cause. In this sense, all that man knows intuitively is revealed to him ; for even his axiomatic knowledge does not originate from himself independently and apart from his Creator. All that he knows in this manner, he knows through his intellect, and this intellect is the workmanship of God. Man cognizes in accordance with the laws of hu man intelligence, and these laws are established by his Maker.

General or unwritten revelation, consequently, includes all that belongs to ethics and natural religion. In Script ure, that moral and religious truth which man perceives immediately by reason of his mental constitution is called a " revelation." For example, the knowledge of future retri bution possessed by the pagan is so denominated. " The wrath of God," says St. Paul, " is revealed (airoKaXvirreTai) from heaven," Rom. 1 : 18 ; and this wrath is subsequently described as operating in the workings of an accusing con science, Rom. 2:15. The pagan's knowledge of the unity of God, and of such attributes as eternity, omnipotence, and sovereignty (S-eiorrjs) is also represented as a Divine teach ing. " That which may be known of God [in this intuitive

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 63

manner] is manifest in them ; for God hath showed it unto them," Eom. 1 : 19, 20. This inward knowledge is also de nominated a " law written in the heart," Rom. 2:15; which has led to its being called an unwritten law. Turrettin (II. 1, 6) denominates it " revelatio naturalis."

Unwritten or general revelation, then, is a particular form of human consciousness that is ultimately referable to God. It is denominated by English writers the " moral " or " re ligious " consciousness ; by which is meant, a mode of con sciousness that relates to moral and religious objects and truths, and is determined by them. The Germans call it the " God-consciousness ; " meaning thereby a form of conciousness of which God is the object. As the " sense-con sciousness " denotes the sum-total of all the inward experi ence that results from the impression made upon man by the material world, so the God-consciousness denotes the in ward experience resulting from the impression made by God upon the human spirit. This mode of man's con sciousness not only has God for the object of it, but for the cause of it. And this in two ways: 1. First, the object generally is the cause of the subjective impression, by reason of the correlation between subject and object. The objec tive coal of fire is the cause of the subjective sensation. The consciousness of physical pain is not produced by an act of will. The man is not the author of the sensation, but the object that causes it is. In like manner, man's con sciousness of God is not produced by man's volition, but by God as an object that impresses him.

2. Secondly, God is not only the object of knowledge, but he is also a personal and active agent who operates on the human mind so that it shall have this knowledge of Himself. In the phrase of St. Paul, God "reveals" and " manifests " his being and attributes within the human spirit. The coal of fire is the cause of the sense-conscious ness, by the mere correlation between itself and the physi cal sense. But God is the cause of man's knowledge of

64: BIBLIOLOGY.

God not merely by the correlation between the two beings, but also by a direct energy operating upon man. An ir rational object like a stone or a planet exerts no direct effi ciency upon the cognizing mind of man ; and neither does a rational object like a human person. Sensation and cog nition, in these instances, result from a passive impression made by the object. But in the God-consciousness, the ob ject actively assists in the cognition. God causes the human mind to know God by an inward and immediate efficiency, in addition to the correlation which he has established be tween the finite and Infinite Spirit. In St. Paul's phrase, lie " shows," " reveals," and " manifests " himself.

The Scriptures go yet further than this, and refer all the operations of reason to the Author of the human intellect. Nothing in human consciousness is independent of God, and isolated. God is the " Father of lights," of every kind. James 1 : 17. God " shows " whatever is known by virtue of the human constitution. Even human reason, which in the intuitions of mathematics and in the laws of logic seems to be a self-sufficient faculty, is represented in Script ure as dependent. Man is able to perceive intuitively, only because the Supreme Reason illumines him. " The Logos," says St. John (1 : 4, 9), " is the light of men, and coming into the world enlightens every man." " There is a spirit in man," says Elihu who in this instance speaks truly, " and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understand ing," Job 32 : 8.

Human knowledge, then, considered from this point of view, is an unwritten revelation because it is not aboriginal and self-subsistent, but derived. It issues ultimately from a higher source than the finite intelligence. Human reason has the ground of its authority in the Supreme Reason. This is seen particularly in that form of reason which Kant denominates " practical," and whose judgments are given in conscience. This faculty has an authority for man that can not be accounted for, except by its being the voice of God.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 65

If conscience were entirely isolated from the Deity, and were independent of Him, it could not make the solemn and sometimes terrible impression it does. No man would be afraid of himself, if the self were not connected with a higher Being than self. Of the judgments of conscience, it may be said literally, that God reveals his own holy judg ment through them. " Whence comes the restraint of con science ? " asks Selden (Table Talk). " From a higher Power ; nothing else can bind. I cannot bind myself, for I may untie myself again ; an equal cannot bind me, for we may untie one another. It must be a superior Power, even God Almighty." l

The wide use of the term revelation was more common in the Patristic church than it has been since. The first defend ers of Christianity were called to vindicate it against poly theism. They would naturally, therefore, select for defence such of its truths as were more particularly combated by paganism, such as the unity of God, and the first principles of natural religion generally. This led them to point out the grounds of these first truths of morals and religion in the human constitution ; so that the distinction between nat ural and revealed religion though recognized was not em phasized. All religious knowledge was represented as a revelation from God, partly through the light of nature, and partly in a supernatural manner. The first Apology of Justin Martyr is an example of this. See chapters viii., xviii., Ivii. But when polytheism ceased to be the great foe of Chris tianity, and deism took its place, it became necessary to lay special stress upon the distinction between the unwritten and the written revelation. When the skeptic himself de fended the claims of natural religion, and asserted the needlessness of the gospel, then the Christian apologist was com pelled to discriminate carefully between that knowledge which comes to man in the structure of his mind, and that

1 See Twesten : Dogmatik, H 146 ; Shedd : Theological Essays, 303, 304 ; Neander : Apostel-Geschichte, Abschnitt Sechster ( Versohnung).

6G BIBLIOLOGY.

which he receives through a supernatural source, and in a written word, in order to show the insufficiency of the former to meet the wants of man as a sinner.

General or unwritten revelation, though trustworthy, is not infallible. This differentiates it from the special or written revelation.

1. In the first place, the ethical and religious teaching of God through the structure of the human mind is vitiated more or less by human depravity, (a). Sin darkens the in tellect, so that there is not that clear perception which char acterizes the angelic intuition, and which was possessed by the unf alien Adam. (b). Sin gives a bias to the will against the truth, so that even when there is an accurate perception, there is an endeavor to get rid of it. Men know God to be holy, but do not like to retain this knowledge. Rom. 1 : 28. (

2. Secondly, infallibility cannot be attributed to the un written revelation, because of the limitations of the finite mind. Natural religion cannot be any more trustworthy than the human intellect itself is.1 But the human intel lect cannot be infallible, unless it is preserved from all error by an extraordinary exertion of Divine power. That ordinary operation of God in the human mind which is seen in ethics and natural religion, though sometimes reaching a high degree of certainty and validity, never reaches the point of absolute infallibility. Even when the unwritten revelation is rectified by the written revelation, we cannot attribute to it the absolute authority of the latter, because

1 See Conybeare : Reply to Tindal, in Shedd : History of Doctrine, I. 208.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 67

the rectification is more or less imperfect. The purest form of ethics and natural religion is to be found in Christendom, not in Paganism. The ethical system of Plato is not as cor rect as that of Butler. But infallibility cannot be attributed to either, as it is to the ethics of the decalogue, and the sermon on the mount. See Ursinus : Christian Religion, Question 92.

3. Thirdly, the unwritten revelation is inadequate to the needs of man as a sinner, because it does not include those truths which relate to redemption. Its doctrines are suffi cient only for a sinless being. Natural religion is silent re specting the exercise of mercy. It reveals only law and justice : 0/3777 not dydinj. St. Paul affirms that the wrath, not the compassion of God, is taught to men in the workings of conscience. This is the fatal lack in all the natural re ligions of mankind. Many current treatises on Comparative Religion are erroneous and misleading here. It is frequently contended that Boodhism and Confucianism are co-ordinate religions with Christianity, because they teach the golden rule, and other principles of ethics. But this does not prove the point. The distinguishing characteristic of Christianity is not the teaching of sound ethics, but the offer of mercy through a Divine mediator, and a radical change of human character. Christianity is gospel, not law ; but Confucian ism and Boodhism, so far as they contain truth, are law, not gospel. If it can be shown that Boodhism and Confucian ism actually secure the forgiveness and extirpation of human Bin, then they may be classed with Christianity. But there is no pardon and no regeneration in any religion but that of Jesus Christ. "Who is he that forgiveth sins, but God only?" Hence the modern Christian, like the primitive, cannot concede that Christianity is merely one among several religions ; merely one of the religiones licitae. Christianity is an exclusive religion for man, because it is the only re demptive religion for him. Shedd : Theological Essays, 374-376.

68 BIBLIOLOGY.

In the common use of the term, revelation is employed in the restricted signification, and signifies the written word of God. The contents of the written revelation are as follows :

1. Scripture includes among its teachings those of un written revelation : namely the first truths of ethics and natural religion. It assumes the validity of the doctrines of the divine existence, the unity of God, the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will, and future reward and punishment.

But these doctrines as taught in Scripture differ from the same doctrines as taught in Plato, for example : (a). By stronger evidence, and greater certainty. Immortality in the Phaedo is a hope and aspiration. In the gospel of John, it is the absolute assurance of personal knowledge and experi ence. Christ is an eye-witness, in respect to the other world and the other life. The Son of man speaks that which he knows, and testifies that which he has seen, John 3 : 11. (J). By freedom from erroneous elements. Morality in the decalogue, and in the sermon on the mount, is not mixed with false ethics. In Plato and Aristotle it is: e.g., the destruction of sick infants and the community of wives (Republic, Y.) ; and the justifying of slavery (Ethics, I. 4-8), and of abortion, and the destruction of feeble off spring (Ethics, YIII. 16). Natural religion in the unwritten form is vitiated by its connection with the impure reason of man ; in the written form, it is the pure reason of God. The Bible gives an inspired statement of natural religion ; Plato gives an uninspired statement. The first is infallible ; the second is more or less trustworthy, but not free from error. Whether polygamy is intrinsically immoral, cannot perhaps be determined by natural religion as deduced from the human mind alone ; but natural religion as enunciated by Christ makes polygamy to be wrong. " From the be ginning it was not so," Matt. 19 : 8. Christ teaches that monogamy is founded in the created nature and constitution of man. Again, the monotheism of the Bible is without

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 69

error ; that of natural religion is more or less vitiated : either in teaching too much severity in God, as in Pagan ism ; or too much indulgence in Him, as in the deistical schools of Christendom.

2. The written revelation contains many truths and facts that result from human observation and reflection. All that is historical, in both the Old Testament and the New, is of this kind. The narrative, for example, of the journeyings of the children of Israel, is the record of eye-witnesses. The history of the rise of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah, as recorded in the books of Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles, is an account drawn from contemporary sources. All that is geographical is of this kind ; and all that is chronological. The natural history of the Scriptures is also the product of man's observation.

But all this Biblical history, chronology, and geography} differs from corresponding matter in uninspired literature, by being unmixed with error. Biblical history is not leg endary like that of early Greece and Rome. Biblical chro nology is not extravagant like that of Egypt, as reported to Herodotus by the priests. Here the influence of inspiration is very apparent. Moses was guided in collecting and com posing the historical narratives in the Pentateuch. Hero dotus was not thus preserved from error in gathering and writing his accounts of the Egyptians, Persians and Greeks. "Many of the sacred writers," says Hodge (1. 155), " although inspired, received no revelation. This was probably the fact with the authors of the historical books of the Old Testa ment. The evangelist Luke does not refer his knowledge of the events which he records to revelation, but says he de rived it from those c who from the beginning were eye-wit nesses and ministers of the word,' Luke 1:2. It is imma terial to us where Moses obtained his knowledge of the events recorded in the book of Genesis ; whether from early documents, from tradition, or from direct revelation. If the Bacred writers had sufficient knowledge in themselves, or in

70 BIBLIOLOGY.

those about them, there is no need to assume any direct revelation. It is enough for us, that they were rendered in fallible as teachers."

3. The written word, besides the truths of natural re ligion, and the facts and truths that come within the ken of the ordinary human intelligence, contains a series of truths that are altogether different from these. These are the most important part of the contents of Scripture, and con stitute the most strictly supernatural element in the written word. Speaking generally, they are those truths and facts that relate to man's salvation from sin : viz., the trinity ; the creation and apostasy of man ; the incarnation ; and re demption. The doctrine of sin, though a fact of conscious ness, and thus belonging also to natural religion, has in the Scriptures certain features that imply special teaching, since human consciousness unassisted could not discover them : viz., the account of the temptation by Satan, and the fall in Adam ; and a profound analysis and delineation of sin itself, such as is given in the seventh and eighth chapters of Ro mans. The doctrine of sacrificial atonement for sin is also a truth of natural religion ; but the Mosaic system of sacri fices, so peculiar in its features, was given by the teaching of the Holy Spirit. " The Holy Ghost signified this, that the way into the holiest of all was not yet made mani fest, while the first tabernacle was yet standing," Heb. 9:8.

This twofold variety in the contents of the Bible necessi tates two varieties or modes of Divine operation upon the human mind: 1. Inspiration; 2. Revelation (proper). The distinction between these two is important, and the neglect of it has led to confusion.

Inspiration is like Revelation, in that it is a superhuman influence upon the particular person selected to be the organ of the Divine mind. But inspiration goes no further than to insure freedom from error in presenting that truth which has been obtained in the ordinary ways in which men obBEVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 71

tain truth ; while revelation discloses new truth that is inac cessible to the ordinary human mind. A man may be in spired, and yet not reveal anything. Much of the Bible is of this kind. But a man to whom a revelation is communi cated, is also inspired to express and record it. Inspiration is more of the nature of superintendence ; revelation is more of the nature of instruction and information.

The distinction between inspiration and revelation is an old one. Edwards (Mysteries of Scripture) marks the dis tinction in the following manner. " We ought to distin guish between those things which were written in the sacred books by the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and those which were only committed to writing by the direc tion of the Holy Spirit. To the former class belong all the mysteries of salvation, or all those things which respect the means of our deliverance taught in the gospel, which could not be known from the principles of reason, and there fore must be revealed. But to the other class those things belong, which either are already known from natural relig ion, but are of service to inculcate duty on man, and to demonstrate the necessity of a revelation of the means of salvation ; or all histories, useful to illustrate and assure us of the doctrines revealed, and which point out the various degrees of revelation, the different dispensations of salva tion, and the various modes of governing the church of God ; all of which are necessary to be known in the further explanation of mysteries."

Claude Frassen, a Franciscan monk and theologian of the 17th century, assumed three kinds of inspiration : 1. Inspiratio antecedens, or the revelation of things before un known. This is revelation proper. 2. Inspiratio concomitans, or the security against error in the statement of truths or facts known in the ordinary way. This is inspiration in distinction from revelation. 3. Inspiratio consequens, or the divine authority stamped by inspired men upon writ ings composed without inspiration ; e.g., the gospels of Mark

72 BIBLIOLOGY.

and Luke approved by Peter and Paul. See Knapp : The ology (Introduction).

Lee, in his work on Inspiration has made the distinction with care. But he errs in contending that it is not found in the older writers. Citing Quenstedt as one. who holds the " mechanical " theory, he quotes the following from him: "res quae in scriptura continentur, non solum per assistentiam et directionem divinam infallibilem literis consignatse sunt, sed singulari Spiritus Sancti suggestioni, inspi ration!, et dictamini, acceptae ferendae sunt." Lecture I. Here, evidently, " suggestio " denotes " revelation," and " inspiratio " denotes " inspiration." In the same connec tion, Quenstedt speaks of : " res sanctis scriptoribus natural iter prorsus incognitae ; naturaliter quidem cognoscibiles, actu tamen incognitae ; non tantum naturaliter cognoscibiles, sed etiam actu ipso notae," and brings them all under the head of inspiration.

Marking this distinction, the first position to be taken re specting the Bible is, that it is all of it inspired. The origi nal autograph-volume of inspiration was free from error. This does not mean that every sentence or proposition in Scripture contains a truth. The words of Satan to Eve (Gen. 3 : 4) were a falsehood. But those words were actu ally spoken, and they are recorded with infallible accuracy. Some of the reasonings and inferences of Job's friends were false, but they occurred as they are related by the inspired penman.

This theory of plenary inspiration has been the gener ally received doctrine of the Church. The following state ment of Turrettin (II. iv. 5) contains it : " The sacred writers were so moved and inspired by the Holy Ghost, both in respect to thought (res ipsas) and language, that they were kept from all error, and their writings are truly au thentic and divine." Quenstedt defines in a similar man ner. "Scripture is infallible truth, free from all error; each and everything contained in it is absolute truth (verisREVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 73

sima) ; be it doctrine, morals, history, chronology, topog raphy, proper names.'7 Similarly JELollaz remarks, that " matters of genealogy, of astronomy, of politics, though the knowledge of them is not necessary to salvation, are yet divinely revealed [inspired], because they serve to interpret and illustrate the truths that are necessary to salvation." Hase : Hutterus, § 44. These theologians, in these affirma tions, have reference to the original autograph. The state ment, be it doctrinal, historical, chronological, or geograph ical, as it came from the inspired person himself, was accurate. But they concede that some minor errors have subsequently come into the scripture manuscripts, from copyists and translators, and that some have been introduced by critics and exegetes.

The Westminster Confession (I. ii. vi.) teaches that " all the books of the Old and ISTew Testament are given by in spiration of God, to be the rule of faith and life ; " and that " our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts." The Scripture proofs of the authority and in fallibility of the scriptures are : 2 Tim. 3 : 16, " All script ure is given by inspiration of God." Heb. 1 : 1, 2, " God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son." 1. Cor. 2 : 13, " Which things we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth." 2. Pet. 1 : 21, " Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." John 5 : 39, " Search the scriptures." Rom. 3:2, " Unto them were committed the oracles of God." Isa. 8 : 20, " Look ye to the law and to the testi mony."

The theory of plenary inspiration prevailed in the Patris tic, Mediaeval, and Reformation periods. Luther has some times been cited as adopting a different view, because of his

74: BIBLIOLOGY.

opinion respecting the authority of the Apocalypse and the Epistle of James. But he questioned the canonicity of these portions of scripture. All scripture that he conceded to be canonical, he held to be infallible.

The Christian fathers are sometimes said to have held a loose view of inspiration. But the view of Augustine was certainly a strict one, and it had high authority in the pa tristic and mediaeval churches. In his De Consensu Evangelistaruin (I. xxxv.), he says : " Christ is the head and his apostles are the members. Whatever he wished us to read concerning his words and deeds, he ordered to be written down as if with his own hands ; and he who reads the nar ratives of the evangelists will believe them as if he saw Christ himself writing by their hands and pens."

Calixtus (1650), in Germany, introduced a less strict mid dle theory ; according to which the sacred writers were pre served from all error in regard to doctrine necessary to sal vation, but not in regard to subjects that have no such importance. His view found few advocates in his own day. Baumgarten (1725) reaffirmed it, maintaining that the Di vine influence preserved the sacred writers from error only so far as the purpose of a revelation required, which is the salvation of the soul from sin ; this purpose, he said, would not be frustrated by unimportant errors in chronology, his tory, topography, etc. This view, during this century, has gained ground particularly in Germany. Such evangelical theologians as Tholuck, Twesten, and Miiller adopt it. Dorner accepts it in part. " There are historical matters which stand in essential connection with the meaning and spirit of revelation. In this case, inspiration does not apply merely to non-historic eternal truths." Christian Doctrine, § 59. The theory is presented eloquently by Coleridge in his Con fessions of an Inquiring Spirit. For a criticism, see Shedd : Literary Essays, 336-342.

The objections to this middle theory of inspiration are the following: 1. The primary and the secondary matter in

EEVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 75

Scripture, such as doctrine and history, are so indissolubly connected with each other, that uncertainty in respect to the latter casts uncertainty upon the former. If for example the history of the residence of the Israelites in Egypt, and of their exodus and wanderings, is mythical and exaggerated like the early history of Assyria and Babylon, this throws discredit upon the decalogue as having been received from the lips of God on Sinai. If the history, geography, and chronology, in the midst of which the doctrinal elements of the Pentateuch are embedded, contain fictions and contra dictions, these doctrinal elements will not be accepted as an infallible revelation from God.

The same reasoning applies to the history and chronology of the New Testament. If the narrative by the four evan gelists of the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ is more or less legendary, it will be impossible to secure for the doc trines of Christ that undoubting belief which the church in every age has exercised in regard to them. This is clearly perceived by the skeptic. Strauss well knew that if he could succeed in proving the mythical character of the New Testament history, he would have little difficulty in destroy ing human confidence in the New Testament dogmas.

To say that if the doctrines of Scripture are held to be infallible, it is of no consequence whether the history and geography of Scripture are free from error, is like Schenkel's assertion that if the spirit of Christ is with the church, it is of no consequence whether his body rose from the grave or not. It would be impossible for the church to believe that the spirit of Christ dwells and operates in his people, if the cfiurch at the same time were denying or doubting that Christ rose from the tomb. The primary and the sec ondary, the doctrinal and the historical elements of Script ure stand or fall together. This is illustrated by a fact in the history of rationalistic criticism. Graf "assigned a postexilian origin to the great body of legislation found in Exo dus, Leviticus, and Numbers. The historical portion of this

76 BIBLIOLOGY.

Grundschrif t, lie still maintained to be the oldest part of the Pentateuch. But here, as Kuenen said, was the Achilles heel of his theory. Hence Eiehra and others insisted that he had no right to separate the legislative from the historical portions, unless he renounced the leading principles of analy sis as hitherto employed. Graf then yielded, and announced his conviction that the whole of the first Elohist, history as well as laws, is post-exilian. This view was afterwards elaborated by Wellhausen." Chambers : Pentateuchal Criti cism. Essay I. 14.

2. It is improbable that God would reveal a fact or doc trine to the human mind, and do nothing towards securing an accurate statement of it. This .is particularly the case, when the doctrine is one of the mysteries of religion. Such profound truths as the trinity, the incarnation, vicarious atonement, etc., require the superintendence and guidance of an infallible Spirit to secure an enunciation that shall not be misleading. Hence it is more natural to suppose that a prophet or an apostle who has received directly from God a profound and mysterious truth inaccessible to the human intellect, will not be left to his own unassisted pow ers in imparting what he has received. Especially is it improbable that communications from the deity would be veiled in extravagant and legendary costume.

3. The middle theory of a partial inspiration is more diffi cult to be maintained, than is the theory of plenary inspira tion. Because if only a part of Scripture is infallible, it becomes necessary to point out which part it is. If any one asserts that there are errors in the Bible, he must demon strate them. This is an arduous task. It is more difficult to prove that the narratives of the Pentateuch are forgeries of later writers, than to prove that they were composed by Moses. No one can demonstrate that the history of the exodus is legendary. The evidence for it as history is much greater than against it as fable. The arguments in favor of the scripture chronology are stronger than those against it.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 77

If they were not, the chronology would long ago have been rejected by the majority of students of the Bible ; the num ber of believers would have been as small as the existing number of skeptics.

It must be remembered that unsolved difficulties are not equivalent to a proof of the falsity of Scripture. Because a particular link in the chain of Biblical chronology, for ex ample, cannot now be put in, it does not follow that this chronology as a whole is erroneous. The mere absence of complete proof of the affirmative is not a proof of the nega tive. When there is a strong body of proof for a proposi tion, the mere fact that at a certain point the proof is weak, or lacking, is not sufficient to discredit the demonstrative force of this body of proof. The fact that the skeptic can ask a question which the believer cannot answer, is not a proof that the skeptic's own position is the truth, or that the believer's position is false. The unsolved difficulties re specting inspiration have often been palmed off as positive arguments for his own position, by the unbeliever.

In maintaining the plenary inspiration of the Bible, we shall consider it first as containing matter that is revealed, in distinction from inspired. All such revealed truth is in fallible, that is, free from error.

Kevelation in the restricted sense, we have seen, denotes the communication of truth or facts hitherto unknown to man, and incapable of being deduced from the structure of the human intellect, or derived through the ordinary chan nels of human information. It is generally indicated in the Old Testament by such phraseology as the following : "The vision of Isaiah which he saw concerning Judah and Jeru salem," Isaiah 1:1. " The burden of Tyre," Isa. 23 : 1. " The word of the Lord that came to Jeremiah, concerning the dearth," Jer. 14 : 1. " Then was the secret revealed to Daniel, in a night vision," Dan. 2 : 19 ; 10 : 1. " Thus eaith Jehovah, Call unto me, and I will answer thee, and shew great and mighty things which thou knowest not," Jer.

78 BIBLIOLOGY.

33 : 2, 3. In the New Testament, St. Paul describes a revela tion as a species of divine communication. " What shall I profit you, except I shall speak either by revelation (ev aTTOKaXvifrei,), or by knowledge," 1 Cor. 14 : 6. " When ye come together, every one of you hath a doctrine, hath a revelation (airoKakirfyiv), hath an interpretation," 1 Cor. 14 : 26. " I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord," 2 Cor. 12 : 1. The product of a revelation is de nominated a " mystery." " WTe speak the wisdom of God in a mystery," 1 Cor. 2:7. " Let a man so account of us as stewards of the mysteries of God," 1 Cor. 4:1. " Behold 1 show you a mystery," 1 Cor. 15 : 51. A mystery is a truth or fact revealed without an explanation of it. The trinity is such. Oftentimes when a proof of a revealed truth is demanded, it is really an explanation that is asked for. The objector requires that the fact or truth be made clear to his mind ; in which case, the mystery is at an end.

As an example of a revelation, consider 2 Thess. 2 : 3. St. Paul here informs the Thessalonian church of a fact that had been divulged to him from God : viz., that the second advent of Christ to the final judgment will not occur, until after a great apostasy in Christendom has taken place. He could not have obtained the knowledge from any human source. It was a secret which God disclosed to him. And it was infallible information. The future history of the world will evince that it is. Other examples of revelation are seen in the account of the resurrection of the body, in 1 Cor. 15 : 35-55 ; of the cessation of the work of redemp tion, in 1 Cor. 15 : 24-28 ; and of the conversion of the Jews after the conversion of the Gentiles, in Rom. 11 : 25. The account, in Gen. 1, of the order and succession of events in the creation of the world, is a revelation. This is a his tory which is both revealed and inspired. In this respect it differs from the history of the exodus of the Israelites, and similar histories in Scripture, which are inspired but not re vealed. There was no human observer to witness the proREVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 79

cess of creation, and to compose an account of it. The information of what was done in the six days must have been imparted by the Creator himself, who was the only actor and the only spectator. It could not have been derived from human records, or human science. Again the doctrine of the trinity is a truth not deducible by rational reflection, and therefore it is a revelation. In this respect, it differs from the doctrine of the unity of God. This latter is a truth capable of being inferred by the human intellect, as St. Paul (Rom. 1 : 19) teaches, from a contemplation of the works of creation outwardly and the operations of the human soul in wardly. The trinity is a part of the written revelation ; but the divine unity is a truth of natural religion, or unwritten revelation. The doctrine of the trinity as stated in the Bible is both revealed and inspired; the doctrine of the divine unity as stated in the Bible is inspired but not revealed.

Again, the doctrine of vicarious atonement is a revela tion. The doctrine of personal atonement, namely, that the transgressor must himself suffer, is a truth of natural re ligion ; but that another competent person may and will suffer for him is a truth only of revealed religion. " The soul that sinneth it shall die " (Ezek. 18 : 4), is natural re ligion. Christ uwas made a curse for us" (Gal. 3:13); Christ " is the propitiation for our sins " (1 John 2:2); is revelation. Whether God will pardon sin, and in what way he will do it, can no more be determined by a priori reason ing, than it can be determined by a priori reasoning whether another poet like Shakespeare will appear. It is a question of fact and of intention on the part of God ; and a fact must be known either by history, or by prophecy, which is history beforehand. And the only historical statement respecting the fact that God will forgive sin, is that of God himself in the written revelation. There may be conjectures and hopes in regard to the Divine mercy, but no certain knowledge except by a word from the Divine lips. The exercise of justice being necessary, the fact that it will be exercised

80 BIBLIOLOGY.

is a part of the unwritten revelation. The wrath of God is revealed in the human conscience, Rom. 1 : 18. But the exercise of mercy being optional, and contingent upon the Divine will, the fact that it will be exercised is a part of the written revelation only.

To determine then how much of the Bible is revelation proper, and how much is only inspiration, we have but to examine its contents. Anything in its pages that may indis putably be deduced by human reasoning, or be drawn from human sources of information, is not revealed. But every thing else is. The genealogical tables in Matthew and Luke are not revelation. Much of the historical narrative in the Old Testament and New Testament is not revelation. Geo graphical and statistical data are no part of revelation in dis tinction from inspiration.

Revelation in the restricted and technical use of the term is not human education and development. "When the human mind unfolds its own powers and manifests its own internal resources, the product is human. Philosophy, ethics, and natural theology are not an extraordinary communication from the Supreme Reason. They are the evolution of finite reason, and the product of human inquiry and investigation. It is true that inasmuch as the human intellect is the work manship of God, and its laws of thinking are imposed by its author, the result may be denominated a revelation in the wide sense of the term. But while it is an unwritten revela tion, it is also a natural operation of the human mind. It has the characteristics of the human mind, and is associated with the darkness and error of the fallen human rnind. For apostasy has hindered the pure development of the finite reason, so that while the unwritten revelation is sufficiently valid and trustworthy to render man inexcusable for his polytheism and sensuality, it is not an infallible and un erring light.

The theory of Lessing, in his tract entitled Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, that revelation, meaning by it the

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 81

Christian system, is education or human development, is ex actly wrong. He regards the Scriptures as only anticipating what the human mind could find out for itself, only more slowly and much later. But the distinguishing truths of the Christian Scriptures are of such a nature that they cannot be deduced from premises furnished by man's intellect. They are historical, not a priori. They must be made known by testimony, not by reasoning. The mathematician by mathematical calculation cannot discover in what order the different species of creatures were made. The a priori method can do nothing here. If any man had happened to be present, and witnessed the creative work, he could have reported what he had seen. But no man can in an a priori manner discover the way and manner in which the world was created. Similarly, no man can deduce in an a priori mariner from the nature and structure of the human mind, the doctrines of the trinity, the incarnation, the vicarious atonement, and redemption. These are not an evolution of the human mind, but a disclosure from the Divine mind.

For the same reason, revelation is not the product of national education and development. The Old Testament is not Hebrew literature, in the sense that the Iliad and Greek Drama are Greek literature. The whole Hebrew nation was not inspired by the Holy Spirit, but only a chosen few individuals in it. The merely natural and na tional development of the Hebrew mind produced the Targums and Talmud, and the Rabbinic literature generally, not the Old Testament scriptures. The latter were the work of Moses, Samuel, David, Isaiah and others — a small circle of Hebrews who were selected out of the Hebrew nation, and supernaturally taught in order that they might instruct their own people, and through them all other peoples. The sacred writers claim this for themselves, and it was conceded by the nation. See Josephus : Contra Apionem, I. 8. That the Old Testament scriptures are merely one of the literatures of the world, the work of the Hebrew nation and not a special revelation, in UK- |,..,.ini:iir and foundation of .-ill nitioimlintic criticism. ll Tin- ( >l«l Tn. lamml.," iayn Manrirr ( M«.ral and MH:.pl.\;.i."d I '1 , 1 1, ,: ,. .| ,| I y, < 'll. I.), " i" MO|. |.|M- hi..!nry of HH-II', thought! :il «»iil. <;n u history of

of iiiiin.rir to men. ir it is not- t.liui,, it, li nothing; 'M. ii Ealai

from beginning to (Mid. To muko it tin- lii: l«»ry «>f t In- : p< .-u lutionri of u curliiin tribo iibuut (iod, wo inusl. «l« n\ tin- very root of M\y lpeoul*tloni whiith Unit tribo ovctr luid. !;<>r tliia root in MM- !>• li<-l' tliut lln-v could not Hunk of him, nnl

An rrror of Iho HHIMO ^(umrul niit.iiro IH found in KOIIIU ovjiiigdlic.jd (M-iliirH, Hiich IIH "VVoiHS, for oxiunplo. In his Diblicul Theology of tbo Mow ToHtamont, ho ussuinos that the Gospels, primarily, wero tho product of Iho Primitive <-lnirch HM 11 whohi, not of tho ApoHtolic circlo oxchiHivoly. In its lii M(, form, Iho Life of Chrint was a narrativo ilouting about, in i IK- !'n i (Hirintian brothorliood, and not a narrativo rompoiu-d «lirt'clly or indiroc.t.ly by four apOitloi under tho guidance of inspiration. The primitive account of ('lirint'B wordn and docdn wan very fragmentary, and wan KubHiMjuently Bllppluniontod ami worked over into tho four GoHpoln a« tho church now hns them. There was an original .Mark, from which the present Mark wat» derived, and that original camo from the oral tradition of tho 8r§t Christian brotherhood. kk()nr synoptic (Jospelrt in their preaont form are probably of later origin than most, of the other books of the New Testa ment, and it is possible that many HayingH of JOSUH have boon tukiMi up into them which woro either altogether, or at least in their prewent nhupo, foreign to the earliest tradition. Tho .l.>li. inn. MM tradition in altogether excluded from tho earliest tradition." Weiss: Theology of N. T.$ 10, I 1. This view makes the Life of Christ to be the product not, of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, but of tho Primitive church; and thin roijiiiroa this church to have boon divinely guided in tieUHVKLATION AND I NSI'I l{ ATION. 83

Scribing the life Mid actions of Christ, if the description is :m infallible one. Accordingly, the advoeatesof this view

Cut MM- I'aci, in the case is, that the first Christian In-oilierhood obtained all I, IK; knowledge it, lia,; pare an account of his life :md lra.eliiiii.rs, and wen; promised di\ine aid and iniidance in doin^; it. MafL 10:5iiO; .Idiii Il:i35, 'Jd; l.ri:i:{ i.r.. 'I1!. is ^ni|.orl;uit, work was not loft to tin- random iiief.lio<] of a,n eai'ly (!

That the Gospels had an apostolical not, an rrelesiai tical origin, is j»roved l»y I In; fact, that, there WUH a £i£a^rj r&v aTToo-roXroi/, in wliich the lir; I, hrotherhood lt cont inucd." Ac!,; LJ : TJ. This WaS tin; common narrative of the Twelve Apostles respecting the life, teaching, and miracles of I heir Lord. Thin common oral account, ^iven by Mir. Twrlvr,

"which from the beginning were eye-witnesses ami minis ters of the word," Luke, I : ii, Home of the brotherhood at tempted to commit, to writing (avaTa^aaSai &i,t'iyri

84 BIBLIOLOGY.

that the original number of eye-witnesses might be kept full after the death of Judas, a twelfth apostle was chosen out of those who had " companied with them all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among them." Mat thias was chosen and ordained as an apostle, " to be a wit ness of Christ's resurrection," Acts 1 : 22. This testimony " with great power gave the apostles " in witnessing " of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus," Acts 4 : 33. This StSa^?; rwv aTTocrro^wv was committed to writing by those four of the Twelve Apostles to whom the four canonical Gospels have been attributed by the church for nearly twenty cen turies. These four Evangelists put into a fixed form the oral gospel which the Twelve had been teaching in their missionary work. The four were the agents of the Apos tolic college, in doing what Christ commanded them to do when he promised "to bring all things to their re membrance whatsoever he had said unto them." Justin Martyr, as early as 160, expresses the common belief of the church on this point, when he says that " the Apostles in the memoirs composed by them, which are called Gospels, have thus delivered unto us what was enjoined upon them." Apology I. Ixvi. See Presbyterian Review, Jan. 1887, 164-167.

That the Bible as containing revealed truths and facts is infallible, is allowed by those who hold the middle theory of inspiration. All truths and doctrines of Scripture that are necessary to salvation are certainly without mixture of error, and are the infallible rule of faith and practice. It is not therefore the fact of infallible revelation that is disputed, but the fact of infallible inspiration. We turn to the con sideration of this, which is the more difficult part of the general subject.

1. Inspiration is not sanctification. It is the operation of the Holy Spirit upon the human mind, for the purpose of conveying religious truth to mankind. It has therefore a certain resemblance to regeneration, in having a Divine

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 85

author and source. But it differs from it, in that the aim is not to impart holiness but information. Inspiration is in tellectual, while regeneration is spiritual. When the Holy Spirit inspires a person, he does not necessarily sanctify him ; he only instructs him and conveys truth by him. Balaam was inspired temporarily upon a certain occasion : " The Lord put words into his mouth," Num. 23 : 5. And all that he said while under the influence of the Lord was free from error. Caiaphas also was temporarily inspired : " This he spake not of himself, but prophesied " (John 11 : 51) ; and the prophecy was fulfilled. Nay more, even a dumb animal may be employed as the organ through which God conveys truth to men, as was the case with Balaam's ass. " The Lord opened the mouth of the ass " (Num. 22 : 28) ; and her expostulation was full of sense and truth. The ass made no mistake in anything she said to Balaam. The Divine message through her, as an instrument, was infallible. In the same manner, even a piece of un conscious matter like the pillar of cloud, or the burning bush, may be employed as the medium of a theophauy and of divine instruction through symbols.

This shows that inspiration is only intellectual illumi nation, and is entirely distinct from sanctification. If in spiration involved sanctification, the degree of each must be equal, and infallibility in knowledge would require sinlessness in character. Most of the organs of inspiration were in point of fact good men. " Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." None of them however were sinless and perfect men, and yet they were infallible. They had a perfect knowledge on the points respecting which they were inspired, but they had not a perfect charac ter. Peter was inspired, but he was defective in character, and was rebuked by Paul for his inconsistency in conduct. If we compare the result of the Apostolic council related in Acts 15, with the individual action subsequently of Peter spoken of in Gal. 2 : 11-13, we see that the same person

86 BIBLIOLOGY.

may as an imperfectly sanctified man recede from a position which he had taken previously as an inspired man. The decision of the council respecting the Mosaic ceremonial law was the teaching of the Holy Ghost ; but the weak yielding of Peter to the demands of Jewish Christians was the work ing of sinful imperfection — of which Peter subsequently re pented under the fraternal rebuke of Paul. Solomon was inspired to teach a certain class of truths, mainly ethical in distinction from evangelical, but his religious character, par ticularly in his old age, has led some to doubt his salva tion.

The fact that inspiration is instruction, not sanctification, and that revelation is an objective information from God which does not depend on subjective characteristics in the person chosen as the medium of communication, explains how it is that a volume containing the most profound views of God and man that have yet been published on earth, could have been produced amongst a people comparatively low in knowledge, civilization, and culture. The Hebrews were in ferior to the Greeks and Romans, in merely humanistic characteristics ; inferior in literature, art, and science. They produced very little in these provinces. But nothing in Greek or Roman theology and ethics will compare with the Scriptures of the Old Testament. The decalogue is the highest of moral codes ; but Moses was the leader and head of a half civilized and degraded body of Egyptian slaves. Had his theological and religious knowledge been only that which his own environment in Egypt at the court of Pharaoh would have furnished, he could no more have composed the decalogue, or the account of the creation in the opening of Genesis, than he could have composed Hamlet or the Principia. The immense disparity between the Old Testament as a book and the Hebrew people as a nation, shows that the knowledge of God and divine things contained in the former, but wanting in the latter, came ab extra. It was communicated from on high.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 87

2. Inspiration is not omniscience.1 The operation of the Holy Spirit does not impart all truth to the inspired mind, but only a portion of it. And it is religious truth that is principally conveyed. The Holy Spirit communicates sec ular truth only so far as this is necessary to the imparting of religious truth. " The scriptures principally teach what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God re quires of man." "Westminster L. C. 5. They teach secular and scientific truth only in subserviency to this.

Again, the knowledge of one inspired man may be less than that of another. There is a gradation in imparting re ligious truth. In the beginning of the Old economy, the Holy Ghost disclosed the doctrine of the incarnation only to that extent in which it is seen in the promise respecting the " Seed of the woman." The doctrine continues to be divulged with increasing details, until in Isaiah it is greatly widened and enlarged. In the Jtew Testament, the doctrine is as fully revealed as it will be, until the vision of the church by faith becomes the vision face to face. The apos tle John knew more than Moses, respecting the pre-existence, incarnation, and. death of the Son of God. Yet the latter was infallibly inspired upon all points respecting which he has said anything. But he has not spoken upon as many points as St. John has.

3. Inspired truth is not necessarily completely compre hensible. A doctrine or fact may be infallible, and yet mysterious. Because the Bible is not level to human in telligence in all its teachings, it does not follow that it is not free from error. In 1 Pet. 1 : 10, 11, the Old Testa ment prophets themselves are described as " inquiring and

1 Immer, Hermeneutics p. 18, argues against the infallibility of St. Paul, be cause of the failure of his memory in regard to a certain particular. 1 Cor. 14 : 16. Because the apostle could not remember how many persons he had bap tized, therefore his teaching in 1 Cor. 15 respecting the resurrection is fallible ! Upon the same principle, he should deny St. Paul's infallibility because he waa ignorant of the steam engine and telegraph.

88 BIBLIOLOGY.

searching " into the meaning of the prophecies taught them by the Holy Spirit. The "sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow" are points that are mentioned.

Defining inspiration positi\7ely, it may be described as the influence of the Holy Spirit upon a human person, whereby he is infallibly moved and guided in all his statements while under this influence. The general notion is that of an afflatus. There is an i inbreathing of the Holy Spirit upon the human spirit. The epithet employed by St. Paul (2 Tim. 3 : 16) is $eo7rz>euo-T09. The consequence is an inward im pulse and actuation of the mind. " Holy men of God spake as they were moved (carried along, fapopevoi) by the Holy Spirit," 2 Pet. 1 : 21.

Analyzing, there is : (a). Suggestion of matter, both as to thought and language; aiding the memory is included in this (John 14 : 26) ; * (&). Impulse to speak or write ; (c). Direction, by which the mind is preserved from error. We are aided in conceiving of the operation of the Holy Spirit in inspiration, by its analogy with his operation in regeneration, (a). It violates no laws of thought, (b). It leaves the individual peculiarities as it finds them. (c). It is thorough and all-pervading. Hence it affects the language as well as the thought.

At this point, there is a difference of opinion among those who hold to plenary inspiration ; some affirming, and some denying the doctrine of verbal inspiration, in connec1 "In his extreme old age, the elder Adams was asked for an analysis of James Otis's speech in 1761 on the acts of the Board of Trade, which was five hours long. He answered that no man could have written the argument from memory 'the day after it was spoken,' much less 'after a lapse of fifty-seven years.' Adams then proceeded to compose a series of Letters on the subject filling thirty-three closely printed pages. Comparing these letters with letters written at or near the time, I am obliged to think that the venerable man blended together his recollections of the totality of the influence and doctrines of Otis during the years 1761-6. I own that I have had embarrassment in adjusting the authorities." Bancroft : History, IV. 416. If St. John did not compose and write his Gospel until A.D. 80, or 90, he certainly would have needed super natural assistance in reporting so minutely and fully as he has the last discourse of Christ, some fifty or more years after its delivery.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 89

tion with it. Everything depends, in settling this question, upon the view taken of the connection between thought and language. If words are merely arbitrary signs of ideas, like the algebraic symbols plus and minus, — mere marks, having no affinity with the ideas, and not prompted by them — then an idea might be suggested by inspiration with out any prompting or suggestion of a word to express it. Thought and language in this case are wholly diverse and disconnected, and if words are given to the prophet by which to exhibit the ^vordless thoughts that have been started in his mind, it must be by dictation. | Dictation is the standing objection to verbal inspiration. Upon this theory of language, it is assumed that the two processes of thinking and expressing thought can each go on by itself independently of the other, and that the thought does not naturally and inevitably prompt the word. "When an author dictates to a scribe, the scribe does not go through the mental process along with the author ; any more than does the type-setter in setting up type ; any more than does the parrot in repeating human words. The scribe does not think the author's thoughts along with him, but mechani cally writes down what he hears with his ear. In this in stance, the ideas and the words, for the scribe, are entirely separated from each other. If this be the true theory of the relation of language to thought, then verbal inspiration would be dictation.

But if it be held that there is a natural affinity and a nec essary connection between thought and language, then what ever prompts thought prompts language, and an influence upon one is an influence upon the other. The suggestion of ideas inevitably involves the suggestion of words. Thought and language upon this theory are inseparable, so that when the Holy Spirit inspires a prophet, the mind of the prophet is so moved that he not merely thinks, but utters his thinking in language that is suitable and simultaneously inibreathed and prompted along with the thought. Both alike are theopneus90 BIBLIOLOGY.

tic.1 This is wholly different from dictation. Dictation sep arates thought and language ; verbal inspiration unites them. Verbal inspiration is the truth, if thought is prior to and suggests language ; but not if language is prior to and sug gests thought. The inspired writer in this latter case does not have the thought until he has had the word, and the word is dictated to him by the Spirit, not prompted in him by the inspired thought in his own mind.

That words are not arbitrary signs of ideas, having no natural connection and affinity with the ideas expressed by them, is proved : 1. By Scripture. According to the Bible, an idea and its word are the same thing essentially. They are human thought in two different modes or forms. When a thought is in the mind, or unuttered, it is an idea. When that same thought is out of the mind, or uttered, it is a word. An idea is an. internal word ; and a word is an ex ternal idea. To speak, is to think externally ; and to think, is to speak internally. Accordingly, the Scriptures denomi nate thinking internal speaking. " The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God," Ps. 14 : 1. " Begin not to say with in yourselves," Luke 3:8. " Afterwards lie said within himself," Luke 18 : 4. In these instances, thinking is men tal speaking, and consequently speaking is vocal thinking. With this agrees our own modern usage. In common parlance, when men utter their thoughts in words, they are said to "think aloud." In Greek, \6yo<; signifies both reason and word. Reason is internal thought (\6yos eVSto^ero?) ; word is external thought (Xoyo? Trpofopucos).

2. By comparing the sounds of human language with

1 Says Philippi (Glaubenslehre, Zweiter Kapitel), " While we maintain verbal inspiration (Wortinspiration), we do not mean the inspiration of each word separately and by itself ( Worterinspiration). " As he explains his meaning, it seems to be, that an apostle, or prophet, under the impulse of the Divine Spirit, originated a product that as a unity and a whole was inspired both in matter and form, thought and language. But each particular word, one by one, was not mechanically and separately suggested to him. The process of inspiration was dynamical, continuous, and flowing.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 91

other sounds. Human language is not mere unmeaning noise, like the sounds in material nature, such as that of falling water, or of thunder. These sounds have no sense or signification for the human reason. Nor is human lan guage like the cries of animals, or the singing of birds. These sounds, though approaching nearer to human speech than do the sounds of material nature, yet contain no in tellectual ideas or conceptions. They are thoughtless inar ticulate cries, not language proper. But the sounds of every human language are thoughtful, and waken thought. They are not mere sounds, but sounds filled with sense and meaning for the human mind. See Torrey: Theory of Fine Art, 236.

3. By the fact that shades of an idea suggest varieties of words. This explains the origin of synonyms. The author of Proverbs denominates the second trinitarian person Wis dom ; St. John denominates him Reason. The two phases of the revealed idea suggest the two different terms for it.

4. By the fact that men think in words, (a). If an Eng lishman reads or speaks the French language, his thinking is connected with English words alone, unless he has made the French language as familiar as his own, and can think in it. Before he can grasp the idea, he must transfer it from the French word to the corresponding English one. Not until this process has been gone through, is he master of the thought. Here, thought is necessarily connected with lan guage. The following from a work of fiction illustrates this. " Madame de Lalouve spoke very good English indeed, and her accent, especially, was all but faultless, but she had the defect of thinking in French, and translating afterwards into our vernacular, and hence her speech occasionally lapsed into Gallic idioms and turns of language. It was quite otherwise with that other linguist whose nickname was Chinese Jack. He was one of those polyglot talkers who are possessed of the rare gift of thinking in any articulate tongue, from Hebrew to Japanese, and therefore of ex92 BIBLIOLOGY.

pressing his thoughts as a Malay, or a Persian, or a Spaniard would do, and not as a scholar with an elaborate acquaint ance with the language would do." (b). Intense thinking often causes audible wording or phrasing of the thought ; for example, whispering, or speaking aloud to one's self. (c). The dumb person, attempts to utter his thoughts in an in articulate murmur or sound of some kind. His ideas strug gle for utterance, implying that an idea is incomplete with out its word. (d). A tribe of men without an articulate language, if such could be found, would be without human ideas. Their range of consciousness would be like that of the brutes. Sometimes a particular word is found to be wanting in a language, and it is also found that the particular idea is wanting also. The missionary Kiggs reports that the Dakota language contained no word for one quarter, or one eighth, and so on, because the people had no idea of such fractions. They stopped with the notion of one half, in their calculations, and went no further mentally. " Only one word," he says, " exists — Tiaiikay^ half. We mission aries in writing out and improving the language can say hankay-hankay, the half of a half ; but the tribe do not. Besides hankay, there is nothing but the word for a piece. But this is an indefinite word, and not suited for the cer tainties of mathematics. The poverty of the language has been a great obstacle in teaching arithmetic. But the poor ness of the language shows their poverty of thought in the same line."

5. By the fact that a peculiar kind of thought expresses itself spontaneously in a particular kind of phraseology. Poetic thought suggests and prompts poetic forms of lan guage; philosophic thought suggests and prompts philo sophic forms, etc.1

1 On the necessary connection of thought and language, compare Miiller : Science of Language, First Series, Lectures I. II. IX. ; Science of Thought, I. 284, sq. Westcott : Study of the Gospels (Introduction). Shedd : Literary Es says, 149-168.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 93

Scripture itself asserts verbal inspiration. Jer. 1:9, "I have put words in thy mouth ; " Luke 21 : 12-15, " I will give you a mouth and wisdom " — both language and thought ; Matt. 10 : 20, " It is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you ; " Acts 2 : 4, " They spake as the Spirit gave them utterance ; " 2 Peter 1 : 21, " Holy men spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." Words are carefully selected by the inspired mind, under divine guidance. In John 10 : 35, stress is laid upon the use of the word " gods" as applied to prophets and mag istrates ; and in Gal. 3 : 16, upon the use of the singular " seed," not the plural " seeds." The neuter is employed instead of the masculine, when the idea of the impersonal becomes of great consequence ; e.g. : Luke 1 : 35, TO yevvafjievov ayiov; John 10 : 30, ev instead of I*?. In Phil. 2 : 6, fj-opfyri &eov is used instead of ova-la £eo£>, because the idea is that of a particular trinitarian person, not of the divine essence simply. In John 17 : 24, the Keceptus reads cfc SeSw/ea?, and the uncials read o SeSco/ea?. If the idea in the mind of the inspired writer was that of the church as a collective unity, the thought suggested the word 6. If it was that of particular individuals, the thought suggested the word of;?.

The objections urged against the plenary inspiration of the Bible are the following :

1. There are discrepancies and errors in the history, geography, and chronology. In replying to this objection, it is to be remarked in the outset, that the correction of a book by itself is different from its correction by other books. There is only apparent error in the first case ; in the second there is real error. If the witness himself while upon the stand explains satisfactorily certain varia tions in his own testimony, this does not invalidate his tes timony. But if another witness contradicts or corrects him, this awakens doubt and may invalidate.

Now it is a fact that many of the difficulties of which we

94: BIBLIOLOGY.

are speaking do not arise from a discrepancy between the Bible and other books, but between parts of the Bible it self. For example, 2. Kings 8 : 26 asserts that Ahaziah was twenty-two years old when he began to reign, and 2 Chron. 22 : 2 asserts that he was forty-two years old at that time. One of these must be corrected by the other. Again, Luke relates that one of the malefactors reviled Christ, and the other did not ; Mark says that " they that were cruci fied with him reviled him ; " and Matthew that " the thieves also which were crucified with him " insulted him. These variations can be shown to be consistent with one another, by comparing scripture with scripture, as is done in the ordinary Harmonies of the Gospels. It is plain, in reference to such seeming discrepancies, that inasmuch as each sacred writer knew what had been said by his pre decessors, what appears to be contradiction to a modern reader must have been none for the original author. He evidently was not aware of any real discrepancy. For had he been, he would either have referred to it and har monized it with his own, or else would have avoided it altogether by verbally conforming his own statement to that of his predecessor.

The Bible then is self -rectify ing. The book furnishes the materials for its own verification. This is wholly differ ent from rectification from human sources, such as profane literature. When scripture explains or if need be corrects scripture, the divine explains and verifies the divine ; in spiration explains inspiration ; spiritual things are compared with spiritual, 1 Cor. 2 : 13. But if scripture requires to be explained and corrected by human authorities, then the divine is rectified by the human. In the first case, the error is only seeming ; in the last, it is real.

Another preliminary remark is, that minor and unessen tial variations are positive proofs of truthfulness in a wit ness. Had the Gospels been forged, there would not have been even seeming discrepancies, because pains would have

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 95

been taken to avoid them. Discrepancies of a certain kind, are sure proof of an absence of collusion and previous agree ment between the evangelists. Variations are not neces sarily contradictions. The testimony of witnesses in court who agree in the general, is not rejected because of some unessential diversity. If each witness exactly and parrotlike repeated the other's testimony, he would be suspected for the very reason of exact similarity. There may be too much agreement between witnesses, as well as too little.

Minor variations, consequently, are not inconsistent with plenary inspiration. As they are compatible with a true account, they are also compatible with an infallible account. In saying that the Holy Spirit inspired both Matthew and John in writing a memoir of Christ, it is not meant that he guided them in such a way that each related the very same incidents in the very same manner, and in the very same words ; that lie inspired them to produce two fac-similes. But the meaning is, that he guided each in such a manner that the individuality of each writer was preserved in the choice of incidents, in their arrangement, and in the phrase ology ; and yet in such a manner that neither writer attrib utes to Christ a parable which he did not teach, a miracle which he did not work, or describes him as concerned in occurrences with which he really had nothing to do. Luke's order differs in some particulars from that of Matthew, but this does not prove that there is historical error in either of them. A biographer may know the actual and true order, and yet alter it for logical or rhetorical reasons. He may, far such reasons, throw together in one group a series of parables or miracles which were spoken or wrought at dif ferent times, and still his account of the parables and mir acles cannot be charged with mistake, because the grouping is apparent on the face of his narrative.

Four different persons may be inspired to relate the biography of Christ, and may produce four narratives that are infallible, or free from error, without mentioning the

96 BIBLIOLOGY.

very same incidents, in the very same order, in the same degree of detail, and in the same phraseology. The object or oftentimes seems to suppose that infallibility means not only freedom from error, but such an identity of state ment as would amount to a fac-simile. The inscription on the cross is an example. Matthew reports that it was, "This is Jesus, the King of the Jews." Mark, that it was, " The King of the Jews." Luke, that it was, " This is the King of the Jews." John, that it was, " Jesus of Nazareth the King of the Jews." Now if infallibility means freedom from error in the statement actually made, and not the exclusion of every kind of variety in the man ner of stating a fact, and so the production of a mere fac simile, these four reports are infallible. Mark is not in error when he says that the inscription was, " The King of the Jews." These words were in the inscription, as the other reports show. He states the truth, though not the whole truth. Had he said in addition that these were the ipsissima verba, and were oil the words, he would have stated an error.

From the list therefore of alleged discrepancies and er rors, must be deducted all such as scripture itself enables the reader to correct. To these belong : (a). Errors of copyists. 2 Kings 8 : 26, " Ahaziah was two and twenty years old when he began to reign," compared with 2 Chron. 22 : 2, " Forty and two years old when he began to reign." According to 1 Sam. 6 : 19, 50070 men were slain for looking into the ark ; seventy men probably being the number. Speaker's Commentary in loco. Says Kawlinson (Introduction to Chronicles), " The condition of the text of Chronicles is far from satisfactory. Various readings are frequent, particularly the names of persons and places which occur in different forms not likely to have been used by the same writer. Numerous omissions are found, especially in the genealogies, where sometimes important names have dropt out ; and sometimes the names which remain do not

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 97

agree with the numerical statement attached to them. But the most important corruptions are in the numbers in Sam uel or Kings, sometimes unreasonably large, and therefore justly suspected. Other defects are a derangement in the order of the words, and the substitution of a more familiar term for one less known."

(5). Errors in translation.

(c). Discrepancies which greater fulness of detail in the narrative would remove. " Brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio," says Horace. A harmony of the four Gospels that removes every difficulty without exception is probably not possible, be cause of the sketch-like nature of the narrative. The Gospels are memorabilia, and were called aTro/jivrjiJLovevfjiaTa at first. A series of memoranda, though agreeing in principal feat ures, are generally difficult to reconcile in all particulars. The conciseness and brevity of one evangelist at a particular point, sometimes makes it difficult or even impossible to show his agreement in this particular with another evangelist who is fuller at this point. But no evangelist ever differs so greatly from the others as to destroy his own historical credibility, or that of the others. Differences sometimes arise from silence on the part of a writer, and these are alleged to be contradictions. Mark and John give no account of the mi raculous conception of Christ by the Holy Ghost, yet both of them imply it. He is a supernatural and divine person for them both. There is nothing in Mark and John that contradicts the miraculous conception. John gives no ac count of the institution of the Lord's Supper, but he records conversations of Christ that involve the fact. See John 6 : 48-58. Two inspired narratives may be each infallible, and yet one contain more information than the other. Had Matthew, for example, related two of Christ's temptations in the desert, and omitted the third, while Luke related all three, both accounts would have been inerrant, provided that Matthew had not positively asserted that there were only two temptations. There would be no just ground for

98 BIBLIOLOGY.

saying that the two accounts contradicted each other. It is not necessary that an inspired person should know all things, or even report all that he does know ; but only that what he does report should be true. The evangelists were permitted and thus inspired to omit some incidents in Christ's life ; for it is improbable that the contends of the four Gospels contain all that the four evangelists knew concerning him. " There are also many other things which Jesus did, the which, if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be writ ten," John 21 : 25.

(d). Discrepancies arising from a general statement by one witness, and a particular statement by another, and sometimes by one and the same witness. Matthew (27 : 44), and Mark (15 : 32), say that the thieves crucified with Christ reviled him. The reference here is to a class of men. Luke (23 : 39-43) says that one of them reviled him, and the other did not. He enters into detail, as the other evangelists do not. . According to Acts 9 : 7, the com panions of Saul heard the heavenly voice but " saw no man ; " according to Acts 22 : 9, they saw the light, but " heard not the voice." The very same person, namely Luke, who made the first statement made the last, and was not aware of any contradiction between the two. In the first passage, an indistinct sound from heaven is intended, as in Matt. 24 : 31 (

(e). Difficulties arising from an incorrect interpretation of scripture. The explanation of the word " day " in Gene sis 1, is a marked instance. Exegetes for many years inter preted it to mean a day of twenty-four hours, thereby bring ing Genesis and geology into collision. But so far as the text is concerned, there is full right and reason to explain it as a period. This was the first interpretation, because it

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 99

was the most natural one. The patristic exegetes so under stood the word. " The meaning," says Whewell (Inductive Sciences, I. 286), "which any generation puts upon the phrases of scripture, depends more than is at first sight sup posed upon the received philosophy of the time. Hence while men imagine that they are contending for revelation, they are in fact contending for their own interpretation of revelation. At the present day, we can hardly conceive how reasonable men should have imagined that religious reflec tions in scripture respecting the stability of the earth, and the beauty and use of the luminaries which revolve around it, would be interfered with by the acknowledgment that this rest and motion are apparent only."

(/*). Difficulties in Biblical chronology arise from the fact that the sacred writer does not give a full list of all the names in a series, but only a selected list. Sometimes he omits the name of the son and passes to that of the grand son, or great-grandson, whom he calls a " son." In Gen. 46 : 16-18, three generations, sons, grandsons, and greatgrandsons, are all called the " sons " of Zilpah. The genea logical tables of the Jews were drawn up artificially. That of our Lord by Matthew is an example. Fourteen names are selected in each of the three periods mentioned. But it would be a great error to infer that Matthew intended to teach that there were exactly fourteen generations, no more and no less, in each of these periods, and should calculate the time accordingly. Gardiner : Harmony, Pt. I. 39. The evangelist took the catalogue of names given in the temple records, and modified it to suit his purpose. This method makes it impossible for one living many centuries later, to construct a Biblical chronology that shall be mathematically precise down to a year, or a score of years. Only an ap proximation was intended by the writer himself, and the Holy Spirit who guided him. Sometimes, in quoting, a round number is given instead of the exact. Stephen says 400 for 430, in Acts 7 : 6. Speaker's Commentary in loco.

100 BIBLIOLOGY.

In addition to this, there is the difference between the Hebrew text from which the modern versions have been made, and that from which the Septuagint version was made. There is a difference of 1500 years. Which is the original text ? Only the original is the inspired text.

But while the Biblical chronology is only approximately, not mathematically accurate, it does not follow that it is erroneous. There can be no mathematically exact chronol ogy. The Scripture chronology is free from the fatally damaging error which characterizes all the early ethnical chronology — namely, of attributing an immense antiquity to man and nations. The inspired writers bring all human history within a period of six or eight thousand years. In so doing, they teach no error. This chronology is confirmed by the monuments and records of Assyria, Babylon, and Egypt. Speaker's Commentary : Introduction to Kings and Hosea. Beecher : Presbyterian Review, July, 1881.

(g). Difficulties arising from attributing to the sacred writer statements that are not his, but which he merely re cords. These make a large list, and furnish some of the most specious objections to the doctrine of plenary inspira tion. It is objected, for example, that the discourse of Stephen, in Acts 7, contains chronological and other errors. Even if this can be made out, these errors are not imputable to Luke who reports the discourse. Stephen is indeed said to have been " full of the Holy Ghost," Acts 6:5; and so is Barnabas, Acts 11 : 24. But neither of them belonged to the apostolic college of infallible teachers of the Church. This is one of a multitude of statements in Scripture, both of fact and of opinion, whose authorship is not referable to the inspired writers who merely report them.

(A). Variations in citations from the Old Testament in the New. These are neither errors nor contradictions, be cause the variation is intended by the New Testament writer. The statement of Davidson in the earlier edition of his Hermeneutics expresses the catholic opinion. " Every

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 101

mode of quotation has been employed, from the exactest to the loose ; from the strictly verbal method to the widest paraphrase ; but in no case is violence done to the meaning of the original." In the later editions of his work, David son recedes from this position, and agrees with the ration alist, who affirms that the meaning of an Old Testament pas sage is sometimes wrested in quotation by St. Paul. Immer (Hermeneutics) so asserts. That a New Testament writer quotes an Old Testament passage by way of accommoda tion, does not disprove his inspiration. He may be divinely guided to do this, as well as to quote strictly. The passage which he cites, even if not taken in its first and strictest sense, is yet suited to teach the particular truth which he is inspired to convey. An apostle may adapt a text to his present purpose, as a preacher may, provided the text as so adapted aids him in imparting truth, not error. The same remark holds respecting verbal variation in quoting. That a New Testament writer quotes Moses ad sensum and not ad verbum, does not prove that he is uninspired and fallible upon the subject which he is presenting.

Eespecting the difficulties in Scripture that are still un settled, it is to be noticed that there is no alleged error in doctrine, history, chronology, and physics, that has been demonstrated to be such so irref rag ably that it is absurd to attempt a reply. There is no list of conceded errors in scripture. There are perplexities remaining, but while there is not an instance in which the controversy with the skeptic has resulted in establishing the fact of un doubted error in revelation, there are many instances in which it has resulted in demonstrating its truth and accu racy. The skeptical criticism to which the canon has been subjected for a period of nineteen centuries has strength ened, not weakened, the doctrine of plenary inspiration. The discoveries in Nineveh, Babylon, and Egypt, in par ticular, evince this.

The infallibility of Scripture is denied upon the ground

102 BIBLIOLOGY.

that it contains a human element. The human is fallible and liable to error. If therefore the Bible has a human element in it, as is conceded, it cannot be free from all error. This is one of the principal arguments urged by those who assert the fallibility of Scripture.

This objection overlooks the fact, that the human ele ment in the Bible is so modified by the divine element with which it is blended, as to differ from the merely ordinary human. The written Word is indeed Divine-human, like the incarnate Word. But the human element in Scripture, like the human nature in our Lord, is preserved from the defects of the common human, and becomes the pure and ideal human. The human mind alone and by itself is fallible, but when inspired and moved by the Holy Spirit becomes infallible, because it is no longer alone and by itself. The written word, in this respect, is analogous to the incarnate Word. The humanity of Christ, by reason of its assump tion into personal union with the eternal Logos, while re maining really and truly human, is yet not the ordinary sinful humanity. It is perfectly sanctified humanity, free from sin. Similarly, when the Holy Spirit inspires a hu man mind, though this human mind is not freed from all sin, because inspiration is not sanctification, yet it is freed from all error on the points involved. It is no longer the fallibly human, but is infallible upon all subjects respecting which it is inspired to teach. The inspired human differs from the uninspired human, similarly as the human nature that is united with the second trinitarian person differs from the human nature that is found in an ordinary man. Christ's human soul thought and felt like a real man, but without sin. The Divine-human, in this instance, is sin less. Isaiah's human mind when under inspiration thought and perceived like a real man, but without error. He was not without sin ; for inspiration does not sanctify. But he was infallible ; for inspiration enlightens without any mixt ure of untruth.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 103

The " human element " in Scripture means, that an in spired man in perceiving and conveying truth employs his own human mind, his own native language, the common figures of speech, and exhibits his own individual peculiar ities, but without misconception and error upon the subject of which he treats, because his human mind is actuated and guided by the Divine Mind. The doctrine, both ethical and evangelical, which the human mind under this super human influence teaches, is infallible. The history which it relates is according to facts, and unmixed with legend. The physics which it sets forth contains no pantheism or polytheism. The chronology which it presents has no im mense and fabulous antiquity, like that of Egypt and India.

Those who contend that the Bible is fallible because it contains a human element commit the same error, in kind, with those who assert that Jesus Christ was sinful because he had a human nature in his complex person. Both alike overlook the fact that when the human is supernatnrally brought into connection with the divine, it is greatly modi fied and improved, and obtains some characteristics that do not belong to it of and by itself alone. "When the Logos would assume a human nature into union with himself, this nature was first prepared for the union by being perfectly sanctified by the Holy Spirit in the miraculous conception. And when the Holy Spirit selects a particular person — Moses, Samuel, David, Isaiah, John, Paul — as his organ for communicating religious truth to mankind, he first makes him infallible, though he does not make him sinless. Con sequently, the human element in the prophecy, or the his tory, or the dogma, which this inspired person gives to the Church, is not a fallible element, because it is blended with the divine element of inspiration and kept free from hu man error.

2. A second objection urged against the doctrine of plen ary inspiration is, that there is a conflict between the Bib104 BIBLIOLOGY.

lical physics and natural science.1 Upon this subject, the following is to be remarked :

1. The inspired writers were permitted to employ the astronomy and physics of the people and age to which they themselves belonged, because the true astronomy and phy sics would have been unintelligible. If the account of the miracle of Joshua had been related in the terms of the Copernican astronomy ; if Joshua had said, " Earth stand thou still," instead of, " Sun stand thou still " ; it could not have been understood. The modern astronomer himself describes the sun as rising and setting.

2. If the inspired writers had distinctly and formally represented the popular physics of their day to be the abso lute and scientific physics for all time, as they represent the gospel to be the absolute and final religion for all time ; if they had endorsed and defended the Ptolemaic astronomy ; this would have proved them to be fallible and uninspired. But this they never do. Except in a few places which we shall specify, the Bible does not commit itself to any system of physics. The purpose of the scriptures, says Baronius, is " to teach man how to go to heaven, and not how the heavens go." The sacred writers employ the geocentric physics in their descriptions of natural phenomena, as Kep ler and Newton do when they speak of sunrise and sunset, but they nowhere set forth this popular physics as revealed and infallible truth. Because the sacred writer (Josh. 10 : 1214) describes the sun as standing still, it does not follow that he taught the Ptolemaic astronomy. He had no particular astronomical system whatever in view. Kepler so under stood him. " The only thing which Joshua prayed for, was that the mountains might not intercept the sun from him. It had been very unreasonable at that time to think of astronomy, or of the errors of sight and sense ; for if any one had told him that the sun could not really move on

1 See Whewell : Inductive Sciences, V. iii. 4 (The Copernican System op posed on theological grounds).

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 105

the valley of Ajalon except only in reference to sense, would not Joshua have answered that his desire was that the day might be prolonged, so it were by any means whatever." Kepler: On Hash Citations from Scripture. Stanley: Jew ish Church, 1st Series, 277.

Lord Bacon, alluding to "the school of Paracelsus and some others that have pretended to find the truth of all natural philosophy in scripture," remarks that in so doing " they do not give honor to the scriptures as they suppose, but much embase them. For to seek heaven and earth, in the word of God, whereof it is said i heaven and earth shall pass away, but my word shall not pass,' is to seek tempo rary things amongst eternal; and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek the living amongst the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead amongst the living ; neither are the pots or lavers, whose place was in the outward part of the temple, to be sought in the holiest place of all, where the ark of the testimony was seated. The scope or purpose of the Spirit of God is not to express matters of nature in the scriptures otherwise than in pas sage, and for application to man's capacity, and to matters moral or divine." Advancement of Learning, II. (sub. fine).

3. At the same time, physical science is to some extent taught by revelation and recorded by inspiration. It is erroneous to say that the Bible commits itself to no physics whatever. Certain truths and facts in regard to the mate rial universe were revealed to some of the writers of the Bible, and these have infallibility. Most of these disclos ures relating to physics are made in the beginning of the scriptures. The book of Genesis contains the principal of them. The Holy Spirit having revealed as much respect ing the material world as seemed good to him, preparatory to his revelations respecting the spiritual world, is after wards silent. Christ himself, " by whom all things were made, and without whom was not anything made that was

106 BIBLIOLOGY.

made," makes no further disclosures than those which were granted to Moses.

The positive and distinct teachings of revelation, in the opening of Genesis, respecting the physical universe, differ remarkably from the popular physics of the ancient world. Moses does not present a cosmogony like that of Assyria, or Egypt, or India, or Greece and Rome. His idea of the relation which matter sustains to God is wholly different from that of even as deep a thinker as Plato.

Among the peculiarities that distinguish the revealed physics are the following :

1. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo ; in sharp contrast : (a). To the eternity of matter, in atheism ; (b). To emanation from the deity, in pantheism ; (

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 107

visible and invisible," Col. 1 : 10. Mosheim, in a learned dissertation annexed to his translation of Cudworth (Ed. Tegg, III. 144), shows that none of the heathen philoso phers taught that the world was created ex nihilo.

2. The absolute independence of God in relation to the universe. He is before all things, and by him all things exist. This is in marked contrast to the common view in the ancient physics, and in the skeptical schools in modern physics. In the physics of Plato and Aristotle, the deity is conditioned by the V\T], though a comparatively lofty and spiritual view of the deity is held. In the cruder physics of Lucretius, mind is wholly subject to matter. The deity is not a free and independent being, so far as the material universe is concerned. Material law rules everything, so that a supernatural act is impossible.

3. The absolute omnipotence of God in relation to the universe. Forces and laws of nature are under his entire control. They can be originated, or altered, or suspended by their Creator. This feature is also utterly antagonistic to the natural science of the ancient world. See Isaiah 40 : 12, 15, 22 ; Ps. 104.

4. In the opening chapters of Genesis, the order of cre ation that is given is wholly different from that in the hea then cosmogonies. The Mosaic account begins with the origin of light. Had man been left to conjecture whether the principle of life was originated before that of light, he would have been in doubt which to place first in the order. Moses places it second. Even when the Mosaic account is adopted, there is a propensity to alter it. Coleridge (Table Talk, Apr. 30, 1823), after remarking that the Zendavesta must have been copied in parts from the writings of Moses, says that "in the description of creation, the first chapter of Genesis is taken almost literally, except that the sun is created before the light, and then the herbs and the plants after the sun : which are precisely the two points they did not understand, and therefore altered as errors." A theorist

108 BIBLIOLOGY.

having only the ordinary data would unquestionably have placed the sun in the heavens, before he placed grass, herbs, and trees, upon the earth. Moses would naturally have done the same, if his information had been merely human. God revealed the fact to him as it actually was. And physical science now finds a geological period of warm-water oceans, dense mists, and high temperature, extremely favorable to vegetable life and growth, long before the sun was able to penetrate the thick and dark vapor with its rays. Again, a theorist might very naturally have placed the creation of marine life on the third day, in connection with the gather ing together of the waters, and the formation of the seas and oceans. The element in which fishes and reptiles live would suggest their origination. But Moses places it on the fifth day, in connection with the creation of air animals and man. The order and succession of creative acts as rep resented by Moses evinces its originality. It is not copied from human schemes, but often runs counter to them. But this difference and contrariety proves that the Biblical ac count of the creation proceeded from a different source from that of the Egyptian, or the Hindoo, or the Greek and Roman cosmogony.

The Scriptures, then, as an inspired sum-total, are to be referred to God as their author. They are not a national literature, like that of Greece, Home, or England. This view, ably presented by Ewald, makes the Bible merely the development of a national mind ; in which case, infallibility and authority could no more belong to it than to any other national literature. But the Bible was not produced by the Hebrew nation. It was the product of a select number chosen from time to time out of the nation, and specially informed and inspired by God. The Old and New Testaments were composed by a college of prophets and apostles, not by the people of Israel. Inspiration belongs to an inspired circle of Hebrews, not to the Hebrews generally. Moses, and Samuel, and David, and Isaiah, and their inspired associREVELATION AND INSPIRATION. 109

ates, were enlightened by the Holy Spirit, in order that they might impart to the people to which they belonged a knowledge that was otherwise inaccessible to that people, and to all peoples. It is true that the Bible is tinged with Hebrew coloring. It is not a Latin or an English book. And this, because the inspired persons through whose in strumentality it was originated were Hebrews. But this^ does not prove that the truths and facts which it contains, were derived merely from the operation of the common national mind.

The infallibility and authority which distinguish the Scriptures from all other books, are due to the Divine authorship. But God employed various modes in this authorship. This is taught in Hebrews 1:1, 2. " God, who at sundry times and in divers manners (TroXu/Aepw? KOI TToXurpoTTw?) spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son/' Here, the prophets of the Old Testament, and Christ, the subject of the revelation, are mentioned as the media through whom the Divine Mind was communicated. To these, must be added the apostles of the New Testa ment.

The " divers manners," in which God made the commu nications now included in the Bible, are the following :

1. By a theophany or personal appearance of God. (a). God appears in a form, and directly speaks words to an in dividual in his waking and ordinary condition. Gen. 18: 117; Ex. 3:4; 19:20. (5). God appears in a form, and directly speaks to an individual in a dream. Gen. 28 : 12. (c). God appears in a form, and directly speaks to an indi vidual in an extatic vision. Ezek. 8:1. It is the second person of the trinity who appears in these theophanies, and speaks words to an individual. It is in this reference that he is called the Word, John 1:1; and the "image of the invisible God," Col. 1:15; and the " express image of the Father's person," Heb. 1 : 3. Compare Edwards : Work of

110 BIBLIOLOGY.

Eedemption, I. i. Owen : Holy Spirit in Prayer, II. Martensen : Dogmatics, § 125.

2. Without any theophany or personal appearance of God. (a). By the high-priest with Uriin and Thummim. Ex. 28 : 30 ; 1 Sam. 28 : 6. (5). By the prophets under an afflatus. 2 Kings 21 : 10 ; Kom. 1 : 2 ; 1 Peter 1 : 11, 12 ; 2 Peter 1 : 21 ; 1 Cor. 2 : 13. (

3. By the incarnation. Christ's communications of truth, in their manner, were like the direct utterances of God in the theophanies of the Old Testament, and not like those indirect communications which were made through the prophets and apostles. The Jehovah in the theophany was the same trinitarian person who is in the incarnation. The theophany was the harbinger of the incarnation. God in the form of angel, bush, or dove, prepared for God in a human form. Christ differed from the prophets and apos tles, in that he did not speak under an afflatus, but from the divine nature itself. The eternal Word is the infinite ful ness of all knowledge. " That was the true Light," John 1 : 9. "God giveth not the Spirit by measure unto him," John 3 : 34. As Christ wrought miracles not as an agent, but as deity itself, so he spake truth from himself, and not as an inspired man receiving it from God.

Marsh: Lectures on Divinity, XXIII. -XXXIV. Graves: On the Pentateuch, Macdonald : On the Pentateuch. Hengstenberg : Au thenticity of the Pentateuch. Keil and Delitzsch: Commentary on Old Testament. Bible Commentary : Introductions to the several books of Scripture. Lange : Commentary. Faber : Horae Mosaicae. Havernick : Introduction to Pentateuch. Norton : Genuineness of the Gospels. Westcott : New Testament Canon. Lightfoot : Exam ination of " Supernatural Religion." Ebrard : On the Gospel His tory, Pt. II. Div. ii. Green : Hebrew Feasts ; Pentateuch Vindi cated; Moses and the Prophets. Curtiss: Levitical Priests. Bissell : Origin of the Pentateuch. Sanday : The Gospels in the Second Century. Bleek, J.: Introduction to the Old Testament. Bleek, F. : Introduction to the New Testament. Watts : The Newer Criti cism. Fisher : Supernatural Origin of Christianity. Bartlett : Sources of History in the Pentateuch. Mill: Pantheistic Princi ples of Interpretation. Essays : On Pentateuchal Criticism.

THE authenticity of a book is its genuineness.1 A written composition is authentic, if it is the product of the person to whom it is attributed. The Apostles' Creed lacks au thenticity, because it was not composed by the Apostles, to whom it is attributed ; the Epistle to the Romans is authen tic, because it can be proved to be the composition of St. Paul.

The credibility of a book is distinguishable from its au1 Watson (Apology, Letter II.) defines "an authentic book" as one "that relates matters of fact as they really happened." This is credibility, and is the earlier use of the term. The later usage makes authenticity to mean genuine ness. Compare Shakespeare's use with that of Addison and Burke, in Richard son's Dictionary, sub voce.

112 BIBLIOLOGY.

thenticity. Gulliver's Travels is authentic, being the gen uine product of Swift, but its contents are fictitious. In the case of human products, there may be authenticity with out credibility. But in the case of a Divine product, the fact of authenticity establishes the fact of credibility. If it be proved that God is the author of the Bible, the Bible must be credible. Hence in reference to the Scriptures, the two topics of authenticity and credibility are insepara ble, and must be discussed in connection with each other.

In establishing the authenticity of the Scriptures, the natural method is first to prove the authenticity of the New Testament, and then to employ the New Testament in de monstrating that of the Old.

1. The first evidence that the writings of the New Testa ment are genuine is found in the Language. It is Hellen istic Greek, which was the dialect in use at the time when the books of the New Testament purport to have been written ; and it is this dialect modified both by the Hebrew cast of thought, and by Hebrew idioms. This accords with the personal traits and peculiarities of the Evangelists and Apostles. Were the New Testament written in the classi cal Greek of Plato, this would be sufficient to throw doubt upon its authenticity.

2. The second proof of the genuineness of the New Tes tament writings is found in the testimony of the Ecclesias tical writers of the first three centuries, from Ignatius to Origen. Eusebius collected this testimony as early as 325. It is given in his History (III. xxv. ; VII. xxv.) ; and in his Demonstratio Evangelica. A thorough investigation of this argument was made by Lardner, in his Credibility of the Gospel History. The Introductions of Michaelis, Guericke, Bleek, Reuss, and others, present the subject in a condensed form and with reference to modern attacks.

3. A third argument is found in the testimony of Hereti cal writers of the first three centuries. The Gnostic theo rists in particular rejected some of the fundamental doctrines

AUTHENTICITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 113

of the New Testament, while they conceded the genuineness of the writings in which they were contained. This was the case with Marcion, who altered the gospel of St. Luke to make it agree with his view. The Epistles of Paul were also subjected to attack and alteration, particularly with re gard to the doctrine of atonement. In these instances, the authenticity was conceded, but the authority and credibility disputed.

4. A fourth argument for the genuineness of the New Testament is found in the testimony of pagan Skeptics of the first three centuries. Celstis, Porphyry, and Lucian do not dispute the authenticity of the New Testament, but its credibility and authority.

5. A fifth argument is found in the early Versions of the New Testament. The Peshito Syriac translation was made about A.D. 175, and the Old Latin (Itala) about the same time. The two Egyptian versions were made about A.D. 250 ; and the Aethiopic about A.D. 350. It is incredible that these translations should should have been made, if the be lief had not been universal in the Church in the years 200 and 300, that the books of the New Testament were the genuine writings of the evangelists and apostles. The first translations of Dante's Divine Comedy were not made until four or five hundred years after its composition, but these versions will always constitute a strong proof of the genu ineness of that poem.

6. A sixth argument is found in the doubts that were expressed by some portions of the Church respecting some parts of the New Testament. The so-called Antilegomena (James, Jude, 2d Peter, 2d and 3d John, Hebrews, and Revelation) were critically examined in reference to their authenticity, and were finally accepted by the whole church. This shows that there was more or less of a critical spirit in the Primitive church, which became satisfied by investiga tion. As the incredulity of Thomas resulted in the strength ening of the evidence of Christ's resurrection, so the doubts

114 BIBLIOLOGY.

of a portion of the Primitive church resulted in establish ing the authenticity of the Antilegomena.

The authenticity of the Old Testament, unlike that of the New, obtains little support from the testimony of those who lived near the time of its origin. Its greater antiquity pre vents this. The proof is of a more indirect and general nature ; the strongest part of it being the testimony of Christ and his Apostles as given in the New Testament. "We shall therefore consider it under the heads of Credi bility and Canonicity.

Grotius : De Veritate Beligionis Christianae ; Translated by Clarke. Neander : Life of Christ. Christlieb : Modern Doubt, Lectures VI.VIII. Paley : Evidences of Christianity. Ebrard : Gospel History, Pt. II. Div. i. Norton : Internal Evidences of Christianity. Edersheini : Life of Jesus. Ellicott : Life of Christ. Blunt : Coinci dences of O. T. and N. T. Lardner : Credibility of N. T. Robin son : Harmony of the Gospels. Gardiner : Harmony of the Gospels. Wieseler : Synopsis of the Gospels. Greswell : Dissertations on the Harmony of the Gospels. Eawlinson : Historical Evidences. Lange : Life of Christ. Keim : Life of Jesus of Nazareth. Weiss : The ology of the New Testament. Strauss : Life of Jesus. Streat : Seeming Contradictions in Scripture, London, 1654.

THE proofs of the credibility of the New Testament are the following : 1. The excellence of the doctrines taught in it. The ethics of the New Testament is greatly superior to that of Greece and Rome in elevation and spirituality. Had the early Christians possessed gunpowder, the steam engine, and the telegraph, while no others had them, their superiority in science would be undisputed. They possessed a doctrine of morals as much superior to that of paganism, as modern inventions are to ancient. The moral character produced by New Testament Christianity is higher than than that produced by other religions. The Yedas, the Koran, and the still better writings of Plato and Aristotle, do not transform human nature as do the Scriptures.

Among the doctrines of Christianity is that of endless suffering for sin. If the apostles testified falsely, and the

116 BIBLIOLOGY.

New Testament is merely their fiction, they were liable ac cording to their own statement to eternal perdition. . At the same time, great temporal suffering was the consequence of teaching the gospel. If they were deceivers, they suf fered for their deception in this life, and were to suffer eternally in the next. A falsehood under such circum stances is improbable ; for there was nothing to gain by it, either here or hereafter.

2. The character of Jesus Christ is an argument for the credibility of the New Testament. He is implicated in these writings in such a manner that if they are false, he is an impostor. Whatever be the kind of the falsehood, it cleaves to him. If the writings were forged designedly, he was an accomplice. If they are erroneous by reason of ig norance and superstition, he shares in this ignorance and superstition. But he claims all knowledge upon the sub jects discussed in the New Testament. In this lies the ab surdity of Renaii's portraiture of Christ. According to Kenan, Christ was self-deluded and superstitious and yet the ideal man.

3. The effects of the New Testament in the history of the world are an argument for its credibility. Christendom proves the truth of Christianity. That the best part of hu man history rests upon a falsehood, is incredible. The rule, " By their fruits ye shall know them," applies here. As grapes cannot be gathered from a thorn bush, so the phi losophy, the poetry, the science, the art, the morality, and the civilization of the Christian in distinction from the heathen world could not have sprung from imposture and delusion. The Koran has not produced such effects in human his tory, nor have the Yedas. The Koran did not make its way by its intrinsic moral force, but by the sword. If it had been left like the New Testament to its own unassisted qualities, it would not have made converts beyond the fam ily of Mohammed. The spread of Mormonism is an illus tration. There is no sword to force it into sway, and

CREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. H7

therefore it remains a small local sect in Utah. Christi anity, though greatly helped, does not depend upon earthly victory at critical points in its history. Had Charles Martel been defeated by the Saracens at Poitiers, this would not have annihilated the Christian religion ; any more than the ten persecutions did.

4. The miracles of the Kew Testament prove the credi bility of its doctrines. This supposes that the truthfulness of the miracle has previously been established. If it be conceded that Jesus Christ really did raise Lazarus from the dead by his own power, he must have had creative power. This evinces him to have been a divine being ; and if divine, of course a being of absolute truth. If it be con ceded that the apostles of Christ did really perform mira cles by the power of Jesus Christ imparted to them, then they must have been in communication with him, and his credibility attaches to them as his agents and instruments. For it is incredible that miraculous power should originally belong to an evil being, though it may be delegated to him. The intuitive judgment is expressed in John 9 : 16, 33 ; 10 : 21, " Can a devil open the eyes of the blind ? How can a man that is a sinner do such miracles ? If this man were not of God, he could do nothing [miraculous]." A miracle therefore, if an actual historical fact, is a proof of the divine origin of the truths attested by it.

The historical reality of a miracle is proved in the same manner that any historical event is proved ; namely, by hu man testimony. Testimony is another man's memory. We trust our own memory as we trust our own senses, because memory is a remembered sensation, or consciousness. If therefore another person is honest and possesses as good senses as ourselves, there is no more reason for disbelieving his remembered sensations than for disbelieving our own. We prove that miracles were wrought by Christ and his apostles, by the testimony, or remembered experience of honest men, not of inspired men. This is to be carefully

118 BIBLIOLOGY.

noticed. The resurrection of Lazarus is established by the same kind of evidence as that by which the assassination of Julius Caesar is proved ; namely, that of capable and truth ful eye-witnesses. Inspiration is not brought in to strengthen the testimony, in one case any more than in the other. It is the common human testimony, such as is accepted in a court of law, that is relied upon to establish the historical reality of a miracle. Those Jews who saw Lazarus come forth from the tomb, and those Jews who afterwards saw him alive, were none of them inspired men at the time when the miracle was performed. A few of them were afterwards inspired, but this inspiration added nothing to their honesty, or to their capacity as witnesses ; for inspira tion is not sanctification.

The argument from miracles is therefore no argument in .'i circle. We do not prove that certain miracles were per formed because certain inspired men saw them, and then proceed to prove that these men were inspired because they wrought miracles. But we prove that certain miracles were performed, because certain truthful men saw them, and then proceed to prove that some of the truthful men were also inspired men. And among the proofs of their inspira tion, is the fact that they were empowered by God to work miracles in attestation of their inspiration but not of their honesty.

That they were honest witnesses is all that the apostles claim for themselves, when they give their testimony to miracles. They say nothing in this connection about their inspiration. St. Peter affirms: "We have not followed cunningly devised fables, when we made known to you the power and coming of the Lord Jesus Christ, but were eye witnesses of his majesty," 2 Pet. 1 : 16. St. Paul does the same. " I delivered unto you, how that Christ died for our sins ; and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day ; and that he was seen of Cephas, then of the twelve ; after that he was seen of above five hundred brethCREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 119

ren at once ; after that lie was seen of James ; then of all the apostles. And last of all he was seen of me also," 1 Cor. 15 : 3-8. Inspiration is not requisite in order to honesty. The "five hundred brethren" who saw Christ after his resurrection are to be regarded as capable and up right witnesses, unless the contrary can be proved. Their veracity alone is sufficient to prove the fact that he who was crucified on mount Calvary before thousands of spec tators was alive again upon the earth.1

And here it is important to observe, that the number of eye-witnesses to the gospel miracles is not to be estimated by the number of Christ's personal friends and disciples. The Jewish people generally, of that generation, were spec tators of those miraculous events that accompanied the public life of Jesus Christ in Palestine, and virtually ac knowledged that they were. Because the apostles in the very beginning of their preaching, and ever afterwards, boldly assert that the Jews themselves saw these miraculous events. Peter, on the day of Pentecost, addressing the "men of Israel," describes Jesus of [Nazareth as "a man approved of God among you, by miracles and wonders and signs which God did by him in the midst of you, as ye yourselves know," Acts 2 : 22. This appeal to the whole mass of the Jewish population of that day for the truth of Christ's miracles, was not contradicted by the Jews; as it unquestionably would have been, had these miracles been the invention of a few followers of Christ. Snch a bold and unblushing summoning of a whole nation as witnesses of what had never happened among them, would have been immediately repelled with scorn, and its falsehood exposed ; and such a contradiction and exposure of the narratives of the first preachers of Christianity by the Jews generally, on the very spot where

1 See South : On Christ's resurrection. Sermons, III. 91. Also Christlieb's summing up of the ten appearances of Christ after his resurrection. Modem Doubt, Lecture VII.

120 BIBLIOLOGY.

the miracles were asserted to have taken place, would have been a fatal obstacle to their spread among other peoples. The Jews had every motive to flatly contradict the assertion of St. Peter, that Christ's miracles had been wrought in the midst of the Jewish people, and that the Jewish people knew that they had. But they did not contradict it. The Gospel narratives continued to be repeated among the Jews, and were believed more and more widely, because no one of that generation denied that the events had occurred. It was reserved for a later generation to do this. Silence gives consent. The Jewish people of that generation, by making no objection to the testimony of the apostles, commit them selves to it. They involuntarily fall into the number of eye-witnesses for the Gospel miracles.

The force of an indirect national testimony is very great ; in some respects even greater than the direct testimony of an individual. The following remarks of Charming (Evi dences of Christianity), respecting the testimony of a printed book compared with that of its author will apply here. "A book may be a better witness than its author. Suppose that a man claiming to be an eye-witness should relate to me the events of the three memorable days of July, in which the last revolution of France was achieved ; suppose, next, that a book, a history of that revolution, published and received as true in France, should be sent to me from that country. Which is the best evidence of the facts? I say, the last. A single witness may deceive ; but that a writer should publish in France the history of a revolution that never occurred there, or which differed from the true one, is in the highest degree improbable ; and that such a history should obtain currency, that it should not instantly be branded as a lie, is utterly impossible. A history re ceived by a people as true, not only gives us the testimony of the writer, but the testimony of the nation among whom it obtains credit. It is a concentration of thousands of voices, of many thousands of witnesses. I say, then, that

CREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 121

the writings of the first teachers of Christianity, received as they were by the multitudes of Christians in their own times and in those that immediately followed, are the testi mony of that multitude, as well as of the writers. Thou sands nearest to the events join in bearing testimony to the Christian miracles."

While however the testimony for a miracle is the same in kind writh that for any common historical event, it is stronger in degree. The world believes that Julius Caesar was assassinated by Brutus in the Capitol, on the testimony of those who saw the deed as recorded by contemporary and succeeding historians. The credibility of this event is not disputed. But it would be possible to dispute it. Had there been any strong motive for so doing, such as obtains with some men in the instance of the Christian religion, it would have been disputed. The evidence for the assassina tion of Julius Csesar is historical, not mathematical. It is assailable. And yet it goes into history, and is universally accepted as a fact of history.

The evidence for the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ is yet stronger, by reason of what may be de nominated a monumental testimony added to the personal. Besides the testimony of those who saw these events and the record of it in the writings of the New Testament, and the few references to the death of Christ by others like Josephus and Tacitus, there is the fact of an institution like the Christian Church with its sacraments and worship, which greatly strengthens the testimony of the personal witnesses. If the assassination of Julius Csesar had been commemorated down to the present time by a society formed in his honor, and bearing his name, the proof of his assassination would have been strengthened just so much more as this is fitted to strengthen testimony.

Now comparing the facts connected with Christianity with the facts of secular history, we see that the former have a superiority over the latter, in respect to this kind of

122 BIBLIOLOGY.

evidence. No event in secular history is so much supported by monumental evidence, as is the crucifixion and resurrec tion of Christ. It is literally the centre of human history. Everything groups around it. The epoch anno domini from which everything is dated, Sunday with its public worship, the Church organization, the sacrament of the Supper, the feasts and fasts of Christendom, all imply the actual histor ical existence of Jesus Christ as he is described in the Gos pels, and generally the truth of the New Testament.

It is here that one of the differences between Christianity and infidelity is apparent. Infidelity does not embody itself in institutions, and therefore has no monumental evidence. No great organization is founded upon its principles ; and it is not incorporated into the structure of human society. It not only builds no churches, but it builds no hospitals. Doing nothing towards the religious welfare of man, it does nothing even for his physical wellbeing. It is not found in heathenism. It lives only in the midst of Christendom ; upon which it feeds as the canker-worm does upon the vege tation which it destroys.

The miracles of the New Testament being thus supported, first, by a human testimony as strong at least as that by which the best established facts of secular history are sup ported, and, secondly, by an additional evidence from insti tutions and monuments, become a proof of the credibility of the doctrines of Christianity. For these doctrines were promulgated in connection with these miracles ; so that if it be true that no one but God could have wrought the mir acles, no one but God could have promulgated the doc trines.

The principal theories antagonistic to the credibility of the New Testament are the following : 1. The four Gospels are the productions of impostors, who designedly attempted to deceive. Celsus took this position. He conceded the authenticity of the gospels, but denied their credibility. They were written by Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, but

CREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 123

with the intention to palm off miracles as real events. Reimarus, the author of the Wolfenbiittel Fragments, adopted this view.

Generally speaking, this form of infidelity has not pre vailed among learned skeptics. It is current mostly among the uneducated opponents of Christianity. It is the infidel ity of the masses, so far as the masses have been infidel. It is true that this view appears somewhat among the Eng lish deists and French atheists of the 18th century. But these cannot be classed with the erudite skeptics of the present century. This is evinced by the estimate which the skepticism of this age puts upon them. Baur would not think of referring to the Philosophical Dictionary of Voltaire, as authority for his own positions. Strauss would not strengthen his statements, by such Biblical criticism as that of Toland and Collins. This species of attack, which charges downright imposture upon the Founder of Christi anity and forgery and deception upon his apostles, may therefore be disregarded in the general estimate of skepti cism. It does not influence the educated unbeliever. It works among the illiterate. The chorus in Burns's " Jolly Beggars " gives voice to it :

" A fig for those by law protected !

Liberty's a glorious feast ! Courts for cowards were erected, Churches built to please the priest."

2. A second and more plausible theory antagonistic to the credibility of the New Testament is the so-called mythical theory. This does not charge intentional deception, and downright imposture, upon Christ and his apostles, but would account for the narratives and teachings of the Gos pels, by the unconscious and gradual self-deception of super stitious and enthusiastic men. The biography of Christ as related by the four evangelists, according to this theory, re sembles that of a Koman Catholic saint as related in the

124: BIBLIOLOGY.

Acta Sanctorum. A devout monk dies, and one hundred years after his death the traditions respecting him are re corded by some enthusiastic admirer. Some striking events in his life are magnified into wonders. Some uncommon acts of piety and devotion are exaggerated into miracles. The biographer is not a cool and calculating deceiver, but he is self-deceived. He accepts the mass of historical mat ter that has floated down to him, and in common with his fellow monks and religionists gives it a blind credence. In this way a legend is related as actual history. There is a kernel of truth and fact in it. There was such a monk, and some of the events related actually occurred. But there is also much that is not historical, and must be thrown out by the critic.

A myth differs from a legend, as a nation differs from a community. It is a national legend. This unconscious process of exaggeration which goes on in a monastery and a community of monks, goes on upon a large scale in a nation, and through a whole people or race. The early history of Koine illustrates this. The narratives respecting the found ing of Rome, the early accounts of Romulus and Kuma, the descriptions of the battles and combats between Ro mans and Sabines, Horatii and Curiatii, were the slow for mation of ages and periods when the imagination was ac tive, and traditions were not scrutinized. There is a basis of truth, but all is not veritable history. What is true of Rome is true of Greece, of Egypt, of India. Each has its mythical age.

The same is true of Christianity, according to the theory which we are considering. At its first beginning, there was an individual named Jesus Christ, of marked traits and of remarkable life. But the admiration and affection of adherents gradually exaggerated these traits and life into the supernatural, the miraculous, and finally the Divine. While no deliberate and intentional deception is to be charged either upon the principal personage, or his adheCREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 125

rents, any more than in the instance of the Roman myth or the mediaeval legend, a full historical credibility can no more be conceded to the one than to the others.

The objections to the mythical theory of the origin of Christianity are the following: 1. The character, claims, and teachings of Jesus Christ, as represented in the New Testament, contradict the national feeling of the Jews at the time of the Advent and ever since. But it is of the nature of a myth, to be in entire harmony with the spirit of the people among whom it arises. The national legends of early Rome do not offend and affront the Roman pride, but favor it. The mythical stories connected with king Arthur and the knights of the Round Table harmonize with the temper and spirit of the early Britons. The myth always aggrandizes the nation itself, and the heroes of the nation, because it is a spontaneous outgrowth of the national imagination.

But the character, and claims, and doctrines of Jesus Christ were an utter offence to the feeling of the people among whom he was born, and by whom he was crucified. He was the farthest possible from a national hero, or a pop ular idol. The Jewish imagination, if employed in the construction of exaggerated accounts of a Jewish Messiah, would not have selected Jesus the Nazarene. The Jewish Messiah, according to the common national feeling at the time, would not have been the son of a Nazarene (" shall Christ come out of Galilee," John 7 : 41, 52 ; 1 : 46), nor would he have been born in a stable.

It is therefore impossible to account for the character and teachings of Christ, by the theory of mythical develop ment. He could not have been the merely natural out growth of Judaism, as Judaism was in the beginning of the first century, any more than Shakespeare could have been the outgrowth of the Pictish period in English history. The utter contrariety between the New Testament and the carnal Judaism, between the spirit of Christ and that of

126 BIBLIOLOGY.

the unspiritual people of whom he was born, is fatal to the mythical theory.

If it be said that the biography of Christ in the Gos pels is not a national product, but that of a few individuals of a nation, and therefore this answer does not apply to the case, the reply is, that these few individuals were Jews, and thoroughly imbued with the views and traditions of their people, and of the time in which they lived. They were expecting a temporal prince in the Jewish Messiah, and it required three years of personal instruction by Christ, and finally the inspiration at Pentecost, to disabuse them of their error. If therefore this biography was the work of their own imagination, either in part or wholly, it would inevitably have had the national characteristics. An earthly reign and an earthly splendor would have been at tributed to their hero.1 Neither can the person of Christ be explained as the natural product of human development generally. Says Meander (Life of Christ, 4, Ed. Bohn), " the image of perfection presented in Jesus of Nazareth stands in manifold contradiction to the tendencies of hu manity in that period ; no one of them, no combination of them, could account for it." " Christianity," says Chaiming (Evidences of Christianity), " was not the growth of any of the circumstances, principles, or feelings of the age in which it appeared. In truth, one of the great distinctions of the gospel is that it did not grow. The conception which filled the mind of Jesus, of a religion more spiritual, gener ous, comprehensive, and unworldly than Judaism, and des tined to take its place, was not of gradual formation. We detect no signs of it, and no efforts to realize it, before his time ; nor is there an appearance of its having been grad ually matured by Jesus himself. Christianity was deliv ered from the first in its full proportions, in a style of sin gular freedom and boldness, and without a mark of pain1 Edersheim (Life of Jesus, III. i.) observes that the temptation of Christ, in the Gospels, is not found in the Rabbinical representation of the Messiah.

CREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 127

ful elaboration. This suddenness with which this religion broke forth, this maturity of the system at the very mo ment of its birth, this absence of gradual development, seems to me a strong mark of its Divine original." 1

2. Secondly, the mythical period in the history of a people is in the beginning, not at the close of its career. !N"o myths were originated respecting Roman demigods and heroes in the days of the Empire. When a people have reached their culminating point and begin to decline, the national imagination is not active in producing exaggerated accounts of either men or events. This period is the day of criticism and skepticism, when the myths that were pro duced in the childhood of the nation are sifted, doubted, and rejected.

What now was the case with Jndea at the time of the Advent ? The nation was drawing near its downfall. It was virtually a part of the Roman Empire, though the sceptre had not formally and actually departed from Judah. Everything was effete. The morning freshness of the early faith was entirely dried up. The Jewish people, excepting a small minority represented by Simeon and Anna who were " waiting for the consolation of Israel," were either hypocritical formalists like the Pharisees, or skeptical disbe lievers like the Sadducees. More than this, they were under the iron heel of that powerful despotism which had sub jugated the world, and all national hope and aspiration was dead within them. This consequently was no time for the play of that innocent and unquestioning fancy by which the myth and the ballad are invented. To suppose that a body of legendary narrative and teaching could spring up in such surroundings as these, would be like supposing that

1 While this remark of Charming disconnects the New Testament too much from the Old, and separates Christianity too much from the spiritual Judaism that prepared for it, it is nevertheless correct in regard to the originality of Christ's doctrines, and is the more significant as it comes from one who denied his deity.

128 BIBLIOLOGY.

the most delicate forms of poetry — those of Keats and Ten nyson for example — could have originated in a commu nity of miners or day laborers. When Shakespeare makes Hector quote Aristotle, it is an anachronism that may be pardoned, because there is no anachronism in the human nature which he depicts. But when men are represented by the theorist as inventing the most fanciful and childlike forms of literature, in the wearied and skeptical old age of a nation ; when the time of the Csesars is selected as the period for the npspringing of a series of myths and legends, this is an anachronism that admits of no excuse or justifica tion. Arnold speaks in amazement of Strauss's " idea of men's writing mythic history between the time of Livy and Tacitus, and of St. Paul mistaking such for realities ! " Stanley : Life of Arnold, II. 51.

3. The mythical theory supposes superstition, and a pro pensity to believe in the wondrous and superhuman. But the Jews were never at any time specially liable to this charge. Their rigorous monotheism was unfavorable to legends and fictions respecting the deity, and his operations. The Jews at the time of the Advent were, on the whole, disinclined to believe in the miraculous. This is proved by the fact, that they endeavored to explain away the reality of Christ's miracles by attributing them to sorcery and a league with Satan : " This fellow doth not cast out devils, but by Beelzebub, the prince of the devils," Matt. 12 : 24. The account of the man born blind whose sight Christ restored, betrays great unwillingness to believe that this miracle had actually been performed. " Is this your son that was born blind ; how then doth he now see ? What did he unto thee ? How opened he thine eyes ? " All that portion of the Jewish people who were Sadducean in their opinions, certainly, were not inclined to superstition but to skepticism. " Though Christ had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him," John 12 : 37.

4. The myth is polytheistic, not monotheistic. It deCREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 129

scribes the adventures and actions of a multitude of divini ties among themselves. A single deity affords no play for the imagination. As Guizot remarks (Meditations, 1st. Series, 192), " the God of the Bible has no biography, neither has he any personal adventures." The Babylonian and Assyrian legends respecting the creation, fall, and deluge, differ wholly from the Biblical narratives of which they are the corruption, by the introduction of many gods. They also differ in being sensual, in parts. See the nar rative of the amours of Istar (Yenus) and Izdubar (Nimrod), in Say ce- Smith's Genesis, Ch. XI Y.

This fact must be considered, in settling the important question respecting the use of earlier materials by an in spired writer. When it is acknowledged that Moses used ancient traditions and documents in composing the first part of Genesis, the vital question is, Whether he used sa cred or secular traditions, ecclesiastical or national ; wheth er he employed documents derived from the line of Seth and the antediluvian church — the " sons of God," as they are denominated in Gen. 6 : 2 — or whether he worked over those which have come down in the annals of Assyria, Babylon, and Egypt. In the former case, the document is an integral part of the primitive revelation to Adam and the patriarchal church. It is monotheistic and free from error. In the latter case, the document is a part of ethnic religion, and is vitiated like all ethnic religion by poly theistic and pantheistic fables.

If it be said that the national legend is sanctified and freed from its false and corrupting elements, before it is in corporated by the inspired writer into his work, the reply, in the first place, is, that little or nothing would be left in this case. The pantheism, polytheism, and sensuality, are so thoroughly wrought into the fabric of the myth that they could be extirpated only by the annihilation of the whole thing. But, secondly, the antagonism between Infinite Holiness and human impurity is too great to permit of such

130 BIBLIOLOGY.

borrowing on the part of God. In the Old Testament, the chosen people are forbidden, under the severest penalties, to make any use whatever of the religious rites and cere monies of the idolaters around them. Is it probable that the Holy Spirit would have contradicted his own teachings, and employed the idolatrous myths of Babylon and Kineveh in constructing revealed religion ? "When the Israelites had made a golden calf, and had attempted to introduce an idolatrous cultus, Moses was commanded not merely to break the idol in pieces, but to pulverize it, and mingling it with water compel the people to drink it down. Gen. 32 : 20. This vehement and abhorrent temper of the Bible to wards idolatry in all its forms, is utterly inconsistent with the supposition that the Holy Spirit would permit his inspired organs to depend, in the least, upon the fables of an idola trous mythology for their instruction. The sanctification of polytheistic myths for the service of monotheism, and their adoption into revelation, would be like the alleged consecra tion of heathen statues of Jupiter and Apollo by the Rom ish church, and their conversion into statues of St. Peter and St. Paul.

But while there is this amount and kind of evidence for the credibility of the Xew Testament, it must be noticed that it can produce only a historical faith. It cannot produce saving faith ; that higher species of confidence which ac companies salvation.1 The scripture applies here, " The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they arc foolishness unto him : neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned," 1 Cor. 2 : 14. In accordance with this statement, the Westminster confes sion (I. v.), after asserting that " we may be moved to a high and reverent esteem of scripture, by the testimony of the church, the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the

1 On the distinction between historic faith (fides humana), and saving faith (fides divina), see Dorner : Christian Doctrine, I. 98-113.

CREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 131

parts, and the scope of the whole," adds that " our full per suasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine au thority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts/' Sim ilarly, Calvin (Inst. I. viii. 13) remarks that " the scripture will be effectual to produce the saving knowledge of God, only where the certainty of it shall be founded on the in ternal persuasion of the Holy Spirit. Those persons betray great folly who wish it to be demonstrated to infidels that the scripture is the word of God, which cannot be known without faith."

The reasons for this are the following: 1. Christianity is moral and historical truth, not axiomatic and mathematical. Consequently it demands the assent of faith, in distinction from assent to a self-evident proposition. Its founder said, " Repent ye and believe the gospel," Mark 1 : 15. This com mand implies that Christianity can be disbelieved. Axio matic or self-evident truth cannot be disbelieved, and neither can it be believed. Geometry is not a matter of faith. It is improper to say that we believe that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts, or that two and two make four. We perceive these truths, but do not believe them. They do not rest upon testimony, and are not accepted on account of testimony, like historical truth.

The assent of faith is therefore different from the assent of intuitive perception. We do not intuitively perceive that Christ rose from the dead, or that the Logos was born of a virgin, any more than we do that Alfred the Great was king of England. Intuitive knowledge is direct perception either by the senses, or by the reason. There is no possi bility of doubting a sensuous impression, or a mathematical intuition. Each is self-evident. But for moral and historical truth, there is not the certainty of self-evidence but of prob ability, more or less. Consequently, in history and in morals, there are degrees of certainty, but not in mathematics. In moral and historical truth, there is a sufficient reason for

132 BIBLIOLOGY.

believing the truth or the fact, though not such a reason as renders disbelief impossible. We may therefore doubt or disbelieve in regard to religious truth, because, while it is credible by reason of testimony and other kinds of evidence, it is not self-evident like an axiom or a physical sensation. Faith is reasonable, in case there are more reasons for be lieving than for disbelieving. It is not necessary that there should be such evidence as overwhelms all objections and renders them absurd, in order to evince the rationality of faith. The preponderance of evidence justifies the act of faith, and condemns that of unbelief. A criminal is sen tenced to death in a court of justice, not by reason of an absolute demonstration that admits of no possibility of the contrary, but by reason of a preponderance of testimony which conceivably might be erroneous.

2. The belief of Christian truth is voluntary ; the percep tion of mathematical truth is involuntary. A man " yields" to the evidence for moral and historical truth, which implies the possibility of resisting it. His will, that is, his inclina tion, coincides with his understanding in the act of faith. But a man assents to geometrical axioms without any con currence of his will. This is the act of the understanding alone. He does not yield to evidence, but is compelled by it. " Moral truths," says Ullmann (Sinlessness of Christ, 50), " do not force themselves upon our mind with the indubit able certainty of sensible objects, or with the incontrovertible evidence of mathematical demonstration. Their reception into the mind is to some extent an act of self-determina tion." Faith therefore has a voluntary element in it. The doctrine of the Divine existence, for example, is not assented to passively and necessarily from the mere mechanic struct ure of the intellect as the axioms of geometry are, but actively and freely. Axioms are not matters of proof ; the Divine existence is. The individual believes in the exist ence of God, partly because he inclines to believe it, and not because it is absolutely impossible to resist the evidence for

CREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 133

it, and to sophisticate himself into the disbelief of it. He yields to the proof presented for the doctrine. " A man's creed," says Byron (Life, IV. 225), "does not depend upon himself; who can say, 4I will believe this, that, or the other ? ' ' But this depends upon the amount of evidence in the case. A man cannot say that he will be lieve Gulliver's travels; because there is not sufficient prob ability in them, and testimony for them. But he can say that he will believe Caesar's Commentaries, because there is sufficient probability and testimony to warrant this decision. At the same time, there is not such a degree of evidence for the truth of Caesar's Commentaries as to render disbelief impossible.

3. Faith being an act of the understanding and will in synthesis carries the whole man with it. Scientific assent being an act of the understanding alone carries only a part of the man ; the head not the heart. Faith consequently affects the character, but axiomatic intuition does not.

4. The belief of Christian truth is an object of command ; assent to self-evident truth is not. This follows from the fact that faith is voluntary. A command is addressed to the will. " Believe in Christ," is consistent language. " Be lieve Euclid," is absurd.

5. The belief of Christian truth is rewardable, perception of mathematical truth is not. The former is a virtue ; the latter is not.

For these reasons it is impossible to produce by the his torical and moral arguments for the truth of Christianity, such a conviction as is absolutely invincible to the objec tions of the skeptic, and what are still stronger, the doubts of a worldly and unspiritual mind. The human heart and will has such a part in the act of belief in the gospel, that any opposing bias in it is fatal to absolute mental certainty.

Saving faith is far more certain than historical faith. It is a mental certainty that is produced by the Holy Spirit. He originates an immediate consciousness of the truth of

134 BIBLIOLOGY.

the gospel ; and wherever there is immediate consciousness, doubt is impossible. Saving faith implies a personal feel ing of the truth in the -heart; historical faith is destitute of feeling. This makes the former far more certain than the latter, and less assailable by counter arguments. When an inward sense and experience of the truth of the gospel is produced by the Divine Spirit in a human soul, as great a mental certainty exists in this instance as in those of sen suous impressions and axiomatic intuitions. A dying be liever who is immediately conscious of the love of God in Christ Jesus, is as certain in regard to this great fact as he is that fire pains the flesh, or that two and two make four. "When St. Paul said, " I am persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come ; nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of Christ Jesus our Lord" (Eom. 8:38, 39), lie was as sure of this as he was of his own existence. And this, because of his immediate consciousness of the redeem ing love of God.1

The credibility of the Old Testament is proved by the New Testament. Christ and his Apostles refer to it as divine revelation. John 5 : 39, " Search the scriptures." Luke 24 : 27, 44, " Beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself. All things written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms, must be fulfilled concerning me." Kom. 1:2, " The gospel of God was promised afore by his prophets in the holy scriptures." 2 Tim. 3 : 16, " All scripture is given by inspiration." 1 Pet. 1 : 10-12, 2 Pet. 1 : 20, 21, " Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

By the term "Scriptures" is meant that collection of writings known as the sacred books of the Jewish people.

1 On the subject of Christian certainty, in distinction from natural certainty, see the thoughtful treatise of Prank.

CREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 135

They are referred to by Christ and his apostles, as the source of information respecting religion generally, and all matters pertaining to human salvation. It is clear that they received them as authoritative, and a final arbiter upon such subjects. But this implies the credibility of the Old Testa ment, if Christ and his apostles were not deceived in their opinion and judgment. That the reference of Christ, when he speaks of "the Scriptures," is to a well-known collection of inspired writings, is proved by Matt. 5 : 17. " Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets : I ain not come to destroy but to fulfil." Our Lord here affirms that his mission will realize all that is promised in the Old Testament revelation. This revelation he denotes by the common Jewish designation: the Law and the Prophets, i.e. the Pentateuch and Prophetico-Historical books. There is the same reference to a collection of writings in John 7 : 19, 22, 23. " Did not Moses give you the law ? Moses gave unto you circumcision. A man receiveth circumcision on the sabbath day, that the law of Moses should not be broken." Here, the ceremonial law is more particularly meant, and this law is not taught in one book, or part of a book, of the Pentateuch, but runs through Exodus, Leviti cus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy. Tn Luke 2 : 22, Mary was purified " according to the law of Moses." Moses is represented by Christ as " giving " law in these books. In like manner, in Acts 15 : 21, the word Moses denotes a col lection of sacred writings. "Moses of old time hath in every city them that preach him, being read in the syna gogues every sabbath day." The Jewish congregations at the time of the Advent had the Pentateuch read to them by a reader, as both Jewish and Christian congregations now do, believing that it had the inspired authority of Moses. In the walk to Emrnaus with two of his disciples, Christ " beginning at Moses and all the prophets, expounded unto them in all the scriptures the things concerning him self," Luke 24: : 27. He recapitulated and explained all the

136 BIBLIOLOGY.

Messianic promises in the Old Testament ; beginning with the " Seed of the woman " in Genesis, and ending with the "Messenger of the covenant" in Malachi. In Mark 12 : 26, Christ refers to the miracle of the burning bush as an act ual fact, and denominates the book of Exodus in which the account of it is contained, " the book of Moses." In Matt. 22 : 32, Christ quotes Jehovah's words to Moses from the burning bush — making a second reference to this miracle. If it is objected, that Christ only accommodated himself to the ancient Jewish opinion that Moses was the author of the book of Exodus without believing or endorsing it, the reply is, that Christ is arguing to prove to the Sadducees that the resurrection of the body is a fact. Now unless Jehovah actually spoke to Moses those words, and Moses recorded them without error, so that Christ is correct in calling Exodus "the book of Moses," his argument fails. If Jehovah did not speak the words, Christ did not prove his point. If Jehovah did speak them but Moses did not record them, he did not prove it ; because he refers to Moses as his authority. And if Jehovah did speak the words, but Moses did not record them infallibly, Christ's argument though having some validity would not be marked by infallibility. There may have been some error in the narrative. That Christ refers to a well-known collection, is also proved by his quotation from the Old Testament in Matt. 23 : 35. " Upon you shall come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias son of Barachias " (Barachias is want ing in Luke 11 : 51, and in j$c). Here our Lord mentions an event in Genesis and in Chronicles (2 Ch. 24 : 21, 22) ; the first and almost last book of the canon. Between these two events, he speaks of a series of righteous men whose blood was spilled in martyrdom. Who can doubt that he had in mind the entire Old Testament, which contains the account of these martyred servants of Jehovah. The refer ence to the murder of Zacharias proves that Chronicles beCREDIBILITY OP THE SCRIPTURES. 137

longed to the canon, in Christ's opinion. To say that Christ accommodates himself to the popular view without adopting it himself, contradicts the connection of thought. Christ is -announcing the judgment of God upon the Pharisees. This would be an idle threat if there were no such series of martyrs, and no true account of them in the Old Testament scriptures. In Matt. 12 : 39, Christ cites the miracle of Jonah as one which he believed, and his hearers also. But Jonah is comparatively a secondary book in the canon, and the miracle therein recorded more difficult to believe than most. According to Luke 4 : 17-21, Christ read and com mented on the 61st chapter of Isaiah. This shows that he did not regard the later prophecies of Isaiah as spurious.

That the writings now received by the Christian church as the Old Testament canon were the same as those to which Christ and his apostles refer, is proved by the fol lowing arguments :

1. They are the same which were translated into Greek by the Seventy, 285 B.C. For two centuries preceding the Advent, they had been received among the Greekspeaking Jews as the inspired volume. As a collection, they were called "the Scriptures." It is objected, that in the Septuagint version the apocryphal books are found. But they did not belong to it originally. That they con stituted no part of the work of the Seventy, is proved by the fact that Philo and Josephus do not mention them, though Sirach, one of the best of the apocryphal authors, wrote about 237 B.C. ; that Christ and his apostles never quote from them, though they quote from the Septuagint version of the Old Testament ; that some of the manuscripts of the Septuagint version do not contain the apocrypha ; and that the Palestinian Jews never regarded the apocrypha as ca nonical. The explanation of their presence in some of the manuscripts of the Septuagint is, that the Egyptian or Alex andrian Jews had a higher estimate of the apocrypha than the Palestine Jews had, and appended them to the Old Tes138 BIBLIOLOGY.

taraent canon ; as, at a later date, some other apocryphal writings were appended to manuscripts of the New Testa ment, and obtained some currency in the Patristic church. The Sinaitic manuscript, for example, contains the Epistle of Barnabas and the Pastor of Hermas; and the Alex andrine contains the first Epistle of Clement of Eome and the apocryphal psalms attributed to Solomon. Such uncanonical compositions were occasionally copied into the manuscripts of the New Testament, by those who highly esteemed them, and in this manner gradually acquired some authority. By being appended to the canonical Old Testa ment, the authority of the apocrypha increased, until finally it was declared to be canonical and inspired, by the council of Trent. The Patristic church, however, was not agreed concerning the apocrypha, and never adopted it in general council. Jerome (Prologus Galeatus) asserts that Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus do not belong to the canon. Melito, Origen, Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory Nazianzen, Athanasius, Amphilochius, and Epiphanius give lists that do not include the apocrypha. Clement of Alexandria and Irenseus placed it on an equality with the canonical books. The North African fathers took this view in the council of Hippo (393), and in the 3rd council of Carthage (397). These small local councils included the apocrypha "inter scripturas canonicas." That the apocrypha is canonical and inspired, is a Romish, not a Patristic decision. The Re formers rejected the Romish opinion, and denied the in spiration and canonicity of the apocrypha.

2. They are the same writings which Philo and Josephus recognize as the Jewish Scriptures. Philo, in the first century, cites from most of them. Josephus (Contra Apionem, I. 8) states that the Jews have " twenty-two books which are justly believed to be divine." It is not certain from the passage, which is somewhat obscure, whether Jo sephus included Chronicles, Ezra, Esther and Nehemiah ; though the probability is that he did. The fact that

CREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. 139

these are contained iu the Septuagint version would favor this.

3. The Targnms go to show that the books received by the Christian church as the Old Testament canon are the same as those received by the Jews. That of Onkelos is a Chaldee translation of the Pentateuch. Onkelos wrote about the time of the Advent ; others say in the 2nd cen tury. The Targum of Jonathan contains in Chaldee, Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings, Isaiah, Jeremiah and the Minor Prophets.

4. The Samaritan Pentateuch supports the genuineness of the Old Testament Pentateuch. The Samaritans received it from the ten tribes, in all probability, and the ten tribes must have had it at the time of their separation from Judah, B. c. 975 ; for they would not subsequently have taken it from Judah.

5. The great care with which their sacred books were preserved by the Jews, makes it highly probable that the books now received as the inspired canon of the Old Tes tament are the same as those received by Ezra and !Nehemiah. The Pentateuch by the command of Moses was deposited with the sacred things of the tabernacle, and pro vision was made for its public reading from time to time. Deut. 31 : 9-13. Josephus in his autobiography says that Titus gave him leave to take from the "ruins of his coun try " what he wished. He asked for the liberty of his own family, and the " holy books " of his people ; which were granted to him.

6. The language evinces the genuineness of the received Old Testament canon. All the varieties of Hebrew, from the early forms in Genesis and Job to the later in the Chal dee of Ezra and Nehemiah, are found in it.

7. The discoveries in the antiquities of Assyria, Baby lonia, and Egypt support the genuineness of the Old Testa ment.

8. The agreement in doctrine between the Old Testament

140 BIBLIOLOGY.

and the New supports the genuineness of the former. The same general system of justice and mercy ; law and gospel ; sin and redemption runs through both. " It is mere as sertion, that fatherhood, filiation, and brotherhood are unrevealed in the Old covenant ; the truth is, they are re vealed, but in a limited and mediate typical manner. It is an equally vague assertion to affirm that the God of the New Testament is not an indignant God, full of majesty and power, and that Christians ceased in every sense to be servants." Nitzsch : Christian Doctrine, § 63.

Josephus : Contra Apionem, I. Du Pin : On the Canon. Cosin : On the Canon. Jones : On the Canon. Lardner : Credibility of the New Testament. Stuart : On the Canon. Alexander : On the Canon. Westcott : On the N. T. Canon. Credner : Zur Geschichte des Kanons. Horne-Tregelles : Introduction. Davidson : Introduc tion. Schaff- Herzog : Encyclopaedia, Art. Canon. Kitto : Ency clopaedia, Art. Canon. Charteris : On the Canon. Ladd : Sacred Scripture, Ch. IX. Eeuss : History of the Canon, Tr. by Hunter. Bleek : History of N. T. Canon (Introduction to N. T.). Oehler : Kanon des A. T. (Herzog : Encyclopadie). Landerer : Kanon des N. T. (Herzog : Eucyclopiidie). Smith : Dictionary, Art. Canon. Chambers : Canon of Scripture.

THE canonicity of a book means its right to a place in the collection of inspired writings ; and this depends upon the fact that it was composed by an inspired man, or under his direction. Canonicity therefore is very closely connected with authenticity or genuineness, and some would merge the two in one. If a book can be proved to be the gen uine product of an evangelist or apostle, its canonicity is established. To determine whether a writing is canonical, is to determine whether it originated in the very restricted circle of inspired men, or in the very wide circle of ordinary men. In answering this question, some assistance is deriva ble from the nature and contents of the book. Absurdities and contradictions, sentiments contradicting the general tenor of revelation, and such like characteristics, would prove that a writing is not the product of inspiration, and

142 BIBLIOLOGY.

therefore not canonical. Thus the subject of canonicity is also connected with that of credibility. At the same time, the question, Who is the author of the book ? is different from the question, Is the book credible ? The former is the question when the subject of canonicity is under considera tion.

The inquiry respecting the authorship of a writing is mainly historical. To answer it, requires the testimony of competent witnesses ; and the most competent witnesses are those who lived nearest to the time of the alleged origin and authorship. An eye-witness is the best of all ; and the next best witness is one who personally heard the testimony of an eye-witness, and so onward. Consequently, the Prim itive church was better situated and qualified than the Modern church, to testify respecting the authorship of the Gospel of Luke or the Epistle to the Hebrews. More of documentary evidence, and more of personal testimony was accessible in the year 150 than in the year 1880. An Alex andrine scholiast had more data for determining which of the Platonic dialogues are spurious, than any English or German philologist of the 19th century. The generation of Americans who lived at the close of the 18th century had the best advantages of any, for settling the question whether Jefferson was the author of the Declaration of In dependence.

The canonicity of a New Testament book is not settled by the authority of the Primitive church, but by its testi mony. This mistake is frequently made. Coleridge (Table Talk, March 31, 1832) says that "we receive the books as cribed to John and Paul as their books, on the judgment of men for whom no miraculous discernment is pretended. Shall we give less credence to John and Paul themselves ? " The Modern church does not receive John's Gospel and Paul's Epistles as canonical, on the "judgment," or decision, of the Primitive church respecting their contents, but on their testimony respecting their authorship. Testimony

CANONICITY. 143

respecting canonicity is like testimony respecting miracles. The Modern church does not rest its belief in the miracles of our Lord on the authority of the first Christians, but on their witness and attestation. The authority of the first Christians is no higher than that of any other Christians, but their testimony is.

Neither is the question of canonicity to be answered by the witness of the Holy Spirit in the consciousness of the believer. The teaching of the Holy Ghost, while indis pensable to a saving apprehension of Biblical truth, is not available at this point. The Holy Spirit teaches in regard to the credibility, but not in regard to the canonicity of Scripture. The Divine Spirit does not inform any man, or class of men, who composed the book of Chronicles or of Joshua. This would be a revelation. God leaves the ques tion respecting the authorship of particular books of Script ure to be settled chiefly by historical testimony ; and, from the nature of the case, by the testimony of the earlier generations rather than of the later. The testimony to canonicity is in this respect like the testimony to miracles. It is not inspired and infallible, yet it is credible and trust worthy. We go to the very first Christians of all for the testimony to miracles; and we must go to the earlier Christians for the testimony to canonicity. And as the proof of miracles does not depend upon the inward teaching of the Holy Spirit, neither does the proof of canonicity. Says Dorner (Doctrine, I. 96), " The testimony of the Holy Spirit gives us no immediate information upon the historic origin of a book, upon its source in an inspired author. It gives us no divine certainty as to the manner and method in which certain writings have arisen in history, so that it will not do to found the certainty of the truth and divinity of Scripture upon the experience of the divinity of the form of Holy Writ." With this the Westminster Confes sion, I. v., agrees, in mentioning as the first of the grounds of a historical faith in the Scriptures, " the testimony of the

144 BIBLIOLOGY.

church," and making no mention at all of the inward teach ing of the Spirit in this connection.

The history of the Old Testament canon is obscure, ow ing to its very great antiquity. Were it a modern product, as some assert, there would be more historical data.

That the books of Moses were collected and arranged before Samaria was taken and the ten tribes carried away by the Assyrians under Shalmanesar, B.C. 724, is evident from the fact that the Samaritans must have obtained the Pentateuch from the ten tribes and not from Judah. It is an ancient and widely current tradition, that Ezra made a complete collection of the books of the Old Testament, ex cepting those few which were written after his time. An other tradition, mentioned in 2 Maccabees 2: 13, attributes this work to Nehemiah. There is no good reason for doubt ing that upon the return from the Babylonian captivity, B.C. 536, the revision and collection of the Old Testament canon occurred. The same Divine guidance that brought about, in such an extraordinary manner, the return of the Jews from their long captivity in the heart of Asia, and the rebuilding of the temple under Ezra and Nehemiah, would naturally have led to their re-collecting and re-editing those sacred writings upon which the future prosperity of the chosen people, and the accomplishment of its mission in the world, absolutely depended. The Jewish church and state without the Old Testament canon, would have been a mere empty shell. In this redaction of the Old Testament canon, the ancient and previously acknowledged writings of Moses and the earlier prophets were of course accepted, and to these were now added the later writings up to the time of Ezra. The division was three-fold. 1. The Law. 2. The Prophets. 3. The Hagiographa. It is the same that Christ refers to in Luke 24 : 44, under the names of the law, the prophets, and the psalms. By the " psalms " is meant the whole third part, or the Hagiographa. Josephus mentions this three-fold division. Contra Apionem, I. viii.

CANONICITY. 145

According to him, the Law contains the "five books of Moses " : Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuter onomy ; the Prophets comprise " thirteen books " : Joshua, Judges with Ruth, Samuel, Kings, Isaiah, Jeremiah with Lamentations, Ezekiel, Daniel, the twelve Minor Prophets, Job, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther; the Hagiographa includes " four books of hymns to God " : Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes and Solomon's Song. In all there are twenty-two books, equalling the number of the Hebrew alphabet. The Jews, following the Talmud, now make the Hagiographa to consist of eleven books: viz., Psalms, Proverbs, Job, Canticles, Ruth, Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, Esther, Dan iel, Ezra, and Chronicles.

Prideaux (Connection, I. v.) is of the opinion that Malachi was written after the time of Ezra. He argues also that the genealogy of the sons of Zerubbabel in 1 Chron. 3 : 19-24, being carried down to the time of Alexander the Great, 330 B.C., shows that this part of Chronicles was composed subsequently to Ezra. "It is most likely," he says, " that the two books of Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, and Malachi were added to the canon in the time of Simon the Just, 300 B.C., and that it was not until then that the Jewish canon of the Old Testament was fully completed. And indeed these last books seem very much to want the exactness and skill of Ezra in their publication, they falling far short of the correctness which is in the other parts of the Hebrew scriptures." Rawlinson, on the contrary (Bible Commentary, 1 Chron. 3 : 19-24), regards Prideaux as in error in reckoning thirty years to a genera tion. He himself reckons only twenty, and attributes Chronicles to Ezra, who died about B.C. 435. " The style of Chronicles is like that of Ezra," says Rawlinson. Mov ers makes the date of Chronicles B.C. 400. Ewald assigns it to the time of Alexander the Great, B.C. 336-323.

More is known respecting the manner of collecting the New Testament canon, though no particular action in de10

146 BIBLIOLOGY.

fining and authorizing it can be mentioned until after it has become universally received in the church.

The four Gospels were from the first distinguished from the apocryphal. Justin Martyr (163) speaks of "memoirs" of Christ as the work of the evangelists. Irensens (202) cites passages from all four of the canonical Gospels. Adv. Hsereses, II. xxii.-xxiv., et alia. Clement of Alexandria (220) and Tertullian (220) do the same. Tatian (175), and Ammonius (200), arrange harmonies of the four Gospels. Theodoret (457) found 200 copies of Tatian's harmony in the Syrian churches, which he took away from them, be cause of some heresies it contained. Neander supposes that Tatian mixed some things with the canonical Gospels from the apocryphal. Origen (250) writes a commentary on Matthew and John. These facts prove the general accept ance of four and only four Gospels as canonical, prior to A.D. 250. Yet there was no action of the church in a general council to this effect.

The Epistles began to be collected very early. Ignatius (Ad Philadelphenses, v.) speaks of the Gospels, and the " Apostolical writings." The Epistles were sent from church to church, either in the original or in transcript. In Col. 4 : 16, Paul bids the Colossians to send the letter he had written to them, to the Laodicean s, and to obtain his letter to the Laodiceans and read it themselves. This custom would naturally lead to the multiplication of copies, and the collection by different churches of the whole series of Epistles, as fast as they were written.

The Vatican and Sinaitic manuscripts belong to the middle of the 4th century (A.D. 325-350). The former contains all the Gospels, and all the Epistles excepting Philemon, Titus, 1st and 2d Timothy, Hebrews, and the Apocalypse. The latter contains all the Gospels, all the Epistles, and the Apocalypse. The Muratorian canon (A.D. 150) is much older than these oldest uncials, and mentions as accepted and canonical, the four Gospels,

CANONICITY. 147

Acts, thirteen Epistles of Paul, two and perhaps three Epistles of John, Jude and Revelation. And it is possible that 1st Peter is mentioned (provided "tantum" is an error for "imam"). It mentions Hebrews, perhaps, under the title of the "Epistle to the Alexandrians." It omits 2d Peter and James.

The New Testament canon was thus collected and adopt ed by the custom and usage of the churches, not by conciliar action. The formation of a symbol was similar ; for the Apostle's creed was not the work of the Apostolic college. The first conciliar action respecting the canon was by the council of Laodicea, in 360. This adopted the whole New Testament, excepting Revelation. It was a small council, and of little influence. The council of Hippo (393), and Carthage (397), established similar catalogues. But there was little call for this conciliar action, because the practice and usage of the church had already anticipated it.

Aristotle : Metaphysics, XI. vi. , vii. Plato : Phaedo ; Laws, X. 894-899. Anselm : Monologium, i.-vi. ; xvii.-xxviii. Charnocke : Discourses (God a Spirit). Cudworth : Intellectual System, I. ii. ; V. iii. (Corporeal and unextended substance.) More : Immortality of the Soul, I. i.-x.1 Smith: Discourses (Immortality of the Soul ; Existence and nature of God). Bates : Immortality of the Soul. Nitzsch : Christian Doctrine, g 63. Ulrici : God and Nature. Christlieb : Modern Doubt, Lecture III. Muller : Sin, II. 113-139.

THE words of our Lord to the Samaritan woman, " God is a Spirit," John 4 : 24, although spoken for a practical pur pose, are also a scientific definition. The original (Trvevpa 6 &-0?) by its emphatic collocation of Trvevpa, and omission of the article, implies that God is spirit in the highest sense. He is not a spirit, but spirit itself, absolutely. The employment of the article in the English version is objec1 More departed from the common opinion, in contending that spiritual sub stance has extension and the three dimensions, like material substance. It dif fers from matter in having self-motion, and in not having impenetrability. It is not moved ab extra, and its presence does not exclude that of material sub stance. He denied the schoolman's dictum, that the soul is all in every part of the body ; because this is incompatible with the view that spiritual substance is extended.

152 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

tionable, because it places the deity in a class with other spiritual beings. But this is not the thought of Christ, who asserts that "no one knoweth the Father but the Son " (Matt. 11 : 27) ; thus claiming for himself a knowledge of the deity as the absolute and unconditioned spirit, who is not cognizable by the finite mind in the manner and degree that finite spirit is. Man knows the nature of finite spirit through his own self -consciousness, but he knows that of the Infinite spirit only analogically. Hence some of the characteristics of the Divine nature cannot be known by a finite intelligence. For example, how God can be indepen dent of the limitations of time, and have an eternal mode of consciousness that is without succession, including all events simultaneously in one omniscient intuition, is inscrut able to man, because he himself has no such consciousness. The same is true of the omnipresence of God. How he can be all at every point in universal space, baffles human comprehension, though it has some light thrown upon it, by the fact that the human soul is all at every point in the body.

The Divine being is of an essence whose spirituality tran scends that of all other spirits, human, angelic, or archangelic ; even as his immortality transcends that of man or angel. God is said alone to have immortality (1 Tim. 6 : 16), because his immortality is a parte ante, as well as a parte post. His immortality is eternity. And in the same man ner, when the spirituality of God is compared with that of his rational creatures, it might be said that he alone has spirituality.

The transcendent nature of the Divine spirituality is seen in the fact of its being formless and unembodied. "No man hath seen God at any time," John 1 : 18. " Ye saw no similitude," Deut. 4 : 12. The Infinite spirit cannot be so in cluded in a form as not to exist outside of it. The finite spirit can be, and in all its grades is both embodied and limited by the body.

NATURE OF GOD. 153

"That each, who seems a separate whole, Should move his rounds, and, fusing all The skirts of self again, should fall Bemerging in the general soul,

Is faith as vague as all unsweet :

Eternal form shall still divide

The eternal soul from all beside ;

And I shall know him when we meet." — TENNYSON.

The seeming exception to this, in the instance of man be tween death and the resurrection, is not really such. The disembodiment of the spirit is only temporary. The com pleteness of the person requires the resurrection and reunion of the bodily form.

Hence in order to have communication with his embodied creature, man, the Supreme being assumes a form ; first in the theophanies of the Old Testament, and lastly in the in carnation of the New.1 In his own original essence he is formless, and hence could not have any intercourse with a creature like man, who is conditioned in his perception by the limitations of finite form. For this reason, " the Word became flesh and dwelt among us full of grace and truth," John 1 : 14. Uniting with a human soul and body, "the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath expounded (Ifipyifowo) him," John 1 : 18. In Phil. 2 : 6, the trinitarian personality of the Logos is denomi nated a " form of God " (fioptyrj 3eov). This does not mean a visible corporeal embodiment, for it describes the Logos before his incarnation. A distinction, or mode of the divine essence is intended by it. This begotten, or filial "form" of God is purely spiritual and incorporeal, and hence is compelled to assume a corporeal form ; namely, " the form of a servant " (popcf)^ explained by

1 But in both of these modes of manifestation, the Infinite spirit though in a form is not shut up and confined in it. The Son of Man was also in heaven, at the same instant that he was on earth in a human body. Jehovah, though pres ent in the form of the burning bush, was at the same moment omnipresent also.

154: THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

ver. 8) ; in order to have society with man. Some have supposed that the incarnation is necessitated not only by man's sin, but by the needs of the angelic world, in order that there may be intercourse between God and the angels. That there is a provision for this latter, and that God mani fested himself to the holy and happy angels prior to and irrespective of the incarnation of the Word, is clear from the Biblical representations concerning such an intercourse. Compare Ps. 104 : 4 ; 103 : 20 ; 1 Kings 22 : 19 ; 2 Chr. 18 : 18 ; Isa. 6:5; Luke 15 : 10 ; Heb. 1 : 7; 2 : 5. But the em bodiment of God the Son in a perishable human form, in volves humiliation and suffering for the special purpose of atonement and redemption, and hence it cannot have refer ence to the needs of the sinless angelic world. Moreover, there would be no reason for the adoption of man's nature and form, in order to a manifestation of God to the angels. While the spiritual essence of God is incorporeal and formless, it is at the same time the most real substance of all. Mere body or form does not add to the reality of an essence, because the form itself derives its characteristics and its reality from the informing spirit. " The things which are seen were not made of things which do appear," Heb. 11 : 3. Yisibles were not made of visibles, but of in visibles. The phenomenon, consequently, is less real than the noumenon ; the visible than the invisible. God's incor poreal and formless being is so intensely and eminently real, that all formed and corporeal being, in comparison, is unreal. "All nations before him are as nothing, and less than noth ing, and vanity," Isa. 40 : 17. " Mine age is as nothing before thee," Ps. 39 : 5. " Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thoii hadst formed the earth and the world, thou art God," Ps. 90 : 2. " The more unbodied," says Smith (Nature of God, 123), " anything is, the more unbounded also is it in its effective power : body and matter being the most sluggish, inert, and unwieldy thing that may be, having no power from itself, nor over itself ; and thereNATURE OF GOD. 155

fore the purest mind must needs also be the most almighty life and spirit." 1

The transcendent reality of the Divine essence appears also in the fact that it is a necessary essence. The objective reality cannot even in thought, still less in fact, be sepa rated from the subjective idea, as it can be in the instance of contingent and created substance. We can conceive of the non-existence of the created and contingent being of whom we have an idea, but not of the uncreated and neces sary being of whom we have an idea. A being that might be a nonentity does not correspond to our idea of a neces sary being. A necessary being, consequently, has more of being than a contingent being has. He is further from non entity. God, therefore, is more real than any of his creat ures, be they material or immaterial. The Infinite spirit is more real than the finite spirit ; and the finite spirit is more real than the body it inhabits, because it can exist with out it.

While, however, there is this transcendence in the spirit uality of God, there is also a resemblance between the Infinite and the finite spirit. The invisible, immortal, and intelli gent mind of man is like in kind to the Divine nature, though infinitely below it in the degree of excellence. What the Arians erroneously asserted respecting the nature of the Son, would be true of the nature of man and angels, namely, that it is ofiowvo-ios with God, but not opoovcrios. Man's

1 Claudienus of Vienne, in the 5th century, notes the following points of dif ference between soul and body : 1 . Everything is incorporeal which does not occupy space. The soul occupies no space. 2. Reason, memory, and will occupy no space. 3. The body feels the impression of touch in the part touched ; but the soul feels the impression as a whole, not in a part. 4. There is in all bodies a right and a left, an up and a down, a front and a back ; but nothing of the kind in the soul. 5. The soul feels by visible organs, but feels invisibly. The eye is one thing, seeing is another ; the ears are one thing, hearing is another ; the hand is one thing, touching is another. We distinguish by the touch what is hot and what cold, but we do not touch the sensation of touch, which in itself is neither hot nor cold ; the organ by which we feel is a different thing from the sensation. Guizot : Civilization I. 399, Ed. Bonn.

156 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

spiritual nature resembles that of the deity, bat is not iden tical with it.

If the difference between God and man is exaggerated, then the Infinite and finite are so separated from one another, that religion becomes impossible. God is practically reduced to a nonentity, by being placed wholly outside the sphere of human apprehension. He is so different from his rational creatures, that no analogies can be found between them, and nothing can be positively and absolutely affirmed concern ing him. From this extreme and error, spring deism and agnosticism in theory, and epicureanism in practice. De ism asserts the Divine existence, but with the fewest attri butes possible. Bolingbroke denied that any of the mor al attributes may be affirmed of God. Only power and adaptive intelligence as seen in physical nature, belong to the Supreme being. This is making the difference between the Infinite and finite so great, that the religious feel ings of adoration, love, faith, and penitence are impossible. Hobbes taught agnosticism ; maintaining that God is so totally different from man, that he is not only incompre hensible, but inconceivable, and not an object of thought. Cudworth, in opposition, maintained that God is conceiv able, but not comprehensible ; or, in modern phrase, is ap prehensible, but not comprehensible. Although God is an inscrutable mystery, he is yet an object of thought. " By mysterious doctrines, we mean," says Conybeare (On Scripture Mysteries) " those concerning which our ideas are inadequate, or indeterminate. This supposes that of mysterious doctrines we have some ideas, though partial and incomplete. Indeed, when we can frame no ideas, we can strictly speaking give no assent. For what is assent, but a perception that the extremes, the subject and pred icate of a proposition, do agree, or disagree ? But when we have no manner of ideas of these extremes, we can have no such perception. And as no combination of terms act ually without significance can make a real proposition, so no

NATURE OF GOD. 15?

combination of terms to us perfectly unintelligible can, with respect to us, be accounted a proposition. We maintain, therefore, that we have some ideas even of mysterious doc trines. There is a vast difference between unintelligible and incomprehensible. That is unintelligible, concerning which we can frame no ideas ; and that is only incompre hensible, concerning which our ideas are imperfect."

On the other hand, if the resemblance between the Infi nite and finite spirit is so exaggerated as to obliterate the distinction between the two, then materialistic theories in philosophy, and literalizing theories in theology arise. All the errors of gnosticism, of pantheism, and of anthropo morphism are the consequence. Gnosticism and pantheism attribute evolution and development to the Divine essence, and thus subject it to the conditions and limitations of finite growth and succession. Upon this theory, an immutable consciousness that is omniscient, simultaneous, and successionless, in other words, absolutely complete and perfect, cannot belong to the Supreme being. God's consciousness, according to the pantheist, is mutable, fractional, and in creasing like that of man and angel. But this is anthropo morphism ; God's mental processes are converted into those of man. Anthropomorphism sometimes exaggerates the re semblance between God and man, so far as even to attri bute sensuous organs and emotions to God.

It is one of the few benefits in connection with the many evils that have been wrought by modern pantheism, that it has brought into view the absoluteness of the Deity ; his transcendent perfection of being. It is true that what pantheism gives with one hand, it takes back again with the other. In identifying man and the universe with God, it obliterates the distinction between the finite and Infinite, and thus abolishes the transcendent perfection of the Deity which it had so emphatically asserted. But setting aside this self-contradiction, which is characteristic of all error, and considering simply the energy with which a pantheist

158 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

like Hegel, for example, insists upon the unconditioned nat ure of the Absolute spirit, we perceive that even fatal error may have an element of truth in it.

There are two predicates which are of fundamental im portance in determining the idea of God as a spirit : 1. Substantiality ; God is an essence or substance. 2. Person ality ; God is a self-conscious being. Predicates are dis tinguishable from attributes, as the base is from the super structure. It is because God is a substance and a person, that he can possess and exert attributes.

1. In the first place, the idea of God as a spirit implies that of substance or essence, because that which has no sub stance of any kind is a nonentity. " Deus est quaedam substantia ; nam quod nulla substantia est, nihil omnino est. Substantia ergo, aliquid esse est." Augustine, on Ps. 68. God is ens : real actual being. He is not a mere idea, or construction of the mind, like a mathematical point or line. A mathematical point is not an entity ; it has no substan tial being ; it exists only subjectively ; it is merely a mental construction. The same is true of space and time. These are not two substances. They are not objective entities or beings. Neither are they, as Clarke affirmed in his a priori argument for the Divine existence, the properties of a sub stance or being ; because properties are of the nature of the substance, and have the same kind of objective reality with it. Space and time cannot be classed with either material or spiritual substance. And there are only these two kinds. A substance possesses properties. But space has only one property, namely, extension. This is not sufficient to con stitute it a material substance ; and it is sufficient to show that it is not spiritual substance, because this is unextended. Time, again, has no one of the properties of matter, and thus is still further off from material substance than space is. And it certainly has none of the properties of mind.1

1 It should be noticed that it is not because space and time are invisible that they are not substances, or entities. An entity may be invisible. The forces of

NATURE OF GOD. 159

Plato (Sophist. 247, 248) defines substance, or objective being, as " that which possesses any sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another ; " or " that which has the power of doing or suffering in relation to some other existing thing." Hence he says that "the definition of being or substance is simply, power." Now, whether sub stance be defined as entity having properties, or as entity having power, God is a substance. He has attributes which he manifests in his works of creation and providence ; and he has power which he exerts in the universe of matter and mind. He makes an impression upon the human soul, as really as matter and its forces do upon the human body. " I remembered God and was troubled," Ps. 77 : 33. Ter ror in the soul because of God, is as vivid a form of con sciousness as any physical sensation ; and if the objective existence of matter is proved by external sensation, the ob jective existence of God is proved by internal consciousness. Man is not terrified by a nonentity. The Scriptures justify the application of the idea of substance to God, by denom inating him " I am," Exod. 3 : 14 ; and " he who is," Rev.

nature are invisible, but they are entities, not abstract ideas or forms of thought. They make an impression upon substances. They are efficient powers. They an swer to Plato's definition of substance. The force of gravity is like time in hav ing none of the geometrical dimensions, but it cannot, like time in Kant's philos ophy, be explained as a mere form of the understanding, the mode in which the human mind conceives. Gravity is a substantial or material force, and consti tutes a part of the material universe. It is invisible matter; matter without form, but not without entity. The same is true of all the other forces of inor ganic nature.

Matter has an invisible and formless mode of existence in organic nature, as well as in inorganic. The principle of animal life is real entity, but it is without the geometrical dimensions, and is as invisible as the spirit of man, or of God. But it is matter, not spirit. The bodily life, the so-called animal soul of a dog is nothing but matter. It constitutes no part of the moral and spiritual world. It dies with the body which it inhabits and vitalizes. It was the overlooking of the distinction between matter as visible and invisible, that led Butler, Wesley, Agassiz and others, to favor the doctrine of animal immortality. Because the dog's soul is invisible like that of man, they concluded that it is immortal like his. But an invisible principle may be as perishable as a visible body ; and must be, in case it is a material or physical principle ; in case it belongs to the world of matter, not of spirit.

160 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

1:4; and by attributing to him " godhead " ($60x775), Coloss. 2 : 9, and a " nature" (zW), Gal. 4 : 8 ; 2 Pet. 1 : 4. God, therefore, as the infinite and eternal spirit, is a real being, and not a mere idea of the human intellect. John of Damas cus affirms that " entity is attributed to God in scripture in a higher sense (fcvpi,a)T€pov) than it is to any creature." Nitzsch : Christian Doctrine, § 62. It is as proper to speak of the substance of God as of the substance of matter.

The two substances, matter and mind, are wholly diverse, and have nothing in common, except that each is the base of certain properties, and the ground of certain phenomena. These properties and phenomena being different in kind, prove that material substance and spiritual substance differ specifically and absolutely. Matter cannot think, and mind cannot be burned. Spiritual substance is known by its qual ities and effects. In this respect it is like material substance, which is cognizable only by its properties and effects. Nei ther matter nor mind can be known apart from, and back of, its properties. That these are two substances, and that each has its own peculiarity, is a common belief of man which ap pears in the better pagan philosophy. " ]Sro origin of souls can be discovered in matter ; for there is nothing mixed or compounded in souls; or anything that seems to be born or made from matter (ex terra). There is nothing of the nat ure of water, or air, or fire in them. For in such material elements, there is nothing that has the power of remem bering, of perceiving, of thinking ; nothing that retains the past, foresees the future, and comprehends the present. These characteristics of the soul are divine, and it is impos sible to perceive how man could have obtained them, ex cept from God." Cicero : Tusculan Questions, I. 27, 28. Cicero cites this doctrine as Aristotle's ; and mentions with it Aristotle's opinion that since mind as distinguished from matter has these divine qualities, it must be eternal (ob eamque rem, seternum sit necesse est). Compare More : On Immortality, I. iii.

NATURE OF GOD. 161

Spiritual substance in the instance of the Infinite being is not connected with a body, or a form in which it dwells. God as spirit is " without body, parts, or passions." West minster Confession, II. i. He does not occupy space. But spiritual substance in the instance of finite being is em bodied. Both man and angel have form, and are related to space. Yet it must be noticed that even in the case of man, mind is independent of matter. The soul may exist consciously in separation from the body. It does so exist between death and the resurrection. " The spirit returns to God who gave it." Eccl. 12 : 17. In dreams, there is consciousness without the use of the senses. In this case, the mind is the sole efficient. St. Paul's vision of the third heavens was independent of the body; because he could not determine whether he was embodied or disembodied. 2 Cor. 12 : 2, 3.

The truth that God is a substance or essence is important, first, in contradiction to that form of pantheism which de fines him as the " absolute idea." An idea is not a being. It is not an objective entity, but a notion of the human mind. If God has no reality other than that of an idea, he is not real in the sense of a being or an essence that can affect other beings or essences. The theorist of this class would relieve the difficulty, by saying that the absolute idea gets essentiality or reality by " positing " itself in the world, or the finite. But this is to say that the finite, or the world, is the true essence of God, and that apart from the world God is not an entity. Secondly, the truth that God is a substance is important, in contradiction to the view that makes him to be the mere order of the universe, or " a power that makes for righteousness." This, too, is not a substance. Thirdly, the truth that God possesses essential being is important, in reference to that hyper-spirituality which transforms him into a mere influence or energy, a stream of tendency pervading the universe, having no con stitutional being, and no foundation for natural and moral

162 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

attributes. The Primitive church was troubled with this false spiritualism in the Gnostic speculations, which led Tertullian to contend that God possesses "body." This vehement l^orth African father, laboring with the inade quate Punic Latin to convey his thought, was probably contending for the truth, and intended no materialism ; al though Augustine (On the Soul, II. ix.) thought him to be obnoxious to this charge. Interpreted by what he says else where, we think that Tertullian only meant to assert that God, though a spirit, is a substance or essence, and employed the word " corpus " to designate this. For he expressly de clares that God "has not diversity of parts; he is altogether uniform." But a substance which is uncompounded and without parts, is not a material substance. It is not a body in the strict sense of the term, but an unextended and im ponderable substance. Respecting the spirituality of God, Tertullian (Contra Praxearn, 16) affirms that "God holds the universe in his hand, like a nest. His throne is heaven, and his footstool is earth. In him, is all space (locus), and he is not in space ; and he is the extreme limit of the uni verse." In the tract De anima (7), Tertullian asserts a " corporalitas animse," which is other than the bodily cor poreality, because it is found when the body is separated from the soul. The instances of Dives and Lazarus are cited. These were disembodied souls, and yet they were capable of suffering and enjoyment. Hence, says Tertullian, they could not be without corporality in the sense of sub stantiality. u In corporalitas enim nihil patitur, non habens per quod pati possit ; aut si habet, hoc erit corpus. In quantum enim omne corporale passibile est, in tantum quod passibile est, corporale est." Polanus (Syntagma Y. 32) so understands Tertullian : "Tertulliano corpus generaliter significat substantiam vere eubsistentem, sive sit visibilis, sive invisibilis. Ilinc deum quoque corpus esse dixit. Sed prsestat ejusmodi dfcvpo\oyias vitare." Lactantius (De ira dei, 2) combats those who " deny that God has any figNATURE OF GOD. 163

are, and suppose that he is not moved by any feeling: qui aut figuram negant habere ullam deum, ant nullo affectu commoveri putant." By " figure " Lactantius means the definiteness of personality.

The pseudo-spirituality of the Gnostics led to these statements of Tertullian and Lactantius. Respecting them, Bentley (Free Thinking, X.) makes the following remark. " With a few of the fathers, the matter stands thus : They believed the attributes of God, his infinite power, wisdom, justice, and goodness, in the same extent that we do ; but his essence, no more than we can now, they could not dis cover. The scriptures, they saw, called him spiritus, spirit ; and the human soul anima, breath ; both of which, in their primitive sense, mean aerial matter ; and all the words that the Hebrew, Greek and Latin, of old, or any tongue now or hereafter can supply, to denote the substance of God or soul, must either be thus metaphysical, or else merely nega tive, as 'incorporeal' or 'immaterial.' What wonder, then, if, in those early times, some fathers believed that the di vine substance was matter or body ; especially while the notion of ' body ' was undefined and unfixed, and was as extensive as 'thing.' Was this such a shame in a few fathers ; while the Stoics maintained qualities and pas sions, virtues and vices, arts and sciences, nay syllogisms and solecisms, to be 'bodies'? " Yoltaire (Morals of Na tions) founds upon these statements of Tertullian and Lac tantius the assertion, that " the greater part of the fathers of the church, Platonists as they were, considered the soul to be corporeal." Ilallam (Literature of Europe, III. 94) has the same misconception, and asserts that " the fathers, with the exception, perhaps the single one, of Augustine, taught the corporeity of the thinking substance."

The Westminster Confession (II. 1) defines God to be " a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions." These qualifying clauses define, so far as is possible, the idea of spiritual substance. The invisibility of spirit, as pre164 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

viously remarked, would not of itself differentiate it from matter and material nature. The force of gravity, the chemical forces, electricity, magnetism, and the like, are as invisible as God himself, or the soul of man. Heat, ac cording to the recent theory, is the invisible motion of in visible molecules. There is an invisible ground of the visible and tangible. Back of the world of ponderable physics, which we apprehend by the five senses, there is an unseen world which is natural still, not moral ; physical still, not spiritual. Who ever saw, or ever will see, that principle of life of which outward and material nature is but the embodiment or manifestation? When we have stripped the visible world of its visibility and ponderability, and have resolved it into nnseen forces and laws, we have not reached any higher sphere than that of nature and mat ter. He who worships the life of nature, or adores the force of gravity ; nay, he who has no higher emotions than those of the pantheistic religionist, which are called forth by the beauty and splendor of visible nature, or the cloudy and mystic awfulness of invisible nature, is as really an idolater as is the most debased pagan who bows down before a vis ible and material idol. But when this definition of God was made, the invisible side of the material world was not the subject of natural science so much as it has been since. The " material " meant the visible and ponderable. Con sequently the term " invisible " referred more particularly to the immaterial and spiritual.

In Scripture, this characteristic of invisibility is some times attributed to God in a relative sense. It denotes that God, even when he has assumed a form, as in a theophany, may be an object too dazzling and resplendent for the creat ure's eye to look upon. Jehovah says to Moses, " Thou canst not see my face ; for there shall no man see me and live ; thou shalt see my back parts." Ex. 33 : 20. The incarnate Son is denominated (Ileb. 1 : 3) " the brightness the reflected splendor) of God's glory," upon

' NATURE OF GOD. 165

which man can look; but in the instance of the trans figuration, the vision was too resplendent for mortal man to behold. In this sense, God is invisible as the incandescent orb of the sun is invisible to the naked eye. It is impossible to fix the gaze upon it without being blinded by excess of light.

In saying that God, as a pure spirit, is " without body, parts or passions," a definite conception is conveyed by which spirit and matter are sharply distinguished. Matter may have bodily form, be divisible, and capable of passions : that is, of being wrought upon by other pieces of ponder able matter. None of these characteristics can belong to God, or to any spirit whatever. " Take ye, therefore, good heed unto yourselves (for ye saw no manner of similitude on the day that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb, out of the midst of the fire) lest ye corrupt yourselves, and make you a graven image, the similitude of any figure, the like ness of male or female," Deut. 4 : 15, 16. Idolatry con ceives of the deity as a form, and the Hebrews were warned against the error.

It is difficult for man, in his present condition, to think of substance, and yet not think of figure or parts. Augus tine (Confessions, "VII. i.) describes his own perplexity, when renouncing Manichseism, in the following manner. " Though not under the form of the human body, yet wras I constrained to conceive of Thee as being in space, either infused into the world, or diffused infinitely outside of it. Because, whatsoever I conceived of as deprived of this space seemed to me nothing, yea, altogether nothing, not even a void ; as, if a body were taken out of its place, and the place should remain empty of any body at all, yet would it remain a void place, as it were a spacious nothing." In Confessions, Y. xiv., he says, " Could I once have conceived of a spiritual substance, all the strongholds of the Manichseans would have been beaten down and cast utterly out of mind. But I could not."

166 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

But that it is possible to think of unextended substance, is proved by the fact that we think of the human soul as without figure and parts, and yet as a real entity. In truth, it is easier to think of the reality and continued existence of the soul after death, than of the body. The body, as to its visible substance, is dissolved into dust, and blown to the four winds, and taken up into other forms of matter. But the soul being indissoluble and indivisible, has a subsistence of its own apart from and independent of the body. It is easier to realize and believe in, the present actual existence of the spiritual part of Alexander the Great, than of the material part of him. That the soul of Alexander the Great is this instant existing, and existing consciously, is not so difficult to believe, as it is to believe that his body is still existing. It is easier to answer the question, Where is the soul of a man who died a thousand years ago ? than to answer the question, Where is the body of a man who died a thousand years ago ? " The dust returns to the earth as it was, and the spirit returns to God who gave it," Eccl. 12:7.

Nothing is more natural and common than to speak of our intellectual " nature " or " being," meaning thereby our immortal substance. In this case, " substance " denotes that entity which stands under agencies and phenomena as their supporting and efficient ground. We cannot conceive of the soul as only a series of exercises. There must be an agent in order to agency ; a substantial being in order to exercises. To ask us to think away the substance of the soul, and then to conceive of its exercises, is like asking us to think away the earth around a hole, and then to conceive of the hole. The thoughts of the mind are distinguishable from the mind. " This perceiving, active being," says Berkeley (Principles of Knowledge, in initio), " is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them."

NATURE OF GOD. 167

Hume (Understanding, IY. vi.) denied the reality of spir itual substance, contending that there is nothing but a series of sensuous " impressions," and remembered u ideas " of them. Mill copies Hume in rejecting the notion of a sub stance as the foundation of consciousness and the agencies of the human soul, and defining the soul to be " a perma nent possibility of thought and feeling ; a thread of con sciousness." Examination of Hamilton, 254, 255. The American theologian Emmons was understood to hold that the soul is a series of exercises. Dwight seems to have had him in view, in his attack upon this theory. Smith : Faith and Philosophy, 241. Mill's definition of mind would not be accepted by the materialist, if applied to matter. The physicist would nokgrant that gunpowder is only "the per manent possibility of explosion." The term " possibility " does not denote entity ; but the chemist affirms that gun powder is entity. Compare Locke : On Substance.

That the idea of unextended spiritual substance is a rational idea, is proved by the fact that the human intellect naturally adopts it. Plato and Aristotle argued in defence of it, in opposition to the atheistic schools of their time, who contended that there is nothing objectively existent but matter or extended substance. The later Platonists also, like Plotirius and Simplicius, affirmed the validity of the idea. Plotinus maintained that "one and the selfsame numerical thing may be, all of it, entirely everywhere ; " that " the deity is not part of it here, and part of it there ; r that " God being not in space, is yet present to everything that is in space ; " that " God is all of him indivisibly present to whatsoever he is present." Pythagoras and Plutarch took the same ground.

These philosophers endeavored to prove that there is another species of substance than that which has figure in space, and is divisible into parts. This is spiritual sub stance ; the eternal essence of God, and the immortal es sence of angel and man. " There are," says Cud worth (Sys168 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

tern, Y. iii.), " two kinds of substances in nature : the first, extension or magnitude, really existing without the mind, which is a thing that hath no self -unity at all in it, but is in finite alterity and divisibility, as it were mere outside and outwardness, it having nothing within,1 nor any other action belonging to it, but only locally to move when it is moved. The second, life and mind, or the self -active cogitative nat ure, an inside being, whose action is not local motion, but an internal energy, within the substance or essence of the thinker himself, or in the inside of him." Material sub stance is moved ab extra ; spiritual substance is moved ab intra, that is, is self-moved. This is perhaps the most im portant point in the distinction between mind and matter. Mind moves voluntarily ; matter is moved mechanically. That mind is a substance, though unextended and incor poreal, was strongly maintained by Plato and Aristotle. " The Peripatetics, though they expressly held the soul to be «0-a>yu.aT09 or incorporeal, yet still spoke of a vov<$ vXt^o?, a material [substantial] mind or intellect. This, to modern ears, may possibly sound somewhat harshly. Yet if we translate the words by ' natural capacity,' and consider them as only denoting that original and native power of intellec tion which being prior to all human knowledge is yet neces sary to its reception, there seems nothing then to remain that can give offence." Harris : Hermes, III. i.

Spinoza has done more than any other modern philoso pher, to annihilate the distinction between incorporeal and corporeal substance, or between mind and matter, by attrib uting to his one infinite substance two heterogeneous and incompatible modes or properties : thought and extension.

1 Similarly, Schelling (Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre, 240) remarks : " Nur eine in sich selbst zuriickgehende Kraft schaffb sich selbst em Inures. Daher der Materie kein Innrcs zukommt." Coleridge adopts this in his Biographia (Harper's Ed. 242). Schubert says that " the farther we penetrate into matter, we find the minute and microscopic more and more ; but the further we penetrate into mind, we discover the great and grand, more and more." AnBJchten, 195.

NATURE OP GOD. 169

Spinozism teaches : 1. There is only one substance, and this substance is God. 2. This substance thinks : " cogitatio attributum dei est, sive deus est res cogitans." 3. This substance is extended : " extensio attributum dei, sive deus est res extensa." Ethices, II. ii. But these two modes of Spinoza's one substance exclude each other. If one and the same substance is extended in space, and is also a thinking substance, it follows that matter thinks. To say that mat ter thinks is materialism, in the same way that to say that matter is God is atheism. This theory is revived in the recent attempt to explain thought by the molecular motion in the brain.1

Plato (Sophist, 246) describes the conflict going on in his day respecting the definition of substance (Swrta). " Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven, and from the unseen, to earth, and seem determined to grasp in their hands rocks and oaks ; of these they lay hold, and are ob stinate in maintaining that only the things which can be touched and handled have being or essence, because they define being and body as one, and if anyone says that what is not a body exists, they altogether despise him, and will hear of nothing but body. And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend themselves from above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that true es sence consists of certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas ; the bodies of the materialists which are maintained by them to be the very truth, they break up into little bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be generation and not es sence. O Theatetus, there is an endless war which is always raging between these two armies on this ground."

The quantity of unextended and invisible substance is

1 For a refutation of Spinoza, see Howe : Living Temple, Pt. II. ch. i. For a clear statement of Spinozism, see Ueberweg : History, II. 55 sq. Hobbes denied the existence of anything but body, and asserted that God is corporeal. Cudworth : System, Ch. V. Section iii. Berkeley (Principles of Knowledge) takea the other extreme, and maintains that mind is the only substance.

170 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

greater than of extended and visible substance. 1. God is imextended substance, and his immensity is vaster than that of the whole finite universe. 2. The unextended and invis ible part of the finite universe is larger in amount than the ponderable, extended, and visible part of it : viz. (a) the spirits of men and angels ; (5) invisible atoms, or molecules ; (c) the invisible forces of nature. These constitute a sum total of existence that is greater and more important than the whole visibility that clothes them. The unseen universe is vaster than the seen. A man's soul is greater than hia body. The invisible force of gravity is greater than all its visible effects. The invisible force of cohesion is the cause of all the visibility and ponderability of matter. Without it, there would be no extended and ponderable substance, for the atoms or molecules apart from its attraction would be infinitely separated and scattered.

In defining God to be " a most pure spirit without pas sions," it must be remembered that the term " passion " is used etymologically. It is derived from patior, to suffer. Passion implies passivity. It is the effect of an impression from without. The effervescence of an alkali under an acid illustrates the meaning of the term. One substance in nature works upon another, by virtue of a correlation and correspondence that is fixed. The one in reference to the other is passive and helpless. Ascending higher, passion in sentient existence, as in man or brute, arises from the impression upon a physical nature of the physical object that is correlated to it. Passion in man or brute is the working of mere appetite. In this sense, St. Paul speaks of the motions, or passions (rraSyfAara) of sins which are in the members. Rom. 7:5; Gal. 5 : 24. Locke (Essay, II. xxi. 4) distinguishes between "active and passive power." " From body [matter], we have no idea of the beginning of motion. A body at rest affords us no idea of active power to move ; and when it is set in mo tion itself, that motion is rather a passion than an action :

NATURE OF GOD. 171

for when the ball obeys the stroke of the billiard stick, it is not any action of the ball, but bare passion. " Passion " in the Westminster definition, is the same as Locke's " passive power."

God has no passions. He stands in no passive and organ ic relations to that which is not himself. He cannot be wrought upon, and impressed, by the universe of matter and mind which he has created from nothing. Creatures are passively correlated to each other, and are made to be af fected by other creatures ; but the Creator is self-subsistent and independent of creation, so that he is not passively cor related to anything external to himself. God, says Aquinas, has absolute, not merely relative existence, like a creature. " Esse relativi est ad aliud se habere. Si igitur relatio sit ipsa divina essentia, sequitur quod esse divinae essentiae sit ad aliud se habere ; quod repugnat perfection! divino esse quod est maxime absolutum est et per se subsistens." Suinma, I. iii. Men and angels are put into a certain rela tion to the world which they inhabit, and there is action and reaction between them and the external universe. This does not apply to God. He is not operated upon and moved from the outside, but all' his activity is self-determined. All the movement in the Divine essence is internal and ab intra. Even when God is complacent towards a creature's holiness, and displacent towards a creature's sin, this is not the same as a passive impression upon a sensuous organism, from an outward sensible object, eliciting temporarily a sensation that previously was unfelt. Sin and holiness are not substances ; and God's love and wrath are self-moved and unceasing energies of the Divine nature. He is volun tarily and eternally complacent towards good, and displacent towards evil.

The forces of nature do not make an impression upon the Divine essence. There is no organic action and reaction between the created universe of mind and matter, and the eternal being of God. " In God," says Newton (Scholium,

172 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

at the end of the Principia), " all things are contained and move, but without mutual passion. God is not acted upon by the motions of bodies ; and they suffer no resistance from the omnipresence of God." Passions are liable to be ex cessive. Not being self-determined, but determined ab ex tra, their intensity depends upon what is outward. God has no passionate or exorbitant emotions. The doctrine that God has passions would imply that there is an organic unity between him and the universe, with action and reaction. But two such different beings as God and material nature, or God and man, cannot constitute one organic system of existence. In an organism, one part is as old as another, and as neces sary as another. Organs are contemporaneous ; having the same common nature and origin, and developing simultane ously. This cannot be true of the Infinite and finite spirit, and still less of the Infinite spirit and matter. See Presby terian Keview, Oct. 1880, 769, 770.

It is important to remember this signification of the term " passion," and the intention in employing it. Sometimes it has been understood to be synonymous with feeling or emotion, and the erroneous and demoralizing inference has been drawn, that the Divine nature is destitute of feeling altogether. " God," says Spinoza (Ethices, V. 17-19), " is free from all passions ; he is not affected with joy and sad ness ; or with love and hatred. No one can hate God : and he who loves God cannot endeavor to cause God to love him, because God can neither love nor hate." Spinoza as sumes that love and hatred involve alternations of happiness and misery in the being /'who has such emotions. Conse quently God cannot have either love or hatred. Similarly, Hartrnann (Ivrisis des Christenthums, 41) remarks that " die Liebe Gottes ist eine anthropopathische Vorstellung von ganz gleicher Ordnung mit der Personlichheit Gottes ; sie steht und fallt mit dieser, und ist dem religiosen Bewussteeyn auf pantheistischer Basis ebenso entbehrlich wie diese." Such a statement reduces the Supreme Being to

NATURE OF GOD. 173

mere intelligence, and to the lowest form of intelligence ; that, namely, which is disconnected with moral character istics. It denudes God of those emotional qualities that necessarily enter into personality, and are requisite in order to love, worship, and obedience upon the part of the creat ure. But the error could not logically stop here. The in telligence of the deity could not long survive his moral feeling. If he is conceived to have the power of perceiving sin, for example, but no power of feeling displeasure to wards it, such a weak and inefficient perception would be un worthy of notice, and would soon be theoretically, as well as practically denied. A theory that begins with affirming absolute indifference in God, and denying that he either loves the good, or hates the evil, must end ultimately in re jecting all moral attributes, and reducing him to blind force. It could not even concede happiness to the deity, because this is a species of feeling. " When," says Howe (Re deemer's Tears), " expressions that import anger or grief are used concerning God himself, we must sever in our concep tion everything of imperfection, and ascribe everything of real perfection. We are not to think that such expressions signify nothing, that they have no meaning, or that nothing at all is to be attributed to Him, under them. Nor are we, again, to think that they signify the same thing with what we find in ourselves, and are wont to express by these names. In the Divine nature, there may be real and yet most serene complacency and displacency ; viz., such as are unaccompanied with the least commotion, and import noth ing of imperfection, but perfection rather, as it is a perfec tion to apprehend things suitably to what in themselves they are."

The Scriptures attribute feeling to God, and nearly all forms of feeling common to man. That all of these are not intended to be understood as belonging to the Divine nature is plain, because some of them are as incompatible with the idea of an infinite and perfect being as are the

174 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

material instruments of hands and feet attributed to him in Scripture. Such an emotion as fear, for example, which God is represented as experiencing (Gen. 3 : 22, 23 ; Ex. 13 : 17 ; Deut. 32 : 27), must be regarded as metaphorical. The same is true of jealousy (Deut. 32 : 21) ; of grieving and repenting (Gen. 6 : 6, 7 ; Ps. 95 : 10 ; Jer. 15 : 6).

The criterion for determining which [form of feeling is literally, and which is metaphorically attributable to God, is the divine "blessedness. God cannot be the subject of any emotion that is intrinsically and necessarily an unhappy one. If he literally feared his foes, or were literally jealous of a rival, he would so far forth be miserable. Literal fear and literal jealousy cannot therefore be attributed to him. Tried by this test, it will be found that there are only two fundamental forms of feeling that are literally attributable to the Divine essence. These are love (ajaTrrj), and wrath (opyij). Hatred is a phase of displeasure or wrath. These two emotions are real and essential in God ; the one wakened by righteousness, and the other by sin. The ex istence of the one necessitates that of the other ; so that if there be no love of righteousness, there is no anger at sin, and, conversely, if there be no anger at sin, there is no love of righteousness. " He who loves the good," says Lactantius (De ira, 5), " by this very fact hates the evil ; and he who does not hate the evil, does not love the good ; because the love of goodness issues directly out of the hatred of evil, and the hatred of evil issues directly out of the love of goodness. I^o one can love life without abhorring death ; and no one can have an appetency for light, without an an tipathy to darkness." The necessary coexistence of these opposite feelings towards moral contraries like righteousness and sin, is continually taught in Scripture. " All they that hate me love death," Prov. 8 : 36. " Ye that love the Lord, hate evil," Ps. 97 : 10.

Complacency towards righteousness and displacency to wards sin are not contraries, but opposites, or antitheses.

NATURE OF GOD. 175

They are the action of one and the same moral attribute, viz., holiness, towards the two contraries right and wrong. Consequently they are homogeneous feelings. The Divine wrath is the Divine holiness in one phase or mode of it ; and the Divine love is the same Divine holiness in another phase or mode of it. One involves and supposes the other. But in the instance of contrary feelings, such for example as pleas ure and pain, or contrary qualities like righteousness and sin, there is heterogeneity. Pain and pleasure are not two modes or phases of the same thing ; and neither are righteousness and sin. These are not opposite antitheses which involve and imply each other. Each exists alone without the other. The one excludes the other, instead of supposing the other. The relation of opposites or antitheses is that of polarity. Moral love and moral wrath are like the two poles, north and south, of the same magnet, or the two manifestations, positive and negative, of the same electricity. Boreal mag netism is as really magnetism as austral ; and positive elec tricity is as really electricity as negative. So, also, moral wrath is as truly holiness as moral love. " He who leaveth Thee," says Augustine, " whither goeth or fleeth he, but from Thee pleased, to Thee displeased." Accordingly, the two feelings of love of holiness and hatred of evil coexist in the character of God, the most perfect of beings, and in that of angels and redeemed men. Human character is worthless, in proportion as abhorrence of sin is lacking in it. It is related of Charles the Second, that "he felt no gratitude for benefits, and no resentment for wrongs. He did not love anyone, and hated no one." lie was indifferent to wards right and wrong, and "the only feeling he had was contempt." Green: History of the English People, IX.1

These emotions of love and wrath are compatible with

1 Upon the subject of the Divine anger, see Tertullian : De ira dei. Neander : Apostel-Geschichte, II. 616. (Reconciliation, in Rom. 4 : 35 ; Phil. 2:6). Shedd : Theological Essays, 269-285.

176 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

the Divine blessedness. To love righteousness is confessedly blessedness itself. To be displeased with and hate wicked ness, at first sight, would seem to introduce commotion and unhappiness into the Divine mind. But this is because it is confounded with the passion of anger and hatred in the de praved human heart. This is an unlawful feeling ; a man has no right to hate his fellow, or to be angry with him with this species of wrath. He is forbidden by the moral law to exercise such an emotion. It is the illegitimateness of the feeling that makes it a wretched one. But any emo tion that is permitted, and still more that is commanded by the moral law, cannot cause mental distress. To suppose this, is to suppose that morality and misery are inseparably connected, and that to feel rightly and righteously is to be miserable.

There is a kind of wrath in the human soul that resem bles the wrath of God, and constitutes its true analogue. It is the wrath of the human conscience, which is wholly different from that of the human heart. This kind of anger is commanded in the injunction, " Be ye angry and sin not," Eph. 4 : 26. Were this species of moral displacency more often considered, and the Divine anger illustrated by it, there would be less of the common and unthinking opposi tion to the doctrine of the Divine wrath.

That this species of moral displeasure is compatible with blessedness, is plain from an examination of the nature of happiness. Aristotle (Ethics, X. 4) defines happiness or pleasurable emotion to be "the coincidence and harmony between a feeling and its correlative object." Bishop Butler gives the same definition, substantially, in his remark that " pleasure arises from a faculty's having its proper object." When the feeling of hunger, for illustration, is met by food, two things are brought into contact that are intended for each other, and the consequence is a pleasurable sensation. If the feeling of hunger were met by an innutritions fluid like water, there would be no coincidence and agreement

NATURE OF GOD. 177

between them, and the result would be dissatisfaction and some degree of pain.

Now when the emotion of anger in a most pure spirit like God comes into contact with moral evil, there is har mony between the feeling and its object. It is a righteous feeling spent upon a wicked thing. When God hates what is hateful, and is angry at that which merits wrath, the true nature and fitness of things is observed, and he feels in him self that inward satisfaction which is the substance of hap piness. Anger and hatred are associated in our minds with unhappiness, because we behold their exercise only in a sin ful sphere, and in an illegitimate manner. In an apostate world, the proper and fitting coincidence between emotions and their objects has been disturbed and destroyed by sin. A sinner hates the holiness which he ought to love, and loves the sin which he ought to hate. The anger in his heart is selfish and passionate, not legitimate and calm. The love in his heart is illicit ; and hence in scripture it is denominated "lust," or "concupiscence" (&rrt&yfj,ia). In a sinful world, the true relations and correlations are reversed. Love and hatred are expended upon exactly the wrong ob jects. But when these feelings are contemplated within the sphere of the Holy and the Eternal ; when they are beheld in God, a most pure spirit, without body, parts, or passions, and exercised only upon their appropriate and deserving objects ; when the wrath falls only upon the sin and uncleanness of hell, and burns up nothing but filth in its pure celestial flame ; then the emotion is not merely right and legitimate, but it is beautiful with an august beauty, and no source of pain either to the Divine mind, or to any minds in sympathy with it.

It is here and thus, that we can explain the blessedness of God in connection with his omniscience and omnipres ence. We know that sin and the punishment of sin are ever before him. The feeling of wrath against the wicked ness of man and devils, is constantly in the Divine essence.

178 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

Yet God is supremely and constantly blessed. He can be BO, only because there is a just and proper harmony between the wrath and the object upon which it falls ; only because he hates that which is hateful, and condemns what is dam nable. Hence he is called " God over all [hell as well as heaven] blessed forever." The Divine blessedness is not destroyed by the sin of his creatures, or by his own holy displeasure against it. And here, also, is seen the compati bility of some everlasting sin and misery with the Divine perfection. If the feeling of wrath against moral evil is right and rational, there is no impropriety in its exercise by the Supreme being, and its exercise by him is the sub stance of hell. If the feeling is proper for a single instant, it is so forever.

While therefore God as a most pure spirit has no pas sions, he has feelings and emotions. He is not passively wrought upon by the objective universe, so that he experi ences physical impressions and organic appetites, as the creature does, but he is self-moved in all his feelings. God's moral love and wrath relate to the character and actions of free moral agents. He does not either love or hate inorganic matter. He has no physical appetite or an tipathy. The emotions of love and wrath go forth not towards the substance of free agents, but towards the agency only. God does not hate the soul of a sinner, but only his sin ; and he does not love with holy complacence the sub stance of the human mind, but its activity.

2. Personality is the second fundamental predicate of spirit. God is a personal Being. Personality is marked by two characteristics : (a) self-consciousness ; (b) self-deter mination.1

1 One of the contradictions in Spinoza's system is, that while he denies to man self-determination, he concedes to him self-consciousness. But a theorist who could attribute to God the two contradictories, thought and extension, could attribute to man the two contradictories, personality and necessity. On these two factors in personality, see Mil ler : Sin, II. 113-142. Urwick's Trans.

NATURE OF GOD. 179

Self-consciousness is, first, the power which a rational spirit has of making itself its own object, and, secondly, of knowing that it has done so. All consciousness implies a duality of subject and object; a subject to know, and an object to be known. If there be a subject but no object, consciousness is impossible. And if there be an object, but no subject, there can be no consciousness. Mere singleness is fatal to consciousness. I cannot be conscious of a thing, unless there is a thing to be conscious of. Take away all objects of thought, and I cannot think.

Consciousness is very different from self -consciousness, and the two must be carefully discriminated. In conscious ness, the object is another substance than the subject ; but in self -consciousness the object is the same substance as the subject. When I am conscious of a tree, the object is a different entity from my mind ; but when I am conscious of myself, the object is the same entity with my mind. In consciousness, the duality required is in two things. In selfconsciousness, the duality required is in one thing.

An animal has consciousness in the sense of sentiency, but not self -consciousness. It is impressed by external ob jects that are no part of its own substance, but it is never impressed by itself. It never duplicates its own unity, and contemplates itself. It is aware of heat and cold, of pleas ure and pain, but it is never aware of the subject which ex periences these sensations. It cannot refer any of its ex periences back to itself as the person that experiences them. An animal is not a person, and cannot have the conscious ness of a person ; that is to say, it cannot have self-con sciousness. " Why is it," says Christlieb (Modern Doubt, 153), " that the gorilla with a throat similar to that of man, can only howl or whine, and that man with a throat like the ape's can speak and sing ? The answer is, that the beast cannot form an objective notion of his sensations and feelings, and therefore cannot reproduce them in language ; it cannot distinguish between a personal ego and the mo180 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

mentary sensation. It is the power to do this, and not his organs of voice (for even the deaf and dumb make a lan guage for themselves) which gives man the faculty of speech."

Man has both consciousness and self -consciousness. He has that inferior species, in which he only feels, but does not place his feeling in relation to himself as the ego. In the first place, he has the sensuous consciousness of the animal, and the blind agencies of physical appetite. This is mere sentiency, differing from that of the animal only in the fact that it is capable of being scrutinized and converted into self-consciousness. In the second place, there are the spontaneous workings of thought and feeling continually going on, which constitute a consciousness, but not neces sarily a self-consciousness. The man thinks, but does not think of what he thinks. He feels, but does not scrutinize his feeling. His feeling is said to be " unconscious," in the sense of unreflecting, or not self-conscious. It is one of the effects of conviction by the Holy Spirit, to convert con sciousness into self-consciousness. Conviction of sin is the consciousness of self as the guilty author of sin. It is forc ing the man to say, " I know that /have thus felt, and thus thought, and thus acted." The truth and Spirit of God bring sinners to self-knowledge and self -consciousness, from out of a state of mere consciousness.

Self-consciousness is higher than consciousness. It is the highest and most perfect form of consciousness. It is the species that characterizes the Supreme Being. God does not like man have consciousness separate from self -con sciousness. In the first place, he has no sentiency. He is not impressed and wrought upon by an external object, as creatures are, by virtue of a correlation between himself and it. He is without body, parts and passions. In the second place, there are no blind and unreflecting mental processes in God. He never comes to self -consciousness out of mere consciousness, as man does ; but he is perpetually self -conNATURE OF GOD. 181

templating, self-knowing, and self-communing. God is cognizant of the universe of matter which he created ex nihilo, and which consequently is no part of his own essence. But this cognition comes not through the medium of the senses, and is not an imperfect kind of knowledge like the sentiency of an animal, or the passive consciousness of the unreflecting man. The Divine consciousness of the uni verse, as an object, is always related to and accompanied with the Divine self-consciousness, which is immutable and eternal. In God, consciousness and self -consciousness are inseparable, but not in man. Man may be conscious, yet not self-conscious. God cannot be. Man passes from con sciousness to self-consciousness, and back again. God does not. Consequently, God's self-consciousness is more per fect and of a higher grade than that of man or angel.

Self-consciousness is more mysterious and inexplicable than mere consciousness. It has been the problem of the philosophic mind in all ages. The pantheist asserts that the doctrine of the dualism of mind and matter renders cognition impossible, but that the doctrine of monism ex plains cognition. He maintains that if it can be shown that all consciousness is in reality self-consciousness, because all substance is one substance, then the problem of cogni tion is made clear. But in fact it is made darker. For mere sameness of substance does not account for cognition. One stone is identical in substance with another, but this does not go to prove that one stone knows or can know another stone. There is no reason, consequently, for asser ting that mind cannot know matter, unless mind and matter are the same substance. In order to be conscious of a mate rial object, it is not necessary to be a material subject. The only case in which it is necessary for the subject and ob ject to be identical in substance, is that of seZ/'-consciousness. In this instance, the object known must be one in substance with the subject knowing. The identity of sub ject and object is true only in reference to the knowledge

182 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

which the individual person has of himself. The instant he passes to the knowledge of any other object than his own soul, he has another form of consciousness than self-con sciousness. When I cognize a tree, I am conscious, but not self-conscious. When I know God, I am conscious, not selfconscious. The substance, or object, known in each of these instances, is not my substance, but that of another being, and my consciousness is not self-consciousness. I can indeed pass from consciousness to self-consciousness, by referring the consciousness of the tree to the self as the subject of it. But this is a second act additional to the first act of mere consciousness.

The truth is, that it is more difficult to explain self -con sciousness than consciousness ; to conceive how the subject can know itself , than how it can know something that is not itself. The act of simple consciousness, which is com mon to both man and brute, is comparatively plain and ex plicable. When we look at an object other than ourselves ; when we behold a tree or the sky, for example ; the act of cognition is easier to comprehend than is the act of selfknowledge. For there is something outside of us, in front of us, and another thing than we are, at which we look, and which we behold. But in this act of ^/-inspection, there is no second thing, external and extant to us, which we con template. That which is seen, is one and the same thing with that which sees. The act of cognition, which in all other instances requires the existence of two totally different entities — an entity that is known, and an entity that knows — in this instance, is performed with only one entity. It is the individual soul that perceives, and it is this identical individual soul that is perceived. It is the individual man that knows, and it is this very same man that is known. The eyeball looks at the eyeball. This latter act of cogni tion is much more mysterious than the former, so that noth ing is gained by contending that all consciousness is really self -consciousness. Compare Augustine : Trinity, XIV. vi.

NATURE OF GOD. 183

We have said that all consciousness implies a duality of subject and object. Self -consciousness, consequently, re quires these. And the peculiarity and mystery is, that it obtains them both, in one being or substance. The human spirit, in the act of self -cognition, furnishes both the subject that perceives, and the object that is perceived. The soul duplicates its own unity, as it were, and sets itself to look at itself. It is this power which the rational spirit possesses of making itself its own object, that constitutes it a personal being. Take away from man this capacity of setting him self off over against himself, and of steadily eying himself, and whatever other capacities he might be endowed with, he would not be a person. Even if he should think, and feel, and act, he could not say, " I know that I think ; I know that I feel ; I know that I am acting."

God as personal, is self-conscious. Consequently he must make himself his own object of contemplation. Here the doctrine of the trinity, the deep and dark mystery of Chris tianity, pours a flood of light upon the mystery of the Di vine self -consciousness. The pillar of cloud becomes the pillar of fire. The three distinctions in the one essence per sonalize it. God is personal because he is three persons : Father, Son, and Spirit.

Self -consciousness is (1), the power which a rational spirit, or mind, has of making itself its own object ; and (2), of knowing that it has done so. If the first step is taken, and not the second, there is consciousness but not self -conscious ness; because the subject would not, in this case, know that the object is the self. And the second step cannot be taken, if the first has not been. These two acts of a rational spirit, or mind, involve three distinctions in it, or modes of it. The whole mind as a subject contemplates the very same whole mind as an object. Here are two distinctions or modes of one mind. And the very same whole mind also perceives, that the contemplating subject and the contem plated object are one and the same essence or being. Here

184: THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

are three modes of one mind, each distinct from the others, yet all three going to make up the one self-conscious spirit. Unless there were these two acts and the three resulting distinctions, there would be no self-knowledge. Mere sin gleness, a mere subject without an object, is incompatible with self-consciousness. And mere duality would yield only con sciousness, not self-consciousness. Consciousness is dual ; self -consciousness is trinal.

Revelation represents God as " blessed forever." This blessedness is independent of the universe which once did not exist, and which he created from nothing. God, there fore, must find all the conditions of blessedness within himself alone. He is " blessed forever " in his own self-con templation and self-communion. He does not need the uni verse, in order that he may have an object which he can know, which he can love, and over which he can rejoice. " The Father knoweth the Son," from all eternity (Matt. 11 : 27) ; and "loveth the Son," from all eternity (John 3 : 35) ; and " glorifieth the Son," from all eternity (John IT : 5). Prior to creation, the eternal Wisdom " was by him as one brought up with him, and was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him " (Prov. 8 : 30) ; and the eternal Word "was in the beginning with God" (John 1:2); and "the only begotten Son " (or God only begotten, as the uncials read) was eternally " in the bosom of the Father " (John 1 : 18). Here is society within the essence, and wholly indepen dent of the created universe ; and self-knowledge, self-com munion, and blessedness resulting therefrom. But this is impossible to an essence destitute of these internal personal distinctions. Kot the singular unit of the deist, but the plu ral unity of the trinitarian explains this. A subject with out an object could not know. What is there to be known ? Could not love. What is there to be loved ? Could not re joice. What is there to rejoice over? And the object can not be the created universe. The infinite and eternal object of God's infinite and eternal knowledge, love, and joy, cannot

NATURE OF GOD. 185

be his creation ; because this is neither eternal nor infinite. There was a time when the universe was not ; and if God's self-consciousness and blessedness depend upon the uni verse, there was a time when he was neither self-conscious nor blessed. The objective God for the subjective God, therefore, must be very God of very God, begotten not made, the eternal Son of the eternal Father.

At this point, the radical difference between the Chris tian trinity and that of the later pantheism appears. The later pantheism (not the earlier of Spinoza) constructs a kind of trinity, but it is dependent upon the universe. God distinguishes himself from the world, and thereby finds the object required for the subject. This is the view of Hegel. " As God is eternal personality, so he eternally produces his other self, namely, Nature, in order to self -con sciousness." Michelet : Geschichte der Philosophic, II. 647. This conditions the Infinite by the finite. God makes use of the world in order to personality. To know himself as ego, he must know the universe as the non-ego. Without the world, therefore, he could not be self-conscious. There would be nothing from which to distinguish himself, and without such an act of distinction and contrast he would be impersonal. God is thus dependent upon the world for his personality. But by his idea, he cannot be dependent upon anything that is not himself. Consequently God and the world must ultimately be one and the same substance. God's personality is God's becoming conscious of himself in man and in nature. These latter are a phase or mode of the Infinite. The universe, consequently, must be coeval with God, because he cannot have any self-consciousness without it. Says Hartmann (Krisis des Christenthums, 42), " Ein Gegensatz von Selbstbewusstsein und Weltbewusstsein, von Ich und Niclit Icli, von Subject und Object in Gott, nicht denkbar ist. Yielmehr sein Selbstbewusstsein mit seiner intuitiven Weltbewusstsein eins ist. Das Abso lute kann kein anderes Selbstbewusstsein haben als sein

186 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

intuitives Weltbewusstsein." See Kurtz: Sacred His tory, 23.

But this is not the way in which the self-consciousness of the Godhead is mediated and brought about, according to divine revelation. In the Christian scheme of the trinity, the media to self-consciousness are all within the divine essence, and are wholly separate from, and independent of, the finite universe of mind and matter. The divine nature has all the requisites to personality in its own trinal con stitution. God makes use of his own eternal and primary essence, and not of the secondary substance of the world, as the object from which to distinguish himself, and there by be self -knowing, and self -communing. God distinguishes himself from himself, not from something that is not him self. This latter would yield consciousness merely, not self-consciousness. God the Father distinguishes himself from God the Son, and in this way knows himself. " Ko man knoweth the Son but the Father ; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son," Matt. 11 : 27. The divine self -contemplation is the beholding and loving of one divine person by another divine person, and not God's beholding of the universe, and loving and communing with it. " The Father loveth the Son, and sheweth him all things that him self doeth," John 5 : 20. " The first love of God the Father to the Son is that which we call ad intra, where the divine persons are objects of each other's actings. The Father knows the Son, and the Son knows the Father ; the Father loves the Son, and the Son loves the Father ; and so conse quently of the Holy Ghost, the medium of all these act ings." Owen : Sacramental Discourse, XXII.

The self-consciousness of God has an analogue in the selfconsciousness of man, in that the latter also is brought about without the aid of any other substance, or object, than the mind itself. In the instance of the finite spirit of man, we have seen that in the act of self-consciousness, no use is made of the external world, or of the non-ego. The human

NATURE OP GOD. 187

spirit in this act of seZ/'-contemplation duplicates its own unity, and finds an object for itself as a subject, in its own substance, and not, as in the act of mere consciousness, in the substance of the external world. If this is possible and necessary in reference to man, and finite personality, it is still more so in reference to God, and infinite personality. The Supreme being cannot be dependent upon another es sence than his own, for the conditions of self -consciousness. He is self-sufficient in this central respect, as in all others, and finds in his own nature all that is requisite to self-knowledge, as well as to self-communion and blessedness. Were it not so, God would be dependent upon his creation, and the blas phemous language which Byron puts into the mouth of Lu cifer would be true.

"He is great,

But, in his greatness, is no happier than

We in our conflict

Let him

Sit on his vast and solitary throne,

Creating worlds, to make eternity

Less burthensome to his immense existence

And unparticipated solitude.

Let him crowd orb on orb : he is alone. . . .

Could he but crush himself, 'twere the best boon

He ever granted ; but let him reign on,

And multiply himself in misery !

. . . . He, so wretched in his height,

So restless in his wretchedness, must still

Create, and recreate." — CAIN, I. i.

The Biblical doctrine of three distinctions, in one essence, each of which possesses the entire undivided essence, shows how God's self-consciousness is independent of the universe. God makes himself his own object. The first act, in the natural order, is the distinguishing of himself from him self. This yields the first and second distinctions, or per sons. The eternal Father beholds himself in the eternal Son ; his alter ego, or other self. The subject contemplat ing is different and distinct, as to form (pop^rf, Phil. 2 : 6),

188 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

not as to essence (6Wia), from the object contemplated. God the Father is not the same person (/j,opr} rov 3-eov) as God the Son, though he is the same substance or being (ova-la rov &eov). But this is not the whole of the trinitarian process. There must be a second act, namely, the perception that the subject-ego and object-ego, arrived at in the first act, are one and the same essence ; that the Father and the Son are not two beings but one. This sec ond act of perception supposes a percipient ; and the per cipient is a third distinction or mode of the divine essence, the Holy Spirit, who is different as to form (pop^rf) from the first and second, because he recognizes both their dis tinctness of person and their unity and identity of nature. The circle of the divine self -consciousness is now complete. By the two acts of perception, and the three resulting dis tinctions, the eternal Being has made himself his own ob ject, and has perceived that lie has done so. And there is real trinality in the unity. For the subject-ego is not the object-ego ; the first "form of God" is not the second "form of God." And the third distinction who reunites these two in the perception of their identity of essence, is neither the subject-ego nor the object-ego; the third "form of God" is not the first or the second form, and yet is consubstantial with them both. The third distinction does not, like the first, posit an object, but only perceives the act of positing. There is, consequently, no second object that requires to be reunited in the unity of essence. Hence the two acts and the three resulting distinctions are sufficient to complete the circle of self-consciousness.1

1 For a fuller development of this subject upon this line, see note in Shedd : History of Doctrine, I. 365-368 ; Introduction to Augustine on the Trinity, pp. 8, 9. Also Augustine : Trinity, XIV. vi.-viii. Guericke : Church History, 203. Miiller : On Sin, II. 136 sq. Billroth : Religions-Philosophic, § 89, 90. Wilberforce : Incarnation, III. Kidd : On the Trinity (Eternal Sonship) ; with Candlish's Introduction. Candlish : Fatherhood of God. Dorner : Christian Doctrine, I. 412-462. Kurtz : Sacred History, § 2. Christlieb : Modern Doubt, Lect. HI. Passavant : Wille, p. 4.

NATURE OF GOD. 189

Thus the Divine personality, in the light thrown upon it by the revealed doctrine of the trinity, is seen to be wholly independent of the finite. God does not struggle out into self-consciousness by the help of the external universe. Be fore that universe was created, and in the solitude of his own eternity and self-sufficiency, he had within his own es sence all the conditions of self -consciousness. And after the worlds were called into being, the divine personality remained the same immutable self-knowledge, unaffected by anything in his handiwork.

" Oh Light Eterne, sole in thyself that dwellest, Sole knowest thyself, and known unto thyself, And knowing, lovest and smilest on thyself ! " DANTE : Paradise, xxxiii. 125.

This analysis shows that self -consciousness is tririal, while mere consciousness is only dual. The former implies three distinctions ; the latter only two. When I am conscious of a tree, there is first, a subject, namely, my mind; and sec ondly, an object, namely, the tree. This is all there is in the process of consciousness. But when I am conscious of myself, there is first, a subject, namely, my mind as a con templating mind ; there is, secondly, an object, namely, my mind as a contemplated mind ; and, thirdly, there is still another subject, namely, my mind as perceiving that these two prior distinctions are one and the same mind. In this trinal process of self -consciousness, there is much more than in the dual process of simple consciousness.

The earlier pantheism of Spinoza differs from the later of Hegel, in combating the doctrine of the divine personal ity altogether, and in any form whatsoever. Hegel, as has been previously noticed, would obtain a kind of personality for the Infinite through the medium of the world, but Spinoza maintains that the Infinite, from the very idea of it, cannot be personal. If it should become so, it would cease to be infinite. He condensed his view in the dictum :

190 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

"omnis determinatio est negatio;" all limitation is nega tion. A person in order to be such, must distinguish himself from something that is not himself. If God is personal, he must therefore be able to say that he is not the world. In personally defining himself, he sets limits to himself ; and if he sets limits, he is not unlimited, and if not unlimited, not infinite. If God and the universe, says Spinoza, are two different substances, and exclude each other in the way the theist maintains, then God is not the All, and therefore not the Infinite. God plus the universe would be greater than God minus the universe.

This reasoning proceeds upon a false idea and definition of the Infinite. It confounds the Infinite with the All. The two are wholly diverse. In the first place, the Infinite is the perfect. Consequently, it excludes all modes of ex istence that are imperfect. But the All includes these. Secondly, infinite qualities of necessity exclude finite quali ties ; but the All does not. One and the same being cannot be both infinite and finite. But the fact that a being is not finite and in this sense limited, does not make him finite. This is the obvious fallacy in the pantheistic position, that if God can distinguish himself as other than the world, and as not the world, he is not infinite. A limitation of this kind is necessary in order that he may be the Infinite. To say that a being is not finite ; to " determine " him by this " negative " (using Spinoza's dictum), is the very way to say that he is infinite. An infinite power cannot be a finite power; an infinite knowledge cannot be a finite knowledge. A physical force able to lift one hundred pounds cannot be a force able to lift only fifty pounds, any more than one hundred can be only fifty. The Infinite, therefore, does not like the All, comprise all varieties of being, possible and actual, limited and unlimited, good and evil, perfect and imperfect, matter and mind. The Infinite can create the finite, but cannot be the finite. Thirdly, the Infinite is simple ; the All is complex. Everything in the former is

NATURE OP GOD. 191

homogeneous. The contents of the latter are heterogeneous. Fourthly, the Infinite is without parts, and indivisible ; the All is made up of parts, and is divisible.

The All, consequently, is a pseudo-Infinite, and to assert that it is greater than the simple Infinite is the same error that is committed in mathematics, when it is asserted that an infinite number plus a vast finite number is greater than the simple infinite. Mathematical infinity is neither in creased nor diminished by the addition or subtraction of millions of units. In like manner, it is no increase of infinite and absolute perfection, to add a certain amount of finite imperfection to it. God's essence, for example, is eternal, immutable, and necessary ; the substance of the finite universe is temporal, mutable, and contingent. The former must be, and cannot be conceived of as non-ex istent ; the latter may or may not be. ISTow, to add such an inferior and secondary species of being to the absolutely perfect and eternal essence of God, and regard it as in creasing; his eternity and immensity, or to subtract it and assert that it diminishes his eternity and immensity, is ir rational. God's power again is infinite. This omnipotence would not be made more mighty, by endowing it with that infinitely less degree of power which resides in a man or an angel. The same is true of infinite knowledge. God's omniscience would not be made greater, by the addition of a narrow finite intelligence. To add contingent being to necessary being, does not make the latter any more neces sary. To add imperfect being to perfect being, does not make the latter any more perfect. "God," says Miiller (Sin, I. 14), " is a universe in himself, whether the world exist or not."

The error of confounding the Infinite with the All has been committed by writers who are far from pantheism, in their intention. The phraseology of Edwards is sometimes open to objection, in that he appears to combine God with the universe in one system of being, thereby making him a

192 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

part of the All, and obliterating the distinction between In finite and finite existence. " If the deity," he says (Nature of Virtue), " is to be looked upon as within that system of beings which properly terminates our benevolence, or be longing to that whole, certainly he is to be regarded as the head of the system, and the ctef part of it ; if it be proper to call him apart who is infinitely more than all the rest, and in comparison of whom, and without whom, all the rest are nothing, either as to beauty or existence." This quali fication of his remark, shows that Edwards had doubts whether it is proper to speak of one universal system of being ; what he elsewhere calls " being in general ; " of which God is a part.1 In another place (End in Creation), he speaks still more unguardedly, when he says that " the first Being, the eternal and infinite Being, is in effect Being in general, and comprehends universal existence." This, if found in Spinoza, would mean that God is the All. A similar confounding of God with the All is found in Ed wards on the Will (I. iii.), where he remarks that " there is a great absurdity in supposing that there should be no God, or in denying being in general." Here, " God " and " being in general " are convertible terms. Andrew Fuller (Calvinism and Socinianism, Letter "VII.) says that " God must be allowed to form the far greater proportion, if I may so speak, of the whole system of being." He probably borrowed this from Edwards. This is the same error that appears in the Greek pantheism, which regarded TO GV as TO Trdv.

Dorner (Christian Doctrine, I. 319) falls into the same error. ""We have previously regarded God as the infinite original Being or Essence — indeed as the original All of

1 It is also to be observed, that God cannot properly be denominated an object of benevolence or benevolent regard. Only a created being can be such. We bless God in the sense of adoring him, but not in the sense of bestowing a bless ing upon him. We do not wish him well, as we do or should all creatures. God is above this. To wish a being well, implies the possibility of his not being

NATURE OP GOD. 193

being. God is originally the totality of being, and there fore a universality attaches to him, inasmuch as somehow all being must originally be included in him." Cudworth (Int. Syst., IY. xvii.) finds the doctrine that God is All, in the Orphic poetry, but would interpret it in an allowable sense ; referring to such texts as 1 Cor. 15 : 28, " God is all in all ; " Acts 17 : 28, " In him we have our being." But he thinks that the Stoics, and some others, held the doctrine in a "gross" pantheistic sense: there being " Spinozism be fore Spinoza." Hamilton and Mansel confound the Infinite with the All, and employ this spurious idea in proving the position that the personal Infinite involves limitation and self-contradiction. If God distinguishes himself from the universe, then God minus the universe is less than God plus the universe. Hamilton, in his letter to Calderwood, ex plicitly defines the Infinite as TO ev /cal irav. He also con founds the Infinite with the Indefinite or Unlimited. See his list of antinomies, in Bowen's Hamilton, p. 522.

The personality of the Essence or Godhead, must be dis tinguished from that of a Person in the Essence or Godhead. The existence of three divine persons in the divine essence results in the self -consciousness of the essence. This gen eral self-consciousness of the triune Godhead must not be confounded with the particular individual consciousness of the Father as Father, of the Son as Son, of the Spirit as Spirit. The personality of the trinity is not the same as that of one of its persons. The personality of a trinitarian per son consists in the fatherhood, or the sonship, or the pro cession, as the case may be. But the personality of the trinity consists not in any one of these individual peculiari ties, but in the result of all three. The three hypostatical consciousnesses make one self-consciousness, as the three persons constitute one essence.

The personality of one of the persons, the Greek trinitarians denominated ISiorr)? (individuality) ; that peculiarity which distinguishes him from the others. The personality

194 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

of the Son, is his sonship ; of the Father, his paternity ; of the Spirit, his procession. In this reference, it is prefer able to speak of the personality of the essence, rather than of the person of the essence ; because the essence is not one person, but three persons. The personality of the Divine essence, or of God in the abstract, is his self-consciousness, which, as we have seen, results from the subsistence of three persons in the essence and the corresponding trinal con sciousness. From this point of view, it is less liable to mis conception, to say that God is personal, than to say that God is a person. The latter statement, unless explained, con flicts with the statement that God is three persons; the former does not.

The Divine essence cannot be at once three persons and one person, if " person " is employed in one signification ; but it can be at once three persons and one personal Being. The Divine essence, by reason of the three distinctions in it, is self -contemplative, self-cognitive, and self -communing. If there were only a single subject, this would be impossible. Consequently, that personal characteristic by which the trinitarian persons differ from each other cannot be the personal characteristic of the essence, or the entire Godhead. The fatherhood of the first person is not the fatherhood of the Trinity. The sonship of the second person is not the sonship of the Trinity. The procession of the third person is not the procession of the Trinity. If, however, the distinction is marked between a single trinitarian person, such as the Father, or the Son, or the Spirit, and a triune person such as the Godhead, it would not be self-contradictory to say that God is three persons and one person ; because the term " person" is employed in two senses. In one instance, it de notes the hypostatical personality, in the other, the tripersonality ; in one case, it denotes a consciousness that is single, in the other a consciousness that is trinal ; in one case the consciousness is simple, in the other, complex.

Augustine : City of God, IV. xxiv. xxv. xxxi. ; VII. vi. ; VIII. i.xii. Clement of Alexandria : Miscellanies, V. xiv. Cicero : De Natura Deorum, III. 16-25. Calvin : Institutes, I. iii. iv. x. Cudworth : System, IV. i.-xxviii. More : Antidote to Atheism. Howe : Living Temple, I. ii. Stillingfleet : Natural and Eevealed Religion, I. i. Charnocke : Discourses, I. II. Lowman : Hebrew Kitual, I. ii. Bolton : Evidences of Christianity from Christian Apologists. Christlieb : Modern Doubt, II. Buchanan : Modern Atheism. Flint : Theism ; Antitheistic Theories. Harris : The ism. Mommsen : Rome, I. ii. xii. Curtius : Greece, I. ii. Thirlwall : Greece, XXII. Naville : Modern Atheism. Thompson : Christian Theism. Nagelsbach : Homerische Theologie. Glad stone : Homer, II. 1 seq. Miiller : Science of Language, 2d series, IX. X. Bowen : Modern Philosophy, III. Shedd : History of Doctrine, I. 51-74; 103-130. Gillett : God in Human Thought. Eawlinson : Egypt, X. Quatrefages : Human Species, XXXV. Fisher : Theistic and Christian Belief.

THE term " being," when applied to God, refers to his nature and constitution : quid sit ; in opposition to materi alistic and pantheistic conceptions of him. The term " ex istence," when applied to God, refers to the question whether there is any such being : quod sit ; in opposition to atheism. We analyze and define God's being ; we dem onstrate his existence.

The Scriptures contain no formal or syllogistical argu ment for the Divine existence. The opening sentence : " In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," sup poses that the reader has the idea of God in his mind, and

196 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

recognizes its validity. The only form of atheism com bated in the Bible, is practical atheism. The " fool " says there is no God, Ps. 14: 1. In Eph. 2 : 12, the aSeoi ev rut Kocrfup are the same as the Z&oi rwv SiaSyicwv. The Westminster Larger Catechism (105) mentions forty-six sins as varieties of atheism ; such as " ignorance of God, forgetfulness, disbelief, carnality, lukewarmness," etc. Milton (Samson Agonistes, 296) describes practical atheism :

" For of such doctrine, never was there school But the heart of the fool, And no man therein doctor, but himself."

The reason why the Scriptures make no provision against speculative atheism by syllogistic reasoning is, that syllogis tic reasoning starts from a premise that is more obvious and certain than the conclusion drawn from it, and they do not concede that any premise necessary to be laid down in order to draw the conclusion that there is a Supreme being, is more intuitively certain than the conclusion itself. To prove is, "e re certa incerta confirmare." "An argu ment is something clearer than the proposition to be main tained," says Charnocke. But the judgment, " There is a God," is as universal, natural, and intuitive as the judg ment, " There is a cause." The latter judgment has been combated (by Hume, e.g.), as well as the former. And the principal motive for combating the latter is, the invalida tion of the former. Men deny the reality of a cause, only for the purpose of disproving the reality of a First Cause.

Another reason for the absence of a syllogistical argu ment for the Divine existence in scripture, is suggested by Stillingfleet (Origines Sacrae, III. i.). He remarks that in the early ages of the world, the being of God was more universally acknowledged by reason of the proximity in time to the beginning of the world, and to such events as the flood, and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. Hence Moses found little atheism to contend with. FurINNATE IDEA OP GOD. 197

thermore, the miracles connected with Moses's own mission rendered arguments for the divine existence unnecessary. Under Sinai, God proved his existence by his miraculous presence to the senses.

The evidence relied upon in the scriptures for the Divine existence is derived from the immediate and universal con sciousness of the human soul, as this is awakened and de veloped by the works of creation and providence. St. Paul has given the fullest account of the subject, of any inspired writer, in Horn. 1 : 19, 20, compared with Acts 17 : 24-28 ; 14 : 16, 17. The positions which he lays down are the fol lowing :

1. The pagan possesses a knowledge of God as invisible (TO, aopara avrov) ; as eternal (cuiSto? Suva/At,^ ; as omnipo tent (aifSto? Suva/Ms) ; as supreme (SetoV^?) — sovereignty not godhead (A. V.), which would require SeoTr)? as in Col. 2: 9 ; as holy in revealing wrath (opyrj) against sin ; as one God — there being only one almighty, supreme, and eternal being ; as benevolent : Acts 17 : 25 ; 14 : 16 ; Rom. 2 : 4. Only the more general unanalyzed idea of God is attributed to the pagan, because there are degrees of knowledge, and his is the lowest. The unity, invisibility, omnipotence, eternity, retributive justice, and benevolence of the Divine being are represented by St. Paul as knowable by man as man, and as actually known by him in greater or less de gree.

2. The pagan, though having an imperfect, yet has a valid and trustworthy knowledge of God. It is denominated aX^etai/, Rom. 1 : 18. It is sufficient to constitute a foun dation for responsibility, and the imputation of sin. Idol atry is charged against the pagan as guilt, because in prac tising it he is acting against his better knowledge, Rom. 1 : 20. Sensuality is guilt for the same reason, Rom. 1 : 32. Unthankfulness is guilt, Rom. 1 : 21. Failure to worship the true God is guilt, Rom. 1 : 21. Accordingly, the West minster Confession (I. i.) affirms that "the light of nature

198 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

and the works of creation and providence do so far manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, as to leave man inexcusable." Sin is chargeable upon the heathen, because they have not lived up to the light of nature. Any man is guilty who knows more than he performs. The Divine esti mate of human duty, and the Divine requirement, proceeds upon the created capacities of the human soul, not upon the use that man makes of them. Because the pagan was origi nally endowed with the idea of one God, supreme, almighty, and holy, he is said by St. Paul to know God, and is con sequently obligated to love and serve him so far as he knows him. The fact that the pagan's sin has vitiated this original idea, does not release him from this obligation, or prove that he is destitute of the idea, any more than the vice of man in Christendom, and the moral ignorance that ensues from it, release him from obligation.

The foundation for these statements of St. Paul is the fact that the idea of God is natural to the human mind, like the ideas of space and time, and the mathematical ideas of a point, a line, a circle, etc. These latter ideas are always assumed as more or less present and valid in human intelli gence. The degree of their development in consciousness varies in different races and civilizations ; but, in some de gree, they are universal ideas. An " innate " idea is one that results from the constitution of the mind. It is not a fixed quantity in human consciousness, but varies with the mental development.

The idea of God is rational in its source. It is a product of the reason, not of the sense. In this respect, it is like the mathematical ideas. It is an intuition of the mind, not a deduction or conclusion from an impression upon the senses by an external object. St. Paul describes the nature of the perception by the participle voovfieva, which denotes the direct and immediate intuition of reason. The invisible attributes of God, which are not objects of the senses, and are not cognizable by them, are clearly seen by the mind

INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 199

(z/ofc), says St. Paul. The reason is stimulated to act by the notices of the senses ; but when thus stimulated, it perceives by its own operation truths and facts which the senses them selves never perceive. The earth and sky make the same sensible impression upon the organs of a brute that they do upon those of a man; but the brute never discerns the "invisible things" of God; the " eternal power and god hood."

There. must always be something innate and subjective, in order that the objective may be efficient. The objects of sense themselves would make no conscious impression, if there were not five senses in man upon which to impress themselves. They make no conscious impression upon a rock. In like manner, the order, design, and unity of exter nal nature would not suggest the idea of a Supreme being, if that idea were not subjective to man. " Unless education and culture were preceded by an innate consciousness of God, as an operative predisposition, there would be nothing for education and culture to work upon." ]S"itzsch : Chris tian Doctrine, § 7.

Turrettin (III. ii. 5) asserts that even speculative atheism is only apparent and seeming, because there is in man " an in nate knowledge of God, and consciousness of divinity (sensus divinitatis) which can no more be wanting in him, than a rational intellect ; and which he can no more get rid of than he can get rid of himself." Calvin (List., I. iii.) argues " that the human mind is naturally endowed with the knowl edge of God." Compare Charnocke : Discourse I. (in initio). Pearson (Creed, Art. I.) remarks that " we shall always find all nations of the world more prone to idolatry than to atheism, and readier to multiply than to deny the deity." Socrates (Republic, II. 378) would not have the mythologi cal narratives concerning the gods made known to the young, because of their tendency to destroy the natural belief in the deity. "^Neither if we mean our future guardians of the state to regard the habit of quarrelling as dishonorable,

200 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

should anything be said of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, which are quite untrue." The second book of the .Republic enun ciates very clearly the view of Socrates concerning the Divine nature, and shows that he regarded the knowledge of God as natural to man. See especially, II. 379-383. St. Paul indi cates the subjective and innate quality of the idea of God, by employing the verbs aTro/caXvirro) and $>avepoG) respect ing it. These imply that the source of the perception is internal, not external. It is a revelation in the human con sciousness, and through the constitutional structure of the human intellect. Such verbs as these are never employed to describe the outward impressions of the senses.

The teaching of St. Paul respecting the innate idea is con firmed by that of the pagan philosophers themselves. Cudworth has discussed the heathen theology, as represented by Greece and Rome, with immense learning and great candor. He proves by abundant quotations, 1, That many of the pagan philosophers were " theists," that is, monotheists, and acknowledged one supreme God. 2, That the multiplicity of gods, of which they speak, does not denote many eternal and self-existent deities, but only inferior divinities produced by the Supreme being, and subject to him : the word "gods" being employed by them somewhat as it is in Scripture, to signify angels, princes and magistrates. Intellectual System, I. 370 sq. 417 sq. Ed. Tegg.

The Greek and Roman monotheism is well expressed in the following remark of Cicero (De Legibus, I. 8). " There is no animal excepting man that has any notion of God; and among men there is no tribe so uncivilized and savage (fera) which, even if it does not know what kind of a god (qualem deum) it ought to have, does not know that it ought to have one." Thirlwall (History, XXII.) says that " Socrates acknowledged one Supreme being as the frarner and preserver of the universe ; used the singular and plural number indiscriminately concerning the object of his adoraINNATE IDEA OF GOD. 201

tion ; and when he endeavored to reclaim one of his friends who had scoffed at sacrifices and divinations, it was, accord ing to Xenophon, by an argument drawn exclusively from the works of one creator."

1. The natural monotheism of the pagan is proved by the names given to the Supreme being. The term for God is identical in languages of the same family. Says Miiller (Science of Language, 2d series, X.), '• Zeus, the most sacred name in Greek mythology, is the same word as Dyaus in Sanscrit, Jovis or Ju in Jupiter, in Latin, Ti\v in AngloSaxon, preserved in Tiwsdaeg, Tuesday, the day of the Eddie god Tyr, and Zio in Old-High German. This word was framed once and once only ; it was not borrowed by the Greek from the Hindus, nor by the Romans and Ger mans from the Greeks. It must have existed before the ancestors of those primeval races became separate in lan guage and religion ; before they left their common pastures to migrate to the right hand and to the left." Says De Yere (Studies in English, p. 10), " the term for God is identical in all the Indo-European languages — the Indie, Iranic, Cel tic, Hellenic, Italic, Teutonic, and Sclavonic." Grimm and Curtius (Griechische Etymologic, § 269) give this etymology of Zeus. When the name for the Supreme being is different, because the language is of another family, the same attribute or characteristic of superiority and supremacy over inferior divinities is indicated by it. The same deity whom the Greeks and Komans called Zeus or Jupiter, the Babylonians denominated Belus and Bel, the Egyptians Arnmon, the Persians Mithras, the North American Indian the Great Spirit. See Studien und Kritiken, 1849.

2. This natural monotheism is proved by the title in the singular number given to the Supreme divinity. Solon (Herodotus, I. 32) denominates him o $eo?, TO &etov. Soph ocles speaks of 6 fj,eya<; $609. Plato often denominates him o $eo9. Other titles are, o S^/uoupyo?, o rjyefAwv, 6 Trptaro? $609, 6 Tr/acoTo? i/ou9j 6 #7raT09 KpeiovTW (Homer), rj irpovola

202 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD}

(Plutarch). Horace (Carm., I. xii.) describes the Supreme deity as the universal Father, to whom there is nothing " simile aut secundum." " The name of one Supreme God," says Calvin (Inst., I. x.), " has been universally known and celebrated. For those who used to worship a multitude of deities, whenever they spake according to the genuine sense of nature, used simply the name of God in the singular number, as though they were contented with one God."

The early Christian Apologists universally maintained the position, that the human mind is naturally and by creation monotheistic. Tertullian (Apologeticus, 17) says, " God proves himself to be God, and the one only God, by the fact that he is known to all nations. The consciousness of God is the original dowry of the soul ; the same in Egypt, in Syria, and in Pontus. For the God of the Jews is the one whom the souls of men call their God. The Christians wor ship one God, the one whom ye pagans naturally know ; at whose lightnings and thunders ye tremble, at whose benefits ye rejoice. We prove the divine existence by the witness of the soul itself, which, although confined in the prison of the body, although enervated by lusts and passions, although made the servant of false goods, yet when it recovers itself as from a surfeit or a slumber, and is in its proper sober condition, calls God by this name [deus, not Jupiter, Apollo, etc.] because it is the proper name of the true God. l Great God,' ' Good God,' and ' God grant,' are words in every mouth. Finally, in pronouncing these words, it looks not to the Roman capital, but to heaven ; for it knows the dwelling-place of the true God, because from him and from thence it descended." Clement of Alexandria, by numer ous quotations from pagan writers, proves that there is much monotheism in them; which he denominates " Greek plagiarism from the Hebrews." Stromata, V. xiv. Lactantius (Institutions, I. 5) quotes the Orphic poets, Hesiod, Virgil, and Ovid, in proof that the heathen poets knew the unity of God. He then cites Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, and

INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 203

Seneca, to show that the pagan philosophers had the doc trine. Augustine (De Civitate, IV. xxiv.-xxxi. ; VII. vi. ; VIII. i.-xii.) takes the same view of pagan theology. " Varro," says Augustine, " while reprobating the popular belief in many divinities, thought that worship should be confined to one God ; although he calls this one God the soul of the world." Varro states that the Eomans for more than one hundred and seventy years worshipped without images. Minucius Felix (Octavius, 18) argues in a manner like that of Tertullian. " Audio vulgus, cum ad caelum manus tendunt nihil aliud quam deum dicunt, et : ' Deus magnus est,' et ; ' Deus verus est,' et ; ' Si deus dederit.' Vulgi iste naturalis sermo est, an christiani confitentis oratio? Et qui Jovem principem volunt, falluntur in nomine, sed de una potestate consentiunt." Eusebius (Praeparatio Evangelica, XL 13) quotes from the Timaeus, to prove that Plato agrees witli Moses in teaching the unity of God. In the Praeparatio Evangelica (XI. 1), Eusebius maintains that "PJatonis philosophiam, in iis quae omnium maxime necessaria sunt cum ilia Hebraeorum convenire." Modern au thorities agree with the Christian apologist. " Among all nations," says Kant (Pure Reason, p. 363), " through the darkest polytheism, glimmer some faint sparks of monothe ism, to which these idolaters have been led, not from re flection and profound thought, but by the study and natural progress of the human understanding."

That monotheism prevailed somewhat in Abraham's time in races other than the Hebrew, and in countries other than Palestine, is evident from the following Biblical data. Hagar, the Egyptian, " called the name of the Lord that spake unto her, Thou God seest me," Gen. 16 : 13. Jeho vah appears to Abimelech, the Philistine king, and Abimelech said, " Lord, wilt thou slay also a righteous nation ? " Gen. 20 : 3-8. Pharaoh, the Egyptian, speaks of Joseph as "a man in whom the spirit of God is," Gen. 41 : 38. JethrOj the priest of Midian, gives to Moses his son-in-law,

204 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

the counsel of a god-fearing man. Ex. 18 : 9-12, 19-23. Balaam, in Mesopotamia, enunciates the doctrine of one God the sovereign ruler of all. Numbers 24 : 16. Kuth, a Moabitess, speaks of God the Lord. Ruth 1 : 16, 17. It is true that in some instances, as in those of Hagar and Ruth, this knowledge of God might have been received from those with whom they associated, but after subtracting these, it is still evident that considerable monotheism was current, particularly among the races descending from Shem.

The Persian religion contains many monotheistic ele ments. Cudworth (Vol. I. 471) remarks that upon the au thority of Eubulus, cited by Porphyry, " we may conclude that notwithstanding the sun was generally worshipped by the Persians as a god, yet Zoroaster and the ancient Magi, who were best initiated in the Mithraic mysteries, asserted another deity superior to the sun, for the true Mithras, such as was iravrwv TroiijTijs, /cat irarrjp^ the maker and father of all things, or of the whole world, whereof the sun is a part." Similarly, Prideaux (Connection, I. iv.) says that Zoroaster reformed the Magian religion, by introducing a principle superior to the two Magian principles of good and evil, namely " one supreme God who created both light and darkness." Prideaux thinks that Zoroaster ob tained the suggestion from Isa. 45 : 5-7. Herodotus (I. 131) asserts that the Persians have no images of the gods, no temples, no altars, and consider the use of them a sign of folly. Compare Rawlinson : Herodotus I. v. A writer in the Princeton Review, Oct. 1869, affirms that the coun trymen of Cyrus and Darius were not polytheists, and did not worship fire, or any other idol, but one almighty God. The Persian monotheism was undoubtedly owing in part to Biblical influences. The captivity of Judah, and the residence of the Jews at Babylon, must have brought the Hebrew religion into contact with those of Assyria, Baby lonia, and Persia. Jewish communities also flourished at

INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 205

several great centres in central Asia, subsequent to the captivity. See Merivale: Eoinan History, LIY. But while this element of tradition is conceded, it does not explain the entire fact. The natural monotheism of the human mind remains a great and underlying factor in the problem.

According to John 1 : 4, there is a natural apprehension of God ; and according to John 1 : 5, there is a sinful mis apprehension of him. The Logos was " the light of men," and " the darkness comprehended not " this light. The first statement relates to the innate idea of God given by creation ; the second, to the innate idea as vitiated by sin.

The vitiation of an idea is not the eradication of it. If the idea of God were absolutely extinct in the human spirit, religion would be impossible. But man in all the varieties of his condition, has a religion of some kind in which a su perior being is recognized. Hence, St. Paul does not ex cept any portion of the human family from his description of human nature as furnished with religious ideas. His statement is sweeping and universal, that " when men knew God they glorified him not as God," and therefore are with out excuse.

It has been objected to this, that some tribes of men have been discovered destitute of the idea of God. But when the alleged fact has been investigated, it has been found that a very low grade of knowledge has been mistaken for blank ignorance. In some instances, the statement is that of an ignorant witness, and is contradicted by an intelligent one. Ben Ali, Livingstone's guide, told Livingstone that the Makondi " had no idea of a deity ; that they knew nothing of a deity, or a future state ; had no religion except a belief in medicine ; and prayed to their mothers when in distress or dying." But Livingstone, on going among the Makondi, found them saying that " in digging for gum-copal, none may be found on one day, but God (Mungu) may give it to

206 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

us the next." " This showed me," he says, " that the con sciousness of God's existence was present to their minds." Livingstone's Last Journals, p. 38. Respecting the African races generally, Macdonald (Africana, I. 67) remarks : " We should say that their religion and its worship is practically polytheism. Beyond their polytheism, their language con tains a few expressions that remind us of pantheism, and a great many that speak of monotheism." Says Quatrefages (Human Species, XXXV.), " the result of my investigations is exactly the opposite to that to which Lubbock and St. Hilaire have arrived. Obliged in the course of my investi gation to review all human races, I have sought atheism in the lowest as well as the highest. I have nowhere met it except in individuals, or in more or less limited schools, such as those which existed in Europe in the last century, or which may still be seen at the present day."

The existence of an idea in the mental constitution, and its development in consciousness, must be distinguished from each other. The idea of God is not so fully developed in one man or nation, as it is in another. No two men even in a Christian land are exactly alike in this respect. But their mental constitution is the same. One man has a more impressive sense of the divine justice than another; an other has a deeper consciousness of the divine mercy ; an other of the divine wisdom. The idea of God has immense contents, and the varieties of its unfolding are innumera ble. Apostasy from God and sin hinder the evolution of the innate idea. They also confuse and corrupt its develop ment in consciousness, so that a deeply immoral individual or nation, will exhibit less of a true knowledge of the deity than a comparatively moral individual or nation. The difference in the amount of moral intelligence shown in the history of the human family, consequently, is not due to any original difference in the structure of the human spirit, or in the constitutional provision which the Creator has made for a knowledge of himself, but to the greater or less deINNATE IDEA OF GOD. 207

gree of human depravity. In proportion as a people are hostile to the innate idea of God, and do not " like to re tain " it in consciousness, they are given over to a reprobate mind, and the idea either slumbers, or is mutilated and altered. The " truth of God," that is, the true view and conception of God, is " changed into a lie;" that is, into polytheism, or pantheism, or atheism. Rom. 1 : 25, 28.

The imbruted condition of the idolatrous world does not disprove the existence of the innate idea of the deity. A fundamental idea in the human constitution may be greatly undeveloped, or vitiated, and still be a reality. No one will deny that the ideas of space and time belong as truly to the rational understanding of a Hottentot, as they did to that of Plato. But it would not follow, that because the Hot tentot has not elicited the ideas of space and time by re flection upon their nature and bearings, they are extinct within his mind. The axioms of geometry are as much in tuitive truths for the Esquimaux, as they were for Newton ; but if they should be stated to the Esquimaux in words, his first look might be that of blank vacancy. In truth, it re quires a longer time and more effort to bring the savage man to consciousness respecting geometrical truth, than it does to bring him to consciousness respecting the idea of God. The missionary, contrary to the view of those who assert that civilization must precede evangelization, finds that he can elicit the ideas of God, the soul, of sin and guilt, sooner and easier than he can the ideas of mathematics and philosophy.

Socrates, in the Platonic dialogue entitled Meno, takes a slave-boy who is utterly unacquainted with geometry, and by putting questions to him in his wonderful obstetric method, develops out of the boy's rational intelligence the geometrical proposition and demonstration, that the square of the diagonal contains twice the space of the square of the side. If the proposition had been stated to the boy in this form at first, he would have stared in utter ignorance.

208 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

But being led along step by step, he comes out into the conclusion with as clear a perception as that of Socrates himself. Compare Cicero : Tusculan Questions, I. 24. To affirm, by reason of the undeveloped condition of the geo metrical ideas in this slave's mind, that he was destitute of them, would be as erroneous as it is to deny the existence of the idea of the deity in every human soul, because of the dormant state in which it is sometimes found. Reason is more spontaneously active in some minds than in others ; but reason is alike the possession of every man. Pascal at the age of twelve discovered alone by himself, and without any mathematical instruction, the axioms and definitions of geometry, and actually worked out its theorems as far as the thirty-second proposition of Euclid.

The doctrine of an innate idea and knowledge of God does not conflict with that of human depravity, and cannot be adduced in proof of the position that there is some nat ural holiness in man. Natural religion, or the light of nat ure, is not of the nature of virtue or holiness. This for two reasons. 1. A rational being may know that there is one God, and that he ought to be obeyed and glorified, and yet render no obedience or worship. The lost angels are an example. " Thou believest that there is one God ; thou doest well, the devils also believe and tremble," James 2 : 19. This natural knowledge of God is in the understand ing only ; not in the will and affections. It is consequently not an element in the moral character ; but only a charac teristic of the rational constitution.

2. Secondly, the idea of God is not man's product, but that of God. St. Paul employs the phrase #eo? tyavepo&e, respecting it. The Creator is the author and cause of this knowledge in the creature. Whatever worth or merit, therefore, there may be in this mental possession, is due to God not to man. Some theologians have attempted to overthrow the doctrine of depravity, and establish that of natural virtue and merit, upon the ground of the lofty ideas

INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 209

of God, freedom, and immortality, in the human spirit.1 Were these ideas self -originated ; did man, being at first a tabula rasa, come by them through a laborious reasoning of his own, there would be some ground for the view. But the idea of God is a gift of God, as truly as any other gift proceeding from the divine hand. " That which may be known of God ; " all the religious knowledge which the hu man spirit possesses by virtue of its constitution ; is a man ifestation or revelation, for God has u showed " it unto man. That mode of human consciousness by which man is immediately and intuitively aware of his Maker, is as really the product of God, as is the breath in the nostrils. " Unser Gottesbewustsein ist immer, wenn es ein wahres ist, auch ein von Gott bewirktes," says Twesten. All ego tism, therefore, all merit in view of the lofty ideas in human nature, is excluded by the doctrine of creation and provi dence, as much as it is by the doctrine of justification by grace. A man might as rationally claim that his faculty for perceiving geometrical truths is due to himself, and is of the nature of virtue, and rewardable, as to claim that his in tuitive idea of God is a product of his agency for which he deserves the rewards of the future life.

The assertion that the idea of the deity is the product of education, and not innate, is disproved by the following considerations.

1. The savage races have no education in this reference, but they have the idea. 2. If theism could be taught by priests and interested parties, then atheism could be taught by skeptics. But it has been found impossible to educate any considerable portion of the human family into disbelief of the divine existence. Atheism is sporadic, never gen eral, or even local. 3. The terror before God which man feels as a transgressor, is a strong motive for him to banish the idea from his mind, if it could be done ; and it could be

1 Charming is one of the ablest, and most eloquent of them. See his sermon on Likeness to God.

210 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

done, if its existence depended merely upon instruction. Cease to instruct, and it would cease to exist.

The more profoundly and carefully the forms of human consciousness are investigated, the stronger becomes the evi dence for the Divine existence. Atheism is refuted by an accurate and exhaustive psychology. This is apparent from an examination of both consciousness and self -consciousness. 1. In the first place, a proof of the Divine existence is found in man's God-consciousness, considered as a universal and abiding form of human consciousness. Consciousness implies a real object that is correlative to it. There cannot be a universal and abiding consciousness of a non-entity. Sensuous consciousness proves the existence of a sensuous object, namely, matter. The shadow implies the substance. The same is true of that particular mode of human con sciousness denominated the God-consciousness. If there were no God, this form of consciousness would be inexpli cable, except upon the supposition of a mental mockery, or hallucination. There would be consciousness, without an object of consciousness. But it is too universal and con stant, to be accounted for by imagination and self-delusion. Consciousness is always upon the side of theism, never upon that of atheism. Multitudes of men have been conscious that there is a God ; but not a single individual was ever conscious that there is not a God. Says La Bruyere (Les Caracteres, c. 16), " Je sens qu'il y a un dieu, et je ne sens pas qu'il n'y en ait point."

2. In the second place, a proof of the Divine existence is found in man's self -consciousness. This, also, like man's God-consciousness, logically implies God's objective exist ence. The reality of man as a finite ego involves that of an infinite ego. When I speak the word u I," I certainly distinguish between my own substance and that of the ma terial world around me, and thereby imply that there is such a world. It would be absurd to distinguish myself from mere non-entity. Now, as in the sense-consciousness

INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 211

the existence of the outer world is necessarily implied, so in the self-consciousness the existence of God is implied. The consciousness of diversity and of alterity, in both cases, supposes the equal reality of the subject that cognizes and the object cognized. If the human spirit, by immediate self-consciousness, knows that it is a distinct individual self, and is not God, this proves not only that it has the idea of God, but that this idea has objective validity ; precisely as when the human spirit is immediately conscious that it is another thing than the external world, this proves not only that it possesses the idea of the external world, but that this idea has objective validity.

/Skjf-consciousness, therefore, leads inevitably to the be lief in the being of God. If I am conscious of myself as a self, it follows that I must be conscious of God as another self. The evolution of the self -consciousness runs parallel, and keeps even pace with the evolution of the God-conscious ness. If the former is narrow and meagre, the latter will be so likewise. If self-consciousness and self-knowledge are deep and comprehensive, the consciousness and knowl edge of God will agree with them. " Noverim me, noverim te," says Bernard. " If I knew myself better, I should know God better," might be truly said by every human being, from Plato down to the most degraded fetish worshipper. Just as soon as any man can intelligently say, " / am," he can and logically must say, " God is." Just as soon as he can intelligently say, "Jam evil," he can and logically must say, " God is holy." The antithesis and con trast is felt immediately, in both cases ; and an antithetic contrast implies two antithetic and contrasted objects. The logical implication of the consciousness of a sinful self, is the consciousness of a holy God. He who knows darkness knows light, and he who has the idea of wrong necessarily has the idea of right. The imbruted pagan who is cited to disprove the view we are upholding, has as little knowledge of himself as he has of the deity. His self -consciousness is

212 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

as slightly developed as his God-consciousness. If a low grade of a particular form of human consciousness may be instanced to prove the non-entity of the object correlated to it, then the low form, and often the temporary absence of self -consciousness in the savage, would prove that he is not an ego. Compare Calvin's remarks upon " the connection between a knowledge of God, and the knowledge of our selves." Instit., I. i.

It follows, therefore, that man has the same kind of evi dence for the Divine existence, that he has for his own per sonal existence : that of immediate consciousness. But this is the most convincing and invincible species of evidence. We have a stronger proof that we ourselves exist, than that the world of matter around us exists ; of the existence of the ego than of the non-ego. A man's own existence is the most certain of all things. Berkeley denied that matter is a real entity, but not that his own mind is such. Locke, who was by no means inclined to undervalue the force of argu ments derived from matter and sensuous impressions, never theless places the evidence of self-consciousness at the high est point in the scale. " The real existence of other things without us can be evidenced to us only by our senses ; but our own existence is known to us by a certainty yet higher than our senses can give us of the existence of other things ; and this is internal perception, or self-consciousness, or in tuition." Locke: Des Cartes' proof of the being of God. Life and Letters, Bohn's Ed., p. 316. In like manner, Smith (Immortality, VI.) contends that " we know a thousand times more distinctly what our souls are, than what our bodies are. For the former we know by an immediate converse with ourselves, and a distinct sense of their operations ; whereas all our knowledge of the body is little better than merely historical, which we gather up by scraps and piece meal from doubtful and uncertain experiments which we make of them. But the notions which we have of a mind, that is, of something that thinks, apprehends, reasons, and

INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 213

?, are so clear and distinct from all those notions which we can fasten upon a body, that we can easily con ceive that if all body-being in the world were destroyed, we might then as well subsist as we do now."

Why then, it will be asked, has the Divine existence been disputed and denied ? Men, it is objected, do not dispute or deny their own self-existence. To this we reply, that they do. The reality of an absolutely personal existence for the human spirit not only can be disputed and denied, but has been. Pantheism concedes only a phenomenal and transient reality to the individual ego. The individual man, it is asserted, exists only relatively and apparently, not ab solutely and metaphysically. He has no substantial beingdifferent from that of the Infinite, but is only a modification of the eternal substance. His experiences ; his thoughts and feelings, hopes and fears ; in other words, his self -con sciousness, is phenomenal, and from the philosophic point of view an illusion. It lasts only seventy years. The indi vidual is not immortal ; he is absorbed in the infinite sub stance of which he is only one out of millions of modes. Now this is really a denial of self -consciousness, and it has been maintained by a dialectics even more acute, and a ratio cination even more concatenated than any that has been employed by atheism in the effort to disprove the Divine existence. Spinoza and Hegel have defended this theory, with an energy of abstraction, and a concentration of mental power, unequalled in the annals of human error. That the denial of a true and real self-consciousness for man has been comparatively an esoteric doctrine, and has not had so much currency as the atheistic doctrine, arises from the fact that man has not so strong a motive for dis puting his own existence, as he has for disputing that of the deity. Men are not so afraid of themselves as they are of their Maker, and Judge— although if they were fully aware of the solemn implications of a per sonal and responsible existence, they would find little to

214: THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

choose between denying their own existence and that of God.

Monotheism was the original form of religion ; panthe ism and polytheism were subsequent forms. This is proved by the Bible, and the earliest secular records. According to Genesis, man was created a monotheist. His first estate was his best estate. He lapsed from a higher to a lower grade of both character and knowledge.1 Cicero (Tusculan Questions) remarks that " quo proprius homo aberat ab ortu et divinia progenie, hoc melius ea fortasse quae essent vera cernebat." The statements of the early poets and philosophers respecting a golden age, express the belief that the primitive condition of man was a high, not a low one. The earlier Greek poetry is more monotheistic than the later. There is less polytheism in the Homeric the ology than in that of Greece at the time of St. Paul. The number of inferior deities is greater in the last age of mythology, than in its first period. Miiller (Literature of Greece, II. 1-3) affirms that " the Homeric poems, though belonging to the first period of Greek poetry, do not, never theless exhibit the first form of the Greek religion. The conception of the gods as expressed in the Homeric poems suits a time when war was the occupation of the people, and the age was that of heroes. Prior to this, the nation had been pastoral, and the religion then was that earlier form which was founded upon the same ideas as the deep religions of the East. It was a nature-worship that placed one deity, as the highest of all, at the head of the entire system, viz., the God of heaven and of light / for this is the meaning of Zeus in Greek, and of Dm in Sanscrit." Prideaux (Connection, I. iii.) derives idolatry from a cor ruption of the doctrine of a mediator, which is contained in the religion of Noah and Abraham. The nations regarded the sun, moon, and stars, as the habitations of intelligences

i Upon this subject see Van Oosterzee : Dogmatics, XXV.; Hardwick : Christ and other Masters ; Stillingfleet : Origines, III V.

INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 215

who were secondary divinities or mediator gods. This was the first stage in the process. As the planets were visible only in the night, they invented images to represent them. This produced image- worship ; Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Apollo, etc. This was the second and final stage in the process. The religion of the Yedas, puerile as it is in many respects, is superior to the popular religion of India at the present time ; showing that there has been a lapse from a higher and better knowledge. The earlier Varuna-Vedic literature is more spiritual and truthful than the later IndraYedic. See Cook : Origins of Religion, Essay I. llawlinson (Egypt, X.) maintains that the " primary doctrine of the esoteric religion of Egypt undoubtedly was, the real es sential unity of the Divine nature. The gods of the popu lar mythology were understood, in the esoteric religion, to be either personified attributes of the Deity, or parts of nature which he had created considered as informed and inspired by him."

The first step in the corruption of the primitive monothe ism, is pantheism. Here the unity of God is still retained, but the difference in essence between him and the universe is denied. The fact that the idea of the Divine unity is pre served proves that this idea is natural to the human mind. The second step in the decline from the primitive monothe ism, is polytheism. Here, the unity or the one substance of pantheism is subdivided, and the subdivisions are person ified ; showing an endeavor to regain the personality of God, which has been lost in pantheism. Pantheism is too abstract and destitute of elements that appeal to man's feel ings, to be a popular religion. It is the idolatry or false worship of the philosopher ; while polytheism is that of the common mind. For an account of the modification of monotheism outside of revelation, see Guizot : Meditations, First Series, VII.

It is an error to represent, as Schelling doesi n his Phi losophy of Mythology, the various mythological systems as

210 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

the normal and necessary action of the human mind work ing its way up from a lower to a higher form of the relig ious consciousness. This makes idolatry to be a regular and legitimate step, ordained by the Creator himself, in the progress of the human race toward a perfect religion. St. Paul takes the contrary view. According to him, the human mind is monotheistic by creation and in its struct ure, and pantheism and polytheism are a progress down ward, not upward. Idolatry is sin. But according to Schelling, idolatry is innocent, because it is a necessary movement of the human intellect. The theory taught by Hume in his History of Religion, that polytheism was the primitive religion, and that monotheism is the result of human progress, is part of that general theory of man which holds that he was created low down the scale of existence, perhaps descended from the animal tribes, and through vast ages of time slowly struggles upward of and by him self.

The relics of monotheism found outside of the pale of revelation, in the various countries and civilizations, are traceable to two sources. 1. To the monotheistic structure of the human mind, in the way that has been described. This is the subjective and fundamental requisite. 2. To the influence of the primitive revelation from God, made in the line of Seth, fragments of which have floated down among the races of mankind.1 Both of these sources and causes of monotheism should be recognized. If only the first is acknowledged, justice is not done to traditional rec ords and data. If only the second is acknowledged, and all the monotheism in human history is referred to a special revelation in early times, justice is not done to the constitu tion of the human mind. It conflicts, moreover, with St. Paul's representations in Rom. 1.

After this examination of the monotheistic structure of

1 Upon the influence of the patriarchal revelation, see Bolton : Evidences, II.; Stillingfleet : Origines Sacrae, III. v.; Gale: Court of the Gentiles.

INNATE IDEA OF GOD. 217

the human spirit, considered as the foundation of natural religion, it is important to observe that natural religion is insufficient for human needs. The position of the deist, that the teachings of the human reason concerning the being and attributes of God are adequate, and that revealed re ligion is superfluous, is untenable because there is nothing redemptive in them. Natural religion manifests the justice of God, but not his mercy. The opyrj rov $eoO is revealed in the common human consciousness, but not the ajaTrij rov &eov. The God-consciousness includes the Divine holiness, but not the Divine compassion. Natural religion inspires fear, but not hope and trust. The monotheistic idea of the deity contains only such moral attributes as justice, veracity, and immaculate purity. In St. Paul's analysis, mention is made of omnipotence, sovereignty, unity, and retributive dis pleasure ; but no mention is made of the attribute of mercy. The Divine benevolence is indeed displayed to the pagan, in the rain from heaven, and the fruitful seasons, Acts 14 : 7 ; but providential benevolence is not pardoning mercy. The lost man and even the lost angel experiences the be nevolence of God. He maketh his sun to shine alike upon the evil and the good. Natural religion, consequently, is not an adequate religion for man, unless it can be proved that he does not need the mercy of God.

The utmost that human reason can say respecting the ex ercise of Divine mercy is, that it is $> possibility. There is no self-contradiction in the proposition that God may show mercy to the guilty. Says Witsius (Apostles' Creed, Disser tation XXV.), " if one carefully consider the all-sufficiency of the Divine perfections, according to that idea of the Su preme being which is impressed by nature upon our minds, we will possibly conclude, or at least conjecture, that it is not altogether beyond the range of possibility, that a just and holy God may be reconciled to a sinner."

But it may be objected that inasmuch as the attribute of mercy necessarily belongs to the Divine nature, a careful

218 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

analysis of the innate idea of God would yield this attribute to the heathen mind, and in this way the heathen might come to the knowledge that God shows mercy, and so find a redemptive element in natural religion. This objection overlooks the distinction between the existence of an attri bute, and its exercise. Some of. the Divine attributes are at tributes of nature only, and some are attributes of both nat ure and will. In the former case, an attribute not only nec essarily exists in the Divine essence, but it must necessarily be exercised. Truth, or veracity, is an example. God of necessity possesses this quality, and he must of necessity manifest it at all times. Its exercise does not depend upon his sovereign will and pleasure. He may not be truthful or not, as he pleases. The same is true of the Divine justice. But the attribute of mercy is not an attribute of nature only, it is also an attribute of will. Though mercy is an eternal and necessary quality of the Divine nature, and is logically contained in the idea of God as a being possessing ail per fections, yet the exercise of it is optional, not necessary. Because God is a merciful being, it does not follow that he must show mercy to every object without exception, without any choice or will of his own. He says, " I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy," Eom. 9 : 15. The exercise of this attribute depends upon the Divine good pleasure. It might have existed as an immanent and eter nal attribute in God, and yet not have been extended to a single man. Because God has not shown mercy to Satan and his angels, it does not follow that he is destitute of the attribute. To deny the freeness of mercy, is to annihi late mercy. If mercy is a matter of debt, and God is obliged to show mercy, as he is obliged to be truthful and just, then mercy is no more mercy and grace is no more grace, Rom. 11 : 16.1 God's mercy, in this respect, is like God's omnipo1 It is no reply to say, that although God does not owe the exercise of mercy to the sinner, he owes it to himself. For if God owes it to his own attributes and perfection of character, to pardon sin, a neglect or refusal to do so in a sinINNATE IDEA OF GOD. 219

tence. God necessarily has the power to create, but is un der no necessity of exerting this power. If he had never created anything at all, he would still have been an omnipo tent being. And so, too, if he had never pardoned a single sinner, he would still have been a merciful being in his own nature.

Now it is because the exercise of mercy, unlike that of truth and justice, is optional with God, that the heathen cannot be certain that mercy will be exercised toward him. In thinking of the subject of sin, his own reason perceives intuitively that God must of necessity punish transgression ; and it perceives with equal intuitiveness that there is no corresponding necessity that he should pardon it. He can say with emphasis, " God must be just ; " but he can not say, " God must be merciful." Mercy is an attribute whose exercise is sovereign and optional, and therefore man cannot determine by any a priori method whether it will be ex tended to him. He knows nothing upon this point, until he hears the assurance from the lips of God himself. When God opens the heavens, and speaks to the human creature saying, " I will forgive your iniquity," then, and not till then, does he know the fact. Shedd: Natural Man, Sermon XVIII. Hence the religion of mercy and redemption is historical and promissory in its nature. It contains a testi mony respecting God's actual decision and purpose concern ing the exercise of compassion. It is a record authenticated and certified of what God has decided and covenanted to do in a given case ; and not a deduction from an a priori principle of what he must do of necessity. Natural religion, on the other hand, is neither historical nor promissory. It is not a historical narrative like the Old and New Testament ; and it contains no promise or covenant made by God with man. Natural religion is not a series of facts and events, but of truths only.

gle instance would be a dereliction of duty to himself, and a spot on his charac ter. Mercy, on thia supposition, as well as on the other, is not grace but debt.

220 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

Consequently, natural religion, or the religion of justice, can be constructed in an a priori manner out of the ideas and laws of human intelligence ; but the gospel, or the re ligion of mercy and redemption, can be constructed only out of a special revelation from God. Conscience can give the heathen a punitive, but not a pardoning deity. Man's natural monotheism does not include a knowledge of the Divine mercy, but only of the Divine holiness and dis pleasure at sin. It is sufficient for man as created and sin less ; but not for man as apostate and sinful. It is because the heathen is a " stranger from the covenants of promise," that he " has no hope." Eph. 2 : 12.

Gangauf : Psychologie des Augustinus, 82 sq. Anselm : Monologium; Proslogium. Tr. in Bib. Sacra, 1851. Hasse : Anselm, II. 233-286. Calvin : Institutes, I. i. iii. Des Cartes : Method, IV. ; Meditations, III. V. ; Principles of Philosophy, I. 14, 15. Tr. by Veitch. Leibnitz : De la demonstration Cartesienne. Witsius : Apostles' Creed ; Dissertation, IV. v. More : Antidote to Atheism, I. viii. Stillingfleet : Origines Sacrae, III. i. 14, 15. Smith : Dis courses (Existence of God). Charnocke : Discourses, I. II. Cudworth : Intellectual System (Final Causes), II. 608-625. Ed. Tegg. Howe : Living Temple, I. ii. Clarke : Demonstration ; Answer to Letter VII. Bates : Existence of God. Locke : Understanding, IV. x. King : Life of Locke, 313. Ed. Bohn. Kant : Pure Eeason. p. 359-370. Tr. by Meiklejohn. Billroth : Eeligions-philosophie, § 33 sq. Chalybaus : History of Philosophy, Lecture III. Ueberweg : History of Philosophy, I. 383 sq. Hallam : Literature of Eu rope, II. iii. Paley : Natural Theology. The Bridgewater Treatises. Janet : Final Causes. Martensen : Dogmatics, g 38-43. Dorner : Christian Doctrine, I. 212 sq. Christlieb : Modern Doubt, II. Hodge: Theology, I. 204-237. Shedd : History of Doctrine, I. 231-238. Harris : Theism. Martineau : Study of Eeligion.

ALTHOUGH the evidence for the Divine Existence which is most relied upon in Scripture, and which is common to all men, is that of immediate consciousness, yet certain syl logistic arguments have been constructed which have the following uses :

1. They assist the development of the idea of God, and contain a scientific analysis of man's natural consciousness of the deity. These arguments all derive their force from the innate idea, and the constitutional structure of man.

222 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

Hence some theologians deny that they are proofs properly so called, and disparage them. Says Rosenkranz (Encyclopadie, 6), " there are already in geometry, a hundred dem onstrations of the Pythagorean proposition, all of which do what they promise. There are also numberless proofs of the being of God, none of which perform what they prom ise. God is not a right-angled triangle, and for his exist ence neither many nor convincing proofs can be discov ered. There is only one argument for God's existence, and that he furnishes himself." Ilamann remarks that if he who denies the Divine existence is a fool, he who would de monstrate it is a still greater one. Hagenbach (Encyclopadie, 291) says that the seeking after proofs of the Divine existence is proof enough. The human mind does not irrepressibly, and perpetually search for the evidence that a non-entity exists. 2. Secondly, these arguments reply to the counter-arguments of materialism and atheism. Of them, the principal are : The ontological, the cosmological, the teleological, the moral, and the historical.

The Ontological Argument for the Divine Existence has fallen into disrepute for the last century or more. It is now very commonly regarded as involving a sophism. Kant de clares it to be sophistical, as also he declares all the a pos teriori arguments to be. Historians of philosophy, like Ueberweg, analyze it not only to give an account of it, but to refute it. In the current treatises in apologetics, it is rare to find an appeal to it as a conclusive demonstration.

This is a different view from that entertained in the six teenth and seventeenth centuries, and by the most powerful reasoners among the fathers and schoolmen. While, owing to the subtlety and geometrical nicety of the form of the argument, its cogency was not always acknowledged, and there was some dispute concerning its logical force, yet on the whole both the philosophers and theologians of those centuries regarded it as a valid argument, and fit to be em ployed in the defence of theism. The English theologians

ARGUMENTS. 223

made much use of it ; especially those who were deeply versed in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Gudworth, Stillingfleet, Howe, Bates, John Smith, and Henry More depend greatly upon it in their contest with the atheism of Hobbes and others. Des Cartes restated it in a modified form, and considered it to be a demonstration ; and Des Cartes is the father of all modern philosophy that is found ed in consciousness.

The germ of the argument is found in the remark of Augustine (Trinity, "VII. iv.) that "God is more truly thought than he is described, and exists more truly than he is thought." This is one of those pregnant propositions, so characteristic of the Latin father, which compress a theory into a nut-shell. The meaning of it is, that while man's idea of God is truer to the reality than his description of him is, yet his idea is less true and credible than the reality itself. God's existence is more real than even our concep tion of him is for our own mind ; and our conception, con fessedly, is a reality in our consciousness. The subjective idea of God, instead of being more real than God, is less real. The "thing," in this instance, has more of existence than the " thought " of it has. This is exactly contrary to the postulate that underlies all the reasoning against the ontological argument ; namely, that in no case is the object so real as the idea of it, and that therefore the existence of no object whatever can be inferred from the mere idea. Every subjective conception, it is contended, more certainly is, than its objective correspondent. Consequently, no mere thought, of any kind, can demonstrate the existence of a thing.

This position, we may remark in passing, that the objec tive can never be so certainly real as the subjective, is fatal not only to the ontological argument for the Divine exist ence, but to the argument for all existence. It conducts to idealism immediately. If, for example, from the sub jective sensation we cannot infer the objective existence of

224 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

matte^, the certainty of the material world is gone. The sensation is the only reality, and the "thing" is at best only a contingency. Possibly it exists, but there is no absolute certainty that it does. The assertion that because we have the mere idea of God there is no certainty of a correspond ent Being, is essentially the same as the assertion that be cause we have the mere sensation of matter there is no certainty of a correspondent substance. If the subjective cannot prove the objective in the former case, it cannot in the latter.

The acute and powerful intellect of Anselm was the first to construct the ontological argument in a syllogistical form. And it will appear, we think, that its first form is its best. All the subsequent modifications have weakened rather than strengthened it. The metaphysical intuition that saw the heart of the doctrine of the atonement, saw also the heart of the doctrine of the Divine existence.

The argument is derived, as the etymology (TOV 6Vro§ 716705) denotes, from the idea of absolute and perfect in dis tinction from relative and imperfect being. It runs as fol lows. The human mind possesses the idea of an absolutely perfect Being ; that is, of a Being than whom a more per fect cannot be conceived. But such perfection as this im plies necessary existence ; and necessary existence implies actual existence : because if a thing must be, of course it is. If the absolutely perfect Being of whom we have the idea does not exist of necessity, we can conceive of a being who does so exist, and he would be more perfect than the former. For a contingent being who may or may not exist, is not the most perfect conceivable ; is not the absolutely perfect. In having, therefore, as the human mind unquestionably has, the idea of an absolutely perfect in distinction from a relatively perfect being, it has the idea of a being who ex ists of necessity ; as in having the idea of a triangle, the mind has the idea of a figure with three sides. Necessity of being, therefore, belongs to perfection of being.

ABGUMENTS. 225

The strength of Anselm's argument lies in two facts. 1. That necessity of existence is an attribute of being, and a perfection in it. 2. That necessity of existence is an attri bute and perfection that belongs only to absolute and infin ite being, not to relative and finite being.

1. It is clear, in the first place, that necessity of existence is an attribute. It can be affirmed of one being, and denied of another. God has this characteristic quality, and angels and men have it not. Both necessity and contingency are attributes of being. And necessity is a higher charac teristic than contingency of existence. That which must be, is superior to that which may or may not be. That which cannot without logical contradiction be conceived not to be, is more perfect than that which can be so conceived. Hence there are grades of being. One species of being may be nearer to nonentity than another. The infinite and ab solutely perfect is at an infinite remove from non-exist ence ; the finite and relatively perfect is at only a finite dis tance from nonentity. We can conceive of the annihilation of the finite ; but the annihilation of the infinite is an ab surdity. " It is truly said," remarks Howe (Yanity of Man as Mortal), "of all created things, that their non esse is more than their esse ; that is, they have more no-being than being. It is only some limited portion [degree] of being that they have ; but there is an infinitude [infinite degree] of being which they have not. And so coming infinitely nearer to nothingness than to fulness of being, they may well enough wear the name of l nothing.' ' All nations before him are as nothing, and they are counted to him less than nothing,' Isa. 40 : 17. Wherefore the First and Fountain-Being justly appropriates to himself the name I Am, yea tells us, He is, and there is none besides him ; thereby leaving no other name than that of f nothing' unto creatures."

2. And, in the second place, necessity of existence is an attribute and perfection that is unique and solitary. It

226 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD).

cannot be ascribed to a finite created thing, any more than eternity of existence, or immensity of existence, or immu tability of existence can be. The idea of the absolutely per fect differs from that of the relatively perfect, or the imper fect, in implying necessity and excluding contingency. The two ideas are totally diverse in this particular, so that the analysis of the one will give a result wholly different from that of the other. Because the idea of a stone, or a man, or of any finite thing, will not yield real entity or exist ence as the logical outcome, it does not follow that the idea of the infinite God will not.

The nature of the ontological argument will be seen still more clearly, by examining the objections that have been urged against it, and also the modifications of it since the time of Anselm.

1. A contemporary of Anselm, the monk Gaunilo, in his tract entitled Liber pro Insipiente, or Plea for the Fool, raised the objection which has been repeated over and over again, that the idea of an object does not involve its exist ence. We have the idea of a tree, but it does not follow that there is an actual tree. We have the idea of a winged lion, but it does not follow that such a creature actually exists.

The reply is, that the ideas compared are not analogous in respect to the vital point of necessary existence, but are wholly diverse. One idea is that of perfect and necessary being ; the other that of imperfect and contingent being. What is true of the latter idea is untrue of the former, and vice versa. The idea of a tree implies contingency, that it may or may not exist ; that of the absolutely perfect Being implies necessity, that he must exist. From the idea of the tree, we cannot prove actual objective realit}r, because of the element of contingency ; but we can from the idea of God, because of the element of necessity. If the idea of a thing implies that it may or may not exist, it does not follow from the idea that the thing does exist. But if the idea of a thing

ARGUMENTS. 227

implies that it must exist, it does follow from the idea that the thing does exist. This objection, therefore, to the ontological argument breaks down, because the analogy brought in to support it is a spurious one. It is an example of the Aristotelian //.era/3acrt5 ei9 aXXo 76^05. Analogical reasoning is valid between things of the same species ; but invalid if carried across into another species. Gaunilo, arguing against Anselm, urged that the idea of the " lost island " does not imply that there is such a thing. Anselm replies, that if Gaunilo will show that the idea of the " lost island " implies its necessary existence, he will find the island for him, and will guarantee that it shall never be a " lost island " again.1 Gaunilo's objection overlooks the difference in kind be tween infinite necessary and perfect being, and finite con tingent and imperfect being ; between primary and second ary substance ; between uncreated and created being, or between God and the universe. We are so accustomed in the case of finite beings and things to abstract necessity of existence from them, that we unthinkingly transfer this to God. Because we can logically conceive of the non-exist ence of the finite, we suppose that we can of the infinite. But the two species of being differ toto genere. Kespecting all finite beings or things, nothing more can be inferred from their nature and idea than possibility and perhaps probability of existence. Necessity and certainty of exist ence cannot be inferred. But respecting infinite being, mere possibility and probability of existence are excluded by the very nature and idea of it. Possibility and contingency of existence are directly contradictory to the idea of perfect and infinite substance. In this instance, we cannot, as we can in the other, conceptually separate necessity of existence

1 Another flaw in Gaunilo's counter-argument is, that he starts from the con ception of a Being "greater than all things else that exist," but Anselm starts from the conception of a Being " greater than all things else that can be con ceived" The latter implies a greater perfection than the former. From the former conception, Anselm would not attempt to prove actual existence. The ideal may be more perfect than the actual.

228 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

from substance. Infinite being, ex vi termini, is necessary being.

Necessity, as a logical term, denotes so firm a connection between the subject and predicate, that it is impossible that they should be separated. If therefore substance and ne cessity of existence cannot be separated from each other, even in thought or logical conception, in the instance of " the most perfect Being conceivable," it follows that the denial that such a Being exists is not only moral but logical " folly." The atheist is guilty not only of sin, but of un reason. For it is a contradiction to suppose that the most perfect Being conceivable, that is, a necessarily existing Being, was non-existent a million of years ago, because this would make him a contingent and imperfect being. It is equally contradictory, for the same reason, to suppose that the most perfect Being conceivable will cease to exist at some future time. But there is no contradiction in suppos ing that the angel Gabriel had no existence a million years ago, or that he will have none a million years hence, be cause he is not the most perfect being conceivable. And there is no contradiction in supposing that the entire ma terial universe was a nonentity a million years ago, unless it can be shown that it is the most perfect being conceiva ble.

The impossibility of separating necessity of being from absolute and perfect being, may be illustrated by the neces sary connection between extension and matter. The idea of extension is inseparable from that of matter. To ask me to think of matter without extension is absurd. In like manner, to ask me to think of absolute perfection of being without necessity of being is absurd ; as absurd as to ask me to think of absolute perfection of being without eternity of being, or infinity of being. The being is not absolutely perfect, if it may be non-existent ; just as a substance is not material, if it is unextended. To conceive of the most per fect being conceivable as a contingent being, or a non-exARGUMENTS. 229

istent being, is impossible. Says Anselm (Proslogium, XXII.), " That which begins from non-existence, and can be conceived of as non-existing, and which unless it subsist through something else must return to non-existence, does not exist in the highest and absolute sense."

Kant commits the same error with Gaunilo, in employing a spurious analogy. Objecting to the ontological argument, he remarks (Pure Reason, 365, Meiklejohn's Tr.) that " it is indeed necessary that a triangle have three angles if it exist, but there is nothing in the idea of a triangle that necessitates its existence." Very true ; and therefore the example is not pertinent. The idea of a triangle lacks the very element and attribute, contained in the idea of the most perfect being conceivable, upon which the whole force of the ontological argument depends — namely, necessity of existence. The predicate, " if it exist," connected with the subject, " a triangle," implies contingency. Kant's objec tion is in fact even weaker than that of Gaunilo. To at tempt to invalidate the ontological argument by employing the idea of a purely mental construction like the idea of a triangle, is even more illegitimate than to employ the idea of a real, though non-absolute and contingent object like a tree or a man. The idea of a triangle, like that of a mathe matical point or line, is purely imaginary. There is no objective substance in any mathematical figure whatever. Angles, lines, surfaces, and points are not things. The idea of a triangle does not imply that it is being of any kind, still less that it is necessary being. A triangle is not an entity. It cannot be brought under the category of sub stance ; consequently it is a nonentity. It is a purely ideal construction, to which there is and can be no objective cor respondent. It cannot be said to objectively exist, either contingently or necessarily. Kant's analogy, consequently, is even more spurious than that of Gaunilo ; for a tree or a man, though not having necessarily-real, yet has contin gently-real existence.

230 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

Kant endeavors to prove that the ontological argument is a synthetical, not an analytical judgment ; that the con clusion is not deduced from the premise, but imported into it. There is no better expositor of Kant than Kuno Fischer, and he gives the following account of Kant's ref utation, as he regards it, of the ontological argument. " Kant affirms that the propositions asserting existence are synthetical judgments ; in other words, that existence is no logical attribute which we can find by analyzing a concept. This position completely destroys all ontology ; for it re moves the possibility of concluding from the concept of a thing, its existence. If existence belongs to the attributes of a concept, the ontological proof* is quite valid. If it be a logical attribute, it follows immediately from the concept by mere dissection, and the ontological proof is an analyti cal judgment ; an immediate syllogism of the understand ing. If existence be a logical attribute, it must stand in the same relation to the concept that other logical attributes do. The content of the concept must be diminished if I subtract existence, increased if I add it. The concept of a triangle, for example, is not changed, whether I merely represent it to myself, or whether it exist without me. The attributes which make a triangle to be such are entirely the same in both cases. It is the same with any other con cept ; that of the deity." '

We place the finger upon the last assertion in this ex tract, and deny that what is said of the concept of the tri angle is true of the concept of the deity — assuming it to be conceded, that the deity is the equivalent of Anselm's " most perfect Being conceivable." For if from the con cept of the deity, or the absolutely perfect Being, the attri bute of existence be subtracted, the concept is changed. It is no longer the concept of the most perfect Being con ceivable. The concept of an existing Being is, certainly,

i Mahaffy : Translation of Kuno Fischer on Kant, pp. 125, 258, 359.

ARGUMENTS. 231

not the same as the concept of an imaginary Being. Take the characteristic of actual existence out of the concept of the deity, and it becomes the concept of an unreal or imaginary being ; and an unreal or imaginary being is not the most perfect Being conceivable. The content of the concept is changed in respect to both quantity and quality. It loses the attribute of objective existence, which dimin ishes the quantity of the content. And the same loss in jures the quality ; for imaginary being is nonentity, instead of perfect being. If one should say, " I have the concep tion of a triangle, but it does not include tri-laterality," the contradiction is plain. Or should he assert that the at tribute of tri-laterality can be subtracted from the concept of a triangle without altering the content, the error is pat ent. But it is the same contradiction, to affirm that the idea of God as a perfect being does not include real objec tive being, or that this characteristic can be subtracted from it without diminishing its contents. The rejector of the on tological argument affirms such propositions as the following : "I have the idea of the most perfect Being conceivable; but it is the idea of a nonentity ; in other words, it is only an idea." "I have the idea of the most perfect Being conceiv able ; but it is the idea of an imaginary being ; that is, it is merely a figment of my mind." This contradiction is well described by a French writer (Franck : Dictionnaire, Art. Anselme). "He who rejects the belief of the Divine Exist ence conceives, nevertheless, of a Being to whom a superior cannot be conceived. Only he affirms that this Being does not exist. But by this affirmation he contradicts himself, inasmuch as that Being to whom he attributes all these per fections, yet to whom he at the same time denies existence, is found to be inferior to another being, who, to all his other perfections, joins that of existence. He is thus forced by his very conception of the most perfect being to admit that such a Being exists, inasmuch as existence makes a neces sary part of that perfection which he conceives of."

232 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

It is overlooked by Kant and Fischer, and by all who reason upon this line of analogy, that the idea of God, or the absolutely Perfect, is unique and solitary. God is not only unus but unicus. There is no parallel to him. No true analogue can be found. " To whom then will ye liken God ? or what likeness will ye compare unto him ? " Isa. 40 : 18. To employ analogical reasoning in a case where all analogies fail, was the error of Gaunilo, and has been repeated from his day to this.1

2. A second objection to the argument of Anselm is that it amounts only to this : " If there be an absolutely perfect Being, he is a necessarily existent Being. One idea im plies the other idea. It is only a matter of subjective no tions, and not of objective existence. The absolutely per fect Being may not exist at all ; but if he exist, he exists necessarily." Ueberweg (History of Philosophy, I. 384) em ploys this objection.

This objection, likewise, is self -contradictory, as is shown by the analysis of the proposition, " If the absolutely Per fect exist, he exists necessarily." There is inconsistency between the protasis and apodosis. The word " if " in the former denotes contingency, and the word " necessarily " in the latter excludes contingency. The absolutely perfect Being is described in the protasis as one respecting whose existence it is proper to use a hypothetical term, and in the apodosis as one respecting whose existence it is improper to use it. This conditional proposition implies that the most perfect Being conceivable is both contingent and nec essary.

Coleridge (Works, IY. 408, Ed. Harper) urges this ob jection, in the following terms : " The Cartesian syllogism

i In this criticism, we have assumed, as Kant and Fischer do, that "exist ence " may be regarded as an attribute, and have argued from their point of view. As will be seen further on, existence is not strictly an attribute. But if "necessity of existence," be substituted for "existence," the argument still holds good. Certainly if from the concept of the absolutely perfect Being, the attribute of necessity of existence be subtracted, the concept itself is changed.

ARGUMENTS. 233

ought to stand thus : The idea of God comprises the idea of all attributes that belong to perfection. But the idea of existence is such ; therefore the idea of his existence is in cluded in the idea of God. Now, existence is no idea, but a fact • and though we had an idea of existence, still the proof of a correspondence to a reality would be wanting ; that is, the very point would be wanting which it was the purpose of the demonstration to supply. The idea of the fact is not the fact itself." This objection holds against the Cartesian form of the argument, but not against the Anselmic. The idea of " existence," it is true, is one to which there may be no corresponding reality or fact. But the idea of " necessary existence " is not. " Existence " is ambiguous, and may mean contingent existence, as well as necessary ; in which case, the idea does not logically in volve the reality or fact. But " necessary existence " has only one meaning, and logically involves a corresponding fact or reality. To say that a necessary being has no ex istence, or may have none, is, of course, a contradiction in terms. And to say that the idea of necessary existence does not imply the idea of actual existence, is equally con tradictory. But in reasoning analytically from an idea, the reasoner is entitled to all that the idea contains.

Coleridge, like Kant and others, brings the idea of the infinite and finite, the uncreated and created, God and the universe, under one and the same category, and contends that what is true of one idea is of the other. As the idea of a tree, in Coleridge's phrase, is " the mere supposition of a logical subject, necessarily presumed in order to the conceivableness of the qualities, properties, or attributes" of the tree, so is the idea of God. The idea in both instances is a mere hypothesis, to which there may be no correspond ing fact or reality. It is only " a mere ens logicum, the result of the thinker's own unity of consciousness, and no less contained in the conception of a plant or of a chimera, than in the idea of the Supreme Being" "Works,

234 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

IY. 409. This implies that the idea of a plant or a chi mera is a true analogue to that of the most perfect Being conceivable.

3. A third objection to Anselm's argument is that made by Leibnitz ; namely, that the argument supposes the possi bility of the existence of the most perfect Being. This he thinks needs first to be demonstrated. And yet he adds, that " any and every being should be regarded as possible until its impossibility is proved." Leibnitz remarks that he " stands midway between those who think Anselm's argu ment to be a sophism, and those who think it to be a dem onstration," and that if the possibility of the existence of the most perfect Being were demonstrated, he should regard Anselm's argument as " geometrically a priori." De la De monstration Cartesienne, 177. Ed. Erdmann.

The reply to this half-way objection of Leibnitz is, that there is no greater necessity of proving that the most per fect Being is possible, than of proving that any being what ever is possible. That being of some kind is possible, is indisputable. That something exists is self-evident. To assert that there is nothing, is absurd. The premise with which Clarke begins his construction of the a priori argu ment ; namely, " something exists ; " is axiomatic, and must be granted by atheist and theist alike. The idea of " being " is certainly one that implies an objective correspondent. If I say, " I have the idea of being, but it is only an idea, there really is no being," I perceive the absurdity immediately. " The very words," says Coleridge (Works, II. 464. Ed. Harper), " there is nothing, or, there was a time when there was nothing, are self-contradictory. There is that within us which repels the position with as full and instantaneous a light as if it bore evidence against it in the right of its own eternity." But if the mind does not perceive any ne cessity of proving the possibility of being in the abstract, even of relative and contingent being, still less does it per ceive a necessity of demonstrating the possibility of the

ARGUMENTS. 235

most perfect being conceivable. On the contrary, there is more need of proving the possibility of a contingent than of a necessary being. That which may or may not exist is less likely to exist, than that which must exist and cannot be conceived of as non-existent.

4. A fourth objection to the ontological argument is, that it makes existence an attribute of a Being, when in fact it is being itself. The subject is converted into its own predi cate. To assert that a Being possesses being, is tautology. This is a valid objection against one form of Des Cartes' statement of the ontological argument, but not against Anselm's. Des Cartes shortened the argument, by deriving actual being directly from the idea of absolute perfection of being, instead of first deriving, as Anselm did, necessity of being from absolute perfection of being, and then deriving actuality from necessity. The spread of Cartesianism gave currency to this form of the argument ; and it is this form of it which most commonly appears in modern speculation. The English divines of the seventeenth century very gen erally employ this mode. In Kant's polemic, the argument is stated in the Cartesian manner, not in the Anselmic. The following is an example : " Having formed an a priori conception of a thing, the content of which was made to embrace existence, we believed ourselves safe in concluding that reality belongs to the object of the conception merely because existence has been cogitated in the conception." 1 If in this extract " necessity of existence " be substituted for

' Reine Vernunft, 463. Ed. Rosenkranz. Ueberweg (Vol. II. 50) notices the difference between the two forms of the argument in the following remark : " The Cartesian form of the ontological proof has a defect from which the An selmic is free ; namely, that the premise, ' being is a perfection,' involves a very questionable conception of ' being ' as a predicate among other predicates, while Anselm has indicated a definite kind of being, namely, being not merely in our minds but also outside of them, as that in which superior perfection is involved." But this misses the true point of difference. Anselm's " definite kind of being " is, necessity of being," not being outside of our minds." This latter is objec tive being, and is the same as Des Cartes' u existence." If this is all the differ ence between Anselm and Des Cartes, there is none at all.

236 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

" existence," the " illusion " which Kant charges upon the a priori reasoner disappears.

Necessity of existence, as we have before remarked, is a true predicate, like eternity of existence, and immensity of existence, and all the other attributes that describe absolute being and differentiate it from relative and finite being. And from this predicate, the objective actual existence of that to which it belongs can be inferred. In omitting it, and attempting to make a predicate out of " existence " in stead of " necessity of existence," Des Cartes lost an indis pensable term of the syllogism, jumped directly from the premise to the conclusion, and exposed the argument to a valid objection.1

But while Des Cartes' form of the argument is vicious reasoning, it suggests a profound truth. It directs attention to the difference in kind between primary and secondary being, and to the important fact already alluded to, that existence cannot even conceptually be separated from sub stance in the instance of the absolute and perfect, as it can in that of the relative and imperfect. The finite may exist only in thought and imagination ; the infinite cannot. There may be no imperfect and contingent being ; there must be perfect and necessary being. The universe may be non-existent, but God cannot. And this, because ab solute perfection of being excludes unreality of every kind. Consequently, it excludes imaginary being, which is no be ing at all. And it excludes contingent and temporary being, because these are relative and imperfect grades. None of these are " the most perfect being conceivable." The absolute Being, therefore, is the only strictly real. All

1 Des Cartes seems to have been aware of the defect in this form of stating the argument. He more commonly employs " existence " in the Method, and the Meditations. But he uses "necessity of existence," in the Method, p. 79 ; Meditations, p. 67, 68 ; Principles of Philosophy, p. 119, 189, 190, 191. Veitch's Trans. Ueberweg (History, II. 42, 49, 51) ; Schwegler (History, 175) ; and Locke (King's Life of, 314) represent Des Cartes as stating the argument in the Anselmic form.

ARGUMENTS. 237

else, in comparison, is a shadow. Existence cannot be ab stracted from substance of this kind, without changing its grade. To attribute non-existence to the infinite, is to con vert it into the finite. But existence can be abstracted con ceptually from secondary and contingent substance without changing the species. In fact, it is substance of a secondary species for the very reason that it can be conceived of as non existent.

Des Cartes not only adopted Anselm's ontological argu ment with a modification, but added another feature to it. His addition is the following. We have the idea of the most perfect Being. It does not come through the senses, because such a Being is not sensible. It is not a fiction or fancy of the mind ; this we know from our own conscious ness. It is therefore, an innate idea, and must have been inlaid in our constitution by the most perfect Being himself. This is an a posteriori addition to the ontological argument. It is of the same nature with the cosmological argument. From the effect, the cause is inferred. The idea is a pro duct which has God for its author. But to mix the a priori with the a posteriori argument is not to improve either.

Locke (King's Life, p. 315 sq.) objects to Des Cartes' ar gument, that it does not demonstrate anything more than the existence of the eternal matter of atheism. In this, he implies that eternity of being belongs to the idea of matter. But this is an error, because eternal being supposes neces sary being, and necessary being supposes absolute perfec tion of being. But matter is not the most perfect being conceivable. Consequently, it is contingent, not necessary being. " Reason can annihilate matter in thought, always and without self-contradiction." Kant : Pure Reason. Meiklejohn's Trans, p. 379.1

1 See Locke, Understanding, IV. x., for the arguments for the Divine exist ence. In this part of his work, he really admits the doctrine of innate ideas in the sense in which Plato taught them, though not in the mistaken sense in which he himself combats them.

238 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

Stillingfleet (Origines Sacrae, III. i.) stated the ontological argument as follows. The perfectly clear perception of the mind is the strongest evidence we can have of the truth of anything. This postulate he borrowed from Des Cartes. We have a perfectly clear perception that necessary exist ence belongs to the essence of God ; and if necessary exist ence belongs to God's essence, it follows that actual exist ence does. This clearness of the perception, it is to be noticed, shows that the idea of God is an idea of the rea son, not of the imagination. It is accompanied with the conviction that it is a true idea, and not a mere inven tion of the fancy, like the idea of a winged horse, for ex ample.

Samuel Clarke stated the ontological argument as fol lows : It is certain that something has existed from all eternity. Absolute nonentity is inconceivable. Whatever has eternally existed is self -existent, and whatever is selfexistent, is necessarily existent, and whatever is necessarily existent cannot be conceived as non-existent. The material world cannot be the " something " that has. eternally existed, because we can conceive of its nonentity. Therefore the " something " which has eternally existed is God. Further more, infinite space and time cannot be conceived of as non-existent ; yet they are not substances or beings of themselves. They must therefore be properties of some substance or being. God is this substance or being.

Clarke's construction of the ontological argument is in ferior to that of Anselm, for two reasons. 1. The " some thing " which eternally exists may be confounded with the pantheistic ground of all things ; the " substance " of Spi noza. An eternal " something " does not necessarily suggest intelligence and morality in the " something." Anselm's " most perfect Being conceivable " does. 2. Space and time are not properties of any substance whatever. They are not properties of material substance ; nor of finite spir itual substance ; nor of infinite spiritual substance. They

ARGUMENTS. 239

are not properties of matter, nor of the human spirit, nor of the angelic spirit, nor of God.

Edwards (Will, Pt. II. Sect, iii.) shows a hesitation con cerning the ontological argument similar to that of Leib nitz. He asserts that if man had " sufficient strength and extent of mind," he would " intuitively see the absurdity of supposing God not to be ; " but adds, that " we have not this strength and extent of mind to know this certainty, in this intuitive, independent manner." This is saying that the human mind is not strong enough to perceive an absurdity. Yet Edwards adds, that " he will not affirm that there is in the nature of things no foundation for the knowledge of the being of God, without any evidence of it from his works," and that he thinks that " there is a great absurdity in the nature of things simply considered in supposing that there should be no God, or in denying Being in general." But, certainly, the human mind has sufficient " strength and ex tent," to perceive what is " absurd in the nature of things."

The ontological argument has the endorsement of inspira tion. The Hebrew Jehovah, in Ex. 3 : 13, denotes neces sity of existence. " This term, as applied to God, intimates that to ~be is his peculiar characteristic ; that he is, in a sense in which no other being is ; that he is self-existent, and can not but be. In the opinion that in this lies the significance of the name, the ancient Jews and most scholars of emi nence have concurred." ' To give a name, in both the He brew and the Greek intuition, is to describe the inmost and real nature of the thing. Plato, in the Cratylus (390), repre sents Socrates as saying that " the right imposition of names is no easy matter, and belongs not to any and everybody, but to him only who has an insight into the nature of

1 Alexander : Kitto's Encyclopaedia, Art. Jehovah. Maimonides, the Rabbi of the 12th century, so explains Jehovah. See Lowman : Hebrew Ritual, p. 270. Delitzsch (Old Testament History of Redemption, § 58) says that " the name Jehovah denotes the One whose nature consists in being (Seyn), which contin ually manifests itself aa existence (Daseyn) ; the eternal, and eternally living One.

240 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

things." The nomenclature given by the unf alien man to the objects of nature (Gen. 2 : 19, 20) implies a deep knowl edge of nature. And when the deity chooses before all others the name I Am, or Jehovah, for himself, the refer ence is to his absoluteness and perfection of being. The ethnic names in distinction from the revealed name of the deity imply attributes, not essence. The Teutonic " God " indicates that the deity is good. The Greek and Latin world employed a term (0eo?, deus) that lays emphasis upon that attribute whereby he orders and governs the universe. But Moses, divinely taught upon this point, chose a term which does not refer to any particular attribute, but to the very being and essence of God, and teaches that the deity must be, and cannot be conceived of as non-existent. He was not bidden to explain or justify the name, but only to announce it. This shows that the idea of a necessarily ex istent being is one which the human mind readily accepts.

The sweeping assertion is sometimes made that no idea whatever implies an external object corresponding to it. There is certainly one idea that does. It is that of being itself. If I say, " I have the idea of being, but it is only an idea : there is really no being," I perceive the absurdity im mediately. It is the same as saying, " There is nothing." The postulate in Clarke's argument : " Something exists," must be granted by the atheist as well as by the theist. But if this be true of the idea of being, it is still more so of the idea of necessary being. If the general idea of being implies objective being corresponding to it, the special idea of necessary being certainly does.

The ontological argument is of uncommon importance in an age tending to materialism, and to physical science. For it turns the human intellect in upon itself, and thereby con tributes to convince it of the reality of mind as a different substance from matter. The recent neglect of a priori methods, and over- valuation of a posteriori, is one of the reasons why matter has so much more reality for many

ARGUMENTS. 241

men than mind. If an object is not looked at, it gradually ceases to be regarded as an object at all. When theorists cease to contemplate mental and moral phenomena, they cease to believe that there are any. The gaze of the physi cist is intent upon the physical solely. Consequently, the metaphysical, or spiritual becomes a non-entity. Out of sight, it is out of mind, and out of existence, for him. Analyzing and observing matter alone, he converts every thing into matter. The brain is the soul, and molecular motion is thought. What he needs is, to cultivate meta physical in connection with physical studies ; a priori, in connection with a posteriori methods ; to look at mind as well as matter. In this way he gets a consciousness of mind, in distinction from the consciousness of matter.

Consciousness is consciousness, however it be obtained. If it be the result of a purely mental process, it is as truly consciousness as if it resulted from a purely sensuous pro cess. When I am conscious of the agencies of my soul by introspection, this mode or form of consciousness is as real and trustworthy, as when I am conscious of the agencies of my body by sensation. It is of no consequence how con sciousness arises, provided it does arise. Those a priori methods, consequently, which dispense with sensation and sensuous observation, and depend upon purely intellectual and spiritual operations, are best adapted to convince of the reality of an invisible and immaterial substance like the hu man soul. Some men tell us that they want a philosophy of common things. The soul of man is a very common thing ; and if the physicist would spend as many hours in observing the phenomena of his soul, as he does in observing the phe nomena of an oyster, he would have as much consciousness of his soul as he has of the oyster. We acquire conscious ness of an object by busying the mind about it. And if, after sufficient effort, the materialist should fail to obtain any consciousness of his mind, in distinction from his body, he would indeed have to conclude that he has none.

242 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

The Cosmological Argument is derived from the exist ence of the universe (KOCT/JLOV \6yos). It is implied in Ileb. 3:4, " Every house is builded by some man, but he who built all things is God." Its force depends upon the ax iom that an effect supposes a cause. Aquinas (Summa, I. ii. 3) states the argument as follows : 1. Motion in the uni verse implies a prime mover who is not moved ; and this is God. This form of the argument is valuable in reference to the mechanical physics, which resolves all existence into the movements of molecules or atoms. These atoms must either be self-moved, or moved by a prime mover other than the atoms. 2. Effects, generally, imply an efficient. 3. That which is contingent ; which might not be, and once was not ; implies that which is necessary, or that wrhich al ways was and must be.

Kant (Pure Reason, Meiklejohn, 374,) objects, that the concept of causality cannot be pressed beyond the domain of sensuous existence, and therefore the first cause given by the cosmological argument would not be intelligent. But the world of finite mind is a part of the universe. The existence of the rational universe implies that of a rational first cause. Clarke (Answer to Letter VII.) makes the ob jection, that the argument from causality will not prove the eternity, infinity, immensity, and unity of God. The temporal phenomena of nature prove that there has been from the beginning of the phenomena, a Being of power and wisdom sufficient to produce them. But that this Be ing has existed from eternity, and will exist to eternity, cannot be proved from these temporal phenomena. It is necessary, therefore, says Clarke, to fall back upon the ne cessity of the existence of God that is given in the rational idea of him. The same reasoning applies to the infinity of God. The universe is not known as infinite, or even as un limited, because it is not completely known. We are, there fore, arguing from only a finite effect, which would yield only a finite cause.

ARGUMENTS. 243

Clarke's objection overlooks the fact, that every finite ob ject implies original non-existence, and therefore creative power in the cause. Hence the quantity of being in the effect, is not the measure of the quantity of being in the cause. A grain of sand, even an infinitesimal atom of matter, if it be granted that it is not eternal but came into being from non-entity, would prove infinite power, equally with the immensity of the universe, because finite power cannot create ex nihilo. The absolute origination of the least amount of finite being requires omnipotence, equally with the greatest amount. The other objection of Clarke, viz : That the temporal phenomena of nature would prove only a temporal author of them, falls to the ground, when it is considered that it is inconceivable that the cause and the effect should begin to exist simultaneously. The cause must be older than the effect, from the nature of the case. Creation from nothing, in this case too, as in the previous one, implies that the cause of the phenomena in time must be prior to time. In John 1 : 1, it is said that the Logos was already in being " in the beginning " of time ; which proves that he existed in eternity. In like manner, God as the efficient cause of events in time must have existed before time, in order to be capable of such ac tion at the very beginning of time.

Hume objects to the cosrnological argument, that it is a petitio principii. Cause and effect, he says, are relative terms, so that one implies the other. But whether the phenomenon is an effect, is the very question. Hume de nies that it is, asserting that it is only a consequent that follows an antecedent. There is no necessary connection between the two related phenomena. It is only the habit of seeing one succeed the other, that leads to the expecta tion that they will invariably do so. Hume requires proof that any event is an effect, proper ; for if thid be granted, it follows of course that there is a cause. Father and son are relative terms. In constructing an argument to prove

that Napoleon Buonaparte had a father, it would not be al lowable to begin by assuming that Napoleon Buonaparte was a son. This objection of Hume is the same as that of the ancient Pyrrhonist, as stated by Diogenes Laertius. " Causation, the Pyrrhonists take away thus : A cause is only so in relation to an effect. But what is relative is merely conceived, and does not exist. Therefore, cause is a mere conception." Mackintosh : History of Ethical Phi losophy. Note 2.

The reply to this is the following : (a) Hume's view of the connection of one event with another, as being merely that of antecedent and consequent, is founded upon sensa tion merely, not upon the action of reason. A brute's eye sees that one event precedes another, and this is all that the brute sees and knows. And, according to Hume's theory, this is all that the man should see and know. But the fact is, that the man knows much more than this. In his con sciousness there are additional elements, that form no part of the animal's consciousness. A man not only sensuously sees that the one event precedes another, but rationally per ceives that the one invariably and necessarily precedes the other. These two characteristics of invariability and neces sity in the sequence are not given by the sense ; but they ;ire by the reason. The animal does not perceive them. The real question, consequently, between Hume and his opponents is, whether animal sensation or human reason shall decide the case. A man's mind, unlike the brute's eye, perceives not merely the sequence, but the manner of the sequence. (5) All phenomena, without exception, either precede or succeed each other, and therefore, according to Hume's theory, all phenomena ought to be either causes or effects. But we do not so regard them. The light of day invariably succeeds the darkness of the night, but we do not deem the former to be the effect of the latter. It is only of & particular class of antecedents and consequents, that we assert that one is the cause and the other is the efARGUMENTS. 245

feet. The mark of this class is not merely ocular antece dence, but efficient and necessary antecedence, (c) In mere succession, the antecedent and consequent may change places. The day may be either the antecedent or the con sequent of the night. But in causation, the places of cause and effect cannot be so reversed. The cause must always be prior to the effect. (d) If the certainty of the con nection between one event and another is the effect of custom, and not an intuitive perception, this certainty should increase in proportion to the number of instances. A man should be more certain that the explosion of gun powder is the effect of its ignition, in the hundredth instance in which he witnesses it, than in the tenth instance. J3ut he is not.

The Teleological Argument l is derived from a particular characteristic of the world : namely, the marks of design and adaptation to an end (re\o?) which appear in it. It is stated in Ps. 94 : 9. " He that planted the ear shall he not hear I and he that formed the eye, shall he not see 1 " The evident adaptedness of the eye for vision proves an in telligent designer of the eye. This form of the argument for the Divine existence is the most popularly effective of any. It is an ancient argument. Cicero (Tusculan Ques tions, I. 23) states it in an eloquent manner, borrowing from Socrates and Plato. Xenophon presents it in the Memorabilia. Galen (De usu partium, Y. v.) employs it in opposition to Asclepiades. The Bridgewater Treatises con tain it in the fullest form. Paley's statement of it is marked by his usual lucidity and force.2

i Janet : Final Causes. Bell : The Hand. Kirby : History and Habits of Animals.

8 Final causes are more easily discovered in a narrow than in a wide sphere ; in biology than in astronomy. When it is asked : Why do the planets revolve around the sun ? the efficient cause is commonly meant. The inquirer aska for the particular force that causes the revolution. But when it is asked : Why do the motor nerves run along the limbs ? the final cause is commonly meant. The inquirer asks for the purpose of this arrangement.

246 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

The teleological argument, like the cosmological, must not be confined to the material world, but extended to the intellectual ; as in Ps. 95 : 10, " He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know ? " The marks of design in the constitution of the human soul infer an infinite design ing mind who created it. The human will is intended for volition, not for perception. The human imagination is made for picturing, not for reasoning. The human under standing is designed for perception, not for volition.

Chemistry furnishes some fine materials for this argu ment. Elementary substances cannot be combined in any proportion at pleasure. The ratio in every instance is pre determined ; the amounts are weighed out by the Author of nature with a nicety which no art can attain. For ex ample, twenty-three ounces of sodium will exactly unite with thirty-five and five-tenth ounces of chlorine, and make table salt. But if 23.5 ounces of sodium are put together with 35.5 ounces of chlorine, nature will put the extra half ounce of sodium on one side, and the remainder will unite. Cooke: Religion in Chemistry, p. 288. Crystallography, also, affords examples of symmetrical arrangement of par ticles, in which geometrical proportions are invariable. The crystal is a petrified geometry.

An objection similar to that urged against the cosmologi cal argument, has been made to the teleological. There is adaptation, it is said, but not design • as there is sequence but not causality. Certain things are adapted to certain uses, but not madeybr certain uses. The eye is adapted to vision, but has no designing author. When it is asked, how this striking adaptation is to be accounted for apart from design, the answer is : either by the operation of law, or by chance. To the latter explanation, there is a fatal objection in the mathematical doctrine of probabilities. The chance of matter's acting in this manner is not one in millions. Natural adaptation, upon this theory, would be as infrequent a phenomenon as a miracle. And yet adaptaARGUMENTS. 247

tion to an end is one of the most common facts in nature ;

occurring in innumerable instances. The other explanation, by law, is equivalent to the acknowledgment of a design ing author, or else it is mere tautology. A law implies a law-giver ; because it merely denotes an invariable course of action, or a universal fact in nature. The law of gravita tion is only a name for a general fact, namely, that matter attracts inversely as the square of the distance. The law is merely the rule of action in the case. To say, therefore, that the law of gravitation is the cause of gravitation, is to say that the fact itself is the cause of the fact ; that a gen eral fact produces particular facts. There is nothing causa tive in the law, any more than there is in the fact or facts which are its equivalent. Consequently, a law requires to be accounted for, as much as do the phenomena under it ; and this carries the mind back to a creative author of law.

Bacon objects to the inquiry for final causes, as leading to unfounded explanations and conjectures, thus hindering the progress of science. But Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood, in endeavoring to find out the design and use of the multitude of valves in the veins. And, generally, the search after the purpose in nature has been the stimu lus in physical science. That some of the conjectures re garding final causes should prove to be erroneous, is un avoidable to a finite intelligence. Aristotle (Metaphysics, I. ii.) contends that if the end or final cause cannot be found, science is impossible. There would be endless pro gression in inquiry, with no terminus or goal. Scientific investigation would have no result.

The Moral Argument is stated in two modes : 1 Con science testifies to the fact of obedience, or of disobedience, of a moral law. This implies a law-giver. This is God. Calvin, Melanchthon, and Turrettin employ this mode. 2. We observe an inequality between the happiness of good and bad men, here upon earth. This requires an adjust24:8 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

ment hereafter. This implies a righteous arbiter and judge.

The Historical Argument is derived from the historical fact, that all the nations have had the belief that there is a Supreme Being. Aristotle employs it, Metaphysics, XI. viii. Cicero, also, De Legibus, I. viii. ; and Grotius, Chris tian Keligion, I. 12.

Athanasius : Contra Arianos ; De Decretis Synodi Nicaenae (Ox ford Library, Tr.). Augustine : De Trmitate ; De Civitate, XI. x. (Nicene Library, Tr.). Anselm : De Fide Trinitatis ; De Processione Spiritus. Hasse : Anselm, II. 287 sq. Aquinas : Summa, Pars I. Quest, xxvii.-xliii. Calvin : Institutes, I. xiii. 5. Ursinus : Christian Eeligion, Quest. 25. Witsius : Covenants, I. ii. 5-7 ; Apostles' Creed, Dis. VI. VII. XII. XXIII. Turrettin : Institutio, III. xxiii.-xxxi. Hooker : Polity, V. li.-lvi. Stillingfleet : Trinity and Transubstantiation compared. Bull : Defensio Fidei Nicaenae (Oxford Library, Tr. ). Pearson : Creed, I. II. VII. Usher : On the Incarnation. Waterland : First and Second Defences ; Importance of Doctrine of the Trinity. Howe : Calm Discourse of the Trinity ; Trinity of Persons. Owen : Brief Declaration ; Saints' Fellowship with the Trinity ; Vindiciae Evangelicae ; Person of Christ. Leighton : Theological Lectures (VII.) . Cudworth : Intellectual System, II. 311-433 (Pagan Trinity). Edwards : Observations on the Trin ity. Horsley : Belief of First Ages ; Tracts. Smith : Scripture Testimony. Magee : On Atonement. "Ward law : Reply to Yates. Wilberforce : On the Incarnation. . Kidd : On the Trinity. Treffrey : The Trinity. Sineaton : On the Holy Spirit. Neander : His tory, II. 403-477. Dorner : Christology (Nicene Trinity) ; Chris tian Doctrine, g 28-32. Baur : Dreieinigkeitslehre, I. 395-470. Frank : Christian Certainty, § 33, 36. Billroth : Religions-Philosophie, § 89, 90. Miiller : On Sin, II. 136 (Urwick's Tr.). Nitzsch : Christian Doctrine, \ 81-84. Martensen : Dogmatics, \ 52-58, 181184. T. Maurice : Oriental Trinities. Morgan : Trinity of Plato and Philo. Christlieb : Modern doubt, IV. Schaff : History, III. 600-689. Shedd : History of Doctrine, I. 243-391 ; Introduction to Augustine on the Trinity.

IT has been remarked, in the investigation of the Divine Nature, that the doctrine of the Trinity, though not dis250 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

coverable by human reason, is susceptible of a rational de fence when revealed. This should not be lost sight of; not withstanding the warning of the keen Dr. South (Sermon XLIIL), that " as he that denies this fundamental article of the Christian religion may lose his soul, so he that much strives to understand it may lose his wits."

It is a noticeable fact, that the earlier forms of Trinitarianism are among the most metaphysical and speculative of any in dogmatic history. The controversy with the Arian and the Semi- Arian brought out a statement and defence of the truth, not only upon scriptural but ontological grounds. Such a powerful dialectician as Athanasius, while thor oughly and intensely scriptural; while starting from the text of scripture, and subjecting it to a rigorous exegesis ; did not hesitate to pursue the Arian and Semi- Arian dialec tics to its subtlest fallacy in its most recondite recesses. If anyone doubts this, let him read the four Orations of Athanasius, and his defence of the Nicene Decrees. In some sections of Christendom, it has been contended that the doctrine of the Trinity should be received without any attempt at all to establish its rationality and intrinsic neces sity. In this case, the tenets of eternal generation and pro cession have been regarded as going beyond the scripture data, and if not positively rejected, have been thought to hinder rather than assist faith in three divine persons and one God. But the history of opinions shows that such sec tions of the church have not proved to be the strongest de fenders of the scripture statement, or the most successful in keeping clear of the Sabellian, Arian, or even Socinian departure from it. Those churches which have followed scripture most implicitly, and have most feared human speculation, are the very churches which have inserted into their creeds the most highly analytic statement that has yet been made of the doctrine of the Trinity. The Nicene Trinitarianism is incorporated into nearly all the symbols of modern Christendom ; and this specifies, particularly,

TRINITY IN UNITY. 251

the tenets of eternal generation and procession with their corollaries. The English church, to whose great divines, Hooker, Bull, Pearson, and Waterland, scientific Trinitarianism owes a very lucid and careful statement, has added the Athanasian creed to the Nicene. The Presbyterian churches, distinguished for the closeness of their adherence to the simple scripture, yet call upon their membership to confess, that " in the unity of the Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity : God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. The Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding ; the Son is eternally begotten of the Father ; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son." West minster Confession, II. iii.

In discussing the subject of the personality of God (183, sq.), we have seen that this involves three distinctions in the Infinite Essence. God cannot be self -contemplating, selfcognitive, and self-communing, unless he is trinal in his constitution. The subject must know itself as an object, and also perceive that it does. This implies, not three dis tinct substances, but three distinct modes of one substance. Consequently, the Divine unity must be a kind of unity that is compatible with a kind of plurality. The unity of the Infinite being, is tri-unity, or trinity. God is a plural unit.

The attempt, therefore, of the deist and the Socinian to construct the doctrine of the Divine unity is a failure, be cause it fails to construct the doctrine of the Divine per sonality. Deism, with Socinianism and Mohammedanism, while asserting that God is personal, denies that he is three persons in one essence. It contends, by implication, that God can be self-knowing as a single subject merely without an object ; without the distinctions involved in the subject contemplating, the object contemplated, and the perception of the identity of both. The controversy, consequently, is as much between the deist and the psychologist, as it is beTHEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

tween him and the theologian. It is as much a question whether his theory of personality and self-consciousness is correct, as whether his interpretation of scripture is. For the dispute involves the necessary conditions of personality. If a true psychology does not require trinality in a spiritual essence in order to its own self-contemplation, self-knowl edge, and self-communion, then the deist is correct ; but if it does, then he is in error. " That view of the Divine nature," says Smith (Faith and Philosophy, 191), " which makes it inconsistent with the incarnation and trinity, is philosophically imperfect, as well as scripturally incorrect."

In speaking of the Divine unity, therefore, a peculiar kind of unity is intended, namely, a unity that is trinal. And when the Divine trinality is spoken of, a peculiar kind of trinality is intended, namely, a trinality that con stitutes only one essence or Being. As a unity which ex cludes trinality is not meant, so a trinality which excludes unity is not meant. " Cum dico unum, non me trinitatis turbat numerus, qui essentiam non multiplicat, non variat, nee partitur. Ilursum, cum dico tria, non me arguit intuitus unitatis, quae ilia quaecumque tria, seu illos tres, nee in confusionem cogit, nee in singularitatem redegit." Bernard: De Consideratione, V. 8.

Consequently, in reference to God, we may not discuss mere and simple unity, nor mere and simple trinality ; but we must discuss unity in trinality, and trinality in unity. See Athanasius : Contra Arianos, IV. 13 sq. We may not think of a monad which originally, and in the order of nature, is not trinal, but becomes so. The instant there is a monad there is a triad. Neither may we think of a triad which originally, and in the order of nature, is not a monad, but becomes so. The instant there is a triad, there is a rnonad.

"T/J.VU ffe novds, "T/j-vu

Movds ft rpids &v, Tpids It jj.ovds &v. — SYNESIUS.

TRINITY IN UNITY. 253

The Christian trinity is not that of Sabellius and Py thagoras: namely, an original untrinal monad that subse quently, either in time or in the order of nature, becomes a triad : whereby four elementary and constituent factors are introduced into the problem ; namely, one essence, and three additional persons. God is not one and three, but one in three. There is no primary monad, as such, and without trinality, to which the three distinctions are ad juncts. There are only three constituent factors in the problem. For the essence has no existence outside of and apart from the three persons, so as to constitute a fourth factor in addition to these three. The monad, that is, the essence, never exists in and by itself untrinalized, as in the Sabellian theory, and in the Pythagorean scheme of the tetractys, adopted by Coleridge (Works, Y. 18, 19, 404). It exists only as in the persons ; only as trinalized. The essence, consequently, is not prior, either in the order of nature Or of time, to the persons, nor subsequent to them, but simultaneous with them. Hence, the essence is not one constituent factor by itself, apart from the persons, any more than the persons are three constituent factors by themselves, apart from the essence. The one essence is si multaneously three persons, and the three persons are one essence. The trinity is not a composition of one essence with three persons. It is not an essence without distinctions united with three distinctions, so as to make a complex. The trinity is simple and incomplex. " If," says Twesten (Dogmatik, II. 229), " we distinguish between the clearness of light and the different degrees of clearness, we do not imply that light is composed of clearness and degrees of clearness." Neither is God composed of one untrinal es sence and three persons^

It follows, consequently, that we cannot discuss the Divine unity by itself, exclusive of trinality, as the deist and the Socinian endeavor to do. Trinality belongs as necessarily and intrinsically to the Divine unity, as eternity does to

254 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

the Divine essence, " If," says Athanasius (Oration 1. 17), " there was not a Blessed Trinity from eternity, but only a unity existed first, which at length became and grew to be a Trinity, it follows that the Holy Trinity must have been at one time imperfect, and at another time entire ; imperfect until the Son came to be created, as the Arians maintain, and then entire afterwards."

The necessary connection between the Divine unity and trinality, is like that between the Divine essence and attri butes. God's essence is not prior to and separate from his attributes. He is never an essence without attributes. The essence and its attributes are simultaneous and insep arable. God cannot be conceived of as developing from an essence without attributes, into an essence with attri butes. He is not essence and attributes, but essence in at tributes. The whole essence is in each attribute ; and the whole essence is also in each trinitarian person. As we can not logically conceive of and discuss the Divine essence apart from the Divine attributes, so we cannot logically conceive of and discuss the Divine unity apart from the Divine

The unity of God is unique. It is the only unity of the kind. An individual man is one ; and any individual creat ure, or thing, is one. But there are others like it, each of which is likewise numerically one. God is not merely one, but the only one ; not merely unus, but unicus. He is not one of a species, or one in contrast with another of the same kind. God is one God, and the only God. The no tion of the unique must be associated with that of unity, in the instance of the Supreme Being.

God is not a unit^ but a unity. A unit, like a stone, or a stick, is marked by mere singleness. It admits of no in terior distinctions, and is incapable of that inherent trinaL ity which is necessary to self-knowledge, and self -conscious ness. Mere singleness is incompatible with society, and therefore incompatible with the Divine communion and

TBINITY IN UNITY. 255

blessedness. God is blessed only as he is self-knowing and self -communing. A subject without an object could not experience either love or joy. Love and joy are social. They imply more than a single person.

The Scripture doctrine of the Divine plenitude favors distinctions in the Divine essence. Fulness of being im plies variety of existence. A finite unit has no plurality or manifoldness. It is destitute of modes of subsistence. Meagreness and barrenness mark a unit; opulence and fruitfulness mark a unity. This TrXijpcDf^a, or, plenitude of the Divine essence, is spoken of in Eph. 3 : 19, " Filled with all the fulness of God ; " in Colos. 1 : 19 ; 2 : 9, " The fulness of the Godhead." Ambrose (De Fide, Y. i.) marks the distinction as follows : " Singularitas ad personam pertinet, unitas ad naturam." Says Twesten (Dogrnatik, II. 228), " so far as plurality lies in the idea of the trinity, it is not contradictory to the unity belonging to the Divine essence, but only to that solitariness which cannot be har monized with the living plenitude and blessedness which are ascribed to God in revelation, and which God possesses in himself, and independently of the finite." Owen (Doc trine of the Trinity Vindicated) remarks that " it may be true, that in one essence there can be but one person, when the essence is finite and limited, but not when the essence is infinite." The following from Lessing (Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, § 73) is remarkable, as coining from one who would not be supposed to have devoted much study to metaphysical trinitarianism. " What if this doc trine [the trinity] should bring us to see that God cannot possibly be one in the sense in which finite things are one ; that his unity must be a transcendental unity that does not exclude a kind of plurality (Mehrheit) ? Must not God have, at least, an absolutely perfect idea (Yorstellung) of himself ; that is, an idea in which is contained all that is in himself? But would all that is in himself be contained in this idea, if it included merely the notion^ or bare possibil'

TIIKOhOOY (DOCTIMNi; 01' COD).

/'///of his neee; t;ary ;ui«l art.ual (•••! tenee, as well MS of hin attrilMite;. '> Poi-,;,il>ility mii'lil, c\li:iu: I, the nature of liiH attrihiile;., lint, doe;; it. licit, of liin necessary and actual exflt enoef M Wenil lo me that, it. would not. Consequently, ( iod must cither have no j>< r/'rrf. idea or imago of liiin el f, or elM Hii, jn-rlrrl, ii|i-:i i:1. M IM-'-C; : :ii'il y (Wtual, \ \\\\\\. i;<, objectively r(5iil| UH IK; liiitiKcli* IH. rrii«- im:i^«j or roprtiHontiition of myself in a mirror, it, \\\ t.i'iic, ll nothing but En empty uiid iiiironl ima^o of mo, IXM^IIUH*! it, II;IK in it, only 10 much of mo as is relieved by the ruyn of li^lit fulling upon the mirror. JJut if this imago contain, d //// .-ill without, exception — wliicli J myHclf contain, would it then he :i men; empty und unreal repreHentation ; or not rather a true du plication of my tell J If, now, I affirm a similar self dupli cation in God, I get porhapH aH near to the truth :is the imperfufttioii of human language permits. And it is un<|u< tionahle, that those who would make this idea which

The argument for the truth and reality of the Trinity from the characteristics of the Christian experience, is condusivo. There must bo trinality in the Divine unity, in order to the exorcise of the peculiar affections in the Chris tian consciousness. The Christian experience as portrayed in tlie "Now Testament, and as expressed in St. Paul's case, for example, is both impossible and inexplicable, without the three persons in tho one God. St. Paul is continually alluding, in his hopes and joys, to tho Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Abstract the Father, Son, and Spirit, and leave merely a bare untrinal substance as tho object of love, hope, and worship, and St. Paul's religious experience can not bo accounted for. If, from the common Christian e..nHciousness, those elements should ho eliminated which re sult from the intuition of tho Divine being as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctilier, little would remain. Let, any

TKl\rn IN IMTY.

iMU1 think away :ill of his religious experience licit. relates to thr leather. Sou, ami Holy Spirit, ami ivlain only what rolates to tin' DMn6 GSSOnOG M a monad aiul mil rinali. ed, ami ho will peivehe ho\v very much of his beM. religious experience p'ows out of t riuitarianisni, and cannot -row out of unitarianism. Men cannot and do not lovo, pray to, ami adoro a mere abstract, Infinite nature. They lo\ e, ad dress, and worship certain persons in that nature. Upon this point, 1'Yank ^System of ( Mirisl ian ( Vrtainty, ^ oo) re marks as follows: "(iod is the unity, the one Hein;-;, \vh.»

li thd originating autlior and H^ont in the i'lu i/.iinu e\pe

i-ienee. Hut tliis unity has triualily in relation to this experience. (iod in jud:Miient .causes t In- .-.em c of r, in and j-;uill ; (iod in atonement, t>\piates ,sin and ••;uill ; (Jo*l in re-vneraf ion and eomersion HMIH»N es sin and ^uilt. Hero an' three modes ,>r forms of (iod. Wl.it is one ahsoluto penonal (J*>d, to whom t ho (Mii'istian o\\cs all this. In hiieh wa.y, and to this extent, t he ( 'hrist ian is as aired, l»y means ol redemption and the oh|ects of faith implied in it, of (iod as the triune ( iod."

Although trinal, the l>i\ine es: enee is aIin/>/t'i not e,.m pound. In this respect, the unity of the Unite spirit, re Hemhles that ol' tin- Inliuite. The .spirit of man is not com po: ed of two ;,uhs lances. It, in homo:;vneoiiM. It, is ull spirit. A material unity is complex, hein^ composed of a yariety of elementary : iihstaiu-es. Hence, thoi'O lll'O v:n utiesol matti-r, l»ut, not, of spirit.. 15 y I'oason of its im'oin |>le\ity and .simplicity, th<- Di\ine e;.senco in iiulivisihlo. Not. hein:1; made up, as mallei- is, of di\ ersi^ purt.H or proper ties, it. cannot, he di\ ided or unaly/.ed into tlium. u Tlu) niilnrr of the Trinity is denominated simple, bocmiSO it haH not. anything which it, can loso, and IHH'HIIHO it irt not onu tiling and its conUintH another, as a cup and the liquor, or a body and its color, or the air and the lijdit. and heat, of it." Augustine : ( 'ily of ( Jod, X I. \.

The doi-trine of the Diyine, unity, in opposition to poly

258 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

theism, is taught in the Scriptures. Deut. 6:4," The Lord our God, is one Lord." 1 Kings 8 : 60, " The Lord is God, and there is none else." Isa. 44 : 6, " Beside me there is no God." Mark 12 : 29, " The Lord our God is one Lord. John 10 : 30, " I and my Father are one " («/). 1 Cor. 8 : 4, " There is none other God but one." Eph. 4:6," One Lord, one God and Father of all." Gal. 3:20, "God is one." No sin is more severely prohibited and threatened than the worship of idols.

The rational proofs of the Divine unity are the follow ing : 1. Unity is implied in the idea of God as the most perfect Being. Each of his infinite perfections excludes a second of the kind. There cannot be two eternal beings ; or two omnipotent ; or two supreme ; or two self-existent ; etc. " Hence," says Aquinas (Summa, I. xi. 3), " the an cient philosophers, as if compelled by the truth, in postulat ing an infinite principle (principium), postulated only one such principle." Turrettin (III. iii. 7) cites Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Epictetus, and Seneca as teaching the unity of the Supreme being ; pater hominum deorumque. 2. The unity and harmony apparent in the created universe demonstrate the Divine unity. There would be two conflicting plans, had there been two creating archi tects.

The doctrine of the Trinity is one of revelation, not of natural religion, and therefore the first work to be done re specting it, is to deduce it from the language of Scripture. It is not directly formulated, as an affirmative proposition, in any single text ; if 1 John 5 : 7 is spurious. But it is indirectly formulated in some texts, and taught part by part in many others. To collect, collate, and combine these, is to construct the dogma biblically.

There are two general classes of Trinitarian texts : 1. Those which mention all of the three persons of the God head. 2. Those which teach the deity of one or another of the persons singly.

TRINITY IN UNITY. 259

1. Texts of the first class are the following: The account of the baptism of Christ, in Matt. 3 : 16, 17, mentions three persons. A person speaks from heaven, saying : " This is my beloved Son." The person who is spoken of in this ad dress is the " beloved Son," and another than the person speaking. The " Spirit of God " who descended like a dove, alighting upon the Son, is still a third person, differ ing from the other two. The person who speaks is not seen. The person spoken of is seen, and stands in the waters of Jordan. A third person is also seen, but, in the form of a dove, descending from heaven. It was a saying current in the days of the Arian controversy : " Go to the Jordan, O Arian, and thou wilt see the Trinity." The term " Spirit," in this instance, does not denote some property or influence of God, because to descend from heaven in a personal form, and to take a personal attitude, is never at tributed in Scripture, or anywhere else, to an impersonal influence or attribute.

The formula which Christ gave his apostles for adminis tering baptism to believers mentions the three persons of the Trinity, and thereby indirectly formulates the doctrine. Matt. 28 : 19, " Teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." The three are here represented as equal in dig nity and authority. Whatever be the significance of bap tism, no discrimination is made between the relation which the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost sustain to it. But that baptism is the recognition of the divinity of the person in whose name it is administered, is self-evident. Paul asks in amazement, if the Corinthians were baptized in the name of Paul ? 1 Cor. 1 : 13. When it is said that the Israelites " were all baptized unto Moses " (eis TOV Majvorrjv), 1 Cor. 10 : 2, the meaning is not that they were baptized unto the name (eio- TO ovopa) of Moses, but with reference to (&?) the Mosaic doctrines and ritual ; as persons were said to be baptized " unto John's baptism " (Acts 19 : 3), in confirma260 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

tion of their belief in John the Baptist's mission and preach ing.

The Apostolic benediction mentions all three persons. 2 Cor. 13 : 14, " The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost be with you all." Here, the apostle expresses the desire, that favor to the guilty through Christ as the mediator, from God the Father's love, may be made effectual by the Holy Ghost. Each person performs an office peculiar to himself. Three persons are mentioned in Eph. 4 : 4-6, " There is one Spirit, one Lord, one God and Father of all ; " and in 1 Peter 1:2, " Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, and sprink ling of the blood of Jesus Christ."

There are, also, passages in which three persons are ^spoken of, who are distinguished from each other by cer tain acts which each performs, and which could not be per formed by a creature. John 15 : 26, " But when the Com forter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me." John 14:16, "And I will pray (ep&rtfcrco) the Father, and he shall give you another Com forter, that he may abide with you forever, even the Spirit of truth." In the first of these, mention is made of the Comforter who is sent, of the Son who sends him, and of the Father from whom he proceeds. In the second, the same persons are mentioned, but the Father sends the Com forter. This is explained by the identity of essence in each person, whereby, in scripture the same act is sometimes re ferred to more than one person. 1 Cor. 12 : 4-6, " There are diversities of [spiritual] gifts (^apicr/jidTa^ but the same Spirit. And there are differences of [ecclesiastical] admin istrations, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of [miraculous] operations (evepwpdTwv), but it is the same God which worketh all in all." Here, the gifts, adminis trations, and operations are such as could not proceed from

TKINITY IN UNITY. 261

a creature ; and the three persons mentioned stand in the same relation to one another, and to the gifts, administra tions, and operations. Eph. 2 : 18, " For through him, we both have access, by one Spirit, to the Father." Jude 20 : 21, " Praying in the Holy Ghost, keep yourselves in the love of God, looking for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ." Ilev. 1 : 4, 5, " Grace be unto you from him which is, and was, and is to come, and from the seven spirits which are before his throne, and from Jesus Christ." The " seven spirits " are the Holy Spirit designated by the Jewish sacred number, denoting infinite perfection.

2. The passages of the second general class, in which only a single trinitarian person is spoken of, will be presented under the heads of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

That the doctrine of the Trinity was taught in the Old Testament wras generally maintained by the fathers, school men, and divines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centu ries. The language of Quenstedt expresses the common view of these authorities. " As the mystery of the Holy Trinity is proposed with sufficient clearness in the books of the Old Testament, so likewise from them alone the divin ity of Christ, and of the Holy Spirit, and thus the whole mystery of the Trinity can be demonstrated against any op ponents who concede the inspiration of the Old Testament." Hase : Hutterus, p. 168. Calixtus questioned this position, in 1645, and was answered by Calovius. For the exegesis of the Fathers upon this point, see Irenaeus : IV. x. xi. ; Augustine : City of God, XVI. vi. ; Confessions, XIII. v. Speaker's Commentary : Gen. 1 : 26 ; Isa. 32 : 1, 2. Au gustine contended that man was made in the image of the triune God, the God of revelation ; not in that of the God of natural religion, or the untriune deity of the nations. Consequently it was to be expected that a trinitarian ana logue can be found in his mental constitution, which he attempted to point out. All acknowledge that the Divine

262 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

unity has its correspondent in that of the human mind. But Augustine and the fathers generally go further than this. This, in their view, is not the whole of the Divine image. When God says, " Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," they understood these words to have been spoken ~by the Trinity, and of the Trinity ; by and of the true God of revelation : the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, one God. How far Moses comprehended the full meaning of the Divine teaching in these words, is one thing. Who it really was that taught, is another. The apostle Peter asserts that the Old Testament inspiration was a Trinitarian inspiration, when he says that " the prophets who prophesied of the grace that should come, searched what the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand of the sufferings of Christ." 1 Pet. 1 : 10, 11.

The doctrine of the Trinity is revealed in the Old Tes tament, in the same degree that the other truths of Chris tianity are ; not with the clearness and fulness of the New Testament, yet really and plainly. God is trinal in the Old Testament ; but with more vagueness than in the New. In the Old economy, only the general doctrine of three per sons in the essence is taught. In the New dispensation, the characteristic differences between the three are speci fied. The New Testament formula of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, together with the other data connected with this, yields the peculiarities of generation and spiration, of filiation and procession ; constituting a further develop ment of the truth found germinally in the earlier revela tion.1 " The trinitarian conception of God," says Delitzsch (Old Testament History of Redemption, 178, Curtis's Ed.), " is not a product of philosophical speculation, but the re flex, not only of the New Testament, but also even of the Old Testament facts of revelation. God and the Spirit of

1 Compare Witsius : Covenants, I. ii. 5-7. Laighton ; Theological Lectures, VTL Lee : Inspiration, Lecture III. p. 123. Dorner : Christian Doctrine, § 28.

TRINITY IN UNITY. 263

God are already distinguished upon the first page of the Holy Scriptures, and between both, the Angel of God stands as the mediator of the covenant, according to Gen. 16 ; and as the leader of Israel, according to Ex. 14 : 19. The angel of his presence, according to Isa. 63 : 9, is the saviour of his people."

The passages in the Old Testament which imply the doc trine of the Trinity are : 1. Those in which God speaks in the plural number. Even if no weight be attached to the pluralis excellentiae in the name toirfcj*, yet when God him self employs the plural number in speaking of himself and his agency, it evidently supports the doctrine of personal dis tinctions in the essence. Gen. 1 : 26, " God said, Let us make man after our image." Gen. 3 : 22, " God said, Behold the man is become as one of us" Gen. 11 : 7, " The Lord said, Let us go down, and there confound their language." Isa. 7 : 8, " "Whom shall I send, and who will go for us." The exegete would shrink from substituting " me " for " us," in these passages ; as he would from substituting " I " for "we," and " my," for "our," in the sentence, "We will come unto him and made our abode with him," John 14 : 23. And yet it would be proper to do so, if there really is only a single person in the Supreme Being. " We might have supposed," says Augustine (City of God, XYI. vi.), " that the words uttered at the creation of man, ' Let us,' not Let me, ' make man,' were addressed to the angels, had he not added, ' in our image ; ' but as we cannot be lieve that man was made in the image of the angels, or that the image of God is the same as that of angels, it is better to refer this expression to the plurality of the trin ity." This remark of Augustine contradicts the explana tion of Philo and Maimonides, who say that God addressed the angels, associating them with himself. Justin Martyr (Trypho, LXII.) finds the trinity in this passage. Compare, Introduction to Augustine on the Trinity. Nicene Library, III. 5.

264 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

2. Of less logical value in themselves, yet having a de monstrative force in connection with other proofs, are the trisagiou in Isa. 6:3," Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord of hosts ; " and the threefold address in Numbers 6 : 24-26, " The Lord bless thee, and keep thee ; the Lord make his face to shine upon thee ; the Lord lift up his countenance upon thee." " This formula of benediction," says Kurtz (Sacred History, § 46), " already contains the whole mystery of the divine Trinity, and of the redemption which was to be accomplished by it, in an undeveloped form, or like a germ. It was designed to aid in connecting with the relig ious knowledge of the people a certain view, to be after ward rendered more distinct, of the personality of the one God unfolded in three persons, and operating in a three fold manner in the work of human salvation."

3. Still more important than either of the two preceding classes of texts, are those in which God is expressly dis tinguished from God, as subject and object. The theophanies of the Old Testament, like the incarnation of the Son, are trinitarian in their implication and bearing. The narra tive relating to Jehovah and Hagar, in Gen. 16 : 7-13, is an example. Here, the person who is styled in verses 7, 9, 10, 11, the " angel ("Jj^ta) of the Lord," is addressed in verse 13 as almighty God (b«): "Thou God seest me." God is thus a person who sends (" of the Lord "), and a person who is sent (" angel "). The theophany of Jehovah to Abraham, described in Gen. 18 : 1-19, is another example. Here, one of the " three men " spoken of in verse 2 is de nominated Lord (^"ia), in verse 3, and Jehovah in verse 13; and is described by Abraham as the "judge of all the earth " in verse 25, before whom he himself is but " dust and ashes " (verse 27). In verse 14, this Jehovah-angel dis tinguishes himself from " the Lord " (rrirp) by asking, " Is any thing too hard for the Lord ? " This could not be exchanged for : " Is anything too hard for me ? " The " men " in 18 : 22 are only two of the three. These two

TRINITY IN UNITY. 265

went toward Sodom, leaving Abraham standing before the third, who is called Jehovah. In 19 : 1, these two angels come to Sodom. The theophany of Jehovah to Lot, in Gen. 19, is another example of the trinitarian distinctions. In verse 1, "two angels " (literally, " the two angels " : see 18 : 22) are sent by " Jehovah " (verse 13) to destroy Sod om. In verse 18, one of these angels is addressed as " Lord " (^*»). The Masorites have the note, Kadesh, i.e., " holy," to signify that " Lord " is employed in the divine sense, not the "profane" or human, as in 19:2 ("my lords "). The context favors the Masorite view ; because Lot's words to the Lord, in 19 : 18-12, and the Lord's words to Lot, imply the deity of the angel ; e.g., " I will over throw the city." It is uncertain whether the " Jehovah " who " went his way as soon as he had left communing with Abraham " (Gen. 18 : 33) joins " the two angels " that " came to Sodom at even " (Gen. 19 : 1) ; or whether one of these " two angels " is Jehovah himself. One or the other supposition must be made. The interchange of the singu lar and plural in the narrative is striking. " It came to pass when they had brought them forth abroad that he said, Es cape for thy life. And Lot said unto them, Oh not so my Lord: behold now thy servant hath found grace in thy sight. And he said unto him, See, /have accepted thee ; 7 will not overthrow the city of which thou hast spoken," Gen. 18 : 1721. The theophany of Jehovah to Moses, in Exodus 3, is another instance of the subjective and the objective God. The person described in verse 2 as " the angel of the Lord," is denominated God (trrfta) in verse 4, and " the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," in verse 6.

4. There are passages in the Old Testament that speak of three persons in the Supreme Being. Isa. 48 : 16, " The Lord God, and his Spirit have sent me " (the Messiah). In Haggai 2 : 4, 5, 7, three persons are mentioned : " The Lord of hosts," his " Spirit," and the " Desire of all na tions." If rn»n (ver. 7) is rendered ra e/eXe/era (Sept.),

266 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

still two divine persons are mentioned. This would prove distinctions in the Divine unity. There are three persons who bring Israel out of Egypt: God; the "angel" of God ; (Ex. 3 : 2,4 ; 23 : 20 ; 32 : 34) ; and the " Spirit " of God, Isa. 63:7-14.

5. All those passages in the Old Testament, which ascribe divine names and works to the Messiah, and divine opera tions to the Holy Spirit, establish the doctrine of the trin ity, by implication. These will be mentioned under the topics of the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Edersheim (Life of Jesus, Appendix IX.), by quotations from the Targums, Talmuds, and older Midrashim, shows that there are 456 passages in the O. T. (75 from the Pentateuch, 243 from the Prophets, and 138 from the Hagiographa) that are ap plied by the Rabbins to the Messiah. Among them are

2 Sam. 7 : 14 ; "I will be his Father and he shall be my Son ; " Ps. 2 : 7, " Thou art my Son, this day have I be gotten thee." Compare Heb. 1 : 5, 6.

The Jews learned from the Old Testament that the Holy Spirit is a person. When John the Baptist tells the Phar isees and Sadducees, that one would soon appear among them who would baptize them with the Holy Ghost (Matt.

3 : 7-11), he did not explain who the Holy Ghost is. He spoke of an agent known to them. So also in the instance of Christ's promise to his disciples, that he would send them the Comforter, the Holy Spirit, John 14 : 26 ; 15 : 13, 14. But this knowledge which is presupposed, must have been a common and current knowledge, derived from the Old Testament representations of God.

Augustine (Confessions, XIII. 5) finds the trinity in Gen. 1 : 1, 2. The " beginning," he understands to be an agent, as in Rev. 3 : 14. " In principio " means, " by the Begin ning ; " that is, by means of him who causes to begin, or originates. " Thou, O Father, didst create heaven and oarth in him who is the Beginning of our wisdom, which is thy Wisdom, of thyself, equal unto thee and coeternal, that

TRINITY IN UNITY. 267

is, thy Son." Dorner (Christian Doctrine, I. 346) quotes Deut. 32 : 39, in comparison with Exod. 3 : 14. The same Being who says " I am I," also says " I am He."

The technical term " trinity " is not found in Scripture ; and neither is the term " unity." The earliest use of the word is in Theophilus of Antioch (f 181, or 188), who re marks that " the three days which were before the luminaries*are types of the trinity." Ad Autolycum, II. 15. The term triad is employed by Plotinus (f 270), and Proclus (f 485). Tertullian (f 220) employs the term trinitas. Origen (f 250) uses rpias twice. Rufinus, in translating Origen, employs trinitas. In the fourth century triunitas appears. The schoolmen discuss the triplicitas of the di vine nature, in connection with the simplicitas. Baumgarten-Crusius: Dogmengeschichte, II. 120. Trinity is the abbreviation of tri-unity.

God is trinal (trinum), not triple (triplex). Compare Augustine : Trinity, YI. vii. That which is triple is com plex; it is composed of three different substances. That which is trinal is incomplex ; it denotes one simple sub stance, having a threefold modification. "We may speak of the trinal, but not of the triple deity." Hollaz, in Hase's Ilutterus, 172. The German Dreieinigkeit is more accu rate than Dreifaltigkeit ; and the English tri-unity than threefoldness, or triplicity. Dreieinheit comes still nearer to trinitas, than Dreieinigkeit. This latter leans toward tritheism, in denoting a unity of will and affection, rather than of nature. Dreiheit denotes trinality only.

The term " person " does not denote an attribute of the essence, but a mode of the essence ; that is, a particular " form " of its existence, according to the term used by St. Paul, Phil. 2:6. It is proper to speak of a trinitarian mode, but not of a trinitarian attribute. A trinitarian per son is sometimes defined as a " relation " of the essence. "Respondeo, dicendum quod relationes quaedam sunt in divinis realiter." Aquinas : Summa, I. xxviii. 1. By a

268 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

" relation," here, is not meant an external relation of God to the finite universe ; as when the essence is contemplated in relation to space and time, and the attributes of immensity and eternity are the result ; but an internal relation of the divine essence towards itself. It is the essence in a certain mode, e.g., the Father, as related to this same essence in a certain other mode, e.g., the Son.

The clue to the right construction of the doctrine of the Trinity, lies in the accurate distinction and defini tion of Essence and Person. The doctrine is logically consistent, because it affirms that God is one in another sense than he is three ; and three in another sense than he is one. If it affirmed unity in the same respect that it affirms trinality, the doctrine would be self -contradictory. " To assert," says Conybeare (On Miracles), " that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three distinct infinite Beings, and yet but one Being, is an express contradiction. To assert that they are three distinct Beings, of which two are inferior, and yet each is God, is either to use the term God equivocally in this case, or else is an ex press contradiction. But to assert, that there is but one di vine nature or essence" that this undivided essence is com mon to three persons • that by person when applied to God we do not mean the same as when applied to man, but only somewhat analogous to it ; that we have no adequate idea of what is meant by the word person when applied to God, and use it only because distinct personal attributes and ac tions are ascribed to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in Scripture, is no contradiction. We do not assert [without qualification, and abstractly] that one is three, and three are one ; but only that what are three in one respect may be one only in another. We do not assert that three beings are one being ; that three persons are one person ; or that three intelligent beings are one intelligent being (as the word person signifies when applied to men) ; but only, that in the same undivided nature, there are three differences

TRINITY IN UNITY. 269

analogous to personal differences amongst men ; and though we cannot precisely determine what those differences are, we have no more reason to conclude them impossible, than a blind man hath to conclude the impossibility of colors be cause he cannot see them." Athanasius (Cont. Ar., IY. 10) states the matter thus : u We assert the unity of the God head as expressly and strenuously as the distinction and di versity of the persons. We believe the Father and the Son to be two, perfectly distinct from one another in their rela tive and personal characters ; but withal we believe these two to be one God, one infinite essence or nature, the Son or Word begotten of the Father, united with him and in separable from him in essence. And that illustration which we have so often made use of before, serves very well to explain our meaning, though by no means to explain the thing itself. Fire and light are truly distinct. The one is a body differently modified from the other, as is evident from their acting differently upon us. And yet they are one as to substance and general properties. For light is the issue of fire, and cannot subsist separate from it."

The first proposition in the formulated statement of the doctrine of the Trinity is, that God is one in respect to Es sence. The Greek terms that denote the essence are, ovaia, uo-i?, TO 6V. The Latin are, essentia, substantia, natura, ens, res. The English are, essence, substance, nature, be ing. The schoolmen and elder Protestant divines preferred the term essence to substance, because the latter logically implies accidents or unessential properties : a distinction in applicable to the Divine nature. Augustine (Trinity, V. ii.) asserts that accidents are not predicable of it. Another objection to the term substance was, that in the Latin church substantia was used to translate vTrocrracm, as well as ovcria, and thus became ambiguous. The phraseology of the Xicene creed contributed to this ambiguity. This creed condemns those who assert that the Son is e'f erepas ij overlap. The question is, whether the two are

270 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

synonymous. Petavius maintains the affirmative, and asserts that the two terms were not discriminated technically until the council of Alexandria, in 362. According to him, the Nicerie creed condemns only one heresy, that of the Arians. Bull, on the other hand, maintains that the Nicene council employed ova-la to denote the essence, and uTrocrrao-t?, the person ; and that the creed condemns two heresies : that of the Arians, who denied that the Son is from either the Father's essence or the Father's person; and that of the Semi- Arians, who denied that he is from the Father's es sence, but conceded that he is from the Father's person. The Semi- Arians did not directly say, as the Arians did, that the Son was a creation ex nihilo, but affirmed that he was derived from the Father's person in a peculiar manner, so as to resemble him in essence, but not to be identical. He was o/zotou

In the Latin church, substantia was employed to translate uTToo-rao-t?, and also, together with essentia, to translate ova-la. " That which must be understood of persons, ac cording to our usage, is to be understood of substances, ac cording to the Greek usage : for they say three substances (uTTocrrao-et?), one essence, in the same way as we say three persons, one essence, or substance, (essentiam vel substantiam)." Augustine : Trinity, VII. iv. " As from sapere comes sapientia, so from esse comes essentia ; a new word indeed, which the old Latin writers did not use, but which is naturalized in our day, that our language may not want an equivalent for the Greek ova-La" City of God, XII. ii. The same double use of substantia, to denote either the person or the essence, appears in the following statement of Anselm (Monologinm, Prefatio) : " Quod enim dixi summam trinitatem posse dici tres substantias, Graecos secutus sum, qui confitentur tres substantias in una essentia, eadem fide qua nos tres personas in una substantia. Nam hoc sigTRINITY IN UNITY. 271

nificant in deo per substantiam quod nos per personam." Calvin (Inst., I. xiii. 5.) remarks upon this ambiguity as follows : " When the Latins would translate the word ofjioova-ios, they called it consubstantial, signifying the sub stance of the Father and the Son to be one, thus using sub stance for essence. "Whence also Jerome, writing to Damasus, pronounces it to be sacrilege to say that there are three substances in God ; yet, that there are three sub stances in God, you will find asserted in Hilary more than a hundred times."

Essence is derived from esse, to be, and denotes energetic being. (Augustine : Trinity, Y. ii). Substance is from substare, and denotes the latent potentiality of being. Reinhard defines thus : " Substantia divina est ea natura, in qua inest vis agendi infinita ; essentia est complexus omnium perfectorum infinitorum.'' Similarly, Anselm (Monologium, 16) defines the term essence : " Ilia igitur est summa justitia, summa sapientia, summa veritas, summa bonitas, summa beatitudo, summa eternitas, potestas, unitas ; quod non est aliud quam summe ens, summe vivens ; et alia similiter." The term essence describes God as a sum-total of infinite perfections; the term substance describes him as the underlying ground of infinite activities. The first is, comparatively, an active word : the last, a passive. The first is comparatively a spiritual, the last, a material term. We speak of a material substance rather than of a material es sence.

The term substance, in and of itself, is impersonal. It signifies bare and mere being. Whether it is self-conscious being, must be determined b}T other considerations. Hence the doctrine of an infinite substance without that of three distinctions in it, yields only the deity of pantheism. In finite substance must be trinalized, and exist as personal subsistences, in order to personality. Trinitarianism is the surest support of the doctrine of the Divine self -conscious ness. Says Nitzsch (Christian Doctrine, § 81), " so long as

272 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

theism merely distinguishes God from the world, and does not distinguish God from God, it is constantly exposed to a relapse and transition into pantheism, or some other denial of the absolute Being. It is the doctrine of the trinity alone that affords a perfect protection against atheism, poly theism, pantheism, and dualism. For the absolute distinc tion between the Divine essence and the world, is more se curely and firmly maintained by those who worship the trinity, than by those who do not. It is precisely those systems of monotheism which have in the highest degree excluded the doctrine of the trinity, and have prided them selves on this very account, the [pseudo] Jewish and Mo hammedan, for example, that have led to the grossest pan theism, on account of their barrenness and vacuity."

Spiritual substance, both infinite and finite, requires to be personalized. In the instance of the infinite essence of God, this is done by the opera ad intra ; the eternal genera tion and spiration. Without these eternal acts and processes, there would be only an impersonal monad; the substantia una of Spinoza. That immanent and necessary activ ity within the Divine essence, whereby the Father begets the Son, and the Father and the Son spirate the Spirit, makes it to be self-contemplating, self-knowing, and selfcommuning. Destitute of this activity and these dis tinctions, the essence would be destitute of personality. In the instance of the finite nature or substance of man, this is personalized by temporal generation. The original unity, the one common nature in Adam, is divided, and made to become millions of individual persons by this divi sion and distribution. The original human nature, though having personal properties, such as immortality, rational ity, and voluntariness, is nevertheless impersonal viewed as mere substance in Adam. Only as it is formed into dis tinct individuals by propagation, is it personalized. In say ing that the human nature in Adam is impersonal, the term is used comparatively. It is rational, spiritual, and volunTRINITY IN UNITY. 273

tary substance : human nature, not brute nature, or inor ganic nature. It is capable of personality, and thus is po tentially personal ; but it is not strictly and actually per sonal, until by temporal generation it has become individual men.

It is an incommunicable cnaracteristic of the Divine es sence, that it can subsist wholly and indivisibly in more persons than one. This distinguishes the Divine nature from the human. The latter can exist in more persons than one, but not as an indivisible whole. It is divided into thousands and millions of individual persons, no one of whom has the whole undivided substance. A trinitarian person is the entire Divine nature subsisting in a particular manner : viz., as Father, or as Son, or as Holy Spirit. A human person is a fractional part of the entire human nat ure subsisting in a particular manner : viz., as Peter, or as James, or as John.

The second proposition in the formulated statement of the doctrine of the Trinity is, that God is three, in respect to Persons. This side of the doctrine is the most difficult to apprehend, because analogies from the finite are difficult to find, and if found are exceedingly recondite and abstruse. The human mind quite readily grasps the notion of sub stance and attributes. But the doctrine of " subsistences " in the substance, of " distinctions " in the essence, brings to view a species of existence so anomalous and singular that little aid can be derived from analogy. The distinction be tween the subject and object ego, in human self -conscious ness, is probably the closest analogue, but this itself is ex ceedingly difficult of comprehension, and is inadequate to fully explain the Divine self -consciousness.

The difficulty in apprehending the idea of a personal subsistence is evinced by the inadequacy, and ambiguity of the terms employed to denote it. The Greek trinitarians denominated a divine person, viroa-Tacns, TO inro/ceipevov, The first is found in Heb. 1 : 13, " the exact

274 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

image of his person " (-^apaKrrjp rfjs virocrrda-ew^ avrov). The last is found in Luke 12: 56, "face of the sky" (TTpocrcoTrov rov ovpavov). It was the term for the mask worn by an actor. The Sabellians employed it to denote a secondary and assumed phase of the Supreme One, in the economical trinity which they asserted. It was never a favorite term with the catholic trinitarians, but whenever used by them denoted a primary and eternal mode of the essence. The Latin trinitarians employed the word per sona. Sometimes substantia was employed. The ambigu ity caused by the use of this latter word for person might have been avoided, had they coined, as the schoolmen did, the term " subsistantia." The English terms are : hypostasis, subsistence, distinction, person, relation, and mode.

St. Paul (Phil. 2 : 6) defines a trinitarian person to be " a form of God." The rendering, « the form of God " (A. Y. and R. V.), is inaccurate, as f^op^ij is anarthrous. There are three "forms" of God. The whole Divine essence (ovcrid) subsisting (vTrdp^wv, not &v] in the Paternal form (^op<^rj\ is the first person ; in the Filial form, is the second person ; in the spirated or Spirit form, is the third person. The one undivided essence subsists in these three " forms " si multaneously and eternally, and has no existence other than this trinal one. One of these original and eternal " forms " of God, namely, the Son, took " a form of a servant," still retaining his original Divine form ; and this form of a ser vant was " a likeness of men ; " and this likeness of men involved a " fashion " or bodily form (cr^/m) of a man. According to this representation of the apostle, a trinitarian person is an invisible form or mode of the Divine essence. It is not a material and bodily form, because it required to be incarnated in order to this. The Son of God while subsisting only as a particular eternal form of the Divine essence, was as incorporeal and invisible as the other " forms," the Father and the Spirit.

The simultaneous existence of one and the same Divine

TRINITY IN UNITY. 275

essence in three forms is possible, because it is spiritual substance. In the instance of matter, three simultaneous forms necessarily imply three different things or substances. One and the same piece of clay cannot have three forms simultaneously. It can have them only successively. In order that there may be three different forms of clay si multaneously, there must be three different pieces of clay. But in the instance of mind, or immaterial substance, three simultaneous forms or modes do not necessarily imply three different minds or substances. One and the same entire mind may remember, understand, and will si multaneously. Memory, understanding, and will are three simultaneous forms, or modes of one and the same mind or spirit. In self-consciousness, also, one and the same mind may be subject, object, and subject-percipient si multaneously.

As previously remarked (p. 253), the Divine essence has no existence out of and apart from the Divine persons, or forms. We are not to conceive of it as existing first, in the order either of nature or of time, without trinality, and of three personal distinctions or forms being added to it. Neither are we to conceive of it as being transformed from an untrinalized, to a trinalized state. From eternity, the Divine essence subsists in a trinal manner. The instant that it is one essence, it is three persons. To conceive of it as a mere monad, marked by singleness, is erroneous.

Again, when it is said, that there are three persons in one essence, it is not meant that the essence is a fourth thing, within which the three persons exist. This is precluded by the antithetic statement, that the one essence is all in each of the three persons. Neither may we think of a trinitarian person as apart of the Divine essence existing in a pe culiar mode. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each, and simultaneously, the whole divine essence ; eo that while there are three persons, there is but one essence. The rea son of this is, that eternal generation and spiration do not

276 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

create new essences, but only modify an existing one. When the Father generates the Son, he causes the whole of his infinite and eternal essence to be the essence of the Son. He does not cause a new and different essence from his own, to be the Son's essence. And the same is true, mutatis mutandis, of the spiration of the Spirit by the Father and Son. This is imperfectly illustrated in the process of hu man self-consciousness. In self -contemplation, the subjectego posits as the object-ego, the one whole and undivided human spirit. In so doing, it does not create a second spirit, but only modifies the existing spirit. The substance of the object-ego is numerically and identically the same as that of the subject-ego. The first ego, in the act of selfbeholding, may in a certain sense be said to communicate to, or make common with, the second ego, the entire sub stance of the human spirit. One and the same human spirit now " subsists " in these two modes or distinctions. There are now two distinctions in one human mind.1

An eternal essence can be communicated, or made com mon to two divine persons, without being created ; even as an eternal attribute can be communicated without being created. Our Lord affirms, that " as the Father hath life in himself ; so hath he given to the Son to have life in him self," John 5 : 26. The attribute of self -existence is here represented as " given," or communicated ; not as created. The Father makes self-existing life a common quality be tween himself and his beloved Son, in order " that all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father," John 5 : 23.

1 The defect in the ternary of subject, object, and subject-percipient, like that in the ternary of memory, understanding, and will, employed by Augustine and the patristic trinitarians, is, that neither of them are so objective to each other as the three persons of the Trinity are. The personal pronouns cannot be em ployed respecting them ; neither can personal actions and affections be ascribed to them. They illustrate the trinality of the one Divine essence, but not the substantiality of the three persons. The subject-ego cannot send the object-ego on a mission. The memory cannot address the understanding as a distinct per son.

TRINITY IN UNITY. 277

Accordingly, all trinitarian creeds are careful to affirm that the Divine essence is communicated in its entirety, and that there is no division of it by the eternal generation and procession. A trinitarian person is not a fractional part of the essence. The Augsburg Confession (I. i) says, that " the churches use the name person in that signification in which the fathers have used it, to signify, not a part or quality in another, but that which properly subsists by itself." " A divine person," says Fisher (Westminster Catechism, 6), " is a complete, intelligent, and individual subsistence in the one undivided essence of God, which is neither a part of any other subsistence, nor sustained by any other subsistence, and is distinguished from other subsist ences by an incommunicable property." A brief and con venient definition of a Divine person is that of Hooker : " The persons of the trinity are not three particular sub stances, to whom one general nature [property] is com mon, but three [persons] that subsist by one substance, which itself is particular : yet they all three have it, and their several ways of having it are that which maketh their personal distinction." Polity, V. Ivi. Says Owen (Trinity Vindicated, X. 504), " a divine person is nothing but the divine essence, upon the account of an especial property, subsisting in an especial manner. In the person of the Father, there is the divine essence and being, with its property of begetting the Son, subsisting in an especial manner as the Father." The elder Protestant theologians and symbols defined a divine person to be, a mode of sub sistence marked by a certain peculiar characteristic : modus subsistendi, T^OTTO? U7ra/?fe&)?. The divine essence with the characteristic which Scripture denominates generating, is the Father ; the same numerical essence with the character istic called filiation is the Son ; the same numerical essence with the characteristic called procession, is the Spirit. This peculiarity, which is called technically the " hypostatical character," constitutes the personality of a trinitarian per278 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

son ; that which distinguishes him from the others. And this personality of a trinitarian person must not be con founded with that of the essence. The paternity of the Father, or the sonship of the Son, is not the same thing as the personality of the Godhead. The hypostatical charac ter is incommunicable. The Father cannot have filiation. The Son cannot have generation. And neither of them can have procession. The divine persons cannot exchange their modes of subsistence. The first person cannot be or become the third, nor the second the first. The most enigmatical part of the doctrine of the Trinity is in the hypostatical character. What is this paternity of the Father ? and this filiation of the Son ? and this being spirated, or procession of the Spirit ? Since revelation has given only the terms, Father, Son, and Spirit, with the involved ideas of pater nity, filiation, and procession, the human intellect can go no further towards a metaphysical explanation than these terms and ideas will yield materials. And this is not far.

A divine person differs from a human person in the fol lowing respects. 1. The substance of a human person is not the identical and numerical substance of another human person. Two human persons have the same Jdnd of sub stance, because they are constituted of fractional parts of one specific human substance or nature ; but they do not have the same substance identically and numerically. That part of human nature which, by temporal generation, has been separated from the common nature and formed into the individual James, is not the same identical and numerical thing as that other part of human nature which, by temporal generation, has been formed into the individual John. But the substance of one Divine person is the substance of the others, both numerically and identically. In this instance, there is no division of substance. The whole undivided Di vine nature is in each Divine person simultaneously and eternally. The modifying of the Divine nature by eternal generation and spiration does not divide the nature, as ternTRINITY IN UNITY. 279

poral generation does, but leaves it whole and entire, so that the substance of the begotten Son and the spirated Spirit is numerically and identically that of the unbegotten and unspirated Father. 2. One human person exists externally to another, and separate from him ; but one Divine person exists in another, and inseparably from him. " The Son can do nothing of himself [separate and in isolation], but what he seeth the Father do : for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise," John 5 : 19. 3. One human person can exist without another; but one Divine person cannot.

Revelation clearly teaches that these personal characteris tics are so marked and peculiar, that the three Divine per sons are objective to each other. God the Father and God the Son are so distinct from each other, that some actions which can be ascribed to the one cannot be ascribed to the other. The Father " sends" the Son; this act of sending the Son cannot be attributed to the Son. The Father " loves " the Son ; this act of loving the Son cannot be ascribed to the Son. An examination of the Scriptures gives the following series of twelve actions arid relations of the three trinitarian persons, which prove that they are objective to one an other ; that one may do or experience something that is per sonal to himself, and is not personal to the others. One divine person loves another, John 3 : 35 ; dwells in another, John 14 : 10, 11 ; suffers from another, Zach. 13:7; knows another, Matt. 11 : 27 ; addresses another, Heb. 1:8; is the way to another, John 14 : 6 ; speaks of another, Luke 3 : 22 ; glorifies another, John 17 : 5 ; confers with another, Gen. 1 : 26, 11 : 7 ; plans with another, Isa. 9:6; sends another, Gen. 16 : 7, John 14 : 26 ; rewards another, Phil. 2 : 5-11 ; Heb. 2:9. Here are twelve different actions and relations which demonstrate that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not one and the same person.

Such inspired representations involve more than official distinctions ; as when one and the same person is a father,

280 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

a citizen, and a magistrate. They imply that there are three in the Godhead, who are so objective to each other that each can say " I," and may be addressed as " Thou." The words of Christ, in John 17:5, teach this : " Now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was." " The dif ference," says Turrettin, III. xxvii. 8, " between one divine person and another, is greater than the difference between the person and the essence. For the essence may be predi cated of each and all the persons, but the personal charac teristic cannot be predicated of any person except the one to whom it belongs. The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Spirit is God ; but the Father is not the Son, or the Son the Father." A trinitarian person is not so compre hensive as the Godhead, because he does not possess the personal characteristics belonging to the other two persons. He is the essence with one personal peculiarity ; while the Godhead is the essence with three personal peculiarities. A trinitarian person includes all that is in the unity, but not all that is in the trinality of God ; all that is in the essence, but not all that is in the three modes of the essence.

The trinitarian persons are not so real as to constitute three essences, or beings. This is the error of tritheism. If " real," which is derived from res, be taken in its etymo logical signification, then the distinction is to be called modal, not real. A trinitarian person is a mode of a thing (res), and not another separate thing. To guard against the tritheistic inference from the etymological meaning of "real," the catholic trinitarian affirms that there are not three different entities or things, but only one entity or thing in three modes of subsistence. " Persona differre dicitur ab essentia, non realiter, id est essentialiter, ut res et res ; sed modaliter, ut modus a re." Turrettin III. xxvii. 3.

But here, again, it is necessary to guard against the error of Sabellianism, which may result from a false inference from the term " mode." A mode, in the strict use of the

TRINITY IN UNITY. 281

term, is only a form of some part of a substance or " thing." Diamond, for illustration, is one mode of car bon ; charcoal is another mode. Here is a substance in two modes. But the particles that constitute the bit of char coal are not the particles that constitute the bit of diamond. Using the term in this sense, it would be an error to say that a Divine person is a mode of the essence. For a mode, in this case, contains only a fraction of the common sub stance. The whole substance of all the carbon in the uni verse is not in any one piece of charcoal, or of diamond, but only a portion of it. But the whole Divine essence is in each trinitarian person or " mode " of the essence.

Whether, consequently, the distinctions in the Godhead shall be called " real " or " modal," depends upon the error that is to be excluded by the term. As against Sabellianism, the distinctions are real and essential; that is, in and of the essence, and not merely economical and official. For Sabellianism regards essence and person as identical, and concedes no difference between them. " Sabellius," says Athanasius (Oration IY. 9, 25), " maintained that the Father and Son are one person ; are personally one, appellatively two ; are one essence with two names to it (TO ev SIWVVJJLOV}. This made it impossible that either of them should be a person at all, unless the Father could be his own Son, and the Son, his own Father. Had the Father and Son not been two persons, the Son would not have said, < I and the Father are one/ but l am one.' " " The declaration of the Son's unity with the Father, the Jews mistook, as Sabellius did after wards, for a declaration of his being the Father, the person of the Father himself." Oration IY. 17. Similarly Augus tine (Trinity, Y. ix) remarks that the Sabellians must read the text thus : " I and my Father is one," instead of " are one." According to the Sabellian scheme, the Divine essence is unipersonal ; single, not trinal. There is only one Divine essence, and only one Divine person. This essence-person viewed in a certain reference, and acting in a certain econom282 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

ical manner, is the Father ; in another, is the Son ; in an other, is the Spirit. The quasi-persons of Father, Son, and Spirit, are only the single untrinal monad discharging three functions. The Sabellian trinity is economical, that is, one of offices ; as one and the same human person may be a citizen, a magistrate, and a parent. It is not an intrinsic, and immanent trinity, but one of manifestation only. It is not grounded in the Divine constitution, but is assumed for the purposes of creation, redemption, and sanctification. God is not trinal per se, but only with reference to the creation. Originally, the Divine essence is untrinal, and becomes trinal through its offices and functions. " Sabellius's trinity," says Meander (I. 598), " is transitory. When the purposes of its formation are accomplished, the triad is resolved again into the monad."

In opposition to this, the Scriptures teach that the Fa ther, Son, and Holy Spirit are three persons independent ly and irrespective of creation, redemption, and sanctifica tion. If God had never created the universe, but had existed alone from all eternity, he would be triune. And the three persons are so real and distinct from each other, that each possesses a hypostatical or trinitarian consciousness differ ent from that of the others. The second person is con scious that he is the Son, and not the Father, when he says, " O Father, glorify thou me," John 17 : 5. The first person is conscious that he is the Father and not the Son, when he says, " Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee," Heb. 1 : 5. The third person is conscious that he is the Spirit, and neither the Father nor the Son, when he says, " Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them," Acts 13 : 2. These three hypostatical consciousnesses constitute the one seZ/^-consciousness of the Divine essence. By reason of, and as the result of these three forms of consciousness, the Divine essence is self -con templative, self-cognitive, and self-communing. Though there are three forms of consciousness, there are not three

TRINITY IN UNITY. 283

essences, or three understandings, or three wills, in the Godhead ; because, a consciousness is not an essence, or an understanding, or a will. There is only one essence, having one understanding, and one will. But this unity of essence, understanding, and will, has three different forms of consciousness : namely, the Paternal, the Filial, and the Spiritual ; because it has three different forms of subsist ence : namely, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. If it had only one form of subsistence, as in the Sabellian scheme, it would have only one form of consciousness. It would exist only as a single subject, and would have only a cor responding consciousness. But this would not be a full and true sej/xjonsciousness, because this requires the three dis tinctions of subject, object, and percipient-subject, which are not given in the Sabellian triad.

It must be noticed that the Divine self -consciousness is not a fourth consciousness additional to the three hypostatical consciousnesses, but is the resultant of these three. The three hypostatical consciousnesses are the one Divine selfconsciousness, and the one Divine self-consciousness is the three hypostatical consciousnesses. The three hypostatical consciousnesses in their combination and unity constitute the one self-consciousness. The essence in being trinally con scious as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is self-conscious. As the one Divine essence is the same thing with the three persons, and not a fourth different thing by itself, so the one Divine self -consciousness is the same thing with the three hypostatical consciousnesses, and not a fourth different thing by itself. In this way, it is evident that the three hypostat ical consciousnesses are consistent with a single self-con sciousness, as the three hypostases themselves are consistent with a single essence. There are three persons, but only one essence; and three hypostatical consciousnesses, but only one self-consciousness.

Accordingly, having respect to the Sabellian heresy, the catholic trinitarian affirms that the distinctions in the

2S4 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

Trinity are essential, not modal. They are in and of the essence, in such a manner as to trinalize it. "When, how ever, the heresy is at the other extreme, and tritheism maintains that the distinctions are " real " in the sense of constituting three separate things (res) or entities, the catholic trinitarian denies this, and affirms that a trinitarian person is not a second separate thing, but a " mode " of one and the same thing. But as a mode, it is the whole thing, not a fraction of it.

The word " God " sometimes denotes the trinity, the en tire godhead ; as in John 4 : 24, irvevpa o 3e6? ; and in 1 Cor. 15: 28, Iva % 6 $eo? ra irdvra ev TTCLO-LV. The reference in these passages is not to one person in particular, but to the Supreme Being as conceived of in revelation ; that is, as the triune God. In such texts, the term, God, " is not to be considered uTrocrrar^w?, as peculiarly expressive of any one person, but as ouo-fcwSw?, comprehending the whole deity." Owen: Communion with the Trinity, I. ii. There is the same use of the word " God " for the Trinity in the line, " Praise God from whom all blessings flow." The line following, " Praise Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," explains who " God " is. The article is employed with $609, in John 4 : 24, to denote the true God, in distinction from a falsely conceived God, who is supposed to be local and to be wor shipped at a particular point. Sometimes the term " God " denotes " deity," the abstract Divine nature or essence, without reference either to the trinity or to any particular person, as in John 1 : 1, $609 fy 6 ^6705 : " the Word was deity." St. John does not, here, say that the Logos was the godhead or the trinity, but that he was divine. Hence, $e&9 is anarthrous ; first, to denote the Divine nature in the abstract (compare Trvevfia anarthrous in John 4 : 24) ; sec ondly, in order not to confound the person of the Logos with that of the Father, who in the preceding clause is designated by Seov with the article. When the Father, or Son, or Spirit, is denominated £eo?, the word is used in the

TRINITY IN UNITY. 285

sense of deity, not of trinity. For a careful examination as to whether " God" denotes, in Scripture, the Trinity, or the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, see Augustine: Trinity, Books II. III.

There are two classes of characteristics by which the trinitarian Persons are discriminated. 1. Internal, or notae internae ; 2. External, or notae cxternae.

The internal characteristics are those acts, or activities of the Supreme JJeing which are within the essence, and are coniined to it. They are denominated opera ad intra, because they are not emanent or transitive acts, that go out of: and beyond the Divine essence, and produce external results — such as the creation of a new substance from noth ing, like that of the finite universe. " The internal works or actions of God are those which the persons perform and exercise one towards another." Ursinus : Christian Keligion, Quest. 25. The Niceno use of the term " act," ap plied to the generation of the Son, denotes a constitutional and necessary agency, and a consequent emanation of the essence, similarly, " as the sun is supposed to act in gen erating rays, fountains to act in generating streams, mind to act in generating thoughts, trees to act in generating branches, bodies to act in generating effluvia." Waterland : Second Defence. The term " activity " is preferable to " act," to designate the eternal generation and spiration, because the latter more naturally denotes something that comes to an end, while the former denotes something con tinuous and unceasing.

This immanent and constitutional activity belongs to the Divine essence, because it is spirit. Spirit, by its very nat ure, and especially the infinite and eternal Spirit, is active. Matter is dead ; but mind is living. Spirit is energetic and self-moving ; but matter is inert and moved. Ilenco God is frequently called in Scripture, the living God. Jer. 4:2; Job 19:25; John G : 57. God swears by himself as the living One, Num. 14 : 21 ; Isa. 49 : 18 ; Jer. 22 : 24',

286 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

Ezek. 5 : 11. Previous to creation, and entirely irrespective of it, the deity is active in himself. God must not be con ceived of, as in the pantheistic systems of India and Ger many, as inert and slumbering prior to the work of crea tion ; but from everlasting to everlasting he is inherently and intrinsically energic. There is nothing dead and im mobile in the Godhead. Neither is there anything latent and requiring to be developed, as there is in the imper fect spirit of man. In the scholastic phrase, " deus est actus purissimus, sine ulla potentialitate." God is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, Heb. 13 : 8. lie is without variableness, or parallax, James 1:17. And this is true of the immanent and constitutional activity of the Divine essence, in generation and spiration. These opera ad intra are an eternal and unceasing energizing and trinalizing of the essence, in and by those two acts whereby the Father communicates the essence with the Son, and the Father and Son communicate it with the Spirit.

This constitutional and inherent activity of the Divine essence has for its resultant, the triuitarian distinctions. The Divine nature energizes internally from eternity to eternity in two distinct manners, and thereby is simulta neously and eternally three distinct persons : Father, Son, and Holy Spirit ; God Unbegotten, Begotten, and Proceed ing. The Westminster Confession (II. iii.) defines this in ternal activity in the terms of the Athanasian creed. " In the unity of the Godhead, there are three persons of one substance, power, and eternity ; God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. The Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding ; the Son is eternally be gotten of the Father ; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son." This marks off the per sons. He who begets is a different person from him who is begotten. He who proceeds is different from those from whom the procession issues.

According to this statement, there are two internal marks

TRINITY IN UNITY. 287

or characteristics, by which the Divine persons are distin guished from one another : viz. generation and spiration ; or filiation and procession ; according to the point of view that is adopted. Generation and spiration are subjective and active in signification. They denote the acts of a Divine person or persons, as related to another Divine person. Fili ation and procession are objective and passive in significa tion. They denote the results of the acts, that is, the eternal processes consequent upon them. The first person subjec tively and actively generates the second person, and eternal filiation is objectively and passively the result, or process, ensuing from it. The first and second persons subjectively and actively spirate the third person, and eternal procession is objectively and passively the result. That internal ener gizing, or opus ad intra, which Scripture denominates "be getting/' modifies the Divine essence in a particular manner, and this resulting mode of the essence is denominated the Son of God. That other internal energizing, or opus ad intra, which is called " spiration," modifies the Divine es sence in still another manner, and this resulting mode of the essence is denominated the Holy Spirit. The theologi cal term " spiration " comes from the Biblical term " Spirit," appropriated to the third person. It is applied to him tech nically, with reference to the manner in which he has the essence : spiritus, quia spiratus. He is no more spiritual in substance than the Father or Son. But the essence is com municated to him by spiration, or outbreathing (irvevpa = spiritus = breath).

The following particulars are to be carefully noticed. 1. These internal acts or activities of generation and spira tion, in the Divine essence, are not creative acts. They originate nothing external to God, and other than God. They do not make a new essence, but only modify an existing one. When the Father generates the Son, he does not call another substance into existence from non entity, as he does when he makes the universe. This is

288 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

marked in the Xicene creed, by the clause, " begotten, not made/'

2. These internal activities are not temporal and tran sient, but eternal and unceasing. They have neither begin ning, nor ending, nor cessation. Neither of them is before the other, in time. All are eternal, and therefore simul taneous. The first person is not the eternal Father, before the second person is the eternal Son. An eternal Father cannot exist before an eternal Son ; if so, there would be a time when he is not the eternal Father. A Divine per son who has no son is not a father ; apa 7rcm)p, a/Ma vlds (Athanasius). " In hac trinitate nihil prius aut posterius, nihil majus aut minus, sed tota tres personae coaeternae sibi sunt, et coaequales." Symb. Ath. 24. On account of the eternity and immutability of the Divine paternity and sonship, Athanasius (Oration, T. 21) argues that these are the truest and most proper paternity and sonship ; of which human paternity and sonship are only finite and im perfect copies. For these relations, in the case of God, are necessarily and immutably distinct from each other ; while in the case of man, they are not. A human person may be both a father and a son at the same time ; but a Divine person cannot be. A human person may be a son and not a father, and subsequently may become a father. But in the case of a Divine person, no such change as this is possible. If a trinitarian person is a father, he is so eternally and immutably. If he is a son, he is so eternally and immutably. God the Father is never other than a father, and God the Son is never other than a son.

Again, the three trinitarian persons, unlike three human persons, suppose each other, and cannot be conceived of as subsisting independently and separately from each other. Three human persons exist side by side, separately and in dependently, so that if one or two of them are subtracted, the remaining person or persons are the same as before the subtraction. The personality of each is unaffected by that

TRINITY IN UNITY. 289

of the others. But in the instance of the three trinitarian persons, each is what he is, in reference to the others, and if one be subtracted, the others disappear also. Abstract God the Father, and there is no God the Son left ; abstract God the Son, and there is no God the Father left. And the same is true of God the Spirit.

'6. They are necessary activities. It is as necessary, that is, it is as fixed in the nature and constitution of the Godhead, that from all eternity the Father should generate the Son, as that he should be omnipresent, or omnipotent. " What madness," says Athanasius (Oration III. 63), " is it to rep resent the Supreme Being as considering and consulting with himself, whether he shall provide and furnish himself with his own Reason and Intelligence. The Son of God is no mere voluntary or arbitrary effect of God's power, but the necessary issue of his nature, and the Son of his sub stance." Says Hooker, V. liv., " Whatsoever Christ hath common unto him with his heavenly Father, the same of necessity must be given him, but naturally and eternally given ; not bestowed by way of benevolence and favor." The same is true of the spiration of the Spirit by the Father and Son. This, also, is a necessary and constitutional ac tivity of the Divine essence. It is optional with God to energize externally, but not internally. The opera ad extra, in creation and providence, depend upon sovereign will. God might or might not create the universe ; may or may not uphold it. But we cannot say that he may or may not be triune. That immanent and eternal activity which trinalizes the essence, and results in the three trin itarian persons, being grounded in the very nature and con stitution of the Supreme Being, must be. And yet this ne cessity is not that of external compulsion. It is like that of the Divine existence. It is not optional with God to exist. He must be. Yet he is not compelled to exist by external necessity. He exists willingly. And such is the necessity of the eternal generation of the Son, and spiration

290 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

of the Spirit. The Father, says Turrettin (III. xxix. 22), generates the Son, " non libertate indifferentiae, sed spontaneitatis." '

The difference between the relation of generation and spiration to the essence, and to the persons, respectively, is im portant. The generation and spiration are out of or from (e/e) the essence, "by (Sla) the persons. The Son, though generated by the Father, issues from the essence. He is a form or mode of the essence, not a form or mode of the Father. The first person generates the second person not out of his own personal characteristic of paternity, but out of the essence itself. In generation, the first person does not communicate his Jiypostatical character, namely, his fatherhood, to the Son, but the whole undivided essence. The Son is £eo? IK &eov ; the essence in the Filial form or mode emanating from the essence in the Paternal form or mode.

Again, the Spirit, though spirated by the Father and Son, yet proceeds not from the Father and Son as persons but from the Divine essence. His procession is from one, namely, the essence ; while his spiration is l>y two, namely, two persons. The Father and Son are not two essences, and therefore do not spirate the Sjririt from two essences. Yet they are two persons, and as two persons having one numerical essence spirate from it the third form or mode of the essence — the Holy Spirit : their two personal acts of spiration concurring in one single procession of the Spirit. There are two spi rations, because the Father and Son are two persons ; but there is only one resulting procession. See Turrettin, III. xxxi. 6. According to the Greek view

1 The objections made by the English Arians and Semiarians (Clarke, Whiston, etc.,) to the Athanasian doctrine were : " That generation implies division of essence, aiid necessary generation implies outward coaction ; that generation is an act, and every act implies choice ; that necessary agents are no agents, and necessary causes are no causes ; that three persons must be three intelligent agents, and three agents cannot be one being, one substance, one God." Waterland : Second Defence, p. 4.

TBINITY IN UNITY. 291

of the procession of the Spirit, there is only one act of spiration, that of the Father ; so that there is one spiration and one procession.

The Biblical proof of these internal activities of the Di vine essence is found :

1. In those passages which denominate the first person the Father, the second person the Son, and the third per son the Spirit. Ps. 2:7; Matt. 3 : 17 ; 28 : 19 ; John 1 : 14 ; Acts 13 : 33 ; Eom. 1:4; Heb. 1 : 8 ; 1 John 5 : 20. The terms father and son suppose generation. The terms are correlative, and must be taken in the same sense. If "father" and "son" are literal, so is "generation." If " generation " is metaphorical, so are "father" and " son." Whoever affirms that the second person of the trinity is literally and really the son of the first person, must, if he would not contradict himself, also affirm that the second person is literally and really begotten by the first. There is literally a communication of the Divine essence in the generation and filiation.

2. In those passages which denominate the Son " only " begotten, "own " son, and " dear" son. John 1 : 14, 18 ; 3 : 16, 18 ; 1 John 4:9; Coloss. 1 : 15 ; Heb. 1:6; Rom. 8 : 3, 32 ; Col. 1:13; Matt. 3 : 17 ; Eph. 1 : 6 ; 2 Peter 1 : 17. The second person in his original trinitarian status is denominated 1/469 ; in his estate of humiliation as mediator, he is sometimes called Trafc. This latter term means " ser vant," and is never used of the unincarnate Word. In Acts 3 : 13 ; Matt. 12 : 18 ; the phrase irals pov denotes the same as " my servant," in Isa. 42 : 1. The Sept. renders w by Trat?. See J^itzsch : Christian Doctrine, § 13 ; BengeJ, on Matt. 12 : 18.

3. In those passages which technically denominate the third person the Spirit ; and those which speak of his pro cession. " Spirit," in the technical trinitarian use, signifies that the third person is spi rated or outbreathed by the Fa ther and Son. The Hebrew D*n and the Greek irvevfia

denote a breath, or breathing. Gen. 1:2; Xum. 27:18; Ps. 51 : 11 ; Isa. 63 : 11 ; Hos. 9 : 7 (Gesenius in voce) ; Matt. 3 : 16 ; Luke 1 : 35 ; John 1 : 32, 33 ; 3:5, 6 ; Acts 2 : 4, et alia. Christ " breathed on his disciples, and said unto them, Eeceive ye the Holy Ghost," John 20 : 22. This spiration of the Spirit in time, was symbolical of the eternal spiration in the Godhead. The third person is also described as " proceeding " from the Father, John 15 : 26. Though in this text it is not said that he proceeds from the Son also, yet there are texts that imply this. He is called the " Spirit of the Son," Gal. 4:6; the " Spirit of Christ," Rom. 8:9; the "Spirit of Jesus Christ," Phil. 1:19. The genitive in these passages denotes the source. It is noteworthy, that in the New Testament the third person is nowhere denominated the " Spirit of the Father." Fur thermore, the Holy Spirit is "received from " Christ, John 16 : 14, 15 ; is " sent by " Christ, John 15 : 26 ; is " sent in the name of " Christ, John 16 : 26. The " mission " and " reception " of the third person from the second person, and in his name, favors the Latin doctrine of his spiration by and procession from him.

Some trinitarians have attempted to hold the doctrine of the Trinity, while denying eternal generation, spiration, and procession. They concede that there are three eternal persons in the Godhead, denominated in Scripture, Father, Son, and Spirit, but contend that to go beyond this, and affirm such acts in the Godhead as generation and spiration, is to go beyond the record. They reject, or at least doubt, this feature in the Nicene Trinitarianism.

But this is inconsistent. These trinal names, Father, Son, and Spirit, given to God in Scripture, force upon the theologian the ideas of paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession. He cannot reflect upon the implication of these names without forming these ideas, and finding himself necessitated to concede their literal validity and objective reality. He cannot say with Scripture that the first person

TRINITY IN UNITY. 293

is the Father, and then deny or doubt that he " begets." He cannot say that the second person is the Son, and then deny or doubt that he is " begotten." He cannot say that the third person is the Spirit, and then deny or doubt that he "proceeds" by "spiration" (Spiritus quia spiratus) from the Father and Son. Whoever accepts the nouns, Father, Son, and Spirit, as conveying absolute truth, must accept also the corresponding adjectives and predicates, beget and begotten, spirate and proceed, as conveying absolute truth.

Recapitulating, then, we have the following internal marks (notae internae) or personal peculiarities, by which to distinguish the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit from each other. 1. The Father generates the Son, and spirates the Spirit. Generation and spiration are the eternal acts, the opera ad intra, that characterize the first Person. The first Person is distinguished by two acts, and no process. 2. The Son is generated by the Father, and together with him spirates the Spirit. Filiation is an internal process and spiration an internal act that characterize the second Person. The second Person is distinguished by one act, and one process. 3. The Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son. Procession is the internal process that marks the third Person. There is no internal act of the Holy Spirit ; but his external activity, especially in redemption, is more marked than that of the first and second Persons. The third Person is distinguished by a process, and no act.

Respecting the meaning of the terms generation and spiration, filiation and procession, little can be said, because inspiration has given but few data. The catholic trinitarianism defines generation and spiration, as those eternal acts in the Godhead by which one person communicates the es sence to, or rather with, another. The term " communicate " must be taken etymologically. By generation, the Father makes the eternal essence common (tcoivwveLv) to himself and the Son. The Son does not first exist, and the essence is then communicated to him. " The Father," says Turrettin

294 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

(III. xxix. 21), " does not generate the Son either as pre viously existing, for in this case there would be no need of generation ; nor as not yet existing, for in this case the Son would not be eternal ; but as coexisting, because he is from eternity in the Godhead." " When the Son says, 'As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself,' the meaning is not that the Father gave life to the Son already existing without life, but that he so begat him, apart from time, that the life which the Father gave to the Son by begetting him is co-eternal with the life of the Father who gave it." Augustine : Trinity, XY. xxvi. 47. The same statement and reasoning apply to the act of spiration. By spiration, the Father and Son make the eternal essence common to themselves and the Spirit. They are not two persons that exist prior to the third, but eternally co-exist with him. The co-existence, in both generation and spiration, follows from the fact that it is one and the same numerical essence which is commu nicated and constitutes the substance of each person ; and this essence cannot be any older in one person than in another.

The results of these two eternal, constitutional, and nec essary activities of generation and spiration in the Divine essence, are two distinct and personal emanations of the essence. There is no creation of a new essence, but a modi fication of an existing one ; and this modification is a kind of issue, or efflux. God the Son is the offspring of God the Father ; " very God of very God," (e'/c r^? oiWa?). God the Spirit " proceeds " from the Father and the Son. The com mon statements in the patristic trinitarianism respecting this emanation of the essence are the following : The Son is from the Father, not as an effect from a cause ; not as an inferior from a superior ; not as created finite substance from uncreated infinite substance ; but as intelligence is from intellect, the river from the spring, the ray from the sun. These illustrations were employed by the early trinitarians,

TRINITY IN UNITY. 295

to denote the sameness of essence between the first and sec ond persons, and the emanation of the latter from the former. This internal emanation was taught as early as Theophilus. " The word being God, and being naturally produced from God " (e/c 3eoO 7re0u/ccb?). Ad Autolycum, 22. Pareus (Corpus doctrinae Christianae, XXY.) says : " Filius est genitus, spiritus sanctus procedit, sive emanat, a patre. " The term " ernanat " is explanatory of both " genitus " and " procedit," in this proposition ; because Pareus held to the procession of the Spirit from both Father and Son. Pareus, ip his notes on the Athanasian creed (Art. VII.), says " that procession or emanation is the ineffable communication of the Divine essence, by which the third person of the trinity receives from the Father and the Son the same en tire essence which the Father and the Son have." Quenstedt enunciates the catholic view in the following man ner : " Eternal generation is not by derivation, as in the instance of human generation ; nor by transfusion ; nor by any action that begins and ends. It is by an unceasing ema nation, to which there is nothing similar in rerum natura." Hase : Hutterus, 174. Similarly, Turrettin (III. xxxi. 1) describes the procession of the Spirit, as an " emanatio a patre et filio, distinctam a filii generatione." Bull defines as follows : " Patrem esse principium Filii et Spiritus Sancti, et utrumque ab ipso propagari interiore jwoductione, non externa : unde fit, ut non modo ex Patre, sed in ipso Bint, et Pater in ipsis ; neque in sacra Triade altera persona ab altera separari possit, sicut tres humanae personae ab invicem disterminantur." Defensio IV. iv. 9.

The term " emanation " is inapplicable to an opus ad extra, like creation, but not to the opera ad intra. When God creates the universe of matter and mind, he makes a new substance from nothing. The universe is not an efflux or emanation of the Divine essence. But when the Father generates the Son, this is an eternal emanation and outflow of the Divine essence. An emanation is of the same sub296 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

stance with that from which the emanation issues ; a crea tion is a new and different substance from that of the crea tor.

The phrase " communication of essence," is preferable to " derivation of essence ;" though the latter is sometimes em ployed by orthodox trinitarians. The term derivation is better suited to human than to Divine generation, because it denotes division and distribution of a substance. When the Divine nature is communicated, it is communicated or " made common," as a whole undivided essence. In eternal generation, the entire Divine nature is caused to be the, nature of the second person. But when finite human nature is derived, it is only a portion of human nature that is de rived. In human generation, an abscided part of human substance is separated from the common mass, and is made to become a distinct and separate human individual. Hence, it cannot be said, that the whole human nature is in each human person, as it can be that the whole Divine nature is in each Divine person. Human derivation is the transmis sion of a separate fraction ; eternal generation is the com munication of an undivided whole. "The generation of the Son of God is not like that of a man, which requires a separation and division of substance." Athanasius : Oration, 1.14.

It has already been noticed that it is the characteristic of the Divine essence, that it can subsist indivisibly and totally in more persons than one. These adjectives are im portant. For the human nature can also subsist in more persons than one ; but not indivisibly and totally. An in dividual man, a human person, is only a part, and a very small part of the whole human nature or species. But the first, second, or third person of the Godhead is the entire Divine nature, in a particular mode of subsistence. All of the Divine substance is in each Divine person ; but not all of the human substance is in each human person.

The whole of the Divine essence subsisting in a certain

TRINITY IN UNITY. 297

mode constitutes God the Father, or God the Son, or God the Holy Spirit ; a part of the human substance, or specific nature, separated from the remainder of it by human gen eration, constitutes the individual Peter, James, or John. A Divine person is denominated a subsistence in the es sence ; a human person is denominated an individual of (not in) the species. The preposition "of" denotes division and separation of substance; the preposition "in" excludes this. Says Ursinus (Christian Religion, Q. 25), " in per sons created, he that begetteth and generateth doth not communicate his whole substance to him that is begotten, for then he would cease himself to be a man ; but only a part, which being allotted and severed out of the substance of him that begetteth is conveyed or derived unto him that is begotten, and so is made to be the substance of another individual or person, distinct from the substance of the in dividual who begetteth. But in uncreated trinitarian per sons, he that begetteth, or spirateth, communicates his whole essence to him that is begotten or proceeds ; yet so, that he who communicates doth retain the same essence, and that entire. The reason of this difference between a divine and a human person is, that the substance of man is finite and divisible ; but that of God is infinite and indivisi ble. And, therefore, the Divine essence, being the same numercially, and whole or entire, may be both communi cated and retained simultaneously."

The great mystery of the Trinity is, that one and the very same substance, can subsist as an undivided whole in three persons simultaneously. That a substance can be divided up, and distributed, so as to constitute a million or a billion of individuals, as in the instance of the human nature or species, is comparatively easy to comprehend. But that a substance without any division, or distribution, can at the same in stant constitute three distinct persons, baffles the human understanding. In the sphere of matter, this would not only be incomprehensible, but absurd. A pint of water

298 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

could not possibly be contained in three different pint cups at one and the same instant. But spirit is not subject to the conditions of matter ; and as the whole human soul may all of it be in every part, and every point of the body, at one and the same instant, so the Divine essence may all of it be in each of the three Divine persons simultaneously. It is no contradiction, taking the nature of unextended spirit ual substance into view, to say that the one numerical Divine essence is indivisibly and wholly present at a million points of space at the same time, without making it a million of essences. If so, it is no contradiction to say that the one numerical Divine essence subsists indivisibly and wholly in three modes or persons at the same instant, without making it three essences. If the plurality of points at which the Divine omnipresence is found does not multiply the essence in the first case, the trinality of the persons in which the Divine existence is found does not multiply the essence in the second case.

It is here that the error of a specific, instead of a numeri cal unity of the Divine essence, is apparent. In the case of specific unity, or the unity of a race, the one substance or nature is divided and distributed. The individuals are fractional parts of it. If the three persons of the Godhead constitute a Divine species, or a specific unity, as the mill ions of human persons constitute a human species, then no single trinitarian person possesses the whole divine nature, any more than any single human person possesses the whole human nature. For to possess a property of the human nature, like rationality, or immortality (the whole of which property may be in each human person), is not to possess the whole substance of the human nature. If, then, the trinal unity is a specific or race-unity, no one of the three Divine persons is whole deity, any more than a single hu man person is whole humanity.

The clause etc TT}? ouo-ta?, and the epithet o/uooucrto?, might, of themselves, suggest a specific unity. The preposition IK

TRINITY IN UNITY. 299

may be partitive in its signification, and so may the adjec tive o/u,o?, and the Latin con in " consubstantial." But if God the Son is " out of " or " from " the Divine nature in the same partitive manner that the individual Socrates is " out of" or "from" the human nature, and is "consub stantial" with the Divine Father in the same way that a human son is consubstantial with a human father, by hav ing a portion only of the same nature with him, then the whole Divine essence is not in God the Son. And if so, no one of the Divine attributes, and still less all of them, can be in God the Son. For a Divine attribute cannot be long to a fraction of the essence. Consequently the I^icene Trinitarians uniformly explain and guard the statement that the Son of God is " of " the essence, and is " consub stantial " with the Father, by saying that the eternal gener ation differs from the human, by communicating the entire essence, and that each Divine person possesses the one Di vine nature numerically and totally, not specifically and frac tionally.1

The simultaneous existence of the undivided and total nature in each of the three persons, the Nicene trinitarians endeavored to illustrate by the figure of circum-incession (Trepixcaprjcris, circulatio). There is a continual inbeing and indwelling of one person in another. This is taught in John 14 : 10, 11 ; 17 : 21, 23 : " Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me ? Believe rne, that I am in the Father, and the Father in me. I pray that they all may be one, as thou Father art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us." a This, the Nicene

1 The English Arians : Clarke, Whiston, Whitby, and others, denied that consubstantiality means one numerical substance possessed by each of the three persons. Hunt : Religious Thought in England, III. 23.

2 Athanasius (Oration III. 21) remarks that Christ prays here that the disci ples "may imitate the trinitarian unity of nature, in their unity of affection. Had it been possible for the disciples to be in the nature of the Father as the Son is, he would have prayed ' that they may be one in thee,1 instead of ' one in

300 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

writers described metaphorically as an unceasing circulation of the essence, whereby there is an eternal intercommunion and interaction of being in the Godhead, so that each per son coinheres in the others, and the others in each. " Each [person] is in each [person], and all [three persons] are in each [person], and each [person] is in all [three persons], and all [three persons] are one [being]." Augustine: Trinity, "VI. 10. " The community of nature between the Son and the Father is like that between brightness and light, be tween the stream and the fountain. The Son is in the sub stance of the Father, as having his subsistence communi cated to him out of that substance ; and again, the Father is in the Son, as communicating his substance to the Son, as the nature of the solar substance is in the rays, as intelli gence is in the rational soul, and as the very substance of the fountain is in the waters of the river. The brightness of the sun is coeval with its substance or body. It is not a flame kindled or borrowed from it, but the offspring and issue of its substance or body. The sunbeams cannot be separated from that great fund of light. They cannot be sup posed to subsist, after their communication with the planet itself is cut off. And yet the sun and the brightness that flows from it are not one and the same thing." Athanasius, Oration III. 3, 4. " In trinitate maxime propria est et perfectissima Trep^ofy^crt?, siquidem personae sese mutno continent ; ita ut ubicunque una persona est, ibi reliquae duae existant, hoc est ubique omnes sint." Bull : Defensio, IV. iv. 14.1

The terms first, second, and third, applied to the per sons, are terms of order and relationship only. They imply no priority of nature, substance, existence, or excellence.

1 The Platonists employed this figure of circulatory movement, to explain the self -reflecting and self -communing nature of the human mind. " It is not pos sible for us to know what our souls are, but only by their Kivrxrfis KVK\iKal, their circular and reflex motions, and converse with themselves, which only can steal from them their own secrets." Smith : Discourses (Immortality, II.).

TRINITY IN UNITY. 301

Hence, the Son is sometimes named before the Father, 2 Cor. 13 : 14 ; Gal. 1 : 1. Sometimes, the Spirit before the Son, Rev. 1 : 4, 5. The term " father " does not denote a higher grade of being, but exactly the same grade that the term " son " does. A human son is as truly man, as a hu man father. He is constituted of human nature as fully and entirely as his father is. Augustine (Sermo 140, § 5) remarks that " if the Son were not equal to the Father, he would not be the son of God." The substance or consti tutional nature determines the grade of being. A person having a human nature is ipso facto human ; whether he comes by it by the act of creation, as Adam and Eve did, or by propagation, as Cain and Abel did. So a person who possesses the Divine nature is ipso facto divine, whether possessing it by paternity, or filiation, or proces sion. Christ asserts that " as the Father hath life in him self, so he hath given to the Son to have life in himself," John 5 : 26. But " life in himself " is self -existence. As the Father has self -existence, so he has given to the Son to have self -existence. The difference in the manner in which self-existence is possessed by the Father and Son, makes no difference with the fact. The Son has self -exist ence by communication of that essence of which self -exist ence is an attribute. The Father has self-existence without communication of it, because he has the essence without communication of it.

While there is this absolute equality among the Divine persons in respect to the grade of being to which they be long, and all are alike infinite and uncreated in nature and essence, there is at the same time a kind of subordina tion among them. It is Trinitarian, or filial subordination ; that is, subordination in respect to order and relationship. As a relation, sonship is subordinate to fatherhood. In the order, a father, whether divine or human, is the first, and a son is the second. Hence the phrases " filial subordina tion " and u trinitarian subordination " are common in trim302 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

tarian writers. The fourth section of Bull's Defence of the Nicene Faith is devoted to the proof of the subordination of the Son to the Father, in respect to his personal pecu liarity of sonship ; the second and third sections having been devoted to the proof of his consubstantiality and coeternity with the Father, in respect to his essence.

The trinitarian subordination of person, not of essence, must not be confounded with the Arian and Semi-Arian subordination, which is a subordination of essence as well as of person. Neither must it be confounded with the theanthropic or mediatorial subordination. This latter in volves condescension and humiliation ; but the trinitarian subordination does not. It is no humiliation or condescen sion for a son to be the son of his father. That the second trinitarian person is God the Son, and not God the Father, does not imply that his essence is inferior to that of the Father, and that he is of a lower grade of being, but only that his sonship is subordinate to the Father's paternity. The Son of God is an eternal, not a temporal son ; and an eternal son must have an eternal nature in order to be eter nal. In the theanthropic or mediatorial sonship, there is an humbling, though no degrading of the eternal Son, be cause of the assumption into union with the Divine nature of an inferior human nature. But in the Arian or SemiArian subordination, there is not only humiliation, but deg radation. The Son of God, upon this theory, is of a lower grade of being than the Father, because he is of a different essence or nature.

The following resume, condensed from the Dogmatics of Twesten (Theil II. § 42), presents the subject of the notae internae in a clear light.

" The internal characteristics include the order according to which the Father is immutably the first, the Son immu tably the second, the Spirit immutably the third person of the Trinity, and the ground ov foundation of this order in certain constitutional and necessary acts in the Divine esTRINITY IN UNITY. 303

sence. Since God is pure life and act (actns purissimus) ; and since by virtue of his absolute independence and spon taneity there is nothing in him inert or lifeless, nothing given independent of his act and nothing outwardly neces sary ; those characteristics whereby the Divine persons are distinguished from each other must rest upon the Divine energizing ; namely, upon two eternally immanent acts, gen eration and spiration. These acts are internal, because they have nothing but the Divine essence itself for an object. They terminate upon the Divine essence as modifying it, not upon the universe as creating it. And they are personal acts, because it is not the Divine essence as common to the three persons, but as it subsists modified in particular per sons, that is the subject or agent in the case. Hence it fol lows, that these acts of generation and spiration are not to be regarded as the common action of all three persons, but as the particular action of one or more distinct persons — that of generation being the act of the first person, and that of spiration the act of the first and second.

" But if the Father is unbegotten, does it not follow that he alone is the absolute Being? and is not this Arianism? Not so. For one and the same numerical essence subsists whole and undivided in him who is generated, as well as in him who generates ; in him who is spirated, as well as in those two who spirate. There can therefore be no inequal ity of essence caused by these acts of generation and spira tion. There may be, and there is an inequality in the several modes in which one and the same eternal essence subsists by virtue of these acts. The essence in the be gotten mode or 'form' of the Son, is second and subordi nate to the essence in the unbegotten mode or ' form ' of the Father. But this inequality of mode or ' form ' does not relate to time, for the essence in the Son is as old as the essence in the Father ; nor to nature or constitutional being, for this is the same thing in both. It relates only to the personal characteristics of paternity, filiation, and proces304 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

sion. Hence the Athanasian symbol can assert that ' in trinitate, nihil prins aut posterius [tempore], nihil majns ant minus [natura], sed tota tres personas coeternas sibi esse et coequales,' and yet an inequality of relationship may be granted, if by this is meant merely that the Father is the generative source of the Son, and the Father and Son the spirative source of the Spirit ; or, in other terms, that the Son's person is grounded in that of the Father, and the Spirit's person is grounded in those of the Father and Son, while yet the one eternal essence itself, which is identical in each, has no source and no ground."

The external characteristics, notae externae, of the three persons, are transitive acts, opera ad extra. They are ac tivities and effects by which the Trinity is manifested out wardly. They are the following : 1. Creation, preservation, and government of the universe. 2. Redemption. 3. In spiration, regeneration, and sanctification. The first belongs officially and eminently to the Father ; the second to the Son ; the third to the Holy Spirit. The Father creates, yet by and through the Son : Ps. 33 : 6 ; Prov. 3:19; 30 : 4 ; John 5:17; Acts 4 : 24, 27. The Son redeems, yet com missioned by the Father: Rom. 3 : 24 : 5 : 11 ; Gal. 3 : 13 ; Rev. 5 : 9. The Spirit inspires and sanctifies, yet as sent by the Father and Son. He inspires the prophets : 2 Sam. 23 : 2, 19 ; 2 Peter 1 : 21 ; and sanctifies the elect : 1 Pet. 1 : 2.

These works are occasionally attributed to another per son. The Son creates : Col. 1:16; Heb. 1:3; Is. 44 : 24. The name Saviour is given to the Father : 1 Tim. 1:1; Jude 25. The Father sanctifies : John 17 : 17. Commonly, the Father raises Christ from the dead : Acts 13 : 30. But Christ " has power to take his life again : " John 10 : 18 ; and rises from the dead : Rom. 14 : 9 ; Acts 10 : 41 ; 1 Cor. 15 : 4. The Father " judgeth without respect of persons," 1 Pet. 1 : 17 ; and yet " all judgment is given to the Son," John 5 : 22 ; Mat. 25 : 31. This is explained by the unity of the essence. In every external operation of a person.

TRINITY IN UNITY. 305

the whole essence operates, because the whole essence is in each person. The operation, consequently, while peculiar to a person, is at the same time, essential ; that is, is wrought by that one Divine essence which is also and alike in the other persons. An official personal act cannot, therefore, be the exclusive act of a person, in the sense that the others have no participation in it. " There is no such division in the external operations of God, that any one of them should be the act of one person without the concurrence of the others." Owen : Holy Spirit, II. iii. At the same time, an act like creation for example, which is common to all the persons of the trinity by virtue of a common participation in the essence, yet stands in a nearer relation to the essence as subsisting in the Father than it does to the essence as subsisting in the Son, or the Spirit. The same reasoning applies to re demption and the second person ; to sanctification and the third person. Power, wisdom, and love are attributes com mon to the Divine essence, and to each of the persons ; but both Scripture and theology appropriate power in a special way to the Father, wisdom to the Son or Logos, and love to the Holy Spirit, because each of these attri butes stands in a closer relation to the particular person to whom it is ascribed, than to the others.

The internal activities, on the other hand, unlike the ex ternal, are attributed to one person exclusively of the other two, or else to two persons exclusively of the other one. Generation is the act of the Father only, the Son and Spirit having no share in it. Spiration is the act of the Father and Son, the Spirit having no participation in it. Filiation belongs to the Son alone. Procession belongs to the Spirit alone. According to the Greek, in distinction from the Latin doctrine of the third person, spiration is ex clusively the Father's opus ad intra. The same remark re specting exclusiveness is true of the incarnation. It is the second person exclusively, not the first or the third, who unites with human nature.

306 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

The Deity of God the Father is undisputed, and hence there is less need of presenting the proof of it. The Di vine names, attributes, works and adorableness, are ascribed to him.

The term " Father " denotes an immanent and eternal relation of the first trinitarian person. God, in himself, and irrespective of any reference to the created universe, is a father : the Father of the Son. Were God primarily the Father because of his relation to men and angels, and not because of his relation to the second person in the God head, his fatherhood would begin in time, and might conse quently end in time. If there was once a time when God was not the Father of the Son, there may be a time when he will cease to be so. " It is the greatest impiety," says Cyril of Jerusalem (Catacheses, XL 8), " to say that after deliberation held in time God became a Father. For God was not at first without a Son, and afterwards in time be came a Father."

The hypostaticdl or trinitarian paternity of God the Father as related to the Son, must not be confounded with i\\Q providential paternity of God the Trinity as related to the creation. Only one of the Divine persons is the trini tarian Father ; but the three persons in one essence consti tute the providential and universal Father. The Triune God is generally the Father of men and angels by creation, and specially of the elect by redemption. Hence, the term Father applied to God has two significations. It may denote the Divine essence in all three modes, or in only one mode. The first clause in the Lord's prayer is an example of the former. When men say, " Our Father who art in heaven," they do not address the first person of the Godhead to the exclusion of the second and third. They address, not the untriune God of deism and natural religion, but the God of revelation, who is triune, and as such the providential Father of all men, and the redemptive Father of believers. If a man deliberately and consciously intends in his suppliTRINITY IN UNITY. 307

cation to exclude from his worship the Son and the Holy Spirit, his petition is not acceptable. " He that honoreth not the Son, honoreth not the Father," John 5 : 23. A man may not have the three persons distinctly and formally in his mind, when he utters this petition, and in this case he does not intentionally exclude any trinitarian person or per sons ; but the petition, nevertheless, ascends to the Divine Three, not to a single person exclusively ; and the answer returns to him from the Triune God, not from any solitary person exclusively. " It is a doctrine," says Witsius (Lord's Prayer, Diss. VIL), "firmly maintained by all orthodox divines, that the Father cannot be invoked in a proper manner, without at the same time invoking the Son and Holy Spirit, because they are one in nature and in honor. Nor can it, I think, be denied that, laying out of view the distinction of persons and looking only at what is common to all three persons in the Godhead, God may be denomi nated our Father. Yet I cheerfully concur with those in terpreters who maintain that the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is particularly addressed in the first petition." Says Augustine (Trinity, Y. ii.), " That which is written, ( Hear, O Israel : the Lord our God is one Lord,' ought not to be understood as if the Son were excepted, or the Holy Spirit were excepted. This one Lord our God, we rightly call, also, our Father."

The term Father denotes the Trinity in John 4 : 21, 23, 24. " The hour cometh when ye shall neither in this moun tain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father. The true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth." Here the term Father is synonymous with " God " who " is a Spirit ; " the true object of worship. But Christ, in men tioning the object of worship, had in his mind the God of revelation, not of deism ; trinal as he is in Scripture, not single as he is in natural religion ; the very same God in whose trinal name and being he commanded all men to be lieve and be baptized. Christ's idea of God as the univer308 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD).

sal Father was trinitarian, not deistic. In his intuition, and theology, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, and the Heavenly Father of angels and men. " The appel lation Father, descriptive of the connection between God and his creatures, is true of every one of the Divine per sons, and of the three Divine persons, one God. The [paternal] relation to the creatures is as true of the Son and Holy Ghost as of the Father, in respect to the Divine nature ; for all these persons are respectively, and in union, the Father of the universe ; the Father in creation, in gov ernment, and in protection. The Son as Messiah is fore told in his protecting kindness and mercy as ' a Father to the fatherless.' " Ps. 68 : 5, 6 ; Isa. 9 : 6. Kidd : Eternal Sonship, Ch. XIII.

A believer in the Trinity, in using the first petition of the Lord's prayer, may have the first person particularly in his mind, and may address him ; but this does not make his prayer antitrinitarian. He addresses that person as the representative of the Trinity. And the same is true whenever he particularly addresses the Son, or the Spirit. If he addresses God the Son, God the Son implies God the Father. Each Divine person supposes and suggests the others. Each represents the others. Consequently, to pray to any one of the Divine Three is by implication and virtually to pray to all Three. No man can honor the Son without honoring the Father also. Says Christ, " He that hath seen me hath seen the Father also," John 14 : 9. In like manner, he that prays to the Son prays to the Father also. Says Turrettin (III. xxv. 27), " The mind of the worshipper will not be distracted by the consideration that there are three Divine persons, if he remembers that the whole Divine essence is in each of the persons, so that if he worships one he worships all. With Gregory of Nazianzurn, he may say : c I cannot think of the one Supreme Being without being encompassed with the glory of the three persons ; and I cannot discern

TRINITY IN UNITY. 309

the three persons without recurring to the unity of the es sence.' "

The hypostatical or trinitarian paternity of God, in dis tinction from the providential, is mentioned in John 17 : 5. " Now, O Father, glorify tliou me with thine own self." Here, Christ addresses the Father alone ; the first person of the Godhead exclusively. He did not address the Trin ity, for he did not address himself, or the Holy Spirit. Respecting this trinitarian fatherhood, the Son says, "my Father," not " our Father." John 14 : 27 ; 15 : 1, 8, et alia.

The baptismal formula, and the doxologies indisputably prove that paternity is an immanent and eternal relation of God. The rite that initiates into the kingdom of God would not be administered in three names denoting only certain temporal and assumed attitudes of the Supreme Being. Neither would a Divine blessing be invoked through three titles signifying only these. Baptism and invocation are acts of worship, and worship relates to the essential and eternal being of God.

The hypostatical or trinitarian character of the first per son is, that he possesses the essence " originally," in the sense that it is not communicated to him by one of the other persons. Augustine (Trinity, II. i.) thus speaks of the " original " or unbegotten possession of the essence by the Father. " We call the Son, God of God ; but the Fa ther, God only, not of God. Whence it is plain that the Son has another of whom he is, and to whom he is Son ; but the Father has not a Son ^whom he is, but only to whom he is Father. For every son is what he is, of his father, and is son to his father ; but no father is what he is, of his son, but is father to his son." A common term applied to God, in the patristic age, to denote this peculiar ity was, " unbegotten." " Next to God, we worship and love the Word, who is from the unbegotten and ineffable God." " We have the unbegotten and ineffable God." " We have

310 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

dedicated ourselves to the unbegotten arid impassible God." "He is the first-born of the unbegotten God." Justin Mar tyr : Apology I. xxv., liii. ; II. xii., xiii. " There are also some dissertations concerning the unbegotten God." Rufinus: Preface to the Clementine Recognitions. In the writings of Athanasius, the Father is denominated dyevVIJTOS, ingenerate or unbegotten, and the Son yevvrjros, gen erate or begotten.

The phrase " Unbegotten God " implies and suggests the phrase " Begotten God." This denotes no more than the phrase " God the Son ; " the latter containing the substan tive, the former the adjective. Clement of Alexandria (Stromata, Y. xii.) remarks that " John the apostle says, no man hath seen God at any time. The only begotten God who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." Irenaeus (Adv. Haereses, IY. xx. 11) quotes this text in the same form : " The only begotten God which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." This patristic em ployment of the phrase "Begotten God" strongly supports the reading /jbovoyevrjs £eo

In the controversy between the English Trinitarians and Arians, conducted by Water-land and Samuel Clarke, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, a distinction was made by the former between " necessary existence " and " selfexistence " that is liable to misconception and requires no tice. The Father, says Waterland, is both necessarily ex istent and self-existent. The Son is necessarily existent, but not self -existent. In this use of terms, which is uncom mon, the term self-existent was employed not with reference to the essence, as is usually the case, but to the person only. In this sense, " self -existent " denotes what the Nicene trinitarians meant by " unbegotten " or " ingenerate." The

TRINITY IN UNITY. 311

Father is self-existent, in Water-land's sense, because the Divine essence is not communicated to or with him. He has it of himself. The Son is not self -existent in Waterland's sense, because the Divine essence is communicated. He has it not from himself, but from the Father. But the Sou is necessarily existent, says Waterland, because he possesses an essence that is necessarily existent. The fact that the essence is communicated by eternal generation does not make it any the less an infinite, eternal, and unchangeable essence. In brief, according to "VYaterland, the Son is neces sarily existent because the Divine essence is his essence ; but he is not self-existent, because his personal characteristic of filiation, his peculiar " self," is not from himself but from another person.

If no distinction be made between necessary existence and self -existence, as is the case in the ^Nicene statements, Waterland would attribute both necessary existence and self-existence to the Son. He would concede self -existence in the sense in which it is attributed to the Son in John 5 : 26 : "As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself." Here, "life in him self " denotes the self -existence of the Divine essence, which is also necessary existence. The Father has this uncommunicated. The Son has it communicated or "given" from the Father, by eternal generation.

The Father was sometimes denominated ir^yrj T?}? ^eor^TO? ; pl£a TT da-iys S-eorrjro^. This phraseology is used with qualification, by accurate trinitarians. Some orthodox writers employ the phrase, " f ons trinitatis," to denote the hypostatical character of the Father, which is better than " fons deitatis." " If," says Howe (Trinity, Lecture XIV.), " we do suppose the Son and the Holy Ghost to be from the Father by a necessity of nature, an eternal necessity of nature, and not by a dependence upon his will, they will not be creatures, because nothing is creature but what de pends upon the will and pleasure of the Creator. And if

312 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

they be not creatures, what are they then ? Then, they must be God, and yet both of them from the Father, too ; for all that do assert the trinity do acknowledge the Father to be fons trinitatis, the fountain of the Trinity : and if from this fountain the Son be in one way, and the Holy Ghost be in another way, both from the Father ; that is, the Son from the Father immediately, and the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, and this not by choice, but by an eternal necessity of nature, here is this doctrine as easily conceivable as any that I know of whatsoever, that lies not within the compass of our manifest demonstration." Turrettin (Inst. III. xxx. 1) says that the Father is fons deitatis, " si modus subsistendi spectatur." Owen (Saints' Communion, III.) remarks that " the Father is the fountain of the deity." Hooker (Polity, Y. liv.) quotes Augustine as Baying that "pater est ir^ala ^edr^ro?." In these cases, deitas is loosely put for trinitas. Strictly speaking, how ever, deity denotes the Divine essence ; and the first person is not the Father of the essence. But trinity denotes the essence personalized by trinalizing. In this reference, the first person is the father and fountain. " We teach," says Calvin (Inst., I. xiii. 23, 25), " according to the Scriptures, that there is essentially but one God; and therefore that the essence of both the Son and the Spirit is unbegotten. But since the Father is first in order, and hath himself be gotten his Wisdom, therefore as has before been observed, he is justly esteemed the original and fountain of the whole Divinity" [Trinity].

The Deity of God the Son was the subject of one of the greatest controversies in the Patristic church. But the work that was done then in investigating the Scriptures did not require to be repeated. Christendom since the Nicene age, as well as before, has believed in the Divine nature of the Son of God.

The denomination " Son," given to the second trinitarian person, denotes an immanent and eternal relation of the

TRINITY IN UNITY. 313

essence, not a temporally assumed one. This is proved : (a) By the antithetic term " Father " applied to the first per son. Both terms must be taken in the same signification. If one person is eternal, so is the other ; if one denotes a temporal relation, so does the other. Arius contended that God was not always a Father, and that the Son was not always a Son. The Nicene trinitarians maintained the contrary. Compare Socrates : History I. vi. ; Athanasius : Contra Arianos, I. §§ 5, 9. Gangauf : Augustin's Trinitatslehre, p. 311 sq. (5) By the epithets "eternal," "own" ($109), and " only begotten," which qualify the sonship of the second person, and discriminate it from that of angels and men. (c) By the use of the term in the baptismal for mula and the benedictions.

The deity of the Son of God is abundantly proved in Scripture. The general impression made by the New Tes tament favors the deity of Christ. If the evangelists and apostles intended to teach to the world the doctrine that Christ is only a man, or an exalted angel, they have certainly employed phraseology that is ill-suited to convey such a truth. Says John Quincy Adams (Diary, VII. 229), " No argument that I have ever heard can satisfy my judgment, that the doctrine of the divinity of Christ is not counte nanced by the New Testament. As little can I say, that it is clearly revealed. It is often obscurely intimated ; some times directly, and sometimes indirectly asserted ; but left on the whole in a debatable state, never to be either demon strated or refuted until another revelation shall clear it up." This is the testimony of a Unitarian of learning and judg ment. The criticism, however, occurs to a reader, that if a doctrine is " sometimes directly, and sometimes indirectly asserted " in the New Testament, it should be accepted by a believer in revelation, however great the difficulties con nected with it.

By " deity" more is meant than "divinity," as this latter term is employed by different classes of Anti-Trinitarians.

314 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

The Arians and Semi-Arians taught the " divinity " of the Son, in the sense of a similarity of nature between him and the Father. This resemblance is greater and closer than that of any other being, man or angel, but is not identity of essence. Socinus and the Polish Unitarians also taught the " divinity " of Christ, in the sense of similarity of essence, but in a lower degree than the Arians and Semi-Arians held the tenet. Socinus says : " Dicimus concedere nos Christum esse naturalem Dei Filium." Srnalcius affirms : Filium personam esse non diffitemur, eamque divinam." Turrettin : Institutio, III. xxviii. 1. By the phrase " nat ural Son of God," Socinus meant a miraculous generation of Jesus Christ in time by the Holy Spirit, but not an eter nal and necessary generation out of the Divine essence.

The crucial term is " coessential," or " con substantial " (o/juoovaios). Neither the Semi-Arian, nor the Arian, nor the Socinian, would concede that the essence of the Son is the very identical essence of the Father. It is like it, but it is not it. The Son has " divinity " but not " deity ; " the term divinity being used in the loose sense, as when writers speak of the " divinity in man," meaning his resemblance to God. No one would speak of the " deity in man," un less he were a pantheist.

1. The deity of the Son is proved by the application of the name God to him. Ps. 45 : 6, 8, " Thy throne, O God (Qirftt») is forever and ever." This is quoted and thus reaffirmed in Ileb. 1 : 8, 9, " Unto the Son, he saith, thy throne, O God, is forever and ever." Isa. 9:6, "A child is born unto us, and his name shall be called the mighty God " (lias *!»). In Jer. 23 : 5, 6, the « Branch " of David is called " The Lord (mri"?) our Kighteousness." The same is said of Messiah in Jer. 33 : 15-17. Here, Jerusalem = the Church= Christ (1 Cor. 12 : 12 ; Gal. 3 : 16.) Speaker's Com. on Jer. 33 : 16. In Isa. 7 : 14, Messiah is called " God with us," and the prophecy here recorded is said, in Matt. 1 : 23, to be fulfilled in the birth of Jesus Christ.

TRINITY IN UNITY. 315

In Malachi 3 : 1, the Messenger (ayye\\ov, Sept.) about to come to his own temple (yabv eavrov, Sept.) is called Lord ( V'"™) ; and Mark (1 : 2) and Luke (1 : 76) teach that this is Jesus Christ. The day of the coming of this Messenger is called the " great and dreadful day of the Lord " ("J"H) Mai. 4 : 5.

In the New Testament, there are passages in which what is said in the Old Testament concerning Jehovah is applied to Jesus Christ. Compare Numbers 14 : 2 ; 21 : 5, 6 ; Ps. 95: 9, with 1 Cor. 10:9. Here the tempting of Jehovah is the tempting of Christ. The Receptus, Itala, Peshito, Yulgate with DEF, read Xpua-rov in 1 Cor. 10 : 9. Lachmann, Tischendorf, Ilort, with &BC, read /cvpiov. The Alexan drine codex reads &e6v. In Ileb. 1 : 10, 11, what is attrib uted to Jehovah in Ps. 102 : 26, is attributed to Christ. In John 12 : 40, 41, it is asserted that the language of Isaiali (6 : 9, 10,) concerning Jehovah refers to Jesus Christ. Isa. 45 : 23, compared with Rom. 14 : 10, 11 (Receptus), shows that the judgment-seat of God is the judgment-seat of Christ : Lachmann, Tischendorf, Hort, Peshito, Yulgate, with fcABCD, read &eov in Rom. 14: 10. Joel 2 : 32 com pared with Rom. 10 : 13, proves that the name of Jehovah is the name of Christ. In Eph. 4 : 8, 9, Christ gives the gifts that in Ps. 68 : 18 are given by Jehovah.

John 1 : 1 contains absolute proof of the deity of the Son of God : $eo9 f\v o Xo709. The omission of the article with $eo9 converts the word into the abstract, denoting the spe cies, " deity." Compare wvevfia^ anarthrous, in John 4: 24: irvevfjia o $eo9. The use of r^v implies uncreated being, in distinction from created ; which, in verse 3, is denoted by eyevero. The distinct personal existence of the Logos is also denoted by 71-^69 rbv &eov, which is quite different from avv TO) Sew. The former preposition with the accusative implies coexistence, along with another. The latter prepo sition with the dative blends in one substance, so as to ex clude distinct individuality. 1 John 5 : 20, ovro9 ecrriv o

316 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

$eo5. Here, ouro? most naturally refers to

" Eternal life " is never appropriated to the Fa ther by St. John, but is very often to the Son. Compare John 1 : 4; 11 : 25 ; 14: 6 ; 1 John 1 : 2 ; 5: 11, 12. Christ is called $609 in Rom. 9 : 5. The conversion of the passage into a doxology, by punctuation, by some modern editors of the text, in opposition to the almost universal understanding of the ancient, mediaeval, and modern church, is a striking instance of an attempt to bring Scripture into harmony with the Arian view of Christ's person. Christ is clearly the antecedent — no other person having been spoken of in sev eral verses preceding ; o wv is a relative clause, not begin ning a new proposition but continuing one that has been commenced ; and the words TO Kara adpica, referring to the human nature of Christ, require an antithesis referring to the divine nature, as in Rom. 1 : 3. See Shedd : on Rom. 9 : 5. Christ is called £eo?, in Titus 2:13: " Looking for the blessed hope and appearing of the glory of our great God and Saviour, Jesus Christ" (R. Y.). That £eoO and crcorfjpcx; denote one and the same person, is proved by these facts : (a) That eTrifydveiav is never applied to the Father, and that Christ's "appearing" is the thing hoped for. (&) The next clause speaks of the great God and Saviour as " giving himself." (c) That /zeyaXou would seem uncalled for, if applied to the Father, since no one disputed the propriety of this epithet in reference to the first person. Usteri : Lehre, p. 325. The exclamation of Thomas, John 20 : 28, o Kvpios IJLOV /cal 6 $eo? /JLOV, proves the deity of Christ. It was addressed to Christ : elirev avrw. The use of the article o, instead of the interjection

TRINITY IN UNITY. 317

3 : 16, " God was manifest in the flesh." The reading is supported by D3KL, most minuscules, Keceptus, Mill, Scliolz ; 05 is supported by &AC', Coptic, Sahidic, Gothic, Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles, Alford, Hort. The reading o? refers to Christ indisputably, and there are such predicates attributed to him as belong to no creature. Philippians 2 : 6 proves Christ's divinity. Christ could not be in a " form " of God without the nature of God ; the " form " of a servant implies the nature of a servant. And he was in a form of God previous to being in the form of a servant. It was no robbery of honor (apiraypov) for Christ to claim equality with God. The proposed rendering : "To be held on upon," would require apway/jid. The plural, " gods," is sometimes applied to creatures : to angels, and magistrates ; but the singular, " God," never is. The ap plication of the singular to Christ proves his deity.

2. Divine attributes are ascribed to the Son of God. (a) Eternity, Prov. 8 : 22, 23. The personal Wisdom (n^n) " was set up from everlasting." That this is not a personi fied attribute is proved, 1. By the length of the description, and the large number of details. Personification is brief, and does not go into particulars. 2. By the ascription of personal actions, and a personal utterance of them : " I was by him ; 1 was daily his delight ; when he prepared the heavens, I was there; my delights were with the sons of men ; now therefore hearken unto me, O ye children ; blessed is the man that heareth me." A personification oc curs, generally, in the midst of a narrative. But this oc curs in the midst of maxims and didactic utterances. " In this passage," says Nitzsch, " we have an unmistakable germ of the ontological self-distinction of the Godhead." l Micah 5:2, " From Bethlehem Ephratah, shall come forth

1 Upon the connection of the Wisdom of the Old Testament with the Logos of John, see Bleek : Introduction to the New Testament, § 81 ; Luthardt : Au thenticity of the Fourth Gospel ; Godet : Commentary on John ; Dorner : Per son of Christ, I.

318 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

he whose goings forth [emanation] have been from old ; " literally, " from the days of eternity." Compare Matt. 2 : 6. In Isa. 9 : 6, the Messiah is called the " everlasting Fa ther;" literally, "the Father of eternity." Heb. 7: 3, " The Son of God " has " neither beginning of days nor end of life." In Rev. 1:8; 22 : 13, the " Son of man " says of himself, " I am Alpha and Omega." In John 8 ; 28, Christ says of himself, " Before Abraham was I am ; " where the use of e't/u is in contrast with that of fyeveo-Qai. Compare with this the contrast between rjv and eyevero in John 1:1, 3. In John 17 : 7, Christ affirms his exist ence with the Father, " before the world was." (J) Im mensity and Omnipresence. Matt. 18 : 20, " Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." Mat. 28 : 20, " I am with you al ways." John 3 : 13, " The Son of man who is in heaven," and on earth, simultaneously. Socinus explains 6 &v, here, by fuisse. (c) Omnipotence. Rev. 1:8; " I am the Al mighty." John 5 : 19, " "Whatsoever things the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise." Heb. 1 : 3, The Son " upholdeth all things by the word of his power." Mat. 18 : 18, " All power is given unto me in heaven and on earth." This latter text refers to the mediatorial commission, it is true ; but it must be remembered that a mere creature could not take such a commission, if it were offered to him. In interpreting those passages in which omnipotence and divine exaltation (Phil. 2 : 9) are said to be " given " to the incarnate Son, it must be recollected that it requires an in finite nature to receive and wield such infinite gifts. A created nature would be crushed by them, as Tarpeia was by the shields of the Sabine soldiers. They are communi cable only to an infinite person, (d) Omniscience is as cribed to the Son. John 21 : 17, " Lord thou knowest all things." John 16 : 30, " We are sure that thou knowest all things." John 2 : 24, 25, " Jesus knew what was in man." John 1 : 49, " When thou wast under the fig-tree, I saw

TRINITY IN UNITY. 319

thee." Rev. 2 : 23, " I am he which searcheth the reins and hearts." Compare with 1 Kings 8 : 29, " Thou only knowest the hearts of all the children of men." In Mark 13 : 32, Christ is said to be ignorant of the day of judg ment. This is explained, by many, by a reference to his human nature. He was ignorant in respect to his human ity. But there is another explanation which refers it to the total theanthropic person. An official ignorance is meant. Augustine so explains. " Christ as the Mediator was not authorized, at that time, to give information re specting the time of the final judgment, and this is called 1 ignorance' upon his part; as a ditch is sometimes called * blind ' because it is hidden from the eyes of men, and not because it is really so." Macknight interprets in the same way. This use of " know " for " making known," is fre quent in Scripture. Gen. 22 : 12, " Now I know that thou fearest God, seeing that thou has not withheld thine only son from me." In 1 Cor. 2:2, St. Paul says, "I deter mined not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ." To " know " means to " make known," in Mat. 11 : 27. " No one knoweth the Son but the Father, neither knoweth any one the Father but the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him." Compare John 1 : 18, " The only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." A particular trinitarian person is officially the one to reveal another, and in this reference the others do not officially reveal, and so are officially " ig norant." Paul (Gal. 1 : 16) says that " it pleased God the Father to reveal his Son in him." This explanation of the " ignorance," spoken of in Mark 13 : 32, as official, agrees better than the other with other statements of Scripture. When it is said that " the Father only " knows the time of the day of judgment, this must be harmonized with the truth that the Holy Spirit is omniscient, and " searcheth the deep things of God," 1 Cor. 2 : 10. The Holy Spirit is not ignorant of the time of the day of judgment, but like

320 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

the incarnate Son lie is not commissioned to reveal the time. Again, it is not supposable that Christ now seated on the mediatorial throne is ignorant, even in respect to his human nature, of the time of the day of judgment, though he is not authorized to officially make it known to his church, (e) Immutability. Heb. 1 : 11, 12, " The heavens shall perish, but thou remainest." The immutability of Jehovah, in Ps. 102 : 26, is here ascribed to the Son. Heb. 13 : 8, " Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever." (/) The Divine " plenitude," that is, the Divine es sence and attributes, is attributed to Christ in Coloss. 2 : 9, " In him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily." (g) Self -existence, or " life in himself," is attributed to the incarnate Son. John 5 : 26. That this is " given," or " communicated," to the Son by the Father, does not im ply inequality of being. Self-existing life is ipso facto Di vine. The mode in which it is possessed does not change the nature of the possession. In communicating the Di vine essence to the Son, the Father communicates all its properties.

3. Divine works are attributed to the Son of God. (a) Creation. Prov. 8 : 27, " When he prepared the heavens, I was there." John 1:3," All things were made by him." Coloss. 1 : 16, 17, " By him were all things created, visible and invisible." Heb. 1:2, " By whom he made the worlds." Heb. 1 : 10, " Thou Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth." (5) Preservation. Heb. 1 : 3, " Upholding all things by the word of his power." Coloss. 1 : 17, " By him all things consist." John 5 : 17, " My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." (c) Miracles performed by Christ in person, or through his apostles ; es pecially the resurrection of the dead. John 5 : 21, " As the Father raiseth up the dead, so the Son quickeneth whom he will." John 6 : 40, " I will raise him up at the last day." Christ appeals to these miracles in proof of his divinity. John 5 : 36, " The works that I do, bear witness of me."

TRINITY m UNITY. 321

Socinus asserted that the creation ascribed to Christ is the secondary spiritual creation. This is not so, because : (a) St. John (1 : 3) speaks absolutely, without any qualifi cation; which would have been necessary, if a particular kind of creation were intended. (&) The universal creation without exception (ovSe ev) is expressly mentioned, (c) It is not exclusively the spiritual creation, namely, the church, because (ver. 10) that part of the world who " knew him not " was created by him. (d) St. Paul (Coloss. 1 : 16) ex tends the creation by Christ to all creatures, visible and in visible ; to angels, as well as men ; and speaks of the sec ond spiritual creation afterwards (ver. 18). Socinus also asserted that Christ's agency in creation is instrumental (Si avrov, John 1:3). The reply is : (a) That there cannot be instrumental agency in such a work as creation ex nihilo. An instrument must have materials to work upon, but there are none in creation. (5) The same preposition (&' avrov) is applied to God. Horn. 11 : 36, " And through him, are all things ; " Gal. 1:1, " An apostle not of men, but by Jesus Christ, and God the Father." (c) The creation is not only Si avrov (Coloss. 1 : 16), but ek avrov (Coloss. 1 : 16). Christ is the final end, as well as first cause, (d) The crea tion is not only 8t avrov, but ev avr<£>, Coloss. 1 : 17. The universe has its supporting ground in Christ (ev avrw a-vvea-T77/te), as man is said to live in God, Acts 17 : 38. When creation is peculiarly ascribed to the Father, the Son is not excluded, any more than when redemption is peculiarly as cribed to the Son, the Father is excluded.

It is asserted that Christ's power to work miracles was offi cial, like that of the apostles and prophets. This is an error, because (a) Miraculous power emanated from him as from the original source. Luke 6 : 19 ; 8 : 46 ; Matt. 9 : 28, "Be lieve ye that / am able to do this ? " (5) The apostles af firm that they do not work miracles in their own name, but in the name of Christ. Acts 9 : 34, " Jesus Christ maketh thee whole ; " Acts 3 : 16, " His name, through faith in

322 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

his name hath made this man strong ; " Acts 4 : 10, " By the name of Jesus Christ doth this man stand here before you, whole." Compare Matt. 14 : 33, " They worshipped him," with Acts 14 : 15, " Why do ye these things ? " When Christ (John 11 : 41) thanks the Father for hearing his prayer, it is to be noticed that it is a prayer in his office of mediator ; and that he offers it in order that the people may have a proof of his Divine mission (ver. 42). It was not that he felt himself unable to work the miracle, and needed to be empowered for the act ; but he wished that the spec tators, " the people which stood by," should know that he and the Father were one and the same Being in all acts and words. If the spectators had seen Lazarus raised from the dead with no allusion to the eternal Father, and no uplift ing of the Filial eye, they would have been apt to separate Christ from the Father, as a kind of separate and indepen dent God. Respecting this prayer, Christ says, "I know that thou hearest me always," implying that his prayer is not like that of a mere man, which may or may not be heard, according as God shall see best, (d) The work of salvation in its several parts is ascribed to Christ : Redemp tion, Acts 20 : 28. Election, John 13 : 18. Effectual call ing, John 10 : 16 ; Matt. 9 : 13. Sanctification, Eph. 5 : 26. Mission of the Spirit, John 16 : 7, 14 ; 15 : 26. Defence against enemies, John 10 : 10. Gift of eternal life, John 10 : 28. Resurrection of the body, John 5 : 21. Final Judgment, John 5 : 22 ; Acts 17 : 31. Christ is called the Lord of the Church, Eph. 4:5; and the Husband of tho Church, Eph. 5 : 25, which latter is the title given to Je hovah in reference to Israel (Isa. 54 : 5).

4. Religious worship in its various acts is rendered to the Son of God, namely : Faith. John 14 : 1, " Believe also in me." Hope. Ps. 2 : 12, " Blessed are all they that put their trust in him (the Son) ; " but "cursed is the man that trusteth in man," Jer. 17 : 5. Adoration. Heb. 1:6," Let all the angels of God worship him ; " Ps. 2 : 12, " Kiss

TRINITY IN UNITY. 323

(a mark of homage and adoration, 1 Sam. 10 : 1) the Son ; " John 5 : 23, " The Father hath given all judgment to the Son, that all men should honor the Son even as they honor the Father ; " Phil. 2 : 9, 10, " At the name of Jesus, every knee should bow." Invocation of blessing. Grace, mercy, and peace are implored from Christ, not less than from the Father. Believers are described as those " who call on the name of the Lord Jesus Christ," 1 Cor. 1:2; Acts 9 : 14. Stephen calls upon Christ to receive his spirit at death, Acts 7 : 59. Glory and honor are invoked for Christ, in connection with the Father " who sitteth upon the throne," Rev. 5 : 13. Examples of doxology to Christ are, 1 Pet. 4 : 11 ; 2 Tim. 4:18; Eev. 1:6; 2 Pet. 3 : 18. Says Athanasius (Orat. III. 12), " ' May God and his angel Gabriel, or Michael, grant you,' would be a new and ex traordinary sort of prayer. But ' God the Father, and his Son Jesus Christ grant you,' is perfectly agreeable to Scripture."

5. The deity of the Son is proved by his trinitarian posi tion and relations, (a) By the equality of the Son with the Father. John 5 : 17, 18, " Saying that God was his Father, he made himself equal with God." This equality, Christ proved to the Jews by asserting his self -existence, or " life in himself," John 5:26; and equality in honor, " All men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father," John 5 : 23. "When Christ says (John 5 : 19) that " the Son can do nothing of himself " (a(f> eavrov), he means that he cannot work in isolation or separation from the Father, as if he were another Being. Hence, he adds, " What things soever the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son like wise." The same truth is taught in John 8 : 28, " I do nothing of myself, but as my Father hath taught me, I speak these things." When Christ said (John 14 : 28), " My Father is greater than I," he was comparing his then existing state of humiliation with the glorious state of the Father. If the disciples understood this, they would re324 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

joice "because I said I go unto the Father," since it would be a return to " the glory which Christ had with the Father, before the world was," John 17 : 5. See Luthardt on John 14 : 28. (b) By the unity of the Son with the Father. John 10 : 30, " I and my Father are one being " (eV).1 The Jews understood this to be a claim to unity of essence ; and to be " blasphemy, because that thou being a man maketh thyself God," (ver. 33). Christ reiterates and proves his claim, by reference to the use of the word " gods " (not God) applied to the prophets and magistrates of the Old economy. Ps. 82 : 6 ; Ex. 21 : 6 ; 22 : 8, 9, 28 (n^n:» = "judges"). It is an argument from the less to the greater. If magistrates may be called gods, then the commissioned Messiah may be called the Son of God ; and the Son of God he had previously asserted to be one with the Father (John 10 : 30). This, the Jews regarded as " making him self God " (ver. 33). The Jews understood the " Son of God " to be God, as is proved by Matt. 26 : 63-65.

6. The deity of the Son is proved by the office of medi ator which he discharges, (a) A mediator must be the equal of either of the two parties between whom he medi ates ; " a daysman who can lay his hand upon both," Job 9:3. "A mediator is not of one [party]," Gal. 3:20. (b) He must be a prophet who can inwardly enlighten, and not merely teach by words externally ; a king who can pro tect his kingdom ; and a priest who can make atonement to justice for his people. These functions cannot be dis charged by a finite Being.

7. The deity of the Son is proved by the fact that he is revealed and manifested. This implies that primarily he is the unrevealed deity. Compare Gal. 1 : 15, 16, " To reveal

1 Athanasius (Oont. Arianos, IV. 9) remarks that there are three ways in which these words can be understood. 1. That which is one thing in one respect, is two in another. 2. That which is one thing, is two by having two names. 3. That which is one thing, is two by being divided into two parts. The first ia Nicene trinitarianism. The second is Sabellianism.

TRINITY IN UNITY. 325

his Son in me ; " 1 John 3:8," The Son of God was mani fested." A created being is never said to be revealed or manifested. When it is said (Acts 2 : 36) " that God hath made that same Jesus whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ," the reference is not to his essential but his economical or official dominion as the God-man and Mes siah. When Christ is called (Rev. 3 : 14) " the beginning (apxtf) of the creation of God," it is in the active sense of the word apxtf ; as in Rev. 1:1, 8, where Receptus, Vul gate, Coptic, fcfc, have apxtf Ka^ TO TeXo?. He causes the creature to begin. He is the " beginning," in the sense of origin, or source. It corresponds to the Alpha, in Rev. 1 : 8. Origen employs the term in an active signification, in his treatise TLepi dp^wv, De Principiis : concerning first originating principles. The apyr) of Plato and Aristotle is the term for the cause of the origin or genesis of anything. Plato (Phaedo) quotes Anaxagoras as teaching that vovs is rj apx>j T?}? Kivrjo-efa. Aristotle (Eth., III. i.) says that a man is blamed or praised for that ov rj apyrj ev avrw earl. In Ethics, III. i., the same idea is conveyed by the two phrases : 6v rj apyr) e^coQev, and oiror av r) curia kv rot?

8. The deity of the Son is proved by the fact that he is eternally generated., not created in time. This is established by those texts which teach the unique and solitary nature of his sonship. The Son is jiovoyevrfs : " The only begot ten of the Father," John 1 : 14 ; " the only begotten Son " (uncials, " only begotten God "), John 1 : 18 ; 3 : 16, 18 ; 1 John 4 : 9. The Son is Trpeororo/to? : " When he bringeth the first begotten into the world," Heb. 1 : 6. The Son is TrpoyToroKos Trdarj^ /cTt(766)? : " Begotten before all creation," Col. 1 : 15. The context show that the genitive, here, is not partitive, but is governed by TT/JWTO? in composition ; " for by him were all things created," Col. 1 : 16. Compare TTpwro? ftov fy, John 1 : 30. This is the exegesis of Tertullian (De Trinitate) ; of Ambrose (De Fide, I. iv.) ; of Atha326 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD).

nasius (Cont. Arianos, II. 63) ; of Eusebius (Dem. Evang., Y.) ; and of Chrysostom. Had St. Paul wished to say that the Son is a part of creation, he would have written, irpwTOTO/C09 €K TracTT/? ^Ttcreo)?. Compare etc rwv vercpwv, Col. 1 : 18. The Son is ayaTrrjTos : u This is my beloved Son," Matt. 3 : 17 ; 17 : 5. The Son is I'Sto?: " He said that God is his own Father" (iraripa $toi>), John 5 : 18 ; God " sent his own Son " (rov eaurov vlov\ Rom. 8 : 3, 32.

That the generation of the Son of God is in eternity, and not a temporal emanation, is proved by Micah 5 : 2. The " goings forth " (issuing, asfa) of the Ruler of Israel who is to be born in Bethlehem are "from everlasting." The Hebrew denotes an emanation, as in Ps. 65 : 8. "The out goings of the morning," are the beams of sunrise. Compare Hosea 6 : 3. That he* is Son in the sense of a Divine per son, is proved by the fact that the angels are not called Son in this sense. " Unto which of the angels said He at any time, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee ? And again, I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to me a Son," Heb. 1:5. It is also proved by the fact, that he is to have the uttermost parts of the earth for his possession, Ps. 2:8; that he is to overthrow the sinful kings of earth, Ps. 2:9; and that the kings of the earth are commanded to worship him, Ps. 2 : 12.

The passage, " Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee " (Ps. 2 : 7), teaches the eternal generation of the sec ond trinitarian person. That it relates to the Messiah, is proved by Acts 4 : 25, 26 ; 13 : 33 ; Heb. 1 : 5. The earlier Rabbins referred this text to the Messiah ; the later Rab bins, in order to invalidate the doctrine of the deity of Christ, have many of them referred it to David. Moham med, in the Koran, alters it to, " Thou art my prophet, I have educated thee." Respecting the meaning of " begot ten," in this passage, there are three explanations : (a) The begetting is the eternal generation. The words, " this day," denote the universal present, the everlasting ]S"ow, which

TRINITY IN UNITY. 327

is put for eternity. This view is taken by Origen, Athanasius, Basil, Augustine, elder Lutherans, Turrettin. (&) The begetting is the miraculous conception, or the incarnation of the eternal Son. The words, " this day," are equivalent to, " when he bringeth in the first begotten into the world," Heb. 1 : 6. This view is held by Chrysostom, Theodoret, Kuinoel, Hoffmann, (c) The begetting is the resurrection and exaltation of Christ. This view is taken by Hilary, Ambrose, Calvin, Grotius. But this explanation rests upon a misapprehension of St. Paul in Acts 13 : 32-35. The apostle does not quote (verse 33) the passage in the second psalm, " Thou art my Son," etc., in order to prove the resur rection of Christ, but his incarnation; or the fulfilment of the Messianic promise, made to the fathers (verse 32). The "raising up" (R. V.; not "again," as in A. V.) of Jesus, spoken of in verse 33, is the bringing of the Messiah into the world for his mediatorial work. Compare Horn. 9 : 17, " For this same purpose have I raised thee up " (egrpyeipd ere). This incarnation of the Son, St. Paul says was promised in " the second psalm." He then proceeds (Acts 13 : 34) to prove the fulfilment of the promise that the Messiah should be raised from the dead, by quoting from Isa. 55 : 3, and from the sixteenth psalm (ver. 10) : " And as concerning that he raised him up from the dead, he said on this wise, I will give you the sure mercies of David ; and in another psalm, Thou wilt not suffer thine Holy One to see corrup tion." The choice, therefore, lies between the first and sec ond explanations; and the deity of the son is proved by Ps. 2 : 7, in either case. It is directly taught by the first explanation ; and impliedly by the second. Because, the incarnation of the Son supposes his prior unincarnate exist ence and position.

Augustine (Trinity, II. i.) classifies the texts referring to the Son in the following manner: 1. Texts teaching the unity and equality of substance between the Father and Son : such as, " I and my Father are one," John 10 : 30 ;

328 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

"Who being in the form of God, thought it not rob bery to be equal with God," Phil. 2:6. 2. Texts teaching the inferiority of the Son on account of his having taken the form of a servant : such as, " My Father is greater than I," John 14 : 28 ; " The Father hath given Him authority to execute judgment, because He is the Son of man," John 5 : 27. 3. Texts teaching neither equality nor inferiority, but only that the Son is of the Father : such as, " For as the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself," and, " The Son can do noth ing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do," John 5 : 20, 19.

Before proceeding to prove the Deity of God the Holy Spirit, it is necessary to notice the technical use of " Spirit," and of " Holy " in this connection. The third person in the Godhead is denominated the Spirit with reference to his person, not his essence. He is no more spiritual as to his substance than is the Father or the Son. He is denomi nated the Spirit, because of the mode in which the essence is communicated to him ; namely, by spiration : Spiritus, quia spiratus. " The Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, but the Holy Ghost is emphatically the Spirit. Not that he is spirit in any higher, or any different sense of the word spirit, but upon other accounts, the name of Spirit is em phatically and more peculiarly attributed to him." Waterland : Second Defence, Qu. II. Neither is he denominated the " Holy " Spirit because holiness is any more peculiar to him than to the first and second persons ; but because he is the author of holiness in creatures. The epithet " Holy," also, relates to the person, not the essence.

Socinians deny the distinct personality of the Holy Spirit ; they concede eternity, because they regard the Spirit as the influence or effluence of the eternal God. That the Holy Spirit is a Person, is certain : 1. Because he speaks of himself in the first person. Acts 10 : 19, " I have sent them." Acts 13 : 2, " Separate for me Barnabas and Saul,

TRINITY IN UNITY. 329

for the work whereunto I have called them." 2. Because personal acts are attributed to him. (a) Teaching, John 14:26. (5) Witnessing, John 15:26; Bom. 8:16. (c) Revealing future events, 1 Tim. 4:1. (d) Searching the depths of God, 1 Cor. 2 : 10. (e) Setting apart and sending persons for the ministry, Is. 61 : 1 ; Acts 13:2; 20 : 28. (/) Creating, Gen. 1 : 2. (g) The miraculous conception, Luke 1 : 35. (fi) Ordinary and extraordinary gifts are bestowed, 1 Cor. 12 : 11. 3. Because he is described as personally dis tinct from the Father and Son, being sent by them. John 14:16; 15:26; 16: T. This separate and personal dis tinctness is marked by the use of the masculine pronoun with the neuter article and noun. John 16 : 13 : orav e\&rj etcelvGs rb Trvev/jua TT}? aA^eta? ; Eph. 1 : 13 : Believers are sealed ry Trvevfjuari, 09 ea-riv appa/3a)v, etc. 4. Because he co-operates with equal power and authority with the Father and the Son, in conferring and sealing blessings to the church. This is proved by the baptismal formula, Matt. 28 : 19 ; the apostolic benediction, 2 Cor. 13 : 14 ; the wit nessing respecting redemption in Christ, 1 John 5:7: " There are three that bear record, the Spirit, the water, and the blood, and these three agree in one." 5. Because he ap pears in theophanies. In the form of a dove, Matt. 3 : 16 ; in the form of a tongue of flame, Acts 2 : 3, 4. 6. Because sin is committed against the Holy Spirit. Is. 63 : 10, " They rebelled and vexed his Holy Spirit." Matt. 12 : 31, 32, The unpardonable sin. Acts 5 : 3, Ananias and Sapphira lied against the Holy Ghost. 7. Because the Spirit is distinguished from the gifts of the Spirit, 1 Cor. 12:4, 8, 11 ; and from the energy (Sura/u?) of the Spirit, Luke 4 : 14 ; Luke 1 : 35.

That the Holy Spirit is a Divine Person is clear : 1. Because the Divine name is given to him. In Isaiah 6 : 9, Jehovah speaks, and in Acts 28 : 25 the Holy Ghost is said to speak the same words. In 2 Sam. 23 : 2, 3, " The Spirit of the Lord spake; and he is called the God of Israel."

330 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

The lie of Ananias against the Holy Spirit was a lie against God, Acts 5 : 3. The believer's body is the temple of God, because the Holy Spirit dwells in it, 1 Cor. 3 : 16 ; 6 : 19. The indwelling of the Holy Spirit, is the indwelling of God. " We know that we dwell in God, and God dwelleth in us, because he hath given us of his Spirit," 1 John 4:13.

2. Because the Divine attributes are ascribed to him. (a) Eternity. Gen. 1 : 2. (5) Omnipresence. Ps. 139 : 7, 8, " Whither shall I flee from thy Spirit ? " 1 Cor. 3 : 16, "The Holy Spirit dwelleth in you." (c) Omniscience. 1 Cor. 2 : 10, " The Spirit searcheth the deep things of God." John 16 : 13, " He shall guide you unto all truth, and show you things to come." 2 Peter 1 : 21, " Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." (d) Omnipotence. Luke 1 : 35, " The power of the Highest " is the power of the Holy Ghost. Komans 8 : 11, " He shall quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit which dwelleth in you."

3. Because Divine worlds are attributed to him. (a) Creation, Gen. 1 : 2 ; Ps. 33 : 6. (5) Preservation and government, Ps. 104 : 30. (c) Miracles, Matt. 12 : 28 ; 1 Cor. 12 : 4 ; Luke 1 : 35. (d) The unction and mission of the Messiah, Isa. 61 : 1. (e) Remission of sin and regen eration, 1 Cor. 6 : 11 ; John 3 : 5. (f} Government of the Church, Acts 13:2; 15 : 28 ; 20 : 28. (g) Prediction of future events, John 16 : 13 ; Acts 11 : 28. (h] Charis mata, 1 Cor. 12 : 7-11. (i) Illumination, Eph. 1 : 17, 18. (J) Sanctification, 2 Thess. 2 : 13 ; 1 Pet. 1 : 2. (yfc) Res urrection of the dead, Rom. 8 : 11.

4. Because Divine worship is rendered to him : In the baptismal formula, Matt. 28 : 19. In the apostolic benedic tion, 2 Cor. 13 : 14 ; Rev. 1:4. In this last passage, the " seven spirits," are the Holy Spirit ; who is so called, be cause of the variety of his gifts ; because it is the perfect number in the Jewish idea ; and because of an allusion to

TRINITY IN UNITY. 331

the seven churches addressed.1 1 Cor. 6 : 20, " Glorify God in your body, which is God's ; " but it is the Holy Spirit who dwells in the body as his temple, (verse 19). Acts 4 : 21, 25, " Lord thou art God, who by the mouth of thy servant David hast said, Why do the heathen rage ? " But David spake by the Holy Spirit, so that this act of worship on the part of the disciples terminated on the Holy Spirit.

The reason why less is said in Scripture respecting the adoration and worship of the third person than of the others is, that in the economy of redemption it is the office of the Spirit to awaken feelings of worship, and naturally, therefore, he appears more as the author than the object of worship. But a person who by an internal operation can awaken feelings of worship is ipso facto God.

The deity of the Holy Spirit is proved by the nature of his spiration and procession. It is marked by the same characteristics with those of the generation of the Son. It is eternal ; never beginning and never ending. It is neces sary ; not dependent upon the optional will of either the first or second persons. And it is an emanation out of the one eternal essence ; not the creation of a new substance from nothing. The procession of the Holy Spirit is not that temporal and external afflatus which terminates upon creatures, in inspiration, regeneration, and sanctification ; but that eternal and internal spiration whereby a subsistence in the Divine essence results.

How procession differs from generation, it is impossible to explain. " That there is a difference between generation and procession, we have taught, but what is the manner of the difference, we do not at all pretend to teach." John of Damascus : De Orthodoxa Fide, IV. x. " There is a differ1 In Rev. 5 : 6, uThe seven spirits of God sent forth into all the earth," are the "seven eyes of the Lamb." In the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs, ' ' seven spirits " of error are described who stand for Satan the archspirit of evil. Grabe : Spicilegium, L 146.

332 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

ence between generation and procession, but I do not know how to distinguish them, because both are ineffable." Au gustine : Contra Maximinum, XIX. Some of the school men attempted to explain the difference, by saying that the generation of the Son is by the mode of the understanding and intellect, and hence the Son is called Wisdom and AVord ; but the procession of the Spirit is by the mode of the will and affections, and hence the Spirit is called Love. Turrettin (III. xxi. 3) distinguishes the difference by the following particulars : 1. In respect to the source. Gener ation is from the Father alone ; procession is from the Father and Son. 2. In respect to the effects. Generation not only results in a hypostatical personality, but in resem blance. The Son is the "image" of the Father; but the Spirit is not the image of the Father and Son. An image is a representation of one, not of two persons. Genera tion, again, is accompanied with the power to communi cate the essence; procession is not. 3. In respect to the order of relationship. Filiation is second, and procession is third. In the order of nature, not of time, spiration is after generation. The Father and Son spirate the Spirit, not as two different essences, in each of whom resides a spirative energy — which would result in two processions — but as two personal subsistences of one essence, who con cur in one resulting procession. There are two spirations, but only one procession. Turrettin, III. xxxi. 6.

The Latin church objected to the Greek insertion of JJLOVOV in article 7 of the Athanasian Symbol: airo rov (povov) Trarpos ; and the Greek church blamed the Latin for adding Filioque to the Nicene Symbol, at the Council of Toledo, in 589. At the Council of Florence, in 1439, a compromise was made, whereby it was decided that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father by (per) the Son. But the Greeks receded from this, and stood upon their first posi tion. The use of per implies instrumental agency, which is inaccurate.

TRINITY IN UNITY. 833

Says Turrettin (III. xxxi. 5), "Although the Greeks ought not to be regarded as heretics for their opinion, neither ought the schism between the West and East to have arisen upon this ground, yet the opinion of the Latins is more in accordance with Scriptures, and there is more reason for retaining it than for rejecting it: Because: 1. The Spirit is sent not less by the Son than by the Father, John 16:7; but he could not be sent by the Son, unless he proceeded from him. 2. The Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son, not less than of the Father, Gal. 4:6; Rom. 8 : 9 ; Phil. 1:19. 3. Whatever the Spirit has, he has not less from the Son than from the Father, John 16 : 13-15 ; and as the Son is said to be from the Father because he does not speak of himself, but from the Father, from whom he has all things, so the Spirit ought to be said to proceed from the Son, because he hears and speaks from him. 4. Christ breathed the Spirit upon his disciples (John 20 : 22), and this temporal spiration implies an eternal."

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

Charnocke : On the Attributes. Howe : Oracles of God, Lectures XVII.-XXV. Schleiermacher : Glaubenslehre, g 50-56 ; 79-85. Twesten : Dogmatik, II. ii. Nitzsch : Christian Doctrine, § 65-75. Hodge : Theology, I. 368-439. Van Oosterzee : Dogmatics, I. 251-272. Martensen : Dogmatics, g 46-51. Strong : Theology, IV. i.

THE Divine Attributes are modes either of the relation, or of the operation of the Divine essence. They are, con sequently, an analytical and closer description of thee ssence. " Every divine attribute," says Kitzsch (Doctrine, § 67), " is a conception of the idea of God." The terms "conception " and "idea" are here employed as in the philosophy of Schelling. As the general and undefined idea is reduced to the form of the particular and definite conception, so the gen eral Divine essence is contemplated in the particular attri bute. The attributes are not parts of the essence, of which this latter is composed. The "whole essence is in each attri bute, and the attribute in the essence. We must not con ceive of the essence as existing by itself, and prior to the attributes, and of the attributes as an addition to it. God is not essence and attributes, but in attributes. The attri butes are essential qualities of God. Hence Augustine, the Schoolmen, Calvin and Melauchthon say that " divinae virtutes sunt ipsa essentia." Turrettm (III. v. 7) remarks that " attributa dei non possunt realiter differre ab essentia, vel inter se tanquam res et res."

The Divine attributes are of two classes, according as they

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 335

denote a passive relation of the essence, or an active opera tion of it. 1. The essence considered as passively related to itself, is self -existent and simple ; as passively related to duration, is eternal ; to space, is immense ; to number, is one. Self-existence, simplicity, eternity, immensity, and unity are not active operations of the Divine essence, but inactive relationships of it. Eternity, immensity, unity, and simplicity, and the like, are not modes of energizing but of existing. 2. The essence considered as in action yields attributes of a second class. When, for example, the Divine essence is contemplated as simply energizing, this is omnipotence ; as cognizing, this is omniscience ; as adapting means to ends, this is wisdom ; as energizing benevolently or kindly, this is goodness. These attributes are the Divine essence, whole and entire, contemplated in a particular mode of external operation.

The Divine attributes are objective and real, and not merely man's subjective mode of conception. We cannot say that we conceive of God as omnipotent, omnipresent, wise, good, and just, but that in fact he is not so. These attri butes are objectively real, because the entire Divine essence is in them. The essence is not phenomenal and unreal, con sequently the attributes are not. In proportion as specula tion has been engaged with the Divine essence while neg lecting or denying the Divine attributes, it has been pan theistic; because it has occupied itself with a subject with out predicates, a substance without properties. The Monad of gnosticism and the Absolute of pantheism are examples. These are mere mental abstractions, like the unknown quan tity of algebra.

The difference between a Divine attribute and a Divine person is, that the person is a mode of the existence of the essence ; while the attribute is a mode either of the relation, or of the external operation of the essence. The qualify ing adjective "external" is important; because the inter nal operation of the essence describes a trinitarian person.

When the Divine essence energizes ad intra, tho operation in generation, or t-;pi ration, ami the OHHCIICO BO energizing in MM: Father, or tho Son ; but when the .Divine essence «-nerM| ••••:! i -a, the operation i:i omnipotence, or omniscience, or benevolence, etc. A trinitarian person I'H a mode of the essence ; a divine attribute in a phase of the essence.

Several attributes may bo grouped under a general term. Wisdom and omniscience fall under the head of the under standing. They are cognitive attributes, involving percep tion only. Goodness and mercy fall under the head of the will. They are voluntary attributes, in the scrine that their exorcise is sovereign and optional. Such attributes, conse quently, are phases of tlio .Divine understanding and will. In Scripture, all the attributes aro sometimes summed up under the term "glory" (8o£a). "The heavens declare the glory of God," PH. ID : 1. Sometimes, however, the r.,ntc\i, shows that a particular attribute is meant, as in Rom. C: 4, where (Christ is said to bo " raised by the glory of the Father." "Glory" here donoton the divine omnipotence. Compare John ' : I I

Tho number and classification of the Divine attributes is attended with Home difficulty, and has led to considerable difference of opinion among theologians. Some reckon self -existence, immensity, simplicity, eternity, and the like, among the Divine attributes* others do not. Nit/scli (Christian Doctrine, ft W5) denies that infinity, eternity, and immutability, aro properly denominated attributes.

Tho Divine attribute! have been classified an incommuni cable and communicable ; natural and moral ; immanent or intransitive, and omanent or transitive j positive and nega tive; absolute and relative; active and passive. Tho in communicable attributes are those that belong to God ex clusively, HO that thorn is nothing resembling them in a created spirit. They admit of no degrees, but aro Divine by their very nature. Such are self existence, simplicity, infinity, otornity, immutability. Tho communicable al.tri

bate w^ those which su»poesw»*lm a tmt«» degree* wore

he&ness* justice* eooipassk>n. trtrtk It is with reference

-.--. :'.vo •."•.:.- ,-; ^..v..

I t ; .v I •> ,v-v.- .;• -.:..v. : ...... :.;:,>

-Bev^hv>lv,ferIamhohr*lPW,ia^ TUt «»T eflotuM^ bo id a wr^txwt* in an infinite dqgitft k prow Matt. 4Th«ra is new [infinite^] good Ut «%,*

:-\- -••>:•:•-. ..... ' •• ;:v.-.v.

,-: ^\v. <-.:/-. .v:v S/:\-N.-•--•••^•^-\v, v ....... y-vso-A- W->/.o"- •>

to the ttahurd^ and MttM^BMft to the uwnd. The

-or. .-; ..... V -.: -< .;-v :• -.- •'•. :VAV.-V$,O./-" .-:uv, ivorw,

The immaneAt or intran^tiv^ attribute are whv:; ,:o :-.o: :- tVr::i .;-.: ,-v .;:^-v:-,:^-- :\- P-x-vo essweev but remain intemaL &»?h are imnie«$itY% eK' ^encev ete. The ^naxient or

.'.•.- ,-\

Such are omnipotence* benerotenwe* jx^tice^ ete. The po$i» tire attributed are, thoee which belong m a finite <%ree to :'-.o ,"v.i".-.-v. iv-..> :\'::-.;:ixv' .-;-.v ::-./s^ v.v:v \\ '.-•.,•*•. \" :\--::s

impexfeelioii is negatived or remoYecL The absolute attri;-•;:,-< ,-\V:v<> ::v !v'..-;:vv. ,-' i\v. :o -.-.->/.{ . '••-•/--.NV

r'.-.o '..;::,•:• .i:vo-v.:v;v:^:\v, ov.-v.i^'v:\v,^:/ "''^ \"^^ :\:

••r'c. ,------v,v

::io :,U\i ,-f vvs: : '.Vr r\:;:-v\\ so'.f c\-.s:,-.uv. ^•^^••^-••<•:v.

We adopt the classification of inoowwunicable ; municable attributes, TheW«stmiik«terS

^

s< • ^ "v, ....... •-•-•••-•,- .-;::-. -.1-.::^; NV:-.-,-;-. ;-.v -./\--,.; >>

338 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

communicable attributes that are qualified by the former : " God is a spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth."

The Self-existence of God (aseitas) denotes that the ground of his being is in himself. In this reference, it is sometimes said that God is his own cause. But this is ob jectionable language. God is the uncaused Being, and in this respect differs from all other beings. The category of cause and effect is inapplicable to the existence of a neces sary and eternal Being.

The Simplicity of God denotes that his being is uncompounded, incomplex, and indivisible : " a most pure spirit, without parts." Simplicity does not belong to angels and men. They are complex, being composed of soul and body : two substances, not one. They are not unembodied and mere spirit. The angels, like the redeemed after the resurrection, have a spiritual body, which does not mean a body made of spirit, but one adapted to a spiritual world. A spiritual body belongs to the world of extended form, not of unextended mind. The simplicity of the Divine being is not contradictory to the trinity of his es sence, because trinity does not denote three different es sences, but one essence subsisting in three modes. The trinitarian distinctions no more conflict with the simplicity of the essence, than do the attributes. The essence is not divided into either hypostases, or attributes. The whole essence is in each person, and in each attribute. The theory of external emanation is incompatible with the simplicity of the Divine essence. A substance which by efflux of par ticles can flow out into new forms, like rays from the sun, is compounded and complex. When it is said, in Rom. 11 : 36, that "all things are of him" (ef avrov), it is not meant that the universe is an effluent portion of the Divine essence, but that it originates from him as its creator. When it is said, in Acts IT : 28, that man is the offspring

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 339

(761/05) of God, it is not meant that man participates in the Divine essence, but possesses a nature similar to that of God.

The Infinity of God is the Divine essence viewed as hav ing no bounds, or limits. And since limitation implies im perfection, the infinity of God implies that he is perfect in every respect in which he is infinite. If knowledge in any being has bounds, it is imperfect knowledge ; if holiness has degrees or limits in any rational spirit, it is imperfect holiness. Yet finite holiness is real excellence, and limited knowledge is real knowledge. The finiteness of holiness does not convert it into sin ; neither does the limitedness of knowledge convert it into error, or untruth. The imper fection or limitation of the finite relates not to quality, but to quantity. Infinity is a general term denoting a charac teristic belonging to all the communicable attributes of God. His power, his knowledge, his veracity is infinite. It also characterizes the being of God, as well as his attributes. His essence is infinite. In this respect, infinity is like eter nity and immutability. These latter, like the former, pervade the essence and all the communicable attributes. The West minster Shorter Catechism, Q. 4, defines God to be a Spirit who is " infinite, eternal, and unchangeable," first in his essential " being," then in his " wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." The Divine infinity is taught in Job 11 : 7-9. " Canst thou by searching find out God ? Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection ? It is as high as heaven, what canst thou do ? deeper than hell, what canst thou know ? The measure thereof is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea."

The Immensity (in mensum) of God is his essence as re lated to space. The Divine essence is not measurable, be cause not included in any limits of place. " The heaven of heavens cannot contain thee," 1 Kings 8 : 27 ; 2 Chron. 2 : 6 ; Jer. 23 : 24. God's immensity is spiritual, having no extension of substance.

340 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

By virtue of God's immensity, he is Omnipresent. Im mensity and omnipresence are thus inseparably connected, and are best considered in reference to each other. Omni presence has respect to the universe of created beings and things ; to space as filled. Immensity has reference to this, and to what is beyond ; to space as void : the " extra flaminantia moenia mundi," of Lucretius (De Natura, I. 74). God is said to be beyond the universe (extra mundum), not in the sense that there are spaces beyond the universe which he fills by extension of substance, but in the sense that the universe does not exhaust his immensity, or is equal to it. " God's immensity," says Schleiermacher (Glaubenslehre, § 53), " is almighty immensity which determines or condi tions space itself, and all that exists in space."

The presence of mind is wholly different from that of matter. Spiritual substance is present, wherever it is pres ent, as a complete ^vhole at every point. The human soul, for example, is present as a unity and totality at every point of the body. It is not present as the body is, partitively, or by division of substance. God, also, as the infinite Spirit, is present at every point of space as a totality. He is not present in the universe by division of substance, but as a unity, simple and undivided. This is taught in the dicta : " The soul is all in every part ; " " God is a circle whoso centre is everywhere, and circumference nowrhere." Omni presence is taught in Ps. 139 : 7 sq., " Whither shall I go from thy presence ? " ; Jer. 23 : 23 sq. ; Is. 61 : 1 ; Acts 17:24.

The Divine omnipresence means rather the presence of all things to God, than God's presence to all things. They are in his presence, but he is not in their presence. When it is said, Jer. 23 : 24, " Do not I fill heaven and earth, saith the Lord," the language is tropical If God were literally contained in the universe, the universe would be more im mense than he is. " Nothing contains thee, but thou containest all things," says Anselm (Proslogium 19). (a)

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 341

omnipresence of God is not like the presence of a material body in a locality. This excludes the presence of another body ; but God's presence does not exclude that of matter. " God," says Augustine (De diversis quaestionibus, I. 20), " is not at some particular place (alicubi). For what is at some particular place is contained in space ; and what is contained in some space is body. And yet because God ex ists and is not in space, all things are in him. Yet not so in him, as if he himself were a place in which they are." (b) The Divine omnipresence is not like the presence of a finite spirit embodied in a material form. The soul of man, though not standing in the same relation to space that mat ter does, is yet not everywhere present, but is confined to a certain place ; namely, the circumference of the body. " In quo loco est animus ? credo equidem in capite : et cur credam, afferre possum : sed alias : nunc ubi sit animus, certe quidem inte est." Cicero, Tusc. Quaest. I. 3. (c) The omnipresence of God is not by extension, multiplication, or division of essence. He is all in every place, similarly as the soul is all in every part of the body. The whole essence of God is here, is there, and everywhere.

God is said to be " in heaven," " in believers," " in hell," etc., because of a special manifestation of his glory, or his grace, or his retribution. In this reference, sinners are said to be " away " from God, and God from them. Some theo logians have taught a " specialis aproximatio essentiae divinae ad substantiam credentium," upon the strength of John 14 : 23 : " We will come unto him and make our abode with him." But this is unnecessary. " The essential presence of God is the same everywhere ; the influxive de clarative presence of God is special, and otherwise in one place than another." Bates : On Heaven.

Some Socinian and deistical writers deny God's omni presence as to essence, and assert only a presence by opera tion from a distance. Newton seems to refer to this in a scholium at the end of the Principia : " God is one and the

34:2 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

same God always and everywhere. He is omnipresent, not by means of his energy (virtus) alone, but also by his sub stance ; for energy cannot subsist without substance." The pagan acknowledged the Divine omnipresence. " Jovis omnia esse plena," says Aratus. Virgil remarks that " deum ire per omnes terras tractusque maris, coelumque profundum." Compare also Seneca : De Benevolentia, I. 8.

The Eternity of God is his essence as related to duration. It is duration without beginning, without end, and without succession. Gen. 21 : 33, " The eternal God." Is. 57 : 15, "The One that inhabiteth eternity." Ps. 90:2, "From eternity to eternity, thou art God." Ps. 102:26-28; Is. 41 : 4 ; 1 Tim. 1 : 17, " The King eternal" 1 Tim. 6 : 16, " The Lord of lords who only hath immortality." Eev. 1 : 8, " I am Alpha and Omega." The French version of the Scriptures renders Jehovah by 1'Eternel.

Eternity is different from immortality, or simple endless ness. The schoolmen denominated the latter sempiternitas and aeviternitas. This is duration with succession, and has a beginning, but no end. Eternity considered as without beginning is described as a parte ante ; as without ending, as a parte post. But the terms " before " and " after," in this description, are tropical. They bring in the notion of time and succession, by which to explain ; so that this defi nition is by quantity, not by quality. Locke's definition of eternity as " infinite time, without beginning and ending," is inadequate, because it makes eternity to be a species of time. The omission of successionlessness, in this defi nition, is fatal to accuracy. Eternity with succession is like immensity with extension, and omniscience with con tingency. Some have defined eternity as the " timeless," the " supra-temporal," in order to distinguish it in kind from time. Says Schleiermacher (Glanbenslehre, § 52), " we must negative from God, not only all limits of time, but time itself."

That clause in the definition of eternity which represents

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 343

it as without sequences and succession, defines it according to quality. The schoolmen explain by saying that God, by reason of his eternity, has a simultaneous possession of his total duration. The creature comes into possession of his total duration gradually, and piecemeal. The whole of the Divine knowledge and experience is ever before the Divine being, so that there are not parts succeeding parts. The image that represents eternity is the ocean ; that which represents time is the river. " The eternity of God's existence," says Edwards (Will, IY. viii.), " is nothing else but his immediate, perfect, and invariable possession of the whole of his unlimited life, together and at once. It is equally improper to talk of months and years of the Divine existence, and mile-squares of deity." Says Aquinas (Summa, I. x. 4), " eternitas est tota sirnul ; in ternpore, autem, est prius et posterius. Ergo tempus et eternitas non sunt idem." Says Boethius (De Consolatione, V. iv.), "eternitas est rnensura esse permanentis, tempus vero est mensura motus." Says Hooker (Pol., V. Ixix.), " only God hath true immortality or eternity, that is to say, continuance wherein groweth no difference by addition of hereafter unto now." Says Smith (Existence of God), " an infinitely comprehensive mind hath a simultaneous possession of its own never-flitting life ; and because it finds no succession in its own immutable understanding, therefore it cannot find anything to measure out its own duration. And therefore the Platonists were wont to at tribute aiwv or eternity, to God ; not so much because he had neither beginning nor end of days, but because of his immutable and uniform nature." Compare King : Origin of Evil, I. iii. ; Locke : Understanding, II. xiv. 10 ; Anselm : Proslogium, 19.

In Scripture, the eternity of God is denoted by the term " to-day." Ps. 2 : 7, " To-day have I begotten thee." The eternal generation of the second trinitarian person is here described by the present alone, to the exclusion of the past

344 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

and the future. This is the particular element in time which is best fitted to express the nature of the successionless, and the unchangeable. The instant is a point of time, and has no sequences. Hence eternity has been defined as an " eternal Now," or an " universal Present." Kant re gards time as a form of the understanding ; that is, as the manner in which the finite mind thinks, by reason of its finiteness. Similarly, Berkeley (Principles of Knowledge, § 98) defines time to be the succession of thoughts in the hu man mind. If this definition be accepted, then there is no time for God, because there is no succession of thoughts in his mind. The form and manner of God's consciousness is totally different in respect to succession, from that of man's consciousness. He does not think sequaciously as man and angel do. " My thoughts are not as your thoughts," Is. 55:8.

The instantaneous vision, and successionless unchanging consciousness of the Divine omniscience, in comparison with the gradual view and successive increasing knowledge of the creature, have been thus illustrated. A person stands at a street corner, and sees a procession passing, whose component parts he does not know beforehand. He first sees white men, then black men, and lastly red men. When the last man has passed, he knows that the proces sion was composed of Europeans, Africans, and Indians. Now suppose that from a church tower he should see at one glance of the eye, the whole procession. Suppose that he saw no one part of it before the other, but that the total view was instantaneous. His knowledge of the procession would be all-comprehending, and without succession. He would not come into the knowledge of the components of the procession, as he did in the former case, gradually and part by part. And yet the procession would have its own movement still, and would be made up of parts that follow each other. Though the vision and knowledge of the pro cession, in this instance, is instantaneous, the procession itDIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 345

self is gradual. In like manner, the vast sequences of hu man history, and the still vaster sequences of physical his tory, appear all at once, and without any consciousness of succession, to the Divine observer. This is implied in the assertion that God " declareth the end from the beginning," Is. 46 : 10 ; and that " known unto God are all things from the beginning of the world," Acts 15 : 18. Both extremes of that unlimited series which make up the history of the created universe, together with all the intermediates, are seen at once, by the eternal Creator of the universe. Says Charnocke (Eternity of God), " though there be a succession and order of things as they exist, there is no succession in God in regard to his knowledge of them. God knows the things that shall be wrought, and the order of them in their being brought upon the stage of the world ; yet both the things and the order, he knows by one act [of knowledge]. The death of Christ was to precede his resurrection in the order of time ; there is a succession in this ; both at once are known by God ; yet the [one] act of his knowledge is not exercised about Christ as dying and rising at the same moment ; so that there is a succession in things, when there is no succession in God's knowledge of things." Man knows a succession successively ; God knows a succession instan taneously, and simultaneously. God sees the end from the beginning, and hence for him there is no interval nor se quence between the end and the beginning. Man sees the end from the end, not from the beginning, and hence there is an interval and sequence, for him, between the two.

Not only is God's act of knowledge eternal and successionless, but his act of power is so likewise. God creates all things from eternity by one act of power, as he knows all things from eternity by one act of knowledge, and as he decrees all things from eternity by one act of will. As we must employ the singular, not the plural, when we speak of the eternal decree, so we must when we speak of the eternal causation. There is one eternal all-comprehending decree,

346 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

and one eternal all-creating cause. For God, there is no series in his action any more than in his cognition, or in his purpose. God's energy as the cause of the creation is one and enccessionless, like his decree ; the creation itself, as the effect of this eternal cause, is a successive series. The cause is one ; the effect is many. The cause is eternal ; the effect is temporal. For the Divine consciousness, the crea tion of the world is not in the past, and the destruction of the world is not in the future. God is not conscious of an interval of thousands of years between the act by which he created the heaven and the earth "in the beginning" (Gen. 1 : 1), and the act by which he created man on " the sixth day " (Gen. 1 : 26), because, in this case, one would be older than the other, and thus only one of them would be an eter nal act. God's causative energizing in both instances was eternal, and therefore simultaneous ; but the effects of it were successive and temporal. It is impossible for the hu man mind to comprehend, or even to conceive of this. But it is necessary to postulate it, in order to maintain the Di vine immutability and omniscience. Neither of these attri butes can be established, if it be held that God's conscious ness respecting his exertion of power is successive like that of man or angel. Should we define God's eternal causation as an endless succession of creative volitions, then God's con sciousness of his future creative volitions is in the future, like that of man and angel. This is fatal to omniscience, when the consciousness relates to cognition ; and fatal to immutability, when the consciousness relates to action. If the Divine will, like the human, energized successively through the six days of creation, so that in the Divine con sciousness the Divine willing on the first day preceded the Divine willing on the second, and the Divine willing upon the third followed that upon the second, then God, like man and angel, is conscious that two days are longer than one, and three days longer than two ; which is contrary to the statement that " one day is with the Lord as a thousand

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 347

years, and a thousand years as one day," 2 Pet. 3:8; and to the affirmation that " a thousand years in his sight are but as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night," Ps. 90 : 4. The volition by which God created " the heaven and the earth " (Gen. 1:1) is eternal, but the heaven and the earth are not eternal. If the matter of the earth was originated ex nihilo (say) twenty million years ago, this matter is now exactly twenty million years old. But the Divine volition that originated it is not exactly twenty million years old. The created effect can be measured by days and years, but the creative cause can not be.

Eternity implies perfection and completeness ; time im plies imperfection and incompleteness. An eternal being, and an eternal consciousness, never improve and never de teriorate ; a temporal being and consciousness is contin ually experiencing one or the other. A creature increases in knowledge in certain directions, and loses knowledge in others. He acquires information and he forgets. The Creator has infinite knowledge at every instant, and neither learns nor forgets. " The duration of everything must of necessity be agreeable to its nature ; and, therefore, as that whose imperfect nature is ever flowing like a river, and con sists in continual motion and changes one after another, must needs have accordingly a successive and flowing dura tion, sliding perpetually from present into past, and always posting on toward the future, expecting something of itself which is not yet in being, but to come ; so must that whose perfect nature is essentially immutable, and always the same, and necessarily existent, have a permanent duration, never losing anything of itself once present, as sliding away from it, nor yet running forward to meet something of itself before, which is not yet in being." Cud worth : Intellectual System, I. v. It follows, therefore, that there is no evolution, or development in an eternal essence and consciousness. Evolution is change, by the very definition.

34:8 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

Development is a transition from one mode of existence and experience to another. If there be evolution in a con sciousness, then the consciousness is mutable, successive, fractional, and incomplete ; if there be no evolution in a consciousness, and it is without succession, then the con sciousness is immutable, simultaneous, omniscient, and com plete.

This characteristic of an eternal being and consciousness is enunciated in the scholastic dictum : " Deus est actus purissimus sine ulla potentialitate." There is nothing po tential or latent in the deity, as there always is in created and finite natures. " Necesse est id quod primum ens, esse in actu, et nullo modo in potentia," says Aquinas, Sumrna, I. iii. 1. One fatal error in the pantheistic conception of God is, that it attributes potentiality to him. It maintains that God is capable of evolution, and that he is endlessly passing through a process of development. This obliterates the distinction between the Infinite and the finite, by as cribing to the former a characteristic that belongs only to the latter. The Infinite cannot be the perfect, if the pan theistic postulate be true. For if the Infinite being is pass ing from lower to higher modes of existence and of consciousness, as finite being is, absolute and immutable perfection cannot be attributed to him. Moreover, since evolution may be from the more perfect to the less perfect, as well as from the less perfect to the more perfect, it fol lows from the pantheistic theory, that the Infinite being may tend downward, and become evil. See Shedd : Theo logical Essays, 134.

The all-comprehending and unchanging consciousness of God excludes memory. This can belong only to the finite mind. As there is nothing past in the consciouness of God, there can be no such act in him as that of recalling the past to mind. He neither remembers nor forgets, in the literal sense, because the whole of his knowledge is simultaneously and perpetually present. And this whole, or sum total, of

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 349

omniscience, includes all that which for the creature is ineluded in past, present, and future time.

The term " eternity " is sometimes employed in a second ary signification, to denote the future world in distinction from this ; as when it is said that a deceased man has gone into eternity. In this case, eternity does not denote successionless existence, but the spiritual existence of the next life. Men and angels cannot have the unchanging eternal consciousness of God. Every finite mind must think, feel, and act in time. Time is the necessary form of the finite understanding. This is one of the elements of difference between the Infinite and the finite.

" Immediate are the acts of God, more swift Than time, or motion ; but to human ears Cannot without process of speech be told, So told as earthly notion can receive." — MELTON.

Augustine upon this point errs, in attributing a successionless intuition to the beatific vision of the saints and an gels. In the heaven of heavens, " the inhabitants," he says (Confessions, XII. xiii.), " know all at once, not in part, not darkly, not through a glass, but as a whole, in manifesta tion, face to face, not this thing now, and that thing anon, but all at once, without succession of times." God un derstands the finite form of cognition, though it is not the form of cognition for him. He knows that for the creature there is an interval between events, but this does not imply that for him there is an interval. He perfectly compre hends man's knowledge by sensation, but this does not prove that he himself has sensation. "He knoweth our frame, and remembereth that we are dust," but he has no such per sonal consciousness of frailty.

The idea of an existence and consciousness without se quences and succession is difficult even to entertain, much less to comprehend. There is nothing analogous to it in human consciousness, which is wholly successive. Hence

350 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

the idea of the Divine eternity as without evolution, and change, is even more baffling to human intelligence than is the idea of triunity. The former is a greater mystery than the latter. The notions of paternity, filiation, and proces sion, enable the human mind to seize upon the doctrine of the trinity, but there are no corresponding points of con tact in the doctrine of the Divine eternity. For this rea son, some theologians define eternity as infinite time, and deny that it is without succession. They assert that there are sequences and intervals in God's consciousness, as there are in that of men and angels. This was the opinion of Clericus. But greater difficulties follow from the denial, than from the affirmation of a consciousness without succes sion in God. It is certain that God is omniscient and im mutable ; but he can be neither, if his mind is subject to the same categories of time and space with the created mind. For both are associated. A creature of time is also a creature of space. A finite spirit cannot be omnipresent. It is embodied, and therefore must exist in a locality. " The eternity of God," says Sehleiermacher (Glaubenslehre, § 52, 54), " is to be conceived as omnipotent eternity, that is, as that which in God determines and conditions time itself, with all that is temporal. God is /3a

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 351

her experience during a fearful storm at sea. " As the ves sel reeled under a tremendous shock, the conviction of our impending destruction became so intense in my mind, that my imagination suddenly presented to me the death-vision, so to speak, of my whole existence. I should find it im possible adequately to describe the vividness with which my whole past life presented itself to my perception ; not as a procession of events, filling up a succession of years, but as a whole — a total — suddenly held up to me as in a mirror, indescribably awful, combined with the simultaneous, acute, and almost despairing sense of loss, of waste, so to speak, by which it was accompanied. This instantaneous involun tary retrospect was followed by a keen and rapid survey of the religious belief in which I had been trained, and which then seemed to me my only important concern." In all diis, however, there is really a succession and a series ; only it is so exceedingly rapid as to seem simultaneous.

The Immutability of God is the unchangeableness of his essence, attributes, purposes, and consciousness. Immuta bility results from eternity, as omnipresence does from im mensity. That which has no evolution and no succession, is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. Malachi 3 : 6, " I arn Jehovah, I change not ; " Ps. 102 : 26, " The heavens shall perish, but thou shalt endure ; " James 1 : IT, " With whom is no variableness (7rapd\\ayrj\ neither shadow of turning." Immutability belongs to the Divine essence ; God can have no new attributes. It belongs also to the Divine will ; his decrees are unalterable. The Socinians Crellius and Vorstius deny this latter ; asserting that God can will what he once nilled, and nill what he once willed. This is contradicted by Scripture. Numbers 23 : 19, " God is not a man that he should lie ; nor the son of man that he should repent ;" Is. 46 : 10, " My counsel shall stand ; " Ps. 33 : 11, "The counsel of the Lord standeth forever;" Ps. 110:4, " The Lord hath sworn and will not repent ; " 1 Sam. 15 : 29, " The Strength of Israel will not lie nor repent ; " Heb. 6 :

352 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

17, " Whereby, God, willing to show the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath." Immutability also characterizes the Divine consciousness. Nothing new is added to it, and nothing old is subtracted from it. Infinite knowledge is a fixed quantity, and so is an infinite experi ence. God is immutable because : (a) His being is from himself, and not from another, (b) He cannot change for the better, nor for the worse, (c) All causes and reasons for change are wanting, viz. : dependence upon another, error of mind, inconstancy of will and purpose. The act of creation ex nihilo made no change in God. It did not affect his own eternal essence ; and his will and power to create were the same from eternity. Emanation ad extra would make a change in the essence. This is the outward effluence of substance, and diminishes the mass from which it issues. Incarnation made no change in God. The Divine essence was not transmuted into a human nature, but as sumed a human nature into union with itself.

God is said to repent. Gen. 6:6," It repented the Lord that he had made man upon the earth ; " Jonah 3 : 10, " God repented of the evil that he had said that he would do unto them." This means no change in his attributes and character, but only in his manner of treating men. " Kepentance in God is not a change of will, but a will to change." If God had treated the Ninevites after their re pentance, as he had threatened to treat them before their repentance, this would have proved him to be mutable. It would have showed him to be at one time displeased with impenitence, and at another with penitence. Charnocke (Immutability of God) remarks that " the unchangeableness of God, when considered in relation to the exercise of his attributes in the government of the world, consists not in always acting in the same manner, however cases and circumstances may alter; but in always doing what is right, and in adapting his treatment of his intelligent creatures to the variation of their actions and characters. When the

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 353

devils, now fallen, stood as glorious angels, they were the objects of God's love, necessarily ; when they fell, they were the objects of God's hatred, because impure. The same reason which made him love them while they were pure, made him hate them when they were criminal." It is one thing for God to will a change in created things ex ternal to himself, and another thing for him to change in his own nature and character. God can will a change in the affairs of men ; such as the abrogation of the Levitical priesthood and ceremonial ; and yet his own will remain immutable, because he had from eternity willed and decreed the change. In like manner, promises and threatenings that are made conditionally, and suppose a change in man, imply no change in the essence or attributes of God. " If that nation against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them," Jer. 18 : 7-10. ~No change is made in God, as there is in the creature, by his knowledge. A creature increases his knowledge, and experiences a change intellectually. But God's knowledge is a fixed quantity, because it is in finite, lie knows everything from everlasting to everlast ing, and at each instant, and there is no more than every thing. He knew before it came to pass, that Christ would be crucified upon Calvary. When that event occurred, it made no change in his knowledge. He was no better in formed than he was before. He was no more certain of the crucifixion after the event, than he was before it, be cause he had decreed that it should take place. He could not have foreknown that it would take place, unless he had predetermined that it should. If God does not first decide that an event shall happen, he must wait and see whether it happens in order to any certain knowledge ; and this would make a change in his knowledge.

God is an intelligent being, and knowledge is one of his communicable attributes. " God created man after his own image, in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness." Shorter

354 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

Catechism, Q. 10. The Divine essence considered as cog nizing gives the attribute of Omniscience. 1 John 3 : 20, " God is greater than our hearts, and knoweth all things ; " John 21 : IT, " Lord thou knowest all things ; " Acts 15 : 18, " Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world ; " Ileb. 4:13, " All things are naked and opened (reTjOa^XKTyLiez/a) unto the eye of him with whom we have to do;" Rom. 11:33; Matt. 6:32; 1 Kings 8:39; Ps. 139 : 1-16 ; Isa. 46 : 10 ; Ezek. 11 : 5.

The Divine knowlege is (a) Intuitive, as opposed to demonstrative or discursive ; it is not obtained by compar ing one thing with another, or deducing one truth from an other ; it is a direct vision. (5) Simultaneous, as opposed to successive ; it is not received gradually into the mind, and by parts ; the perception is total, and instantaneous. (

God's omniscience, from the creature's point of view, is foreknowledge ; but it is not foreknowledge from God's point of view. The Infinite mind comprehends all things in one simultaneous intuition, and, consequently, there is for it no " before," or " after." Says Charnocke (God's Knowledge), " God considers all things in his own simple knowledge as if they were now acted ; and therefore some have chosen to call the knowledge of things to come, not prescience, or foreknowledge, but knowledge ; because God sees all things at one instant." Says Owen (Vindiciae, V.), " God knows all things as they are ; and in that order wherein they stand. Things that are past, as to the order of the creatures, lie knows as past ; not by remembrance, however, as we do ; but by the same act of knowledge wherewith he knew them from all eternity, even before they were." But this knowledge of everything simulta neously and at once, is for the finite mind equivalent to

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 355

knowing before the event. Foreknowledge, strictly taken, implies an interval between the knowledge and the event. Had the Ninevites not repented, Nineveh would have been destroyed in accordance with the prophecy of Jonah. Forty days would have elapsed between Jonah's foreknowl edge of the event, and the event itself. A series of occur rences and experiences would have intervened, and become gradually known by Jonah. But this is not true of the Divine mind. God is not conscious of an interval of sev eral thousand years, between his knowledge of Christ's cru cifixion and the occurrence of the crucifixion. For God, Christ was crucified from eternity, and the event was known and real to him from all eternity. Omniscience excludes both foreknowledge and subsequent knowledge. In this reference, Augustine (De diversis quaestionibns, II. ii. 2) says : " What is foreknowledge but the knowledge of the future. But what is future to God ? For, if the divine knowledge includes all things at one instant, all things are present to him, and there is nothing future ; and his knowl edge is knowledge, and not foreknowledge." Says Charnocke (God's Knowledge), " the knowledge of one thing is not, in God, before another; one act of knowledge doth not beget another. In regard of the objects themselves, one thing is before another ; one year before another ; one generation of men before another ; one is the cause, and the other is the effect ; in the creature's mind there is such a succession, and God knows there will be such a succes sion ; but there is no such order in God's knowledge ; for he knows all those successions by one glance, without any succession of knowledge in himself."

God has a knowledge of all things that are possible, in distinction from things actual. lie knows all that he can do. This is denominated scientia simplicis intelligentiae. It is knowledge that is confined to the Divine understanding, and never causes an act of the will. The things that are possible and known as such, are never made real. Char356 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

nocke (God's Knowledge) explains it as the knowledge not only of the possible, but as speculative in distinction from practical knowledge. " God knows evil not with a practical knowledge, so as to be the author of it, but with a specula tive knowledge so as to understand the sinfulness of it ; or a knowledge simplicis intelligence, of simple intelligence, as he permits it, not positively wills it." God has a knowl edge of what is conditionally possible, that is, of those events which have never come to pass, but which might have occurred under certain possible conditions. This is denominated scientia media, or conditionata. For example, God knows that if a certain person should live to middle life, he would become exceedingly vicious and wicked. He prevents this by an early death of the person. Biblical in stances are, Matt. 11 : 21-23 (the repentance of Tyre and Sidon ; of Sodorn and Gomorrah) ; 1 Sam. 23 : 5-14 ; Jer. 38 : 17-20.

The doctrine of scientia media has been employed to ex plain the imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity. This sin is imputed because God foreknew that each one of the posterity would have committed it, if he had been placed in Adam's circumstances. But upon this theory, any man might be charged with any sin whatsoever ; for God knows that there is no sin which he would not com mit, if strongly tempted and not kept by divine grace. Furthermore, upon this theory, sin is imputed, in the order of nature, before it is committed. Socinus denies that God has foreknowledge of man's free acts. Owen : Yindiciae, V. Cicero (De divinatione) contends that prescience and free will are incompatible ; and since free will is neces sary to responsibility, this must be retained and foreknowl edge given up. Augustine examines Cicero's views, in De Civitate, Y. ix.

Wisdom is a particular aspect of the Divine knowledge. 1 Tim. 1 : 17, " God only wise." It is the intelligence of God as manifested in the adoption of means to ends. The

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 357

Hebrew ton^ and the Greek o-o<£o?, primarily signify skilful, expert. It is seen : 1. In creation. Ps. 19 : 1-7 ; " The heavens declare the glory of God ; " Ps. 104 : 1-34, " O Lord, how manifold are thy works ; in wisdom hast thou made them all ; " Job 38 : 5, " Who hath laid the measures thereof ? " 2. In providence. Ps. 33 : 10, 11, " The Lord brought the counsel of the heathen to nought;" Kom. 8:28, "All things work together for good." 3. In re demption. 1 Cor. 2:7; Rom. 11 : 33, " O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and the knowledge of God ! " Eph. 3 : 10, "The manifold (TroXzW/aXo?) wisdom of God." The wisdom of God is called " the foolishness of God " (1 Cor. 1 : 25), in order to exhibit its infinite superiority to human wisdom. The lowest degree of Divine wisdom, so low as to be called folly in comparison with the highest de gree, is wiser than men. Wisdom is represented as a triuitarian person, in Prov. 8, and is the same as the Logos of John 1 : 1.

Wisdom implies a final end, to which all secondary ends are subordinate. This end is the glory of God. Rom. 11:36, "To him are all things." Says Leighton, "As God could swear by no greater, he swears by himself ; so as he could propose no greater end, he proposed himself." The glory of God means such a manifestation of the Divine perfections as leads creatures to worship and adore. Ado ration is the highest act of a creature, and the revealed ex cellence of the Creator is the object that elicits it. The es sential glory of God, that is, his glory as it exists per se, is not intended in this definition. This is the same, whether there be a creation or not ; whether there be worship or not.

The happiness of the creature cannot be the final end of God's action. There would be no wisdom in this case, be cause the superior would be subordinated to the inferior. This would be folly, not wisdom. It would be a mal-adaptation of means to ends. The end would be made the means,

358 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

and the means the end. The infinite would exist for the finite. Moreover, happiness from its very nature cannot be an ultimate end, because to seek it is to fail of get ting it, "He that finds his life shall lose it." To seek holiness as an ultimate end is to attain it. To seek holiness results in happiness, but not vice versa. Happiness is the effect, and holiness is the cause. Hence the command is, " Be ye holy," not, " Be ye happy." Another proof that happiness is not an ultimate end like holiness, is the fact that there are many kinds of happiness, but only one kind of holiness. Happiness depends upon the attainment of an object that is different from itself; and the objects are vari ous : such as wealth, pleasure, fame, in the lower eudaemonism ; and knowledge, culture, and virtue, in the higher. But holiness does not depend upon securing an object dif ferent from itself. A man is happy, only when he has ob tained wealth, or fame, or culture, or something that is other than happiness itself. But a man is holy, not by ob taining wealth, fame, or culture, or something other than holiness, but by obtaining holiness itself. Consequently, holiness can be an ultimate end, but happiness cannot be. Yet, the moral perfection of the creature cannot be re garded as the final end of GocPs action, though this is a higher view than the preceding. The creature in any as pect cannot be regarded as the last end, any more than the first cause of all things. The finite will cannot be an ulti mate end for the infinite will. The creature must say, " Kot my will, but thine be done." Similarly, a finite nature or being cannot be an ultimate end for the infinite being.

The Power of God is the Divine essence energizing, and producing outward effects. It is the Divine activity ad extra. The immanent activity of the essence ad intra, as seen in the trinal distinctions and their intercommunion, does not come under the category of the Divine power. For this is necessary and constitutional activity. It is not optional with God to be triune. Eternal generation and

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 359

spiration are not, like creation, providence, and redemption, acts of power, in the sense that if God so please they need not be performed. The Divine power is optional in its exercise. God need not have created anything. And after creation, he may annihilate. Only when he has bound himself by promise, as in the instance of faith in Christ, does his action cease to be optional. It cannot be said that God may keep his promises, or not, as he pleases.

The Divine power is Omnipotence. Ps. 115 : 3, " Our God is in the heavens ; he hath done whatsoever he hath pleased ; " Eev. 4:8," Holy Lord God Almighty ; " Gen. 17 : 1, u I am the Almighty God." Omnipotence is called the " word " or " command " of God. Ps. 33 : 6, " By the word of the Lord the heavens were made. He commanded and it stood fast." This denotes the greatness of the power. Creation requires only God's fiat. The Divine power is not to be measured merely by what God has actu ally effected. Omnipotence is manifested in the works of the actual creation, but it is not exhausted by them. God could create more than he has, if he pleased. He can do more than he has done, should it be his will. He could have raised up children to Abraham from the stones in the bed of Jordan ; he could have sent in aid of the suffering Eedeemer twelve legions of angels.

The Divine power is limited only by the absurd and selfcontradictory. God can do anything that does not imply a logical impossibility. A logical impossibility means that the predicate is contradictory to the subject; for exam ple, a material spirit, a corporeal deity, a sensitive stone, an irrational man, a body without parts or extension, a square triangle. These are not objects of power, and there fore it is really no limitation of the Divine omnipotence to say that it cannot create them. They involve the absurdity that a thing can be and not be at the same time. A logical impossibility is, in truth, a nonentity ; and to say that God

360 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

cannot create a nonentity, is not a limitation or denial of power. For power is the ability to create entity.

Again, God cannot do anything inconsistent with the perfection of the Divine nature. Under this category, fall the instances mentioned in Heb. 6 : 18, "It is impossible for God to lie ; " and 2 Tim. 2 : 13, " He cannot deny him self ; " and James 1 : 13, " God cannot be tempted." God cannot sin : (a) Because sin is imperfection, and it is con tradictory to say that a necessarily perfect Being may be imperfect. (J) God cannot sin, because he cannot be tempted to sin, and sinning without temptation or motive to sin, is impossible. God cannot be tempted, because temptation implies a desire for some good that is supposed to be greater than what is already possessed. But God cannot see any thing more desirable than what he already has ; and his un derstanding is infallible, so that he cannot mistake an ap parent for a real good. All such cases, when analyzed, will be found to imply something contradictory to the idea and definition of God. If it could be supposed that God is ca pable to be tempted and to sin, it would prove that he is not infinite. God is not able to die, to see corruption (Acts 2 : 27), to become non-existent. This would be finite weak ness, not almighty power. Says Augustine (De Symbolo, I. i.), " God is omnipotent, and yet he cannot die, he can not lie, he cannot deny himself. How is he omnipotent then ? lie is omnipotent for the very reason that he can not do these things. For if he could die, he would not be omnipotent." Again he remarks (De Civitate, V. x.) that " the power of God is not diminished when it is said that he cannot die, and cannot sin ; for if he could do these things, his power would be less. A being is rightly called omnipotent, from doing what he wills, and not from suffer ing what he does not will."

A question arose among the schoolmen in regard to the Divine omnipotence, and some of them asserted the abso lute omnipotence of God, in the sense that he could do

DIVINE ATTBIBUTES. 361

whatever could be conceived of, either logically or illogically ; whether good or evil ; whether self-contradictory or not.1 They separated the natural from the moral attri butes, and asserted the possibility of a conflict between them. Their view of God implied that his natural attri butes are more central and ultimate than his moral and ethical attributes ; that might in the deity is more funda mental and absolute than right. But the moral attributes are as central and controlling in God as the natural, and it is impossible to conceive that in his most perfect being, bare power can be divorced from wisdom and holiness, and trample them under. Shedd : History of Doctrine, II. 301304.

The manifestations of the Divine power are seen : 1. In Creation. The peculiar characteristic of this exertion of power is, that it originates ex nihilo. The miraculous ia the same kind of exercise of omnipotence. The miracle is creative from nothing. Rom. 4:17, "God calleth those things which be not, as though they were." Isa. 44 : 24 ; Gen. 1:1. 2. In Providence ; by which what has been created is preserved, evolved, and controlled. Heb. 1 : 3, "Upholding all things by the word of his power." The omnipotence of God exerted in the act of creation is denom inated potentia absoluta. In this instance, there is no use made of anything that is in existence. It is the operation of the First cause alone. The Divine omnipotence exerted in providence is called potentia ordinata. In this instance, there is use made of existing things. God in providence emi Des Cartes asserts this. "God did not will that the three angles of a tri angle should be equal to two right angles because he knew it could not possibly be otherwise. But because he willed that the three angles of a triangle should be necessarily equal to two right angles, therefore this is now true ; and so on of other things. Nor is there any need to inquire how God from eternity could have made it true that twice four should not be eight, for I confess that this cannot be understood by us." Des Cartes : Responsiones, § 6. In other places, however, Des Cartes u reasoned more correctly," says Cudworth, II. 532. Tegg's Ed.

362 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

ploys the constitution and laws of nature which he created for this very purpose. The First cause uses second causes previously originated ex riihilo. God causes the warmth of the atmosphere by the rays of the sun, and not by an exer tion of absolute omnipotence. All evolution belongs to the province of God's potentia ordinata. 3. In Kedemption. 1 Cor. 1 : 24, " Christ is the power of God." Horn. 1 : 16, The gospel is " the power of God." Is. 53 : 1, " Messiah is the arm of the Lord." Ps. 80 : 17, Messiah is " the man of thy right hand."

The Holiness of God is the perfect rectitude of his will. The divine will is in absolute harmony with the divine nature. Isa. 6:3," Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts." Isa. 57 : 15 ; Ex. 15 : 11 ; Ps. 89 : 35 ; 145 : 17 ; Amos 4:2; Rev. 4:8; 15 : 4. God's word is holy, Rom. 1 : 2. His promise is holy, Ps. 105 : 42. His sabbath is holy, Isa. 58 : 13. His people are holy, Isa. 62 : 12. His resi dence is holy, Isa. 57 : 15. His angels are holy, Rev. 14 : 10.

Holiness in God cannot be defined in the same terms in which holiness in man or angel is defined, namely, as con formity to the moral law. The moral law supposes a superior being whose love and service are obligatory upon the inferior. " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself," is no law for God. The moral law is the rule of conduct only for finite beings, who are subjects of the divine government. The words, " thou shalt," and " thou shalt not," are inapplicable to the Infinite One. Holiness in God must, consequently, be defined as con formity to his own perfect nature. The only rule for the divine will is the divine reason; and the divine reason pre scribes everything that it is befitting an Infinite being to do. God is not under law, nor above law. He is law. He is righteous by nature and of necessity. The trisagion teaches this truth. God is the source and author of law for all other beings.

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 363

The Divine holiness is expressed: 1. By law given to man ; 2. By feelings in the Divine nature.

1. God's holiness is manifested: (a) In the moral law. (7>) In physical laws, which appear in the course and consti tution of nature, and secure happiness to virtue, and con nect misery with vice, (c) In mental laws. Peace of con science, upon obedience, is the most exquisite enjoyment; remorse of conscience, upon disobedience, is the most ex quisite torture, (d) In positive laws. These spring not from the constitution of nature, or of the human mind, but are enactments by the arbitrary will of God. Such are the law of the Sabbath, and the Levitical law.

The moral law is the most important and clearest of the expressions of the Divine holiness. It is drawn out analyt ically in the ten commandments. These contain two di visions or tables, relating to man's duty to God, primarily, and to his fellow-man, secondarily. The sermon on the mount is a revised edition of the decalogue, and consti tutes the legal basis of the new covenant, as the decalogue did of the old. Christ in the sermon interprets and spirit ualizes the ten commandments. This progress in the reve lation of the moral law explains the temporary allowance, under the old economy, of some evils that were prohibited and abolished under the new ; such as slavery and polyg amy. These were tolerated among the chosen people, " be cause of the hardness of their hearts " (Matt. 19 : 8) ; that is, because the existing condition and circumstances of the people made their immediate abolition impossible. Tolera tion is not approval, but the very contrary. It implies that the thing endured is intrinsically wrong. ~No one toler ates what is intrinsically right. Slavery and polygamy were not legalized and sanctioned by the decalogue, though they were permitted temporarily under the the ocracy.

2. Holiness is expressed in the Divine feelings respecting right and wrong. The elder theologians describe it as an

3G4 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

attribute of will, in this reference. Turrettin (III. xiv. 1) says : " To the will of God pertain those attributes (virtutes) which denote his perfection in disposition and action." They are comprised under justice and benevolence. God as de lighting in purity is holy. Ps. 11 : 7, " The righteous Lord loveth righteousness." Ps. 35 : 5, " The Lord loveth righteousness." Ps. 37 : 28 ; 99 : 4. God as abhorring evil is holy. Jer. 44 : 4, " O do not this abominable thing which I hate." Ileb. 1 : 13.

Holiness occupies a place second to none among the com municable attributes. " If any," says Charnocke, " this at tribute hath an excellency above the other perfections of God. There are some attributes of God which we prefer because of our interest in them, and the relation they bear to us: as we esteem his goodness before his power, and his mercy whereby he relieves us, before his justice where by he punisheth us ; so there are some that God delights to honor because of their excellency. Where do you find any other attribute trebled in the praise of it? 'Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts.' " Holiness is the quality which man is most particularly commanded to possess : Lev. 19 : 2, " Ye shall be holy, for I am holy." Compare 1 Pet. 1 : 1416. It is the attribute which God singles out to swear by. Ps. 89 : 35, " Once have I sworn by my holiness, that I will not lie to David."

Holiness is a general term denoting that quality in God whereby he is right (rectus) in himself, and in all his ac tions. This is implied in the Hebrew p^S, which means straight ; and the Greek St/cato?, which means exactly right (aequus). But right is determined in its manifestation, by the character of the person towards whom it is manifested. What would be right towards an obedient creature, would be wrong towards a disobedient one. This brings to view the attribute of Justice, as a mode of holiness.1 In the

1 Owen : On Divine Justice. Edwards : Satisfaction for Sin, IL

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 365

Westminster Larger Catechism, Q. 7. after describing God as " most holy," it is added "most just."

Justice is that phase of God's holiness which is seen in his treatment of the obedient and the disobedient subjects of his government. It is that attribute whereby he gives to everyone what is due him. The notion of debt or obli gation necessarily enters into that of justice. Sin is indebt edness to law. Matt. 6 : 12, " Forgive us our debts." Cicero (De Finibus, 23) defines justice as " animi affectus suum cuique tribuens." The element of indebtedness, together with that of retribution and penalty, is eliminated from the attribute in the Socinian soteriology. Justice, in this theory, is employed in the loose and general sense of moral excel lence. " There is," says Socinus (Prelectiones Theologicae, c. 16), " no such justice in God as requires absolutely and inexorably that sin be punished. There is, indeed, a per petual, and constant justice in God, but this is nothing but his moral equity and rectitude, by virtue of which there is no depravity or iniquity in any of his works."

The attribute of justice is abundantly taught in Scripture. Dent. 32 : 4, " All his ways are judgment, a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he." Ex. 20 : 5, "I am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children." Ex. 34:7, "The Lord God will by no means clear the guilty." Job 8 : 3 ; 34 : 12 ; Ps. 145 : 17 ; Dan. 9 : 14 ; Matt. 10 : 28 ; Rom. 2 : 6-10.

Rectoral justice is God's rectitude as a ruler, over both the good and the evil. It relates to legislation, or the im position of law. God, both in rewarding and punishing, lays down a just law. The reward and the penalty are ex actly suited to the actions. Job 34 : 23, " For he will not lay upon man more than right." Ps. 89 : 14, " Justice and judgment are the habitation of thy throne." Distribu tive justice is God's rectitude in the execution of law, both in reference to the good and the evil. It relates to the distribution of rewards and punishments. Rom. 2 : 6,

366 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

God "will render to every man according to his deeds."

1 Pet. 1 : 17, " The Father without respect of persons judgeth according to every man's work." Isa. 3 : 10, 11, " Say ye to the righteous that it shall be well with him. Woe unto the wicked ! it shall be ill with him." Distributive justice is twofold : (a) remunerative justice ; (I) retribu tive justice. 1. Remunerative justice is the distribution of rewards both to men and angels. Ps. 58 : 11, '; Verily there is a reward for the righteous." Deut. 7 : 9, 12, 13 ;

2 Chron. 6 : 15, " Thou hast kept with thy servant David my father, that which thou hast promised him." Micah 7 : 20 ; Matt. 25 : 21, " Because thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many things." Matt. 25 : 34 ; Kom. 2:7; Ileb. 11 : 26 ; Jude 6~

Remunerative j ustice is the expression of the divine love (ayaTrr)), as retributive justice is of the divine wrath (0/3777). It proceeds upon the ground of relative merit only. The creature cannot establish an absolute merit before the crea tor. This is taught by our Lord in Luke 17 : 10, " When ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants ; " and by St. Paul in 1 Cor. 4:7, " What hast thou that thou didst not re ceive ; why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it ? " and by God to Job, 41 : 11, " Who hath prevented me, that I should repay him ? Whatsoever is under the whole heaven is mine." Accordingly, the Westminster Confes sion, VII. i., affirms that " the distance between God and the creature is so great, that although reasonable creatures do owe obedience unto him as their creator, yet they could never have any fruition of him as their blessedness and re ward, but by some voluntary condescension on God's part, which he hath been pleased to express by way of covenant."

Absolute merit, as distinguished from relative, supposes an independent relation and agency between two parties, like that between man and man. One man does not create and uphold another man, while the one is serving and obeyDIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 367

ing the other. But this is the state of the case, when man serves and obeys God. Creation, preservation, and re demption all preclude that independent agency by which one party brings another under obligations to him, and es tablishes an absolute merit or indebtedness. Consequently, the exercise of remunerative justice by God is pactional and gracious. It results from a previous covenant upon his part. The reward of a creature's obedience is in consequence of a Divine promise. No primary and original obligation rests upon the Creator to recompense for services rendered by a creature whom he has made from nothing, and continually upholds in existence. A soul that is created holy cannot demand from its maker, at the instant of creation, a re ward for being holy upon the ground of an absolute in debtedness on the part of its maker. Because God has originated the powers and capacities of a creature from nothing, he is entitled to all the agency of these faculties without paying for it ; as the artificer of a watch is entitled to all the motion of the watch, without coming under obli gation to the watch. Even this comparison is inadequate ; for the maker of the watch did not create the materials out of which it is made. But God creates the very substance itself out of which man's faculties of mind and body are made. All that strict justice would require on the part of God, in case a creature should continue in the holiness in which he is created is, that he should not cause him to suf fer. That he should go further than this, and positively reward him for being and continuing holy, is gracious treat ment. If the creature's holiness were self -originated and self-sustained, instead of concreated and sustained by God, then the merit would be absolute, and God would owe the reward by an original and uncovenanted obligation. Not only are the being and faculties, by which the obedience is rendered, created and upheld by God, but the disposition rightly to employ them is due to the Holy Spirit. David expresses this truth in 1 Chron. 29 : 14, " But who am I, and

what is my people, that we should be able to offer so will ingly after this sort ? For all things come of thee, and of thine own have we given thee."

But though no primary and original obligation rests upon the Creator, to reward a creature made from nothing, and continually upheld and helped in the service which he ren ders, yet he can constitute a secondary and relative obliga tion. He can promise to reward the creature's service ; and having bound himself to reward obedience, his own word establishes a species of claim. Obedient man, or angel, may plead the Divine promise as the ground of reward. God desires to be reminded of his promise, and is honored when the creature trusts in it implicitly. And " if we be lieve not, yet he abideth faithful : he cannot deny himself," 2 Tim. 2 : 13. In the words of Witsius (Covenants, I. i. iv.), " God by his promise, has made himself a debtor to men. Or, to speak in a manner more becoming God, he was pleased to make his performance of his promise a debt due to himself. To this purpose, Augustine, Sermo 16, speaks well : i God became our debtor, not by receiving anything, but by promising what he pleased. For it was of his own bounty that he vouchsafed to make himself a debtor.' '; The Scripture representations agree with this. In Rom. 6 : 23, the recompense of obedience is denominated a " gift " (^apia-fjia) ; while that of disobedience is called " wages " (b^rtovia). Sin is the solitary action of the will unassisted by grace ; but holiness is the action of the will wrought upon by God. Again, the reward of obedience is denominated an " inheritance : " Acts 20 : 32, " To give you an inheritance among all them which are sanctified." Eph. 1 : 11, 14, " We have obtained an inheritance." Col. 1 : 2, " The Father hath made us meet to be partakers of the in heritance of the saints in light." But an inheritance is not the payment of a debt, in the strict sense of the word. It results from the parental and filial relations, and not from those of creditor and debtor. Yet, as an inheritance may

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 369

be called the reward of filial obedience, so tlie blessedness of the future state may be and is called the reward of Christian obedience here upon earth.

Since God and redeemed man are two distinct agents, there is a personal quality in man's obedience whereby it is truly rewardable. When God rewards a believer for his severe struggle with a bosom-sin, lie does not reward God's struggle, but man's. Though the struggle was started, helped and made successful by the Holy Spirit, yet it was, after all, a human, not a divine conflict with sin. This is rewardable, and when God rewards it, he does not reward himself but his creature. Paul teaches this in saying, " I live." There is a personal and human quality in the holi ness and the obedience. But that this may not be so ex aggerated as to imply that the personal and the human has been independent and self-sustaining in the holiness and obedience, arid that God has thus been brought under the absolute obligation of a debtor to a creditor, he adds, " Yet not I, but Christ which liveth in me." That the reward of obedience is gracious is still more true in the case of re deemed man. Here, there has been positive disobedience and ill-desert. The gospel promise of reward, in this case, is made not only to a creature, but to a sinful creature.

The rewards for obedience are : 1. Natural. God so constitutes man and nature that virtue has happy conse quences : (a) Peace of conscience : 1 Pet. 3 : 21, " The an swer of a good conscience ; " (J) Worldly prosperity : 1 Tim. 4 : 8, " Godliness hath the promise of the life that now is." 2. Positive. These are the rewards bestowed in the future life, which far exceed the merely natural operations of con science, and earthly good. They consist principally in a special manifestation of the Divine love and approbation. John 14 : 23 ; Matt. 25 : 34-40 ; Ps. 16 : 11, "In thy pres ence is fulness of joy." Ps. 17 : 15, " I shall be satisfied when I awake in thy likeness."

Eetributive justice (sometimes denominated punitive,

370 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

vindicative, or, in the older English, vindictive, avenging, or revenging, L. C. 77) is that part of distributive justice which relates to the infliction of penalty. It is the expres sion of the divine opytf. In a sinless world, there would be no place for its exercise, and it would be comparatively an unimportant aspect of the general attribute of justice. But in a sinful world, retribution must hold a prominent place ; and hence in the Christian religion, which is a religion for a fallen race of beings, retributive justice comes continually into view. Hence when justice is spoken of without any qualifying word to show that some other aspect of the attri bute is meant, punitive justice is intended. Passages of Scripture which present it are : "Rom. 1 : 32, " The judg ment of God is, that they which do such things are worthy of death." Rom. 2:8," Who will visit tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil." 2 Thess. 1:8," The Lord Jesns shall be revealed in flaming fire, taking vengeance (efcBlKtja-Lv) on them that know not God." Acts 28 : 4, " Yengeance (Si/crj) suffereth not to live." Rom. 12 : 19, " Yengeance (e/tSt'/r^o-fc?) is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord."

Retributive justice is expressed : 1. In the commandment that is given with a penalty attached to it. Gen. 2:17, " Thou shalt not eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge ; in the day that thou eatest thou shalt surely die." Gal. 3 : 10, " Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things writ ten in the law to do them." Deut. 27 : 26. Ezek. 18 : 4, "The soul that sinneth, it shalt die." Rom. 6 : 23, "The wages of sin is death." The moral law expresses the mind and intention of the lawgiver. 2. In the actual infliction of the penalty threatened. Both are requisite. The former without the latter would evince want of veracity ; want of power ; or vacillation.

There is an important difference between remunerative and retributive merit, or between the merit of holiness and the demerit of sin. While the former is relative, the latter

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 371

is absolute. If a disobedient creature were disposed to do so, he could demand the recompense due to his transgres sion of the moral law, as something that is strictly due to him. Divine justice is originally and necessarily obliged to requite disobedience, but not to reward obedience. God does not covenant to punish sin, as he does to recompense holiness. The requital in the case of transgression is not pactional and by promise, but necessary. The reason of this is, that sin has the creature for its ultimate and sole efficient. Unlike holiness, sin does not run back to God as its author. When obedience takes place, the Infinite will works in the finite will, both to will and to do. But when disobedience takes place, the finite will works alone. In the act of sin, man is an original and unassisted, though not unsupported author. He performs an act that is analo gous to the Divine act of creation ex nihilo. It is true that the faculties of the creature by which sin is committed are created and upheld by the creator. God sustains the being of man or angel, in and during the very acting of sin. But the wrong agency is the creature's alone. God does not co operate in the act of transgression, and hence its demerit is absolute and not relative.

At this point we notice the doctrine of the Divine concursus. A distinction has been made between an action and the viciousness of an action. The first is called the " ma terial " part of the action, and the latter the " formal " part. God, it is said, concurs in the material, but not in the formal part of sin. " Every action is good by a physical goodness, as it is an act of the mind or hand, which have a natural goodness by creation ; but every action is not morally good : the physical goodness of the action depends on God, the moral evil on the creature." Charnocke : On Holiness, 499. The objection to this distinction between a "material" and a " formal " part of sin is, that the material part of it is not sinful. Sin is a compound of guilt and innocence, ac cording to this analysis and definition. But sin is simple,

372 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

not compound in its nature. It is evil and only evil. To define it as a composition of that which is good in itself with that which is evil, is illogical. The following illustra tion which Charnocke (Holiness, p. 500) gives, will illus trate this. "Two judges are in joint commission for the trial of a malefactor, and both upon proof of his guilt con demn him. This action in both, considered as an action, is good; for it is adjudging a man to death whose crime deserves such a punishment. But this same act, which is but one joint act of both, may be morally good in one judge, and morally evil in the other : morally good in him that condemns him out of an unbiassed consideration of the de merit of the crime ; and morally evil in the other who hath not respect to this consideration, but is moved by some pri vate animosity against the prisoner, and a desire of revenge for some private injury he has received from him. The act in itself is the same materially in both ; but in one it is an act of justice, and in the other an act of murder, as it re spects the principle and motive of it in the two judges."

Upon examining this case, it will be found that what is called the " formal " part of sin is in reality the essence of it ; and what is called the " material" part of sin is no part of it at all. The sin in the instance of the sinful judge, as Charnocke says, is in the principle and motive of his act of passing sentence. This principle and motive is the selfish disposition of the man ; which is simply the inclination or self-determination of his will. This inclination, and this alone, is the viciousness and guilt in the case. Whether the judge actually passed the sentence verbally or not, would make no difference with the fact of his selfishness and sin in the sight of God. This internal action of the will, seen in the self-moving inclination and disposition, is the wickedness of the man. To add to it the action of the physical faculty of the tongue in speaking the sentence, is to add nothing that essentially belongs to the idea and def inition of sin. To distinguish, therefore, this bodily and

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 373

physical part of man's agency, in which God confessedly concurs, as evidence that God concurs in the act of sin itself, is not to the purpose. The real question is, whether God concurs and co-operates in that internal action of the will which is the real malignity and wickedness in the case sup posed. Did God work in the revengeful judge to will, is the question. Did he " concur " in his malignant disposi tion? The answer to this question must be in the negative.

Retributive justice is an attribute whose exercise is neces sary, in case there be transgression of the moral law. God cannot lay down a law, affix a penalty, and threaten its infliction, and proceed no further, in case of disobedience. The divine veracity forbids this. He has solemnly declared that " he will by no means clear the guilty," Ex. 34 : 7. If the penalty is not inflicted, it is not " impossible for God to lie," Heb. 6 : 18; and it is untrue that " the Lord hath sworn and will not repent," Ps. 110 : 4. Hence, in every instance of transgression, the penalty of law must be in flicted, either personally or vicariously ; either upon the transgressor or upon his substitute. The remission of pen alty under the Divine administration is not absolute, but relative. It may be omitted in respect to the real criminal, but, if so, it must be inflicted upon some one in his place.

At this point, the possibility of the vicarious satisfac tion of retributive justice requires a brief notice. The full discussion of the topic belongs to the doctrine of Atone ment. See Yol. II., p. 451. The exercise of justice, while necessary in respect to sin, is free and sovereign in respect to the sinner. Justice necessarily demands that sin be punished, but not necessarily in the person of the sinner. Justice may allow of the substitution of one person for an other, provided that in the substitution no injustice is done to the rights of any of the parties interested. This prin ciple was expressed by the schoolmen in the statement, " impersonaliter poenarn necessario infligi ornni peccato, sed non personaliter omni peccatori." In the words of

374 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

Turrettin (III. xix. 4), " duplex jus oritur circa poenae inflictionem ; aliud necessarium et indispensabile respectu peccati ipsius, aliud vero liberuin et positivum respectu peccatoris."

This agrees with the intuitive convictions of man. " The profound and awful idea of substitution meets us in the religion of the early Romans. When the gods of the com munity were angry, and nobody could be laid hold of as definitely guilty, they might be appeased by one who voltunarily gave himself up (devovere se). Noxious chasms in the ground were closed, and battles half-lost were con verted into victories, when a brave citizen threw himself as an expiatory offering into the abyss, or upon the foe." Mommsen : Rome, I. xii. Mommsen adds that the compul sory substitution of the innocent for the guilty, human sac rifice by force, was not allowed in the early Roman com monwealth. There was, moreover, no formal provision for this substitution in the legislation of the Romans. This substitution was the action of popular impulse, and of the voluntary decision of the individual. Some assert that the substitution of penalty is impossible, and cite in proof the passages : Gen 2 : 17, " In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die;" and Ezek. 18:4, 20, "The soul that sinneth it shall die." In these passages, the verb, not the pronoun, is the emphatic word. They teach the same truth with Rom. 6 : 23 : " The wages of sin is death." If, in these texts, the emphasis is to be laid upon the pronouns " it " and " thou," so as to make the Divine declaration to be, that every individual who transgresses shall himself suf fer the penalty of transgression, and that no other person shall suffer it vicariously for him, then the salvation of a sinner is impossible. For nothing could occur but the exe cution of penalty upon the actual transgressor. No exercise of mercy could take place in the universe of God. Such an interpretation admits of no alternative, and every soul that sinned would die. But that this cannot be the explaDIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 375

nation intended to be put upon these threatenings, is proved by the fact that not every soul that has sinned does suffer the penalty threatened. The implied meaning of these texts, therefore, is, that " in the day thou eatest thereof, thou or thy redeemer shalt die ; the soul that sinneth, it, or its surety shall die." Sin must be punished personally, or else vicariously. "It may be objected," says Edwards (God's Sovereignty), " that God said, If thou eatest thou shalt die ; as though the same person that sinned must suf fer ; and, therefore, Why does not God's truth oblige him to that ? I answer, that the word then was not intended to be restrained to him that in his own person sinned. Adam probably understood that his posterity were included, whether they sinned in their own person or not. If they sinned in Adam, their surety, those words, ' If thou eatest,' meant, ' If thou eatest in thyself, or in thy surety.' And therefore, the latter words, ' Thou shalt die,' do also fairly allow of such a construction as, ' Thou shalt die, in thyself, or in thy surety.' "

The demand of retributive justice is, that sin be punished to the full measure and degree announced in the law. " The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all un godliness and unrighteousness of men," Eom. 1 : 8. The Divine displeasure expressed in punitive justice is not aimed against the person as such, and distinct from his sin. " God," says Charnocke (Holiness, 473), u is not displeased with the nature of man as man, for that was derived from him ; but with the nature of man as sinful, which is derived from the sinner himself. God hates only the sin, not the sinner ; he desires only the destruction of the one, not the misery of the other." God loves the person as such. The immortal nature of man is precious in his sight. Divine justice has no angry spite against anyone's person. Conse quently, if its claims can be satisfied by a suffering endured by another person, properly qualified, there is no feeling of animosity against the sinner's person, to prevent the substi376 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

tution. It is true that justice is not obliged to accept a substitute. It can insist, if it pleases, upon the infliction of the penalty upon the actual criminal. But neither is it obliged to refuse a substitute. Justice is not tied up, by anything in its own nature, to the infliction of the law's penalty upon the identical person of the sinner, to the ex clusion of any other person whatsoever.

In the sphere of human life, a refusal to admit a substi tution of one person for another, in the only case in which substitution is allowable, viz., in commercial law, would look like malice, and would require explanation. Should a creditor refuse to receive the complete vicarious payment of a debt from a friend of the debtor (though this would involve no difficulty for the debtor, who could of course take his friend's money and pay it in person, yet), it would evince a malignant and spiteful feeling of the creditor towards the person of the debtor. It would look as if, be sides obtaining the full satisfaction of his claims, he desired to injure him, or in some way to vex and worry him.1 But in the Divine sphere, the suspicion of personal animosity, in case of a refusal to permit a vicarious satisfaction of jus tice, could not arise, because of the absolute perfection of God. " As for God, his way is perfect," Ps. 18 : 30. And had the Supreme Judge permitted no substitute for man the guilty, it would be necessary to assume that there were good reasons for the procedure. The reasons might be un known, and perhaps unknowable. But the reason certainly could not be, that the Eternal Judge feels hatred towards the body and soul of a man, as that particular man. There is no malignant feeling in God towards the person of even the most wicked and devilish transgressor. God is not a respecter of persons in any sense. He has no prejudice for, or grudge against, any one of his creatures ; and if the complete satisfaction of justice can be secured by a vicarious

1 Compare what Cicero (De Officiis, Lib. I. 10) says concerning a "malicious interpretation " of law.

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 377

endurance of penalty, he has no such ill-will towards the sinner's person, in distinction from his sin, as would pre vent him from accepting it, in case there were no reasons in his own mind why he should not. On the contrary, he loves the person, the immortal spirit, of the transgres sor ; as he has abundantly evinced in the gospel method of mercy. It is, however, to be carefully noticed, in case there be substitution of penalty : 1. That the substituted penalty must be a strict and full equivalent. Justice is in exorable upon this point. Here, the necessary nature of the attribute appears. 2. That the person substituted be able to render complete satisfaction, and be himself no debtor to law and justice.

The sovereignty and freedom of God in respect to justice, therefore, relates not to the abolition, nor to the relaxation, but to the substitution of punishment. It does not consist in any power to violate or waive legal claims. These must be maintained in any event. "Fiat justitia ruat coelum" is an intuitive conviction. The exercise of the other attri butes of God is regulated and conditioned by that of justice. God cannot exert omnipotence unjustly, or benevolence, or mercy. The question, " Shall not the judge of all the earth do right ? " (Gen. 18 : 25), must be answered affirmatively. It follows, then, that the sovereignty of God in respect to retributive justice, consists in his power and right to satis fy its claims in more than one way. He has a choice of methods. He may inflict the full amount of suffering due to sin, either upon the sinner, or upon a proper substitute. He may require the complete satisfaction of justice from the transgressor, or he may provide it for him vicariously. Divine justice may smite the guilty man, or it may smite the man who is God's "fellow," Zech. 13 : 7. It is free to do either ; but one or the other it must do. God is not obliged either to accept or to provide a substituted penalty, and in case he does either, it is grace and mercy towards the actual transgressor. These two particulars, of permit378 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

ting substitution, and providing the substitute, furnish the answer to the question, " Where is the mercy of God, in case justice is strictly satisfied by a vicarious person ? " There is mercy in permitting another person to do for the sinner what the sinner is bound to do for himself ; and still greater mercy in providing that person ; and greater still, in becoming that person.

The Socinian view of retributive justice denies its nec essary nature. " There is no such justice in God," says Socinus, " as requires absolutely and inexorably that sin be punished, and such as God himself cannot repudiate. There is indeed a perpetual and constant justice in God ; but this is nothing but his moral equity and rectitude, by vir tue of which there is no depravity or iniquity in any of his works." Prelectiones Theologicae, XVI . This makes re tributive justice to be an effect of the Divine will ; and not an immanent and necessary attribute. Indeed, Socinus (De Servatore, I.) expressly asserts that justice, in the popular (vulgaris) signification, as opposed to mercy, " dei qualitas non est, sed tantum effectus voluntatis ipsius." It would follow from this, that the moral law together with its pen alty is a positive statute, like the ceremonial law. And as God abrogated the latter, so he could abrogate the former, by an act of arbitrary will. Accordingly, in respect to the necessity of the satisfaction of justice, Socinus remarks : " Divinae justitiae, per quam peccatores damnari meremur, pro peccatis nostris neque Christum satisfecisse, neque ut satisfaceret, opus fuisse, arbitror." But if justice is an at tribute at all, of the Supreme being, it must be essential, like all the other attributes. It can no more be an effect of God's optional will, than his omnipotence can be. An ef fect or product need not be at all, provided the efficient or producer so pleases.

The history of doctrine shows a difference of opinion in respect to the absolute, or the relative necessity of retributive justice. The question was raised by some of the schoolDIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 379

men, whether the satisfaction which Christ makes to Divine justice for the sin of man is necessary per se, or only be cause God so willed it. Schoolmen like Hales, Bonaventura, and Aquinas, adopted the latter view, in opposition to Anselm's positions in his Cur Deus homo ? These theolo gians took an erroneous view of the divine omnipotence, whereby this attribute is made superior to all others. " In contemplating the Divine power as absolute," remarks Hales, " we conceive of a certain energy (virtus) in the deity that is abstracted from the rest of his nature, and transcends all limitations ; and with respect to this form, the divine power cannot have limits set to it (non est determinare)." But it is as impossible and inconceivable, for the divine power to act in isolation from all the other attri butes, as it is for the divine omniscience, or for the divine benevolence to do so. Benevolence cannot act without pow er ; and neither can power, in so perfect a being as God, act without wisdom or justice. This theory ultimately re solves the deity into mere blind force.

Still, the motive, in some instances, was a good one. There was fear of limiting the divine omnipotence. Twisse, the moderator of the Westminster Assembly, affirmed only the relative necessity of retributive justice, in opposition to the powerful reasoning of Owen, who maintained its ab solute nature. Magee (Atonement, I. 191) adopts relative necessity. Respecting such instances, Turrettin (III. xix. 9) remarks, that although both parties are agreed as against the tenets and positions of Socinus, yet the doctrine of the absolute necessity of justice is much the most conso nant with the nature of God, and the language of Script ure, and more efficacious for the refutation of Socinianism (ad haeresim illam pestilentissimam jugulandam). The Re monstrants asserted the relative necessity of retributive jus tice. In their Apologia they say, that " to affirm that the avenging justice of God is so essential to his nature, that by virtue of it, God is obliged and necessitated to punish

380 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

sin, is very absurd and very unworthy of God." See Witsms : Apostles' Creed, Dissertation IX.

No one of the Divine attributes is supported by more or stronger evidences, than retributive justice. 1. The testi mony from Scripture is abundant. To the passages already cited, may be added, as only a part of the great number of texts, Ex. 34 : 7, " God will by no means clear the guilty ; visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children." Ps. 11 : 6, " Upon the wicked he shall rain snares, fire and brimstone, and an horrible tempest." Matt. 18 : 8, " It is better for thee to enter into life halt or maimed, than to be cast into hell-fire." Jade 7, " Suffering the vengeance of eternal fire." Luke 12 : 5, " Yea, I say unto you, fear him who hath power to cast into hell." 2 Thess. 1 : 6, " Seeing it is a righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you." Heb. 2:2, "A just recompense of reward." 2. The testimony from the human conscience, and the consent of all nations alluded to in Horn. 2 : 14, 15, " Their conscience bearing witness, and their thoughts meanwhile accusing." x 3. Sacrifice among pagan nations, and the Jewish system of sacrifices, teach retributive justice. The first is universal, and implies that divine jus tice requires satisfaction by expiatory suffering. The second was an arrangement for eliciting the consciousness of guilt, and preannouncing its pacification through the suffering Messiah. Heb. 10 : 3, " In those sacrifices there is a re membrance of sins every year." 2 4. The remarkable pro vision made in the gospel for the vicarious satisfaction of retributive justice, evinces the reality and importance of the attribute.

* See Plato : Republic, X. 614-621 ; Phaedo, 113, 114 ; Gorgias, 523-527. Taci tus : Annals, VI. vi. ; XIV. x. ; XV. xxvi. Lewis : Plato contra Atheos, Ap pendix LIX. Tholuck : On Heathenism. Owen : On. Divine Justice. Shedd : Theological Essays, 284-293.

2Magee: Atonement (Human Sacrifices; Propitiation as held by Jews and Heathen; Universality of Sacrifice). Owen: On Divine Justice, IV. Smith: Christian Theology, 443-445.

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 381

Ketributive justice is retrospective in its primary aim. It looks back at what has been done in the past. Its first ob ject is requital. A man is hung for murder, principally and before all other reasons, because he has transgressed the law forbidding murder. He is not punished primarily from a prospective aim, such as his own moral improvement, or for the purpose of preventing him from committing another murder, or for the purpose of deterring others from com mitting murder. It is true that moral improvement may be the consequence of the infliction of the penalty. But the consequence must not be confounded with the purpose. Cum hoc, non ergo propter hoc. The criminal may come to see and confess that his crime deserves the punishment, and in genuine unselfish penitence may take sides with the law, and go into eternity relying upon that great atonement of Christ which satisfies retributive justice for his sin ; but even this greatest benefit of all, is not what is aimed at in man's punishment of the crime of murder. For even if there should be no such personal benefit as this attending the infliction of human penalty, the one sufficient reason for inflicting it still holds good, viz., the fact that the law has been violated, and demands the punishment of the offender for this reason simply. Only upon this view of justice, is the true dignity of man maintained. When he is punished because, as a rational and free being, he has responsibly violated the law, there is a recognition of him as a person endowed with free will. But if he is seized and made to suffer for the benefit of others, he is treated like a chattel, or a thing that may be put to use. " The nature of ill-de sert and punishableness," says Kant (Practischer Yernunft, 151, Ed. Rosenkranz), " is always involved in the idea of voluntary transgression ; and the idea of punishment ex cludes that of happiness in all its forms. For although he who inflicts penalty may, it is true, also have a benevolent purpose to produce by the punishment a beneficial effect upon the criminal, yet the punishment itself must be justi382 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

fied first of all as pure and simple requital and retribution : that is, as a kind of suffering that is demanded by the law, without any reference to its prospective beneficial conse quences ; so that even if no moral improvement and no per sonal advantage should accrue to the person from the pun ishment, he must acknowledge that righteousness has been done to him, and that his experience is exactly conformed to his conduct. In every punishment, as such, justice is the very first thing, and constitutes the essence of it. A benevo lent purpose, it is true, may be conjoined with punishment ; but the criminal cannot claim this as his due, and he has no right to reckon upon it. All that he deserves, is punish ment ; and this is all that he can expect from the law which he has violated." The same view is taken of the retrospec tive aim of justice by Miiller, in his lucid discrimination be tween chastisement and punishment. Doctrine of Sin, I. 244 seq. The opposite view, that punishment is prospective in its primary purpose, and aims only at reformation, was maintained by the Greek sophists. Protagoras is repre sented by Plato as saying, that " no one punishes the evil doer under the notion, or for the reason that he has done wrong ; only the unreasonable fury of a tyrant acts in that way." Protagoras, 324. Plato (Laws, X. 904, 905) holds that punishment is retributive. Cicero (De Legibus, I. 14) contends that virtue has regard to justice, not to utility. Grotius defines penalty, as " the evil of suffering inflicted on account of the evil of doing." Coke, Bacon, Selden, and Blackstone explain punishment by crime not by expediency. Kant, Herbert, Stahl, Hartenstein, Eothe, and Woolsey (Political Science, II. viii), define punishment as requital. Beccaria and Bentham found punishment on utility and ex pedience. Penny Cyclopaedia, Article, Beccaria. Paley no tices the difference between human punishment and divine. In the former, there is a combination of the retributive wifh the protective and reformatory, but not in the latter. Moral Philosophy, VI. ix.

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 383

If the good of the public is the chief end of punishment, the criminal might be made to suffer more than his crime deserves. If he can be used like a thing, for the benefit of others, there is no limit to the degree in which he may be used. His personal desert and responsibility being left out of view, he may be made to suffer as much, or as little as the public welfare prescribes. It was this theory of penalty that led to the multiplication of capital crimes. The pre vention of forgery, it was claimed in England, required that the forger should be executed ; and upon the principle that punishment is for the public protection, and not for exact justice and strict retribution, the forger was hanged. But a merely civil crime against property, and not against human life, does not merit the death penalty. Upon this theory, the number of capital offences became very numer ous, and the criminal code very bloody. So that, in the long run, nothing is kinder than exact justice. It prevents extremes in either direction : either that of indulgence, or that of cruelty. Shedd : Endless Punishment, pp. 118-140.

Commutative justice implies an exchange of values be tween two parties, wherein each gives and receives in re turn. This species has no place in reference to God; for " who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed to him again ? " Rom. 11 : 35.

Public or general justice, is a distinction invented by Grotius, for the purpose of meeting certain Socinian objec tions to the Anselmic doctrine of strict satisfaction. It is a relaxed form of justice, by virtue of which God waives a full satisfaction of legal claims, and accepts a partial satis faction in lieu thereof. Analyzed to its ultimate elements, " public justice " is benevolence, not justice. Justice is the exact distribution of reward or of punishment. Anything therefore that is inexact, is in so far unjust. Too much or too little suffering for a crime is not pure justice. Says the younger Edwards (Against Chauncey, ch. IV.), "general or public justice is an improper use of the word justice ; be384 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

cause, to practise justice in this sense is no other than to act from public spirit, or from love to the community; and with respect to the universe, it is the very same with gen eral benevolence." Grotius agreed with Socinus, and both of them agreed with Duns Scotus, in making punitive jus tice optional, not necessary. Grotius held that punishment could be waived and not inflicted, if God so decided. It is not necessary that sin be punished with such a punish ment as strictly, and fully corresponds with the guilt. An inferior penalty may be inflicted, or even no penalty at all, if God so determine. What then was the difference be tween Grotius and Socinus ? It was this. Socinus asserted that when God decides to waive legal claims, he need not do anything to guard against the evil consequences of so doing. He can release the sinner from all punishment, and let the matter drop there. Grotius, on the other hand, though agreeing with his opponent that God can dispense with penalty altogether, yet maintained that he cannot do it with safety to the universe, unless he gives some expres sion to his abhorrence of sin. This he does by the death of Christ. When God remits penalty by this method, he guards against the abuse of his benevolence ; which abuse Socinus made no provision for in his system. According to Grotius, the substituted sufferings of Christ are not a strict equivalent for the penalty due to sin, but an accepted equivalent, as when a creditor agrees to take fifty cents for a dollar, in the settlement of a commercial debt.

Grotius applies the principles of commercial justice to the doctrine of Christ's atonement. He employs an illustration from the Roman commercial law, as presented in the Pan dects of Justinian. Commercial justice can be satisfied by word of mouth. If a creditor calls a debt paid, it is paid ; and the release is denominated " acceptilatio," or acquittance by word of mouth. Commercial justice has no further de mands to make, when the creditor has said that the debt is paid. In like manner, if God will say that the moral law

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 385

is satisfied by an inferior penalty, it is satisfied ; and if he should say that it is satisfied with no penalty at all, it would be satisfied. There are no claims standing against the sin ner, because the claims being of a positive, not a neces sary nature ; being constituted by the optional will of God ; they can be abrogated by the same almighty will. Socinus (De Servatore, III. i.) argues "that God is our creditor. Our sins are debts which we have contracted towards him. But a creditor can by an act of will surrender his claim, without making any legal provision for so doing." This abolishes the distinction between commercial and moral in debtedness, and assumes that the claims of justice and gov ernment, like those of a pecuniary creditor, have no neces sary quality, but are voidable by an act of will. A pecuniary creditor can abolish his claim by a volition, but a magistrate cannot so abolish a moral claim. Shedd : History of Doc trine, II. 347 sq.

The Goodness of God is the Divine essence viewed as en ergizing benevolently, and kindly, towards the creature. It is an emanent, or transitive attribute, issuing forth from the Divine nature, and aiming to promote the welfare and hap piness of the universe. It is not that attribute by which God is good ; but by which he does good. As good in him self, God is holy ; as showing goodness to others, he is good or kind. The Septuagint renders sit: by ^p^crro? = useful. " Good (^pTycrro?) art thou, O Lord, and thou doest good," Ps. 119 : 68. In Rom. 5 : 7, holiness is designated by and kindness by ayaQos : " Scarcely for a righteous man will one die ; yet peradventure for a good (ayo$o?) man, some would even dare to die." In Luke 18 : 19, the refer ence is to benevolence, not to holiness : " None is good (aya&fc), save one, that is God."

Goodness is a special attribute with varieties under it. 1.

The first of these is Benevolence. This is the affection

which the Creator feels towards the sentient and conscious

creature, as such. Benevolence cannot be shown to insen25

386 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

tient existence ; to the rocks and mountains. It grows out of the fact that the creature is his workmanship. God is interested in everything which he has made. He cannot hate any of his own handiwork. The wrath of God is not excited by anything that took its origin from him. It falls only upon something that has been added to his own work. Sin is no part of creation, but a quality introduced into creation by the creature himself.

God's benevolent love towards his creatures, considered as creatures merely, is infinitely greater than any love of a creature towards a creature. No earthly father loves his child with a benevolence equal to that which the Heavenly Father feels towards his created offspring. Luke 6 : 35, " The Highest is kind (%/^

The benevolent interest which God as a creator takes in the sentient creature, as the product of his omnipotent power, is illustrated by the following from Aristotle. " The benefactor loves him whom he has benefited, more than he who has been benefited loves the benefactor. The workman loves his own work, more than the work loves the workman. All men feel greater love for what they have acquired with labor ; as those who have earned their money love it more than those who have inherited it. Mothers are more fond of their children than fathers are ; for the bringing them forth is painful. Parents have greater love for their children, than children have for their parents."

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 387

Ethics, IX. vii. Upon this principle, the benevolent affec tion of God towards his creatures is greater than that of creatures towards each other. God's compassionate love is more tender than that of an earthly father or mother. Ps. 27 : 10, " When my father and mother forsake me, then the Lord will take me up." Men are commanded to imitate the Divine benevolence as the highest form of this affection. Matt. 5 : 44 : " Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you ; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven. Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect." Compare Plato : Republic, I. 33. Montaigne : Essays, VI. viii. (Of the Affection of Fathers).

God's benevolent interest in the sentient creature, and his care for its welfare, is proportioned and suited to the nature and circumstances of the creature, (a) It extends to the animals : Ps. 145 : 16, " Thou openest thine hand, and suppliest the desire of every living thing." Ps. 104 : 21, " The young lions roar after their prey, and seek their meat from God." Compare the whole psalm. Job 38 : 41, " Who provideth for the raven his food ? " Matt. 6 : 26, " Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, yet your heavenly Father feedetli them." Ps. 36 : 6, " Thou preservest man and beast." (5) It extends to man. Acts 14 : 17, " He left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven." (c) It extends to sinful man. Matt. 5 : 45, "He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good." Acts 14 : 17, " He suffered all na tions to walk in their own ways, nevertheless, filling their hearts with food and gladness." Neh. 9 : 17, " But thou art a God slow to anger, and of great kindness, and forsookest them not."

The Divine benevolence varies in its degrees, in accord ance with the capacity of the object to receive it. The brute experiences all of it that he is capable of. As he is physical only, he can receive from his creator only physi388 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

cal good. Man is both physical and mental ; and receives both physical and mental good. Sinful man is deprived of a full manifestation of the Divine benevolence, only by reason of his sin. God manifests to the sinner all the be nevolence that he is qualified to receive. He sends him physical and temporal good : rain from heaven, and fruit ful seasons, filling his heart with food and gladness ; but he cannot bestow upon a sinful and hostile man his approving love, and fill him with heavenly peace and joy. The Di vine benevolence, therefore, is infinite. It is not limited in its manifestation by anything in itself, but only by the ca pacity and characteristics of the creature.

The chief objections to the doctrine of the Divine benev olence are the following : 1. The permission of sin. 2. The existence of suffering here upon earth. 3. The slow progress of redemption. Kespecting the first, it is to be observed that the permission of sin has cost God more than it has man. No sacrifice and suffering on account of sin has been undergone by any man, that is equal to that which has been endured by incarnate God. This shows that God is not acting selfishly, in permitting sin. At the very time that he permits it, he knows that it will result in an infinite sacrifice on his part. Kespecting the second, it is to be said, that the suffering of both animals and man is often greatly exaggerated. The " struggle for existence " in the animal world is not so great as Darwin and others repre sent. The majority, certainly, survive. If they did not, the species would diminish, and gradually become extinct. But the fact is, that generally they are steadily increas ing. And in the human world, there is no struggle at all for existence. Iden do not feed upon one another. The amount of enjoyment, in both the animal and the human \vorld, is greater than the amount of suffering. " The earth is full of the goodness of the Lord," Ps. 35 : 5. " After all, it is a happy world," said Paley. See his proof, in his Nat ural Theology, XXYI. " It is manifest," says King (ForeDIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 389

knowledge, II.), " that though good be much mixed with evil in this life, yet there is much more good than evil in nat ure, and every animal provides for its own preservation by instinct or reason, which it would never do, if it did not think or feel its life, with all the evils annexed, to be much preferable to non-existence. This is a proof of the wisdom, goodness, and power of God, who could thus temper a world infested with so many miseries, that nothing should continue in it which was not in some measure pleased with its existence, and which would not endeavor by all possible means to preserve it." Furthermore, it must be remem bered that in the human world suffering is the effect of sin. Most of the suffering among mankind comes from poverty and disease ; and these are due very greatly to the two vices of intemperance and sensuality. And finally, pain is not an absolute evil for man, unless it is hell-pain. All suffer ing except that of eternal remorse and despair may be a means of good to him. Respecting the third objection, the success of redemption must be estimated at the end of the process, not at the beginning, or in the middle of it. Thus estimated, the great majority of the human family are re deemed by Christ.

2. Mercy is a second variety of the Divine Goodness. It is the benevolent compassion of God towards man as a sin ner. This attribute, though logically implied in the idea of God as a being possessed of all conceivable perfections, is free and sovereign in its exercise. Consequently, it requires a special revelation in order to establish the fact that it will be exercised. As omnipotence is a necessary attribute of God, and yet its exercise in the creation of the universe is not necessary but optional, so, though mercy is a necessary attribute, its exercise is not also necessary. " The goodness of the Deity is infinite," says Charnocke (Goodness of God), " and circumscribed by no limits ; but the exercise of his goodness may be limited by himself. God is necessarily good in his nature ; but free in his communication of it.

390 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

He is not necessarily communicative of his goodness, as the sun of its light; which chooses not its objects, but en lightens all indifferently. This were to make God of no more understanding than the sun, which shines not where it pleases but where it must. He is an understanding agent, and hath a sovereign right to choose his own sub jects. It would not be a supreme, if it were not a volun tary goodness."

Accordingly, the fact that the attribute of mercy will be exercised towards sinful man is taught only in the written revelation. Indeed, this constitutes the most important and principal part of the teaching of inspiration. In the very first communication made to the fallen pair, there was a promise on the part of God, to show mercy in and by the " Seed of the woman : " the Son of man, the incarnate God, Gen. 3 : 15. And in the yet more explicit revelation made to Moses on the mount, in connection with the giving of the law, " Jehovah passed by before him, and proclaimed, The Lord, The Lord God, merciful (trtrn? tender, compassionate), and gracious (Vi3n? showing kindness), long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thou sands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin," Ex. 34 : 6, 7. To quote all the proof -texts for this attribute, would be to quote the bulk of both the Old and the New Testament.

Grace is an aspect of mercy. It differs from mercy, in that it has reference to sinful man as guilty, while mercy has respect to sinful man as miserable. The one refers to the culpability of sin, and the other to its wretchedness. The two terms, however, in common use are interchange able. Grace, like mercy, is a variety of the Divine good ness.

Both mercy and grace are exercised in a general manner, towards those who are not the objects of their special mani festation. All blessings bestowed upon the natural man are mercy, in so far as they succor his distress, and grace,

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 391

so far as they are bestowed upon the undeserving. Matt. 5 : 45, " He maketh his sun to rise upon the evil." Ps. 145 : 9, " The Lord is good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works." Fs. 145 : 15, 16, " The eyes of all wait upon thee."

This general manifestation of mercy and grace is in and by the works of creation and providence. It is also seen in one aspect of the work of redemption. Men who are not actually saved by the Divine mercy, yet obtain some blessings from it. (a) The delay of punishment is one ; namely, the pretermission (irdpea-^} of sin, in distinction from its remis sion (atfreo-ts). Rom. 3 : 25. God's forbearance and longsuffering with a sinner who abuses this by persistence in sin, is a phase of mercy. This is " through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." It is made possible by it. With out Christ's work, there would have been instantaneous pun ishment, and no long-suffering. This is also taught in 1 Pet. 3 : 20, " The long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah." (b) The common influences of the Holy Spirit are another manifestation of mercy in its general form.

Special grace and mercy are exercised only in redemp tion, and towards those whom God is pleased to fix upon. Eph. 1 : 4-6, " According as he hath chosen us in him, hav ing predestinated us unto the adoption of children to the praise of the glory of his grace, wherein he hath made us accepted (tyaplTaxrcv) in the Beloved." Rom. 9 : 15, " I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion."

The Truth or veracity of God, is that attribute of his nature by virtue of which he performs what he has said. Num. 23 : 19, " God is not a man, that he should lie." It is seen : 1. In revelation. 1 Pet. 1 : 25, " The word of the Lord endureth forever." Ps. 100 : 5, " His truth endureth to all generations." Matt. 5 : 18, " One jot or tittle shall not pass from the law till all be fulfilled." 2. In redemption. Heb. 10 : 23, " He is faithful that promised." Heb. 6 : 17,

" God willing [desiring] more abundantly to shew unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his council, confirmed it by an oath." 1 Cor. 1:9," God is faithful, by whom ye were called." 2 Tim. 2 : 13, " He abideth faithful ; he can not deny himself." 3. In retribution. Heb. 3 : 11, " So, I sware in my wrath, They shall not enter into my rest." Compare with Heb. 4 : 1 seq.

THE DIVINE DECEEES.

Augustine: De predestinatione ; Epistola CXCIV., Ad Sixtum. Anselm : Concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis. Calvin : Institutes, I. xxi.-xxiv. Zanchius : On Predestination. Tr. by Toplady. Ursinus : Christian Keligion, Qu. 54. Howe : On De crees, Oracles, Pt. II. ; Prescience and sincerity reconciled. Witsius : Covenants, II. Turrettiu : Institutio, IV. i.-xviii. ; VI. v.viii. Edwards : Decrees and Election ; On the Will, sub tine. Dabney : Theology, Lectures XX.-XXII. Strong : Theology, IV. iii. Cunningham : Historical Theology, XXV. Arrainius : Works, III. (Discussion with Junius). Tr. by Nichols. Episcopius : Institutiones, IV. iv. Watson : Institutes, II. xxv.-xxxviii. Mozley : Augustiniau Doctrine of Predestination. King : On Foreknowl edge.

THE consideration of the Divine Decrees naturally fol lows that of the divine attributes, because the decrees reg ulate the operation of the attributes. God's acts agree with God's determination. Hence the Westminster Shorter Catechism, Q. 7, defines the decrees of God to be " his eternal purpose according to the counsel of his own will, whereby he hath foreordained whatsover comes to pass." God does not act until he has decided to act, and his deci sion is free and voluntary. Hence, the actions of God can no more be separated from the decrees of God, than the ac tions of a man can be from his decisions.

The Divine decree relates only to God's opera ad extra, or transitive acts. It does not include those immanent ac tivities which occur within the essence, and result in the three trinitarian distinctions. All this part of the Divine

394 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

activity is excluded from the Divine decree, because it is necessary and not optional. God the Father did not decree the eternal generation of the Son, nor did the Father and Son decree the spiration of the Holy Spirit. The triune God could no more decide after the counsel of his own will to be triune, than he could decide in the same manner to be omnipotent, or omniscient. The Divine decree, con sequently, comprehends only those events that occur in time. God foreordains, " whatsoever comes to pass " in space and time. That which comes to pass in the eternity of the uncreated essence, forms no part of the contents of God's decree.

The Divine decree is formed in eternity, but executed in time. There are sequences in the execution, but not in the formation of God's eternal purpose. In his own mind and consciousness, God simultaneously because eternally decrees all that occurs in space and time ; but the effects and re sults corresponding to the decree occur successively, not si multaneously. There were thirty-three years between the actual incarnation and the actual crucifixion, but not be tween the decree that the Logos should be incarnate and the decree that he should be crucified. In the Divine de cree, Christ was simultaneously because eternally incarnate and crucified. " The Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world," Rev. 14 : 8. Hence the Divine decrees, in reference to God, are one single act only. The singular number is employed in Scripture, when the Divine mind and nature are considered. " All things work together for good to them who are called according to his purpose (-Trpo&&ru>)" Horn. 8 : 28. " According to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ," Eph. 3 : 11.

God's consciousness differs from that of his rational creat ures, in that there is no succession in it. This is one of the differentia between the Infinite and the finite mind. For God there is no series of decrees each separated from the others by an interval of time. God is omniscient,

DIVINE DECREES. 395

possessing the whole of his plans and purposes simultane ously. " All things are naked arid opened " to his view, in one intuition. God is immutable, and therefore there are no sequences and changes of experience in him. Conse quently the determinations of his will, as well as the thoughts of his understanding, are simultaneous, not succes sive. In the formation of the Divine decree, there are no intervals ; but only in the execution of it. Christ, the aton ing lamb, " was foreordained before the foundation of the world, but was manifested in these last times," 1 Pet. 1 : 20. The decree that Christ should die for sin was eternal ; the actual death of Christ was in time. There was an in terval of four thousand years between the creation of Adam, and the birth of Christ ; but there was no such interval be tween the decree to create Adam, and the decree that Christ should be born in Bethlehem. Both decrees are simultane ous, because both are eternal decisions of the Divine will. " We speak of the Divine decrees as many, because of the many objects which the decreeing act of God respects. The things decreed are many, but the act decreeing is but one only." Fisher : On the Catechism, Q. 7. The things de creed come to pass in time, and in a successive series ; but they constitute one great system which as one whole, and a unity, was comprehended in the one eternal purpose of God. Augustine (Confess., XII. xv.) says, " God willeth not one thing nowr, and another anon ; but once, and at once, and always, he willeth all things that he willeth ; not again and again, nor now this, now that ; nor willeth after wards, what before he willed not, nor willeth not, what be fore he willed ; because such a will is mutable ; and no mu table thing is eternal."

The Divine decree is a Divine idea or thought, and it is peculiar to a Divine thought, that it is equal to the thing produced by it. This earthly globe was decreed from eter nity, but it did not actually exist from eternity. It was from eternity a Divine thought, but not a historical thing.

396 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

But this Divine thought, unlike a human thought, is not in any particular inferior to the thing. Hence, though the thing is not yet actually created, and is only an idea, yet God is not for this reason ignorant in respect to the thing, as man is in respect to a plan which he has not yet exe cuted. A man knows more about his work after he has finished it, than he did before. But God knows no more about the planet earth when his decree to create it is exe cuted, than he did prior to its execution. In the case of the finite mind, the thought is always unequal to the thing ; but in the case of the Infinite intelligence, the thought is always coequal with the thing. " Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being imperfect ; and in thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned when as yet there was none of them," Ps. 139 : 16. God knew what would be created before it was actually created. This knowledge was perfect. The actual creation did not add anything to it. God knew the whole universe in his eternal decree before it was an actual universe in time, with the same perfect omniscience with which he knew it r.fter the decree was executed in space and time. " Did not God know what would be created by him, before it was created by him ? Did he create he knew not what, and knew not beforehand what he should create ? Was he ignorant be fore he acted, and in his acting, what his operation would tend to ? or did he not know the nature of things, and the ends of them, till he had produced them, and saw them in being ? Creatures must be known by God before they were made, and not known because they were made; he knew them to make them, and did not make them to know them. By the same reason that he knew what creatures should be before they were, he knew still what creatures shall be before they are." Charnocke : God's Knowledge, 276.

The Divine decree is the necessary condition of the Divine foreknowledge. If God does not first decide what shall

DIVINE DECREES. 397

come to pass, he cannot know what will come to pass. An event must be made certain, before it can be known as a certain event. In order that a man may foreknow an act of his own will, he must first have decided to perform it. So long as he is undecided about a particular volition, he cannot foreknow this volition. Unless God had determined to create a world, he could not know that there would be one. For the world cannot create itself, and there is but one being who can create it. If therefore this being has not decided to create a world, there is no certainty that a world will come into existence ; and if there Is no certainty of a world, there can be no certain foreknowledge of a world. So long as anything remains undecreed, it is con tingent and fortuitous. It may or may not happen. In this state of things, there cannot be knowledge of any kind. If a man had the power to cause an eclipse of the sun, and had decided to do this, he could then foreknow that the event would occur. But if he lacks the power, or if having the power, he has not formed the purpose, he can have no knowledge of any kind respecting the imagined event. He has neither knowledge nor foreknowledge, because there is nothing to be known. Blank ignorance is the mental con dition. See Smith: Theology, 119 (Note).

In respect to this point, the Socinian is more logical than the Arminian. Both agree that God does not decree those events which result from the action of the human will. Voluntary acts are not predetermined, but depend solely upon human will. Whether they shall occur rests ultimately upon man's decision, not upon God's. Hence human voli tions are uncertainties for God, in the same way that an event which does not depend upon a man's decision is an uncertainty for him. The inference which the Socinian drew from this was, that foreknowledge of such events as human volitions is impossible to God. God cannot fore know a thing that may or may not be a thing ; an event that may or may not be an event. The Arminian, shrinking

398 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

from this limitation of the divine omniscience, asserts that God can foreknow an uncertainty / that is, that he can have foreknowledge, without foreordination. But in this case, there is in reality nothing to be foreknown ; there is no ob ject of foreknowledge. If the question be asked, What does God foreknow ? and the answer be, that he foreknows that a particular volition will be a holy one ; the reply is, that so far as the Divine decree is concerned, the volition may prove to be a sinful one. In this case, God's foreknowl edge is a conjecture only, not knowledge. It is like a man's guess. If, on the contrary, the answer be, that God fore knows that the volition will be a sinful one, the reply is, that it may prove to be a holy one. In this case, also, God's foreknowledge is only a conjecture. To know, or to foreknow an uncertainty, is a solecism. For in order to either knowledge or foreknowledge, there must be only one actual thing to be known, or foreknown. But in the sup posed case of contingency and uncertainty, there are two possible things, either of which may turn out to be an ob ject of knowledge, but neither of which is the one certain and definite object required. There is, therefore, nothing knowable in the case. To know, or foreknow an uncer tainty, is to know or foreknow a non-entity. If it be ob jected, that since God, as eternal, decrees all things simul taneously, and consequently there is really nojftreordi nation for him, it is still true that in the logical order an event must be a certainty before it can be known as such. Though there be no order of time and succession, yet in the order of nature, a physical event or a human volition must be decreed and certain for God, that it may be cognized by him as an event or a volition.

The most important aspect of the Divine decree is, that it brings all things that come to pass in space and time into a, plan. There can be no system of the universe, if there be no one Divine purpose that systematizes it. Schemes in theology which reject the doctrine of the Divine decree,

DIVINE DECREES. 399

necessarily present a fractional and disconnected view of God, man, and nature.

The following characteristics mark the Divine decree: 1. The Divine decree is founded in wisdom. This is implied in saying that God's purpose is " according to the counsel (fiovhrfv) of his will," Eph. 1 : 11. There is nothing irra tional or capricious in God's determination. There may be much in it that passes human comprehension, and is inex plicable to the finite mind, because the Divine decree covers infinite space and everlasting time ; but it all springs out of infinite wisdom. The " counsel " of the Divine mind does not mean any reception of knowledge ab extra, by observa tion, or comparison, or advisement with others ; but it denotes God's wise insight and knowledge, in the light of which he forms his determination. It is possible, also, that there is a reference in the language, to the intercommunion and cor respondence of the three persons in the Godhead. Ps. 33 : 11, " The counsel of the Lord standeth forever." Job 12 : 13, " With him is wisdom and strength ; he hath counsel and understanding." Prov. 19 : 21, " The counsel of the Lord, that shall stand." Mark 7 : 37, " He hath done all things well." Gen. 1 : 31, " God saw everything that he had made, and behold it was very good."

2. The Divine decree is eternal. Acts 15 : 18, "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning." Matt. 25 : 34, "The kingdom was prepared from the foundation of the world." Eph. 1 : 4, "He hath chosen us in him, before the foundation of the world." 2 Thess. 2 : 13, " God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation." 2 Tim. 1:9; 1 Cor. 2 : 7. Rev. 13 : 8, " The Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world." 1 Pet. 1 : 20, Christ as a sacrifice "was foreordained before the foundation of the world." This characteristic has been defined, in what has been said under the Attributes, respecting the simultaneousness and successionlessness of the eternal, as distinguished from the gradations and sequences of the temporal.

400 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

3. The Divine decree is universal. It includes " whatso ever comes to pass," be it physical or moral, good or evil. Eph. 1 : 10, 11, " He worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." Acts 15 : 18, " Known unto God are all his works from the beginning." Prov. 16 : 33. Dan. 4 : 34, 35. Matt. 10 : 29, 30. Acts 17: 26. Job 14: 5. Is. 46 : 10. (a) The good actions of men. Eph. 2 : 10, " Created unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them." (b) The wicked actions of men. Acts 2 : 23, " Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and fore knowledge of God, ye have crucified and slain." Acts 4 : 27, 28. Ps. 76:10. Prov. 16:4. (c) So-called accidental events. Prov. 16 : 33, " The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord." Gen. 45 : 8 ; 50 : 20. John 20 : 36, " A bone of him shall not be broken." Ps. 34:20; Ex. 12:46. Numbers 9:12. (d) The means as well as the end. 2 Thess. 2 : 13, " God hath chosen you to salvation, through sanctification (ev ayiaa-fjLw) of the Spirit." Eph. 1 : 4, " He hath chosen us that we should be holy." 1 Pet. 1:2, " Elect through sanctification of the Spirit." Acts 27 : 24, 31, " The same divine purpose which deter mines any event, determines that event as produced by its causes, promoted by its means, depending on its conditions, and followed by its results. Things do not come to pass in a state of isolation ; neither were they predetermined so to come to pass. In other words, God's purpose embraces the means along with the end, the cause along with the effect, the condition along with the result or issue suspended upon it ; the order, relations and dependences of all events, as no less essential to the divine plan than the events themselves. With reference to the salvation of the elect, the purpose of God is, not only that they shall be saved, but that they shall believe, repent, and persevere in faith and holiness in order to salvation." Crawford : Fatherhood of God, p. 426. (

DIVINE DECREES. 401

30, The Jews could not kill Christ, " because his hour was not yet come." It is objected that fifteen years were added to Hezekiah's life after the prophet had said, " Set thine house in order, for thou shalt die and not live," Is. 38 : 1, 5. But this assertion of the prophet was not a statement of the Divine decree, but of the nature of his disease, which was mortal had not God miraculously interposed.

4. The Divine decree is immutable. There is no defect in God, in knowledge, power, and veracity. His decree cannot therefore be changed because of a mistake of igno rance, or of inability to carry out his decree, or of unfaith fulness to his purpose. Job 23 : 13, " He is in one mind, and who shall turn him ? " Is. 46 : 10, "My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." The immutability of the Divine decree is consistent with the liberty of man's will. " God ordains whatsoever comes to pass ; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin ; nor is violence offered to the will of the creature ; nor is the liberty, or contingency, of second causes taken away, but rather established." West minster Confession, III. i. This is the doctrine of Christ. He asserts that his own crucifixion was a voluntary act of man, and also decreed by God. " They have done unto Elias whatsoever they listed (ocra rj&e\,r)(rav) : likewise shall the Son of man suffer of them," Matt. 17 : 12. " The Son of man goeth as it was determined (w/nayu-ez/oi/), but woe unto that man by whom he is betrayed," Luke 22 : 22. In Acts 2 : 23, it is said, that Christ was " delivered by the deter minate counsel of God," and " by wicked hands was cruci fied and slain."

Respecting the alleged contradiction between the Divine decree and human freedom, the following particulars are to be noticed : (a) The inspired writers are not conscious of a contradiction, because they do not allude to any, or make any attempt to harmonize the two things. If a self-contra diction does not press upon them, it must be because there is no real contradiction. Revelation presents that view of

402 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD).

truth which is afforded from a higher point of view than that occupied by the finite mind. Revealed truth is truth as perceived by the Infinite intelligence. If no contradic tion is perceived by God in a given case, there really is none. The mind of Christ evidently saw no conflict be tween his assertion that he was to be crucified in accordance with the Divine decree, and his assertion that Judas was a free and guilty agent in fulfilling this decree. (&) There is no contradiction between the Divine decree and human lib erty, provided the difference between an Infinite and a finite being is steadily kept in mind. There would be a contra diction, if it were asserted that an event is both certain and uncertain for the same being. But to say that it is certain for one being, and uncertain for another, is no contradiction. The difference between the omniscience of an Infinite be ing, and the fractional knowledge of a finite being, explains this. For the Divine mind, there is, in realitjT, no future event, because all events are simultaneous, owing to that peculiarity in the cognition of an eternal being whereby there is no succession in it. All events thus being present to him are of course all of them certain events. But for a finite mind, events come before it in a series. Hence there are future events for the finite mind ; and all that is future is uncertain. Again, it would be self -contradictory, to say that an act of the human will is free for man, and necessi tated for God. But this is not said by the predestinarian. He asserts that an act of human will is free for both the Divine and the human mind, but certain for the former and uncertain for the latter. God as well as man knows that the human will is self-moved, and not forced from without. But this knowledge is accompanied with an additional knowledge on the part of God, that is wanting upon the part of man. God, while knowing that the human will is free in every act, knows the whole series of its free acts in one intuition. Man does not. This additional element in the Divine knowledge, arises from that peculiarity in the

DIVINE DECREED 403

Divine consciousness just alluded to. All events within the sphere of human freedom, as well as that of physical necessity, are simultaneous to God. Man's voluntary acts are not a series for the Divine mind, but are all present at once, and therefore are all of them certain to God. From the view-point of the Divine eternity and omniscience, there is no foreknowledge of human volitions. There is simply knowledge of all of them, at once, (c) The alleged contradiction arises from assuming that there is only one way in which the Divine omnipotence can make an event certain. The predestinarian maintains that the certainty of all events has a relation to the Divine omnipotence, as well as to the Divine omniscience. God not only knows all events, but he decrees them. Pie makes them certain by an exercise of power ; but not by the same kind of power in every case. God makes some events certain by physical power ; and some he makes certain by moral and spiritual power. Within the physical sphere, the Divine decree makes certain by necessitating ; within the moral sphere, the Di vine decree makes certain without necessitating. To decree, is to bring within a plan. There is nothing in the idea of planning that necessarily implies compulsion. The opera tions of mind, as well as those of matter, may constitute parts of one great system, without ceasing to be mental operations. God decrees phenomena in conformity with the nature and qualities which he has himself given to creat ures and things. God's decrees do not unmake God's crea tion. He decrees that phenomena in the material world shall occur in accordance with material properties and laws ; and phenomena in the moral world, in accordance with moral faculties and properties. Within the sphere of matter, he decrees necessitated facts ; within the sphere of mind, he decrees self-determined acts ; and both alike are certain for God. The Westminster Confession (III. i.) affirms, that " the liberty or contingency of second causes is not taken away, but rather established" by the Divine decree. If God

404 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

lias decreed men's actions to be free actions, and as free ac tions, then it is impossible that they should be necessitated actions. His decree makes the thing certain in this case, as well as in every other. The question how God does this, cannot be answered by man, because the mode of the Di vine agency is a mystery to him. The notion of a decree is not contradictory to that of free agency, unless decree is de fined as compulsion, and it be assumed that God executes all his decrees by physical means and methods. No one can demonstrate that it is beyond the power of God to make a voluntary act of man an absolutely certain event. If he could, he would disprove the Divine omnipotence. " God, the first cause, ordereth all things to come to pass according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, or freely and contingently." "Westminster Confession, Y. ii. Turretin : Institutio, YI. vi. 6. The self-determination of the human will is the action of a free second cause. It is there fore decreed self-determination. In the instance of holiness, the certainty of the self-determination is explicable by the fact that God works in man " to will and to do." In the instance of sin, the certainty of the self-determination is inexplicable, because we cannot say in this case that God works in man " to will and to do."

5. The Divine decree is unconditional, or absolute. This means, that its execution does not depend upon anything that has not itself been decreed. The Divine decree may require means or conditions in order to its execution, but these means or conditions are included in the decree. For illustration, God decreed the redemption of sinners through the death of Jesus Christ. If he had not also decreed the manner of that death, the time of its occurrence, and the particular persons who were to bring it about, but had left all these means of attaining the end he had proposed to an undecreed act of man that was uncertain for Him self, then the success of his purpose of redemption would have depended upon other beings than himself, and upon

DIVINE DECREES. 405

other wills than his own. Consequently, his decree of redemption included the means as well as the end, and Jesus Christ was "by the determinate counsel and fore knowledge of God, taken, and by wicked hands crucified and slain," Acts 2 : 23. Again, God decrees the salvation of a particular sinner. One of the means or conditions of salvation is faith in Christ's atonement. This faith is decreed. " Elected unto sprinkling of the blood of Christ," 1 Peter 1:1. "The faith of God's elect," Tit. 1:1. " Faith is the gift of God," Eph. 2 : 8. But if faith de pends upon the undecreed action of the sinner's will, the Divine predestination to faith is dependent for success upon the sinner's uncertain action, and is conditioned by it. The means to the decreed end, in this case, are left outside of the decree. The same remark applies to prayer, as a means of obtaining a decreed end, like the forgiveness of sins. If the forgiveness of his sins has been decreed to a person, his prayer for forgiveness has also been decreed.

The reasons why the Divine decree is independent of everything finite are the following : (a) It is eternal, and therefore cannot depend upon anything in time ; but every thing finite is in time. (£) The decree depends upon God's good pleasure (euSo/aa), Matt. 11 : 26 ; Eph. 1:5; Kom. 9 : 11. Therefore it does not depend upon the creature's good pleasure, (c) The Divine decree is immutable, Is. 46 : 10 ; Rom. 9 : 11. But a decree conditioned upon the decision of the finite will must be mutable, because the finite will is mutable, (d) A conditional decree is incom patible with the Divine foreknowledge. God cannot fore know an event unless it is certain, and it cannot be certain if it ultimately depends upon finite will.

The Divine decrees are divided into efficacious and per missive. Compare Turrettin III. xii. 21-25.

1. The efficacious decree determines the event : (a) By physical and material causes. Such events are the motions of the heavenly bodies, and the phenomena of the material

406 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

world generally. Job 28 : 26, " He made a decree for the rain, and a way for the lightning of the thunder." (J) By an immediate spiritual agency of God upon the finite will, in the origin and continuance of holiness. Philippians 2 : 13, " For it is God, which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure." Eph. 2 : 8, " Faith is the gift of God." 2 Tim. 2 : 25, « If God peradventure will give them repentance." Eph. 2 : 10, " Created in Christ Jesus unto good works." Eph. 4 : 24, " The new man is created in righteousness."

2. The permissive decree relates only to moral evil. Sin is the sole and solitary object of this species of decree. It renders the event infallibly certain, but not by immediately acting upon and in the finite will, as in the case of the effi cacious decree. God does not work in man or angel " to will and to do," when man or angel wills and acts antago nistically to Him. Acts 14 : 16, " Who in times past suf fered (eiaa-e) all nations to walk in their own ways." Acts 17 : 30, " The times of this ignorance God overlooked " (vTrepi&oov). Ps. 78 : 18, " He gave them their own desire." Ps. 106 : 15, " He gave them their own request." Shedd : History of Doctrine, II. 135-138. As sin constitutes only a small sphere in comparison with the whole universe, the scope of the permissive decree is very limited compared with that of the efficient decree. Sin is an endless evil, but fills only a corner of the universe. Hell (Holle) is a hole or " pit." It is deep, but not wide ; bottomless, but not boundless.

The permissive decree is a decree : (a) Not to hinder the sinful self-determination of the finite will, (b) To regulate and control the result of the sinful self-determina tion. " God's permissive will," says Howe (Decrees, Lect ure I.), " is his will to permit whatsoever he thinks fit to permit, or, not to hinder ; while what he so wills or deter mines so to permit, he intends also to regulate, and not to behold as an idle unconcerned spectator, but to dispose all

DIVINE DECREES. 407

those permissa unto wise and great ends of his own." It should be observed that in permitting sin, God permits what he forbids. The permissive decree is not indicative of what God approves and is pleasing to him. God decrees what he hates and abhors, when he brings sin within the scope of his universal plan. Calvin : Inst. I. xviii. 3, 4. The " good pleasure " (euSo/cta), in accordance with which God permits sin, must not be confounded with the pleasure or complacency (ayaTrrj) in accordance with which he pro mulgates the moral law forbidding sin. The term " good pleasure " has the meaning of " pleasure " in the phrase, " Be pleased, or please to do me this favor." What is asked for, is a decision to do the favor. The performance of the favor may involve pain, not pleasure ; it may require a sacrifice of pleasure on the part of the one who is to " be pleased " to do it. Again, when the permissive decree is denominated the Divine will, the term " will " is employed in the narrow sense of volition, not in the wide sense of in clination. The will of God, in this case, is only a particu lar decision, in order to some ulterior end. This particular decision, considered in itself, may be contrary to the abid ing inclination and desire of God as founded in his holy nature ; as when a man by a volition decides to perform a particular act which in itself is unpleasant, in order to attain an ulterior end that is agreeable. Again, in saying that sin is in accordance with the Divine will, the term " will " implies "control." As when we say of a physician, "the disease is wholly at his will." This does not mean that the physician takes pleasure in willing the disease, but that he can cure it.

This brings to notice the principal practical value of the doctrine that God decrees sin. It establishes the Divine sovereignty over the entire universe. By reason of his per missive decree, God has absolute control over moral evil, while yet he is not the author of it, and forbids it. Unless he permitted sin, it could not come to pass. Should he de408 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

cide to preserve the will of the holy angel, or the holy man, from lapsing, the man or the angel would persevere in holi ness. Sin is preventable by almighty God, and therefore he is sovereign over sin and hell, as well as over holiness and heaven. This is the truth which God taught to Cyrus, to contradict the Persian dualism : " I form the light, and create darkness ; I make peace, and create evil. I, the Lord, do all these things," Isa. 45 : 7. Compare Amos 3:6," Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done it ? " Gen. 20 : 6, " I withheld thee from sinning against me." To deny this truth, logically leads to the doctrine of the independence of evil, and the doctrine of the independence of evil is dualism, and irreconcilable with monotheism. Evil becomes like the V\T) in the ancient physics, a limitation of the Infinite being. The truth re specting the efficacious and the permissive decree is finely expressed in the verse of George Herbert.

" We all acknowledge both thy power and love

To be exact, transcendent, and divine ; Who dost so strongly and so sweetly move,

While all things have their will — yet none but thine.

For either thy command, or thy permission

Lays hands on all ; they are thy right and left.

The first puts on with speed and expedition ; The other curbs sin's stealing pace and theft.

Nothing escapes them both ; all must appear,

And be disposed, and dressed, and tuned by thee,

Who sweetly temper'st all. If we could hear Thy skill and art, what music it would be."

In purposing to permit sin, God purposes to overrule it for good. Ps. 76 : 10, " Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee ; the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain." Gen. 45 : 8, " Ye thought evil against me, but God meant it unto good." This part of the doctrine of the permissive decree may be overlooked or denied, and an inadequate

DIVINE DECREES. 409

statement result. The Council of Trent asserted that sin arises from the " mere permission " of God. The Reform ers were not satisfied with this phraseology, because they understood it to mean that in respect to the fall of angels and men, God is an idle spectator (deo otioso spectante), and that sin came into the universe because he cannot pre vent it, and has no control over it. This kind of permis sion is referred to in the Westminster Confession (V. iv.). " The almighty power, wisdom, and goodness of God extendeth even to the sins of angels and men ; and this not by a bare permission, but such as hath joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding, and otherwise ordering and governing of them, in a manifold dispensation, to his own holy ends ; yet so that the sin fulness thereof proceedeth only from the creature, and not from God." l Ansel in

1 Calvin is sometimes represented as differing from Augustine, and teaching that God decrees sin as he does holiness by an efficacious decree. Mohler so as serts in his Symbolics, but Baur (Gegensatz, 744 sq. ) shows that this is a mis take. Modern Lutheran theologians often make the same assertion. Fisher (Reformation, 202) says that in his Institutes, Calvin "makes the primal trans gression the object of an efficient decree," but "in the Consensus Genevensis confines himself to the assertion of a permissive decree in the case of the first sin." But in the Institutes (III. xxiii. 8), Calvin affirms that "the perdition of the wicked depends upon the divine predestination in such a manner that the cause and matter of it are found in themselves. Man falls according to the ap pointment of divine providence, but he falls by his own fault (suo vitio cadit)." In Institutes, II. iv. 3-5, Calvin, it is true, asserts that "prescience or permis sion " is not the whole truth respecting God's relation to sin, because he is said in Scripture " to blind and harden the reprobate, and to turn, incline, and influ ence their hearts." But the accompanying explanation shows that he has in mind the notion of permission in the case of an idle spectator, who cannot pre vent an action, and can do nothing towards controlling it after it has occurred — the same notion that is alluded to in the Westminster Confession, and other Calvinistic creeds. The " blinding, hardening, turning," etc , Calvin describes as the consequence of the Divine desertion, not causation. Some of his phrase ology in this place is harsh, but should be interpreted in harmony with his ex plicit teaching in Institutes, III. xxiii. 8. One proof that Calvinism does not differ from Augustinianism on the subject of the origin of sin under the Divine decree, is the fact that the Dort canons, which are a very strict statement of Calvinism, reject supralapsarianism, and assert infralapsarianism. This means that the relation of God to the origin of sin is not efficacious, but permissive ; which was Augustine's view.

410 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

(Cur dens homo, I. xv.) illustrates this truth in the follow ing manner. " If those things which are held together in the circuit of the heavens should desire to be elsewhere than under the heavens, or to be further removed from the heavens, there is no place where they can be, but under the heavens ; nor can they fly from the heavens without also approaching them. For whence, and whither, and in what way they go, they still are under the heavens ; and if they are at a greater distance from one part of them, they are only so much nearer to the opposite part. And so, though man or evil angel refuse to submit to the Divine will and appointment, yet he cannot escape it ; for if he wishes to fly from a will that commands, he falls into the power of a will that punishes."

Man may not permit sin, because he is under a command that forbids him to commit it, either in himself or in others. But God is not thus obliged by the command of a superior, to hinder the created will from self-determining to evil. He was bound by his own justice and equity to render it possible that man should not self-determine to evil ; and he did this in creating man in holiness, and with plenary power to continue holy. But he was not bound in justice and equity to make it infallibly certain that man would not self -determine to evil. He was obliged by his own perfec tion to give man so much spiritual power that he might stand if he would, but not obliged to give so much addi tional power as to prevent him from falling by his own de cision. Mutable perfection in a creature was all that jus tice required. Immutable perfection was something more. Compare Charnocke : Holiness of God, 496. We cannot infer that because it is the duty of a man to keep his fellowman from sinning, if he can, it is also the duty of God to keep man from sinning. A man is bound to exert every influence in his power to prevent the free will of his fellowcreature from disobeying God, only because God has com manded him to do so, not because the fellow-man is entitled

DIVINE DECREES. 411

to it. A criminal cannot demand upon the ground of jus tice, that his fellow-man keep him from the commission of crime ; and still less can he make this demand upon God. The criminal cannot say to one who could have prevented him from the transgression, but did not : " You are to blame for this crime, because you did not prevent me from perpe trating it." Non-prevention of crime is not the authorship of crime. No free agent can demand as something due to him, that another free agent exert an influence to prevent the wrong use of his own free agency. The only reason, there fore, why one is obligated to prevent another from sinning, is the command of one who is superior to them both. God has made every man his " brother's keeper." And if God were man's fellow-creature, he also would be his " brother's keeper," and would be obligated to prevent sin. In creating man holy, and giving him plenary power to persevere in holiness, God has done all that equity requires, in reference to the prevention of sin in a moral agent.

How the permissive decree can make the origin of sin a certainty, is an inscrutable mystery. God is not the author of sin, and hence, if its origination is a certainty for him, it must be by a method that does not involve his causation. There are several attempts at explanation, but they are in adequate. 1. God exerts positive efficiency upon the finite will, as he does in the origination of holiness. He makes sin certain by causing it. But this contradicts James 1 : 13 : " Neither tempteth he any man ; " 1 John 1:5," God is light, and in him is no darkness at all ; " Eccl. 7 : 29, " God made man upright, but they have sought out many inven tions." It also contradicts the Christian consciousness. In the instance of holiness, the soul says, " Not unto me, but unto thee be the glory;" but in the instance of sin, it says, "Not unto thee, but unto me be the guilt and shame." " By the grace of God, I am what I am," in respect to holi ness ; " by the fault of free will, I am what I am," in re spect to sin. 2. God places the creature in such circum4:12 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

stances as render his sinning certain. But the will of the creature is not subject to circumstances. It can resist them. Circumstances act only ab extra. The conversion of the will cannot be accounted for by circumstances, and neither can its apostasy. 3. God presents motives to the will. But a motive derives its motive power from the existing inclina tion or bias of the will. There is no certainty of action in view of a motive, unless the previous inclination of the will agrees with the motive ; and the motive cannot produce this inclination or bias. 4. God decides not to bestow that special degree of grace which prevents apostasy. But this does not make apostasy certain, because holy Adam had power to stand with that degree of grace with which his Creator had already endowed him. It was, indeed, not cer tain that he would stand ; but neither was it certain that he would fall, if reference be had only to the degree of grace given in creation. When God decides not to hinder a holy being from sinning, he is inactive in this reference ; and inaction is not causative. 5. God causes the "matter" but not the " form" of sin. There is a difference between the act, and the viciousness of the act. The act of casting stones when Achan was slain was the same act materially as when Stephen was martyred ; but the formal element, namely, the intention, was totally different. God concurs with the act and causes it, but not with the intent or viciousness of the act. But the " form " or " viciousness " of the act is the whole of the sin • and God's concursus does not extend to this. Compare upon the Divine concursus, Charnocke, on the Holiness of God. Charnocke regards it as a valid ex planation of the permissive decree.1

The Divine decree differs from the heathen fate.2 (a) Decree is the determination of a personal Being ; fate is

1 Alexander, in the Princeton Repertory, 1831, makes the same objection as above, to the doctrine of the concursus.

2 On fate as presented in the pagan writers, see the appendix to Toplady's translation of Zanchius, On Predestination.

DIVINE DECREES. 413

merely the connection (nexus) of impersonal causes and effects. The Divine decree includes causes, effects, and their nexus. (5) The Divine decree has respect to the nat ure of beings and things, bringing about a physical event by physical means, and a moral event by moral means; fate brings about all events in the same way. (c) The Divine decree proceeds from a wise insight and knowledge. It adapts means to ends. Fate is fortuitous. It is only an other word for chance, and there is no insight, or foresight, or adaptive intelligence, in mere chance, (d) God, accord ing to the heathen view, is subject to fate : r^v TreTrpwp.h^v fjioipdv dftwdrdv €

" Necessity and chance Approach not me, and what I will is fate." — MILTON.

To predestinate voluntary action is, to make it certain. If it meant, as it is sometimes asserted, to force voluntary action, it would be a self-contradiction. To make certain is not the same as to compel, or necessitate, because there are different ways of making certain, but only one way of necessitating. An event in the material world is made certain by physical force; this is compulsory. An event in the moral world is made certain by spiritual operation ; this is voluntary and free. The lines of Pope express this : God

" Binding nature fast, in fate, Left free the human will."

The distinction between compulsion and certainty is a real one, and if observed prevents the misrepresentation of the doctrine of predestination.1

1 0n this point, see Clarke : Demonstration. Proposition X. sub fine. Clarke, however, contends only that foreknowledge does not necessitate, not that foreordination does not. He is Arminian upon the subject of decrees.

414 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

The following objection is made against certainty, namely, that it is equivalent to necessity. " Si praescita sunt omnia futnra, hoc ordine venient, quo ventura esse praescita sunt. Et si hoc ordine venient, certus est ordo rerum praescienti deo. Et si est certus ordo rerum, est certus ordo causarum ; non enirn aliquid fieri potest, quod non aliqua efficiens causa praecesserit. Si autem certus est ordo causarum quo fit omne quod fit, fato fiunt omnia quae fiunt. Quod si ita est, nihil est in nostra potestate." There is something like this in Cicero, De Fato, xiv. But it is not the opinion of Cicero, but of certain philosophers whose views he criticises. He men tions two theories : 1. That all things happen by fate or necessity, and attributes this view to Democritus, Ileraclitus, Empedocles, and Aristotle. 2. That the voluntary move ments of the human soul do not happen by fate or neces sity. Cicero favors the latter theory. De Fato, xvii. xviii. His view of the relation of human actions to the Divine will, was what would now be called the general providence of God. He did not maintain particular providence. ' ' Magna dii curant, parva negligunt." De natura deorum. II. Ixvi. The fallacy in the above extract consists in as suming that a " certain and fixed order " is identical with fate. This depends upon how the order is " fixed." If it is " fixed " in accordance with physical laws, it would be fate ; but if " fixed " in accordance with the nature of mind and free will, it is not fate, but certainty only.

Certainty may or may not denote necessity. It denotes necessity when a physical event is spoken of; as when it is said that it is certain that a stone unsupported will fall to the ground. It does not denote necessity, when a mental or voluntary act is said to be certain. " If a man should be informed by prophecy, that he would certainly kill a fellowcreature the next day or year, and that in perpetrating this act he would be actuated by malice, it would not enter his mind that he would not be guilty of any crime because the act was certain before it was committed. But if the terms

DIVINE DECREES. 415

were changed, and he were informed that he would be necessitated to commit the act, it would enter his mind." Princeton Repertory, 1831, p. 159.

Predestination is the Divine decree or purpose (-Trpo&eo-t?, Rom. 8 : 28) so far as it relates to moral agents, viz. angels and men. The world of matter and irrational existence is more properly the object of the Divine decree, than of the Divine predestination. God decreed rather than predesti nated the existence of the material universe. Again a de cree relates to a thing or fact ; predestination to a person. Sin is decreed ; the sinner is predestinated. In 1 Cor. 2 : 7, however, the gospel is described as predestinated : " The hidden wisdom which God foreordained (Trpocopto-ez/) unto our glory." This is explained by the fact that the gospel relates eminently to persons, not to things.

Predestination is denoted in the New Testament, by two words : irpoopi^elv and Trpoyiyvwcnceiv. The former signifies " to circumscribe, or limit beforehand." The word opifav is transferred in the English " horizon," which denotes the dividing line that separates the earth from the sky. Hpoopifelv occurs in Acts 4 : 28, " To do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before (irpowpiae) to be done." Pilate, and the Gentiles, and the people of Israel were the agents under this predestination. This is predestination to sin. Examples of predestination to holiness are : Rom. 8 : 29, "Whom he did foreknow (Trpoeyva), he also did predes tinate (irpocopia-e) to be conformed to the image of his son." Rom. 8 : 30, " Whom he did predestinate (Trpowpurev), them he also called." Eph. 1:5," Having predestinated (TT/OOopi'cra?) us unto the adoption of children." Eph. 1 : 11, Being predestinated (irpoopiar&evTes) according to the pur pose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." 1 Cor. 2 : 7, " The hidden wisdom which God ordained before (Trpovpia-ev) unto our glory."

The word Trpayirfix&TiceW) " to foreknow," occurs in Rom. 8 : 29. " Whom he did foreknow (irpoi^vw^ he also did

416 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

predestinate." Rom. 11 : 2, " God hath not cast away his people, whom he foreknew (Trpoeyvo)). 1 Pet. 1 : 20, Christ " verily was foreknown (TrpoeyvoHrpevos) before the founda tion of the world." The noun Trpoyvcocns occurs in Acts 2 : 23, " Delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowl edge of God." 1 Pet. 1 : 2, " Elect, according to the fore knowledge of God." The terms "foreknow" and "pre destinate " denote two aspects of the same thing. Rom. 11 : 2, might read, " God hath not cast away his people whom he predestinated." When one is distinguished from the other, as in Rom. 8 : 29, to " foreknow " means, to " choose," or " single out," for the purpose of predestinat ing. Foreknowledge, in this use of the word, is election. It is the first part of the total act of predestinating. The word " know," in this connection, has the Hebraistic not the classical signification. To " know," in the Hebrew sense, means to regard with favor ; denoting not mere in tellectual cognition, but some kind of interested feeling or affection toward the object. Compare Gen. 18 : 19 ; Ps. 1 : 6 ; 36 : 10 ; 144 : 3 ; Hosea 8:4; Amos 3:2; Nahum 1:7; Matt. 7 : 23 ; John 10 : 14 ; 1 Cor. 8 : 3 ; 16 : 18 ; 2 Tim. 2 : 19 ; 1 Thess. 5 : 12. Shedd : On Romans 7 : 15. Traces of this use of yiyvaxrKew are seen in the earlier Greek usage : 7i>ft)T09 = yvaycrTos signifies a kinsman or a friend. Iliad, XV. 350 ; Aeschylus, Choeph. 702. With this signification, may be compared still another Hebraistic use of the word " to know ; " namely, " to make known." Gen. 22 : 12, " Now I know that tliou fearest God." 1 Cor. 2:2, "I determined not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ."

It is to be carefully observed, that foreknowledge in the Hebraistic sense of " election " means a foreknowledge of the person simply ; not of the actions of the person. " Whom he foreknew," Rom. 8 : 29, does not mean "Whose acts he foreknew," but, " Whose person he foreknew." It signifies that God fixes his eye upon a particular sinful

DIVINE DECREES. 417

man, and selects him as an individual to be predestinated to holiness in effectual calling. This is proved by the re mainder of the verse : " Whom he foreknew, he also did predestinate to l>e conformed to the image of his Son." The holy actions of the elect are the effect, not the cause, of their being foreknown and predestinated. In 1 Peter 1 : 2, believers are " elected unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Christ;" that is, unto justification and sanctificatiori. In 2 Tim. 1:9," God hath called us, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world be gan ; " and certainly, therefore, before any obedience, either partial or total, could be rendered to be the ground of the calling. In Kom. 11 : 2, St. Paul affirms that " God hath not cast away his people whom he foreknew." It would be nonsense, even to suppose that God has cast away a people whom he foreknew would keep his commandments. This, therefore, cannot be the sense of irpoeyva). The ground of predestination, is God's foreknowledge ; and this fore knowledge is not a foresight that a particular individual will believe and repent, but a simple pre-recognition of him as a person to whom God in his sovereign mercy has deter mined to " give repentance," 2 Tim. 2 : 25 ; and to give faith, since "faith is the gift of God," Eph. 2 : 8, and since " as many as were ordained to eternal life believed," Acts 13 : 48. In making the choice, God acts " according to the good pleasure (evbotciav) of his will," Eph. 1 : 5> and not according to any good action of the creature, so "that the purpose of God according to election might stand not of works, but of him that calleth," Rom. 9 : 11.

Foreknowledge, in the Hebraistic use of the word, is prior in the order to predestination, because it means elect ing compassion, and persons are referred to ; but foreknowl edge in the classical sense is subsequent in the order to de cree, because it denotes cognition, and events are referred to. God " foreknows," that is, elects those persons whom

418 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

he predestinates to life. God decrees the creation of the world, and thereby foreknows with certainty the fact.

Predestination makes the number of the predestinated " so certain and definite, that it cannot be either increased or diminished." Westminster Confession, III. 4. 2 Tim. 2 : 19, " The Lord knoweth them that are his." John 13 : 18, " I know whom I have chosen." Ex. 33 : 17, " I know tliee by name." Luke 10 : 20, " Your names are written in heaven." Jer. 1:5, " Before thou earnest forth out of the womb, I sanctified thee, and I ordained thee a prophet unto the nations." Gal. 1 : 15, " God separated me from my mother's womb, and called me by his grace." John 10 : 14, " I know my sheep."

The decree of predestination is divided into the decrees of election and reprobation. God's decree of election re spects angels. 1 Tim. 5 : 21, " I charge thee before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, and the elect angels." Jude 6, " The angels which kept not their first estate." It is not, in this case, a decree to deliver from sin, but to preserve from sinning. Those whom God determined to keep from apostasy, by bestowing upon them an additional degree of grace above what had been given them in creating them in holiness, are the elect angels. Those whom he determined to leave to their own will, and thus to decide the question of apostasy for themselves with that degree of grace with which they were endowed by creation, are the non-elect or reprobate angels. A non-elect angel is one who is holy by creation, and has ample power to remain holy, but is not kept by extraordinary grace from an act of sinful self-de termination. The perseverance of the non-elect angel is left to himself ; that of the elect angel is not. " The first ob ject of the permissive will of God was to leave non-elect angels to their own liberty, and the use of their free-will, which was natural to them, not adding that supernatural grace which was necessary, not that they should not sin, but that they should infallibly not sin. They had a strength

DIVINE DECREES. 419

sufficient to avoid sin, but not sufficient infallibly to avoid sin; a grace sufficient to preserve them, but not sufficient to confirm them." Charnocke : Holiness of God.

Reprobation in the case of an unfallen angel does not suppose sin, but in the case of fallen man it does. A holy angel is non-elect or reprobate, in respect to persevering grace, and the consequence is that he may or may not per severe in holiness. He may continue holy, or he may apos tatize. The decision is left wholly to himself. This is not the case with the elect angel. He is kept from falling. A sinful man, on the other hand, is non-elect or reprobate in respect to regenerating grace. It is not bestowed upon him, and his voluntariness in sin continues.

Election in reference to the angels implies : (a) Mutable holiness. Angelic holiness is not self-originated, hence not self-subsistent and unchangeable. Job 4 : 18, u Behold he put no trust in his servants, and his angels he charged with folly." (5) It implies the operation of the Holy Spirit upon the finite will in all grades of being ; and this in different degrees of efficiency, (c) It implies that a part, only, of the angels were placed upon probation. The per severance in holiness of the elect angels was secured to them by electing grace.

The fall of the angels is the very first beginning of sin, and presents a difficulty not found in the subsequent fall of man ; namely, a fall without an external tempter. This has been discussed in the profound treatise of Anselm, De casu diaboli. So far as God is concerned, the clue to the fall of a holy angel is in his decree not to hinder the exer cise of angelic self-determination to evil. This, however, does not fully account for the origin of angelic sin. When God placed some of the holy angels upon probation, and de cided not to prevent their apostasy by extraordinary grace, they might, nevertheless, have continued in holiness, had they so willed. The origin of their sin is not, therefore, fully accounted for by the merely negative permission of

420 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

God. A positive act of angelic self-determination is requi site ; and how this is made certain by God, is the difficulty. For it must be remembered, that in permitting some of the angels to fall, God did not withdraw from them any power or grace which was bestowed in creation. Nothing that was given in creation was withdrawn from Satan until after he had transgressed. This remark is true also of holy Adam, and his apostasy. How the fall of a holy will can be made a certainty by a merely permissive decree of God is inex plicable, as has already been observed. Neither temptation, nor the circumstances in which the creature is placed, make the event of apostasy infallibly certain. The will of the holy angel or man can resist both temptation and circum stances, and is commanded by God to do so. Nothing but the spontaneity of will can produce the sin ; and God does not work in the will to cause evil spontaneity. The cer tainty of sin by a permissive decree, is an insoluble mystery for the finite mind. The certainty of holiness in the elect by an efficacious decree, is easily explicable. God, in this case, works in the elect " to will and to do." The efficient decree realizes itself by positive action upon the creature ; but the permissive decree does not realize itself in this man ner. God is the efficient author of holiness, but not of sin. The conviction that God is not the author of sin, is innate and irrepressible. Socrates gives expression to it in the Republic, II. 377. But he does so, somewhat from the view-point of dualism. While evil in his view, does not originate in God, and is punished by God, it is not, as in Revelation, under the absolute control of God, in such sense that it could be prevented by him.

The power to prevent sin is implied in its permission. No one can be said to permit what he cannot prevent. Sin is preventable, by the exercise of a greater degree of that same spiritual efficiency by which the will was inclined to holiness in creation. God did not please to exert this de gree in the instance of the fallen angels and man, and thus

DIVINE DECREES. 421

sin was possible. God's power to prevent sin without forc ing the will, is illustrated by the Christian experience. The mind can be so illuminated and filled with a sense of divine things by the Holy Spirit, as to deaden lust and temptation. Compare the temptability of such believers as Leighton and Baxter, with that of an ordinary Christian. Afflictions sometimes cause the common temptations of life to lose almost all their force. Now, carry this mental illu mination and this co-operation of the Divine Spirit with the human spirit to an extraordinary degree, and it is easy to see how God can keep a soul already holy from falling, and yet the process be, and be felt to be, spontaneous and willing. Only the First cause can work internally and directly upon the finite will. Second causes cannot so operate. No man can incline another man ; but God the Holy Spirit can in cline any man to good, however wickedly inclined he may already be. This is a revealed truth, not a psychological one. It could not be discovered by the examination of the selfconsciousness, for this does not give a report of a Divine agent as distinct from the human. Hence the doctrine of spiritual operation in the soul is not found in natural relig ion. The "demon" of Socrates is the only thing resem bling it ; but this, probably, was only the personification of conscience.

The reason for the permission of sin was the manifesta tion of certain Divine attributes which could not have been manifested otherwise. These attributes are mercy and compassion, with their cognates. The suffering of God in carnate, and vicarious atonement, with all their manifesta tion of the Divine glory, would be impossible in a sinless universe. The " intent " was, " that now unto the princi palities and powers in heavenly places might be known by the church the manifold wisdom of God," Eph. 3 : 10. The attributes of justice and holiness, also, though exhib ited in natural religion, yet obtain a far more impressive display in the method of redemption. The glory of God, not

422 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

the happiness of the creature, is the true theodicy of sin. As the mineral kingdom is for the vegetable, the vegetable for the animal, and the animal for man, so all are for God. The inferior grade of being, in each instance, justifies the subservience. This is not egotism or selfishness, because of the superior dignity in each case.

The position that sin is necessary to the best possible uni verse is objectionable, unless by the best possible universe be meant the universe best adapted to manifest the Divine attributes. If the happiness of the creature be the crite rion of the best possible universe, then sin is not necessary to the best possible world. Sin brings misery, and the best possible world, looking at the happiness of the creature alone, would have no sin in it. Sin is very limited in com parison with holiness, in the universe of God. The earth is a mote in astronomy. The number of the lost angels and men is small compared with the whole number of rational creatures. Sin is a speck upon the infinite azure of eternity. Hell is a corner of the universe ; it is a hole or " pit," not an ocean. It is "bottomless," but not boundless. The dualistic and gnostic theory, which makes God and Satan or the Demiurge nearly equal in sway, is not that of revela tion. Because holiness and sin have thus far been so nearly balanced here on earth, it is not to be inferred that this will be the final proportion at the end of human history, or that it is the same throughout the universe. That sin is the exception, and not the rule, in the rational universe, is evinced by the fact that the angelic world was not created by species. Apostasy there is individual, not universal. The Scriptures denominate the good the heavenly " host," and allude to it as vast beyond computation ; but no such description is given of the evil.

God's decree of election respects man. John 15 : 16, " Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you." 1 Cor. 1 : 27, 28, " God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise." Eph. 1:4, " According as

DIVINE DECREES. 423

he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world." James 2:5, " Hath not God chosen the poor of this world, rich in faith." Matt. 13 : 11 ; 20 : 23 ; 22 : 14 ; 24:22, 40; 25:34; Mark 4:11; Luke 10:20; 12:32; IT : 34 ; John 6 : 3T ; Acts 13 : 48 ; Rom. 8 : 28-33 ; Romans, chapters 9-11 ; Gal. 1 : 15 ; Eph. cli. 1 ; 2 Thess. 2:13; 2 Tim. 1:9; Isa. 42 : 1 ; 45 : 4 ; 65 : 9, 22. Human election differs from angelic, in that it is election to holiness from a state of sin, not to perseverance in a state of holiness. It supposes the fall of man. Men are chosen out of a state of sin. " They who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ." Westminster Confession, III. 6. Human election is both national and individual. National election relates to the means of grace ; namely, the re vealed word, and the ministry of the word. Individual election relates to grace itself ; namely, the bestowment of the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit. National elec tion is the outward call ; " many are called," Matt. 20 : 16. Individual election is the inward or effectual call ; " few are chosen." This statement of our Lord that " few " are in dividually elected, in comparison with the "many" who are nationally elected, refers to the state of things at the time of his speaking. Christ was rejected by the majority of that generation to which he himself belonged, but this does not mean that he will prove to have been rejected by the majority of all the generations of mankind.

The following characteristics of the decree of election are to be noticed. 1. God's decree of election originates in compassion, not complacency ; in pity for the sinner's soul, not delight in the sinner's character and conduct. Election does not spring out of the Divine love (djaTrij) spoken of in John 14 : 23 ; but out of the Divine goodness and kindness (%P7?°"T(m?

4:24 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

the fallen human spirit, (a) Because it is his own handi work. Job 14 : 15, " Thou wilt have a desire to the work of thine hands." Jonah 4 : 11, " Should 1 not spare Nine veh, that great city, wherein are more than six score thou sand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand ? " Ezek. 33 : 11, " As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked ; but that the wicked turn from his way and live." Ps. 145 : 8, " The Lord is full of compassion ; slow to anger, and of great mercy." Ps. 103 : 8 ; 86 : 15 ; Micah 7 : 18, " God delighteth in mercy." Ex. 34 : 6, " The Lord passed by and proclaimed, The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin." (b) Because of its capacity for holi ness and worship. Towards the non-elect, this compassion ate feeling exists in the Divine mind, because they, like the elect, are the creatures of God, and have the same ca pacities ; but the expression of this compassion is restrained for reasons sufficient for God, and unknown to the creature. It appears strange that God should feel benevolent compas sion towards the souls of all men alike, and yet not mani fest saving compassion to all of them ; that he should con vert Paul, and leave Judas in sin. Yet there is no contra diction or impossibility in it. We can conceive of the existence of pity, without its actual exercise in some in stances. We can conceive that there may be some men whose persistence in sin, and obstinate resistance of com mon grace, God decides for reasons sufficient to him not to overcome by the internal operation of his Spirit, while yet his feeling towards them as his creatures is that of pro found and infinite compassion. Why he does not over come their self-will by the actual exercise of his compas sion, as he does that of others equally or perhaps even more impenitent and obstinate, is unknown, and perhaps unknowable. " Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in

DIVINE DECREES. 425

thy sight " (Matt. 11 : 26), is all the reason which our Lord assigns.

2. God's decree of election is not chargeable with par tiality, because this can obtain only when one party has a claim upon another. If God owed forgiveness and salvation to all mankind, it would be partiality should he save some and not others. Partiality is injustice. A parent is partial and unjust, if he disregards the equal rights and claims of all his children. A debtor is partial and unjust, if in the payment of his creditors he favors some at the expense of others. In these instances, one party has a claim upon the other. But it is impossible for God to show partiality in the bestowment of salvation from sin, because the sinner has no right or claim to it. " There is," says Aquinas (Summa, II. Ixiii. 1), " a twofold giving : the one a matter of justice, whereby a man is paid what is due to him. Here, it is possible to act partially, and with respect of per sons. There is a second kind of giving, which is a branch of mere bounty or liberality, by which something is be stowed that is not due. Such are the gifts of grace, where by sinners are received of God. In this case, respect of persons, or partiality, js absolutely out of the question, be cause any one, without the least shadow of injustice, may give of his own as he will, and to whom he will : according to Matt. 20 : 14, 15, ' Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own ? ' '

A man cannot be charged with unjust partiality in the be stowment of alms, because giving alms is not paying a debt. He may give to one beggar and not to another, without any imputation upon his j ustice, because he owes nothing to either of them. In like manner, God may overcome the resisting will of one man and not of another, without being chargeable with unjust partiality, because he does not owe this mercy to either of them. This truth is taught in Rom. 9 : 14, 15. " What shall we say then ? Is there unrighteousness with God ? God forbid. For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy

426 THEOLOGY (DOCTRLNE OF GOD).

on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion." Although feeling compas sion toward all sinners in the universe because they are his creatures, God does not save all sinners in the universe. He does not redeem any of the fallen angels ; and he does not redeem all of fallen mankind. He deals justly with both fallen angels and lost men ; and justice cannot be charged with partiality. " Behold therefore the goodness (XprjcrTOTrjTa) and severity (airorofiiav) of God ; on them which fell, severity (strict justice) ; but towards thee, good ness (mercy)," Horn. 11 : 22. Under an economy of grace, there can be, from the nature of the case, no partiality. Only under an economy of justice, and of legal claims, is it possible. The charge of partiality might with as much reason be made against the gifts of providence, as against the gifts of grace. Health, wealth, and high intellectual power, are not due to men from God. They are given to some and denied to others ; but God is not therefore partial in his providence. The assertion that God is bound, either in this life or the next, to tender a pardon of sin through Christ to every man, not only has no support in Scripture, but is contrary to reason ; for it transforms grace into debt, and involves the absurdity, that if the judge does not offer to pardon the criminal whom he has sentenced he does not treat him equitably.

3. The decree of election is immutable, and the salvation of the elect is certain, because God realizes his decree, in this instance, by direct efficiency. He purposes that a cer tain individual shall believe and persevere to the end, and secures this result by an immediate operation upon him. The conversion of St. Paul is an example. " The gifts and calling of God are without repentance," Horn. 11 : 29. " Whom he predestinated them he glorified," Kom. 8 : 30. " Let us not imagine," says St. Augustine, on Ps. 68, " that God puts down any man in his book, and then erases him ; for if Pilate could say l What I have written, I have written,'

DIVINE DECREES. 427

how can it be thought that the great God would write a per son's name in the book of life, and then blot it out again ? " The elect are not saved in sin, but from sin. Sanctification is as much an effect of the purpose of election, as justification. Christians are " elect unto obedience, and sprinkling of the blood of Christ," 1 Pet. 1 : 2. This accords with the pre vious statement, that the Divine decree is universal, includ ing the means as well as the end. Says Milton,

" Prediction, still,

In all things and all men, supposes means ; Without means used, what it predicts, revokes."

PAEADISE KEGAINED, III. 364.

They who are predestinated to life are predestinated to the means and conditions. Acts 13 : 48, " As many as were ordairied to eternal life, believed." Eph. 1:4, " He hath chosen us in Him, that we should be holy." Eph. 2 : 10, "We are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath foreordained that we should walk in them." Says Augustine (De correptione, "VII. xiii.), " those who are made the objects of divine grace, are caused to hear the gospel, and when heard to believe it, and are made to endure to the end in faith that works by love ; and should they at any time go astray, they are recovered." Says Luther (Preface to Romans), " God's decree of predes tination is firm and certain ; and the necessity resulting from it is in like manner immovable, and cannot but take place. For we ourselves are so feeble, that if the matter were left in our hands, very few, or rather none, would be saved ; but Satan would overcome us all."

4. The grace of God manifested in the purpose of elec tion is irresistible ; not in the sense that it cannot be op posed in any degree, but in the sense that it cannot be over come. In the same sense, the power of God is irresistible ; a man may resist omnipotence, but he cannot conquer it. The army of Napoleon at Austerlitz was irresistible, though

428 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

fiercely attacked. God can exert such an agency upon the human spirit as to incline or make willing. Ps. 110 : 3, " Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power." Phil. 2 : 13, " It is God which worketh in you to will and to do of his good pleasure." The doctrine of the internal operation of the Holy Ghost is the clue to this. The finite will cannot he made willing, or inclined : (a) By external force. (5) By human instruction. (

5. The decree of election is unconditional. It depends upon the sovereign pleasure of God, not upon the fore seen faith or works of the individual. Horn. 9 : 11 asserts "that the purpose of God according to election does not stand of works, but of him that calleth." Rom. 9 : 11, 12 teaches that the election of Jacob and rejection of Esau was not founded upon the works of either. "The chil dren being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, it was said, the elder shall serve the younger." 1 Pet. 1 : 2 asserts that believers are " elected unto obe dience," consequently, not because of obedience. 2 Tim.

DIVINE DECREES. 429

1 : 9 affirms that " God hath called us, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose." Rom. 8 : 29 teaches that " whom he did foreknow, he also did predes tinate to be conformed to the image of his son." If God foreknew these persons as conformed to the image of his Son, he would have no need to predestinate them to this conformity. Acts 13 : 48 declares that " as many as were ordained to eternal life, believed." This shows that faith is the result, not the reason of foreordination.

If it be objected that election does not " stand of works," but that it stands of faith, the reply is that : (a) Faith is an inward \vork. John 6 : 29, " This is the work of God, that ye believe." Consequently election not does rest upon faith as a foreseen inward work, any more than upon a foreseen outward work. (5) Faith is a gift of God to man (Eph. 1:8); therefore it cannot first be a gift of man to God, as the ground and reason of his electing act. (c) If election de pends upon foreseen faith, God does not first choose man, but man first chooses God ; which is contrary to John 15 : 16. (d) If election depends upon foreseen faith, there would be no reason for the objection in Rom. 9 : 19 : " Thou wilt say then, "Why doth he yet find fault ? " or for the ex clamation, " O the depth ! " Rom. 11 : 33. If it be said that election depends upon the right use of common grace by the sinner, this would make " the purpose of God according to election " to stand partly of works, and not solely "of him that calleth." Faith in this case is partly " the gift of God," and partly the product of the sinful will. This is contrary to those scriptures which represent God as the alone author of election, regeneration, faith, and repentance. Rom. 9 : 16; 8:7; John 1:12, 13; 3:5; 6 : 44, 65.1

Reprobation is the antithesis to election, and necessarily follows from it. If God does not elect a person, he rejects him. If God decides not to convert a sinner into a saint,

i On this point, see Hodge : Theology, II. 689-710 ; Dabney : Theology, 580, 581 ; Watson : Institutes, II. 395 sq.

430 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD).

he decides to let him remain a sinner. If God decides not to work in a man to will and to do according to God's will, he decides to leave the man to will and to do according to his own will. If God purposes not to influence a particular human will to good, he purposes to allow that will to have its own way. When God effectually operates upon the hu man will, it is election. When God does not effectually op erate upon the human will, it is reprobation. And he must do either the one or the other. The logical and necessary connection between election and reprobation is seen also, by considering the two divine attributes concerned in each. Election is the expression of the divine mercy ; reprobation of the divine justice. God must manifest one or the other of these two attributes towards a transgressor. St. Paul teaches this in Rom. 11 : 22 : " Behold the goodness and severity of God (the divine compassion, and the divine justice) ; on them which fell, severity ; but towards thee goodness."

Consequently, whoever holds the doctrine of election, must hold the antithetic doctrine of reprobation. A creed that con tains the former logically contains the latter, even when it is not verbally expressed. Such creeds are the Augsburg Con fession, Fart 1, Article 5 ; the First Helvetic, Article IX. ; the Heidelberg Catechism, Q. 54. Ursinus, who drew up the Heidelberg Catechism, discusses reprobation in his system of theology founded upon it. The thirty-nine Articles men tion election, and not reprobation. The following Reformed creeds mention both doctrines : Second Helvetic (1566), X. 4. " Et quamvis deus norit qui sunt sui, et alicubi mentio fiat paucitatis electorum, bene sperandum est tamen de om nibus, neque temere reprobis quisqnam est adnumerandus." X. 6. " Alii dicunt : si vero sum de reproborum numero," etc. French Confession (1559), XII. " Nous croyons que de cette condemnation, Dieu retire ceux lesquels il a elus, laissant les autres," etc. Belgic Confession (1561), XYI. " Nous croyons que Dieu s'est demontre tel qu'il est ; savoir misericordieux et juste : mise'ricordieux, en retirant et sauvant ceux

DIVINE DECREES. 431

qu'en son con sell kernel il a e*lus ; juste, en laissant les autres en leur ruine et trebuchernent ou ils se sont precipites." Scotch Confession (1560), YIII. " And for this cause, ar we not affrayed to cal God our Father, not sa meikle be cause he lies created us, quhilk we have common with the reprobate" Irish Articles (1615). " By the same eternal counsel, God hath predestinated some unto life, and repro bated some unto death." Lambeth Articles (1595). " God from eternity hath predestinated certain men unto life ; cer tain men he hath reprobated." Dort Canons (1619), I. 15. " Scriptura Sacra testatur non omnes homines esse electos, sed quosdam non electos, sive in aeterna dei elections pr a eteritos, quos scilicet deus ex liberrimo, justissimo, irreprehensibili, et immutabilimi beneplacito decrevit in communi miseria, in quam se sua culpa praecipitarunt, relinquere" Westminster Confession (1647), III. 3. "By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and an gels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others fore ordained to everlasting death." ]

Reprobation relates to regenerating grace, not to common grace. It is an error to suppose that the reprobate are en tirely destitute of grace. All mankind enjoy common grace. There are no elect or reprobate in this reference. Every

1 The Formula Concordiae (1576-1584) teaches that foreknowledge extends to both good and evil ; that predestination extends to good only. The Waldensian Confession (1655) teaches inability, election, and preterition. It is an abridg ment of the Gallican Confession, and is " highly prized " by the modern Waldensians. The Articles of the Congregational Union of England and Wales (1833) teach election. The creed of the Free Church of Geneva (1848) teaches inability and election. The Free Italian Church (1870) teaches inability. The Methodist Articles drawn up by Wesley (1784) teach inability; the sinner " cannot turn and prepare himself to faith." The Five Arminian Articles (Remonstratia), 1610, teach impotence, and that "God by an eternal purpose hath determined to save those who believe and persevere." Niemeyer excludes this from his collection of " Reformed " Confessions. The Cumberland Presbyterian Confession (1813-1829) teaches inability, and that "God's sovereign electing love is as extensive as the legal condemnation or reprobation, in which all men are by nature. But in a particular and saving sense, none can be properly called God's elect till they be justified and united to Christ. None are justified from eternity. God has reprobated none from eternity." Schaff: Creeds, III. 772,

432 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

human being experiences some degree of the ordinary in fluences of the Spirit of God. St. Paul teaches that God strives with man universally. He convicts him of sin, and urges him to repent of it, and forsake it. Rom. 1 : 19, 20; 2 : 3, 4; Acts IT : 24-31. " The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who hold the truth in unrighteousness, so that they are without excuse. And thinkest thou, O man, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God? Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, and long suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repent ance. God hath made of one blood all nations of men, and appointed the bounds of their habitation, that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him and find him : for in him we live and move and have our being."

The reprobate resist and nullify common grace ; and so do the elect. The obstinate selfishness and enmity of the human heart defeats the Divine mercy as shown in the or dinary influences of the Holy Spirit, in both the elect and non-elect. Acts Y : 51, " Ye stiff-necked, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost." The difference between the two cases is, that in the instance of the elect, God follows up the common grace which has been resisted, with the regenerating grace which overcomes the resistance ; while in the instance of the reprobate, he does not. It is in respect to the bestowment of this higher degree of grace, that St. Paul affirms that God " hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth " [i.e. does not soften]. "It is," says Bates (Eternal Judgment, II.), " from the perverseness of the will and the love of sin, that men do not obey the gospel. For the Holy Spirit never withdraws his gracious assistance, till resisted, grieved, and quenched by them. It will be no excuse, that Divine grace is not conferred in the same eminent degree upon some as upon others that are con verted ; for the impenitent shall not be condemned for want of that singular powerful grace that was the privilege of the

DIVINE DECREES. 433

elect, but for receiving in vain that measure of common grace that they had. If he that received one talent had faithfully improved it, he had been rewarded with more ; but upon the slothful and ungrateful neglect of his duty, he was justly deprived of it, and cast into a dungeon of horror, the emblem of hell."

Reprobation comprises preterition, and condemnation or damnation. It is defined in the Westminster Confession, III. T, as a twofold purpose : (a) " To pass by " some men in the bestowment of regenerating grace ; and (b) " To or dain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin." The first is preterition ; the last is condemnation, or damnation. Pre terition must not be confounded with condemnation. This is done by Baier, Compendium, III. xii. 27. Much of the attack upon the general tenet of reprobation arises from overlooking this distinction. The following characteristics mark the difference between the two. (a) Preterition is a sovereign act ; condemnation is a judicial act. God passes by, or omits an individual in the bestowment of regenerat ing grace, because of his sovereign good pleasure (evSoKia). But he condemns this individual to punishment, not because of his sovereign good pleasure, but because this individual is a sinner. To say that God condemns a man to punish ment because he pleases, is erroneous ; but to say that God omits to regenerate a man because he pleases, is true, (b) The reason of condemnation is known ; sin is the reason. The reason of preterition is unknown. It is not sin, because the elect are as sinful as the non-elect, (c) In preterition, God's action is permissive ; inaction rather than action. In condemnation, God's action is efficient and positive.

1. The decree of preterition, or omission, is a branch of the permissive decree. As God decided to permit man to use his self-determining power and originate sin, so he decided to permit some men to continue to use their self -determining power and persevere in sin. Preterition is no more exposed to objection than is the decree to permit sin at first. "It is

434 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

no blemish," says Howe (Decrees, Lect. III.), " when things are thus and so connected in themselves naturally and moral ly, to let things in many instances stand just as in themselves they are." Preterition is " letting things stand " as they are. To omit or pretermit is to leave, or let alone. The idea is found in Luke IT : 34. " The one shall be taken, the other shall be left." God sometimes temporarily leaves one of his own children to his own self-will. This is a tem porary reprobation. Such was the case of Hezekiah. "In the business of the ambassadors of the princes of Babylon, God left him, to try him, that he might know all that was in his' heart," 2 Chron. 32 : 31. Compare Ps. 81 : 12, 13 ; and David's temporary reprobation in the matter of Uriah. Preterition in the bestowment of regenerating (not common) grace, is plainly taught in Scripture. Isa. 6:9, 10 ; Matt. 11:25, 26; 13:11; 22: 14; Luke IT : 34; John 10:26; 12 : 39 ; Acts 1 : 16 ; 2 These. 2 : 11, 12 ; 2 Tim. 2 : 20 ; 1 Pet. 2:8; Kom. 9 : IT, 18, 21, 22 ; Jude 4. The passage in Isa. 6 : 9, 10 is quoted more often in the New Testament, than any other Old Testament text. It occurs six times in the Gospels (in every instance, in the discourse of our Lord), once in Acts, and once in Romans. Shedd : Romans 9 : 18, 23, 33.

The decree of preterition may relate either to the out ward means of grace, or to inward regenerating grace. The former is national, the latter is individual preterition. In bestowing a written revelation, and the promise of a re deemer, upon the Jews, under the Old economy, God omitted or passed by all other nations. Dent. T : 10, "The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be a special people unto himself : not because ye were more in number, for ye were the fewest." Until the appointed time had come, Christ himself forbade his disciples to preach the gospel indiscrim inately to Jews and Gentiles. Matt. 10 : 5, 6. After his resurrection, national preterition ceased. Mark 16 : 15 ; Luke 24 : 4T. All nations are now elected to the outward

DIVINE DECREES. 435

means of salvation, viz., the Scriptures and the ministry of the word, so far as the command of God is concerned ; though practically many are still reprobated, owing to the unfaithfulness of the Christian Church. St. Paul teaches this, when he asks and answers : " Have they [Gentiles] not heard ? Yes, verily, their sound [of the preachers] went into all the earth, and their words to the end of the world," Eom. 10 : 18. The proclamation of the gospel is universal, not national.

2. There may be individual preterition in connection with national election. Some of the Jews were individually and inwardly reprobated ; but all of them were nationally and outwardly elected. Rom. 9 : 27 ; 11:7, " Israel [the na tion] hath not obtained that which he seeketh for, but the election hath obtained it, and the rest [of the nation] were blinded." Matt. 10 : 16, " Many be [outwardly] called, but few [inwardly] chosen ; " Isa. 10 : 22, 23. Some in Chris tendom will in the last day prove to have been passed by, in the bestowrnent of regenerating grace. " All that hear the gospel, and live in the visible church, are not saved ; but they only who are true members of the church invisible," "Westminster S. C., 61. Reprobated persons are striven with by the Holy Spirit, and are convicted of sin, but they resist these strivings, and the Holy Spirit proceeds no fur ther with them. In his sovereignty, he decides not to over come their resistance of common grace. The non-elect are the subjects of common grace, to which they oppose a stren uous and successful determination of their own will. Every sinner is stronger than common grace, but not stronger than regenerating grace. The non-elect " may be and often are outwardly called by the ministry of the word, and have some common operations of the Spirit, who for their wilful neglect and contempt of the grace offered to them, being justly left in their unbelief, do never truly come to Jesus Christ." Westminster S. C., 68. Isa. 6 : 9, 10, « Go and tell this people, Hear ye indeed, but perceive not. Make

436 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes ; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and convert and be healed." The resistance and abuse of common grace is followed by desertion of God ; which negative desertion is, in this passage of the evangelical prophet, called, Hebraistically, a positive stupefying, hardening and deafening.

Preterition is not inconsistent with the doctrine of the Divine mercy. A man who has had common grace has been the subject of mercy to this degree. If he resists it, he cannot complain because God does not bestow upon him still greater mercy, in the form of regenerating grace. A sin ner who has quenched the convicting influence of the Holy Spirit cannot call God unmerciful, because he does not after wards grant him the converting influence. A beggar who contemptuously rejects the five dollars offered by a benevo lent man cannot charge stinginess upon him, because, after this rejection of the five dollars, he does not give him ten. A sinner who has repulsed the mercy of God in common grace, and demands that God grant a yet larger degree, vir tually says to the Infinite One : " Thou hast tried once to convert me from sin ; now try again, and try harder."

3. There may be individual election in connection with national preterition. Some men may be saved in unevangelized nations. That God has his elect among the heathen, is taught in Calvinistic creeds. The Westminster Confes sion (X. 3.), after saying that "elect infants dying in infancy are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh, when, and where, and how, he pleaseth," adds ; " so also are all other elect persons [regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit], who are incapable of being out wardly called by the ministry of the word." This is not to be referred solely to idiots and insane persons, but also to such of the pagan world as God pleases to regenerate without the written word. The Second Helvetic Confession (I. 7.), one of the most important of the Reformed creeds, after saying

DIVINE DECREES. 437

that the ordinary mode of salvation is by the instrumental ity of the written word, adds, " agnoscimus interim, deum illuminare posse homines etiam sine externo ministerio, quo et quando velit : id quod ejus potentiae est." Zanchius (Predestination, I.) says that " national reprobation does not imply that every individual person who lives in an unevangelized country, must therefore unavoidably perish forever : any more than that every individual who lives in a land called Christian is therefore in a state of salvation. There are no doubt elect persons among the former ; as well as reprobate ones among the latter." Again (IV.), after remarking that many nations have never had the privilege of hearing the word preached, he says, that " it is not indeed improbable that some individuals in these unen lightened countries, may belong to the secret election of grace, and the habit of faith may be wrought in them." By the term "habit" (habitus), the elder divines meant an inward disposition of the heart and will. The " habit of faith" is the believing mind, or disposition of soul. And this implies penitence for sin, and the longing for deliverance from it. The habit of faith is the broken and contrite heart which expresses itself in the publi can's prayer : " God be merciful to me a sinner." It is evident that the Holy Ghost, by an immediate operation can, if he please, produce such a disposition and frame of mind in a pagan, without employing as he commonly does the preaching of the written word. That there can be a disposition to believe in Christ before Christ is personally known, is proved by the case of the blind man in John 9 : 36-38 : " Jesus saith unto him, Dost thou believe on the Son of God ? He answered and said, Who is he Lord, that I might believe on him ? And Jesus said unto him, Thou hast both seen him, and it is he that talketh with thee. And he said, Lord, I believe. And he worshipped him." The case of the Ethiopian eunuch (Acts 8 : 27 sq.) is a similar instance of a penitent sense of sin, and a desire

438 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

for deliverance from it, before the Great Deliverer himself is actually set before the mind. Calvin (Inst. IY. xvi. 19) remarks that " when the apostle makes hearing the source of faith, he only describes the ordinary economy and dis pensation of the Lord, which he generally observes in the calling of his people ; but does not prescribe a perpetual rule for him, precluding his employment of any other method ; which he has certainly employed in the calling of many to whom he has given the true knowledge of himself in an internal manner, by the illumination of his spirit, without the intervention of any preaching." Calvin is speaking of infants in this connection ; but the possibility of the regeneration of an infant without the written word, proves the same possibility in the instance of an adult. In Inst. III. xvii. 4, he describes Cornelius as having been " illuminated and sanctified by the Spirit," prior to Peter's preaching to him. Augustine (Letter to Deogratias, Oil.) teaches that some are saved outside of the circle of special revelation. " Seeing that in the sacred Hebrew books some are mentioned, even from Abraham's time, not belong ing to his natural posterity nor to the people of Israel, and not proselytes added to that people, who were neverthe less partakers of this holy mystery, why may we not believe that in other nations also, here and there, some names were found, although we do not read their names in these au thoritative records ? " In his Retractations (II. xxxi.), Au gustine remarks upon this passage, that the salvation in such cases was not on the ground of personal virtue and merit, but by the grace of God in regenerating the heart, and working true repentence for sin in it. " This I said, not meaning that anyone could be worthy through his own merit, but in the same sense as the apostle said, i Not of works, but of him that calleth ' — a calling which he affirms to pertain to the purpose of God." Nicene Fathers, I. 418. That the Holy Spirit saves some of the unevangelized heathen by the regeneration of the soul, and the production

DIVINE DECREES. 439

of the penitent and believing habit or disposition, is favored by Scripture ; though from the nature of the case, the data are not numerous. The Bible teaches that the ordinary method of salvation is through the instrumentality of the word : " How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard ? and how shall they hear without a preacher 3 " Rom. 10 : 14. But it also teaches that the Divine Spirit sometimes operates in an extraordinary manner, and goes before the preacher of the word. The case of Cornelius, which is one of a class, warrants the belief that the Holy Spirit sometimes works in the individual heart, and pro duces a sense of sin and a believing disposition, prior to the actual presentation of Christ, the object of faith. Cor nelius, before Peter is sent to preach Christ to him, is de scribed as " a just man " who " feared God," Acts 10 : 22. This does not mean that he was a " virtuous pagan " who claimed to have lived rip to the light he had, and who upon this ground esteemed himself to be acceptable to God ; but it means that he was a convicted sinner, who was seriously inquiring the way of salvation from sin. This is evident from the fact that Peter preached to this " just man who feared God," the forgiveness of sin through Christ's blood, and that this " just man " believed and was baptized. Acts 10 : 44-47. Again, it is said, in Matt. 8 : 11, " Many shall come from the east and the west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven, but the children of the kingdom shall be cast out." The indi vidually and spiritually elect from outside of Israel, are here contrasted with the individually and spiritually reprobated from within Israel. Again, the universality of the gospel for the Gentiles as well as the Jews, taught in the promise to Abraham and in the prophesies of Isaiah, makes it probable that the Divine Spirit does not invariably, and without any exceptions, wait for the tardy action of the unfaithful church in preaching the written word, before he exerts his omnipo tent grace in regeneration. Peter supposes the exertion of

440 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

prevenient grace, when he says, "Whosoever among you feareth God, to you is this word of salvation sent," Acts 13 : 26. The phrase " feareth God," here, as in Acts 10 : 22, denotes a sense of sin, and a predisposition of mind to receive the remission of sins produced by the Holy Spirit. The apostles seem to have found such a class of persons in their missionary tours among the unevangelized populations. The assertion of Christ (Matt. 13 : IT), that " many prophets and righteous men have desired to see" the Messiah, though referring primarily to the Old Testament prophets and righteous persons, may have a secondary reference to inquiring persons among the Gentiles, and to Christ as the " Desire of all nations."

Whether any of the heathen are saved outside of Chris tian missions depends, therefore, upon whether any of them are " regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit." The pagan cannot be saved by good works, or human mo rality, any more than the nominal Christian can be. Pagan morality, like all human morality, is imperfect ; and noth ing but perfection can justify. Hence, the Westminster Larger Catechism, Q. 60, affirms that pagans " cannot be saved, be they never so diligent to frame their lives ac cording to the light of nature." The fathers of the Eng lish Church also deny " that every man shall be saved by the law or sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to that law, and the light of nat ure." Farrar : St. Paul, I. 280. The utmost diligence and effort of a pagan fails perfectly to obey the law of God written on the heart ; and only perfect obedience is free from condemnation. The most virtuous heathen has an ac cusing conscience at times, and must acknowledge that he has come short of his duty. Kom. 2 : 15. Yet missionary annals furnish instances of a preparation of heart to wel come the Redeemer, when he is offered. Pagans have been found with a serious and humble sense of sin, and a

DIVINE DECREES. 441

desire for salvation from it.1 Baxter, in his Personal Nar rative, says : " I am not so much inclined to pass a peremp tory sentence of damnation upon all that never heard the gospel : having some more reason than I knew of before, to think that God's dealing with such is unknown to us ; and therefore, the ungodly here among us Christians are in a far more worse case than they."

4. The decree of preterition supposes the free fall of man, and his responsibility for the existence of sin. See Ed wards : Decrees and Salvation, § 58. Man is already guilty, and deserving perdition, and the reprobating decree of God simply leaves him where he already is by an act of his own self-determination. The infra- or sw£>-lapsarian theory is the correct one : infra or sub being used logically, not tem porally. The sublapsarian order of the Divine decrees is this : 1. The decree to create man in holiness and blessed ness. 2. The decree to permit man to fall by the self-de termination of his own will. 3. The decree to save a defi nite number out of this guilty aggregate. 4. The decree to leave the remainder to their self-determination in sin, and to the righteous punishment which sin deserves. Sublapsarianism is taught by the synod of Dort : Decrees, Art. 7 ; and by Turrettin : Institutio, IY. ix. 5.

» The case of the Indian described in Edward's Life of Brainerd is sometimes cited, but it is not so clear and satisfactory as some others. Brainerd describes the Indian as one who " had formerly been like the rest of the Indians, until about four or five years previously. Then, he said, his heart was very much distressed. At length God comforted his heart and showed him what he should do." Brainerd adds : " I must say that there was something in his temper and disposition which looked more like true religion than anything I ever observed amongst other heathens." But Brainerd does not say that this Indian believed and trusted in Christ, when Christ was presented to him as the Saviour from sin : yet had he done so, he would certainly have mentioned it. On the con trary, Brainerd remarks that the Indian "disliked extremely" some of his teaching. He also continued to practise the tricks of a conjurer in connection with idolatrous worship. The evidence and criterion of a true sense of sin, and of a genuine work of the Holy Spirit in a heathen heart, is that readiness to welcome and believe in Christ, when preached, which was exhibited by Corne lius and the eunuch.

442 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

The supralapsarian theory places, in the order of decrees, the decree of election and preterition before the fall, instead of after it. It supposes that God begins by decreeing that a certain number of men shall be elected, and reprobated. This decree is prior even to that of creation, in the logical order. The supralapsarian order of decrees is as follows : 1. The decree to elect some men to salvation, and to leave some to perdition, for the divine glory. 2. The decree to create the men thus elected and reprobated. 3. The decree to per mit them to fall. 4. The decree to justify the elect, and to condemn the non-elect. The objections to this view are the following: (a) The decree of election and preterition has reference to a non-entity. Man is contemplated as creatable, not as created. Consequently, the decree of elec tion and preterition has no real object. "Homo creabilis et labilis non est objectum praedestinationis, sed creatus et lapsus." Turrettin : Institutio, IV. ix. 5. Man is only ideally existent, an abstract conception ; and therefore any divine determination concerning him, is a determination concerning non-entity. But God's decrees of election and reprobation suppose some actually created beings, from which to select and reject. " On whom (ov) he will, he hath mercy ; and lohomhe will, he hardeneth," Korn. 9 : 18. The first decree, in the order of nature, must therefore be a decree to create. God must bring man into being, before he can decide what man shall do or experience. It is no reply to say, that man is created in the Divine idea, though not in reality, when the decree of predestination is made. It is equally true that he is fallen in the Divine idea, when this decree is made. And the question is, What is the logical order, in the divine idea, of the creation and the fall ?

(b) The Scriptures represent the elect and non-elect, re spectively, as taken out of an existing aggregate of beings. John 15 : 19, " I have chosen you out of (e«) the world."

(c) The elect are chosen to justification and sanctification. Eph. 1 : 4-6 ; 1 Pet. 1 : 2. They must therefore have been

DIVINE DECREES. 443

already fallen, and consequently created. God justifies " the ungodly," Kom. 4:5; and sanctifies the unholy, (d) The supralapsarian reprobation is a Divine act that cannot presuppose sin, because it does not presuppose existence. But the Scriptures represent the non-elect as sinful creatures. In Jude 4, the men who were " of old ordained to this con demnation " are " ungodly men, turning the grace of God into lasciviousness." Accordingly, the Westminster Confes sion (III. 7) affirms that God passes by the non-elect, arid " ordains them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice."

The supralapsarian quotes Rom. 9 : 11, in proof of his as sertion that election and preterition are prior to the creation of man. " The children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil," Jacob was chosen and Esau was left. This is an erroneous interpretation. Birth is not synony mous with creation Parents are not the creators of their children. Man exists before he is born into the world.1 He exists in the womb ; and he existed in Adam. Ac cordingly, in Rom. 9 : 10, 12, it is said that " when Rebecca had conceived, it was said to her, The elder shall serve the younger." The election and preterition related to the em bryonic existence. Jacob and Esau had real being in their mother, according to Ps. 139 : 15, 16 : " My substance was not hid from thee, when I was made in secret and curiously wrought in the lowest parts of the earth. Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being unperfect ; and in thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fash ioned when as yet there was none of them." St. Paul (Gal. 1 : 15) says that he was "separated and called from his mother's womb." God says to Jeremiah (1 : 5), " Before thou earnest out of the womb I sanctified thee." In saying

1 Says Haeckel (Evolution of Man, II. 3), "the human embryo passes through the whole course of its development in the space of forty weeks. Each man is really older, by this period, than is usually assumed. When, for example, a child is said to be 9}£ years old, he is really 10 years old."

444 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD).

that they had not " done any good or evil " at the moment of their election and preterition, actual transgression after birth is meant. Original sin, or corruption of nature, char acterized them both ; otherwise, it would be absurd to speak of electing one of them to mercy, and leaving the other to justice. Absolute innocence can neither be elected nor re jected, saved or lost. Eph. 3 : 9, 10 is explained by the Bupralapsarian, to teach that creation is subsequent in the order to redemption. But the clause, " who created all things by Jesus Christ," is parenthetical, not the principal clause. The clause Iva yvapia-Qfj) etc., depends on evwy

5. The decree of preterition does not necessitate perdi tion, though it makes it certain. Because: (a) It has no effect at all, in the order of decrees, until after the free will of man has originated sin. The decree of preterition sup poses the voluntary fall of man. It succeeds, in the order of nature, the decree to permit Adam's sin. Preterition, consequently, has to do only with a creature who is already guilty by his own act, and justly " condemned already," John 3 : 18. (&) It is a permissive not an efficient act on the part of God, that is exerted in preterition. In respect to regeneration, God decides to do nothing, in the case of a non-elect sinner. He leaves him severely alone. He per mits him to have his already existing self-determination, his own voluntary inclination. This is not compulsion, but the farthest possible from it. Compulsion might with more color of reason be charged upon election, than upon preteri tion. For in this case, God works in the human will " to will."

The efficient and blameworthy cause of the perdition of the non-elect is not the decree of preterition, but the selfdetermined apostasy and sin of the non-elect. Mere per mission is not causation. "Ubi nuda est permissio, ibi locum non habet causalitas." Quenstedt, II. ii. 2. The

DIVINE DECREES. 445

non-elect is not condemned and lost because God did not elect him, but because he " sinned and came short of the glory of God," Kom. 3 : 23. " Well ; because of unbelief, they were broken off," Kom. 11 : 20.

The sentence of the last day will not be founded upon God's negative act of not saving, but upon the sinner's positive act of sinning. Christ will not say to the impeni tent, " Depart, because I did not save thee," but, " Depart, because thou hast sinned, and hast no sorrow for it." Should John Doe throw himself into the water and be drowned, while Richard Roe stood upon the bank and did nothing, the verdict would be that the act was suicide, not homicide : " Drowned, not because Richard Roe did not pull him out, but because John Doe threw himself in." It is true that Richard Roe, in this instance, would be guilty of a neglect of duty towards God, in not saving the life of John Doe, but he would not be guilty of the murder of John Doe. Richard Roe's non-performance of his duty towards God, would not transfer the guilt of John Doe's act of self-murder to him. Were God under an obligation to save the sinner, the decree of preterition would be un justifiable. It would be a neglect of duty. But salvation is grace, not debt ; and therefore the decision not to bestow it, is an act of justice without mercy. " On them that fell, severity," or exact justice, is inflicted. Rom. 11 : 22.

While, then, election is the efficient cause of salvation, preterition is not the efficient cause of perdition. If I hold up a stone in my hand, my holding it up is the efficient cause of its not falling ; but if I let it go, my letting it go is not the efficient cause of its falling. The efficient cause, in this case, is the force of gravity. Non-prevention is in action, and inaction is not causation. On the side of elec tion, the efficient cause of salvation is the Holy Spirit in regeneration ; but on the side of reprobation, the efficient cause of perdition is the self-determination of the human will. See South : Sermon on Deut. 29 : 4. Bunyan (Rep446 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

robation Asserted, XI.) lays down the following proposi tions : 1. Eternal reprobation makes no man a sinner. 2. The foreknowledge of God that the reprobate will perish, makes no man a sinner. 3. God's infallible determining upon the damnation of him that perisheth, makes no man a sinner. 4. God's patience and forbearance until the reprobate fits himself for eternal destruction, makes no man a sinner.

6. The decree of preterition makes perdition certain, be cause the bondage of the sinner's will to evil prevents selfrecovery. There are but two agents who can be conceived of, as capable of converting the human will from sin to holi ness : namely, the will itself, and God. If owing to its own action the human will is unable to incline itself to holiness, and God purposes not to incline it, everlasting sin follows, and this is everlasting perdition. The certainty of the per dition of the non-elect arises from his inability to recover himself from the consequences of his own free agency, and the decision of God to leave him " to eat of the fruit of his own way, and to be filled with his own devices," Prov. 1 : 31.

7. The reason for preterition, or not bestowing regener ating grace, is secret and unknown to man. It supposes sin, but not a greater degree of sin than in the elect. This is taught in Rom. 9 : 11 : " The children not having done any good or evil, in order that the purpose of God might stand, not of works, it was said, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated." Election also supposes sin, but not a less degree of sin than in the non-elect. Saul of Tarsus was a violent and bitter enemy of the gospel, but was " a chosen vessel." This is the sovereignty of God in election and preterition, taught in Rom. 9:18: " He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." The meaning of " harden," here, is, " not to soften." 1

1 "Pharaoh was hardened, because God with his Spirit and grace hindered not his ungodly proceedings, but suffered him to go on and have his way. Why God did not hinder or restrain him we ought not to inquire." Luther : Table Talk, 49, Ed. Bogue.

DIVINE DECREES. 447

The meaning of "hate" in Kom. 9: 11, is, "not to love." This text is equivalent to Luke 17 : 34 : " The one shall be taken, the other shall be left." The word e^icrrja-a is em ployed Hebraistically, not classically. It does not denote the positive emotion of hatred against sin, because it is ex pressly said that in election and preterition reference is not had to holiness and sin. A man is not elected because he is holy, or omitted because he is sinful. " Hatred," here, de notes the withholding of regenerating mercy. It is the same Hebraistic use of the word " hate " with that of Christ, in Luke 14 : 26 compared with Matt. 10 : 37. To " hate " father and mother is the same as to " love less," in com parison. Compare also the Hebraistic use of " hide," to de note, " not to reveal," in Matt. 12 : 25. The popular signifi cation of "reprobate" denotes an uncommonly wicked per son. In this, it differs from the scriptural and theological signification, which denotes mere non-election, with no ref erence to degrees of sin. A similar Hebrew idiom is seen in Ps. 141 : 4 : " Incline not my heart to any evil thing." The negative permission to incline himself, the Psalmist calls a positive inclining by God. He asks God to keep him from his own inclination to evil. This idiom is found in the Turkish language. To " let fall," and " to cause to fall," are the same word. " I missed my steamer," in Turkish, is, literally, " I caused my steamer to run away." In the Ori ental languages, the imperative form often expresses permis sion, instead of command. Herrick : Bib. Sacra, Oct. 1885. Again, preterition, while supposing existing sin and un belief, does not rest upon foreseen perseverance in sin and unbelief. God did not omit Esau in the bestowment of re generating grace, because he foreknew that he would con tinue to do wrong in the future. He was passed by, " not having done any evil : " that is, without reference either to past or future transgressions. A reference to these, would have been a reason for passing by Jacob, as well as Esau. Perseverance in sin is the consequence of preterition, not

448 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

the cause of it. God decides not to overcome the sinner's resistance and obstinacy, and the result is, that he persists in his wilful course. Hence, future perseverance in sin is not the reason why God does not bestow regenerating grace upon the non-elect.

8. The final end of both .election and reprobation is the Divine glory, in the manifestation of certain attributes. It is no more true that God creates any " merely to damn them," than that he creates them merely to save them. The ultimate end of all of God's acts is in himself. Eom. 11 : 36, " For of him, and through him, and to him are all things." When God elects and saves a sinner, the attribute of mercy is glorified. When he leaves a sinner in sin and punishes him, the attribute of justice is glorified. Neither salvation nor damnation are ultimate ends, but means to an ultimate end : namely, the manifested glory of the triune God. To exhibit justice is honorable to God, as well as to exhibit mercy. " The ministration of death was glorious. The ministration of condemnation is glory," 2 Cor. 3 : 7, 9.

The two great systems of theology which divide evangel ical Christendom, Calvinism and Arminianism, are marked by their difference respecting the doctrines of election and preterition. 1. In the Calvinistic system, election precedes faith, and preterition precedes perseverance in unbelief. God elects a sinner to the bestowment of regenerating grace, and faith in Christ is the consequence. God passes by a sinner in the bestowment of regenerating grace (though he may bestow all the grades of grace below this), and end less unbelief is the consequence. God is thus the efficient cause and author of faith, but not of unbelief. The elect ing decree is efficacious, and originates faith. The nonelecting decree is permissive, and merely allows existing unbelief to continue. In the Arminian system, election is subsequent to faith, and preterition is subsequent to perse verance in unbelief. God elects an individual, because his faith is foreseen ; and God omits to bestow regenerating

DIVINE DECREES. 449

grace upon an individual, because his persistence in sin and unbelief is foreseen. For the Divine mind, the faith and the perseverance in unbelief have occurred, and the election and preterition follow after them, as their consequence. Consequently, in the Arminian scheme, the reasons for election and preterition are not secret but known. Man's faith is the reason for election ; man's perseverance in unbelief is the reason for preterition.1 2. The Arminian election and preterition are judicial, not sovereign acts of God. They are of the nature of reward and punish ment. Because a man believes in Christ, he is elected : this is his reward. Because he persists in sin and unbelief, he is passed by : this is his punishment. The Calvinistic elec tion and preterition are sovereign, not judicial acts. A man is elected, because of God's good pleasure (Kara evSo/ctav), not because of faith ; and a man is passed by, because of God's good pleasure, not because of persistence in sin. 3. Since the Arminian election succeeds saving faith, in the logical order, it must in the same order succeed death. Inasmuch as in the Arminian scheme the believer may at any time before death fall from faith, and therefore it can not be determined until after death who has saving faith, it follows that a man cannot be elected until after he is dead. In the order of events, death is prior to election. 4.

1 Respecting election, Watson (Institutes, II. 338) remarks as follows: "To be elected is, to be separated from the world (' I have chosen you out of the world '), and to be sanctified by the Spirit (' elect unto obedience '). It follows, then, that election is not only an act of God in time, but also that it is subse quent to the administration of the means of salvation. Actual election cannot be eternal, for from eternity the elect were not actually chosen out of the world, and could not be actually sanctified unto obedience." This explanation makes election to be sanctification itself, instead of its cause. "To be elected, is to be separated from the world, and to be sanctified." The term "separate" is used here by Watson not as St. Paul uses it to denote election, when he says that God " separated him from his mother's womb" (Gal. 1 : 15); but in the sense of sanctification, as St. Paul employs it in 2 Cor. 6 : 17, "Be ye separate, and touch not the unclean thing." By this interpretation, election is made to be the same thing as sanctification, instead of being an act of God that pro duces it; as is taught in Eph. 1:4, "He hath chosen us that we should be holy," and in 1 Pet. 1:2," Elect unto obedience."

450 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

The Arminian election and preterition are the election and preterition of qualities : namely, of faith and persevering unbelief. The Calvinistic election and preterition are those of persons : namely, Peter, James, and John. 5. The Ar minian election is inconsistent with a part of the Arminian statement respecting inability.1 If God elects a sinner be cause he foresees that he will believe and repent, it follows that the sinner has power to believe and repent. If election is conditioned by the act of the human will in believing, this act must be within the sinner's ability. But in the 17th chapter of the Declaration of the Remonstrants, the following statement is found : " Man has not saving faith from himself, neither is he regenerated or converted by the force of his own free will ; since in the state of sin he is not able of and by himself, to think, will, or do any good thing — any good thing that is saving in its nature, particu larly conversion and saving faith." If this were all that is said in the Arminian Articles respecting abilit}% it would be impossible to harmonize it with conditional election. Unconditional election alone is consistent with it. But in connection with this statement of inability, a view of grace is presented that modifies and really retracts this assertion of utter inability, and is consistent with conditional election. Though it is said that man by apostasy " is not able of and by himself to think, will, or do any good thing that is sav ing in its nature," yet, it is also said that " the Holy Spirit confers, or at least is ready to confer, upon all and each to whom the word of faith is preached, as much grace as is sufficient for generating faith, and carrying forward their conversion in its successive stages." Every man, therefore, that hears the gospel receives a degree of grace that is suffi cient for regeneration, provided that he rightly uses it. If therefore he is not regenerated, it must be from the lack of

1 Baur (Gegensatz, 216) shows that the same inconsistency, in first asserting and then denying inability, appears in the Lutheran doctrine of regeneration aa stated in the Formula Concordiae.

DIVINE DECREES. 451

his human efficiency in co-operation with the Divine. The difference, consequently, between the believer and unbe liever, the elect and non-elect, is referable not wholly to God's electing grace, but partly to the right use made of grace by the man himself. Dependence upon regenerating grace in the Arminian scheme IB partial, not total ; and the Arminian election depends partly upon the act of the hu man will, and not wholly upon the will of God.

It is objected to the doctrine of preterition, that God can not be sincere in the universal offer of the gospel in Mark 16 : 15. 1. The first reply is : That sincerity depends upon the intrinsic nature of the thing desired, not upon the re sult of endeavors to attain it. A parent sincerely desires the reformation of a child, because his reformation is a good thing in itself. He may have little or no expectation of accomplishing it, but this does not weaken his longing, or impair the sincerity of his efforts. A miser upon his death bed desires wealth as a species of good, as sincerely as ever, but he knows that he can no longer have it. In like manner, God, by reason of his inherent compassion, may sincerely de sire the conversion of a sinner, as the sinner's highest good, though he knows that it will never take place. The Armin ian theory has no advantage over the Calvinistic at this point. God, says the Arminian, sincerely desires the sinner's re pentance, although he foreknows infallibly that his desire will not be gratified by the action of the sinner. 2. The decree of God is not always expressive of his desire, but sometimes may be contrary to it. God decreed sin, and yet prohibited it. A man's decision, which is his decree in a particular case, is frequently contrary to his natural inclina tion. He decides to suffer pain in the amputation of a limb, though he is utterly averse to pain. His natural spontaneous desire is to escape physical pain, but in this particular instance he decides not to escape it. If there are sufficient reasons for it, a man's particular decision may be not only no index of his general desire, but directly con452 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

traiy to it. The same is true of God. The natural spon taneous desire of God towards all men, the non-elect as well as the elect, is expressed in Ezekiel 33 : 11 ; 18 : 32. "As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure (yen * = to desire) in the death of the wicked ; but that the wicked turn from his evil way and live. I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord ; wherefore turn yourselves and live ye." This Divine desire is constitutional. It springs from the compassionate love of the Creator towards the soul of the creature, and is founded in the essential benevolence of the Divine nature. But this general and abiding desire is distinguishable from the realization or gratification of it by a particular decision in a particular instance. It is conceivable that God may sincerely desire that Judas Iscariot would believe on Christ, and repent of sin, and yet for some sufficient reason decide not to overcome his opposition, and incline him to the act of faith. God desires that there should be no physical pain in his creation. lie takes no delight in physical distress. But in particular instances, he decides not to realize thia desire by a special act of his own in preventing or remov ing pain. The purpose of God, in distinction from his de sire, towards the non-elect, is expressed in Exodus 9 : 16, " For this cause have I raised thee up, for to show in thee my power, and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth ; " and in Rom. 9 : 18, " Whom he will, he hardeneth." The purpose spoken of here, was the deci sion of God not to interfere with the will of Pharaoh. God desired that Pharaoh would spontaneously and of his own accord let the people go. Exodus 9 : 1, " Let my people go." But he decided not to overcome the un willingness of Pharaoh to let the people go. Ex. 9 : 12, " God hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not." This " hardening " was the not softening of his al1 The Septuagint, contrary to New Testament usage, incorrectly renders this by &OV\O/JLO.I instead of &eA«.

DIVINE DECREES. 453

ready hard heart. God sent Moses to persuade Pharaoh. This indicated the divine desire. But God at the same time informed Moses that his persuasion would fail. Ex. 7 : 1-4. This indicated the divine purpose not to conquer Pharaoh's obstinacy. Christ, in deep sincerity and in tears, said : " O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee ; how often would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen doth gather her brood under her wings, and ye would not," Luke 13 : 34 ; 19 : 41. He unquestionably desired that the in habitants of Jerusalem would yield to that degree of com mon grace with which they had been blest, and would re pent and believe on him ; and he unquestionably could have exerted upon them that degree of uncommon grace, by which he is " the author and finisher of faith," Heb. 12 : 2 ; and by which he demonstrates that " all power is given unto him in heaven and in earth," Matt. 28 : 18. Yet he did not exert his power to overcome the obstinacy and re sistance of the human will in this instance. Those inhabi tants of Jerusalem over whom he had wept were passed by in the bestowrnent of regenerating grace, but not of com mon.

One class of Scripture texts teaches that the benevolent desire of God is, that all men should turn from sin. An other class teaches that for reasons unknown to man, but sufficient for God, God determines in some instances not to gratify his own desire. There is nothing self-contradic tory in this ; for it finds a parallel in human action. It is indeed strange to human view, that an Omnipotent Being should, in even a single instance, forbear to bring about what he sincerely desires. But if there be a sufficient rea son for it in the Divine mind, there is nothing intrinsically contradictory in the procedure, and there is certainly noth ing unjust to the sinner in it. Says Turrettin (Institutio, IV. xvii. 33), " God delights in the conversion and eternal life of the sinner, as a thing pleasing in itself, and congru454: THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

ous with his own infinitely compassionate nature, rather than in his perdition ; and therefore demands from man, as an act due from him, to turn if he would live. But although he does not will, in the sense of delighting in, the death of the sinner, he at the same time wills, in the sense of decree ing, the death of the sinner for the display of his justice. Even as an upright magistrate, though he does not delight in and desire the death of the criminal, yet determines to inflict the just penalty of the law."

God desires that the non-elect would turn of himself, by the spontaneous action of his own will under the operation of common grace. He would rejoice in such a conversion. The entreaty, " Turn ye, why will ye die," springs out of this desire. That this entreaty of God fails in this case is owing to the sinner, and therefore does not prove that God is insincere in his desire. Sincerity, we have seen, is independent of the result. If the failure of this en treaty were due to God's own action, then, indeed, insin cerity might be charged. If God, at the time when he is entreating a man to turn, were at work to prevent him from turning, the entreaty would be hypocritical. But God, instead of hindering the sinner, is helping him with that degree of grace which is called " common." The reason why the Divine entreaty thus accompanied with common grace is unsuccessful, is the resistance of the sin ner. Surely, the fact that God does not think proper to add a second degree of grace in order to overcome the sin ner's resistance of the first degree of grace, does not prove that God is insincere in his desire for the sinner's conver sion under the first degree of grace. If a man offer a beg gar a small sum and it is rejected, it would be absurd to say that because he does not now offer him a large sum, he was insincere in the first offer. A parent wills the payment of a son's debts, in the sense of desiring that his son would by industry and economy pay the debts which he has contract ed ; but he may not will the payment of these debts in the

DIVINE DECREES. 455

sense of deciding to pay them for him ; the reason being, that should he pay them he would do injustice to the other members of his family.

A certain class of objections to election and reprobation rests upon the assumption that God is not merciful, unless he shows special mercy, and not sincere, unless he does all that he possibly can to save sinners. This is a fallacy. Sin cerity in extending an invitation, does not involve an obliga tion to give a disposition to accept it. God is merciful in bestowing the gifts of providence and of common grace, though he go no farther than this ; and he is sincere in do ing what he does in common grace, though he does not ex ert saving grace. Says Richard Baxter, " If God please to stop Jordan and dry up the Red Sea for the passage of the Israelites, and to cause the sun to stand still for Joshua, must he do so for every man in the world, or else be ac counted unmerciful ? Suppose a king knew his subjects to be so wicked that they have everyone a design to poison themselves with something that is enticing by its sweetness : the king not only makes a law strictly charging them all to forbear to touch that poison ; but sendeth special messen gers to entreat them, and tell them the danger. If these men will not hear him, but wilfully poison themselves, is he therefore unmerciful ? But suppose that he hath three or four of his sons that are infected with the same wickedness, and he will not only command and entreat them, but he will lock them up, or keep the poison from them, or feed them by violence with better food, is he unmerciful unless he will do so bj7 all the rest of his kingdom ? " If common grace should prevail over the sinner's resistance, it would be saving grace. This is not the same as saying, that the sinner by a right use of common grace makes it saving grace. In this latter case, there is a co-operation of the sin ner with God in regeneration. The sinner by working con currently with common grace renders it effectual. This is synergistic regeneration, and involves conditional election.

456 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

But if without any right concurrent working of the sinner's will, common grace should overcome the sinner's resistance and do the whole work, the regeneration would be due to God alone. To overcome the sinful will, is not the same as to assist it.1

The difference between the Divine desire and the Divine purpose or decree, is the same as between the revealed and the secret will of God, mentioned in Deut. 29 : 29. God's desire in reference to sin and salvation is expressed in all that he has revealed : (a) In the moral law. (b) In the plan of redemption. Everything in the law and the gospel implies that God does not take pleasure in sin, or in the death of the sinner. But there is nothing in the revealed will of God, as made known in the law and gospel, that indicates what he has decided to do towards actually converting particular persons from their sins. This decision is alto gether different from his desire, and it is a secret with him self.

The phrase, " God's will," is ambiguous. It may mean what he is pleased with, loves, and desires. An example of this is, Heb. 13 : 20, 21. " Now the God of peace, make you perfect to do his will ($eA/?7/m), working in you that which is well-pleasing (evdpearov) in his sight." Here, God's " will " is something which he desires and delights in. An example of the secret will is found in Rom. 9 : 19. " Who hath resisted his will ? " Here, God's " will " is his purpose or decree to " harden," or not soften, and is desig nated by fiov\7}[jLa. What he " wills," i.e. decrees, in this instance, is the sinner's remaining in sin, which certainly is not well-pleasing in his sight. In the holy actions of elect men, the secret and the revealed will agree. God, in this case, decrees what he loves. In the sinful actions of nonelect men, the two wills do not agree. God, in this case,

i Compare Edwards : On Decrees and Election, §§ 59-62 ; Howe : Reconcilableness of God's Prescience with his Sincerity ; Baxter : Directions for Spirit ual Peace and Comfort. Bacon's Ed. , I. 252.

DIVINE DECREES. 457

decrees what he hates.1 This distinction is sometimes designated by the terms, legislative, and decretive will ; sometimes by will of complacency (complacentiae), and of good pleasure (beneplaciti) : in which latter case, " goodpleasure " must not be confounded with " pleasure." The schoolmen employ the terms voluntas signi (signified), and voluntas beneplaciti. The Greeks speak of the will evapeo"rta9, and evSo/clas.

The universal offer of the gospel is consistent with the Divine purpose of predestination, because : 1. Christ's atonement is a sufficient satisfaction for the sins of all men. 2. God sincerely desires that every man to whom the atonement is offered would trust in it. His sincerity is evinced by the fact, that, in addition to his offer, he encour ages and assists man to believe by the aids of his provi dence ; such as the written and spoken word, parental teach ing and example, favoring social influences, etc. ; and by the operation of the common grace of the Holy Spirit. The fact that God does not in the case of the non-elect bestow special grace, to overcome the resisting self-will that renders the gifts of providence and common grace ineffectual, does not prove that he is insincere in his desire that man would believe under the influence of common grace ; any more than the fact that a benevolent man declines to double the amount of his gift, after the gift already offered has been spurned, proves that he did not sincerely desire that the person would take the sum first offered. For a fuller statement upon this subject, see Soteriology, p. 482 sq.

The relation of the decree of election to that of redemp tion is important. The statement in the Westminster

i Augustine (Enchiridion, 101) shows how one man in doing right, may agree with the revealed will of God, and disagree with the secret will ; and another in doing wrong, may disagree with the revealed will, and agree with the secret. A sick father has two sons. One of them is godly, and desires and prays for his father's recovery. The other is wicked, and desires and prays for his father's death. God purposes that the father shall die, and he does die. See Owen : Anninianism, V.

458 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

Shorter Catechism, Q. 20, is as follows : " God having elected some to everlasting life, did enter into a covenant of grace to deliver them by a Redeemer." According to this statement, the decree to provide redemption succeeds the decree of election. God first decides to save certain indi viduals from sin and death, and an atoning Redeemer is the means of carrying out this design. This order is fav ored by the fact that Scripture speaks of a covenant be tween the Father and Son, respecting the redemption of men. Isa. 53 : 10, " When thou shalt make his soul an of fering for sin, he shall see his seed." Ps. 2:8, "I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance." Christ stipulates to suffer, provided actual not merely possible salvation shall be the result. He volunteers to die, not only for the pur pose of removing legal obstacles to salvation, but also with the view of actually delivering an immense multitude of particular persons from condemnation. Who these persons are, is determined by a previous election. Christ did not covenant with the Father merely to atone for human sin in the abstract. lie covenants for more than this ; because this of itself would not secure the salvation of a single in dividual, since the result would depend upon the hostile will of man. In this case, Christ would have died in vain, and would receive no reward for his incarnation, humilia tion, and crucifixion. The Arminian order reverses the Calviriistic, in making the decree to provide redemption precede that of election. It is as follows : 1. The decree to appoint Christ as mediator. 2. The decree to make faith and perseverance on the part of man, the condition of salvation. 3. The decree appointing the means to faith and perseverance ; namely, the scriptures, sacraments, and the influence of the Holy Spirit. 4. The decree to elect those whom God foresaw would employ the means, and to condemn those who would not. In this scheme, the success of Christ's atonement depends partly upon the action of the human will, and not wholly as

DIVINE DECREES. 459

in the Calvinistic scheme upon the Divine will, and efficiency.

The school of Saumnr advanced a theory called Hypothet ic Uuiversalisin, which begins with Arminianism and ends with Calvinism. It is as follows : 1. God decreed to pro vide a redeemer for all men indiscriminately, without elect ing any to faith, but leaving wholly to man the act of faith in the provided redeemer. In this way, God has a general will or purpose that all men shall be saved, but its success is conditioned upon the act of man. 2. Foreseeing that no man will believe upon the provided redeemer, God then elects some in whom he works faith and secures persever ance. See Turrettin : Institutio, IY. xvii. The first part of this theory is Arminian ; the second part is Calvinistic.

The objections to this theory are : 1. The decree of redemption is made to depend upon human action. Its success is therefore uncertain. But a divine decree is an independent and infallibly successful act of God. This doc trine therefore conflicts with the idea of a Divine decree. 2. This theory implies that one Divine decree may fail, and be replaced by another. The decree of redemption does not succeed in saving any of mankind, owing to their unbelief, and God supplements it with a successful decree of election. 3. The decree of redemption, in this theory, does not, as it professes, include all men indiscriminately. Large masses of mankind in heathenism have had no op portunity of deciding whether they will believe in Christ. 4. This theory implies that men are elected and saved after they have rejected Christ's atonement. But the Scripture teaches that there is no salvation, but, on the contrary, eter nal death, in case there has been a rejection of Christ. Heb. 6:4-6; 10 : 26.

The doctrines of election and reprobation belong to the higher ranges of revealed truth. This is implied in 2 Pet. 3 : 15, 16. Among the " things hard to be understood," are St. Paul's dogmatic teachings respecting the Divine decrees.

460 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

And those who are " unlearned " in the Christian system, and " unstable v in the Christian experience, " wrest " them out of their true import. They are truths for the wellindoctrinated, and somewhat matured Christian. And this, because they combine and systematize all the other truths of the gospel. These doctrines are the outline and scheme under which the doctrines of grace and redemption are embraced. A man may trust in the atonement of Christ, and yet not be able to state accurately the relation of his act of faith to God's sovereignty and universal dominion. He may drink in the sincere milk of the word, while yet the strong meat belongeth not to him ; because he is unskil ful in the word of righteousness ; because he is a minor and not of full age ; and because he has not his senses exer cised, by reason of use, to discriminate between truth and error. Heb. 5:13,14.

Consequently, the doctrines of election and reprobation are not to be preached " out of season," or taught out of the logical order in the system. They are not to be preached to babes in Christ, but to those who are of full age. They suppose some ripeness and maturity of the Christian experience. In teaching geometry, an instructor does not put a beginner upon the 47th proposition. He leads him up to it, through the axioms and the preparatory theorems. He tells him that the 47th proposition is as certainly true as the axioms, and that he will see it to be so in the end. But he forbids him to perplex himself about it at first. Similarly, the beginner in religion, and still more the unregenerate man, is not to be instructed first of all in the doctrine of the Divine decrees. This is to be reserved for a later period in his mental history. The statement upon this point in the seventeenth of the Thirty-nine Arti cles is excellent. " As the godly consideration of predesti nation and our election in Christ, is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the workings of the Spirit of Christ, so for

DIVINE DECREES. 461

sinners and carnal persons lacking the Spirit of Christ to have continually before their eyes the sentence of God's predestination, is a most dangerous downfall, whereby the devil doth thrust them either into desperation, or into reck lessness of most unclean living, no less perilous than despera tion." Says Selden, in his Table Talk, " They that talk nothing but predestination, and will not proceed in the way of heaven till they be satisfied in that point, do as a man that would not come to London unless at his first step he might set his foot upon the top of Paul's." Says Bengel, " Man must not attempt to look at God behind the scenes." But in all discussion of the subject of predestination, it should never be forgotten that the Scriptures teach a large, not a narrow decree of election. God's elect are " a multi tude which no man can number." Redemption by election includes the vast majority of mankind, if the whole history of man is considered.

The doctrine of election and irresistible grace is more en couraging to the preacher of the word, than the opposite theory. It is more probable that an individual sinner will believe and repent, if faith and repentance depend wholly upon the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit, than if they depend partly upon the energy of the sinner's will ; and still more probable, if they depend wholly upon it. The Christian knows that if his faith and repentance had been left either partly or wholly, to his own separate agency, he would not have believed and repented, be cause he was strongly inclined to sin, loved its pleasure, and disliked humbling confession of sin and steady struggle against it.

On the same principle, it is more probable that the world of sinful men will come to faith and repentance, if this great event depends wholly upon God, and not wholly or partly upon the lethargic, fickle, and hostile will of man. If the success of the Holy Spirit depends upon the assist ance of the sinner, He may not succeed. But if His sue462 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

cess depends wholly upon Himself, He is certain to succeed. It is better to trust God for such an immense good as the salvation of the great mass of mankind, than to trust man kind themselves, either entirely or in part. The biogra phies of successful ministers and missionaries show, that the longer they preach, and the more successful their preach ing, the less do they rely upon the will of the sinner for success. " Not by [human] might, nor by [human] power, but by my Spirit, saith the Lord of Hosts," Zech. 4 : 6. " We shall not walk in an even course, but still reeling and staggering, till faith be set wholly upon its own basis, the proper foundation of it ; not set betwixt two, upon one strong prop and another that is rotten ; partly on God and partly on creature helps and encouragements, or our own strength. That is the way to fall off. Our only safe and happy way is, in humble obedience, in God's own strength, to follow his appointments without standing and question ing the matter, and to resign the conduct of all to his wis dom and love ; to put the rudder of our life into his hand, to steer the course of it as seemeth him good, resting quietly on his word of promise for our safety. Lord, whither thou wilt, and which way thou wilt, be thou my guide, and it sufficeth." Leighton ; On 1 Pet. 3 : 19-21.

Augustine : City of God, XI. Gangauf : Psychologie des Augustinus, I. i. Anselm : Monologium, VIII. IX. Turrettin : Institutio, V. i.-vii. Witsius : Apostles' Creed, Dissertation VIII. Howe : Oracles, II. ix.-xii. Pearson : Creed, Art. I. Cudworth : System, III. 79-220. Ed. Tegg. Clarke : Demonstration, Prop. X. Wise man : Science and Eevelation. Herschel : Discourse on Natural Philosophy . Agassiz : Structure of Animal Life. Dawson : Earth and Man ; Origin of the World. Guyot : Creation. Dana : Crea tion. Ulrici : Gott und Natur. Twesten : Dogmatik, Th. II. \ 36. Schleiermacher : Glaubenslehre, § 40, 41. Quatrefages : Human Species. Argyll : Primaeval Man. Lewis : Six Days of Creation ; Lange's Genesis, p. 314 sq. Mivart : Man and Ape ; Evolution and its Consequences. Southall : Recent Origin of Man. Haeckel : Evolution of Man ; History of Creation. Cabell : Unity of Man kind. Lyell : Antiquity of Man. Cook : Eeligion in Chemistry ; Credentials of Science. Maudsley : Physiology of Mind. Fraser : Blinding Lights. Shedd : Evolution defined and applied (Theo logical Essays). Beale : Protoplasm. Sterling : Protoplasm. Calderwood : Science and Religion. Hodge : Darwinism.

IN the Westminster Shorter Catechism, Q. 8, it is said that " God executes his decrees in the works of creation and providence." The decree itself, we have seen, is im manent in the Divine being, is formed in eternity, and is one single act which simultaneously includes all that comes to pass in all space and time. But as emanent and transi tive, it passes into execution by a gradual and endless suc cession of events and phenomena. The two general modes in which the Divine decree is executed are : 1. Creation.

464 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD).

2. Providence. It might at first sight seem as if Redemp tion should constitute a third mode ; but theologians have commonly included this under the head of Providence, as the special manner in which God provides for the needs of men as sinners.

Creation, in the proper sense of origination ex nihilo, is the very first work that God does ad extra. Nothing pre cedes it, except that eternal activity in the Divine essence which results in the trinitarian Persons. These latter are not creations, but emanations. Hence creation is called " the beginning of God's way," Prov. 8 : 22 ; and God is said to have created the heaven and earth " in the begin ning," Gen. 1 : 1. The doctrine of creation is taught in Gen. 1:1; Nehemiah 9 : 6 ; Job 26 : 3 ; Ps. 19 : 1 ; 104 : 30 ; 124 : 8 ; 146 : 6 ; John 1:3; Acts 17 : 24 ; Rom. 11 : 36 ;

1 Cor. 8:6; 2 Cor. 4:6; Coloss. 1:16; Ileb. 3:4; 4:4; 11 : 3. The peculiar characteristic in creation, namely, the origination of entity from non-entity, is mentioned in Heb. 11 : 3, " The worlds were framed so that things which are seen were not made of things that do appear ; " also in

2 Cor. 4:6, " God commanded the light to shine out of darkness ; " and also in Coloss. 1 : 16, " By him were all things created, visible and invisible."

Creation ex nihilo is peculiar to the Scriptures. It is not found even in the most rational and spiritual of the ancient cosmogonies. Even when an intelligent architect of the universe is affirmed, as in the systems of Plato and Aris totle, an eternal v\r), or chaotic matter, is postulated, out of which it is formed. Philo (On The World) takes the same view. In the Platonic writings, God is rather a demiurge than a creator. Plutarch (Procreation of the Soul) de scribes Plato's view as follows : "The creation was not out of nothing, but out of matter wanting beauty and perfection, like the rude materials of a house lying first in a confused heap." Ranke (Universal History, I. 22) marks the differ ence between the Mosaic and the Egyptian and Assyrian

CREATION. 465

cosmogonies, as " an express counter-statement. With the Egyptians and Babylonians, everything is developed from the inherent powers of the sun, the stars, and the earth it self. Jehovah, on the other hand, appears as the creator of heaven and earth ; as both the originator and the orderer of the world. The conception of a chaos is not excluded, but tli is conception itself rested on the idea of a previous creation."

In Scripture, the term creation is sometimes employed in a secondary sense. " Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created," Ps. 104 : 30. " I create evil," Isa. 45 : 7. " The Lord hath created a new thing in the earth," Jer. 31 : 22. " Create in me a clean heart," Ps. 51 : 10. u I create new heavens and a new earth," Is. 65 : 17. Rev. 21 : 1, et alia. In these instances, the Divine agency operating by means of second causes is intended. Creatures are propagated under laws established by the Creator ; sin is permitted and controlled by God employing the human will ; an extraor dinary event in history is brought about by Divine provi dence ; the regeneration and sanctification of the human soul is a secondary creation.

Under the head of Creation, we have to do only with the primary and strict signification of the term, as denoting orig ination from nothing : de, or ex nihilo. The poverty and inadeqnateness of human language is very apparent, in re spect to this idea. Words are more or less pictorial in their roots and elements. But the creation of entity from non entity utterly forbids any picturing or imaging. For this reason, more or less of qualification or explanation must be employed, in all languages, in connection with the words that are used to denote this purely abstract and inexplicable conception.

The Hebrew word employed to denote the idea of crea tion is ana. According to Gesenius (in voce) it signifies: " 1. To cut, to carve ; 2. To form, create, produce. In Gen. 2:3, is read rniu^b VFQ ; which he created in mak30

466 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

ing : that is, which he made in creating something new." Says Delitzsch, on Gen. 1 : 1, quoted in Lange on Gen. 1 :1, "sra in the Piel signifies to cut, hew, form; but in the Kal, it is employed to denote divine products, new and not previously existing in the sphere of nature and his tory (Ex. 34 : 10 ; Num. 16 : 30, and frequently in the prophets), or in the sphere of spirit (Ps. 51 : 10). In the Kal, it never denotes human productions, and is never used with the accusative of the material." In Ex. 5 , 16, fib? is used with the accusative of material : " Make brick." Dillmann, On Gen. 18 : 21, agrees with Delitzsch. Oehler, Theology of the Old Testament, I. 169, takes the same view. Dorner, Christian Doctrine, II. 23, endorses it. The Patristic, Mediaeval, and Reformation exegesis adopts this interpretation.

The clause ex nihilo is explanatory of the term "cre ation," and is necessary to define it, and guard it from misuse. Unless it be employed, creation may be used to signify " evolution " or " development," which is a wholly different conception. Ex nihilo denotes that a created thing is not produced out of existing matter of any kind what ever : " ex, non designat sed excludit materiam." Creation of entity from non-entity is expressed in Rom. 4: 17, "God calleth those things which be not, as though they were : " TCL fj,rj ovra &>? ovra. The same idea is suggested in 2 Cor. 4 : 6, " God who commanded the light to shine out of darkness." It is not meant that darkness is the material of which light is made, but the state or condition of things in which light is made to begin by a fiat. The passage in Heb. 11 : 3, in which it is said that " things which are seen were not made of things that do appear," teaches that there is an invisible cause for all visibles ; and Coloss. 1 : 16, in which it is said that u all things visible and invisible " were created, (eKTla&rj) by the First Begotten, teaches that God creates the invisible forces of matter, as well as the invisible spirits of angels and men. In the apocryphal book 2 MacCREATION. 467

cabees 7 : 28, it is said that " God made the heaven and earth of things that are not : ef ov/c ovra>v" Creation ex nihilo has its human analogies. The understanding origi nates thoughts from nothing ; and the will originates voli tions from nothing. Thoughts and volitions, however, are not entities or substances, and here the analogy fails. But they are ex nihilo. One thought is not made out of an other thought ; nor is a volition made out of another voli tion. Here the analogy holds good.

The maxim ex nihilo nihil fit is true, in the sense that nothing comes from nothing : (a) By finite power ; (b) As the material out of which something is produced ; (c) By the mode of emanation, generation, or evolution ; because this supposes existing matter. Lucretius (I. 151), lays down the position : " nullam rem e nihilo gigni divinitus unquam." The reason which he gives why even by divine power (di vinitus) nothing can be produced from nothing is, that in this case there would be no need of a seed or egg ; and that, consequently, everything might be produced out of every thing ; men could be originated out of the sea, and fishes and birds out of the earth. Lucretius does not conceive of the seed or egg as created, but as eternal. His reasoning is valid against pseudo-evolution, or evolution defined as " the transmutation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous." Everything may be originated out of everything, upon this theory. The homogeneous vegetable may develop into the heterogeneous animal ; the homogeneous animal into the heterogeneous man. And the process may be downward as well as upward ; because either process is alike the trans mutation of a homogeneous substance into a heterogeneous one. If it were possible by the operation of merely natural law, to convert the inorganic mineral into the organic vege table, it would be possible by the same method to convert the organic vegetable into the inorganic mineral. The rule would work in both ways. As plausible an argument might be constructed out of the deterioration and degradation of

468 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

some of the human family, to prove that man ma}7 be evolved downward into an anthropoid ape, as that which has been constructed to prove that he has been evolved up ward from one.

Spinoza's definition of " substance " was intended to ex clude the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. He defines sub stance as " that which exists of itself ; that is, the conception of which does not require the conception of anything else." Ethics, I. iii. But the conception of a creature, is the con ception of a substance that requires another substance to account for it. A created substance, consequently, is pre cluded by Spinoza's definition of substance. There cannot be any such thing. Des Cartes had previously defined the absolute and primary substance, as " that which so exists that it needs nothing else for its existence ; " and Aquinas (I. xxix. 2) so defines a trinitarian subsistence or person. But Des Cartes added a definition of created or secondary sub stance, as " that which requires the concurrence (concursus) of God, for its existence." Spinoza in his early life made an abstract of Des Cartes' philosophy, for the use of a pupil (De principiis philosophiae Renati Des Cartes). His editor, De Meyer, remarks that Spinoza must not be understood to agree with Des Cartes, and mentions that he rejected Des Cartes' distinction between intellect and will, but says noth ing about the distinction between primary and secondary substance. Bruder's Spinoza, I. 89. Subsequently, when Spinoza published his own system, he rejected the distinc tion between primary and secondary substance, and gave no definition of any substance but the " substantia una et unica," of which everything is a modification. By this petitio principii. or postulate of one substance only, he excludes created substance, and lays the foundation of pantheism.1 This

1 A similar petitio principii is seen in Von Baer's definition of evolution, adopted by Spencer, as the "transformation [transmutation] of the homoge neous into the heterogeneous." That a homogeneous substance (say, vegetable) can be transmuted into a heterogeneous substaaee (say, animal or mineral), is the

CREATION. 469

theory of the universe energetically rejects creation ex nihilo, and maintains emanation. Fichte says that " the assumption of a creation is the fundamental error of all false metaphysics and philosophy/' Hegel explains the universe of matter and spirit as an immanent process of God ; a ma terial efflux out from the Absolute which is retracted again as immaterial spirit. Strauss expresses the same idea in the statement that "trinity and creation are, speculatively con sidered, one and the same thing ; only the former is the rational, and the latter the empirical aspect." Kant, on the contrary, asserts that " the proposition that God, as the uni versal first cause, is the cause of the existence of substance, can never be given up, without at the same time giving up the notion of God as the Being of all beings, and thereby giving up his all-sufficiency, on which everything in theology depends." Practischer Vernunf t, 232 (Abbott's Trans. 279). The maxim " ex nihilo nihil fit " is false in reference to the supernatural and omnipotent power of God. The Su preme being can originate entity from non -entity.1 The folpoint in dispute, but is quietly assumed in the definition. And, in order to give plausibility to this petitio, a false definition of the kl homogeneous " is introduced. It is defined as ' l that which is without organs, " the heterogeneous being k ' that which has organs." Carpenter : Physiology, 888. But the presence or absence of organs is not a mark of a difference in substance ; which is what is requisite in order to heterogeneity. Vegetable protoplasm before the differentiation into organs begins, is as really vegetable substance as afterwards. Animal proto plasm is as really animal matter, before the organs appear as after. There is nothing heterogeneous in either instance.

Another petitio principii of the same kind appears in the agnostic definition of knowledge, as " classification." According to this definition, nothing can be known unless it can be brought under a class ; and a class implies several indi viduals of the same species. " The first cause, the Infinite, in order to be known must be classed," says Spencer (First Principles, p. 81). But as the Infinite is the only one of the species, he cannot be put into a class, and therefore he is utterly unknowable. The point in dispute is, whether all knowledge is classification, and is quietly assumed by the agnostic in his definition of knowledge. Even in re gard to those objects which can be classified, the whole of our knowledge does not consist merely in knowing the class to which they belong. Classification is only one of several elements in cognition.

1 Upon this dogma of creation ex nihilo, so vital to theism, ethics, and relig ion, see Cudworth : System. Ch. V. Pearson : Creed, Art. I. Clarke : Dem470 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

lowing are the characteristics of creation from nothing : 1. Creation has a beginning. It is not the eternal emanation of an eternal substance, or the eternal evolution of an eter nal germ. This is taught in Gen. 1 : 1, by the clause " in the beginning ; " arid in the phrase, " before the foundation of the world," frequently employed to denote eternity. Origen held that God is eternally creating; otherwise he would have nothing to do, and would be mutable in decid ing to create. Schleiermacher : Dogmatik, I. 197. The opera ad intra meet the first objection. The eternal gen eration and spiration are Divine activities prior to the cre ation of the universe, and independent of it. Boethius asserted that God is eternal, and the world is perpetual. Kothe (Ethik, § 40) affirms eternal creation. Defective trinitarian or positively antitrinitarian theories logically tend either to the dogma of an eternal creation, or else of emanation, in order that the deity may have an object for himself as a subject. True trinitarianism finds this object within the Godhead. God the Son is God the Father's object. If creation is eternal, the universe is as old as the creator. It could be said of it, as the Nicenes said of the Son of God : ov/c rjv irore ore OVK fy. 2. Creation is op tional, not necessary, for God. It proceeds from free will, and is expressed by fiat. " He hath stretched out the heav ens by his discretion," Jer. 10 : 2. Emanation is necessary and constitutional, like the generation of the Son and spira tion of the Spirit. 3. Creation originates another new sub stance ; but emanation and evolution produce only modifi cations of an old and existing substance.

The conception of creation from nothing is purely intel lectual, like that of a mathematical point, line, or surface. These latter cannot be explained or even illustrated by sen suous images, and are held as valid conceptions by a purely

onstration, 76. Augustine : Confessions, Books XT. and XII. Ambrose : Hexaeraeron, Lib. II. ch. 1.2. Shedd : History of Doctrine, L 7-15 ; Theological Essays, 133-135 ; 154-159.

CREATION. 471

rational act of the mind unassisted by sensation. The athe istic mathematician who denies the being of God and crea* tion ex nihilo, because he cannot image them, should upon the same principle deny the validity of the mathematical conceptions of a point, line, and surface. Owing to man's strong propensity to image his knowledge, and explain con ceptions by a sensuous method, he attempts to account for the universe by postulating an eternal substance of some ethereal kind, out of which it is made. Hence even Plato and Aristotle suppose an v\r), which is formed into the cos mos by the Supreme architect. Miiller (Literature of Greece, 87, 88) asserts that the idea of creation from noth ing is wanting in the Greek conception of the deity, and is found in the Eastern nations. But the only Eastern people who had the idea were the Hebrews. The Persian cos mogony is dualistic; and the Indian is pantheistic. "It is," says Augustine (City of God, XL ii.), " a great and very rare thing for a man, after he has contemplated the whole creation, corporeal and incorporeal, and has discerned its mutability, to pass beyond it, and by the continued soaring of his mind to attain to this unchangeable substance of God, and, in that height of contemplation to learn from God him self that none but he made all that is not of the divine essence." Mosheim, in a note to Cudworth (III. p. 140), proves by a survey of ancient philosophy and theology, that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is found only in Scripture. The first verse of Genesis mentions the first of the opera ad extra of the triune God ; namely, the creation of the present universe. The clause, " heaven and earth " denotes all that is not God ; namely, the worlds of matter and of finite mind, or the sensible and intelligible worlds. "Heaven and earth" means the universe; as when one says of another : " He would move heaven and earth to accom plish his purpose." The sacred writer begins with an allcomprehending proposition : God created all finite beings and things. The same truth is taught in Coloss. 1 : 16.

472 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

" By him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible." Here, the creation of the universe is referred to the second trinitarian person. A portion of the universe is spiritual in its substance, and is denoted by " heaven ; " and a portion is physical, and is denoted by " earth." The spirits of angels and men con stitute the spiritual part of the universe, and matter con stitutes the physical part of it. From Job 37 : 7, it appears that the angels were created before the six days' work ; and from Gen. 1 : 26, that men were created on the sixth day.

This is the old patristic interpretation of Gen. 1:1. Says Augustine (Confessions, XII. vii.), " Thou createdst heaven and earth : things of two kinds ; one near to thee, the other near to nothing." By this latter, Augustine means the rarefied matter of chaos. Again (Confess., XII. vii.) he says, " Thou createdst heaven and earth ; not out of thyself, for so they should have been equal to thine only begotten Son, and thereby equal to thee also." 1

The created universe of mind and matter, denominated "heaven and earth " in Gen. 1:1, is diverse from God: that is, is another substance. It is not God, nor a part of God ; because God created it from non-entity. God and the universe are not one substance, but two substances ; one primary and the other secondary, one necessary and the other contingent. God and the universe do not constitute one system of being, but two distinct and different systems ; for a system implies that all the parts are of one nature, and coequal in dignity and duration. Some theists, like Edwards for example, under the phrase " Being in general," have unintentionally taught Spinozism. This phrase brings

1 See also, City of God, XI. ix. ; Gen. ad lit. I. ix. 15 ; Gangauf : Augustinus, p. 100. Howe (Oracles II. ix.) takes the same view. So also does Pearson: Creed, Art. I. Delitzsch (Old Testament History of Redemption, 12) says that "the account of the creation begins with an all-comprehending statement, Gen. 1 : 1. The creation which is here intended is the very first beginning, which was not preceded by any other, and hence embraces the heaven of heavens. That which follows in the second verse is confined to the earth and its heavens. "

CREATION. 473

God and the universe into a single system, and makes God a part of it. Whatever is really one system of being is a numerical unity, and is of one and the same essence. The three trinitarian persons, for example, constitute one system of Divine being, and they are numerically one substance. The universe is not infinite, but finite, and therefore cannot belong to the system of the Infinite. The term " infinite," in the proper sense, is applicable only to God. For that which is strictly infinite is also eternal and necessary. But neither eternity of being, nor necessity of being, belongs to the " heaven and earth " that was created " in the beginning " of time. The universe is the Finite, and God is the Infinite. See Howe : Oracles, II. ix. The universe is unlimited, in distinction from infinite. The un limited is capable of increase, diminution, and division, the Infinite is not. Space, time, and matter are unlimited ; they can be added to, subtracted from, and divided. God is infinite, and incapable of addition, of subtraction, or of division. The finite spirit is also unlimited, not infinite. It is capable of increase and diminution ; not by addition and subtraction of substance, but by development of latent properties, or suppression of them. " World " is sometimes put for "universe." In this case, "world" denotes all being that is not God. Coleridge's formula illustrates this. " World - God = 0. God - World = Eeality absolute. The World without God is non-entity. God without the World is, in and of himself, absolute Being, and infinite Perfection." Marsh : Remains, 162. The use of "world" as the antithesis of " God," and the equivalent of " uni verse," is more common in philosophy than in literature. In literature, "world" more generally denotes a part of the universe. Milton uses the term to denote the visible universe of matter :

" How this world Of heaven and earth conspicuous first began."

PAB. LOST, VII. 62.

474: THEOLOGY (DOCTKINE OF GOD).

In the second verse of the first chapter of Genesis, Moses proceeds to speak of the first state and condition of the " earth," in distinction from the " heaven : " " And the earth was without form and void." He describes the " earth " (excluding the " heaven ") as a mass of chaotic matter which had been created ex nihilo, in that " begin ning " spoken of in verse first. By the " earth," in verse second, is not meant merely the planet earth, but the whole material system connected with it ; both solar and stellar. The ensuing description of God's work upon that part of the universe called " earth " shows that the sun, moon, and stars belong to it. Says Matthew Henry, on Gen. 1:2: " A chaos was the first matter. It is here called the < earth ' (though the earth in the sense of the dry land was not made until the third day), because it did most resemble that which afterwards was called earth, mere earth, an unwieldy mass. It is also called the ' deep,' both for its vastness, and because the waters which were afterwards separated from the earth were now mixed with it. This mighty bulk of matter was it, from which all bodies even the firmament and visible heavens were afterward produced by the power of the eternal Word."

Between the single comprehensive act of the creation of the angels and of chaotic matter, mentioned in Gen. 1 : 1, and the series of Divine acts in the six days, de scribed in Gen. 1 : 3-31, an interval of time elapsed. This is the old patristic interpretation. The very com mon assertion, that the church has altered its exegesis, under the compulsion of modern geology, is one of the errors of ignorance. The doctrine of an immense time, prior to the six creative days, was a common view among the fathers and schoolmen. So also was the doctrine of the rarefied and chaotic nature of matter in its first form, a patristic tenet. Kant's gaseous chaos filling the uni verse, adopted by La Place and Herschel, was taught, for substance, by Augustine, in the following positions

CREATION. 475

taken in Confessions, XII. viii. 1. God created a chaotic matter that was " next to nothing ; " that is, the most ten uous and imponderable form of matter. 2. This chaotic matter was made from nothing " before all days ; " that is, in that prior period marked by the words " in the begin ning." 3. This chaotic unformed matter was subsequently formed and arranged, in the six days that are spoken of after Gen. 1 : 1.

Augustine's exegesis of the first chapter of Genesis is substantially this : In the beginning, that is, in a time prior to the six days, God created ex nihilo, the angelic world, or " the heaven," and chaotic inorganic matter, or " the earth." Then in the six days he formed (not created) chaotic inor ganic matter into a cosmical system, solar, stellar, and planetary, and upon the planet earth created (not formed) the organic vegetable, animal, and human species. This was the interpretation generally accepted in the patristic and middle ages. Lombard adopts Augustine's views. Sententiarum, Lib. II. Distinctio xii. David Kimchi, the learned Rabbi of the 12th century, respecting whom the Jews said, " No Kimchi, no understanding of the Script ures," explained Gen. 1, in the following manner. " First of all, God created the * heaven,' that is the highest heaven with the angels ; then the i earth,' the first appearance and condition of which are described in the second verse, and out of which the other creatures are subsequently formed. And it is called without * form and void,' in opposition to heaven ; which was immediately carried to its full perfec tion and replenished with inhabitants." Witsius: Creed, Dissertation VIII.

Respecting the length of the six creative days, speaking generally, for there was some difference of views, the pa tristic and mediaeval exegesis makes them to be long peri ods, not days of twenty-four hours. The latter interpreta tion has prevailed only in the modern church. Augustine teaches (De Geuesi ad literam, IY. xxvii.) that the length of

476 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

the six days is not to be determined by the length of our week-days. Our seven days, he says, resemble the seven days of the account in Genesis, in being a series, and in having the vicissitudes of morning and evening, but they are " multum impares." In Lib. IV. i, he says that it is difficult to say what "day" means. In Lib. V. i, he calls attention to the fact that the " six or seven days may be, and are called one day," Gen. 2:4. In Lib. II. xiv, he calls the six days, " God-divided days," in distinction from " sundivided days." See Lewis : Lange's Genesis, p. 131. Gangauf (Augustine, p. Ill, note) cites numerous passages to the same effect. Anselm (Cur deus, I. 18) remarks that there was a difference of opinion in his time, as to whether the six days of Moses " are to be understood like days of ours," as a successive creation, or whether " the whole cre ation took place at once." He says it is " the opinion of the majority " that man and angels were created at the same time, because we read : " He who liveth forever, created all things at once."

There is nothing in the use of the word " day," by Moses, that requires it to be explained as invariably denoting a period of twenty -four hours ; but much to forbid it. The following facts prove this. 1. Day means daylight, in dis tinction from darkness. Gen. 1 : 5, 16, 18. 2. Day means daylight and darkness together. Gen. 1:5. 3. Day means the six days together. Gen. 2 : 4. The first day (Gen. 1 : 5) could not have been measured by the revolution of the sun around the earth, because this was not yet visible. The same variety in signification, is seen in the Mosaic use of the word " earth." 1. Earth means the entire ma terial universe. Gen. 1:1. 2. Earth means the solar, stel lar, and planetary system. Gen. 1:2. 3. Earth means the dry land of the planet earth. Gen. 1 : 10. 4. Earth means the whole of the planet earth. Gen. 1 : 15, 17. The ten commandments were called by the Jews the " ten words." The term " word " here denotes a truth or proposition,

CREATION. 477

not a single word. Similarly, a period of time having its beginning and ending, its evening and morning, may natu rally be called a " day."

The seven days of the human week are copies of the seven days of the Divine week. The " sun-divided days " are images of the " God-divided days." This agrees with the Biblical representation generally. The human is the copy of the Divine ; not the Divine of the human. Human fatherhood and sonship are finite copies of the trinitarian fatherhood and sonship. Human justice, benevolence, ho liness, mercy, etc., are imitations of corresponding Divine qualities. The reason given for man's rest upon the seventh solar day is, that God rested upon the seventh creative day. Ex. 20 : 11. But this does not prove that the Divine rest was only twenty -four hours in duration ; any more than the fact that human eonship is a copy of the Divine, proves that the latter is sexual.

Respecting the harmony between physical science and revelation, it is to be observed in the first place, that physi cal science is not infallible; so that an actual conflict be tween science and revelation would not necessarily be fatal to revelation. It might be fatal to science. In the seven teenth century, the physics of Des Cartes had great author ity, and much was made by the skeptics of that day of the fact that the Mosaic physics did not square with the Car tesian physics. Says Howe (Oracles II. xxi.), " Some are sick of the history of the creation, because they cannot rec oncile the literal account thereof, in the beginning of Genesis, with the philosophy of their Des Cartes: as if his reputation were a thing more studiously to be pre served than that of Moses; though yet, more might be said than hath been, to reconcile with natural principles even the whole history of the creation." The " vortices" of the Cartesian physics are to-day an exploded and rejected " science ; " and the most skeptical physicist of this gen eration would not dream of alleging a conflict between

478 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

science and religion, because Moses does not agree with Des Cartes.

Again, in the second place, physical science is not one and invariable in its contents. There have been a multitude of scientific theories that cannot be reconciled with each other. The Ptolemaic and the Copernican astronomies are examples. For centuries, the Ptolemaic system was undis puted ; and the skeptic of those centuries endeavored to show that the Bible did not agree with it, and the believer of those centuries endeavored with equal strenuousness to show that it did. Herschel : Discourse, § 336. Christianity, on the other hand, has had substantial invariability. For the differences between Christian believers, even upon the more recondite doctrines, are by no means so great as those be tween the ancient Greek and the modern Englishman, upon the nature and laws of matter. The difference between the Augustinian and the Semi-Pelagian, or between the Calvinist and the Arminian, is not at all equal to that between Ptolemy and Copernicus. The doctrines of the trinity, the incarnation, the apostasy, and the redemption, have always constituted the essential substance of the Christian faith. But no such substantial invariability as this appears in the history of physical science. Even, therefore, if it could not be shown that revelation is in harmony with a science that confessedly is not infallible, and actually is not invariable, it would not be a very serious matter for revelation. The error might be upon the side of science.

After this preliminary observation, we remark, in the first place, that the Biblical physics does not conflict with the heliocentric Copernican theory. Nothing at all is said in the opening of Genesis, respecting the motion of the earth in relation to the sun ; and the phraseology in other parts of Scripture is popular, and to be explained as it is when the modern astronomer himself speaks of the rising and set ting of the sun. In the second place, the order of creation as given in Genesis is corroborated by the best settled reCREATION. 479

suits of modern physics. The whole field cannot of course be gone over. Let us test the matter by referring to geol ogy, in respect to which science the conflict has been the most severe.1

The now generally accepted facts in geology remarkably coincide with the series of events, as they are related in Genesis. The sequence of the creative periods is substan tially the same in both. Physical science may be regarded as having established with considerable certainty, the follow ing positions : 1. The planet earth, at first, was a chaotic mass in a state of fusion, and enveloped in a totally dark atmosphere of vapor. This agrees with the statement in Gen. 1:2: " The earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep." 2. By the cool ing caused by the radiation of heat, a crust was formed over the molten interior, and the atmospheric vapor was con densed into an ocean of water which covered the superficial crust. This primaeval ocean is mentioned in Gen. 1:2: " The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." The creative work under these two heads is not a part of the six days' work. It occurred before the first day, and belongs to the immense duration between " the beginning" and the six days' work. 3. The condensation of vapor did not make the earth's atmosphere clear and translucent immediately. But in course of time it so cleared it, that the light, which had been generated by the heat, could penetrate it with some obscurity. Light as a luminous haze could now be distinguished from darkness. This agrees with Gen. 1 : 3, 4 : God said, " Let there be light ; and God divided the light from the darkness."

The appearance of light before the appearance of the sun, is one of the strongest proofs that the author of this narra tive was instructed upon this point. Such a fact as this must have been revealed to him. Previous to modern

1 For a lucid statement of the teachings of geology concerning the order of creation, see Dana : Creation.

480 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

physical investigations, this apparent misplacement of light before the sun was regarded as singular by the believer, and absurd by the skeptic. The fact, moreover, that the sun and moon do not appear until the fonrth day, and that the vegetable kingdom was created on the third day and was growing without a sun visible in the sky, greatly increased the difficulty. But the theory of the modern geologist re moves the difficulty, and corroborates Moses. According to geology, there was a long period when the primaeval oceans were tepid water, when the atmosphere was a gloam ing, and was as moist, warm, and germinating as that of the rainy season in the tropics.

' ' Over all the face of earth Main ocean flowed, not idle, but, with warm Prolific humor softening all her globe Fermented the great mother to conceive, Satiate with genial moisture." — MILTON.

The consequence was that rank growth of succulent, fernlike vegetation, of which the coal-beds are now the expo nent.

4. As the inorganic process of radiation of heat and condensation of vapor went on, the earth's atmosphere became less and less vaporous, and more and more lumi nous, until the space around the planet assumed the appear ance of the empty, hollow arch of heaven. Previously, this space had been so much filled with vapor, that no dis tinction between earth and sky was possible. This forma tion of the atmospheric welkin, or dome, is described in Gen. 1 : 6-8. " And God said, Let there be a firmament [expanse], and let it divide the waters which are under the firmament from the waters which are above the firmament. And God called the firmament Heaven." A similar atmos pheric process is continually occurring on a smaller scale, in the clearing up of a storm or fog. It is thus described by Shelley in « The Cloud."

CREATION. 481

" For after the rain, when with never a stain, The pavilion of heaven is bare,

Then the winds and sunbeams with their convex gleams Build up the blue dome of the air."

5. By the contact of water with the lava beneath the earth's crust, steam and gases were generated, causing earthquakes and convulsions which lifted the crust, forming the moun tain ranges, elevated table-lands, lagoons, and ocean beds. This process having taken place, the planet is fitted to sup port the first and lowest form of organized matter : namely, the vegetable. Up to this point in the Mosaic account, there is no life of any kind in that part of the created uni verse designated by the term "earth " in Gen. 1 : 2. Every thing is inorganic and lifeless, and the only forces in opera tion are mechanical and chemical. Now the plant as a living species, which could not be originated by any of the mechanical and chemical forces that had previously been in action, is created ex nihilo, and the vegetable kingdom is established on the earth. Geology finds no evidences of vegetable life in the igneous rocks, and corroborates the teaching of Moses in Gen. 1 : 9-12 : " And God said, Let the waters under the heavens be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry land appear. And God called the dry land Earth, and the gathering together of the waters called he Seas. And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after his kind." With this, is to be compared 2 Pet. 3 ; 5 (E. V.). " By the word of God, there were heavens from of old, and an earth compacted (cvvecnwa-a) out of water (e'f f/Saro?), and amidst (or through) water (oY £;8aT0

In saying " Let the earth bring forth (»sn = to sprout)

482 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

grass," Gen. 1 : 11, it is not meant that the inorganic earth or mineral develops into the organic vegetable, and thus that vegetable life is an evolution from the lifeless clod ; because it is also said that God " created every plant of the field before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field before it grew," Gen. 2 : 5.1 The words, " Let the earth bring forth," mean that the earth furnishes the non-vital material elements that constitute the visible form of a plant, which are vitalized and assimilated by an invisible principle of vegetable life — which invisible principle was a creation ex nihilo." The creation of this is the creation of the spe cies vegetable. This interpretation is evidently the true one, not only because it agrees with Gen. 2 : 5, but because the earth, in verse 24, is said to bring forth animals also. If there be no intervening creative energy, and the earth is the sole cause, then evolution produces out of the very same lifeless elements both vegetable and animal life. But even the evolutionist has not yet claimed that the animal comes directly from the mineral. The vegetable is the link be tween the two. The mineral first becomes a vegetable, and then the vegetable becomes an animal, according to the ma terialistic physics. Our Lord's words in Mark 4 : 28 : " The earth bringeth forth fruit of herself (avTOfjudrrj), first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear," explain the words, " Let the earth bring forth grass." The earth, to-day, " brings forth fruit spontaneously of itself," only because of the seed planted in it. And on the third crea1 This is the rendering of the Septuagint, Vulgate, and A. V. But even if that of the Targums, Syraic, Gesenius, and many modern Hebraists, whom the R. V. follows, be adopted, it still appears from the narrative that there was a time when "no plant of the field was yet in the earth, and no herb of the field had yet sprung up." In this state of things, it is plain that the earth could not "bring forth" what was not "in the earth," except by the intervention of a creative act.

2 Philo (Questions on Genesis) so explains. u Moses here (Gen. 2 : 5) inti mates, in enigmatical expressions, the incorporeal species which were created first, in accordance with the intellectual nature which those things which axe upon the earth perceptible to the outward senses were to imitate."

CREATION. 483

tive day, the earth "brought forth grass spontaneously," only because of the new vegetable species then created by God " before it was in the earth, and before it grew." Gen. 2 : 5.

6. The sun and moon now appear in the vault of heaven, that is, in the atmosphere entirely cleared of the primaeval vapor. The seasons are now arranged, since the sun can exert its power, and the vegetable world in its higher as well as its lower forms is developed. This agrees with Gen. 1 : 14-19.

7. Animal life, in the waters, and in the air, is then cre ated. Gen. 1 : 20-23. It is acknowledged that marine life is the oldest of all animal life. The coral formations of the Florida reefs are the work of living creatures. Agassiz (Graham Lectures, 68) thinks that they are " hundreds of thousands of years old." This distinguished naturalist, in his Fossil Fishes, shows, that of the vertebrate animals fishes alone existed at first ; that amphibious animals came later; and that birds and mammals appeared still later; the lower orders first, and the higher afterwards. Haeckel (Crea tion, I. 68) concedes that Agassiz has shown this. The fiat "Let the waters bring forth," is to be explained like, " Let the earth bring forth." A specific animal principle is cre ated ex nihilo, which builds up out of the vegetable and other elements now in the waters, a particular form of fish or bird. " The causality of ' the swarming of the swarm,' cannot lie in the water itself." Lange's Gen. p. 171. Philo : Works, IV. 284. Ed. Bohn.

8. Animal life on the land is then created : (a) irrational animals ; (&) man. Gen. 1 : 24-31. Geology shows that man is latest in the series.

The six days of Gen. 1 are six creative periods ; each having its evening and morning; and each one of these marked by a particular manifestation of Divine power : some more distinctly than others, but all really so marked. This is indicated in the Hebrew : " There was [an] evening,

484 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

and there was [a] morning : one day." The first, second, and fourth days exhibit the Creator operating through those mechanical laws, and chemical properties of matter, which he established " in the beginning " spoken of in Gen. 1 : 1. The effects in these three days are brought about by radiation of heat, condensation of vapor, chemical affinity and repulsion, attraction of cohesion, gravitation, etc. The third, fifth and sixth days are periods during which life, vegetable, animal, and mental, is originated ex nihilo by creative energy. Neither of these forms of life can be ac counted for, by the operation of those laws and properties of matter which were employed on the first, second, and fourth days. The first, second, and fourth are inorganic days ; during which nothing vital is originated. The third, fifth, and sixth are organic days, during which the vegeta ble, animal, and rational kingdoms are originated.

The Mosaic record mentions four, and perhaps five creative fiats, by which the living species in the organic world were originated ex nihilo. The first fiat creates the vegetable species (Gen. 1 : 11, 12). The second creates the animal species in its lower forms ; namely, fishes, reptiles, and birds (Gen. 1 : 20-22). The third creates the animal in the higher form of the quadruped (Gen. 1 : 24, 25). The fourth creates man (Gen. 1 : 26-28). It is somewhat uncertain whether the bird is included under the same fiat with the fish and reptile, because the Hebrew reads, " Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life, and let fowl fly above the earth in the open fir mament of heaven" (R. V.). In this case, the "fowl" are not necessarily the product of the " waters." The author ized rendering : " And fowl that may fly," represents the " waters " as bringing forth the " fowl." St. Paul teaches the doctrine of distinct living species, when he says, " All flesh is not the same flesh ; but there is one kind of flesh of man, another of fishes, and another of birds," 1 Cor. 15 : 39.

CREATION. 485

These several fiats establish and fix the limits that sepa rate the vegetable from the animal kingdom, and the sever al species in the animal kingdom, from eacli other. The re sult of each fiat is distinct from that of the others. The fiat that created the vegetable did not create the fish. The fiat that created the quadruped did not create man. No mere evolution of that which was created by the first fiat will yield that which was created by the second ; in other words, no one of these distinct species can be transmuted into another by merely natural causes. The supernatural power of God must intervene, in order to account for an absolutely new species. God must say : " Fiat." The theory of evolution, as presented either by Haeckel in its extreme form, or by Darwin in its more moderate form, unquestion ably contradicts the Mosaic physics. " The Divine word of power creates not merely a force in general ; each new and distinct creative word introduces a new and distinct princi ple into the already existing sphere of nature — a principle which hitherto had not been present in it." Lange : On Genesis 1 : 9-13. Agassiz (Graham Lectures, p. 13) comes to the same conclusion, from considering the diversities of structure in the kingdom of animal life. " It must be mind acting among these material elements, making them sub servient to its purpose, and not the elements themselves work ing out higher combinations of structure."

At the same time, the Mosaic physics does not needlessly multiply the miracle, but admits of the evolution of varie ties under a species. If but one fiat is intended in Gen. 1 : 11, 12, and no subdivisions are implied under it, then, all the innumerable varieties of plants in the vegetable kingdom have been evolved by propagation from one origi nal vegetable principle. Vegetable protoplasm, in this case, has developed into the endless variety of plants. The men tion, however, of " kinds " of grass, herb, and tree, looks like subdivisions, under the general fiat. So, likewise, if only a single fiat without subdivisions is mentioned in Gen.

4:86 . THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD).

1 : 20, 21, it would not contradict the Mosaic physics to con cede that reptiles have developed from fishes, and even birds from reptiles. But the mention of "kinds" (Gen. 1 : 21) appears rather to imply subdivisions under the gen eral fiat. Again, if in Gen. 1 : 24, 25, but a single fiat without subdivisions is intended by the sacred writer, then the species quadruped originated on the sixth day has de veloped, under the law of propagation, and by the influ ences of environment, into the innumerable varieties that now fill the earth. The fact, however, that the quadruped is produced " after its kind," would seem to indicate par ticular creative acts under the general.

"While there is this amount of indefiniteness and flexi bility in the Mosaic account, respecting the breadth of a species, there is the strictest deflniteness and inflexibility respecting the fact. While, according to Moses, the vege table may evolve from the vegetable, and the animal from the animal, it would utterly contradict the Mosaic physics to concede that fishes, reptiles, and birds have evolved from the plant or vegetable ; that quadrupeds have evolved from fish, reptile, and bird ; that man has developed from irra tional biped or quadruped. The products of two general fiats cannot be brought under a single one. The species man, originated by a distinct fiat on the sixth day, has developed -under the law of propagation and by the influ ence of environment, into the several varieties or races of men. This fiat is distinguished from all the others, in that God addresses himself, not the earth or the waters. It is certain, also, that no subdivisions under it are implied, as in the case of the others, because man is not said to have been produced " after his kind."

This creation and fixedness of species is corroborated by the observations of the physicist. There are botanical and zoological provinces and groups, on the globe. Each spe cies has its own centre, and is propagated from it. Plants, fishes, reptiles, birds, and quadrupeds, have their own habCREATION. 487

itat. The lion is not found in every zone ; nor the horse. Neither is the pine, nor the palm. Man differs in this re spect from all other species. He is found in all zones ; and this, because he has a higher grade of intelligence found in no other species, by which he can supplement nature and counteract what is unfavorable or deadly in his environ ment. He can build a fire — a thing no other animal can do. He can sow and reap grain — which no other animal can do. He can make clothing, to protect himself from cold ; can build a house ; can cook food.

The first theory antagonistic to creation ex nihilo is that of the eternity of matter. One or the other doctrine must be adopted. Something is now, and has been from eter nity. " The very words, There is nothing, or There was a time when there was nothing, are self-contradictory. There is that within us which repels the proposition with as full and instantaneous a light, as if it bore evidence against it in the light of its own eternity." Coleridge : Friend. Works, II. 464. If this "something" is not mind, then it is matter. The objections to the eternity of matter are the following :

1. The idea of matter does not imply absolute perfection. Matter is not the most perfect substance or being that we can conceive of. The idea of matter does not include all kinds of perfection. Rational intelligence is a quality of which matter is destitute. So, also, is free will. 2. The idea of matter does not imply necessary existence. This follows from its not being the absolutely perfect. Matter is contingent being. The supposition of the non-existence of matter, is not in conflict with the proposition that some thing is from eternity. We could still suppose the eternal existence of mind, and account for the temporal existence of matter, as its created product. But the converse is not supposable. For should we suppose the primary non-exist ence of mind, and its subsequent creation by matter, this would imply that the non-intelligent originates the intelli488 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

gent, which is as difficult to believe as that non-entity originates entity. 3. The idea of matter does not imply eternal existence, because it does not imply perfection and necessity of existence. The three conceptions stand or fall together. 4. If matter is eternal it must be the first cause ; but matter cannot be the first cause, since this must be selfmoving and perpetually moving. Matter is marked by the vis inertiae. It must be moved ab extra ; and its motion diminishes if not perpetuated ab extra. The burden of proof lies upon him who denies this. The Newtonian physics and mathematics are inseparable from one another, and both must stand, until they are refuted by a materialis tic physics and mathematics. If therefore there was a time when there was nothing but matter, there could be no be ginning of motion because there is nothing self -moving, and if there be no beginning of motion there can be no causa tion. Matter cannot therefore originate anything. Locke (Understanding, IV. x. 10) argues that inert matter, having no self-motion, can no more produce motion than non-entity can produce entity. If, in reply, the materialist should postulate an eternal motion along with an eternal matter, Locke replies, that even if his postulate should be conceded, matter and material motion could no more produce mind, and mental motion, or thought and will, than nothing could produce something. Incogitative being, he says, cannot originate cogitative being. Matter cannot create mind. Locke sums up the whole in the following sentence : " If we suppose nothing to be eternal, matter can never begin to be ; if we suppose bare matter without motion to be eternal, motion can never begin to be ; if we suppose only matter and motion to be eternal, thought can never begin to be." Says Henry More (Immortality, I. vii.) "If matter as matter had motion, that is, were self -moved, nothing would hold together; but flints, adamant, brass, iron, yea this whole earth would suddenly melt into a thin ner substance than the subtile air, or rather, it would never

CREATION. 489

have been conden sated together to this consistency we find it."

That self-motion is the characteristic of mind, and its contrary, vis inertiae, is the characteristic of matter, has been the historical opinion. Plato (Phaedo) maintains that intellect is the only cause, in the strict meaning of the word. Matter is only apparently a cause. A material cause has another cause back of it, and so backward indefinitely. "We get no Teal cause, until we get to a mind which is selfmoved. Here we have real beginning, and a true cause. Plato approves of, and defends the dictum of Anaxagoras, that vovs can ap^rf TT}? tcLvrjarews. Berkeley has repro duced this view with great clearness and elegance. Cicero Somnium Scipionis) says : " That which is ever moving is eternal ; that which communicates to another object a motion which it received elsewhere must necessarily cease to live, as soon as its motion is at an end. The being which is self -moving is the only being that is eternal, because it is never abandoned by its own properties, neither is this selfmotion ever at an end."

" Newton's first axiom in the beginning of his Principia is : Corpus ornne perseverare in statu quo quiescendi vel movendi uniformiter in directum, nisi quatenus illud, a viribus impressis, cogitur statum suum rnutare." All matter uni formly remains in statu quo, either of motion or of rest, unless it is made to change its state by external causes. The entire structure of the historical physics is built upon this foundation. That the distance between motion and rest is as great as between existence and non-existence, has from the first been the dictum of all physics that has a sup port in mathematics. " Matter has no inherent power, either of beginning to move when at rest, or of arresting its progress when in motion. Its indifference to either state has been expressed by the term vis inertiae." Turner : Chemistry, p. 1. The recent materialistic physics is antiNewtonian, in denying the vis inertiae, and in postulating

490 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

self -motion for matter. " Body and mind," says Haeckel (Creation, II. 360), " can in fact never be considered as dis tinct. As Goethe has clearly expressed it : * Matter never can exist and act without mind, and mind never without matter.' " The first part of Goethe's remark is true, but not the last part. Goethe was a Spinozist, and Spinoza as serted one substance with the contradictory properties of thought and extension. Says Maudsley (Physiology of Mind, p. 148), " We must get rid of the notion of matter as inert. Matter is not inert."

The hjrpothesis of the eternity of matter has been recent ly revived in that of molecular motion. This assumes that the ultimate atoms of matter have self-motion. A motive force is inherent in matter per se. The theorist postulates intrinsic motion along with his molecule. And he must, because he denies that there is any mental or in telligent source of motion. One molecule must impinge upon another molecule by its own motivity, or not at all. The doctrine of self-motion is thus applied to atoms of matter. This is carried to its extreme, in the so-called " natural selection " attributed to matter. Haeckel main tains that inorganic matter, by varying its molecular motion, becomes organic matter. Vegetable and animal life result from mechanical changes in dead matter, and these changes are " selected " and self-caused. Haeckel (Creation, 1. 18,) quotes with approbation the following from Virchow : " Life is only a complicated kind of mechanics. A part of the sum total of matter emerges, from time to time, out of the usual course of its motions, into special chemico-organic combinations, and after having for a time continued therein, returns again to general modes of inorganic action." Here, both self-motion and choice are ascribed to inorganic matter. Certain molecules, by their own election, pass or " emerge " from one kind of motion into a different kind, and then go back or " return " to the first kind. Darwin confines this theory to organic matter. Only living protoCREATION. 491

plasm can effect such changes by its own motivity. Natu ral selection, according to him, is restricted to the mole cules of living matter. A primitive protoplasm being sup posed, all the varieties of vegetable, animal and rational life can then be accounted for, by natural selection — that is, by protoplasmic molecules altering their own motion. Hux ley goes further, and contends that the organic sprang from the inorganic. " What are called second causes produce all the phenomena of the universe." Man's Place in Nature, Essay II.

Upon the theory of Haeckel and Huxley, there is no need of an intelligent and personal Mind, in order to ac count for the phenomena of the universe.1 Self-motion and natural selection in the molecules of matter are suffi cient to explain all. The difference in the direction, and ve locity, with which molecules choose to move is the key. When molecules elect to move in one way, the product is a mineral ; inorganic and lifeless. When they elect to move in another way, the product is a vegetable ; in still another way, is an animal ; in still another way, is a human soul. " The soul of man," says Haeckel (Creation, I. 1T9, 237), "just like the soul of animals, is a purely mechanical activity, the sum of the molecular phenom ena of motion in the particles of the brain. The will is the habit of molecular motion. The will is never free. It depends upon the material processes in the nervous sys tem."

Lamarck, in his Philosophic Zoologique, published in 1809, anticipated this theory in these terms: "All the phe nomena of life depend upon mechanical, physical, and chem ical causes which are inherent in the nature of matter it self. The simplest animals, and the simplest plants, which stand at the lowest point in the scale of organization, have originated, and still do, by spontaneous generation. All

i Darwin's theory of evolution requires a creator to account for the primitive protoplasm, though no creator subsequently.

492 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

animate natural bodies or organisms are subject to the same laws as inanimate natural bodies. The ideas and activities of the understanding are the motional phenomena of the central nervous system. The will is in truth never free. Reason is only a higher degree of the development and com bination of [sensuous] judgments." Lamarck's opinion that infusoria are vegetable, and not animal, was refuted by Ehrenberg and Spallanzani, the eminent microscopists. Kirby : On Animals, 80, 81. Lamarck, however, extended the theory no further than Darwin does. He derived or ganized beings from the microscopically organic, not from the inorganic. In so doing, lie is inconsistent with his theory that "all the phenomena of life depend upon the mechanical, physical, and chemical causes which are inher ent in the nature of matter."

As we have before remarked, the materialistic physics is anti-Newtonian. If it be the truth, the physics of the Principia, of Copernicus and Kepler, is exploded. Matter has the properties of mind : namely, self-motion and selfdirection. If the molecular force, in the words of Virchow, " emerges out of the usual course of its motion into special chemico-organic combinations, and, after having for a time continued therein, returns again to the general modes of in organic motion," this is a self-motion and self -direction as real as any act of the human will. And what is still more important than this anti-historical attitude, this physics has and can have no mathematics to support it. It is wholly disconnected from the calculus. Yet it ought to have a mathematical basis, if it be indeed true that vital and vol untary forces are mechanical. Whatever is mechanical, is subject to laws that can be expressed mathematically. But no vital or voluntary force can be formulated algebraically. The vital action of a plant or an animal, the volitions of the human will, the feelings of the human heart, the thoughts of the human intellect, cannot like the fall of an apple, or the rise of a fluid iii a vacuum, be expressed in inatheinatCREATION. 493

ical terms. The absence of a mathematics for the material istic physics demonstrates its spuriousness.1

1. The first objection to this theory is, that mechanical motion obeys an invariable law, and is incompatible with such varieties of motion as the theory requires. All ob servation shows that a material force, left to itself, never varies in any particular. Gravity never alters its direction, sidewise or upwards. It is forever downward. And it never alters the rate of its velocity. Matter is marked in its motion by fixed necessity and immutability. To attribute a power of selection and of variability to it, is to introduce imagination into science. The materialistic physics is as fanciful as that of the middle ages, which explained phe nomena by the action of fairies and spirits. What is the difference between saying that a molecule moves of itself, and " selects" the velocity and direction of its own motion, and saying that the molecules of a gas rise and float on a sylph of the air, and those of a mineral fall and sink in a gnome of the mine. The machinery of the Plaeckel- Hux ley physics is as fanciful as that of Pope's Rape of the Lock.2

Theorists of this school feel the difficulty, and invent ex pedients for explaining how " selected " changes and varie1 " The progress of science is incalculably promoted by the existence of a body of men, trained to the study of the higher mathematics, who are prepared when an abstruse theory comes before the world, to appreciate its evidence, to take steady hold of its principles, to pursue ita calculations, and convert it into a portion of the permanent science of the world. " Whewell : Inductive Sciences, II. 130. Pseudo-evolution has had no endorsement of this kind.

2 The theory that thought is nothing but cerebration, and that all mental phe nomena result from the motion of the molecules of the brain, was taught in the university of Laputa, according to Swift. Among the various methods of in struction employed in that wonderful institution, Mr. Lemuel Gulliver men tions the following. " I was at the mathematical school, where the master taught his pupils after a method scarce imaginable to us in Europe. The prop osition and demonstration were fairly written on a thin wafer, with ink com posed of a cephalic tincture. This, the student was to swallow upon a fasting stomach, and for three days following eat nothing but bread and water. As the wafer digested, the tincture mounted to his brain, bearing the proposition along with it." Gulliver's Travels, V.

494: THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

ties can occnr within an immutable sphere like that of matter. Strauss, for example (Old and New Faith, 199), suggests that an adequate cause for such peculiar modes of motion amongst atoms " might exist in the conditions, the temperature, the atmospheric combinations of primaeval times, so utterly different from ours." But these them selves are all material causes. " Atmospheric combina tions " are combinations of molecules, and why the " prim aeval" combinations should be " so utterly different from ours," is one of the difficulties to be explained, and cannot therefore be introduced to explain a difficulty.

2. Another objection to the theory that explains all phe nomena by matter and mechanical motion is, that material motion is not perpetual. It gradually and surely exhausts itself. If observation and experiment have settled anything in physics, it is that the perpetual motion of matter by rea son of a force inherent in matter is impossible. Friction finally brings moving matter to a rest. It may require millions of years to do it, but it will certainly be done. The motion of the bodies in the solar system approaches as nearly as anything does to perpetual motion. But the planets, says Newton, are marked by certain " small irregu larities which appear to come from the mutual action of the planets and comets, and which will probably become greater and greater in the course of time, until at last the system will again require its Author to put it in order." Penny Cyclopaedia : Solar System. Wliewell : Astronomy and Physics, II. vii.-xii. It is true that these irregularities caused by planetary and cornetary attraction are very slight, because the great attraction of the vast mass of the sun overmasters and nullifies to a great extent. Still there is a disturbing element after all. Lagrange and Poisson have mathematically demonstrated the great stability of the solar system, but not its endless immutability. Foreign Quarterly Review, III. 138.

But this is not the whole difficulty. There is a positive

CREATION. 495

resistance to the motion of the heavenly masses, from the medium through which they pass. If this medium were as dense as atmospheric air, the motion would soon come to an end, unless reinforced ab extra. It is not atmospheric air, but the so-called ether. " It has become highly prob able," says a writer in the Penny Cyclopaedia (Solar Sys tem), " that an external cause does exist which must, unless there be a counteracting force of which we know noth ing, in time cause the destruction of the solar system. If the planets move in any medium which resists these mo tions, however little, the consequence must be a gradual diminution of their mean distances from the sun, and a gradual increase of their velocities, ending in their abso lutely falling into the sun." *

The doctrine of the " correlation of forces " does not re lieve the difficulty, in respect to perpetual motion. The forces of nature may be correlated to each other, that is, covertible into one another, and yet be diminishing in amount. That all material forces may be found, ultimately, to be but one material force, is not incredible. Physical investigations tend to this view. But this fact, even if es tablished, would not prove that the sum-total of this one material force is suffering no loss from millennium to mil lennium. Five forms of anything might be demonstrated to be but one and the same thing, but this would not prove anything respecting the quantity of being at any one time

1 The following facts go to prove the comparatively recent origin of the solar system. 1. The earth is cooling slowly, yet at such a rate as to make it impos sible that it should have existed many millions of years. It would have been stone cold clear through, in that case. 2. There is reason to believe that the earth is not rotating on her axis with the same rapidity as in former ages, and inasmuch as her shape would have been different if, at the same time she was in a molten state, she had been rotating more rapidly than now, it follows that she has not been rotating so long as has been supposed. 3. The sun is parting with caloric at such a rate, as to make it certain that it could not have continued to radiate heat at the same rate for more than a few millions of years. 4. The changes in the earth's crust, stupendous and varied as they are, could be and probably were accomplished in shorter periods than some geologists consider possible. Quarterly Review, 1876.

496 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

in this thing. This fact seems to be seen by the theorist, and an attempt is made to conceal it, by calling the " cor relation of forces," the "conservation of force," or energy. Conservation is a different conception from correlation, and a stronger term. The " conservation of energy " may mean that in the transmutation of one force into another, the whole of the primary form is conserved in the second form ; or it may mean that only a part of it is conserved. Which of the two is the fact, is the question in dispute.

The "correlation of forces" really amounts only to the analysis of force. "Whether the sum-total of material force in the universe be greater or smaller, cannot be determined, unless the analysis demonstrates that the quantity remains unchanged, under all the different forms which material force assumes. The motion of a cannon-ball is preceded by a certain amount of heat from ignited gunpowder, and is followed by a certain amount of heat in the iron plate which it strikes. But no experiment thus far made, has demonstrated that the amount of heat is mathemat ically the same in the second instance, that it was in the first ; that the heat in the iron plate is exactly equal to the heat in the gunpowder. Heat is converted into motion ; and motion reconverted into heat. Here is correlation of forces. One force is convertible into another. And here also is conservation of force. But how much conservation is the question. How much of the heat in the powder is conserved in the heat of the iron plate remains to be shown. Before we can say that there has been absolutely no loss of material force in these transmutations, it must be demon strated mathematically. No experiment is nice or delicate enough to establish it. At this point the calculus should come in ; as it always has in the historical physics at points when sensible experiments fail.1 But, as yet, there is no

1 It is claimed that the same amount of heat produced by the combustion of the carbon in a man's dinner, would be produced by the same amount of carbon, if burnt out of the body. But no experiment has proved that the vital heat, in

CREATION. 497

mathematics for the new physics. A German investigator, Clausius, claims to have proved mathematically that motion when converted into heat is a mathematical equivalent ; but that heat when converted into motion, is not. There is, he says, some loss of motion in every instance in which heat is converted into motion. The final result, consequently, if there is no interference ab extra, will be, that motion will gradually diminish in the universe and finally cease ; and heat, or temperature, will be uniform. Gardiner : Bibliotheca Sacra, Jan. 1881.

This lack of demonstration is acknowledged by Balfour Stewart. He remarks (Conservation of Energy, p. 8) that " we have the strongest possible evidence for the assertion, that all the various energies in the universe are a constant quantity, which the nature of the case admits of. The asser tion is, in truth, a peculiar one ; peculiar in its magnitude, in its universality, in the subtle nature of the agents with which it deals. If true, its truth certainly cannot be proved after the manner in which we prove a proposition in Euclid. Nor does it admit of a proof so rigid as that of the some what analogous principle of the conservation of matter ; for in chemistry we may confine the products of our chemical combination so as to completely prove, beyond a doubt, that no heavy matter passes out of existence." Stewart then gives some indirect proofs, which, he contends, make the position probable.

3. Another objection to the theory that mechanical and vital forces are identical, is the fact that mechanical forces never originate varieties, while the vegetable and animal kingdoms are full of them. In inorganic nature, there is no deviation from the typical form. Crystals are rigorously confined to their order. No new varieties arise. Gold and copper always crystallize in a cube ; bismuth and antimony in a hexagon ; iodine and sulphur in a rhomb. But flowers

this instance, is equivalent mathematically to the chemical heat, or that the two are identical in kind.

498 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

are not thus rigorously confined to their type. A white flower, in some individuals, shows a reddish tint. This is a so-called " accidental " variety. If seeds be taken from it, its offspring will be redder yet. In this way, a new variety is artificially produced. But this cannot be done with a crystal. The geometrical form here is produced by a mechanical and inorganic, not a vital force ; and it is un changeable. There is no " accidental variety " of a crystal. No such alterations of typical form can be artificially pro duced in this inorganic province. A crystal can be pro duced artificially by chemical action, as well as by the nat ural action of mechanical forces. But in this case too, there can be no variation from the type. This proves a difference in kind between the inorganic and organic; the chemical and the vital.

4. A fourth objection to the hypothesis of the variation of mechanical motion, is found in the immutability of the molecule. Maxwell, professor of Physics at Cambridge, in an address before the British Association, remarked as fol lows : " A molecule of hydrogen, whether on earth, in Sirius or Arcturus, executes its vibrations in the same time. Iso theory of evolution can be formed to account for this identity of molecules ; for evolution implies continual change, and the molecule is incapable of growth or decay, of generation or destruction. None of the processes of nature have pro duced the slightest difference in the properties of any mole cule. "We are, therefore, unable to ascribe either the exist ence of the molecules, or the identity of their properties, to any of the causes we call natural. On the other hand, the exact equality of each molecule to all others of the same kind gives it, as Sir John Ilerschel has well said, the es sential character of a manufactured article, and precludes the notion of its being eternal and self-existent. Though in the course of ages catastrophes have occurred, and may yet occur, in the heavens; though ancient systems may be dis solved, and new ones constructed out of their ruins, the

CREATION. 499

molecules out of which these systems are built, the founda tion-stones of the material universe, remain unbroken and unworn. They continue this day as they were created, per fect in number, and measure, and weight ; and from the ineffaceable characters impressed upon them, we may learn that those aspirations after accuracy in measurement, and justice in action, which we reckon among our noblest attri butes as men, are ours because they are the essential quali ties of Him who, in the beginning created not only the heaven and earth, but the materials of which heaven and earth consist."

The second theory antagonistic to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is that of pseudo-evolution. There is a true and a false theory of evolution. The former defines evolution to be simply " the transformation of the homogeneous ; " the latter defines it to be the " transformation [trans mutation] of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous." This is Spencer's definition adopted from Von Baer. The two definitions and the two theories are direct contraries and contradictories. An evolution, in the historical physics of Linnaeus, Cuvier, Hunter, Blumenbach, and Agassiz, wholly excludes the heterogeneous. It is the same sub stance in kind under new forms. A vegetable seed evolves or develops into a root and stalk ; but the root and stalk are still vegetable. They are still homogeneous with the seed. A vegetable bud, again, becomes a flower, and the flower becomes fruit ; but both flower and fruit are still homogeneous with the vegetable substance of the bud ; they are vegetable. If anything mineral or animal, any thing heterogeneous, should appear in this evolution of the seed and the bud, this would prove that it was no evolution. But pseudo-evolution postulates what true evolution denies : namely, that homogeneous substance transmutes itself into heterogeneous. It asserts that a homogeneous mineral, by intrinsic force, slowly, by infinitesimal degrees, converts it self into a heterogeneous vegetable. Evolution is thus not

500 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

a mere change of. form, but of matter. As this assertion is not supported by proof, it is surreptitiously introduced into a preliminary definition which the opposing party is ex pected to accept. But this is begging the question in dis pute. The question is, whether homogeneous substance ever does or can change itself into heterogeneous substance. Shedd : Theological Essays, 133-137 ; 154-167.

According to this theory of evolution, all the kingdoms of nature issue out of each other without any intervening creative agency. The fiats in the Mosaic account are de nied. The homogeneous mineral develops into the hetero geneous vegetable ; the homogeneous vegetable into the heterogeneous animal ; the homogeneous animal into the heterogeneous man. The doctrine is applied through the entire scale of existence. Vegetable life issues from the life less mineral. Sentient and conscious life evolves from the insentient and unconscious plant. Rational and moral life develops from an animal and brutal life that is utterly des titute of reason and morality. This accounts for, and ex plains the universe of being. In each of these instances, the homogeneous substance is transmuted into the hetero geneous, by purely material laws and causes. There is no rational act of an intelligent and personal creator, when the animal kingdom supervenes upon the vegetable, or when the rational kingdom supervenes upon the animal. Imper sonal, unintelligent, and unconscious evolution accounts for all varieties of being.

Several methods of explanation have been proposed. Lamarck explained by habit. The giraffe at first had a short neck. The habit of reaching up for the leaves of trees, when the grass failed, lengthened the neck. The frog's foot, and that of the goose, was at first without web. The attempt to swim finally produced it. When the long neck and the web-foot were thus produced, they were prop agated, and a new species was the result. St. Hilaire explained by circumstances. Somehow or other the atmosCREATION. 501

phere lost carbon, and the proportion of oxygen was in creased. This made the breathing quicker ; this heated the blood ; this made the nerves and muscles more active ; this changed the scales of reptiles into feathers, and thus the reptile was transformed into the bird. This scheme, just now, is revived in that of " creation by environment."

1. The first objection to the theory of pseudo-evolution is, that it is contradicted by the whole course of scientific observation and experiment. It is a theory in the face of the facts. " Darwinism," says Agassiz (On Classification), " is an a priori conception," and " a burlesque of facts." It " shuts out almost the whole mass of acquired knowledge, in order to retain and use only that which may serve its pur pose." Quatrefages (Human Species, I. i.) asserts that " to attempt, under any pretext whatever, to confound the inor ganic with the organic, is to go in direct opposition to all the progress made for more than a century, and especially during the last few years, in physics, chemistry, and physi ology. It is inexplicable to me that some men, whose mer its I otherwise acknowledge, should have recently again compared crystals to the simplest living forms : to the sarcodic organisms, as they are called by Du Jardin who dis covered them. A change of name is useless; the things remain the same, and protoplasm has the same properties as sarcode. The animals whose entire substance they seem to form have not altered their nature ; whether monera or amoebae, these forms are the antipodes of the crystal from every point of view." " No conceivable combinations," says Roget (Physiology, II. 582), " of mechanical or of chemical powers, bear the slightest resemblance, or the most remote analogy to organic reproduction, or can afford the least clue to the solution of this dark enigma." Foreign Quarterly Review, III. 189-196.

No naturalist has ever discovered an instance of the transmutation of species. Varieties under a species have been seen to be changed into other varieties. Darwin shows

502 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

how pigeons may be made to vary from pigeons, but not how pigeons can be evolved into the horse. No observer has furnished even a scintilla of proof that the vital de velops from the non-vital. It is an axiom older than Aris totle, and always accepted in the historical physics, that omne animal ex ovo est. Life supposes life. The living individual issues only from the living germ. A material molecule never transmutes itself into a vegetable germ. A mustard-seed is never changed into the egg of animal life. A grain of wheat may be kept in a mummy for three thou sand years, and upon being cast into the ground, it will be gin to sprout. A true evolution of this vegetable seed im mediately begins. But no natural or artificial force can cause a diamond to bud and blossom : can transmute this homogeneous mineral into a heterogeneous vegetable. The vast geological ages which the theorist brings in, do not help his theory. A force of nature is no stronger in a mill ion of years, than it is in a hundred. What gravitation cannot do in a century, it cannot do in a hundred centuries. A mechanical force is fixed. It does not increase with the lapse of time. Rousseau (Dictionnaire Botanique) thus speaks of the " nouvelle physique " of his day, which con founded the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms, and maintained that " minerals live, and vegetables feel : " "I have often seen a tree die which before had been full of life ; but the death of a stone is an idea that would never enter my mind. I see exquisite feeling in a dog, but never saw it in a cabbage. The paradoxes of Jean-Jacques are very celebrated, but I never advanced anything so absurd as this."

The experimental and scientific evidence for the trans mutation of substance is so deficient, that only enthusiasts like Haeckel, Huxley, and Maudsley, venture to maintain the evolution of the organic from the inorganic. Darwin confines the transmutation of substance to the organic world. He postulates life, primarily given by the Creator.

CREATION. 503

" I imagine," he says, in phraseology that is curiously un scientific : "I imagine that probably all organic beings that ever lived on this earth descended from some primitive form, which was first called into being by the Creator." In the " Origin of Species," p. 577, he speaks of " the breathing of life, by the Creator, into a few forms, or into one." He does not assert that the mollusc can be de veloped from inorganic molecules ; though he maintains that man may be evolved from the mollusc. While he bridges by evolution the chasm between the oyster and man, he lets it stand between the mineral and the oyster. His work upon insectivorous animals looks like an attempt to prove that animal life can be developed from vegeta ble, but he makes no distinct statement to this effect.

That this spurious theory of evolution is contradicted by the general course of physical experiment and observation, is proved by its failure to obtain general currency. La marck did not supersede Linnaeus. Eminent microscopists like Ehrenberg and Spallanzani demonstrated that the infusoria which Lamarck asserted to be vegetable, were animal. Kirby : On Animals, I. iv. St. Hilaire made no impression upon the established zoology of Cuvier, so that to this day French physics is even more unanimous than either German or English, in affirming an impassable limit between the kingdoms of nature. In Germany, Kepler, Leibnitz, Kant, Haller, and Blumenbach are greater names in physical science than Goethe, Oken, Haeckel and Biichner. In England, the physics of Newton, Linnaeus, Hunter, Cuvier, Faraday, Whewell, Herschel, Agassiz, Guyot, and Dana, influences the educated and disciplined intellect of the nation far more than do the speculations of Darwin, Huxley, and Tyndall. Haeckel (Creation, I. 34) mentions it as a discouraging sign, that the views of Lin naeus, Cuvier, and Agassiz are adopted by " the great ma jority of both scientific and unscientific men ; " and that " the majority of French naturalists are the blind followers

504 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD).

of Cavier." He adds, that " in no country has Darwin's doctrine had so little effect as in France."

The opinions of Kant are entitled to great respect ; for he began his remarkable philosophical career with the met aphysics of mathematics. lie investigated inorganic nature before he investigated mind, and his attitude is firm in ref erence to theism, and the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. In his Critique of the Judgment (§ 74-79), while maintain ing that the inorganic world is explainable by mechanical forces and laws, he is explicit in saying that these forces and laws themselves have a teleological character. They imply a designing mind beyond them. He holds that theism and creation ex nihilo are the truth, and rejects the hylozoism of Spinoza and of atheism. Respecting the possibility of the evolution of the organic from the inorganic, he re marks that " it is absurd even to think of explaining organ ized creatures and their potentialities by purely mechanical principles, or to expect that a l^ewton will one day arise who will be able to explain the production of a blade of grass, according to a law ordained by no designing intelli gence." " Give me," he said, " inorganic matter, and I will explain the formation of an inorganic world." But he denied that it can be said, " Give me inorganic matter, and I will explain the production of a caterpillar." This latter remark is quoted by Strauss : Old Faith, 196.

Physical science can perhaps explain the formation of the solar system by the nebular hypothesis, but not the crea tion of it. For this hypothesis supposes a nebulous matter with its inherent force of gravity, and other forces, to be already in existence. Unless this postulate of fire-mist, and the attraction of gravitation, cohesion, etc., is granted, it cannot account for the solar system. The question imme diately arises, Whence is this fire-mist, with its proper ties ? If this is the origin of the solar system, what is the origin of this origin ? If this is the explanation of the ma terial universe, what is the explanation of this explanation ?

CREATION. 505

The nebular hypothesis may be a correct generalization from observed facts, and have its place in the system of phys ics, but it cannot be a substitute for the First Cause. The words of Whewell, respecting the nebular hypothesis, are true and forcible : " Let it be supposed that the point to which this hypothesis leads us is the ultimate point of physical science; that the farthest glimpse we can obtain of the material universe by our natural faculties, shows it to us as occupied by a boundless abyss of luminous matter ; still we ask, how space came to be thus occupied, how mat ter came to be thus luminous ? If we establish by physical proofs, that the first fact which can be traced in the history of the world is, that ' there was light,7 we shall still be led, even by our natural reason, to suppose that before this could occur, ; God said, Let there be light.' " Astronomy and General Physics, II. vii.

Since there is no proof of the theory of pseudo-evolution from the past results of scientific inquiry, its advocates when called upon for the demonstration betake themselves either to an a priori method, or else to prophecy. Haeckel, for example (Creation, I. 169), replies in the following manner to the assertion of the opponent that the theory is a hypothesis which is yet to be proved : " That this as sertion is completely unfounded, may be perceived even from the outlines of the doctrine of selection." But the " outlines of a doctrine " are the doctrine itself ; and the doctrine itself cannot be the proof of the doctrine, unless it be a priori and axiomatic in its nature. And this charac teristic Haeckel actually claims for his theory of evolution, in the following terms : " The origin of new species by nat ural selection, by the interaction of inheritance and adapta tion, is a mathematical necessity of nature which needs no further proof. Whoever, in spite of the present state of our knowledge, still seeks for proofs of the theory of selec tion, only shows that he does not thoroughly understand the theory." Haeckel, here, makes short work witli the whole

506 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OP GOD).

subject, by claiming an a priori necessity for the theory of pseudo-evolution. Of course, if this be so, experiment and observed facts are not to be demanded. But such a claim for a science that professes to rest upon experiment and ob servation, and not upon a priori grounds, is of a piece with Haeckel's assertion (Creation, II.) that a posteriori knowl edge, by means of use and habit, can be transmuted into a priori knowledge ; in other words, that a truth of experience becomes axiomatic when the experience is long continued — a notion similar to that mentioned by Coleridge, " that a weathercock may form a habit of turning to the east, from the wind having been a long time in that quarter." Works, III. 227.

Respecting spontaneous generation, Ilaeckel (Creation, I. 340, 341) remarks that " experiments on autogeny have furnished no certain and positive results. Yet we must protest against the notion that these experiments have proved the impossibility of spontaneous generation. The impossibility of such a process can, in fact, never be proved. For how can we know that in remote primaeval times there did not exist conditions quite different from those at pres ent obtaining, which may have rendered spontaneous gener ation possible ? " By such reasoning as this, any hypothe sis whatever may be proved. Ilaeckel (Creation, I. 335) explains vital growth by chemical action thus : " A crystal grows by the apposition of particle upon particle ; a plant grows by the intussusception of particle into particle. The fluidity of the albuminous carbon, in the instance of the plant, permits of this penetration, so that the addition is not mere accretion upon the outside, or addition of sur face to surface." But why does a chemical force act so dif ferently from a vital one ? A salt in solution is as much a fluid as the albumen ; but it yields a crystal instead of a plant. If the chemical and the vital are really one and the same mechanical force, why this diversity ? A really me chanical force acts in only one way, The force of gravity

CREATION. 507

does not sometimes lift bodies, and sometimes cause them to fall.

As an example of the employment of prophecy in sup port of the theory of pseudo-evolution, consider the follow ing remark of Haeckel (Creation, I. 32) respecting the pro duction of albumen by a chemical process — thus far found to be impossible : " At some future time, we shall succeed in discovering, in the composition of albuminous matter, certain molecular relations as the remoter causes of these phenom ena of life." There is no logic against prophecy. Seers and soothsayers have an advantage over ordinary investigators, who have nothing but their understandings to work with.1

2. Secondly, the examples adduced by the advocate of pseudo-evolution do not prove that species develops from species, but only that varieties develop from species — which no one denies.2 Haeckel shows that many varieties of

1 The hopefulness of the evolutionist is expressed in the words of Wagner, in the second part of Goethe's Faust, Act II.

" Look yonder ! see the flashes from the hearth ! Hope for the world dawns there, that, having laid The stuff together of which man is made, The hundredfold ingredients mixing, blending, (For upon mixture is the whole depending), If then in a retort we slowly mull it, Next to a philosophic temper dull it, Distil and re-distil, at leisure thin it, All will come right, in silence, to a minute.

Turning again to the hearth. 'Tis forming — every second brings it nearer — And my conviction becomes stronger, clearer. "What nature veils in mystery, I expect Through the plain understanding to effect ; What was organization will at last Be with the art of making crystals classed."

3 The loose use of the term "species" covers up much sophistical reasoning of the evolutionists. Quatrefages (Human Species, 96) says: u Darwin has formed no clear conception of the sense which he gave to the word ' species ; ' I have been unable to find in any of his works a single precise statement on this point." Darwin remarks that "it seems probable that allied species are de scended from a common ancestor." The connection in which this is said, shows that by " allied species " he means only varieties of pigeons, dogs, etc.

508 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

sponges spring from the one species olynthns. But the dif ference between sponge and sponge is not the same as that between mineral and plant, or between plant and animal. When one kind of sponge is transformed into another kind of sponge, this is not the transmutation of a homogeneous substance into a heterogeneous. This does not answer to Spencer's definition of evolution, if the definition is to be taken as it reads. If the sponge should develop into the rose, or the rose into the worm, this would answer the defini tion. But nothing approaching to such a mortal leap as this is seen in nature. Darwin makes it seem probable that all varieties of pigeons may have sprung from one original pair of pigeons — say the blue-rock pigeon ; but this does not prove that the pigeon sprang from a fish, still less from a cabbage, and still less from a bit of granite.

Virchow, in an address at Munich, said that two doc trines are not yet proved, but are hypotheses still : namely,

1. Spontaneous generation of living from inorganic matter.

2. The descent of man from some non-human vertebrate animal. We may expect, he says, that these will hereafter be proved, but meanwhile must not teach them as scientific facts. Nineteenth Century, April, 1878. Gray, though accepting the Darwinian theory of evolution as "fairly probable," asserts that it is a " complex and loose hypothesis, less probable than the nebular hypothesis, or the kinetic theory of gases." New York Times, Feb. 6, 7, 1880.

3. Thirdly, if the doctrine of pseudo-evolution be true, it should be supported, like that of gravitation, by a multi tude of undisputed facts and phenomena. A law of nature — and this kind of evolution is claimed to be such, even the lex legum — is a uniform and universal thing. The hy pothesis of gravitation is not supported by a few doubtful and disputed facts, like those which are cited in proof of spontaneous generation. If there were really such a transi tion by development, from the inorganic to the organic, from the vegetable to the animal, and from the animal to

CREATION. 509

the rational, as is asserted, the process ought to be going on all the time, and all around us in nature, and before the eyes of everyone. A real and actual law of nature cannot be put under a bushel. The theorist should have millions of examples to show. But as yet he has not a single ex ample. Darwin's pigeons, after all his efforts to transform them into another species, are pigeons still. Said Ambrose (Hexaemeron, III. 10), " When wheat degenerates, it does not cease to be wheat ; there is no alteration of species : Non ad translationem generis, sed ad aegritudinem quandam seminis, videtur esse referendum."

4. Fourthly, the well-known fact that hybrids between real species are infertile, proves that there is no transmuta tion of species. A hybrid is an artificial, not a natural product. When man attempts to originate a new species by crossing breeds, as in the case of the horse and ass, he is working against nature, and fails. " Domestication," says Agassiz (Animal Life, 51), " never produces forms which are self -perpetuating, and is therefore in no way an index of the process by which species are produced." Quatrefages (Human Species, I. vi.-ix.) takes the same view. Haeckel (Creation, I. 45) mentions as hybrids that can be propa gated, some between hares and rabbits, and between differ ent varieties of dog. Also, of plants, the willow, the thistle, and the mullein, he says, are hybrids. But hares and rab bits are varieties of the same species ; and, as Macbeth says, " hounds and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels, curs, shoughs, water-rugs, and demi-wolves, are cleped all by the name of dogs." A true species is self-perpetuating. Says Dana, " When individuals multiply from generation to generation, it is but a repetition of the primordial type-idea, and the true notion of the species is not in the resulting group, but in the idea or potential element which is the basis of every individual of the group." Bib. Sacra, 1857, p. 861.

5. Fifthly, this theory of evolution, conflicting as it does with the invariability of nature in the several kingdoms,

510 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

conflicts also with the certainty of natural science. There c:in be no fixed laws of operation, upon this scheme. Any thing may originate out of anything. There is no certainty that mineral substance will always be mineral, for it may become vegetable substance. It is not certain that a vege table species will always remain vegetable, for it may be transmuted into an animal species. Chance rules in nature, not invariable law. And the transmutation of substance may descend as well as ascend. Man may evolve into ape, as well as ape into man. As an example of the hap-hazard that is introduced into physical science by this theory, take its explanation of the origin of the eye, as an organ of vision. Once there was no such organ in existence. It came into being, in the following manner. A certain piece of nervous tissue happened in the lapse of ages to become sensitive to light ; then, after another lapse of time, a trans parent tissue happened to be formed over it ; then, after other ages, a fluid happened to be formed which increased in density and adaptedness to vision ; and thus changes at hap-hazard take place, and finally we have the eye of an animal.1 The Duke of Argyll exposes the capriciousness of this kind of physics, in the following terms: "Under the modes of applying the theory of evolution which have be come commonplace, it is very easy to account for everything. ~\Ve have only to assume some condition opposite to that which now exists, and then to explain the change by show ing that the existing conditions are useful and adapted to existing needs. Do we wish, for example, to explain why the female pheasant is dull colored ? We have only to as sume that once she was gayly colored, and became dull by the gaudier hens being killed off when setting on eggs, and by the duller hens being saved. Do we wish, on the con1 This supposes that in nature an eye can be found in isolation, by itself, sep arate from the body of which it is the eye. But nature never forms organs in this way. They are found only in connection with the organization and growth of the entire body.

CREATION. 511

trary, to explain the brilliant coloring of the male pheasant? We have only to make the reverse assumption — that once they were all dull colored, and that accidental dandies were preserved by the admiration and the consequent selection of the ladies. In like manner, the migration of birds is ex plained by assuming that once upon a time there were no migratory birds, although there must always have been the same changing seasons. Then a few birds came to travel a little way, and then a little farther, and so at last they came to go a great way, and finally the habit, l organized in the race,' became the migratory instinct. It is curious that in this and all similar explanations of what are admitted to be now pure instincts, the theory demands that the earliest be ginnings were more rational than the last developments ; the commencements were more in the nature of intelligent per ception than the final results, which have become the mere mechanical effect of hereditary habits."

According to the theory of pseudo-evolution, there is no preconceived plan and design, by which the origin of living and organized objects in nature is accounted for. They come wholly by chance. Those varieties from which new species are claimed to spring are denominated " accidental." If a piece of nervous tissue happens to become sensitive to light, the first step towards the production of the eye of animal life is taken ; otherwise not. And so with the second step, by which a film is drawn over the sensitive tissue ; and so with all the steps. The processes of nature are entirely fortuitous, upon this scheme, and there is noth ing possible, but the calculation of chances. No invariable and uniform order of nature is possible, and therefore no science of nature is possible. Haeckel (Creation, I. 167,) would parry this objection, by the following self-stultifying remark : "The difference between the two forms of selec tion is this : In artificial selection, the will of man makes the selection according to a plan, whereas in natural selec tion, the struggle for life (that universal inter-relation of

512 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

organisms) acts without a plan, but produces quite the same result, namely, a selection of a particular kind of individ ual for propagation." This is saving that nature's acting by chance will produce "the same result" that man's acting by plan does ; and that nature would have the same regularity and order, by the method of chance, as by the method of design.

6. Some evolutionists, for example, Darwin, Wallace, and Huxley, try to adopt a middle theory. They say that a species may be originated either by selection, or by crea tion. But the alternative is impossible. One idea excludes the other, necessarily. If a particular being is intrinsically such that creation ex nihilo accounts for it, then molecular motion and natural selection cannot, and vice versa. If a thing is intrinsically such that it may be equal to four, it must be. It may not be equal to five. The ideas of crea tion and evolution are as incompatible with each other, as four and five are. Both cannot be true.

7. The abundant proof of design in nature overthrows the theory of evolution. This design is executed even in an extreme manner. The mammae on man's breast, and the web-feet of the upland goose, and the frigate bird, show that the plan of structure is carried out with persistence, even when in particular circumstances there is no use for the organ itself. The symmetry of the species is preserved. Nature is punctilious in respect to design. Even in the de formed and irregular products of nature, the same respect for plan is observed. There is design in these. In a misgrowth of a vegetable, matter is organized methodically. It is not thrown together at hap-hazard, as in a kaleidoscope. Holberg's (Memoirs, p. 196) anecdote of the priest and the humpback will apply here. The priest had said in his ser mon, that everything which God makes is well-made. "Look at me," said a humpback, "Am I well-made?" The priest looked at him, and replied that he was wellmade for a humpbacked man. The priest was wiser than

CREATION. 513

he knew, and his answer had truth in it, as well as wit. The humpback was built upon the plan of a man, not of a dog.

The theory of development is valid, when properly ap plied. Take, for example, Linnaetis's arrangement of the genus felis : Felis domestica (common cat) ; f elis catus (wild cat) ; felis pardus (leopard) ; felis onca (jaguar) ; felis tigris (tiger) ; felis leo (lion). These six species of the one genus, as Linnaeus uses terms, may be developed from one original type. The same may be said also of the seven species of the one genus pinus, in the vegetable kingdom. But ac cording to Linnaeus, felis could not develop from equus ; nor pinus from pirus.

Species should not be multiplied, or the creative act be introduced extravagantly often. The Biblical phraseology, " Let the earth bring forth," and " Let the waters bring forth," implies that within the several kingdoms, after they have been established by creative power, much may then have been done in the production of varieties (not species) by the law of evolution impressed upon each kingdom. There is no objection to tracing all varieties of pigeon to one original, say the blue-rock pigeon, as Darwin does; or all varieties of rabbit to one original type. John Hunter held that "the true distinction between different species of animals, must ultimately be gathered from their inca pacity of propagating with each other an offspring capa ble again of continuing itself by subsequent propagation." Hunter wrote a tract entitled, "Observations tending to show that the Wolf, Jackal, and Dog are all of the same Species."

It should be understood, moreover, how terms are em ployed. If " genus " is the base, then " species " are the divisions. If "species "is the base, then "varieties" are the divisions. In the first case, species can come from spe cies ; in the second, not. Quatref ages : Human Species, I. iii. Dana defines a species as the " unit " in the organic

514 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

world. Morton defines it as a " primordial organic form." The critera of a species are : 1. Permanent fecundity. 2. Sameness of external form. Animals with teeth for eating flesh belong to a different species from those having teeth for eating vegetable food. Animals with webbed feet are not of the same species with those having feet without a web. 3. Sameness of internal structure, shown in habits and instincts. Of these three, the first is the surest criterion. The other two are less certain. Two animals of great simi larity in external structure may be of wholly different spe cies — for example, the ape and man. Hence all three criteria must be combined.

A plausible argument for the development of man from lower animals, is derived from a comparison of the embryo of man at four weeks, with that of the chick ; or at eight weeks, with that of the dog. There is a great similarity. The evolutionist asks: "Is it any more improbable that man should develop from the ape, than that a Plato, or a Shakspeare should develop from an embryo so like the dog's embryo ? " It certainly is not any more improbable, upon the supposition that the human embryo contains noth ing but what is in that of the chick or the dog. But if the human embryo contains, over and above the physical ele ments, a rational and spiritual principle ; if this embryo be a synthesis of mind and matter, and not mere matter ; then it is more probable that a Plato will come from it, than from the canine embryo. This kind of argument proves too much. For not only the embryo, but the new-born babe itself has little more in its external appearance to sug gest the career of a Newton, or an Aristotle, than a new born dog has. The wailing unconsciousness of the one is as far from science and philosophy, as the yelping uncon sciousness of the other. But the babe possesses, along with physical qualities, the "image of God," namely, a rational soul ; while the dog has only an animal soul. There is an invisible rational principle in one, that is not in the other.

CREATION. 515

The maxim, " Judge not by the outward appearance," has full force here.

Resemblance in corporeal form has been overestimated. Similarity in the visible and material structure, does not necessarily prove similarity in the invisible and mental structure. It is conceivable that a creature might be pro duced whose anatomy might be entirely like that of man, and yet have no human as distinguished from brutal traits. The idiot is an example. A human body with only an ani mal soul would look like a man, but would be as far from man as is an ox. The gorilla is nearer to man in physical structure than is a dog ; but he is not so near to man in re spect to sagacity, affection, and other manlike traits. The monkey species is not so intelligent as the canine species. The elephant is nearer to man in respect to mental traits than is the gorilla, but his anatomy is farther off. The ant and bee have more intelligence than many animals have, yet are entirely destitute of brain. Naturalists notice that the period of infancy in man is much longer than in the brute. This is because there is a rational soul in the one, and not in the other, which unfolds more slowly than a physical organism does. The animal takes care of itself in infancy ; but the infant man must be taken care of. For example, the young calf, of itself, finds its nourishment from the dam ; but the babe must be put to the breast of the mother. The latter, if left to itself would die ; but the former would not.

Respecting the time when man was created, and his an tiquity, the narrative in Genesis teaches that he is the last in the series of creations, and that the Creator rested from creation ex nihilo after the origination of the human spe cies.1 "While minerals, vegetables, and irrational animals,

1 Lewis : On the Early Populations of the Globe, in Lange's Genesis, p. 314 sq. Southall : Recent Origin of Man. Pouchet : The Universe, p. 609. Fraser : Blinding Lights. Lyell: Antiquity of Man. Quatrefagea : Human Species, III. xii. xiii. British Quar. Rev. : 1863 (Review of Lyell). Cabell : Unity of Mankind.

516 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

according to Genesis, may be referred back to a long dura tion in the first five days, man cannot be referred to any but the sixth day, and to the " morning " or last part of that. From six to eight thousand years is the period dur ing which the human species has existed. The Septuagint gives fifteen hundred years more of time, from the creation of man, than the Hebrew text. The Christian fathers gen erally adopted the Septuagint chronology. Theophilus of Antioch (Ad Autolycum, 24, 25, 28) makes the Scriptures to give 5,698 years from the creation of man, to the death of the emperor Aurelius Verus, A.D. 69. Julius Africanus (230), the earliest Christian chronologist, dates the creation, 5,499 B.C. Eusebius, Jerome, and Bede reckon 2,242 years between Adam and the deluge — following the Septuagint. The Hebrew text gives 1,656 years. Augustine (City of God, XY. 20) says : " From Adam to the deluge, there are reckoned according to our copies of the Scripture, 2,262 years, and according to the Hebrew text, 1,656 years." Compare City of God, XX. vii. Hales (Chronology, I. 273-303) and Clinton (Fasti Hellenic!, 1. 283-301) defend the Septuagint chronology. See Introduction to Jeremiah, Speaker's Commentary, p. 323-326, where Payne Smith favors the Septuagint recension. Murphy (On Genesis, p. 196) defends the Hebrew chronology. The Samaritan text gives only 1,307 years between the creation and the deluge. Desvignoles, in the preface to his Chronology, says that he has collected above two hundred calculations, of which the longest makes the time between the creation and the incar nation to have been 6,984 years, and the shortest 3,483 years.

Extravagant statements respecting the great antiquity of man are not found in the Greek and Roman literatures. Plato (Laws, II. 656 ; III. 676) speaks of " ten thousand years ago," and " thousands and thousands of cities." But this is indefinite description ; and the first instance relates to Egypt. Mythical and fabulous representations appear

CREATION. 517

in the Egyptian and Hindoo traditions. The Egyptian priests told Herodotus that they possessed a history going back 11,340 years ; and they also told him that during this period the sun had four times altered his regular course, having been twice observed to rise in the west and to set in the east. Compare Spenser's Faery Queen, Y. (Introduc tion). The zodiac of Denderah, according to Dupuis, went back 15,000 years. The astronomer Delambre thought it to be later than the time of Alexander ; and Biot demon strated that it represented the state of the heavens in the year 700 B.C. Furthermore, it was discovered in an Egyp tian temple that proved to have been built during Roman rule. Pouchet: Universe, 610. The conclusions of Lepsius from the monuments of Egypt make that civilization 20,000 years old. But the dates on the Babylonian and Assyrian tablets disprove this chronology. Even if it be conceded that Egypt is older than Assyria, it cannot be so immensely older.

Smith (Assyrian Discoveries, 51) gives 1850 B.C. as the date for Assur, the first capital of Assyria ; and 1350 B.C. for Nineveh, the second capital. He makes Babylon " the capital of the whole country," in the sixteenth century, B.C. " The enormous reigns ascribed by Berosus of Babylon to his ten kings, making a total of 432,000 years force us to discard the idea that the details are historical." Smith : Chaldean Genesis, 307. This scholar thinks the represen tation of ancient authors, that the walls of Babylon were from forty to sixty miles in circumference, to be an exag geration ; and infers from the ruins, that they were " about eight miles around, making Babylon nearly the same size with Nineveh." He believes that the Babylonian records "reach to the 24th century B.C.;" adding, that "some scholars are of opinion that they stretch nearly 2000 years beyond that time." The oldest date assigned by Smith, is 2500 B.C. He places the early Babylonian monarchy B.C. 2500-1500 ; and refers the Izdubar (Nimrod) legends to

518 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

2000 B.C. Assyrian Discoveries, 166, 167. By the Septuagint reckoning, according to Theophilus, there would be 887 years from the deluge to 2500 B.C. ; and from the crea tion to the deluge, 2242 years. Speaker's Commentary : Introduction to Kings, § 8, and to Ilosea. Conder : Syrian Stone-Lore.

The Vedas, according to Max Miiller (Origin of Religion, 147), go back to 1000 B.C. : how much earlier is uncertain. "Whitney (Oriental Studies, 21) places them between 1500 and 2000 B.C. The Brahmins asserted that the astronomi cal tables of India were compiled more than 20,000,000 years ago. But Laplace proved that the calculations had been made after the alleged events ; and moreover, that they were incorrect. Pouchet : Universe, 610.

Had man existed 20,000 years upon the globe, its popu lation would be immensely greater than it is. Remains of ancient cities would be found all over the planet. But there are only twelve or fourteen hundred millions of men now on the globe, and remains of cities are found mostly around the Mediterranean, and in Asia. If we go back to the beginning of profane history (say to 1000 B.C.), we find most of the globe uninhabited by man. All of the Western hemisphere, all of middle and northern Europe, all of northern Asia, all of Africa south of Sahara, and all of Aus tralia and the islands of the sea, were without human pop ulation. At the time of the Advent, the majority of the population of the globe was still gathered about the Medi terranean sea. Probably there were not more than 100,000,000 people on the globe, at that date. Man is very recent upon the American continents. South America has only about 30,000,000 inhabitants. North America at the time of its discovery had but a handful of men, compared with the vast extent of territory. We cannot assume an extrav agant antiquity for man, because by this time the globe would be overrunning with population ; as we cannot as sume an extravagant antiquity even for the material globe,

CREATION. 519

because by this time it would have parted with all its ca loric, and would be stone-cold at the centre. The small num ber of human bones that have been found, compared with the large number of the bones of animals, shows that man was of late origin. Were the earth now to be subjected to earthquake and deluge, human bones would be the most numerous of any in some of the strata that would be opened a thousand years hence. Few fossil human bones have been discovered ; but there are multitudes of animal and vegetable fossils.

Even if the shorter Biblical chronology be adopted, Manetho's Egyptian chronology might possibly be harmonized with it. The following is one explanation of it. Placing the flood 2348 B.C., according to Usher's reckoning, there are 450 years between the flood and the call of Abraham, B.C. 1900. The first twelve dynasties (1-12) of Manetho (280 B.C.) can be placed here, giving 37 years to each dy nasty. This would be the Old empire of Menes and his successors. The pyramids of Gizeh were built in this age. There is, however, great difference of opinion. Mariette Bey makes the Old empire a period of 2,700 years ; Brugsch Bey says 2400 years ; Bnnsen 1076 years (making its beginning B.C. 3059) ; Wilkinson and Poole say 650 years, beginning B.C. 2700. The second period from Abraham to Joseph, B.C. 1900-1637, is that of the Middle empire and the Shepherd kings ; embracing five dynasties of 52 years each (13-17, of Manetho). According to the Bible, Egypt during this period had a settled government. Abraham comes into contact with its king, Pharaoh, for the first time. Gen. 12. Rawlinson (Ancient Egypt, II. 22) regards the Middle empire as beginning about B.C. 1840, and terminat ing about B.C. 1640. The third period, B.C. 1637-1117, includes Egyptian history from Joseph downward, in which the remaining thirteen out of the total thirty dynasties of Manetho may be placed. This is the New empire, com mencing with the eighteenth dynasty (18-30). This period

520 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

includes the ascendancy of Joseph, and of all the Pharaohs mentioned in Scripture, excepting the one contemporary with Abraham. Gen. 12. The 520 years of this period would give forty years to each dynasty.

The alleged great antiquity of Egypt must be found, if at all, in the first period of the Old empire. The data here are in utter obscurity. "For times anterior to 700 B.C., Egypt has no fixed chronology." Kitto : Article Manetho. De Rouge says that " les textes de Manethou sont profondement alteres, et la serie des dates monumentales est tres incomplete." Rawlinson (Ancient Egypt II. 9, 21), says that " the chronological riddle in respect to early Egypt is in soluble. Manetho's general scheme, being so differently re ported, is in reality unknown to us ; its details, being fre quently contradicted by the monuments, are untrustworthy ; and the method of the scheme, the general principles upon which it was constructed, was so faulty, that even if we had it before us in its entirety, we could derive from it no exact or satisfactory chronology."

The repopulation of the globe after the deluge presents no serious difficulty. Population is rapid. According to Malthus, the increase of the means of subsistence is in arithmetical proportion ; that of population is in geomet rical.1 " Every man," says Blackstone (Commentaries, II. xiv,1), " has above one million lineal ancestors, if he reckons back to the twentieth generation." Blackstone's table gives 1,048,576 descendants from a single pair in the twentieth generation, or 660 years, supposing only two children to each pair. But supposing four children to each pair, the twentieth generation would yield 2,097,152 descendants. Petavius, taking only 700 years of the 1,600 between the creation and the deluge, and supposing that 700 years is the average of patriarchal life, and that twenty children are

1 Hume : Populousness of Ancient Nations. Penny Cyclopaedia : Article, Population. Wallace : Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind. Petavius : Computation in Sir Thomas Brown's Pseudodoxia, vi. 6.

CREATION. 521

born to a single pair in eacli century, makes the total prod uct 1,347,368,420. The increase is very great in the last century. The sixth century has 64,000,000, the seventh has twenty times this : viz. 1,347,368,420. But in every generation, this total number of descendants is diminished by death. Supposing, continues Petavius, that Noah and his wife and his three sons and their wives had six children (Gen. 10 mentions sixteen children of Shem, Ham, and Japhet) to each pair, and that this ratio continues, this would give 12,937,284 descendants in fourteen generations of thirty-three years each, or 462 years. But six children is a low estimate, in view of the longevity of man in this period, and the easiness of subsistence in the simplicity of the East, and of early civilization. The United States cen sus shows that in 250 years, the 20,000 Puritans who emi grated from England between 1620 and 1640 have now 13,000,000 descendants.

The objections to the Biblical account of the origin of man drawn from varieties of color and of race are not serious. Climatic influence is very great, especially in a state of bar barism. When man is not protected from the sun and the elements by the appliances of civilization, when he is a sav age, changes go on very rapidly. See Quatrefages : Human Species, VII. " The Portuguese during a 300 years' resi dence in India have become as black as Caffres, yet they form connections among themselves alone, or if they can, with Europeans." Heber : Indian Journal, 53-55. Quar. Rev., vol. XXXVII. 100. See Carpenter: Physiology, XVII.

The argument from languages is strong for the unity of the race. The oldest form of Sanscrit, the Vedic, strik ingly resembles its next neighbors to the westward : the language of the Avesta called the Zend, and that of the Persian inscriptions. The later form of the Sanscrit has less resemblance. Whitney : Oriental Studies, VIII. " The mutual agreement of the Indo-Germanic or Aryan Ian522 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

guages is complete enough to justify the conclusion, that all the nations of this family of languages are only branches of one great nation, which was settled in Upper Asia, and included the ancestors of the Indians, Persians, Greeks, Italicans, Germans, Slaves, and Celts." Curtius : Greece, Li.

The opinions of scientific zoologists favor the recent ori gin of man. " Cuvier does not date the appearance of man farther back than tradition. According to this illustrious zoologist, the history of the human race attests that man has not ruled over the surface of the globe for more than a limited number of years." Pouchet: Universe, 609. "Man," says Quatrefages (Human Species: II. xii. xiii.), "was most certainly in existence during the quaternary period ; has in all probability seen miocene (middle terti ary) times, and, consequently, the entire pliocene (later ter tiary) epoch." As to the question whether man was earlier than this, Quatrefages says it is possible : " Man is a mam mal, and the conditions of existence sufficient for mammals ought to have been sufficient for him. Man is intelligent, and can protect himself against cold. There is nothing then impossible in the idea that he should have survived other species of the same class. But this is a question to be proved by facts. Before we can even suppose it to be so, we must wait for information from observation." pp. 152, 153. " The discoveries of Bourgeois testify, in my opinion, to the existence of a tertiary man. But everything seems to show that, as yet, his representatives were few in number. The quaternary population, on the contrary, were, at least in distribution, quite as numerous as the life of the hunter permitted." p. 177. " Tertiary man is known to us only from a few faint traces of his industry. Of tertiary man himself, we know nothing. Portions of his skeleton have been discovered, it has been thought, in France, Switzer land, and especially in Italy. Closer study has, however, always forced us to refer to a comparatively much later

CREATION. 523

period these human remains, which at first sight, were re garded as tertiary." p. 286. Arcelin makes the age of quaternary clay 6,750 years. Quatrefages thinks this rather too low, and says that the present geological period goes much farther back than seven to eight thousand years, p. 140. " No facts have as yet been discovered which authorize us to place the cradle of the human race other wise than in Asia." p. 178.

The discovery of human bones and implements in situa tions, and connections that seem to imply a great antiquity for man, is not a sufficient reason for rejecting the Biblical account, owing to the uncertainty of the data. Human bones found in juxtaposition with the bones of the cave bear, and the elephant are not conclusive, (a) They may not have been deposited contemporaneously. The action of floods and of violent convulsions, makes it very difficult to say with certainty when deposits were made, or to tell the order in which they occurred. The bear may have laid his bones in the cave hundreds of years before the man laid his, and yet the two now be found side by side. When the bones of extinct animals and stone implements are found together in a gravel bed, who can be certain whether the gravel was deposited upon them, or whether they were deposited upon the gravel, and subsequently mingled and buried under it by earthquakes and inundations. (£) The now extinct animal may not have been extinct four or five thousand years ago. He and early man may have been contemporaneous. The elephant has been found encased in ice in Siberia, during this century. It had long hair, and was adapted to a cold climate. This specimen could not have been many thousands of years old. See Agassiz' Life, pp. 708-710.

Agassiz found in the deep waters of the West Indies " three characteristic genera of sponges from the secondary formation, till now supposed to be extinct." He also caught in his dredge " three specimens of the genus micrestor of

524 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

the cretaceous formation, of which no living species had been previously found."

Antiquity is fabricated for things that are recent. The so-called " lake dwellings " are an instance. Gibbon (Rome, XLIL) relates that the Bulgarians in the time of Justinian, A.D. 525, lived in lacustrine structures. It is probable that no remains of them are earlier than the time of Julius Caesar. Herodotus (Y. in initio) speaks of lake dwellings among a people in Asia Minor, B.C. 450. Rob ert Gray, an English traveller, speaks of seeing them in 1794 on the borders of Lake Wallenstadt. The skeleton discovered at Mentone has all the characteristic marks of the Ligurian Gaul, who was a man of large skeleton, according to Livy's account of the Gauls. Livingstone (Last Journal, 442) says that he never found a single flint arrow-head, or any other flint implement in Africa. No flint exists south of the equator, but quartz might have been used. Iron, he says, was smelted in the remotest ages in Africa. According to this, the iron age was the earliest.

There is great uncertainty in the conclusions drawn from the varieties of implements used by men in past ages. Three kinds have been discovered : (a) Rude stone imple ments ; (b) Finished stone implements ; (c) Bronze and iron implements. Some theorists give this as the natural order. Geikie, however (Ice Age, p. 405), remarks that the difference between the rude flint arrow-heads and axes of the palaeolithic men, and the polished and finely finished tools of the neolithic men, is too great to have no inter mediate. And yet, no intermediate, he says, has been found. But may not the bronze implements be this inter mediate ? In the history of arts, the cutting of gems did not begin until after much skill had been acquired in the use of metals; and the finish of the "elegantly shaped " stone implements is more like that of gem cut ting, than like that of the rude palaeolithic implements.

CREATION. 525

May not the order, consequently be : 1, palaeolithic ; 2, bronze ; 3, neolithic ; instead, as the geologist claims, of : 1, palaeolithic ; 2, neolithic ; 3, bronze. It is difficult to suppose that the polished stone implement could have been made by the rude stone implement. It requires iron tools.

Again, the use of rude stone implements is no proof of the great antiquity of a people. There are tribes of men now on the globe who are using them. Should these tribes become extinct, and their implements be discovered one thousand years hence, it would be a false inference to assert that they belonged to a race that lived before Adam. The stone implement is an index of a particular period in the history of a nation's civilization, rather than of its antiq uity. A nation may be in its barbarous state, and its stone age, at almost any time in the history of the world. " Neobarbarism," says Mahaffy (Greece, p. 16), " means the oc currence in later times of the manners and customs which generally mark very old and primitive times. Some few things of the kind survive everywhere ; thus in the Irish Island of Arran, a group of famous savants mistook a stone donkey-shed of two years' standing for the building of an extinct race of great antiquity. As a matter of fact, the construction had not changed from the oldest type." Says Turner (Anglo-Saxons, I. 10), " we even now, at this late age, see the Esquimau, the wild Indian, the Backsettler, and the cultivated Philadelphian existing at the same time in North America ; so did the Egyptian, the Scythian, and the Greek ; so did high polish and rude barbarism at all times appear in disparted but coeval existence." A contributor to the public press remarks, that " scientific teachers who hold to the succession of stone, bronze and iron ages, in the development of early civilization, have found a peculiarly incorrigible scholar in Dr. Schliemann. From a very careful study of the store of stone and bronze weapons and implements treasured in the pre-historic por526 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

tion of the museum in Leyden, lie has become convinced that the distinction between the different stone, bronze, and iron ages, is purely artificial and imaginary, and concludes that there never was a time, when the earliest inhabitants of Denmark (from whence the proofs were derived), were totally unacquainted with bronze, or used only unpolished, rude stone weapons and implements."

" GOD'S works of providence are his most holy, wise, and powerful, preserving and governing all his creatures, and all their actions." Westminster Larger Catechism, 18. Pres ervation and government are the two functions in the eter nal providence of God. They presuppose creation. 1. Preservation is described in Heb. 1 : 3, as an " upholding." The Son of God " upholds all things by the word of his power." Nothing that is created ex nihilo is self-sustain ing. Consequently it must be sustained in being. It would not require a positive act of omnipotence, antithetic to that exerted in creation from nothing, in order to annihilate created existences. Simple cessation to uphold would re sult in annihilation. For to suppose that matter, for exam ple, could persist in being after the withdrawal of God's preserving power, with such an intensity as to necessitate a direct act of omnipotence to annihilate it, would imply that matter has self-existence, and self-continuance. But this is an attribute that is incommunicable to the creature. This is true of finite mind, as well as of matter. Created spiritual substance is not immortal because it has self -sub sistence imparted to it by the Creator, but because he in tends to uphold and sustain it in being forever. " When we speak of the soul as created naturally immortal, we mean that it is by the divine pleasure created such a substance as not having in itself any composition, or other particles of corruption, will naturally, or of itself, continue forever ; that is, will not by any natural decay, or by any power of

528 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

nature, be dissolved or destroyed ; but yet nevertheless de pends continually upon God, who has power to destroy or annihilate it if he should think fit." Clarke : Letter to Dodwell.

Preservation is more than merely imparting to matter certain properties, and placing it under certain invariable laws. This is the deistical view of providence. God is not immediately present ; nor does he operate directly, but only at a distance. This amounts to communicating selfsubsistence to the creature. God so constitutes the crea tion, that it can continue to exist and move by means of its own inherent properties and laws. But the elements and laws of matter are only another name for matter itself ; another aspect or mode of matter. The deistical theory, consequently, implies that matter, after its creation, is selfsustaining and self-governing. But self-subsistence and self-sustentation are incommunicable properties. They can characterize only the Creator. Neither is preservation the immediate presence and operation of God, as the soul of the world. This is the pantheistic view of providence. According to this theory, God is the informing life, the plastic force in mind and matter. God is the only agent in this case ; as he is the only substance, of which his life is the life. This allows of no secondary substance, and no second causes.

According to the Scriptures, preservation is the immedi ate operation of God as a distinct and different Being, upon, in, and with the creature as a different and distinct being, and always in accordance with the nature of the creature. In the material world, God immediately works in and through material properties and laws. In the mental world, God immediately works in and through the properties and faculties of mind. Preservation never runs counter to crea tion. God does not violate in providence what he has es tablished in creation. The Creator, if we may so say, ad justs and accommodates himself to his creature, in his provPROVIDENCE. 529

idential operation. "Deus," says cardinal Toletus, " concurrit cum causis secnridis juxta ipsarum naturam ; cum liberis libere, cum necessariis necessario, cum debilibus debiliter, cum f ortibus f ortitur, pro sua suavissima dispositione universali operando." The best illustration of the mode in which God operates in providence, is found in the action of the human soul upon the body. The soul is immediately present to, and with the body, yet a different essence from it. The mental force that moves a muscle is not physical, but different in kind from physical force. The soul is not the mere animal vitality which inheres in the muscle, and in the body generally. If it were, it would not be mental force. If the human soul moved the human body, not vol untarily, but in the same way that the vegetable life moves the atoms of the plant, or the animal life moves the mole cules of animal protoplasm, it would be only a plastic and informing force that would die with the plant or the ani mal. It would not be a distinct and different subject, or substance, from the body. The soul as an ego, and a whole, exists in every part of the body, and operates imme diately at every point of the body ; yet as an entity other than the body, and controlling it. It is present at every point where there is bodily sensation, and works at every point where there is bodily motion. So, also, in the instance of God and the created universe, there are two beings of different substance and nature, one of which is immediately present with the other, directly operating in and upon it, upholding and governing. The immediate operation of God in his providence is taught in Acts 17 : 28. " In him we live, and move, and have our being (KOI ecy-tei;)." God preserves (a) The being, that is, the substance, both men tal and material, of the creature ; (5) The inherent proper ties and qualities of the substance, given in creation ; (c) The properties and qualities acquired by use, development, and habit.

This providential agency relates : (a) To physical nature

530 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

generally. Ps. 104 : 14, " He causeth grass to grow ; " Ps. 135 : 5-7, " He causeth vapors to ascend ; " Ps. 147 : 8-15 ; Job 9 : 5-9, " He removeth the mountains, and shaketh the earth out of her place." Acts 14 : 17, " He giveth rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons." (5) To the animal creation. Ps. 104 : 21-29 ; 147 : 9 ; Matt. 6 : 26 ; 10 : 29, « Not a sparrow falleth to the ground without your father." (c) To the events of human history. 1 Chron. 16 : 31 ; Ps. 47 : 7 ; Prov. 21 : 1 ; Job 12 : 23 ; Isa. 10 : 12-15 ; Dan. 2 : 21. (d) To individual life. 1 Sam. 2:6; Ps. 18 : 30 ; Prov. 16 :

9 ; Isa. 45 : 5 ; James 4 : 13-14. (e) To so-called fortuitous events. Ex. 21 : 13 ; Ps. 75 : 6, 7 ; Job 5 : 6, " Trouble doth not spring out of the ground ; " Prov. 16 : 33, " The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord."

"All nature is but art unknown to thee, And chance direction which thou canst not see." — POPE.

(/) To particulars as well as universals. Matt. 10 : 29 ; 10 : 20, " The hairs of your head are all numbered." Universal providence logically implies particular providence, because the universal is composed of particulars and depends upon them more or less. Moreover, in reference to the Infinite being, great and small are alike. The pagan view of provi dence made it universal only. "Magna dii curant, parva negligunt." Cicero : De natura deorum, II. 66. (g) To the free actions of men. Ex. 12 : 36 ; 1 Sam. 24 : 9-15 ; Prov. 16:1; 19 : 21 ; 20 : 24 ; Jer. 10 : 23 ; Phil. 2 : 13. (A) To the sinful actions of men. 2 Sam. 16 : 10 ; 24 : 1 ; Ps. 76 :

10 ; Rom. 11 : 32 ; Acts 4 : 27, 28.

2. The second part of providence is government. This follows from creation and preservation. He who originates a substance or being from nothing, and upholds it, must have absolute control over it. Ps. 103 : 19, "His kingdom ruleth over all." The government of God in the physical universe is administered by means of physical laws. A law

PROVIDENCE. 531

of nature is the manner in which the material elements in variably act and react upon each other, under the present arrangement of Divine providence. The law of gravitation, for example, is the fact that matter, as man now knows it, attracts matter inversely as the square of the distance.

The following particulars are to be noticed in respect to all the laws of nature, in distinction from mental and moral laws, (a) A law of nature is a positive statute ; as much so as the statute of circumcision, or the law of the Sabbath. Physical laws have no a priori necessity. They might have been otherwise than they are, had the Creator of them so determined. God could have originated from nonentity a kind of matter that should have attracted directly as the dis tance, or inversely as the cube of the distance. He might have established the law of chemical affinity upon a differ ent numerical basis from the present. Supposing certain gases to combine with others in the proportion of 1, 3, 5, 7, etc., God might have created instead of them, gases that combine with others in the proportions of 1, 2, 4, 6, etc. This follows from the fact that creation is ex nihilo, and consequently is absolutely untrammelled by any pre-existing substance which necessitates the qualities of the thing created. He who creates matter from non-entity has the most absolute and arbitrary power conceivable, in respect to the properties which matter shall possess. A demiurge who merely moulds an existing v\vj has no such option and freedom as this. He must take the properties of the v\fj into consideration. But a creator is not thus con ditioned. Galileo, in his Dialogues on the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems, says, through Simplicio, " It is not to be denied that the heavens may surpass in bigness the capacity of our imaginations, nor that God might have created them a thousand times larger than they are." Priv ate Life of Galileo, 237. Whewell remarks that " some writers have treated the laws of motion as self-evident, and necessarily flowing from the nature of our conceptions. We

532 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

conceive that this is an erroneous view, and that these laws are known to us to be what they are, by experience only ; that the laws of motion might, so far as we can discover, have been any others." Astronomy and General Physics, II. ii. See ante, p. 29 seq.

(b) It follows from this, that the so-called invariableness of natural laws is relative, not absolute. They are invariable under the present constitution of matter, and arrangement of the material system. Suppose another constitution and arrangement, and they would be different from what they are. And such a supposition is possible, unless we assume that he who creates something from non-entity is limited and conditioned by non-entity. And surely those who can conceive that there may be a world in which two and two do not make five, can conceive of more than one constitution of matter and course of nature.

The government of God in the mental world is adminis tered: (a) Mediately, through the properties and laws of mind, and (&) Immediately, by the direct operation of the Holy Spirit. Moral agents are governed and controlled by all the varieties of moral influence, such as circumstances, motives, instruction, persuasion, and example, and also by the personal efficiency of the Holy Ghost upon the heart and will.

Augustine : City of God, X. viii.-xii. ; XXI. ii.-viii. ; Trinity, III. ii.-ix. Hume : On Miracles. Campbell : Eeply to Hume. Conybeare : On Miracles. Mozley : On Miracles. Neander : Life of Christ, Book IV. Trench : The Gospel Miracles. Channing : Evidences of Eevealed Eeligion. Christlieb : Modern Doubt, Lect ure V. Fisher : Theistic Belief, IV.-VI. Twesten : Dogmatik, § 24. Shedd: History of Doctrine, I. 164 sq. Dorner: Christian Doc trine, % 53-56. Steinrneyer : Miracles of Christ. Penny Cyclo paedia : Art. Miracles. Bruce : Miraculous Element in the Gos pels. Miiller: Sin, IV. iii., iv. Nitzsch: Dogmatics, 107.

THE government of God is occasionally administered by means of miracles. The miracle is an extraordinary act of God. It does not differ from the ordinary course of nature, because it requires a greater exertion of Divine power, but because it requires a different exertion of it. To cause the sun to rise, and to cause Lazarus to rise, both alike demand omnipotence ; but the manner in which omnipotence works in one instance is unlike the manner in the other. The possibility of the miracle rests upon the fact mentioned in the Westminster Confession (Y. iii.), that " the Creator is free to work without means, above means, and against means, at his pleasure."

Whenever the ordinary method by natural means is in adequate to accomplish the Divine purpose in the govern ment of the universe, or any part of it, God employs the extraordinary method by miracle. The rule which Horace

534 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

lays down for introducing the supernatural into poetry, ap plies to its introduction into theology :

" Nee dens intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus Incident."

The miracle occurs only when there is an occasion requir ing it. When, for example, it became necessary, on account of its great wickedness, to destroy the world of mankind more suddenly and swiftly than was possible by natural causes, God miraculously opened the fountains of the great deep, and the flood destroyed them all. The miraculous judgments recorded in the Old Testament were sent for the purpose of controlling, and "governing human creatures, and all their actions." The birth of Jesus Christ, the promised Redeemer of man, a God-man, was impossible by the method of ordinary generation ; hence, the miraculous conception. In the future history of the world, certain events are to be brought about miraculously, because they cannot be by ordinary physical laws. The resurrection of the bodies of all men is one of them. The sudden dissolu tion and reconstruction of this material world at the end of the redemptive economy (1 Cor. 15 : 24 ; Matt. 25 : 31-46), cannot be effected by the present slow and gradual opera tion of natural laws. There must, therefore, be a miracu lous interference similar to that by which the world was first created, and by which it was whelmed in the waters of the deluge.

The miracle, consequently, is to be expected under the government of an intelligent and wise God. Says Channing (Evidences of Kevealed Religion), " To a man whose belief in God is strong and practical, a miracle will appear as possible as any other effect, as the most common event in life ; and the argument against miracles drawn from the uniformity of nature will weigh with him, only as far as this uniformity is a pledge and proof of the Creator's dispo sition to accomplish his purposes by a fixed order, or mode

MIRACLES. 535

of operation. Now it is freely granted, that the Creator's regard or attachment to such an order may be inferred from the steadiness with which he observes it ; and a strong pre sumption lies against any violation of it on slight occasions, or for purposes to which the established laws of nature are adequate. But this is the utmost which the order of nature authorizes us to infer, respecting its Author. It forms no presumption against miracles universally, in all imaginable cases ; but may even furnish a presumption in their favor. We are never to forget that God's adherence to the order of the universe is not necessary and mechanical, but intelli gent and voluntary. He adheres to it, not for its own sake, or because it has a sacredness which compels him to respect it, but because it is most suited to accomplish his purposes. It is a means, and not an end ; and like all other means must give way when the end can best be promoted without it. It is the mark of a weak mind to make an idol of order and method ; to cling to established forms of business when they clog, instead of advancing it. If, then, the great pur poses of the universe can best be accomplished by departing from its established laws, these laws will undoubtedly be suspended ; and though broken in the letter, they will be observed in their spirit, for the ends for which they were first instituted will be advanced by their suspension."

Miracles are not unnatural events ; they are natural to God. The miracles of Christ wear no appearance of magic and artifice, like the tricks of a juggler. They are not whimsical and extravagant, like the miracles attributed to him in the apocryphal gospels ; or like the ecclesiastical miracles of the Papal church. " A miracle," says Feltham (Resolves, xxxiii.), " when God pleases, is as easy to him as a natural cause. For it was at first by miracle, that even that cause was natural. And all the miracles that we have heard of in the world are less a miracle than the world it self." Says Kichter, " Miracles upon earth are nature in heaven."

536 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

Miracles are natural to a personal deity, but unnatural and impossible to an impersonal. All the arguments against them by Spinoza, Baur, and Strauss proceed upon the pan theistic assumption that the Infinite is impersonal, and that everything occurs through the operation of an im personal system of natural law. But if the existence of a personal Infinite is conceded, it would be strange and un natural, if there were never any extraordinary exertion of his omnipotence. Miracles are tokens of a Person who can modify his plans, and make new arrangements in space and time. They are the natural accompaniments of personality and free will. If a human person should never by the ex ercise of will enter upon a new course of action, but should pursue through his whole existence one unvarying tenor like an animal led by instinct, or a machine propelled me chanically, we should doubt his personality. He would come under the suspicion of being only a brute or a ma chine.

Miracles, as Paley argues, are to be expected in connec-1 tion with a revelation from God. " Mr. Hume states the case of miracles to be a contest of opposite improbabilities ; that is to say, a question whether it be more improbable that the miracle should be true, or the testimony false. But in describing the improbability of miracles, he sup presses all those circumstances of extenuation [favoring cir cumstances] which result from our knowledge of the exist ence, power, and disposition of the Deity. As Mr. Hume has represented the question, miracles are alike incredible to him who is previously assured of the constant agency of a Divine Being, and to him who believes that no such Being exists. This, surely, cannot be a correct statement." Paley : Evidences (Preface).

The laws of nature are being continually modified in their action, by the interference of the human will. A stone falls to the ground in a perpendicular line by the operation of gravity. Taking this material force, only, into

MIRACLES. 537

view, there is and can be no variation from this. But a stone can be made to fall in a curve, by human volition. In this case, there is still the operation of the force of grav ity, but with this an accompanying voluntary force that de flects the stone from the perpendicular. If there were only a single solitary instance of such an alteration of nat ure by will, it would be regarded as supernatural.

The laws of nature are also being continually modified in their action, by the intervention of the Divine will. The striking differences in the seasons are examples. This win ter of 1885 is remarkably different from that of 1884. But there is the same system of nature and of natural laws, and these in themselves considered, apart from any influence of a personal will, are invariable in their operation. On the hypothesis that there is no Creator and no God, one physi cal year should be &fac-simile of another. Why this dif ference between two winters, unless an element of personal will be combined with that of impersonal laws ? Physical properties and laws, in themselves, are invariable in their operation. The occasional variety, therefore, that is wit nessed in the general uniformity of natural phenomena, implies Divine volition modifying the general system.

Consider, as another example of the modifying influence of the Divine will upon natural properties and laws, the difference in the longevity of individuals. A person of feeble constitution lives to old age ; one with a vigorous constitution dies in early manhood. If nothing but physi cal properties and laws determines the event, the former person must necessarily die before the latter. But if the personal will of the Author of nature can modify the action of nature, then the former may outlive the latter. The race will not be to the swift, nor the battle to the strong.

Physical nature is full of examples that go to prove the presence of a personal will, in impersonal nature and mat ter. Cut off a snail's head, and it will grow out again ; but cut off a crab's head, and it will not grow out again. Cut

538 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

off a crab's claw, and it will grow out again ; cut off a dog's leg, and it will not grow out again. Koget : Physiology, II. 587. Why this difference in the operation of the very same properties and laws of animal substance ? The prop erties and laws themselves will not account for it. The modifying power of a will above them explains it. Mole cules of matter in atmospheric air are very elastic. If press ure is removed, they recede from each other indefinitely. Air in an air-pump becomes extremely rarefied. Molecules of matter in a fluid are less elastic. If pressure is removed, they recede from each other, but much less than in the case of air, or a gas. Molecules of matter in a solid are still less elastic than those of a fluid. The removal of pressure makes very little change. lierschel : Preliminary Discourse, §§ 239-243. Why should molecules of matter have these different degrees of elasticity, but from the will which created them from nothing ?

The reality of miracles implies the superiority of mind to matter. The denial of a power above material laws and phenomena is materialism. It is equivalent to asserting that matter controls mind. He who denies the supernatu ral, affirms that nature and matter are the ultimate basis of the universe. The conflict consequently between the be liever and the disbeliever, is a conflict between the spiritual and the material, the intellectual and the sensual. It is therefore a conflict between civilization and barbarism.

The position of the materialist is, that matter moves mind, and that material motion explains mental phenomena. This is incompatible with the miracle. The position of the spiritualist is, that mind moves matter, and that mental motion, or volition, explains material phenomena. This is compatible with the miracle. That the latter position is the truth, is proved by the following facts : 1. Thinking tires the body ; but digging does not tire the mind. 2. Feeling in the mind causes the molecular change in the brain, not vice versa. Shame causes the blush, not the

MIRACLES. 539

blush shame. 3. The human tear in its purely physical or healthy state is insipid ; in its morbid state, as affected by grief, is salt, pungent, and corrosive. 4. The saliva when affected by gluttonous appetite, that is, by a mental desire, is greatly increased in quantity, compared with the secre tion from mere hunger. 5. Teasing bees in a hive gener ates heat in the swarm. Kirby and Spence : Entomology, II. 214. Bees have adaptive intelligence, and the irritation of this affects their material organism.

The assertion that the miracle is impossible proceeds upon the hypothesis, that nothing can happen but what is now happening. The present is the norm for all the past, and all the future. The local is the rule for universal space. The skeptic assumes that the phenomena which he now wit nesses are the only phenomena that are possible. This im plies that his experience is the only criterion. It not only makes man the measure of all things, but a class of men. For the experience of even a great majority of mankind, does not constitute universal experience. There is nothing in the structure of the human intellect that supports this assumption. On the contrary, the mind repels the propo sition, that the experience of certain generations of men is an infallible index of all that is possible in all time, and throughout the vast universe of being. " All reason ing from analogy or similitude, is from the habitual asso ciation of ideas, and consequently can amount to no more than this : That the thing appears so to us, because it always has appeared so, and we know of no instance to the contrary. I have seen the sun set to-night, and con clude that it will rise again to-morrow ; because my own experience and the tradition received from others have taught me to associate the idea of its rising again, after a certain number of hours, with that of its setting; and habit has rendered these ideas inseparable. But, never theless, I can give no demonstrative reason from the nat ure of things why it should rise again ; or why the Creator

54:0 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

and Governor of the universe may not launch it, as a comet, to wander forever through the boundless vacuity of space. I only know that during the short period, and within the narrow sphere, which bound my knowledge of this universe, he hath displayed no such irregular exertions of power : but still that period, and that sphere, shrink into nothing in the scale of eternity and infinity ; and what can man know of the laws of God or nature, that can en able him to prescribe rules for Omnipotence ? " Knight : On Taste, II. iii.

The miracle is a suspension of a law of nature, in a par ticular instance. Hume defines the miracle to be " a viola tion of the laws of nature ; " "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the deity." Essay on Miracles, Pt. I. This is incorrect. When our Lord raised Lazarus from the dead, he merely suspended in that par ticular instance, and in that only, the operation of the chemical action by which putrefaction goes on. He did not violate the law. This would have required that lie should cause the saute chemical action that was putrefying the flesh, to stop the putrefaction. Christ in working this miracle did not undo, or revolutionize any law of nature. The general course of nature was undisturbed. Another corpse lying beside that of Lazarus, like all the other corpses in the world, would have continued to putrefy by chemical decomposition.

But the mere suspension of a law of nature in a particular instance, is not sufficient to account for the miracle. Christ, by virtue of the control which he had over natural law, might have arrested the process of decomposition, and yet Lazarus would not have come forth from the tomb, any more than he would if he had been embalmed or petrified. Over and above this power to suspend existing natural laws, there must have been the exertion of a positively reanimating power. Christ must have been able to create or originate physical life itself. Lazarus was made alive from the dead,

MIRACLES. 541

by the exertion of an energy of the same kind by which the first man was made on the sixth day ; that is, by the operation of mere mind itself, apart from matter and its laws.

The explanation that a miracle is the effect of an unknown law of nature, higher than the ordinary law, is untenable, because: (a) It supposes two systems of nature that are contrary to each other. If the iron axe of Elijah's pupil was made to swim, not by the suspension of the law of gravity in that instance, but by the operation of another natural law, it is plain, that this latter law is exactly con trary to the law of gravity. But this would imply two sys tems of nature ; one in which gravity of matter is the law, and one in which levity of matter is the law. This destroys the unity of the material universe. (I) The miracle could not be accounted for upon this theory, except by supposing that one of these two systems of nature is superior to the other. If the two systems were equal in force, the result of their collision would be an equilibrium, and nothing would occur. But if one is superior to the other, the latter must be overcome and disappear. The higher system would annihilate the lower, and finally all nature would become mi raculous (so-called). If it be said that the two systems are kept apart, and do not come into collision ; that each system is a distinct circle, having its own centre ; then it is impos sible that a miracle could happen at all. Every tiling in the circle where gravity is the natural law must occur according ly. The iron must sink in every instance. And everything in the circle when a force contrary to gravity prevails must occur accordingly. The iron must swim in every instance. If it be said, that there is no system or circle where such a higher natural law prevails, but that this force is originated in each instance for the particular purpose of working a miracle, there are these objections : First, it is improper to denominate a few exceptional instances a " law." Secondly, it is unnatural to suppose that the Creator would call a new

54:2 THEOLOGY (DOCTBINE OF GOD).

material force into being, to bring about what he might ac complish by the simple suspension of an existing force, and by the exertion of a single volition of his own. (c) A mira cle, by the very definition, must be exceptional, solitary, and sporadic. It is the effect of a single volition. Miracles are disconnected from one another. They do not evolve out of each other, but are wrought, one at a time. Consequently, a miracle cannot occur by a law ; because this implies a connected series, and an endless series so long as the law re mains in existence. Miracles would be as numerous and constant, if there were a law of miracles, as the phenomena of gravitation. When God made the hand of Moses leprous (Ex. 4: : 6, 7), he did it by an omnipotent volition. This, from the human point of view, was a single separate act of the Divine will. And when he healed the leprosy, this was a second volition. Neither miracle was effected by a force operating continuously like a law of nature.

The argument of Hume against the credibility of miracles begins with asserting, that a miracle " contradicts uniform experience." This is begging the point. The question be tween the disputants is this : Does the miracle contradict the uniform experience of mankind ? By the word " uniform," Hume must mean " universal ; " otherwise his argument would fail. A single experience of a miracle would be as good as a thousand, in logical respects. Mill so understood his use of the term. He states it thus : " Whatever ia con trary to a complete induction is incredible." But a complete induction would embrace all the particular facts. If one were omitted, it would be incomplete. " Uniform experience," consequently, would involve an experience covering all the phenomena upon earth from the beginning of human his tory. It must be more than the experience of the majority of men. It must include that of the minority. In this case as in politics, the minority have rights which the ma jority are bound to respect. The miracle cannot be decided by a majority vote. That a miracle contradicts the expeMIRACLES. 543

rience of all men in the eighteenth century, is not suffi cient to prove that it contradicted the experience of all men in the first century. The induction of particulars must be absolutely complete, in order to evince incredibility. It is not enough to show merely that the miracle contradicts the experience of the disbeliever and of his contempora ries.

There is nothing in physical science that justifies the position, that there never has been and never will be a miraculous event in all space and all time, because there is nothing in physical science to prove the necessary and eternal immutability of nature. That things have been as they are for a million of years, does not prove that they will be the same for a billion of years, and forevermore. All that physics teaches, is, that there is nothing in nature and natu ral forces that can work a miracle. This, the theologian is as ready to say as any one. But by what right is it inferred, that because in matter and nature there is no power able to raise the dead, there is no power anywhere ? Physics has examined only physical nature. It may affirm with ref erence to this, but not beyond this. And to deny that there is anything beyond this is begging the question. To infer respecting the supernatural power of God and the probabil ity of its exercise, from the experience of only a portion of mankind — even though it be the greater portion thus far — is unwarranted. In the future, the experience of the greater part of mankind, or of the entire whole, may be reversed, for all that the objector knows. It is a general law, that substances contract by cold. Water contracts by cold down to 39° Fahrenheit ; at which point it begins to expand, and and on reaching 32° it freezes — which is a great expansion. This law is reversed, Hume might say "violated," at 39°. Suppose that the whole human race had never been in a climate below 40°, and had known nothing of a chemistry by which artificial cold can be produced. If they should infer a so-called necessary law of nature from "experi544 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

ence," in this instance, as Hume has in that of miracles, they would assert it to be impossible that water should ex pand by cold. And the testimony of fifty witnesses living eighteen centuries before Hume's day and generation, to the effect that they had seen the law of contraction by cold actually reversed, would be liable to the same species of ob jection as that which now seeks to invalidate the testimony of the twelve apostles and others, that a man was raised from the dead eighteen centuries ago. It might be said that the fifty witnesses of the expansion of a substance by cold were more likely to be deceived, than that a phenom enon so contrary to the present universal experience of mankind should have occurred. Locke (Understanding, IY. xv.) relates that " a Dutch ambassador entertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland which he was inquisitive after, amongst other things told him that the water in his country would sometimes in cold weather be so hard that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant if he were there ; to which the king replied, ' Hitherto, I have believed the strange things you have told me, because I look upon you as a sober, fair man, but now I am sure you lie.' ):

Hume concedes the possibility, that is, the conceivability of a miracle. Inquiry, IY. " The contrary of every mat ter of fact, is still possible." But he denies the demonstrability of a miracle. In order to establish this denial, he defines a miracle so as to exclude all testimony to it. His definition of a miracle is, that it is an event that never has been seen by an eye-witness. His language is as follows : " It is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life, be cause that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be an uniform [invariable] experi ence against any miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation." Inquiry, Section X. That is to say, if an event was once an object of the senses, this takes it out of the category of the miraculous ; for a

MIRACLES. 545

miracle, by the definition, is something that " never has been observed," never was the object of the senses. It is impossible, consequently, to prove a miracle ; for the proof of the miracle would be the destruction of the miracle. If the event was seen, it was not miraculous. The sophism in this argument of Hume is so patent, that it is strange that is should have acquired so much reputation as it has. The point in dispute, namely, whether a miracle has ever been an object of the senses, is settled in favor of the skeptic, by this definition of a miracle.

There are two observations to be made respecting Hume's position that a miracle is possible, but undemonstrable. 1. The admission that a miracle is possible amounts to noth ing, if a miracle is incapable of being proved. A thing that is possible, but indemonstrable, is practically equiva lent to an impossibility. 2. It is logically inconsistent, to assert the possibility and deny the demon strability of an event. Anything that is conceivably possible is conceiv ably demonstrable. If there is nothing in the nature of an event to prevent our conceiving that it might happen, there is nothing in its nature to prevent our conceiving that it might be observed to happen. If there be no absurdity in supposing that an event might occur, there is certainly none in supposing that it has occurred ; and if it has oc curred, there is no absurdity in supposing that it has been seen.

The miracle is a part of a great whole which is super natural : namely, the person of the Redeemer, and the work of redemption. If there is no incarnation, and no redemp tion, there is no need of the miracle. But if there is, then the miracle is necessary and natural. Hence the person of Christ, his incarnation and resurrection, is the real battle ground. The Old Testament miracles are connected with the Jehovah- Angel, or the redeeming God. Those of the New Testament are connected with the Jehovah-Logos, or Jesus Christ. Here is the point from which both faith and

94K'7.t

546 THEOLOGY (DOCTRINE OF GOD).

unbelief take their departure. He who believes that God incarnate has appeared on earth to save man from sin, will have no difficulty with the miracle. He who disbelieves this, cannot accept it. It is the first step that costs. If the human mind does not stumble over that Divine-human Per son who is " set for the fall and rising again of many," it will not stumble over the supernaturalisin that is naturally associated with Him.

creates animals, he ad6 ANTHROPOLOGY.

dresses the inanimate world : " Let the waters bring fortli the moving creature," Gen. 1 : 20 ; " Let the earth bring forth the living creature," Gen. 1 : 24. The " sonl of life " in the instance of the animal is only the animal soul, whicli is physical and material in its nature, and perishes with the body of which it is the vital principle. The " sonl of life " in the instance of the man is a higher principle, the rational soul, which was imbreathed by the Creator, and made in his image. Hence it is said, in Eccl. 3 : 21, that " the spirit (~^~) of man goeth upward," and " the spirit (nn"]) of the beast goeth downward to the earth."

Three theories have been formed of the mode of man's creation : 1. Pre-existence. 2. Traducianism. 3. Creationism.

Pre-existence teaches that all human souls were created in the beginning of creation, and before the creation of Adam. Each individual human soul existed in an antemundane state, and is united with a human body by ordinary generation. This theory found some snpport in Plato's speculations respectiMg intuitive knowledge as the relics of a pre-existent state of the soul. Some of the Jewish Rabbinical schools adopted it, and Origen endeavored, luisuccessfully, to give it currency in the Christian church. Miiller, in his work on Sin, has revived it in a modified form. lie assumes, not an ante-temporal but a supra-temporal state, in which the soul existed and the origin of sin occurred. The fall of man was not in a time before time, but is timeless. This is virtually the same as Kant's conception of sin as a noumenon, or thing in itself, which is always timeless and spaceless, in distinction from a phenomenon, which always occurs in space and time. Philippi (Glaubenslehre, IIL 9G) contends that Miiller's view is virtually that of preexistence. The propagation of the body still leaves the ego pre-existent.

Pre-existence confines the idea of species to the body. As this is propagated, it is derived out of a common physiAlAN'S CREATION. 7

cal nature. The body, conseqnenth', cannot be older than that pliysical human nature which was created on the sixtli day. The spirit, on the other hand, was created prior to the sixth day. The human spirit is purely individual, like that of an angel.

Traducianism applies the idea of species to both body and soul. Upon the sixth day, God created two human individuals, one male and one female, and in them also created the specific psychico-physical nature from which all the subsequent individuals of the human family are procreated both psychically and physically. Hase (Hutterus KedivivuSj § 79) represents this theory as having been adopted by Tertullian, Augustine, and the elder Protestant divines, in the interest of the stricter theory of original sin. Hagenbach (§ 55, 106) says that Tertullian was an earnest advocate of traducianism ; that Augustine and Gregory the Great express themselves doubtfully and " with reserve respecting creationism ; " and that " traducianism was professed not only by heterodox writers like Apollinaris, but by some orthodox theologians like Gregory of jS'yssa." The writer in the Middle ages who maintains traducianism with nnost decision is Odo, bishop of Cambray. His treatise upon Original Sin has received little attention even from the historians of doctrine, though it is marked by great profundity and acumen.

Neander (I. 615) describes the traducianism of Tertullian in the following terms: "It was his opinion, that our first parent bore within him the undeveloped germ of all mankind ; that the soul of the first man was the fountain liead of all human souls, and that all varieties of individual human nature are but different modifications of that one spiritual substance. Hence the whole nature became corrupted in the original father of the race, and sinfulness is propagated at the same time with souls. Although this mode of apprehending the matter, in Tertullian, is connected with his sensuous habits of conception, yet this is by no means a

8 ANTHROPOLOGY.

necessary connection." This last remark of Neander is important. Bellanuine claims Augustine as a creationist. Melanchtiion and Klee reckon him among traducianists. Gangauf says that he was undecided. Delitzsch (Biblical Psychology, § vii.) asserts that he was wrestling Math the subject all his life. Luther, according to Delitzsch, was at first inclined to traducianism, being urged by Bugenhagen, but afterwards distinguished the creation and infusion of the soul into the body as the second conception, from the first bodily conception. Smith (Tlieology, 168) asserts that " traducianism, on the whole, has been the most widely spread theory."

Turrettin (Institutio, IX. xii. G) remarks as follows respecting the traducian view. " Some are of opinion that the difiiculties pertaining to the propagation of original sin are best resolved by the doctrine of the propagation of the soul (animae traducem) ; a view held by not a few of the Fathers, and to which Augustine frequently seems to incline. And there is no doubt that by this theory all the difficulty seems to be removed ; but since it does not accord with scripture or with sound reason, and is exposed to great difficulties, we do not think that recourse should be had to it."

Maresius (De Marets), a Calvinistic theologian whose opinions had great weight, speaks as follows respecting traducianism. " Although Augustine seems sometimes to have been undecided (fluctuasse aliquando) respecting the origin of the soul ; whether it is by immediate creation or by propagation ; he is fixed in the opinion that original sin cannot be transmitted otherwise than by propagation. And he is far more inclined (longe pronior) to the last mentioned doctrine, nay, to speak truly, he constantly held it (constanter retinuit), in order to save the justice of God ; because it is difficult to show the justice of infusing a soul newly created, and destitute of sin, and having no guilt of its own, into a vitiated body, by whose concupiscence and

MAN'S CREATION". 9

lust it is stained and burdened, is exposed to many and great evils in this lite, and condemned to everlasting punishment liereafter. Augustine, Epist. 28, 137 ; De anima ; and Jansenius, De statu naturae, I. 15. This was the opinion of Apollinaris, and of nearly all the western divines in Jerome's day ; and is defended by Marnixins, Sohnius, and Combachius, truly great divines of our communion ; to which, if this were the place to lay down the statements, I should not be much disinclined (valde alienus)." Maresius : Tlieologia Elenctica, Controversia XL

Charnocke (Discourse I.), after remarking that wisdom and folly, virtue and vice, and other accidents of the soul, are not propagated, adds : " I do not dispute whether the soul were generated or not. Suppose the substance of it was generated by the parents, yet those more excellent qualities were not the result of them," i.e., of the parents. Hooker (Eccl. Pol., II. vii.), also, speaks doubtfully. " Of some things, we may very well retain an opinion that they are probable, and not unlikely to be true, as when we hold that men have their souls rather by creation, than propagation."

Creation ism confines the idea of species to the body. In this respect, it agrees with the theory of pre-existence ; the difference relating only to the time when the soul is created. Creationism and pre-existence both alike maintain that the human soul is individual only, and never had a race-existence in Adam. The creationist holds that God on the sixth day created two human individuals, one male and one female, and in them also created the specific physical nature from which the bodies of all the subsequent individuals were proci-eated ; the soul in each instance being a new creation ex niliilo, and infused into the propagated body.

Hase (Ilutterus Redivivus, 79) represents this view as having been favored by Aristotle, and adopted by Ambrose^ Jerome, Pelagius, Bellarmine, and Calixtus. Hagenbach (§ 106) mentions as advocates of creationism, Lactantius,

10 ANTHROPOLOGY.

Hilary, and Jerome, and remarks (§ 173) that this theory gained gradually upon traducianism in the middle ages, John of Damascus, Anselm, and Aquinas were creationists. Heppe (Reformirte Dogmatik, XII.) says that the Lutheran theologians almost without exception adopted traducianism, while the Reformed divines with very few exceptions maintained creationism. Creationism has been the most common view during the last two centuries.

The choice must be made between traducianism and creationism, since the opinion that man as to his soul existed before Adam has no support from revelation. The Bible plainly teaches that Adam was the first man ; and that all finite spirits existing before him were angels.

The question between the traducianist and the creationist is this : Wlien God created the first two human individuals, Adam and Eve, did he create in and with them the invisible substance of all the succeeding generations of men, both as to the soul and body, or only as to the body ? Was the human nature that was created in Adam and Eve simple, or complex ? Was it physical solely, or was it psychicophysical 1 Had the human nature in the first pair two sides, or only one ? Was provision made for propagating out of the specific nature deposited in Adam, individuals who would be a union of body and soul, or only a mere body without a soul ? '

The question, consequently, between the parties involves the quantity of being that was created on the sixth day, when God is said to have created '' man." The traducianist asserts that the entire invisible substance of all the generations of mankind was originated ex nihilo, by that single act of God mentioned in Gen. 1 : 27, by which he created

> Augustine describes man as the union of spiritual and corporeal substance. "Persona hominis mixtura est animae et corporis, duarum rerum commixtio ; tinius incorporeae, et alterius c orporeae ; nam si aniraa in sua natura non fallatur, incorpoream se esse comprehendit." Ep. lo7, Ad Volusianum. "Quicquid enim corpus non est, et tamen aliquid est, jam recte spiritus dicitur." De Genesi ad literam, XII. vil 10. Compare Gangauf : Aug. Psychologie, 101.

MAN'S CREATION. 11

" man male and female.'' The creationist asserts that only a part of the invisible substance of all the generations of mankind was created by that act : namely, that of their bodies; the invisible substance which constitutes their souls beingcreated subsequently, by as many distinct and separate creative acts as there are individual souls.

Traducianism and ci-eationism agree with each other in respect to the most difficult point in the problem : namelv, a kind of existence that is pi'ior to the individual existence. The creationist concedes that human history does not start with the birth of the individual man. He does not attempt to explain original sin with no reference to Adam. He maintains that the body and physical life of the iudividual is not a creation ex nihilo in each instance, but is derived from a common physical nature that was originated on the sixth day. In so doing, the creationist concedes existence in Adam, quoad hoc. But this racemode of human existence, which is prior to the individual mode, is the priucipal difficulty in the problem, and in conceding its reality as to the body, the creationist carries a common burden with the traducianist. For it is as difficult to think of an invisible existence of the human body in Adam, as to think of an invisible existence of the human soul in him. In reality, it is even more difficult ; because the body of an individual man, as we now know it, is visible and tangible, while his soul is not. And an invisible and intangible existence in Adam is more conceivable than a visible and tangible.

In discussing either traducianism or creationism, it is important to define the idea of " substance." The term, in this connection, does not imply either extension or figure. It is taken in its etymological and metaphysical sense, to denote that entity which stands tender phenomena, and is the base for them. As in theology, the Divine " substance 'or nature is unextended and formless, yet a real entity, so in anthropology, the human "substance" or nature is with12 ANTHROPOLOGY.

out extension and figure, jet is a certain amount of real being with definite and distinguishable properties. Shedd : Theological Essays, 135-137.

So far as the mental or psychical side of the human nature is concerned, when it is said that the " substance " of all individual souls was created in Adam, of course nothing extended and visible is implied. The substance in this case is a spiritual, rational, and immortal essence, similar to the nnextended essence of God, in whose image it M-as made ex nihilo. And so far as the physical and corporeal side of man is concerned, the notion of " substance" must be determined in the same manner. That which stands under, that which is the suhstans of the corporeal form and phenomena, is an invisible principle that has no one of the geometrical dimensions. Physical life, or the animal soul, though not spiritual and immortal like the rational soul, is nevertheless beyond the reach of the five senses. It occupies no space ; it is not divisible by any material instruments ; it cannot be examined by the microscope. In speaking therefore of the primary created " substance " of the liuman body, we must abstract from the notion everything that implies figure and extension of parts. "The things which are seen %vere not made of things which do appear," Ileb. 11 : 3. The visible body is constituted, and built up by an invisible vitality. Neither the cell, nor protoplasm, nor the "aether ".of Cams (Physiologic, I. 13), nor any visible whatever, can be regarded as the suhstans of the body ; as the vital principle in its primordial mode. These are all of them extended, and objects of sensuous perception. They are the first form, in which the primarily formless physical life embodies itself. They each presuppose life as an invisible. In thinkinir, therefore, of the " substance" of all individual bodies as having been created in Adam, M-e must not with Tertullian and others think of microscopic atoms, corpuscles, or protoplasm ; but only of the unseen principle of life itself, of which these are the first visible organization. Modern

MAN'S CREATION. 13

physiology (Haeckel: Creation, 1. 297) describes the human egg as y^y- part of an inch in diameter, so that in a sti-ong light it can just be perceived as a small speck, by the naked eye. This egg is a small globular bladder which contains all the constituent parts of a simple oi'ganic cell. These parts are : (a) The mucous cell-substance or protoplasm, called the ''yolk;" (5) The nucleus or cell-kernel, called the "germinal vesicle," which is surrounded by the yolk. This nucleus is a clear glassy globule of albumen about -^^-^ pai-t of an inch in dian)eter ; (c) The nucleolus, the kernel speck or " germinal spot." This is enclosed and surrounded by the nucleus, and is the last phase of visible life under the present microscope. But this nucleolus is not the invisible life itself in its first phase, as immediately created ex nihilo. This " germinal spot " is only the first hardening, as it were, of the invisible into visibility. It is life in this form / whereas, in the beginning, as created in Adam, physical life was formless and invisible.

Before entering upon the discussion of the two theories of traducianism and creationism, we observe that there are several ways of handling the doctrine of original sin, or sin as related to Adam.

1. It may be held simply as a revealed fact, without any attempt at explanation. The theologian contents himself with affirming that Scripture teaches that all men were created holy in Adam, had an advantageous probation in Adam, sinned freely in Adam, aiid are justly exposed to physical and spiritual death upon these three grounds, and declines to construct any explanatory theory. In this case, he treats the doctrine of original sin as he does that of the creation of the universe. " Through faith he understands that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that the things which are seen were not made of things which do appear," Heb. 11 : 3. Similarly, througli faith he understands that " death passed upon all men because all sinned," Eom, 5 : 12 ; that " by one offence, judgment came upon all men to condemna14: ANTHROPOLOGY.

tion," Rom. 5-18 ; and that "in Adam all die," 1 Cor. 15 : 22 ; and formulates this in the statement that " all mankind descending from Adam by ordinary generation sinned in him, and fell with him, in the first transgression," L. C. 22. But as he does not undertake to explain creation ex nihilo, neither does he undertake to explain the fall in Adam. He accepts the fact of revelation, in each case. He has reason to believe that the docti-ine of the fall in Adam is truth, not error : first, because God would not reveal error ; secondly, because God has made an infinite self-sacrifice in order to deliver man from the guilt and pollution of original sin : a thing he would not have done, if he knows that it is not really and truly sin.

2. The doctrine may be held as a revealed fact, and an explanation attempted by the theory of natural or substantial union with Adam. In this case, Adam and his posterity existed together, and sinned together, as a unity. The posterity were not vicariously represented in the first sin, because representation implies the absence of the party represented ; but they sinned the first sin being seminally existent and present ; and this first sin is deservedly imputed to them, because in this generic manner it was committed by them. The guilt of the first sin, both as culpability (culpa) and obligation to the penalty of eternal death (reatus poenae), is chargeable upon Adam and his posterity upon the common principle that sin is chargeable upon the actor and author of it. The imputation of Adam's sin, upon this theory, differs from the imputation of Christ's righteousness, in being deserved, not undeserved or gratuitous.

3. The doctrine may be held as a fact of revelation, and an explanation of it attempted by the theory of representative OY forensic union with Adam. In this case, Adam as an individual, distinct from Eve, and distinct from his posterity whom in respect to the soul he did not seminally include, sinned representatively and vicariously for his non-existent and absent posterity. As their vicar and representative, he

MAN'S CREATION. 15

disobeyed the Eden statute in their room and place, precisely as Christ obeyed the moral law, in respect to both precept and penalty, as the vicar and representative of his people. The sin of Adam, consequentlj-, is imputed to his posterity in the very same way that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to the believer — namely, undeservedly or gratuitously. The posterity are not guilty in the sense of being inherently and personally ill deserving on account of Adam's sin, just as the believer is not righteous in the sense of being inherently and personally deserving on account of Christ's obedience. As in the latter instance, only the consequences witliout the inherent merit of Christ's obedience : namely, freedom from the obligation to suffer the penalty of eternal death, and a title to eternal life, inure to the believer, so in the former instance, only the consequences of Adam's disobedience without the inherent demerit : namely, the obligation to suffer the penalty of eternal death, and forfeiture of a title to eternal life, inure to his posterity. On this theory, Adam's sin itself^ as a disobedient and rebellious act causative of the penalty of eternal deatli, is not imputed to the posterity, because it was not committed by them. Only its penal consequences are imputed. Adam's act is separated from its effect, namely, the penalty : the former not being chargeable to the posterity ; the latter being imputed to and inflicted upon them. The posterity suffer the punitive evil produced by Adam's sin, but are not inherently and personally guilty of this sin itself.

4. The doctrine may be held as a fact of revelation, and an explanation of it attempted by a comhinatlon of natural with repi-esentative union. This is a middle theory between traducianism and creationism, combining elements of both. But like middle theories generally, it contains contradictory elements. If the posterity were present, as natural union implies, they could not be represented ; for this supposes absence. If they were absent, as representative union implies, they could not be present, as natural union supposes.

16 ANTHROPOLOGY.

A consistent scheme can be constructed upon either view of the Adamic union by itself, but not upon both in combination.' This is evinced by the fact that the tendency on the part of the advocates of representation has been to minimize natural union, in the combination. The latest and one of the ablest of its defenders, the elder Hodge, founds imputation solely on representation. See p. 45. It is important to observe that the earlier advocates of the combination, such as Turrettin for example, asserted that Adam's sin is imputed both as culpa and reatus poenae. Some of the later advocates assert that it is imputed only as reatus poenae ; only as obligation to suffer the penalty of eternal death.

These four ways of handling the doctrine of Adam's sin fall, generally, into the Augustino-Calvinistic anthropology, though some of them have a closer and moi-e self- consistent conformity to it than others. All four assert that penal evil befalls the posterity on account of Adam's transgression, and that this penal evil is phijslcal and spiritual death. This differentiates them from all theories which deny these two points. "Any man who holds that there is such an ascription of the sin of x\dam to his posterit}', as to be the ground of their bearing the punishment of that sin, holds the doctrine of imputation ; whether lie undertakes to justify this imputation merely on the ground that we are the children of Adam, or on the principle of representation, or of scientia media ; or whether he chooses to ])hilosophize

' Hodge notices the contrariety of the two views. "If we reconcile the condemnation of men on account of the sin of Adam, on the ground that he was our representative, or that he sustained the relation which all parents bear to their children, wc renounce the ground of a realistic union. If the latter theory be true, then Adam's sin was our act as truly as it was his. If we adopt the representative theory, his act was not our act in any other sense than that in which a representative acts for his constituents." Theology, II. 164. " A union of representation is not a union of identity. If Adam and his race were one and the same, he was not their representative, for a thing cannot represent itself. The two ideas are inconsistent. Where the one is asserted, the other is denied." Princeton Essays, I. 133.

MAN'S CREATION. 17

on tlie nature of unity until lie confounds all notions of personal identity, as President Edwards appears to have done." Princeton Essays, I. 139.

5. A fifth method is that of the ancient Semi-Pelagian, and the modern Arminian. The doctrine of original sin is received as a truth of revelation, and an explanation is attempted by the theory of representatvve union. Adam acted as an individual for the individuals of his posterity. The latter are not guilty of his first sin, either in the sense of culpability or of obligation to punishment, but are exposed on account of it to certain non-jpenal evils ; principally physical suffering and death. They do not either deserve or incur spiritual and eternal deatli on account of it. This results only from actual transgression, not from Adam's sin.

The doctrine of the unity of Adam and his posterity, in the commission of the first sin and the fall from God, is of the utmost importance in anthropology. Without it, it is impossible to maintain the justice of God in tlie punishment of inherited sin. For it is evident, that an individual person cannot be morally different from the species to which he belongs. He cannot be holy, if his race is sinful. No individual can rise above his species, and exhibit a character and conduct radically different from theirs. Consequently, in order to establish the responsibility and guilt of the individual in respect to the origin of sin, a foothold must befound for him in the being and agency of the race to which he belongs. He must exist in, and act with his species. This foothold is furnished in the Biblical doctrine of a primary existence, and a primary act of the common human nature in Adam, of which the secondary individual existence, and the secondary individual character and acts are the manifestation. Accordingly, all schools of evangelical anthropology have held on upon St. Paul's representation of the Adamic connection, however differently they may have explained it. ISTo one of them has adopted the Pelagian Vol. II.— 3

18 ANTHROPOLOGY.

dogma of pure individualism, and absolute isolation from Adam. In contending that the human species was a complete whole, and an objective reality, in the first parents, traducianism obtains a foundation for that community of action whereby a common sinful character was originated by a single voluntary act of apostasy, the consequences of which appear in the historical series of individuals who are propagated parts of the species. The sinful disposition of an individual is the evil inclination of his will ; this evil inclination comes along in and with his will ; and his will comes from Adam by ordinary descent.

The perplexity into which a devout and thoughtful mind is thrown, which resolutely holds on upon the Augustinian position that inherited sin is damning and brings eternal death, while not holding on upon the co-ordinate Augustinian position of a primary existence and act of the species in Adam, is seen in the following extract from Pascal. "How astonishing is the fact, that the mystery, the most profound of all in the whole circle of our experience, namely, the transmission of original sin, is that of which from ourselves we can gain no knowledge. It is not to be doubted that there is nothing more revolting to our reason, than to maintain that the first man's sin has entailed guilt upon those whose remoteness from the original source seems to render them incapable of its participation. Such transmission appears to us not only impossible, but even unjust. For what can be more opposed to the laws of man's poor justice, than eternally to condemn an infant incapable of free wull, for a sin in which he had so little share that it was committed six thousand years before he came into existence. Nothing, assuredly, is more repugnant to us than this doctrine ; yet, without this mystery, of all the most incom.prehensible, we are incomprehensible to ourselves. Through this abyss it is, that the whole tangled thread of our moral condition takes its mazy and devious way ; and man is actually more inconceivable apart from this mystery, tlian the mystery itself is

MAN'S CREATION, 19

inconceivable by man/' Thoughts : Greatness and Misery of Man.

There are difficulties attending either theory of the origin of man, but fewer connected with traducianism than witli creationism. If the mystery of a C07nplete existence in Adam on both the psychical and physical side is accepted, the difficulties connected with the imputation of the first sin and the propagation of corruption are relieved. As Turrettin says, " there is no doubt that by this theory all the difficulty seems to be removed." It is only the first step that costs. Adopting a revealed mystery in the start, the mystery in this instance, as in all the other instances of revealed mysteries, throws a flood of light, and makes all things plain.

There are three principal supports of Traducianism. 1. Scripture. 2. Systematic Theology. 3. Physiology.

1. The preponderance of the Biblical representations favors it. The Bible teaches that man is a species, and the idea of a species implies the propagation of the entire individual out of it. Individuals, generally, are not propagated in parts, but as wholes. In Gen. 1 : 26, 27, the man and the woman together are denominated " man." In these two verses, as in the remainder of the first chapter, the Hebi-ew t3~K is not a proper name. It does not denote the masculine individual Adam alone, but the two individuals, Adam and Eve, together. Adam, here, is the name of the human jpair^ or sjoecies. It is not until the second chapter of Genesis, that the word is used as a proper name, to denote the masculine, and to exclude the feminine. " God said. Let us make man (ti"T!«) in our image, and let them have dominion. So God created man (ansirrm) in his own ima^e : in the image of God created he him ; male and female created he them^'^ Gen. 1 : 26, 27. Compare Gen. 5 : 2, where the same usage occurs. In employing the singular pronoun "him," the writer still has both individuals in his mind, as is evinced by the change of " him " to " them." Eve is in20 ANTHROPOLOGY.

eluded, when it is said that God created "man" in his own image. In such connections Adam = Adam and Eve. The term is specific, not individuah Augustine (City of God, XY. xvii.) thus notices the specific use of the word " man." " Enos (ci3>5.") signifies ' man ' not as Adam does, whicli also signifies man, but is used in Hebrew indifferently for man and woman ; as it is written, ' male and female created he them, and blessed them, and called their name Adam/ (Gen. 5 : 2), leaving no room to doubt that though the woman was distinctively called Eve, yet the name Adam, meaning man, was common to both. But Enos means man in so restricted a sense, that Hebrew linguists tell us it cannot be applied to woman." '

The same usage is found in the New Testament. In Rom. 7 : 1, St. Paul asks, " Know ye not, brethren, how that the law hath dominion over the man {tov avS-pcoirov) as long as he liveth ? " The law spoken of is that of marriage, to whicli the wife equally with the husband is subject, both of whom are here denominated "the man." When, in verse 2, the apostle wishes to individualize, and distinguish the husband from the wife, he designates him not by au^pcoTTot, but by apyjp. When St. Paul asserts (1 Cor. 15 : 21) that " by man came death," he means both Adam and Eve, whom in the next clause he denominates to ''ASa/j,. Again, our Lord is denominated the Son of man {av^pajirov), although only the woman was concerned in his human origin, showing that woman is " man." When Christ (Matt. 12 : 12) asks : " How much then is a man better than a sheep ? " he includes both sexes. When St. Paul addresses a letter to the " saints and faithful brethren which are at Colosse," Coloss. 1:2; and St. John (1 John 3 : 15) asserts that " whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer ; " they

' With this statement, Gesenius does not agree. He says (sub voce) that " '>^"ip^ is rarely put for the singular; is more commonly collective for the whole racj. Job 7 : 17 ; 15 : 14 ; Ps. 8:5. It is the same as ti"l!*, but only in poetic style."

MAN'S CREATION. 21

mean both male and female alike and equally. And this original unity of species is referred to in St. Paul's statement respecting the marriage relation : " They two shall be one flesh," Eph. 5 : 31. In accordance with this, Augustine denominates Adam and Eve, " primos illos homines in paradiso." De Civitate, XI. xii. The elder Protestant divines call them " protoplasti."

That man was created a species in two individuals appears, also, from the account of the creation of Eve. According to Gen. 2 : 21-23, the female body was not made, as was the male, out of the dust of the ground, but out of a bone of the male. A fractional part of the male man was formed by creative power into the female man. Eve was derived out of Adam. " The man," says St. Paul (1 Cor. 11 : 8), " is not made out of (e/c) the woman, but the woman out of (e^) the man." And the entire woman, soul and body, was produced in this way. For Moses does not say that the body of Eve was first made out of Adam's I'ib, and then that her soul w^as separately created and breathed into it — as was the method, when Adam's body was made out of the dust of the ground — but represents the total Eve, soul and body, as formed out of a part of Adam. " The rib which the Lord God had taken from man made he a woman, and brought her unto the man. And Adam said, This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh : she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man," Gen. 2 : 22, 23. The fact that the total female was supernaturally produced from the male, favors the traducian position that the total man is propagated ; that the soul like the body may be derived. The same creative act which produced the body of Eve out of a rib of Adam, produced her soul also. By a single Divine energy. Eve was derived from Adam, psychically as well as physically. This goes to show that when a child of Adam is propagated, the propagation includes the whole person, and is both psychical and physical. For the connection between a child and its

22 ANTHROPOLOGY.

parents is nearer and closer than was the connection between Adam and Eve at creation. See Augustine: On the Soul, I. 29, where this argument is employed.

These two individuals, created ex nihilo in the manner thus described, are in Scripture sometimes both together called " man ; " and sometimes separately are called " maleman," and " female-man " {p^», and nm), man and wo-man. Gen. 1 : 27 ; 2 : 23. In and witli them, was also created the entire human species : namely, the invisible substance, both psychical and physical, of all their posterity. This one substance, or " human nature," was to be transformed into millions of individuals by sexual propagation. The creation proper of " man " was finished and complete on the sixth day. After this, there is only the generation of "man."' The Biblical phraseology now changes. Eve is '• the mother of all living," Gen. 3 : 20. Adam " begat a son after his own image," Gen. 5 : 3. There is no longer any creation of n:ian ex nihilo by supernatural power ; but only the derivation of individual men out of an existing human substance or nature, by means of natural law, under Divine providence and supervision.

The question now arises : Why is not this propagation only physical, as the creationist asserts ? Why should not propagation be confined to the body 1

1. The first reply is, because it is contrary to Scripture. Certain texts forbid it. In John 3 : 6, Christ afiirms that " that which is born (begotten) of the fiesli is flesh, and that which is born of the spirit is spirit." The term " flesh," here, denotes man in his entirety of soul and body. The spiritual birth certainly includes both ; and the connection implies that the natural birth is equally comprehensive. Men, says our Lord, are born naturally of their parents, and spiritually of God ; and it is the same whole man in both instances. ISTow to the term " flesh " employed in this signification of the total person, Christ applies the participle jeyevvrjfxevov. The "" flesh," or man, consisting of soul and

MAN'S CREATION. 23

bodj together, is " begotten '' and " born.'' That adp^ often comprehends the sonl as well as the body, is clear from many passages. Compare Matt. 24 : 22. Luke 3 : 6. John 1 : 14 ; 17 : 2. Acts 2 : 17. Rom. 3 : 20. Rom. 8 : 4, 5, 8. Gal. 5 : 16, 19. In all these places " flesh '' comprises both the psychical and physical nature of man. Christ employs it in the same signification in John 3 : 6, and teaches that it is a generation and birth.

Traducianism is taught in John 1 : 13. Here, the regenerate are said to be " begotten {e'yevvrjS-i]o-av) not of blood (human seed), nor of the will of the flesh (sexual appetite), nor of the will of man (human decision)." This implies that the unregenerate are " begotten of blood, and of the will of the flesh, and of the will of man." But an unregenerate man is an entire man, consisting of soul and body. His soul and body, therefore, were " begotten and born of blood, and of the will of the flesh, and of the will of man." In this passage, the soul sustains the same relation to generation and birth that the body does ; both come under one and the same category.

In Rom. 1 : 3, it is said that Christ " according to the flesh {Kara adpKa) was made of the seed of David." The term " flesh " here denotes the entire humanity of our Lord, antithetic to his divinity, denominated, irvevjxa ou^jiwcTvv'r]'^. Christ's soul and body together constituted his crap^ ; and this is represented as being " made of the seed of David." St. Paul employs the verb 'yivofiai, to denote that there was a generation, in distinction from a creation, in the origin of Christ's humanity. The connection forbids the confinement of this generation to the physical side of his human nature, so that his human body only, not his human soul, sprang from David. Shedd : On Romans 1 : 3.

In Heb. 12 : 9, it is said that " we have had fathers of our flesh (t»}

24 ANTHROPOLOGY.

the creationist, to prove that man is the father of the body only, God being the father of the soul. There are two objections to this explanation. 1. God is not called the '' Father of our spirits," which would be the required antithesis to " fathers of ow;' flesh." He is denominated " the Father of spirits" generally, not of human spirits in particular. The omission of rjixoiv with irvevfidrcov shows that the fatherhood is universal — relating to men and angels. God is the heavenly Father, in distinction from an earthly father. 2. Had the writer intended to set the human spirit in contrast with the human body, as the creationist interpretation supposes, he would have said : " the Father of our sjnrW^ {rov irvev/u.aro'i tj/mmv), instead of "the Father of spirits" {twv Trvevfidrcov). In this text, therefore, as in John 3 : 6, adp^ comprehends the whole man, soul and body. Chrysostom and Theophylact refer " spirits," in this text, to angels exclusively. Calvin and Bengel find creationism in it. Moll (Lange) and Ebrard find traducianism. ^^Xdp^ bezeichnet hier so wenig als irgendwo, den Leib (daher der Creationismus sicli fiir die Lehre, dasz der Leib allein von den Aeltern gezeugt werde, die Seele aber von Gott geschaffen werde, mit LInrecht auf diese Stelle beruf t) ; sondern adp^ bezeichnet hier, wie immer, das natiirliche durch creaturliche Ivrafte zu Stande kommende Leben." Ebrard in loco.

Traducianism is taught in Acts 17 : 26. God " hath made of one blood all nations." The natural interpretation of this text is, that men of all nationalities are made of one common human nature as to their whole constitution, memtal and physical. There is nothing to require the creationist qualification : " Every man, as to his body," but everything to exclude it. For the apostle was speaking particularly of man as rational, immortal, and having the image of God ; and therefore in saying that " man is made of one blood," he certainly could not have intended to exclude his rational soul in this connection.

MAN'S CREATION. 25

In Heb. 7 : 10, it is said that " Levi," that is, the whole tribe of Levi (verse 9), " was yet in the loins of father, when Melchisedec met" Abraham. Here Abraham is called the father of Levi, thongh he was Levi's great-grandfather. Levi and his descendants are said to have had an existence that was real, not fictitious, in Abraham. But it contradicts the context, to confine this statement to the physical and irrational side of Levi and his descendants. The " paying of tithes " which led to the statement is a rational and moral act, and implies a rational and moral nature as the basis of it.

In Psalm 139 : 15, 16, there is a description of the mysterious generation of man. " My substance was not hid from thee when I was made in secret." Though the reference is to the embryonic and foetal life, yet it includes the mental and moral part of man with the physical. The clauses, " Zwas made," and " tiiy substance," certainly denote the speaker as an entire whole. The same is true of the passage Job 10 : 10, " Hast thou not poured me out as milk, and curdled me like cheese ? " The " me " here, is the whole person. The total ego is described as begotten, in Jer. 1:5: '• Before I formed tJiee in the belly, I knew theeP In Ps. 22 : 9, 10, David says, "Thou art he that took me fi'om the womb. I was cast upon thee from the womb ; thou art my God from my mother's belly."

Gen. 2 : 1-3 teaches that the work of creation was complete on the sixth daj-. '•' God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it ; because that in it he had rested from all his work which God had created and made." If the human soul has been a creation ex nihilo, daily and hourly, ever since Adam and Eve were created on the sixth day, it could not be said that " on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made." Compare Ex. 20: 11, " In six days God made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested on the seventh day ; " and Heb. 4 : 4, God "rested from all his works."

26 ANTHROPOLOGY.

1 Cor. 15 : 22 supports traducianism. " In Adam (tm 'ASa/jb) all die." The article shows that Adam here, as in Gen. 1:17, denotes Adam and Eve inclusive of the species. To " die in Adam " implies existence in Adam. The nonexistent cannot die. Merely metaphorical existence in Adam is non-existence. Merely physical existence in Adam without psychical, would allow of physical death in Adam, but not of spiritual. To die in Adam, both spiritually and physically, supposes existence in Adam both as to soul and body.

The same remark is true respecting Eph. 2:3: " We were by nature ((pvcrei) children of wrath." Here the term (j>va-i^ denotes a real nature derived from foregoing ancestors ; as in Gal. 2 : 15, rj/M6i

The word Tj/xaprov in Rom. 5:12 strongly supports the traducian view. The invariable usage in both the Old and Kew Testaments makes it an active verb. There is not a single instance of the alleged passive signification. Had the apostle meant to teach that all men were " regarded " as having sinned, he would not have said Trayre? rjixapTov, but TTai/re? rjixapTrjKore'i rjcrav, as in Gen. 44 : 32 ; 43 : 9. But if all " sinned " in Adam in the active sense of rjfiaprov, all must have existed in him. Xonentity cannot sin ; and merely physical substance cannot sin. Shedd : On Komans 5 : 12.

These Scripture texts support the traducian position, that the individual man is propagated as an entire whole consisting of soul and body, and contradict that of the creationist, that a part of him is propagated and a part is created. These Biblical data countenance the view, however difficult it may be to explain it, that man being a unity of body and

MAN'S CREATION. 27

soul is heyotten and Ijorn as sucli a unity. " To be the son of a woman/' says Edwards (Against Watts's notion of the Pre-existence of Christ's liuinan Soulj, " is to receive being in both soul and body, in consequence of a conception in her womb. The soul is the principal part of the man ; and sonship implies derivation of the soul as well as the body, by conception. Xot that the soul is a [material] part of the mother as the body is. Though the soul is no [material] part of the mother, and be immediately given by God, yet that hinders not its being derived by conception ; it being consequent on it according to a law of nature. It is agreeable to a law of nature, that when a perfect human body is conceived in the womb of a woman, and properly nourished and increased, a human soul should come into being : and conception may as properly be the cause whence it is derived, as any other natural effects are derived from natural causes and antecedents. For it is the power of God which produces these effects, though it be according to an estahlishtd law. The soul being so much the principal part of man, a derivation of the soul by conception is the chief thing implied in a man's being the son of a woman." In saying that the soul is " no part of the mother as the body is ; " that it is '• immediately given by God ; " and yet that this "' does not hinder its derivation by conception," Edwards evidently means that the soul is not physical substance like the body, and has a psychical in distinction from physical derivation or generation that is peculiar to itself.

Samuel Hopkins (Works, I. 289) follows Edwards, in saying that '• the mother, according to a law of nature, conceives both the soul and body of her son ; she does as much towards the one as towards the other, and is equally the instrumental cause of both." Says jSTitzsch : '" That the individual dispositions of the soul are propagated by generation, will scarcely be disputed.' Why not their generic

' Compare, As You Like It, I. i. '' I know you are my elder brother : the courtesy of nations allows you my better, in that you are the first born : but the

28 ANTHROPOLOGY.

dispositions also ? Hence, we cannot but maintain the doctrine of derivation, together witli creation." Christian Doctrine, § 107. Weiss (Theology of the New Testament, § 67) explains St. Paul as teaching that " the soul is begotten."

The few texts that are quoted in favor of creationism are as easily applicable to tradncianisra. Isa. 57 : 16, " The souls which I have made." The context does not imply a distinction of the soul from the body. On the contrary, " soul " here is put for the whole person. Tradncianism equally with creationism holds that God is the maker of the soul. The body, certainly, is propagated, yet God is its maker. Augustine (On the Soul, xvii.) remarks that God may as properly be said to " make " or " create " in the instance of the propagation of the soul, as in that of its individual creation. " Victor wishes the passage, ' Who giveth breath to the people,' to be taken to mean that God creates souls not by propagation, but by insufflation of new souls in every case. Let him, then, boldly maintain, on this principle, that God is not the creator of our body, on the ground that it is derived from our parents ; and that because corn springs from corn, and grass from grass, thei'efore God is not the maker of each, and does not ' give each a body as it hath pleased him.'"

Zechariah 12 : 1, God " formeth the spirit of man in him.'' The verb ("1:^"^) in this place favors the traduction of the soul. See Lewis's Note, in Lange's Genesis, p. 16-1. Job 33 : 4, " The spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life." This is true also from the traducian position. Numbers 16 : 22, "The God of the spirits of all flesh." The context shows that " spirit," here, is put for the whole man : " Shall one man sin, and thou be wroth with the M-hole congregation." Heb. 12 : 9, " Father of spirits." The antithesis is not between the body and soul of. man, but between man and

same tradition takes not away my blood, were there twenty brothers betwixt us : I have as much of my father in me as you."

MAN'S CREATION. 29

spirits generally. If we are subject to our earthly fathers, ought we not to be subject to the universal Father ? See page 24. John 5:17, "My father worketh hitherto." God works perpetually in preservation and providence. Another explanation, favored by the context, refers the statement to the exertion of miraculous power. Christ asserts that he works miracles, like his Fatlier.

2. Secondly, the theological argument strongly favors traducianisra. (a) The imputation of the first sin of Adam to all his posterity as a culpable act, is best explained and defended upon the traducian basis. The Augustinian and Calvinistic anthropologies affirm that the act by which sin came into the world of mankind was a self-determined and guilty act, and that it is justly chargeable upon every individual man equally and alike. But this requires that the posterity of Adam and Eve should, in some way or other, participate in it. Participation is the ground of raerited imputation ; though not of unmerited or gratuitous imputation. Shedd : On Romans 4 : 3, 8. The posterity could not participate in the first sin in the form of individuals, and hence they must have participated in it in the form of a race. This supposes that the race-form is prior to the individual form ; that man first exists as a race or species, and in this mode of existence commits a single and common sin. The individual, now a separate and distinct unit, was once a part of a greater whole. The Westminster Shorter Catechism, 16, asserts the commission of a connnon sin, in the following terms : " All mankind, descending from Adam by ordinary generation, sinned in him and fell with iiim in his first transgression." The term " mankind " denotes here the human nature before it was individualized by propagation. This nature sinned. Human natu)'e existing primarily as a unity in Adam and Eve, and this same human nature as subsequently distributed and metamorphosed into the millions of individual men, are two modes of the same thing.

30 ANTHROPOLOGY.

Again, tluat a participation of some kind or other in the first sin is postulated in the Westminster formula, is proved by the fact that the first sin is called "a transgression." " Every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, doth bring guilt upon the sinner." Confession, YI. vi. This agrees with Horn. 5 : 15 ; where the first sin of Adam is denominated irapdirrwixa. But a transgression supposes a transgressor ; and the transgressor in this instance must be the "all" who " sinned," spoken of in Rom. 5 : 13 ; and who are the " moxikind descending bj ordinary generation " — that is to say, the human nature existing in Adam and subsequently individualized by propagation. Anselm (De conceptu virginali, X.) reasons as follows : " Each and every child of Adam is man by propagation, and a person by that individuation whereby he is distinguished from others. He is not responsible for original sin because he is man, or because he is a person. For if this were so, it would follow that Adam would have been responsible for original sin before he sinned, because he was both man and a person prior to sin. It remains, therefore, that each and every child of Adam is responsible for original sin because he is Adam. Yet not merely and simply because he is Adam, but because he is, fallen Adam." Anselm, here, uses " Adam " to designate the " human nature " created in Adam and Eve.

The doctrine of the specific unity of Adam and his posterity removes the great difficulties connected with the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, that arise from the injustice of punishing a person for a sin in which he had no kind of participation. This is the Gordian knot in the dogma. Here the standing objections cluster. But if whatever is predicable of Adam as an individual is also predicable of his posterity, and in precisely the same way that it is of Adam, the knot is not cut but untied. ISTo one denies : 1. That the individual Adam committed the first sin prior to its imputation to him, and that it was rightMAX'S CREATION. 31

eonslj imputed to him as a culpable and damning act of disobedience. 2. That his first sin corrupted his nature simultaneously with its commission, and that this corruption, like its cause the first sin, was prior to its imputation as culpable and damning corruption. There is certainly nothing unjust, in imputing the first sin, and the ensuing corruption, to the individual Adam, on the ground that he was the author of both.

Isow if the traducian postulate be true, namely, that Adam and his posterity were specifically one in the apostasy, all that is said of the individual Adam can be said of his posterity. The posterity committed the first sin prior to its imputation to them, and it was imputed to them as a culpable and damning act of disobedience. And the first sin corrupted the nature of the posterity simultaneously with its commission, and this corruption, like its cause the first sin, was prior to its imputation to them as culpable and damning corruption. There is certainly nothing unjust in imputing the first sin, and the ensuing corruption, to the posterity, on the ground that they were the author of both. There is indeed something inscrutably mysterious in the postulate of specific unity, but not more than there is in the postulate that God creates individual souls each by itself, and brings about corruption of nature in them negatively, by the withdrawment of grace, instead of positively by the first sin of Adam.

Edwards argues that a coexistence of the posterity with the first parents, if conceded, would relieve the difiiculties connected with the imputation of their sin. For this implies coagency, and this implies common responsibility. " I appeal," he says (Original Sin, Works, I. 491), " to such as are habituated to examine things strictly and closely, whether, on supposition that all mankind had coexisted in the manner mentioned before, any good reason can be given why their Creator might not, if he had pleased, have established such a union between Adam and the rest of

32 ANTHROPOLOGY.

mankind as was in tlie case supposed. Particularly, if it had been the case that Adam's posterity had, actually, according to a law of nature, somehow grown out of him, and yet remained contiguous and literally united to him, as the branches to a tree, or the members of the body to the head ; and had all, before the fall, existed together at the same time though in different ^;Z«6'(?6', as the head and members are in different places : in this case, who can determine that the Author of nature might not have established such a union between the root and branches of this complex being, as that all should constitute one moral whole ; so that there should be a communion in each moral alteration, and that the heart of every hrancTi should at the same moment participate with the lieart of the root, be conformed to it, and concurring with it in all its affections and acts, and so jointly partaking in its state, as ?^jpart of the same thingy This is defective, in that Edwards supposes a unity composed of individual persons aggregated together, instead of a single specific nature not yet individualized by propagation, as in Augnstinianism. Cut it shows that in his opinion, if a unity of action in the first sin can be obtained for all mankind, then the imputation of the first sin to them is just.

The following from Coleridge (Aids to lieflection. Harper's Ed., I. 289) also implies, that if oneness of nature and substance between Adam and his posterity could be proved, the justice of imputing the first sin would follow. " Should a professed believer ask you, whether that which is the ground of responsible action in your will could in any M'ay be responsihly 2>'^'(^sent in the will of Adam — answer him in these words : ' You, sir, can no more demonstrate the negative, than I can conceive the affirmative.' "

(5) The transmission of a sinful inclination is best explained by the ti-aducian theory. " Original sin," says the Westminster Larger Catechism, 26, " is conveyed from our first parents unto their posterity by natural generation, so that all that proceed from thenx in that way are conMAN'S CREATION. 33

celved and born in sin." Job 14 : 4 ; Ps. 51:5; 58 : 3 ; John 3:6; Epli. 2 : 3. This moral corruption, resulting from the first transgression, could not be transmitted and inherited unless there were a vehicle for its transmission ; imless there were a common human nature, both as to soul and body, to convey it. Tertullian's maxim is logical : " Tradux peccati, tradiix animae." The transmission of sin requires the transmission of the sinning soul. Sin cannot be propagated, nnless that psychical substance in which sin inheres is also propagated. Sin cannot be transmitted along absolute non-entity. Neither can it be transmitted by a merely physical substance. If each individual soul never had any other than an individual existence, and were created ex nihilo in every instance, nothing mental could pass from Adam to his posterity. There could be the transmission of only bodily and physical traits. There would be a chasm of six thousand years between an individual soul of this generation and the individual soul of Adam, across which " original sin " or moral corruption could not go " by natural generation."

The difficulty of accounting for the transmission of sin upon the creationist theory, has led some creationists to assert the creation of all individual human souls sinmltaneously with the creation of Adam, and their quiescent state until each is united with its body. Ashbel Green adopts this view, in his Lectures on the Catechism. Presbyterian Board's Ed. But this does not relieve the difficulty ; because, as distinct and separate individuals, the souls of the posterity could not commit the one single sin, the " one offence " of Adam. They could only sin " after the similitude of Adam's transgression," Rom. 5 : 14 ; that is, imitate and repeat Adam's sin ; and there would be as many sins to be the cause of death as there were souls. These souls must therefore primarily have been a single specific psychical nature, in order to " sin in Adam, and fall with him in his first transgression." Vol. II.— 3

34 ANTHROPOLOGY.

These difficulties in respect to participation in the sin that is imputed, and its transmission, are felt by those who hold to the imputation of original sin, and yet reject traducianism. Hence, the creationist partially adopts traducianism. The theory of representative union is compelled to fall back upon the natural union of Adam and his posterity for support. Turrettin does this. " There can be," lie says (IX. ix. 11, 12), "no imputation of another's sin (peccati alieni) unless some conjunction with him is supposed. This union (cominunio) may be three-fold. 1. JS^atural, like that between parent and child ; 2. Moral and political, like that between king and subject ; 3. Voluntary, like that between friends, and between a debtor and his surety. Tliis latter kind of union we do not include here, since we acknowledge that it implies a previous consent of the parties ; but only the first two kinds, in which it is not necessary that there should be an actual consent in order that the sin of one should be imputed to another. Adam was conjoined with us by this double bond : natural, so far as he is our father and we are his children ; jpolitical and 2i[&o for^ensic, as far as he was the head (princeps), and representative head (caput representativum) of the whole human race. The foundation therefore of imputation is not only the natural union, but especially (praecipue) the moral and federal union, by means of which God made a covenant with Adam as our head." Turrettin mentions the " natural " union first in the order, but describes it as second in importance. In explaining what he means by denominating Adam a public and representative person, he quotes the statement of Augustine, that " all those were one man, who by derivation from that one man were to be so many distinct and separate individuals." But he then qualifies Augustine's phraseology'', by adding, that " they were not one man by a specific or numerical unity, but partly by a unity of origin, since all are of one blood, and partly by a unity of representation, since one represented all

MAN'S CREATION. 35

by the ordinance of God." This qualification shows that Turrettin was not willing to adopt Augustine's statement in full, and that he departed in some degree from the Augustinian anthropology. He denies what Augustine affirms, namely, that all naen were in Adam by both a specific and a numerical unity, and introduces an idea foreign to Augustine, namely, that of unity by representation. Furthermore, he implies that there is a difference between " specific unity " and " unity of origin." But they are the same thing. Specific unity is of course the unity of a species ; and this means that all the individuals are propagated from a common nature or substance. This, certainly, is unity of origin. Secondly, he implies that numerical unity is identical with specific unity. But the two are distinct from each other. A numerical unity may, or may not be a specific unity. In the instance of the persons of the Trinity, there is a numerical unity of nature or substance, but not a specific unity. A specific unity implies the possibility of the division of the one numerical substance among the propagated individuals of the species. But there is no possibil* ity of a division of the Divine essence among the trinitarian persons. Consequently, they constitute a numerical but not a specific unity. But in the instance of man, the unity is both numerical and specific. The human nature while in Adam, is both numerically and specifically one. But when it is subdivided and individualized by propagation, it is no longer numerically one. The numerically one human nature becomes a multitude of individual persons, who are no longer the single numerical unity which they were at first. But they are still specifically one.

It is evident that while this eminent theologian lays more stress upon representative union than upon natural, he does not think that it can stand alone. He supports the representation by the unity of nature. He does not venture to rest the imputation of an act of Adam that brought eternal death upon all his posterity as a penal consequence,

36 ANTHROPOLOGY.

solely upon a representation by Adam of an absent and non-existent posterity. A mere and simple representative acts vicariously for those whom he represents ; and to make the eternal damnation of a human soul depend upon yicarious sin contradicts the profound convictions of the human conscience. To impute Adam's first sin to his posterity merely, and only, because Adam sinned as a representative in their room and place, makes the imputation an arbitrary act of sovereignty, not a righteous judicial act which carries in it an intrinsic morality and justice. This, Turrettin seems to have been unwilling to maintain ; and therefore, in connection with representative union, he also asserted to some extent the old Augustinian doctrine of a union of nature and substance. Yet, adopting creationism as he did, this substantial union, in his system, could be only physical (sensu physico et ratione seminali, IX. ix. 23), not psychical.

Turrettin marks the transition from the elder to the later Calvinism ; from the theory of the Adamic union to that of the Adamic rejpresentation. Both theories are found in his system, and are found in conflict. He vibrates from one to the other, in his discussion of the subject of imputation. Sometimes he represents the union of Adam with his posterity as precisely like that of Christ with his people ; namely, that of vicarious representation alone, without natural and seminal union. Adam's posterity, he says, " nondum erant in rerum natura," when Adam's sin was committed, and consequently " eadem ratione constituimur peccatores in Adamo, qua justi constituimur in Christo. At in Christo justi constituimur per justitiae imputationem ; ergo et peccatores in Adamo per peccati ipsius imputationem." IX. ix. 16. Sometimes, on the other hand, he teaches that Adam's posterity were " in rerum natura," having seminal existence in Adam, and for this reason the exaction of penalty from them is a matter of justice. The following is an example of this style of reasoning. " In the imputation of

MAN'S CREATION. 37

Adam's sin, the justice of God does not exact punishment from the undeserving, but the ill-deserving — ill-deserving, if not by proper and personal ill-desert, yet hj a, jja?'ticipated and common ill-desert founded in the natural and federal union between Adam and ns. As Levi was tithed by Melchisedec in the person of Abraham, so far as he was potentially in his loins, so that he was regarded as justly tithed in and with Abraham, who then bore the person of his whole family (qui totius prosapiae suae personam tunc gerebat), so, much more, can the posterity of Adam be regarded as having sinned in him, seeing that they were in him as the branches in the root^ the Tuass in the first individuals, and the members in the head (ut rami in radice, massa in primitiis, et membra in capite)." IX. ix. 24, 25. This phraseology denotes more than vicarious representation. A representative, pure and simple, does not contain his constituents as the root contains the branches, as the first individuals contain the mass or species, as the head contains the members. Turrettin defines Adam as the " stem, root, and head of the human race " (stirps, radix, et caput generis humani. IX. ix. 23), but qualifies this, by saying that he was so " not only physically and seminally, but morally and representatively P But a representative proper could not be denominated the stem, root, and head of his constituents.

Comparing this latter passage with the first cited, it is evidenj; that Turrettin oscillates between natural and representative union, sometimes relying more upon the one, and sometimes more upon the other. "While unwilling, with Augustine and the older Reformed anthropology, to rest the imputation of Adam's sin wholly upon natural union, he feared to rest it wholly upon vicarious representation. He felt the pressure of the difiiculties attending a specific or race-existence in Adam, and sought to relieve them by combining with the doctrine of natural union that of representative union. In so doing, he attempts to combine iron

38 ANTHROPOLOGY.

with clay. For the two ideas of natural union and representation are incongruous, and exclude each other. The natural or substantial union of two things implies the presence of both. But vicarious representation implies the absence of one of them. Says Heidegger (Heppe : Ref ormirte Dogmatik, 228), " representare est vi quadani juris exhibere praesentiara ejus, quod praesens non est." The natural union of the posterity with Adam implies their existence in him. Two things cannot be naturally or substantially united, one of which is not present ; and still less if one is non-existent. A soul created ex nihilo in a.d. 1880 could not have been naturally or substantially united with the soul of Adam in b.c. 4004. And, on the other hand, the vicarious representation of the posterity by Adam implies their absence from him, and is consistent with even their non-existence.

If, therefore, the posterity were existent and present in the progenitors by natural or substantial nnion, they did not need to be represented, and could not be, since representation supposes absence of substance. If, on the other hand, the posterity were absent as to substance when the representative acted, then it is contradictory to endeavor to have them present by means of a natural or substantial union. In other words, natural imion logically excludes representation, and representation logically excludes natural union. Either theory by itself is consistent ; but the two in combination are incongruous.' Nevertheless, the two ideas since the time of Turrettin have been combined very extensively in Calvinistic schools ; the combination being favored by the rise and progress of representative, in the place of monarchical government. De Moor-Marck (XY. xxxi.) employs both. Witsius (Covenants, I. i. 1, 3) unites the two, "Adam sustained a two-fold relation: 1. As man.

* There is a similar incongruity in the combination of creationism with traducianism, attempted by Martensen (Dogmatics, § 74), and Dorner (Doctrine, II. 353).

MAN'S CREATION. 39

2. As head, and root or representative of mankind." Here, the root is regarded as a representative of the tree, when in fact it is the tree itself in a certain mode or form of ita existence.

It may be said that political representation requires that the parties should be of the same nation, and that this implies a natural union as the foundation of the political. But in this case reference is had to expediency, or the fitness of the representative to conduct the business of his constituent, not to the justice of the proceeding. So far as justice is concerned, a constituent may be represented by anyone whom he pleases to select, and who pleases to act in the capacity of a representative. An American might be represented by an Englishman, provided all the parties concerned are willing. Representative union requires and supposes the consent of the individuals who are to be represented, and properly falls under Turrettin's third division of " voluntary union," which he excludes in the explanation of imputation. But natural union does not require the consent of the individuals. The posterity, prior to their individual existence, are created a specific unity in Adam by the will of God, and while in this status they participate in the first sin. The human species created in this manner acted in and with Adam, and the act had all the characteristics for the species that it had for Adam. It was a moral, a self-determined, and a guilty act, for the progenitors and the posterity alike, because it was such for the one human nature itself, which was the first mode in which the posterity were created and existed.

Since the idea of representation by Adam is incompatible with that of specific existence in Adam, the choice must be made between representative union and natural union. A combination of the two views is illogical. But the doctrine of the covenant of works is consistent with either theory of the Adamic connection. The covenant of works was " made with Adam as a public person," L. C. 22. If a " public per40 ANTHROPOLOGY.

son " means tlie individual Adam solely, acting representa> tively and vicariously for his posterity, both in obeying and sinning, then the covenant of works was made between God and the individual Adam acting as a representative. If a " public person " means Adam and his posterity as a specific unity, acting directly and not by representation, both in obeying and sinning, then the covenant of works was made between God and the specific Adam. But in either case, it must be observed, that it was not the covenant of works that made the union of Adam and his posterity. The union of Adam and his posterity, be it representative or natural, was prior to the covenant, and is supposed in order to it. If Adam was a mere individual, and represented his nonexistent and absent posterity, this was provided for before the covenant of works was made with him. If Adam was specific, and included liis existent and present posterity, this also was provided for before the covenant of works was made with him. Hence, tlie so-called " federal union " does not mean a union constituted hy the foedus or covenant of works. It is rather a status, or relation, than a union proper. There is a covenant relation resting either upon a representative or a natural union. The union itself of Adam and his posterity, in either case, was not made by the covenant of works, but by a prior act of God — by a sovereign declarative act, if the nnion is representative ; by a creative act, if the union is natural, and substantial.

According to the traducianist, the facts are as follows : Adam and his posterity were made a unity by the creative act of God. The human species was created in and with Adam and Eve, both psychically and physically. This is natural or substantial union. With this unity, nameh^, Adam and the human species in him, God then made the covenant of works; according to which, this unity was freely to stand or fall together. "Est unitas naturae, cui unitas f oederalis ei'at innixa." Leydecker, in Heppe : Reformirte Dogmatik, Loc. XY. Having reference to this

MAN'S CREATION. 41

covenant, Adam and his posterity were " federally one : " that is, one in, not hy a foedus, league, or covenant. They were not constituted a unity by the covenant ; for they were already and previously a unity by creation. And because they were so, God established the covenant with them. When therefore a " federal union " is spoken of, it must be remembered that it is a secondary union resting upon a primary union : namely, upon natural union, according to the traducianist ; or upon representative union, according to the creationist.'

In the symbols and theological treatises, both Lutheran and Calvinistic, of the Reformation period, the unity of Adam and his posterity is described as natural, substantial, and specific. It is denoted by such terms as " massa," " natura," " essentia." And Adam means Adam and Eve inclusive of their posterity, as in the first chapter of Genesis. " Etsi enim in Adamo et Heva, natura initio pura, bona, et sancta creata est ; tamen per lapsum, peccatum ipsorum naturam invasit." Formula Concordiae, Solida Declaratio. Hase, 643. " Lapsus Adae vi pessima, humana tota massa, natura, et ipsa essentia corrupta est." Formula Concordiae, Epitome. Ilase, 574. Witsius (Covenants, II. iv. 11) quotes Cloppenberg as saying that " the apostle in Rom. 5, did not 60 understand one man Adam as to exclude Eve: which is here the leading error of some." De Moor-Marck (XY. x.) remarks respecting Paul's statement in 1 Tim. 2:1-4: " Nee negat ab altera parte apostolus mulieris peccatum, cum ununi hominem, quem ceu rvirov rov fiiWovrof Christo opponit, peccati propagati auctorem, in quo peccavimus et morimur omnes, esse docet, quem expresse quoque Adamuin vocat. Coll. Rom. 5 : 12-19 cum 1 Cor. 15 : 21, 22." De Moor (Y. X.) cites Paraeus as making Adam to include Eve : {a) By a common nature, (b) By husband and wife

' Turrettin denominates the federal union the principal union (praecipue). But if it be true that Adam and his posterity were not constituted a unity by the covenant (foedus) of works, it cannot be the primary and principal one.

4:2 ANTHROPOLOGY,

being one flesh. Gen, 2 : 24, Augustine (Citj of God, XL xii.) denominates Adam and Eve " primes illos homines in paradiso," Odo (Bib. Patrum, XXI. 230) remarks : " Quaeritur quomodo peccatum iiabeamus ab origine nostra quae est Adam et Eva." All this agrees with St. Paul, who asserts that " the woman being deceived was in the [first] transgression," 2 Tim. 2 : 14. And the narrative in Genesis (3 : 16-19) shows that the punishment for the first sin fell upon Eve as well as upon Adam.

The elder Calvinistic theologians say nothing respecting representation. The term is foreign to their thought. The order with them is : 1. Specific existence in Adam ; 2. Specific participation in the first sin ; 3. Imputation of the first sin ; 4. Inherence and propagation of original sin. ParaeuSjOn Romans 5 : 12, explains Trai/re? ■^/naprov by " omnes peccaverunt, hoc est, culpa et reatu tenentur." All men are both culpable and punishable. He proves that they are so, by three particulars : 1. By participation in the first act of sin, " participatione culpae ; " because the posterity existed seminally in Adam. " All men committed the first sin when Adam committed it, as Levi paid tithes in the loins of Abraham, when Abraham paid them." 2. By the imputation of the obligation to punishment resulting from participation in the first sin, " imputatione reatus ; " because " the first man so stood in grace, that if he should sin, not he alone but all his posterity should fall from grace and become liable with him to eternal death, according to the threatening, ' In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.' " 3. By the propagation of the inherent corruption of nature which results from the participation in, and imputation of the first sin.

According to the elder Calvinism, as represented by Paraeus and those of his class, original sin jprojpagated in every individual rests upon original sin inherent in every individual ; original sin inherent in every individual rests upon original sin imjputed to every individual ; and original

MAN'S CREATION. 4:«>

sin imputed to every individual rests upon original sin committed by all men as a common nature in Adam. On this scheme, the justice and propriety of each particular, and of the whole are apparent. The first sin, which it must be remembered consisted of both an internal lust and an external act, of both an inclination and a volition, is justly imputed to the common nature because it was voluntarily committed by it; is justly inherent in the common nature, because justly imputed ; and is justly propagated with the common nature because justly inherent. This scheme if taken entire is ethically consistent. But if mutilated by the omission of one or more particulars, its ethical consistency is gone. To impute the first sin without prior participation in it, is unjust. To make it inherent without prior imputation, is unjust. To propagate it without prior inherence is unjust. The derangement of the scheme by omission has occurred in the later Calvinism. The advocate of mediate imputation deranges it, by imputing original sin as inherent, but not as committed either substantially or representatively. The adv^ocate of representative imputation deranges it, by imputing original sin as inherent, but not as committed, except in the deluding sense of nominal and putative commission.

The elder Calvinism, like Augustinianism, starts with a unity, name!}-, Adam and his posterity in him as a common unindividualized nature. This unity commits the first sin : " all sinned," Rom. 5 : 12. This sin is imputed to the unity that committed it, inheres in the unity, and is propagated out of the unity. Consequently, all the particulars regarding sin that apply to the unity or common nature apply equally and strictly to each individualized portion of it. The individual Socrates was a fractional part of the human nature that "sinned in, and fell with Adam in his first transgression," L. C. 22, Consequently, the commission, imputation, inherence, and propagation of original sin cleave indissolubly to the individualized part of the common nature,

44 AIJTHROPOLOGY.

as they did to the unindividualized whole of it. The distribution and propagation of the nature make no alteration in it, except in respect to form. Its natural properties and characteristics by creation, and its acquired properties and characteristics by apostasy, remain unchanged.

Calvin relies upon the natural union between Adam and his posterity, for the explanation of the imputation of original sin. "Two things," he says (Inst., II. i. 8), "should be distinctly noticed ; first, that our nature being so totally vitiated and depraved, we are on account of this very corruption considered as deservedly condemned in the sight of God. And this liability (obligatio) arises not from the fault of another (alieni delicti). For when it is said that the sin of Adam renders us obnoxious to the Divine judgment, it is not to be understood as if we being innocent were undeservedly loaded with the guilt (culpam) of his sin. We derive from him not only the punishment, but also the pollution to which the punishment is justly due. Wherefore Augustine, though he frequently calls it the sin of another, in order to indicate its transmission to us by propagation, yet at the same time also asserts it to belong properly to every individual. Therefore infants themselves, as they bring their condemnation into the world with them, are rendered obnoxious to punishment by their own sinfulness, not by the sinfulness of another. For though they have not yet produced the fruits of their iniquity, yet they have the seed of it within them, nay, their whole nature is as it were a seed of sin, and therefore odious and abominable to God. Wlience it follows, that it is properly accounted sin in the sight of God, because there could not be liability to punishment without guilt (quia non esset reatus absque culpa).'"

1 The proof that participation in the first sin is an essential point in the early Calvinism has been carefully collected by Landis, in a volume entitled, " Original Sin, and Gratuitous Imputation." The author, hovi'ever, while asserting participation, and combating the later doctrine of mere representation by Adam,

MAN'S CREATION. 45

The later Calvinism, in some of its representatives, takes the extreme ground of rejecting natural union altogether, as a support of the doctrine of imputation, and resting it wholly upon representation. The elder Hodge is one of the most positive and ablest of this class.' " Adam," he says 'Princeton Essays, I. 187), " was our representative ; as a Dublic person, we sinned in him in virtue of a union resulting from a covenant or contract. Let it be noted, that this is the 07ily union here [Larger Catechism, 22] mentioned. The bond arising from our natural relation to him as our parent is not even referred to." The objections to this statement are the following : 1. The Catechism in this place denominates Adam a " public person," but does not denominate him a " representative." The term " representative " is not once employed in the Westminster standards. It has been introduced from the outside, to define a " public person." 2, The Catechism, in this place, gives its own definition, and defines a " public person " as one "from whom all mankind descend hy ordinary generation^ Here, only our natural relation to Adam is mentioned ; as it is also in Confession, YI. iii., where "our first parents," as public persons, are denominated " the root of all mankind." Natural, not representative union is the " only " union referred to, in this definition of a public person by the terms "root," "descent," and "ordinary generation." A representative is not the root of his constituents, nor do they

■with particular reference to the views of Hodge, yet rejects the realistic doctrine of race-existence as the true explanation (pp. 13, 20, 31). In so doing, he departs from both Augustine and the elder Calvinists, as much as do the advocates of the representative theory. For it is clear that there can be no participation in the first sin, unless the posterity are in existence to participate in it. And the only way in which they could exist and act in Adam, is as a single specific nature. They could not exist in Adam as an aggregate of millions of individuals.

* Breckenridge (Theology, 499), on the contrary, contends that " we must not attempt to eeparate Adam's federal from his natural headship, by which he ia the root of the human race ; since we have not a particle of reasou to believo that the former would ever have existed without the latter."

46 ANTHROPOLOGY.

descend from him by ordinary generation. 3. The Catechism, in this place, states that the covenant was made " with Adam as a public person." Consequently, Adam could not have been made a public person hy the covenant ; nor could the union between him and his posterity " result from the covenant or contract," as Hodge asserts. Adam and his posterity, frior to the covenant of works, had been made a natural unity by the creative act of God, as the traducianist contends, or else a representative unity by the sovereign act of God, as Ilodge contends ; and with this unity, God established the covenant of works. The covenant presupposes the unity, in both cases.

I^atural union is excluded, and representative union made the sole ground of the imputation of Adam's sin, in the following statement of Hodge. " In the imputation of Adam's sin to us, and of our sins to Christ, and of Christ's righteousness to believers, the nature of the imputation is the same, so that the one case illustrates the others. By virtue of the union between Adam and his descendants, his sin is the judicial ground of the condemnation of his race, precisely as the righteousness of Christ is the judicial ground of the justification of his people." Theology, H. 194, 195. There is confessedly no natural union between Christ and his people, therefore, argues Ilodge, there is none between Adam and his posterity. Christ did not include his people by race-union with them, therefore Adam did not include his posterity by race-union with them. Christ's people did not participate in his obedience, therefore Adam's posterity did not participate in his disobedience. Natural union beino- thus excluded, nothing but representative union remains. Hence it follows, that as Christ vicariously represented his absent people when he obeyed, Adam also vicariously represented liis absent posterity when he disobeyed, and "his sin is the judicial ground of the condemnation of his v&ce, precisely as the righteousness of Christ is the judicial ground of the justification of his people." The correctness of this

MAN'S CREATION. 47

reasoning depends upon that of the assumption, that there is an exact similarity between union in Adam and union in Clirist. Foi- proof that this is an erroneous assumption, see p. 57 sq.

An examination of the Westminster standards evinces, that in the judgment of tlieir authors natural or substantial union is the true ground of the imputation of Adam's sin, and that vicarious representation is inadequate. They never once use the verb "represent," or the noun " representative," in their Confession of Faith and Catechisms — a fact utterly inconsistent with the assertion that "representative union was the only one they maintained." The avoidance and total omission of these terms, when they were making careful definitions of Adam's sin, shows that they regarded them as unsuitable in this connection. The terms " represent" and "representative," it is true, occur in the theological treatises of this period, even in those of the Westminster divines themselves ; but they are excluded from their dogmatic formulas, because while in a loose popular sense Adam may be called a representative of the posterity whom he seminally included, in the strict scientific sense he cannot be. A thing existing in one mode is sometimes said to represent itself as existing in another mode ; as when the root is said to represent the tree. But the two are one and the same thing, in two forms.

The Westminster Assembly explained original sin and its imputation by " natural generation," " ordinary generation," the figure of a "root," and the phrase "public person." All the passages in the Westminster documents relating to Adam's sin are the following : Confession, YI. iii., " They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity descending from them by ordinary generationP Confession, YII. ii., iii., " The first covenant made with man was a covenant of works, wherein life was promised to Adam, and in him to his jposterityP Confession,

48 ANTHROPOLOGY.

XIX. i., "God gave to Adam a law, by which he bound Kim and all h.\s jposterity to obedience." Larger Catechism, 26, " Original sin is conveyed from our first parents unto their posterity, by natural generation f " L. C. 22, " The covenant being made with Adam as a public person, not for himself only but for his jposterity^ all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation sinned in Idm and fell imth him, in that first transgression." L. C. 92, " The rule of obedience revealed to Adam, and to all maoiJcind in him, beside a special command not to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, was the moral law."

In the first of these statements, it is said that " the guilt of the first sin was imputed, and death and corruption of nature is conveyed," because " our first parents were the root of all mankind." This teaches natural, not representative union. For the root does not vicariously re])resent the tree, as something other than and different from itself, and absent and apart from it, but it is the tree itself in the first mode of its existence. A root buried in the ground does not stand for an absent tree, and still less for a non-existent one. When a potato is planted, all the subsequent individuals are seminally present. The vital principle and substance that will produce them is all in the root. And the same is true, when the figure of " seed " is taken instead of that of a "root," as is so often the case in Scripture.

Again, when it is said that " original sin is conveyed from our first parents unto their posterity by natural generation^'' unity of substance and nature is taught. "Whatever descends by natural generation must be seminally and substantially present in the progenitors. And the same is taught in the explanation of the phrase " public person." A public person is described as one " from whom all mankind descend hy ordinary generation, in whom all manhind sinned, and with whom all manhind fell in the first transgression."

In all these Westminster statements, there is not a syllable that teaches that Adam was a non-specific individual

MAN'S CREATION. 49

who vicariously represented a non-existent and absent posterity. And even if it be conceded that the posterity were existent and -pi^esent physically , their merely physical existence and presence would not justify the assertion that they " sinned with and fell in him." The verbs " sinned " and " fell," and the prepositions " with " and " in," are too strong to be applied to the theory of vicarious representation. Men say that a constituent acts " by " his representative, not " in " and " with " him.

(c) The temptation by Satan is best explained by traducianism. Upon the theory of creationism, it is impossible to account for the fall of the individual soul by means of a temptation of the devil. The individual soul viewed as newly created ex nihilo is holy. The Calvinistic creationist denies equally with the Calvinistic traducianist, that God creates a soul without character. This is the Pelagian view. God's creative work is always "good," and is so pronounced by him. The soul as a new creation must therefore first be positively holy, and then freely fall from this created holiness into sin. And it must be tempted to fall. But on the creationist theory, there is no possibility of a temptation by Satan, or from any other quarter. And no attempt is made by the representationist to explain the fall of the posterity by temptation. The only reason which he assigns is,, that God withdraws grace from the posterity. It is not so, in the traducian theory. In the instance of the fall of the entire species in the first human paii", the species was tempted to fall in and with Adam. Adam and Eve were mature and perfect in all their powers, physical, intellectual, and moral. The human nature acted in and with the two sinless individuals, in and with whom it was created. In them, it was tempted by Satan, and yielded to the temptation.

{d) The universality of sin is best accounted for by traducianism. The fall being that of the species in the first pair, is of course coextensive with the species. But upon Vol. IL— 4

50 ANTHROPOLOGY.

the creationist theory, the fall is that of the individual onlj'. Each soul apostatizes from God by itself. Why should every soul without exception fall ? Why not a fall of only a part, as in the case of the angels, who fell as individuals, not as a species ? A soul as created and holy " has the law written upon the heart, and power to fulfil it." (L. C. 17.) Why should it invariabli/ apostatize ?

If it be replied that God withdraws common supporting grace in the instant when he creates each individual soul, and therefore every soul apostatizes, this is of the nature of punishment, and punishment according to Scripture and reason snpposes previous fault (culpa). God did not withdraw the common supporting grace of his Spirit from Adam, until after transgression. But here, by tlie supposition of the creationist, is a pure and holy soul fresh from the hand of God, from whom previous to its apostasy God totally withdraws one of his own gifts by creation, in order to bring about apostasy. The withdrawing of grace occurs not because of apostasy, but in order to produce it.

If it be said that this is done because of the transgression of Adam, this is a good reason from the position of traducianism, because the withdrawal, in this case, is after the fall of t\\Q posterity in and with Adam. An act has now been performed by Adam and his posterity together, which makes the withdrawal of created gifts from the whole unity righteous and just. But from the creationist position, a newly created and innocent soul that never was substantially one with Adam, and did not participate with him in the first transgression, is deprived of certain created gifts by an act of sovereignty. There is no reason, npon this theorj', why by the same sovereignty men might not be deprived of Divine gifts on account of the transgression of Lucifer. Upon the theory of creationism, the withdrawal of the Holy Spirit from the newly created soul is an arbitrary, not a judicial act. The so-called "guilt" of obligation to penalty (reatus * poenae), on the ground of which the withdrawment of grace

MAX'S CREATION. 51

rests, is putative and fictitious, not real. It is constructive guilt — the product of an act of sovereign will w^liicli decides that an innocent person shall be liable to penal suffering because of another's sin. As in the gospel scheme there is a " righteousness of God," that is, a constructive and unmerited righteousness, when the obedience of Christ is gratuitously imputed, so in this scheme there is an " ^^7^righteousness of God," that is, a constructive and unmerited unrighteousness, when the disobedience of Adam is gratuitously imputed. But this confounds all moral distinctions and destroys all ethics, by annulling the difference between righteousness and unrighteousness, and putting each in precisely the same relation to the Divine sovereignty and agency.

If it bo replied, as it is by those who combine representative with natural union, that between Adam and his posterity there is a natural union such as does not obtain between man and Lucifer, and that this relieves the imputation of the first sin and withdrawal of grace from the charge of arbitrariness, this iscreationism betaking itself to traducianism for support. Because, natural union when examined will be found to be race-union ; and race-union must be total not partial, psychical as well as physical, in order to be of any use in justifying the imputation of Adam's sin. Sin is mental, and a merely bodily connection with Adam is not a sufficient ground for imputing his transgression.

The representative theory of imputation endeavors to parry the objection to an arbitrary punishment for another's culpability, by separating punishment (poena) from culpability (culpa) and asserting that Adam's posterity are punishable for his sin, but are not culpable for it. They are compelled to endure penal suffering on Adam's account, though they are not chargeable with his fault or crime. To this separation between the punishment and the culpability of Adam's first sin, so frequently employed in the later Calvinism, but never in the earlier, there are the following objections :

52 ANTHROPOLOGY.

1. It conflicts with the intuitive conviction of the human mind that culpability and punishment stand in the relation of cause and effect, and hence, like these, are inseparable. A free agent is punished because he is culpable. Ko culpability, then no punishment. !No cause, then no effect. That there can be an involuntary obligation to endure the punishment of culpability, when there is no culpability, contravenes the common-sense and judgment of mankind. " There could be no punishment without culpability ; non esset reatus absque culpa," says Calvin (Inst., II. i S). The position that there can be involuntary punishment without culpability nullifies ethics, as completely as the position that there can be an effect without a cause nullifies physics. Ko more demoralizing postulate could be introduced into the province of law and penalty. When the instance of Christ's suffering punishment without culpability is cited to justify this in the instance of Adam's posterity, it is forgotten that Christ consented and agreed to this uncommon arrangement, while Adam's posterity have no option in the matter. If an innocent person, having the proper qualifications and the right to do so, agrees to suffer judicial infliction for another's culpability, of course no injustice is done to him by the infliction ; 'but if he is compelled to do so, it is the height of injustice.

2. The separation of punishment from culpability is a characteristic of tlie Semi-Pelagian and Arminian anthropology, and when adopted introduces a Semi-Pelagian and Arminian tendency into Augustinianism and Calvinism. Chrysostom, and the Greek fathers generally, make this separation. They explain rjfiapTov, in Pom. 5 : 12, to mean, not "sinned," but "regarded as a sinner;" not culpability (culpa), but liability to suffer what is due to culpability (poena). They denied that the posterity of Adam participated by natural union in the first sin, and are culpable and damnable for it. Adam, they contended, only represented his posterity in their non-existence and absence, and couseMAN'S CREATION. 53

quently the statement of the Apostle that "death passed npon all men for that all have sinned " means, that all men are liable by the sovereign appointment of God to snffer certain evils on account of xVdam's sin, but are not really guilty of it in his sight. This same interpretation reappears in the modern Arminianism. Grotius, Liraborch, Locke, Whitby, John Taylor, Walil, and Bretschneider explain rjnapTov, in E,om. 12 : 5, to mean : " To be exposed to suffering and death ; " " to be regarded as sinners ; " "peccati poenam subire" (Grotius); "propeccati culpam sustines," Wahl : Clavis, in voce. And the reason for giving such an uncommon signification to an active verb which nowhere else in Scripture has such a sense, was the opinion that " all men sinned " representatively, not i-eally.

This is wholly foreign to Augustine. In his theory of imputation, " death passed upon all men because all men sinned ; " not because " all men were reckoned to have sinned." He explained ijfiaprov, in Itom. 5 : 12, in its active sense, and as denoting the act of the species in Adam. According to him, Adam's sin is both culpable and punishable, in the posterity. The culpability (reatus culpae), as well as the obligation to suffer penalty (reatus poenae), passes by participation, not by representation — an idea unknown to Augustine. Julian, for example, crowds him with the common objection, that the posterity could not voluntarily sin in Adam " before they themselves were born, and before even their parents or grandparents were begotten." Augustine replies, first citing the high authority of Ambrose to the same eifect, by saying: "Per unius illius voluntatem malam omnes in eo peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus fuerunt.'" Opus Imperfectum, TY. 104. The same reply is made in a multitude of instances. Compare, De Meritis, I. 10 ; III. 14; De Nuptiis, II. 5; Opus Imperfectum, II. 179; City of God, XXI. xii.

This Augustinian method of defending the imputation

54 ANTHROPOLOGY.

of Adam's sin passed, as we have observed (p. 41 sq), to the Lutheran and Calvinistic creeds of the Reformation, and to the Calvinistic theologians generally, down to the 17th century. Turrettin, we have seen (p. 34 sq.), while laying the first stress upon representation, yet retains the doctrine of natural union in connection with it, though adopting creationism. With Augustine and the elder Keformed theologians, he regards culpability and punishability as inseparable ; and the iniputation of Adam's sin, with him as with them, meant the imputation of hoth reatus culpae and reatus poenae. While holding, of course, to the separation of punishment from culpability in the instance of Christ's vicarious atonement for sin, he denies that such separation is possible when the personal j>iinishnient of Adam's posterity for original sin is the instance. The Tridentine theologians had misemployed this valid separation of the two obligations in the case of Christ's suffering, by transferring it to the ordinary ethical relations of man to the moral law, in order to establish their doctrine of ecclesiastical penance. They contended that although the sacrifice of Chi'ist had freed the believer from the culpability of original sin, it had not freed him altogether from its punishment, and therefore he was still bound, more or less, by the reatus poenae ; and must therefore do penance. From the Tridentine divines, this separation passed subsequently, for a different dogmatic reason, to the Arminians, and to some of the later Calvinists. Turrettin combats this Papistic distinction. lie argues as follows to prove that when original sin is in question, there is no possible separation between culpability and punishability, and that if the sacrifice of Christ frees a believer from the culpability of original sin, it frees him from all obligation to suffer the punishment of it. " The Papists erroneously distinguish judicial obligation (reatus), into obligation of culpability (reatus culpae), and obligation to punishment (reatus poenae). Obligation of culpability, they say, is that whereby the sinner is mideservMAN'S CREATION. 55

ing of the favor of God but deserving of his wratli and condemnation ; but obligation to punishment is that whereby he is liable to condemnation and is bound to it. The former obligation, they say, was taken away by Christ; but the latter can remain, at least in respect to the obligation to temporal punishment. But the falsity (vanitas) of this distinction is evident from the nature of each. For since culpability (culpa) and punishment (poena) are correlated, and judicial obligation (reatus) is nothing else than obligation to a punishment that springs from culpability (reatus nihil aliud est quam obligatio ad poenam quam nascitur ex culj>a), they mutually establish or abolish each other (se mutuo ponunt et tollunt) ; so that if culpability and its obligation is tahen away, punishment, which cannot be inflicted excej)t on account of cidjxibility, ought necessarily to be taken away. Otherwise it cannot be said that culpability is remitted and its obligation taken away, if anything still remains to be expiated by the suffering of the sinner."

De Moor on Marck (XV. viii.) repudiates this separation of punishment from culpability, in similar terms. " Repudianda prorsus est Papistica distinctio inter reatum culpae et poenae." Ileppe (Reformirte Dogmatik, Locus XY.), by quotations, shows that this was the common view among the elder Calvinists. Amesius (XII. 2) founds the obligation to suffer punishment on culpability. " Reatus est obligatio peccatoris ad poenam justam sustinendam propter culpam." Riissen (IX. 57) distinguishes between reatus potentialis and actualis, but rejects the distinction between reatus culpae and poenae. " Reatus Q&i ^^otentialis^ qui notat meritum intrinsicum poenae, quod a peccato inseparabile est ; vel actualis, qui per dei misericordiam ab eo separari potest, per remissionem scilicet, quae proprie est reatus actualis ablatio. Ille pertinet ad peccati demeritum.^ et TO KaraKpiTiKov sen condemnabilitatem, quae semper, peccato adhaeret. Iste vero ad demeriti judicium, sen ku56 ANTHROPOLOGY.

TuKpifia, condemnationem, quae tollitur in iis qiiibus venia peccati facta est." (IX. 59.) " Perperaiu vero a Pontificiis distinguitur reatus in lapsnm culpae et ])oena6 : rcatns culpae illis dicitur, quo peccator ex se indignus est dei gratia, dignus autem est ipsius ira et damnatione ; poenae vero, quo obnoxius est damnationi, et ad eani obligatur." Brann (I. iii. 3, 14) also distinguishes between potential and actual obligation, but denies that punishment can be separated from culpability. " Inepte distinguunt Pontificii inter reatuni poenae et reatum culpae, quasi a nobis possit tolli reatus culpae nianente tamen reatu poenae : quasi Christus nos liberasset a cuJjja, sed ita ut nos ipsi luanius poenam, vel in purgatorio, vel alibi : quod est falsissimum. Ubi enini nulla est culpa, ibi nnllus prorsns reatus, nullaque jpoena concipi potest."

As late as the middle of the ISth century, we find the elder Edwards objecting to the separation of punishment from culpability, which is implied in the passive signification given to Tjfjuaprov by Taylor and the Arminian writers of that day. " Xo instance is produced wherein the verb ' sin ' which is used by the apostle, when he says ' all have sinned,' is any whei'e used in our author's sense for ' being brought into a state of suffering,' and that not as a punishment for sin. St. Paul very often speaks of ' condemnation,' but where does he express it ' by being made sinners ? ' Especially how far is he from using such a phi-ase to signify being condemned without guilt, or any imputation or supposition of guilt. Vastly more still, is it remote from his language so to use the word ' sin,' and to say man ' sinneth ' or ' has sinned,' though hereby meaning nothing more nor less than that he by a judicial act is condemned. lie has much occasion to speak of ' death,' temporal and eternal ; he has much occasion to speak of ' suffering ' of all kinds, in this world and the world to come ; but where does he call these things ' sin,' and denominate innocent men ' sinnerSj' or say that they ' have sinned,' meaning thereby

MAN'S CREATION. 57

that tliey are brought into a state of suffering ? " Original Sin, II. iv. i.

The position that there may be punishment without culpability, in the instance of Adam's posterity, is sought to be supported, as we have before noticed, by the parallel between Adam and Christ. It is said that Christ confessedly suffered punishment " for the sins of the whole world " (1 John 2 : 2) without being culpable for them, and therefore Adam's posterity may suffer punishment for Adam's first sin without being culpable for it. If Christ may endure penal suffering for a sin in which he did not participate, then Adam's posterity may also. This is the standing argument of the representationist, and is often accompanied with the assertion, that the two unities are so exactly alike, that it is impossible for the traducianist to hold that Adam's posterity are inherently and personally culpable through their union with Adam, and not also hold that believers are inherently and personally meritorious through their union with Christ ; that participation in Adam's disobedience carries "with it participation in Christ's obedience. Bnt an examination will show that the two unities, thouirh alike in some particulars, are wholly unlike in othei-s ; so that certain characteristics, particularly those of vicariousness and gratuitousness, that are connected with one cannot be with the other. St. Paul himself directs attention to some points of difference in the parallel. See Ilom. 5 : 15, 16.

1. In the first place, Christ suffered freely and voluntarily for the sin of man, but Adam's posterity suffer necessarily and involuntarily for the sin of Adam. Christ was under no obligation to suffer penalty for man's sin, and had he so pleased need not have suffered for it. " I^o man taketh my life from me, but I lay it down of myself," John 10 : 17, 18,. Phil. 2 : 6, 7. But Adam's posterity owe penal suffering on account of Adam's sin, and have no option in regard to its endurance. They do not, like Christ, volun58 ANTHROPOLOGY.

teer and agree to suffer, but are compelled to suffer ; and their suffering, unlike that of Christ, is accompanied with the sense of ill-desert. Original sin as imputed, inherent, and propagated, is felt to be guilt, is confessed as such, and is forgiven as such. This implies that, unlike Christ, thej must in some way have committed the sin for which they feel personally guilty, and for which they are liable to suffer eternal death.

2. Secondly, Christ was undeservedly punished when he suffered for the sin of man ; but Adam's posterity are not undeservedly punished when they suffer for the sin of Adam. Christ ''suffered the just for the unjust;" but Adam's posterity do not suffer the just for the unjust. Christ was innocent of the sin for which he suffered ; but Adam's posterity are not innocent of the sin for which they suffer. Consequently inherent and personal guilt is separable from punishment in the instance of Christ's suffering, but not in that of Adam's posterity.

3. Thirdly, Christ was a sidjstUute when he suffered, but A.dam's posterity are the principals. They do not suffer in the place of sinners when they suffer for Adam's sin, but they suffer as sinners. They are not vicarious sufferers, as Christ was. They suffer for themselves, not for others. Consequently, the imputation of sin to Christ was constructive and putative ; but the imputation of sin to Adam's posterity is real, like that in the case of an actual criminal.

4. Fourthly, the purpose of Christ's suffering is expiatory / that of the suffering of Adam's posterity is retributive. Christ endured penalty in order to the remission and removal of sin ; but Adam's posterity endure penalty solely for the satisfaction of justice. Their suffering obtains neither the remission nor the removal of sin.

5. Fifthly, the guilt of Adam's sin did not rest upon Christ as it does upon Adam's posterity, and hence he could voluntarily consent and agree to endure its penalty, without beino- under oblis-ation to do so. Christ was free from the

MAN'S CREATION. 59

guilt of Adam's sin, both in the sense of culpa and poena. But the posterity are obligated by both, Christ therefore suffers as an innocent person to expiate a sin in which he did not participate ; but Adam's posterity suffer as guilty persons to satisfy the law for a sin in which they did participate/

This comparison of tiie union of Christ and his people with that of Adam and his posterity shows clearly, that Christ's relation to the penal suffering which he voluntarily endured was radically different in several particulars from that which Adam's posterity sustain to the penal suffering which they involuntarily endure, and that it is a great error to argue from one union to the other, so far as these particulars are concerned ; and especially in regard to the particulars of vicariousness and gratuitousness.*

The obvious fallacy in this argument from the parallel between Christ and Adam lies in the assumption, that because there may be vicarious pe?iaZ suffering there may be vicarious sinning / and that because there may be gratui' It may be objected, that on the traducian theory the human nature of Christ did participate in Adam's sin, because it was a fractional part of the original human nature which committed this sin. This is true ; and if Christ had been born by ordinary generation, and his human nature had not been supernaturally prepared for a union with the Divine, he would have shared the common guilt of Adam's sin. But the effect of the miraculous conception and incarnation upon Clirist's humanity was, to abolish both the guilt and the pollution derived through the Virgin mother from. Adam. Christ's human nature was botli justified and sanctified, before it was assumed into union with the Logos ; justiSed proleptically, as were the Old Testament saints, on the ground of an atonement yet to be made, and sanctified completely by the power of tlie Holy Spirit. This justification and sanctification of Christ's human nature was tantamount to non-participation in Adam's sin. For it placed Christ's human nature in the same innocent a,nd. perfect state that the common human nature was in by creation, and before apostasy. See p. 83. For Owen's statement on this point, see Communion with the Trmity, I.

2 While dissenting from the views of Hodge upon the nature of the union between Adam and his posterity, and of the imputation t.f the first sin, the writer has the most profound respect for the opinions of this learned and logical theologian. With the exception of the elder Edwards, to no divme is American theology more indebted.

60 ANTHROPOLOGY.

tons justification without any merit on the part o£ the justified, tliere may be gratuitous condemnation without any ill-desert on the part of the condemned. The former is conceivable, but the latter is not. One person may obey in the place of others in order to save them ; but one person may not disobey in the place of others in order to ruin them. Christ could suffer by mere representation for his absent people, for the purpose of their justification ; but Adam could not sin by mere representation for his absent posterity, for the purpose of their condemnation.

Those who force the parallel between Adam and Christ so far as to make the imputation of Adam's sin precisely like that of Christ's righteousness, commit the great error of supposing that sin, like righteousness, may be imputed to man in two ways : namely, mcritoi'iously, and unmeritoriously or gratuitously. This is contrary both to Scripture and reason. St. Paul teaches that rigliteousness may be imputed either Kara oc^eikruia, or koto, yapiv = Bcopedv = ;^&)pi9 epycov. Horn. 3 : 21, 24, 28 ; 4 : 3-6. He asserts that righteousness may be placed to a man's account either deservedly or undeservedlj' ; either when he has obeyed or when he has not obeyed. " To him that worketh, is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt. But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness," Rom. 4 : 4, 5. But St. Paul nowhere teaches the same thing respecting 8171. lie never says that sin may be put to a man's account either deservedly or undeservedly ; either when he has sinned or when he has not sinned. His doctrine is that of Scripture uniformly, that sin is always imputed to man and angel Kara ocf^eiXrjfxa', never Bcopeav, never ^typt? epyoiv, never undeservedly and gratuitously. The punishment of man's disobedience he denominates " wages," but the reward of his obedience he denominates a " gift." Rom. 6 : 23. Christ's obedience, which is the same thing as " the

MAN'S CREATION, 61

righteousness of God" (Rom. 1 : 17 ; 0:8), can be a gift to Lis people ; but Adam's disobedience cannot be a gift to his posterit}-. Heaven can be bestowed upon the sinner for nothing that he lias done ; but hell cannot be. The characteristic of gratuitousness, or absence of inherent desert, can be associated with righteousness, but not with unrighteousness. Shedd : On Romans 4 : 3.

Turrettin directs attention to this radical difference between the imputation of Christ's righteousness, and that of Adam's sin. He shows that the nature of the imputation is not identical in both cases, but differs in respect to the ground and reason of the imputation. The ground and reason is, judioial Q.ndi forensic, when Christ's obedience is imputed, but inherent and ])ersonal when Adam's disobedience is imputed. His language is as follows : " Christ by his obedience is rightly said to constitute us righteous not by inherent righteousness, but by imputed : as Rom. 4: : 6 teaches, and verse 19 implies, where the contrast with the antecedent condemnation is mentioned. For those are constituted righteous before God who are absolved from merited punishment on account of the obedience of Christ imputed to them, not less than Adam's posterity are constituted unrighteous, that is liable to death and condemnation, on account of the disobedience of Adam. Kor does it follow, that because Adam constituted us unrighteous efficiently, through the 'projtagation of inherent depramty (effective, per propagationem vitiositatis inhaerentis), on account of %ohich we are liable to death before God, Christ in like manner constituted us forensically and judicially righteous before God by an inherent righteousness given to us by himself. Because the scope of the apostle, which alone is to be considered, does not tend to this, but only exhibits the ground of the condemnation on the one side, and of the justification on the other, in our union with the first and second Adam respectively, as to the fact (rem), though the mode of the union is different, owing to the diversity of

62 ANTHROPOLOGY.

the subject.' Institutio, XVI. ii. 19. It is plain tliat Turrettin here founds tiie imputation of Adam's sin, upon some kind of participation in it. Adam, he says, constituted liis posterity unrighteous " effective, per propagationem vitiositatis inhaerentis." The propagation of inlierent holiness is not the way in which Christ makes his people righteous. The ground of the imputation of Adam's disobedience, according to this statement of Turrettin, is different from that of tlie imputation of Clirist's obedience, because " the mode of the union is different, owing to the diversity of the subject," or agent. The former imputation rests upon something propagated, inherent, and subjective in the posterity ; the latter rests upon something wholly objective — namely, the sovereign decision and judicial declaration of God.

The common distinction between legal and evangelical righteousness also shows that righteousness may be imputed in two ways, but sin in only one. " The foundation," says Turrettin (XVI. iii. 7), "of imputation, is either in the merit and worth of the person to whom something is imputed, or else it is outside of the person, in the mere grace and compassion of him who imputes. The first mode is legal im' " Nee si Adamus noa injustos constituit effective per propagationem vitiositatis inhaerentis, propter quam etiam rei samus mortis coram deo ; sequitur pariter Christum nos justos constituere per justificationem forensem judicii dei per justitiam inhaerentem nobis ab ipso datam. Quia scopus Apostoli, qui unice respiciendus, non eo tendet, ssd tantum vult aperire fundamentum communionis reatus ad mortem, et juris ad vitam, ex nnione nostra cum Adamo primo et secundo, quoad rem, licet modus sit diversus propter diversitatem subjecti." This phraseology of Turrettin, taken by itself, would teach the mediate imputation of Adam's sin ; which Turrettin combated. If Adam's posterity are constituted unrighteous merehj and ouhj "by the propagation of inherent depravity " (and this is all he says here), this was the view of Placa6us. But in other places, Turrettin abundantly teaches that there is a reason for this propagation of depravity — namely, tha immediate imputation of tho first sin. Th3 propagation of inherent depravity requires an explanatory and justifying reason ; but the advocate of mediate imputation in denying the imputation of the first sin itself, gives none. So far as Turrettin held to natural union, the logical reason for tho propagation of depravity would be the impiitation of the first sin to the posterity bocause of their participation in it ; so far as he held to representative union, the logical reason would be the imputation of the first sin to the posterity constructively, and without participation.

MAN'S CREATION. 63

piitation, and the last evangelical impntation." It is clear that while both of these imputations apply to righteousness, only one of them is applicable to sin. Obedience may be imputed to man both legally and evangelically, but disobedience may be imputed to him only legally.

The inference that because God gratuitously imputes Christ's righteousness to Christ's people, he also gratuitously imputes Adam's sin to Adam's posterity, is the same kind of fallacy that lies in the inference that because God works in the human will " to will and to do " when it wills rightly, he also works in it " to will and to do " when it wills wrongly. And to argue that if gratuitous imputation is not true in the case of Adam's sin, it is not true in the case of Christ's righteousness, is like arguing that if God is not the author of sin by direct efficiency, he is not the author of holiness by direct efficiency. Both errors proceed upon the false assumption, that God sustains precisely the same relation to holiness and sin. But holiness and sin are absolute and irreconcilable contraries ; so that some things that are true of the former are untrue of the latter. God may be the author of holiness, but not of sin. He can "give," that is gratuitously and undeservedl}^ impute, righteousness, but not unrighteousness. lie can pronounce a man innocent when lie is guilty, because Christ has obeyed for him ; but he cannot pronounce a man guilty when he is innocent, because Adam disobeyed for him. These are self-evident propositions, and intuitive convictions; and they agree witli the Scripture representations respecting the difference between the imputation of righteousness, and the imputation of sin.

3. Thirdly, the physiological argument favors traducianism. Sex in man implies a species, and a species implies that the entire invisible rudimental substance of the posterity is created in the first pair of the species. In nature universally, the Creator does not create a species piecemeal. Tlie term " species " has a two-fold definition, according to the point of view taken. A species may be defined at its

64: ANTHROPOLOGY.

beginning, prior to its generation and propagation ; or at its close, subsequent to its generation and propagation. In the first case, the species is a unity ; in the second case, it is an aggregate, or multitude.

Defining in the first manner : (a) A species is a single invisible nature created in a primitive pair of individuals, which nature, by division of substance through generation and propagation, becomes a multitude of individuals. Tliis defines the human species at the beginning of its history, or at the moment of its creation on the sixth day. He Avho saw Adam and Eve prior to the conception of Cain, saw the human species in its first mode. The species then Avas one and undistributed, in the first pair of individuals.

Defining in the second nlanner : (h) A species is a multitude of individuals, who are procreated portions of a single invisible nature that was created in a primitive pair, and have descended from them in a natural succession of families. This defines the human species at the close of its history, or at the end of tlie world. He who shall see all the individuals of the human species in the day of judgment, M'ill see the human species in its second mode. The species then will be a multitude, not a unity.

Naturalists generally define in the second manner : that is, as an aggregate of individuals. De Candolle defines a botanical species as " a collection of all the individuals which resemble each other more than they resemble anything else ; which can by nnitual fecundation produce fertile individuals; and which reproduce themselve by generation, in such a manner that we may from analogy suppose them to have sprung from a single individual." Penny Cyclopaedia : Article, Species. Quatrefages defines an animal species as " a collection of individuals more or less resembling each other, which may be regarded as having descended from a single primitive pair, by an uninterrupted and natural succession of families." Human Species, I. iii.

A species, or a specific nature, is that primitive invisible

MAN'S CREATIOX. 65

substance, or plastic principle, which God created from nonentity, as the rudiraental matter of which all the individuals of the species are to be composed. The first oak tree, for example, contained the seminal substance of all oak trees. The Creator has exerted no strictly creative power in the line of the oak, since he originated that vegetable species. He has exerted only a sustaining and providential agency, in the propagation of individual oak after individual oak, as this agency is seen in the law of vegetable growth. This doctrine of the creation of a species is taught in Gen. 2 : 5. God " made every plant of the field, hefore it was in the earthy and every herb of the field, Ijefore it grewP ' This describes the origination ex nihilo of a species in the vegetable kingdom. A plant made by God "before it was in the earth, and before it grew," could not have been an evolution out of tlie earth. It is true that into the composition of the first oak there entered various material elements that were already in existence, the earths and gases, but these did not constitute the oak proper. The oak itself, considered as a new and previously non-existent species, was that invisible jprinci/ple of vegetable life which the creator originated ex nihilo, in this particular instance, by which these earths and gases were built up into the visible oak. It belongs among those " things invisible " of which the eternal Son of God is said to be the creator, in Col. 1 : 16. It is one of those " things not seen " (^^ ^aivoiikva) of which the " things seen " {ja pkeiroixeva) are made. Ileb. 11 : 1,3. Ilodge (Theology, II. 80-82) explains the original invisibility of a species by the following quotations. " The immaterial [invisible] * principle," says Agassiz, " determines

• This is the rendering of the Septuagint and Vulgate. The Targams and Syriac render : " Now no plant of the field was yet in the earth, and no herb of the field had yet sprouted forth. " Speaker's Commentary, in loco.

2 " Invisible " is preferable to "immaterial" in this connection, because the "immaterial" strictly speaking is ihe mental and spiritual. Physical life is neither. It belongs to the material world. It is matter, not mind ; but in an invisible state or mode.

Vol. II.— 5

the constancy of the species from generation to generation, and is the source of all the varied exhibitions of instinct and intelligence which we see displayed. The constancy of species is a phenomenon dependent npon the immaterial [invisible] nature. All animals may be traced back in the embryo to a mere point npon the yolk of an egg, bearing no resemblance whatever to the future animal. But even liere, an immaterial [invisible] principle which no external influence can prevent or modify is present, and determines its f utnre form ; so that the egg of a hen can produce only a chicken, and the egg of a codfish only a cod." Similarly Dana says, that " the true notion of the species is not in the resulting group, but in the idea or pote7itial element which is at the basis of every individual of the group." " Here," says Ilodge, "we ]-each solid ground. Unity of species does not consist in unity or sameness of organic structure, in sameness as to size, color, or anything merely external ; but in the sameness of the immaterial [invisible] pi'inciple or ' potential idea ' which constitutes and determines the sameness of nature."

This view of life as an invisible formative principle lies under all the historical physics, and has been adopted by the leading scientific minds. None but the materialists have reje(;ted it, and their speculations have been destructive of scientific progress whenever they have prevailed. Agassiz' "invisible principle," and Dana's "idea" or "potential element" is the same thing as the "visvitae" of Ilaller, the "nisus formativus " of Blumenbach, the "vis medicatrix naturae" of Stahl, the "living principle" of Hunter, the " individuating principle " of Coleridge, the "animating form " of Saumerez. "The animating form," says Sanmerez (Physiology, I. 16, 17), "of a physical body, is neither its external organization nor its figure, nor any of those inferior forms which make up the system of its visible qualities ; but it is the power, which not being that organization nor those visible qualities, is yet able to proMAJST'S CREATION. 67

(luce, to preserve, and to employ them. It is the presiding principle which constitutes the power of the system ; the bond of its elementary parts; the cement that connects them in one whole ; the eflBcient cause whence the individuality of every system arises, and in which the form it assumes resides. It is the power by which the human species differs from the brute, the brute from the vegetable, the vegetable from inanimate matter ; it is the cause that inanimate matter is converted into organs living and active ; that the acorn is evolved into an oak ; that the brute embryo is evolved into an animal, and the human embryo into a man." Compare Ileinroth : Anthropologic, 54c.

The generation and propagation of individuals succeeds the creation of a species, in the Biblical account. God having originated an invisible specific nature or substance, then provides for its division and propagation into a multitude of distinct and separate individuals. This is tauglit in Gen. 1 : 12. " The earth brought forth grass and herb yieldi7ig seed after his kind, and the tree yielding frtdt, whose seed is in itself, after his kind." This is vegetable propagation. The generation of the animal is taught in Gen. 1 : 22. "Be fruitful and multiply." In the Mosaic cosmogony, the creation of a species is the base, and its evolution into individuals is the superstructure. Every true and real species begins by a creative fiat, back of which there is no species of this kind in existence. A true and real species cannot be accounted for by evolution, because this implies existing substance to be evolved. But when the invisible specific substance has been originated from non-entity, it then develops. "When God has made a vegetable species " before it was in the earth," it then " yields seed after its kind."

That the species contains all the individuals, is proved : {a) By non-sexual propagation. In the lowest range of vegetable and animal life, propagation is without sex. The moner (cell) simply divides itself into two (fission) ; and

68 ANTHROPOLOGY.

these divide again, and so on indefinitely. Here the child is as old as the parent. Roget : Physiology, II. 583, Again in the instance of propagation by buds (gemmation), the cell protrudes a part of itself. It buds. And this protruded part may exist either partially or entirely separate from the stock. In both fission and gemmation, there is no impregnation of egg by sperm, of female by male.

Now in both of these instances, the creative act that originated ex nihilo the species or primitive type, inlaid in it all that evolves from it either by fission or by gemmation. The species is capable of producing all this series by innumerable splittings or dividings, without the intervention of a second creative act of God. This is all prepared and provided for, in the one act that originated the species from non-entity.

(J) Sexual propagation, which is the usual method in the higher plants and animals, also proves that the species contains all the individuals. The two sexes may exist in one individual, who is hermaphrodite, or double-sexed. In most of the higher plants, every blossom contains both the male organs (the stamen and anther), and the female organs (the pistil and germ). The garden snail produces eggs in one part of the sexual gland, and in another part sperm, but the conjunction of the two individuals is requisite to impregnation.

The majority of plants are hermaphrodites. Only a few, like the willow and poplar, and some aquatic plants, propagate themselves by sex in two individuals. But in the animal world, the rule is the reverse. Propagation of a species, here, is by male and female individuals ; and each successive pair is the offspring of a preceding pair, and so backward, until the very first primitive pair is reached. This primitive pair was a creation ex nihilo; and the creator of the first pair created in and with them the invisible but real substance of all their posterity.

A species, or specific nature, then, though an invisible

MAN'S CREATION. 69

principle, is a real entity, not a mere idea. When God creates a primordial substance which is to be individualized bv propagation, that whicli is created is not a mental abstraction, or general term having no objective correspondent. A specific nature has a real existence, not a nominal.

The dispute between the realist and nominalist is easily settled, if the parties distinguish carefully between specific and non-specific substance ; or, in otlier words, between organic and inorganic substance. When specific or vital substance is in view, then realism is the truth ; the species is a reality equally with the individuals that are produced out of it. Both species and individuals are entities. But when there is no species ; when there is no vital specific substance out of which the individual is produced ; then the only reality is the individual. " Species," in this case, is employed in a nominal and improper sense. It is only an abstract term, denoting a collection of individuals who are the only reality in the case.

Accordingly, the answer to the question between realism and nominalism : namely, whether a general conception has objective reality or not, depends upon the nature of the thing referred to. The dispute between the parties has overlooked this. In respect to certain things, the assertion of the nominalist is correct ; in respect to certain others, the realist is correct. For example, the general conception of an ink-stand has no objective correspondent, because inkstands are not propagated from a specific substance or nature. They are inorganic, non-vital substance. They are not a species. They are only individuals. The only reality is the particular single ink-stand. " Ink-stand," as a general term, is merely a name, not a thing. The assertion of the nominalist is correct here. The same is true of the crj'stal. There is no propagation of crj'stals from a common specific substance. The only reality here is the individual crystal. Again, there is no objective correspondent

to sucli general terras as biped, quadruped, animal, vegetable, etc., because these denote classes or orders, not species ; neither is there an objective correspondent to the general term " state " or " nation." " Although we speak of communities as sentient beings ; although we ascribe to them happiness and miserj^, desires, interests, and passions ; nothing really exists or feels but individuals.^^ Paley : Moral Philosophy, YI. xi. The individuals of a nation are not propagated out of the nation, but out of the race. There is no English or French propagation. Propagation is human, not national. Englishmen and Frenchmen are primarily the sons of Adam, and only secondarily the sons of Alfred and Clovis.

But the general conception of an oak, an eagle, a lion, or a man, has objective reality, because each of these is a species. All of them belong to the organic world. The individual oak is a portion of a primitive invisible substance, which substance really exists, because God created it from nothing " in the day that he made every plant of the field before it was in the earth," Gen. 3 : 5, The oak has two modes of existence, while the crystal has only one. The oak first exists as a single specific nature, and then afterwards as a multitude of individuals. The crystal has no existence but that of the single particular crystal. And the same is true of the eagle, the lion, and the man. In reference to these propagated things, realism is correct in asserting that the general conception has objective reality, and nominalism is incorrect in denying it.

Realism, then, is true within the sphere of specific, wganic, Qxi^dL proj)agated\)emg ; and nominalism is true within that of non-sjpecijlc, inorganic, and un2?Topagated being. " Crystal," as a general conception, denotes only the collective aggregate of all the individual crystals that ever exist. The individual, here, is the only actual and objective reality. But " man," as a general conception, denotes not only the collective aggregate of all the individual men that

MAN'S CREATION. 71

ever exist, but also tliat primitive linman nature of wliicli they are fractional parts, and out of which tliey have been derived. The individual, in this instance, is not the only actual and objective reality. The species is real also. The one human nature in Adam was an entity, as truly as the multitude of individuals produced out of it. The primitive unity " man " was as objective and real, as the final aggregate " men."

There is a spurious realism arising from a wrong definition of the term " human nature." Human nature is sometimes explained to be merely a common projjeHij of a substance, like " rationality " or " immortality." As all individual men have rationality and immortality as a characteristic quality, so all men liave " humanity," or " human nature " as a characteristic quality. Human natui-e, as thus defined, is only an attribute, or adjunct of each individual ; and the whole of " human nature," in this case, belongs equally and alike to each individual, as does the whole of the property or quality of rationality or immortality. Dr. Hodge, in his explanation of realism, and objections to it, so understands and defines " human nature." He regards it as an adjunct of the individual ; as something united with it. He explains it as " the manifestation of the general pi'inciple of humanity in union roith. a given corporeal organization." Theology, H. 51. "An individual man is a given corporeal organization, in which humanity as a general life or force is present.''^ Theology, 11. 53. " That which constitutes the species, or genus, is a real objective existence, one and the same numerically as well as specifically. This one general substance exists in every individual belonging to the species, and constitutes its essence." Theology, 11. 53. " Individual men are tlie manifestations of this substance, numerically and specifically one and the same, in connection with their several corporeal organizations." Theology, H. 54. He illustrates his view, by magnetism, electricity, etc. "As magnetism is a force in nature existing antecedently.

72 ANTHROPOLOGY.

independently, and outside of any and all individual magnets ; and as electricity exists independently of the Leyden jars in which it may be collected, or through which it is manifested as present ; so humanity exists antecedently to individual men, and independently of them." Theology, II. 52.

This is an erroneous definition. Human nature is a stibstance^ not the property or quality of a substance. It is not the property or quality of an individual substance, but is itself a specific or general substance. Nor is it a specific or general substance added to, or united with an individual ; because the latter is only an individualized j)a7't of the former. Nor is it a " general principle manifesting itself in a given corporeal organization." All of these definitions are incorrect.' Human nature is a specific or general substance created in and with the first individuals of a human species, which is not yet individualized, but which by ordinary generation is subdivided into parts, and these parts are formed into distinct and separate individuals of the species. The one specific substance, by propagation, is metamorphosed into millions of individual substances, or persons. An individual man is a fractional part of human nature separated from the common mass, and constituted a particular person having all the essential properties of human nature. The individual Socrates, for example, is not a previously existing " corporeal organization," to which " human nature," either in the sense of a property like rationality, or in the sense of a '*■ general substance," or " general principle," is added, but he is a dhiinci jmrt of the human nature created in Adam, which part has been separated from the common mass and individualized by ordinary genera' Anselm complained of this same misapprehension of the notion of a species, on the part of Roscellin and the Nominalists. He contended that general conceptions were not mere flatus vocis, but denoted substances. "Nondum intellegit," he says of Roscellin. "quomodo plures hommes in specie sint unus homo ; non potest intelligere aliquid esse hominem, nisi individuum." Baur : Dreieinigkeitslehre, II. 411 sq.

MAN'S CREATION. 73

tion, and which individualized part has the very same properties tliat tlie common mass has, but a different form. Suppose that a bit of clay is broken off from a larger mass, and then moulded into a cup. This cup now has an individual form that is peculiar to itself, such as it did not have before it was broken off and moulded. This cup still has all the specific properties of clay ; such as extension, color, mineral and earthy elements, etc. But the clay that is in this individual cup, is not the clay that is left in the lump from which it was broken off. Kor is it the clay that is in other individual cups, that have been forujed from other pieces broken off from the lump. ISJ^either is this cup a piece of clay without properties, to which a certain set of properties belonging to the lump are added ; but it is simply a piece of the lump itself, having all the essential properties of the clay, but with an individual shape peculiar to itself. Take another illustration of individuality. There is a definite and fixed amount of carbon in the universe. A certain part of it is individualized under the providential law of crystallization, and becomes a black diamond ; and a certain other part of it is individualized by the same method, and becomes the Kohinoor. The substance of each of these individual diamonds is a fraction of carbon, taken from the original sum total of carbon in the universe. But the foi-m, or individuality^ of the one is quite different from that of the other. And no atom of the carbon that enters into the black diamond enters into the Kohinoor. Similarly, no integrant of that portion of " human nature " which constitutes the individual Peter, is an integrant of the individual John. But John is as truly human as Peter. The common properties of human nature belong to each alike,'

' The inquiry may arise whether carbon, here, is not a species, and the crystal an individual under it — contrary to what was said on p. 69, respecting the inorganic sphere. The reply is, that the crystal though having an individuality has not a specific individuality. This requires that the individual be produced by propagation, and have no other properties than those which are in the specitic substance. But a crystal is not produced by propagation, and even in th« in74 ANTHROPOLOGY.

Another illustration of individuality is furnished by the mao-netic stone. If it be broken into small fraij-ments, each piece will be a complete magnet by itself, having all the qualities of the original unity. Each fragment will have its magnetic poles, and its point of indifference, like the undivided mass. The only difference will be in the quantity and the form ; that is, in the individuality of the piece.

The question respecting the priority of the universal (the species) and the individual (res) arises here. Whether the universal is prior to the individuals, depends upon toJiat individuals are meant. If the first two individuals of a species are in mind, then the universal, i.e. the species, is not prior, but simultaneous (universale in re). The instant God created the first pair of human individuals, he created the human nature or species in and with them. But if the individuals subsequent to the first pair are in mind, then the universal, i.e. the species, is prior to the individuals (universale ante rem), God created the human nature in Adam and Eve before their posterity were produced out of it.

Accordingly, the doctrine of " universale ante rem " is the true realism, in case "res" denotes the individuals of \\\Q posterity. The species as a single nature is created and exists prior to its distribution by propagation. The universal as a species exists before the individuals (res) formed out of it. And the doctrine of " universale in re " is the true realism, in case '' res " denotes only the first pair of individuals. The specific nature as created and existing in these two primitive individuals (res) is not prior to them, but simultaneous with them.'

stance of the diamond, which is the purest form of carbon, it is not absolutely, free from other properties than those of carbon ; while anthracite, charcoal, and graphite, and other individual forms of carbon are highly impure. Carbon, however, is one of those general terms which denote an objective reality within the sphere of inorganic being, and so far goes to prove the truth of realism. The original sum total of carbon is as objectively real, as any one of its individualized parts.

' On realism and nominalism, see Hasse : Anselm, II. 77 ; Neander : History, IV. 356 ; Dorner : Person of Christ, II. 377 ; Ueberweg : History of PhilosoMAN'S CREATION. 75

Tradncianism, or propagation, on the side of the body presents less difficulty, and is adopted by creationism. It should not be confined to the body but extended to the soul, for the following physiological reasons :

1. Man at every point in his history, embryonic as well as foetal, is a tmion of soul and body, of mind and matter. lie is both psychical and physical. There is no instant, when he is a mere brute. An embryo without a rational principle in it would be brutal, not human. The human embryo is only potentially a human body ; and it is also potentially a human soul. The development of tlie psychical part keeps pace with that of the physical. The body of a new-born infant is as distant from the body of manhood, as the mind of a new-born infant is from the mind of manhood. That the human egg-cell under the microscope cannot be distinguished from the canine egg-cell, does not prove that the two are identical in species. If they were, the evolution of one into a man and the other into a dog is unaccountable. There must be a psychical principle in one that is not in the other, which makes the difference in the growth and development of each. The fact that there is no manifestation of mind, does not prove that there is no mental principle in the human embryo. The newborn child reveals moral and mental traits as little as does the unborn child. Foeticide is nnirder in the eye of God, and of a pure human conscience ; but it could not be, unless there is rational as well as animal life in that which is killed. Were there merely and only a physical entity without a psychical, the extinguishment of this life would no more be criminal than the crushing of a caterpillar. Creationists themselves suppose a very early creation of the individual soul, and its infusion into the body. Some make the date, the fortieth day after conception.

In the foetal state, the soul sleeps as it does in the inphy, I. 365 sq. ; Baur : Dreieinigkeifc, TI. 406 sq. ; Baumgarten-Crusius : De vero scholasticorum realium et nominaliura discrimine.

76 ANTHROPOLOGY.

fant, or the adult ; only it is a continual sleep. But the soul is as really existent in its sleeping state, as in its waking state. " Sleep," says Saunierez (Physiology, I. 231), " is that condition of the system when the sentient and rational principles have a total suspension of action, when external impressions are of none effect, and the mind itself is in a dormant state. Such is the natural condition of the foetal state, that the various substances are absent upon which tiie organs of sense and of sensation are destined to act ; and the organs themselves are not properly evolved. Sleep, therefore, must be its natural condition."

2. The creation of the soul subsequently to the conception of the body, and its infusion into it, is contrary to all the analogies in nature. Under the common providence of God, as seen in nature, one portion of a living organism is not first propagated, and then a second part created and added to it. Composition and juxtaposition of parts is not the method in propagation ; but generation and growth of the whole individual creature at once, and altogether. " Nature," says Bolingbroke, borrowing from Bacon, " does not proceed as a statuary proceeds in forming a statue, who works, sometimes on the face, sometimes on one part, and sometimes on another ; but ' rudimenta partium omnium simul parit et producit : ' she throws out altogether, and at once, the whole system of every being, and the rudiments of all the parts. The vegetable or the animal grows in bulk, and increases in strength ; but it is the same from the first." (Patriot King.) So, too, the soul and the body hfive a parallel, and equal growth.

" Nature, crescent, does not grow alone In tliews and bulk ; but as this temple waxes, The inward service of the mind and soul Grows wide withal." — Hamxet, I. iii.

3. If the body is propagated and the soul created, the body is six thousand years older tlian the soul, in the inMAN'S CREATION. 77

stance o£ an individnal of this generation. Personal identity is jeoparded by sucli an hypothesis.

Tlie doctrine of the creation of a specific nature that is psychical as well as physical, and its individualization by propagation, is a mystery like that of all creation ex nihilo, and is a matter of faith. The creation of all mankind in Adam cannot be explained. All that can be done, is to keep the doctrine clear of self-contradiction. " By faith we rationally understand [voovjiev) that the worlds were framed by the word of God," Heb. 11:3. By the exercise of the same kind of reasonable faith, we understand that all men existed and apostatized in the first human pair. The fall in Adam is a doctrine of revealed religion, not of natural i-eligion. Human consciousness and observation teach the doctrine of sin, but not of the sin in Adam. If the Scriptures teach this, and the symmetry of doctrine requires it, and all the analogies of nature favor it, and it explains other doctrines that are inexplicable without it, then it is rational to hold it as a constituent part of the Christian system. And in son)e form or other, the sin in Adam is affirmed in all evangelical anthropologies.

But like all the mysteries of the Christian religion, there is an element of reason and intelligence in this mystery, and it is possible to say something in its defence. The following particulars are to be noted, in this reference :

1. The distinction between "nature" and "person" required in Traducianism, is acknowledged to be valid in both Trinitarianism and Christology. God is one nature in three persons. Christ is one person in two natures. In these spheres, the general term "nature" denotes an objective entity or substance, as much as the general term "person." Realism, not nominalism, is the philosophy adopted by the church, when constructing the doctrines of the Trinity and the God-man. Traducianism carries this same distinction into anthropology. Man was originally one single human nature, which by propagation became millions of persons.

78 ANTHROPOLOGY.

This human nature was as much an objective reality as the Divine nature. And a human person is of course a reality.

2. The individualization, or personalizing, of a connnon nature in and by its issuing persons, is w- holly different in anthropology from what it is in theology. Human generation is infinitely diverse from eternal generation and procession. Each trinitarian person is the whole Divine nature in a particular mode or " form of God," Phil. 2:6; but each human person is only o. portion of the human natin-e in a particular mode or form of man. In trinitariauism, there is no division and distribution of essence ; but in anthropology there is. Tlie persons of the trinity are, each one of them, the same numerical essence, identical, and entire, AVhen it is said, that the Son is " of " the essence of the Father, the preposition eK is not used partitively, as it is when it is said that an individual man is " of " the substance of mankind. The trinitarian persons are also said to be " in " the essence — a preposition never used respecting a human person. God the Father is not a portion of the Divine essence, but is the whole essence in that hypostasis. The same is true of the Son, and the Spirit. But a human person is only a pai't of the specific human nature. If we should suppose God to create a human species that was intended to be propagated into a million of human persons or individuals, and that the distribution of substance was to be mathematically equal in every instance, then each individual of such a species would be one-millionth part of it.

Adam and Eve were two human persons created by God, on the sixth day. In and with them, God also created the entire invisible nature of the human species; the masculine side of it in Adam, the feminine in Eve. This nature was complex: being both psychical and physical, spiritual and material.' Adam and Eve procreated Cain "in their own image and likeness," Gen. 5:3. As they were each of

1 Creationism asserts that it was incomplex and simple. It waa only physical and material.

]\IAN'S CREATION. 79

tliein a sjntliesis and union of body and soul, so was their son. This son was an individualized part of the psjchicophvsical nature that was created and included in the parents. Abel was another individualized part. Four individuals now constituted, and also included the human species, instead of two as at lirst. "Human nature" was now comprised in four persons, instead of two. By ordinary' generation, the specific nature was still farther subdivided and individualized into millions of persons. There is no creation ex niliilo in this process, but procreation out of an existing substance. He who looked upon Adam and Eve in Eden, the moment after their creation, saw the whole human race in its first form. And he who shall look on the millions of individuals in the day of judgment, will see the same human race in its last form. The difference between the two visions is formal, not material.

3. The conception of a " nature " or " specific substance " must be kept metaphysical in Anthropology, as it is in Theology and Christology. All visible and pondei-able elements must be banished, and we must think of a substance that is unextended, invisible, and formless. It M-as at this point, that Tertullian and other traducianists erred. Tliey attempted to explain the mystery by " atoms," " corpuscles," and " animalcules."

In conceiving of the one human nature of M-hich all individual men are portions, we are to think of an invisible, in accordance with Ileb. 11 : 3. " The things which ai-e seen were not made of things that do appear." Visibilities were made out of invisibilities. This way of conceiving is possible, so far as the psychical or mental side of the human nature is concerned. The mind of man is substance ; yet spiritual substance, occupying no space and having no form. It is also possible, so far as the physical or bodily side of the human nature is concerned. For scientific physiology cannot stop with the microscopic cell. It goes back of this, to the invisible life which no microscope can exhibit, as the

80 ANTHROPOLOGY.

ultimate or metaphysical mode of the human body. The vital principle is as invisible as the human spirit itself, though it is animal, not rational entity or substance. We can think of the invisible substance or formative principle of a human body as still in existence, although the body as a visible organization and an extended form has been dissolved to dust for centuries. The body of Alexander the Great, as an invisible, is still a part of the physical universe. It has not been annihilated. And yet it is as difficult to explain its present existence, as to explain its existence in Adam. " The life," says our Lord, "is more than the meat." The invisible principle that animates the body is " more," that is, more real and jyermanent., than the food that nourishes it, or even the material elements which it builds up into a visible form.

The elder Edwards was unquestionably tending towards the Augnstinian doctrine of a specific human nature, in his scheme of a unity of Adam and his posterity constituted by Divine omnipotence working after the manner of a continual creation, in unifying the acts and affections of the posterity. The defect in this, is the absence of an underlying substance^ to be the ground and support of the phenomenal acts and exercises. Adam's posterity lack substantial being in him, on this theory. Had Edwards definitely employed the old category of " substance," instead of " a communion and coexistence in acts and affections " (Original Sin, Works, II. 483), he would have simply reaffirmed the doctrine of Augustine, of the more oi'thodox of the schoolmen, and of the theologians of the Reformation — ■ namely, that the posterity were one in Adam as " natura," " massa," " substantia." A mere " unity of acts and affections" brought about by a Divine constitution, would not be a unity of nature and substantial being. Neither is this conceivable. For acts and affections require a subject; and this subject must be either an individual substance, or a specific substance ; either an individual soul, as the creaMAN'S CREATION. 81

tionist postulates, or a specific one, as the traduciaiiist contends.

In some places Edwards, however, suggests that there may be unity of substance between Adam and his posterity. " From these things," he says (Original Sin, Works, 11. 487), " it -will clearly follow that identity of consciousness depends wholly on a law of nature, and so on the sovereign will and agency of God ; and therefore, that personal identity, and so the derivation of the pollution and guilt of past sins in the same person, depends on an arbitrary divine constitution y and this, even though we should allow the same consciousness not to be the only thing wdiich constitutes oneness of person, but should, beside that, suppose sameness of sxibstance requisite. For even this oneness of created substance, existing at different times, is merely dependent identity — dependent on the pleasure and sovereign constitution of him who worketh all in all."

The following are the principal objections urged against the theory of Traducianism :

1. It is said that it conflicts with the doctrine of Christ'ssinlessness. It does not, if the doctrine of the miraculous conception is held. The Scriptures teach that the human nature of our Lord was perfectly sanctified, in and by his conception by the Holy Ghost. Sanctification implies that the nature needed sanctification. Had Christ been born of Mary's substance in the ordinary manner, he would have been a sinful man. His humanity prior to conception was an undividualized part of the common human nature. He was the "seed of the woman," the "seed of David." As such simply, his human nature was like that of Mary and of David, fallen and sinful. It is denominated " sinful flesh," in Rom. 8:3. It required perfect sanctification before it could be assumed into union with the second trinitarian person, and it obtained it through the miraculous conception. Says Pearson (Creed, Art. HI.), " the original and total sanctification of the human nature was first Vol. II.— 6

82 ANTHROPOLOGY.

necessary, to fit it for the personal union witli the Word, ■who out of his infinite love humbled himself to become flesh, and at the same time out of his infinite purity could not defile himself by becoming sinful flesh. The human nature was formed by the Spirit, and in its formation sanctified, and in its sanctification united to the Word." See Christology, pp. 296-305 ; Shedd : Eomans, 8 : 3.

Theologians have confined their attention mainly to the sanctification of Christ's human nature, saying little about lis justification. But a complete Christology must include the latter as well as the former. Any nature that requires sanctification requires justification / because sin is guilt as well as pollution. The Logos could not unite with a human nature taken from the Yirgin Mary, and transmitted from Adam, unless it had previously been delivered from both the condemnation and the corruption of sin. The idea of redemption, also, includes both justification and sanctification ; and it is conceded that that portion of human nature which the Logos assumed into union with himself was redeemed. Ilisown humanity was the "first fruits" of his redemptive work, "Christ the first fruits, afterwards they that are Christ's," 1 Cor. 15 : 23. Consequently, the doctrine is not fully constructed, unless this side of it is presented.

So far, then, as the guilt of Adam's sin rested upon that unindividualized portion of the common fallen nature of Adam assumed by the Logos, it was expiated by the one sacrifice on Calvary. The human nature of Christ was prepared for the personal union with the Logos, by being justified, as well as sanctified. " God was manifested in the flesh, was justified {iSiKuicoBT]) by (eV) the Spirit," 1 Tim. 3:16. Here, the " flesh " denotes the entire humanity, psychical and physical, audit was "justified." The justification in this instance, like that of the Old Testament believers, was proleptical, in view of the future atoning death of Christ.'

* That the antithesis, here, between ffdp^ and irveJJjua, is the same as in 1 Pet. 3 : 18, and Rom. 1 : 3, 4 : namely, between the humanity and the divinity in

MAN'S CREATION. 83

The gracious redemption of the humanity which the Logos assumed into union with himself, is a familiar point in the patristic Christologj. Augustine (Enchiridion, xxxvi.) teaches it as follows : " Wherefore was this unheard-of glory of being united with deity conferred on human nature — a glory which, as there was no antecedent merit, was of course wholly of grace — except that here those who have looked at the matter soberly and honestly might behold a clear manifestation of the power of God's free grace, and might understand that they are justified from their sins hy the same grace which made the man Christ Jesus free from the possibility of sin ? " To the same eifect, Athanasius (Contra Arianos, 11. Ixi.) says that Christ's human nature was " first saved and redeemed {ecronB^ koI '^Xev^epco^), and so became the means of our salvation and redemption."

2. It is objected that traducianism implies division of substance, and that all division implies extended material substance. Not necessarily. When it is said that that which is divisible is material, divisibility by man is meant. It is the separation of something that is visible, extended, and ponderable, by means of material instruments. But there is another kind of divisibility that is effected by the Creator, by means of a law of propagation established for this purpose. God can divide and distribute a primary substance that is not visible, extended, and ponderable, and yet is real, by a method wholly different from that by which a man divides a piece of clay into two portions. There is an example of this even in the propagation of the body. Here, individual physical life is derived from specific physical life. But this is division of life. Imponderable physiChrist's person, is plain from the context. If this be so, the dative is instrumental in both instances ; denoting the agency by which the action of the verb is brought about. " God was manifested by the humanity, and justified by the Divinity." The " justification " of the human nature was through the atonement made by the Divine nature incarnate. This view of the antithesis between adp^ and irvevfia, was taken generally by the older commentators. Of modem exegetes, it is adopted by Wiesinger.

84: ANTHROPOLOGY.

cal substance is separated from imponderable physical substance. An individual body is not animated by the total physical life of the species, but by a derived part of it. That invisible principle which constitutes the reality and identity of the individual human body (p. 65 sq.) is abscided, invisibly, and mvsteriously, from the specific physical nature of man.' But this process is wholly different from the division of extended and visible substance by human modes. Animal life in its last analysis is as invisible as psychical life, and is as little capable of human divisibility.

Accordingly, the advocates of traducianism distinguish between physical and psychical propagation. Maresius, a Keformed theologian of high authority, refers to this distinction in the following terms : " Whatever be the origin of the soul, these three things are to be held as fixed and certain : First, that the soul is immortal ; second, that God is not the author of sin ; thii'd, that we are born from Adam corrupt and depraved. It would not be more difficult to harmonize the propagation of the soul with its immateriality and immortality, than to harmonize the creation of each individual soul with the propagation of original sin. Only it must be remembered that the propagation in this instance is not a coarse (crassam) material propagation from animal substance, but a subtile spiritual deriv^ation from a mental essence similar to that of the light of one candle propagating itself to another." Theologia Elenctica, Controversia XI. Heppe (Reformirte Dogmatik, XI.) quotes the testimony of Hiissen ; "Communior est sententia eorum, qui volunt animara esse ex traduce ; i.e., animam traduci ex anima, non per decisionem aut partitionem animae paternae, sed modo quodam spirituali, ut lumen accenditur de luraine. ISTos autem statuimus, animas omnes immediate a deo creari, et creando infundi."

But if there may be division and derivation of invisible

^ A species or specific nature is divisible, but an individual is not — as the etymology (in-dividuu8) implies.

MAN'S CREATION. 85

substance, in the case of the body, there may be in the case of tlie soul. It is the invisibility and imponderability that constitutes the difficulty, and if this is no bar to propagation in respect to the physical part of man, it is not in respect to the psychical part. When God by means of his own law of propagation derives an individual soul from a specific psychical nature, he does not sever and separate substance in any material manner. The words of our Lord may be used by way of accommodation here : " That which is born of the spirit is spirit." Psychical propagation yields a psychical product. When God causes an individual soul to be conceived and born simultaneously with the conception and birth of an individual body, that entity which he thus derives out of the psychical side of the specific human nature is really and truly mind, not matter. " Deus est qui nos personat," says Augustine. God is the author of our personality. If he can create an entity which at the very first instant of its existence is a spiritual and self-determined substance, then certainly he C2kn j)roj)agate an entity that is a spiritual and self-determined substance. The propagation of the soul involves no greater difficulty than its creation. If creation may be associated with both spirit and matter, without materializing the former, so may propagation. We do not argue that if spirit is created, it must be material because matter is created. And neither should we argue that if spirit is propagated, it must be material because matter is propagated. God creates matter as matter, and mind as mind. And he propagates matter as matter, and mind as mind. We continually speak of the " growth of the soul," " the development of the mind." These are primarily physical terms, but we apply them literally to a spiritual substance, not supposing that we thereby materialize it. Why may we not, then, speak of the " propagation " or " derivation " of a soul without thereby materializing it ?

If the distinction between creation and propagation is

86 ANTHROPOLOGY.

carefully observed, there is no danger of materialism in the doctrine of the soul's propagation. For propagation cannot change the qualities of that which is being propagated. Propagation is only transmission of something that has already been created, and which is already in existence. The quality is fixed by the original creative act. Propagation consequently can only yield what is given in creation. If we grant, therefore, that God did create the human species in its totality^ as a complex of matter and mind, body and soul, physical substance and mental substance, it is plain that the mere individualizing of this species by propagation must leave matter and mind, body and soul, just as it finds them. Matter cannot be converted into mind by being conceived and born, and neither can mind be converted into matter by propagation. Propagation makes no alteration of qualities, because propagation is transmission only. Both sides of man, the physical and the psychical, will therefore retain their original created qualities and characteristics in this process of procreation, which, it must be remembered, is the Creator's work, carried on by means of laws which he has established for this very purpose of propagating a species, and which is conducted under his immediate and continual providence. That which is body, or physical, will be propagated as body ; and that which is soul, or psychical, will be propagated as sonl ; and this because propagation is merely transmission, and makes no changes in the created qualities of that which is propagated or transmitted.'

Propagation implies continuity of substance, and immutability of properties. In the propagation of the body, there is continuity of substance and sameness of properties, between the producing and the produced individuals ; between the parents and the child. There is no creation ex nihilo, of new substance and properties. In every instance

' Shedd : Theological Essays, 253. Delitzsch : Biblical Psychology, VIL p. 137.

MAIL'S CREATION. 87

of bodily conception, a certain amount of cellular substance which has been secreted and prepared by the invisible physical life issues, and is transformed into a child's embryo. The child, physically considered, is a part of the specific human nature transmitted through the parents, and by their instrumentality formed into a separate individual body. It is an q^spring from them. Xow suppose this continuity of substance and uncliangeableness of properties in the instance of psychical or spiritual substance, and we have the propagation of the soul. Spiritual substance is transmitted under the same providential law by which physical substance is. The soul of the child, simultaneously with his body, is derived psychically out of the common human nature, which is both psychical and physical, upon the traducian theory.

Traducianism would be liable to the charge of materialism, if it maintained either of the two following positions : 1. That the soul is or'iginated by propagation. 2. That the soul is propagated hj physical propagation. Keither of these positions belong to the theory. In the first place, traducianism contends as strenuously as creationism that the human soul is the product of creative power; only, this power was exerted once on the sixth day, not millions of times subsequently. The origin of the soul is supernatural, on this theory as well as on the other. The human soul as specific was not an evolution from physical substance, but a creation ex nihilo of spiritual substance. Propagation merely transmits and individualizes what was given in creation. In the second place, the transmission is not by a physical but a psychical propagation. There is nothing in the term "propagate" that necessarily implies materialism. Before this can be charged, it must be asked : What kind of substance is it that is propagated ; and by what land of propagation ? To assert that there is only one kind and mode of propagation, and that propagation can only mean the propagation of matter, is to beg the question.

88 ANTHROPOLOGY.

3. It is objected, that upon the tradiician theory all the sinful acts of Adam and Eve ought to be imputed to their posterity, as well as the first sin. The reply is, that the sinful acts of Adam and Eve after the fall differed from the act of eating of the forbidden fruit in two i*espects : (a). They were transgressions of the moral law, not of the probationary statute. (J). They were not committed by the entire race in and with Adam.

In the first place, by the Divine arrangement in the covenant of works, it w^as only that particular act of disobedience that related to the positive statute given in Eden that was to be probationary. This statute and this transgression alone were to test the obedience of the race. God never gave this commandment a second time. The command not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil would be superfluous after the fall. Fallen man had got the knowledge. Consequently, all sins subsequent to this one peculiar transgression of a peculiar statute belonged to a different class from the first sin, because they were transgressions of the moral law, and the moral law was not the statute chosen by God to decide man's probation. According to Rom. 5 : 15-19, Adam and his posterity were to stand or fall according as they did not, or did commit this one sin, and this only. Postlapsarian sins were violations of the moral law, not of the probationary law. Rom. 5 : 13, 14 teaches that infants sinned in Adam against the probationary statute only. They did not sin " after the similitude of Adam's transgression," but sinned Adam's transgression itself. They did not commit individual transgressions liJce Adam's first transgression, by sinning against either the law of conscience or the written law, but they sinned Adam's identical transgression. The fact that " death passes " upon them, as upon all of Adam's posterity, proves this.

Secondly, only the first act of sin is imputed, because the entire posterity were in Adam and Eve when it was committed, but ceased to be in theih afterwards. Unity

MAN'S CREATION. 89

of natni-e and participation are the ground of the imputation of the first sin. Wlien this unity is broken even in tlie least, the ground is taken from under imputation, and imputation ceases. The conception of the first individual of the species destroj's the original unity. When Cain was begotten, his separate individual existence began. He was no longer " in Adam ; " and no longer an unindividualized part of the species. He was now the o^spring of Adam and Eve ; an individualized part of the human nature that was created on the sixth day. He received and inherited the corruption that was now in human nature, and subsequently acted it out in individual transgressions. His natural and substantial union with his progenitors being at an end, whatever transgressions they might commit were no sins of his, and whatever sins he might commit were no sins of theirs. With reference to the first sin committed by Adam and Eve before the conception of any individual man, St. Paul (Rom. 5 : 18, 19) says : '* By one offence, judgment came upon all men to condemnation ; by one man's disobedience many were made sinners." With reference to the subsequent individual sins committed after the conception of the first individual man, Ezekiel (18 : 20) says : " The soul that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son."

When the advocate of representative union is asked why the sins of Adam after the first sin are not imputed to the posterity, his answer is, that Adam ceased to represent ; ceased to be a public person. In like manner, the advocate of natui-al union replies to the same inquiry, that Adam ceased to be the race- unity postulated in order to the imputation of the first sin. The moment the individualization of the nature begins by propagation, the unity is at an end. If it be objected, that at least the individual transgressions of Adam and Eve during the interval between the first sin and the conception of Cain must be imputed to

90 ANTHROPOLOGY.

the posterity, because the entire posterity are still in Adam and Eve during this interval, the reply is, that the imputation, even in this case, would not lie upon any individual 2yeTSons of the posterity, for there are none, but only upon the non-individualized nature. These personal transgressions of Adam, if charged at all, could be charged only upon the species. But the fact, already mentioned, namely, that it was the transgression of the Eden statute, and not of the moral law, that was made the probationary sin by the Divine arrangement, shows that the personal transgressions of Adam after his first sin would not be imputable even to the non-individualized nature in him.

The first two individuals included the species, but considered simply as individuals were not the species. Adam and Eve viewed as individuals were not the entire human race, but contained it. So Milton, Paradise Lost, IX, 414 :

" Where likeliest lie might find The only two of mankind, hut in them Tlie whole included race, his destined j^rey."

" In Adam, as a common receptacle, the whole nature of man was reposited, from him to flow down in a channel to his posterity ; for all mankind ' is made of one blood,' Acts 17 : 26, so that according as this nature proves through his standing or falling, before he puts it out of his hands, accordingly it is propagated from him. Adam, therefore, falling and sinning, the nature became guilty and corrupted, and is so derived. Thus in him ' all have sinned.' " Matthew Henry : On Rom. 5 : 13. The specific nature was a deposited invisible substance in the first human pair. The prepositions " in " and " with," in the clause, " sinned in and fell with," imply this. As thus deposited by creation in Adam and Eve, it was to be transmitted. In like manner, every individual man along with his individuality receives, not as Adam did, the tohole human nature but a fraction of it, to transmit and individualize. Every individual is to asMAN'S CREATION. 91

sist ill perpetuating his species. Gen. 1 : 28." Every man, consequently, includes a portion of non-individualized human nature transmitted to him from his ancestors immediately, and from Adam primarily. When, and so long as, Adam and Eve were the only two individuals, the entire species was in two individuals. When, and so long as, Adam, Eve, and Cain were the only three individuals, the whole species was in three. At this present moment of time, the Avhole species consists of millions of individuals ; namely, of the millions now living in this world together with the nonindividualized human nature in them, and the disembodied millions in the other world who include no non-individualized substance, because they " are as the angels of God," Matt. 22 : 30. Thus it appears that the human nature was single, entire, and undivided, only in those first two individuals in whom it was created. All individuals excepting tlie first two include each but a fractional part of human nature. A sin committed by a fraction is not a sin committed by tlie whole unity. Individual transgression is not the original transgression, or Adam's first sin.

Hence it follows, that what is strictly and purely individual in a human person must not be confounded with Mdiat is specific in him. As an individual, he sins individually ; but what he does in this individual manner does not affect that portion of fallen human nature which he receives to transmit. This fractional part of the nature does not " sin in and with " the individual containing- and transmitting it. He may be regenerated as an individual, but this does not regenerate that part of the human species which he includes, and which he is to individualize by generation. His children are born unregenerate. Regeneration is individual

' It is certainly an error, when Baird (Elohim, p. 356), asserts that " the blood of Cain and Abel does not now flow in any human veins ; that human nature is not any longer transmitted from them ; but that Seth is the father of the present popidation of the earth." The line of Seth was that of the church, and that of Cain, of the world as the opposite of the church. Both individuals were concerned in the propagation of the species.

92 ANTHROPOLOGY.

only, not specific. It Is f on tided upon an election out of an aggregate of separate individuals. Consequently, it does not sanctify that fraction of human nature which is deposited in each individual to be propagated. Neither do the individual transgressions of a natural man make the corrupt nature of his children any more corrupt. The non-individualized nature in his person remains just as it came from Adam, ^ov are his individual transgressions imputable to his children ; because the portion of human nature which he has i-eceived, and which he transmits, does not act with him and sin with him in his individual transgressions. It is a latent nature or principle which remains in a quiescent state, in reference to his individuality. It is inactive, as existing in him. It does not add to, or subtract from his individual power. It constitutes no part of his individuality. Not until it is individualized, and being separated from the progenitor becomes a distinct person by itself, does it begin to act out the sinful disposition originated in it when Adam fell.

It is no valid objection to the doctrine of existence in Adam, and in foregoing ancestors, that it is impossible to explain the mode. The question : " How can these things be ? " as in the instance of Xicodemus, must be answered by the affirmation that it is a fact, and a mystery. It is no refutation of the doctrine, to ask how the nature exists before it is individualized or procreated, any more than it is a refutation of the doctrine of the resurrection, to ask how the invisible substance of a human body still continues to exist after death. We know the fact from Scripture ; and science also confirms it by its maxim that there is no anniliilation of rudimental substance in the created universe. The body of Julius Caesar is still in being, as to its fundamental invisible substance, whatever that substance may be. Resurrection, though miraculous, is not the creation of a body ex nihilo. In like manner, the elementary invisible substance of the individual Julius Caesar, both as to soul

MAN'S CREATION. 93

and body, was in existence between the time of the creation of the whole human species on the sixth day, and the time of the conception of Julius Caesar. The Westminster Shorter Catechism (Q. 37) states that the bodies of believers, "being still united to Christ, do rest in their graves till the resurrection." This implies that the believer's body, as to its invisible substance, continues to exist for hundreds or thousands^ of years between its death and its resurrection. But this kind of existence is no more mysterious than the existence of the human nature in Adam, and its continued existence between Adam and the year 1875. In one sense, the posterity of Adam are as old as Adam ; the children as old as the parents. The human nature out of which all individuals are derived was created on the sixth day, and all sustain the same relation to it so far as the time of its creation is concerned. The Seyn of all was then, though the Daseyn was not ; the noumenon, though not the phenomenon, was in existence.

It is important to distinguish traits that are derived and inherited from secondary ancestors, either immediate or remote, and traits that are derived and inherited from the first ancestors. To inherit the gout from one's father, is very different from inheriting the carnal mind from Adam. Such inherited idiosyncrasies are not sinful, though they tempt to sin. A hankering for alcohol or opium may be inherited from a grandfather or father, without culpability for it; but pride, and enmity towards God are inherited from Adam, and are accompanied with a sense of guilt. To inherit a temperament, is to inherit a secondary trait. A choleric temper is not guilt. But envy and hatred are. The testimony of conscience in each case is different. These qualities inherited from secondary ancestors may run themselves out in a few generations. But original sin never runs itself out. The former are conquerable without grace; some persons overcome their hankering for alcohol and opium without regeneration. But original sin is un> conquerable without regeneration.

94 ANTHROPOLOGY.

Derivation and inheritance of sinful character is compatible with responsibility for sinful character, provided that while it is derived and inherited at a secondary point, it is self-originated at 2i. primary one. If sinful character be derived at both the primary and the secondary points, then responsibility is impossible. The individual man derives and inherits his sinful disposition from his immediate ancestors, but originated it in his first ancestors. He is born sinful from his father and mother, but was created holy in Adam and Eve. But if he had derived his sinfulness at Ijoth points ; if sin in Adam had been derived from God ; then its transmission from Adam to the posterity would not have involved any responsibility or fault. In Ps. 51:5, David mentions the fact that he was born sinful, as an aggravation of his particular act of adultery, not as an excuse for it. It evinced the depth and intensity of his wickedness. This could not be, if to be born sinful is the same thing as to be created sinful.

The diflSculty in regard to existence in Adam, the first ancestor, is really no greater than the difficulty in regard to existence in the immediate ancestors. The mystery is only farther off.

CHAPTER 11.

Augustine : City of God, XII. i.-ix. xxiii. Anselm : De Casu Diaboli, XII. Aquinas : Sumnia, II. xciii.-xcvii. Calvin : Institutes, I. XV. Ursinus : Christian Eeligion, Qu. 6. Tuvrettin : Institutio, V. ix.-xii. Howe : Oraqles, Lectures XVI. -XX. Miiller : Sin, IV. iv. Edwards : Original Sin, II i ; Efficacious Grace, ^ 43-51. Hodge : Theology, II. 92-15. Strong: Theology, 262-268. Shedd : History of Doctrine, II. 5^65. Smith : Theology, 252-259.

Holiness, in the order, is prior to sin. Man must be holy, before he can be sinful. " The good," sajs Plato (Protagoras, 3M), "maj become bad; but the bad does not become bad ; he is always bad." Similarly, Aristotle (Categories, IX. v.) remarks that to ^eXnov koI to rifxicorepov TTporepov elvac rf} (fyva-et SoKel. The golden age of the poets is the echo and corruption of the Biblical account of man's original state. Tacitus describes the earliest generation of men as follows : " Yetustissimi mortalium, nulla adhuc mala libidine, sine probro, scelere, eoque sine poena ant coercitationibus, agebant : neque praemiis opus erat, cum honesta suopte ingenio peterentur : et ubi nihil contra morem cuperent, nihil per metum vetabantur." Annalium, IH. 26.

The Westminster statement is the common one in the Augustino-Calvinistic creeds : " God created man after his own image, in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness," S. C, 10. " God said, Let us make man in our own image. So God created man in his own image," Gen. 1 : 26, 27. "God hath made man upright; but they have sought out

96 ANTHROPOLOGY.

many inventions," Eccl. T: 29. "The new man is renewed in knowledge after the image of bim that created liim/' Coloss. 3 : 10.

Holiness is more than innocence. It is not sufficient to say that man was created in a state of innocence. This would be true, if he had been destitute of a moral disposition either right or wrong. Man was made not only negatively innocent, but positively holy. Man's regenerate condition is a restoration of his primitive state ; and his righteousness as regenerate is described as Kara ^eov, Eph. 4 : 24 ; and as '• true holiness," Eph. 4 : 24. This is positive character, not mere innocency.

Con-created holiness is one of the distingiiishing tenets of Auorustinianism. Pelamanism denies that holiness is con-created. It asserts that the will of man by creation, and in its first condition, is characterless. Its first act is to originate either holiness or sin. "Kon pleni nascimur ; " we are not boi-n full of character, Adam's posterity are born, as he was created, without holiness and without sin. Pelagius, quoted by Augustine : De peccato originis, XIII. Semi-Pelagianism holds the same opinion ; excepting that it concedes a transmission of a vitiated physical nature, which Pelagianism denies. So far as the rational and voluntary nature of man is concerned, the Semi-Pelagian asserts that lioliness like sin must be selforiginated by each individual. The Tridentine anthropology is a mixture of Pelagianism and Augustinianism. God created man " in puris naturalibus," without either holiness or sin. This creative act, which left man characterless, God followed with another act by which he endowed man with holiness. Holiness was something supernatural, and not contained in the first creative act. Creation is, thus, imperfect, and is improved by an after-thought. In tlie Modern church, the Calvinists and early Lutherans adopted the Auffustinian view. Tbe Arminians and some of the later Lutherans reject the doctrine of con-created holiness.

MAN'S PRIMITIVE STATE. 97

Holiness has two sides or phases: 1. It is percej?t ion and hnoicledge. As such, it relates to the understanding, God and divine things must be apprehended, in order to holiness. 2. It is inclination and feeling. As such, it relates to the will and affections. God and divine things must be desired and delighted in, in order to holiness.

1. The knowledge in which man was created, was the knowledge of God. It was conscious and spiritual, in distinction from speculative. It was that immediate and practical apprehension spoken of in 1 Cor. 2 : 14, " The things of the Spirit are spiritually discerned." This is proved : {a) By the fact that regeneration " is a renewal in knowledge," after the Divine image, Coloss. 3 : 10 ; but regeneration restores what man had by creation. (J) By the fact that being associated with love and reverence, it must have been experimental.

The knowledge possessed by Adam and Eve before the fall was different from what it was after. This is proved by Gen. 2 : 25, " They were naked and were not ashamed." They were conscious of holiness, and had no consciousness of sin. But apostasy brought with it the conscious knowledge of evil. Gen. 3:7, " The eyes of both of them were opened, and they knew that they were naked." Gen. 3 : 22, " God said, Behold the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil." God knows good consciously, and evil, not consciously but, intuitively by his omniscience. Thus his knowledge of both good and evil is perfect ; although his knowledge of the former is by a different method from that by which he knows the latter.' Unfallen man knew good consciously, and evil only speculatively and

> The narrative in Genesis speaks of a knowledge like that of " God " (Gen. 3:22), and like that of "the gods," or Satan and his angels (Gen. 3:5). The knowledge is described from two points of view. Adam, by apostasy, came to have a knowledge of evil similar to that of God, in that it was a thorough knowledge ; and a knowledge ideyitieal with that of Satan, because it was a conscious knowledge. Respecting the knowledge of unfallen Adam, see Augustine : City of God, XXII. xxx. ; StillLngfleet : Origines Sacrae, I. ii. iii Vol. II.— 7

98 ANTHROPOLOGY.

theoretically. Hence his knowledge of sin was imperfect. On the other hand, fallen man knew evil consciously, and ^ood only speculatively and theoretically. '' The eyes of both of them were opened, and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the Lord, amongst the trees of the garden," Gen. 3:7, 8. " The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God ; for they are foolishness unto him," 1 Cor, 2:14.

There are two ways of knowing sin : («) As the sinner knows it ; and, {h) As the saint knows it. A sinful man knows vice by the immediate consciousness of it ; a holy angel perceives it as the contrast of his own virtue and purity. The latter knowledge of sin is far inferior in thoroughness to the former. Thus it appears, that in Adam the conscious experimental knowledge of holiness implied only a speculative and inadeqnate knowledge of sin ; and the conscious experimental knowledge of sin implied only a speculative and inadequate knowledge of holiness. Holy man was ignorant of sin ; and sinful man was ignorant of holiness. Consciously to know good, is a good ; consciously to know evil, is an evil.

2. The inclination and moral disposition with which man was created, consisted in the perfect harmony of his will with the Divine law. The agreement was so perfect and entire, that there was no distinction between the two in holy Adam's consciousness. Inclination was duty, and duty was inclination. Unfallen Adam, like the holy angels, did not feel the law to be over him as a taskmaster, but in him like a living actuating principle. In a perfect moral condition, law and will are one ; as in the sphere of physical nature, the laws of nature and the forces of nature are identical. It is in this reference that St. Paid (1 Tim. 1 : 9) affirms that " the law is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly and for sinners." Law coupled with the threat of punishment, is law in a form suited only to a will at enmity with it. Law when

MAN'S PRIMITIVE STATE. 99

proclaimed at Sinai to rebellious man is accompanied with thunders and lightnings; but not when proclaimed in heaven to the holy and obedient. Shedd : Sermons to the Spiritual Man, 212-224.

The positive holiness, then, with which man was endowed by creation, consisted in an understanding enlightened in the spiritual knowledge of God and divine things, and a will vi'holly inclined to them. The following are .some of the rational proofs that man was so created.

1. The maturity and perfection of man suppose it. Adam was not created an infant, but an adult. To suppose him to be vacant of the knowledge of God, and of moral character, in this advanced stage of existence, contradicts the idea of complete and mature manhood. A perfect man who has neither the knowledge nor the love of God, is a contradiction.

2. The idea of the will, as a mental facult}-, implies a con-created holiness. Inclination enters into the definition of the will, as necessarily as triangularity does into that of a triansule : as intellio-ence does into that of an understanding ; as properties do into that of a substance. To create a will, therefore, is to create an inclination also. If we should suppose God to create a certain faculty which at the instant of its creation was uninclined, and undetermined either to good or evil, it would not be a voluntary faculty. For a voluntary faculty is one that is marked by voluntariness. It is determined and inclined, and evinces thereby that it is a will. If it is destitute of inclination, it is involuntary ; and an involuntary will is a solecism. To say that it will become voluntary by becoming inclined, does not relieve the difficulty. This is to concede that at present it is not voluntary.

The human will is by creation voluntary, as the human understanding is by creation cognitive. When God creates the understanding, he endows it with innate ideas, and laws of thought, by virtue of which it is an intelligent faculty.

100 ANTHROPOLOGY.

These are the content of the understanding. And when lie creates tlie human will, he endows it with an inclination, or a disposition, or a self-determination, whatever be the term employed, by virtue of which it is a voluntary faculty. This is the content of the will. As the understanding without this created intelligence in its constitution would not be an understanding at all, so the will without this created voluntariness in its constitution would not be a will at all.

3. The creation of a finite mind or spirit implies the creation of holiness. Spiritual substance is distinguished from matter, by the characteristic of self-motion, or motion ab intra. Matter must be moved from without, by another material substance impinging upon it. But mind moves from W'ithin. Its motion is not from external impact, but is self-motion. Adam was created a sjpirit. The instant, therefore, that he was created, he had all the characteristics that distinguish spirit from matter. One of these, and one of the most important, is self-motion. But self-motion is self-determination, and self-determination is inclination.' The Scripture asserts that Adam was created a "living soul." Life implies motion ; and the motion in this case was not mechanical or material, but the motion of mind. Thus in creating a rational spirit, God creates a self -moving essence, and this is a self-determining will.

4. If holiness is not created, the creature improves the Creator's work. Augustine (City of God, XII. ix.) thus argues : " Was the good inclination of the good angels created along with them, or did they exist for a time without it ? If along with themselves, then doubtless it was created by him who created them; and as soon as ever they were created, they attached themselves to him who created them with that love which he created in them. But if the

1 Throughout this discussion, self-determination is synonymous with spontaneity or inclination.

MAN'S PRIMITIVE STATE. 101

good angels existed for a time without a good inclination, and produced it in themselves without God's interference, then it follows that they made themselves better than he made them. We must therefore acknowledge that not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels, it can be said, that ' the love of God is shed abroad in their hearts, by the Holy Ghost which is given unto them.' "

5. The dependent nature of finite holiness implies that it is created. Uncreated, independent holiness is possible on]}' in a self-existent and self-sustaining Being. Holiness in the ci-eature is ultimately suspended upon the action of the Creator. It is derived from him. In its first beginning, it must be given both to angels and men. " The nature of virtue," says Edwards (Efficacious Grace, §§ 43-51), " being a positive thing, can proceed from nothing but God's immediate influence, and must take its rise from creation, or infusion from God. There can be no one virtuous choice unless God immediately gives it. Reason shows that the first existence of a principle of virtue cannot be given from man himself, nor in any created being whatsoever ; but must be inmiediately given from God. God is said, in Scripture, to give true virtue and purity to the heart of man ; to work it in him, to create it, to form it ; and with regard to it, we are said to be his workmanship. Lev. 20 : 8, 'I am the Lord which sanctify you ; ' Rom. 11 : 26, 27, ' There shall come out of Zion the deliverer, and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob.' "

Anselm (De casu diaboli, xii.) argues similarly for the derivation of holiness in the finite will. He contends that if the will of man or angel be supposed to be created in a state of indifference, without any inclination whatever, it could not begin any self-motion at all. It would remain indifferent forever, and never have any inclination. A creature with no character will never originate a character. Consequently, the first inclination of the will must be given to the will when the will is made ex uihilo : and since the

102 ANTHROPOLOGY.

holy Creator cannot give to his own work a bad inclination, lie must give a good one.

6. That holiness is creatable in man, is proved by the facts of regeneration and sanctification. The regeneration of tlie soul is the origination of holiness a second time, within it. This is described, in Scripture, as " giving a heart of flesh," " i-enewing a i-ight spirit within," " working in you to will." This pliraseology teaches that God produces a holy inclination. Again, such terms as "• creating anew," "begetting," "quickening" imply the creation of holiness.

Sanctification likewise proves that holiness is creatable. Sanctification is the increase of holiness ; and the increase is by derivation, not by original production. ISTo Christian augments his own holiness by his own isolated decision. The law of sanctification is stated in John 15:4. "Abide in me and I in you : as the branch cannot bear fruit of itself except it abide in the vine, no more can ye except ye abide in me." The vine branch bears fruit spontaneously (afj) eavTov). The grape is a vital, not a mechanical product. But this spontaneity is possible to the branch, only in case it is in the vine. Similarly, sanctification is spontaneous and free, yet only as it is derived from Christ the source of holiness. Another passage in point is 2 Cor. 9 : 8, "God is able to make all grace abound toward you, so that having all sufficiency {avrapiceiav) in all things, ye may abound to every good work." This " sufiiciency " is that genuine and spontaneous inclination to holiness which impels to good acts ; but this inclination is " made to abound " in the Christian by the grace of God. These facts prove that the spontaneous motion of the will may be a product of God, as well as a characteristic of man ; in other words, that a good inclination, while it is the personal quality of a man, may be likewise a created qualit}^ in him.

The arguments that have been presented for the creatability of holiness assume the correctness of the Augustiuian

MAX'S PRIMITIVE STATE. 103

definition of voluntariness, or free agency : namely, that it is tke spontaneous self-determination of the will. This can be created along with the will, if the will itself can be created. Consequently, it is necessary to establish the correctness of this definition. The freedom of the will is its self-motion. That which is self-moved is not forced to move ; and that which is not forced to move is free. Simple self-motion or self-determination, therefore, is the freedom of the will. " God hath indued the will of man with that natural liberty that it is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined, to good or evil." Westminster Confession, IX. i. " Yoluntarie moveri est ex se moveri, et non ab alio." Aquinas : Summa, I. cv. 4.

It is indispensable to voluntary freedom, that the motion shall proceed from an ego, or true self. The falling of water, and the rising of sap, is only seeming self-motion. One globule pushes another by mechanical law, or by vital force. Xo globule is self-moved. Could a man demonstrate that his action, either internal or external, is not the energy of his own personal essence, but that of another personal essence, or is caused by some physical law or force, he would demonstrate that his action is neither voluntary nor free. But if this indispensable characteristic exists, the substance of moral freedom is secured. Many things may still be out of the power of the will, for omnipotence is not necessary in oi-der to freedom, yet if the will be i-eally self-'mclined and self-determined in its activity, internal and external, it is a free will. It is important, here, to notice that the central as well as the superficial activity of the will must be self-activity, in order to freedom and responsibility. The central action of the will is its steady inclination ; and the superficial action is its m.omentary volition in a particular instance. The murderer's hate is the central activitj'- of his will ; the murderer's act is the superficial. Both must be self-moved, in order to responsibility and guilt. And both are self-moved. The murderer is not foi'ced to hate.

104 ANTHROPOLOGY.

He is willing in his hatred, and in all his moral desiies and feelings ; willing in anger, envy, malice, pride, and all forms of sinful inclination. While, however, the central and the superficial activity of the will are alike in regard to free selfmotion, they differ in regard to the power to the contrary. The superficial activity, or the volition, is accompanied with this power ; the central, or the inclination, is not. The murderer can refrain from the outward act of murder, hy a volition ; but he cannot refrain from his inward hatred, by a volition. A volition can stop another volition ; but a volition cannot stop an inclination. A man can reverse bis sinful volition, but not his sinful inclination. This is an indisputable fact of consciousness.

1. It follows from this, that thepower to the contrary, or of antagonistic action, is not necessary in order to the freedom of the will. Simple self-determination, without the additional power to antagonize the existing self-determination, is enough to constitute voluntariness. If the will move in the direction of holiness by its own self-motion, this fact alone demonstrates the freeness of its action. It is not necessary to add a power to act in opposition to the existing self-motion, in order that the existing self-motion may be self-xs\Q\AOi\ ; any more than it is necessary to add the power to fly, in order that the power to walk may be a power to walk.' When holy Adam was self-determining in holiness, it was not necessary to give him the power to self -determine to sin, in order that he might be self-determining in holiness. The possibilitas peccandi was associated with Adam's primitive state, not in order to his freedom, but in order to his lyrohatioii. If God, bj^ the operation of his Spirit, had preserved Adam from the exercise of an antagonistic and contrary self-determination, Adam would still have been self-determined and spontaneously inclined to

' "Fons erroris est, libertatis naturam metiries laoppoTria, et eirh a/x

MAN'S PRIMITIVE STATE. 105

lioliiiess. And the same is true upon the side of sin. If the will of Satan, or of fallen Adam, is spontaneously selfinclined to sin, this fact alone demonstrates the unforced nature of its sinful action. It is not necessary to add the power to the contrary, i.e., the power to self-incline to holiness, in order that the existing sinful self-inclination may he 5tj//'-inclination. It is not necessary in order to responsibility for a sinful inclination, that the sinner be able to reverse his sinful inclination. It is only necessary, that he was able to originate it, and that he did originate it.

That self-determining or inclining is compatible with inability to the contrary, is proved by the following examples. A man wills to be happy. lie is free in thus willing, because the action of his will is self-action. It is his own spontaneous inclination. Yet he cannot will the contrary. No man is able to will to be miserable. If the power to the contrary necessarily enters into the definition of freedom along with the power of inclining or self-determining, then this man who wills to be happy is not free in so willing. But if self-determination alone, and simply, is the ])roper definition of freedom, then this man is free in his will or inclination to be liappy, because it is his i-eal and genuine spontaneity.

Another instance of moral freedom with inability to the contrary, is that of the unregenerate sinner. His sin is voluntary self-determination. It issues out of the self, and it is the working of the self. It is not another man who sins, but this very man and no othei-. This fact establishes his free agency in this sin. He is inclined to sin, and inclination is free agency. Yet he is unable to overcome and eradicate this sinful inclination. This is a Avell-established fact of consciousness. It is also the teaching of revelation. " No man can come unto me except the Father which hath sent me draw him," John 6 : 44. " Whosoever committeth sin is the slave of sin," John 8 : 34. " Without me ye can do nothing," John 15 : 5. Here are two facts : {a) That the

106 ANTHROPOLOGY.

will wills its own sin ; this is self-determination ; {h) That having so willed, it cannot unwill its own sin ; this is inability.

It is false to infer that the will does not will its own sin, if it cannot nnwill it ; that a person does not act freeh', if he cannot recall his act. If the fact of S(jZ/'-deternnnation has been established by conclusive proofs, the fact must stand. A man throws himself off a precipice. This is an act of the self, lie was not flung off by another self, or by a physical force in nature. It was his own spontaneous act. This makes it a free act. Yet he cannot undo his act. He has no power to the contrary, at any point of his fall. Nevertheless, his fall from top to bottom is chargeable to him as his own responsible act. At no point in his fall, is he innocent of suicide. He is guilty of self murder, at every inch in the descent. An inability that results from an act of the self, is as absolute as that which results from the act of another. A man who kills himself is as dead as a man killed by another. In like manner, an inclination to sin that is originated by the self is as insuperable by the self that originated it, and which now has it, as it would be if it were originated by a third party and forced upon him. Moral inability is as real inability as natm-al inability ; but the former is guilty inability, because it is the product of the will itself, while the latter is innocent inability, because it is the product of God in creation and providence. In every act of transgressing the law of God, there is a reflex action of the will upon itself, whereby it becomes unable perfectly to keep that law A man is not forced to sin, but if he does, he cannot of himself get back where he was before sinning. He cannot get back to innocency, nor can he get back to holiness of heart.

Another instance of self-determination without ])ower to the contrary, is that of God. The Supreme Being is selfmoved. But he is unable to sin. This is taught in James 1:13: '' God cannot be tempted." A being who is inMAN'S PRIMITIVE STATE. 107

temptable is impeccable. Yet in the Supreme Being is to be found the highest form of moral freedom. The more intense the self-determination in any being, the more intense the freedom. Consequently, a Avill self-determined to holiness in an infinite degree is marked by a higher grade of freedom, than one self-determined in only a finite degree. But in proportion as self-determination increases, the power to the contrary diminishes. In God, the infinitude of self-determination excludes the possibility of a change in the self-determination ; that is, excludes a power to the contrary. Freedom and moral necessity are one and the same thing, in the Supreme Being.

Freedom in the Infinite Being is inimutable self-determination ; in a finite being, it is in.-ittcthle self-determination. God is free in his holiness, because he is self -moved in the rishteous action of his will. That this motion is eternal and nnchangeable in one and the same direction, does not destroy the self-motivity, and convert it into compulsion. Man also was free in his holiness, yet could sin. lie was free, because self-moved in the right action of his will. That this self-motion was mutable, and could take another direction, did not destroy the self-motivity, and convert it into compulsion. Thus it appears, that the power to the contrary, or the power to reverse the existing self-determination of the will, is not the snbstance of freedom, but only the accident. The freedom of both the Infinite and the finite will is in the self-motion of mind or spirit, as diverse from matter. That God cannot alter his self-determination to good, does not diminish his self-determination. Tliat man conld alter his self-determination to good, did not increase his self-determination. The freedom, in both instances, is in the existmg action of the will, not in a conceivable or possible action. The present inclining is willing unforced agency.

2. Inclination, or self-determination, excludes indifference. A will that is determined or inclined towards God,

108 ANTHROPOLOGY.

is not indifferent towards God. Indifference is tlie exact contrary of inclination or self-determination.

It is here that the two principal theories of moral freedom find their starting-point. The Augustinian asserts, that the essence of voluntariness is self-determination vierely and only. The Pelagian asserts that indetermination, or indifference, with power to will in either direction, is the essence of voluntariness. Unless this power of alternative choice continually exist, there is no freedom. Ilence it perpetually accompanies the will, Loth here and hereafter. The Augustinian affirms that if a will be really self-mo\edi in a particular activity, such as hatred of a fellow-man for example, it is free, even thongh it be not able to start another activity of a contrary nature, such as love of that fellow-man, A man who is M'alking is really and truly walking, though he is not able to fly. His inability to fly does not affect the nature of the act of walking. And similarly man's inability to love, does not destroy the spontaneity and self-motion of his hate.

Tlie Pelagian contends that such self-motion is insufficient. There must be an indefectible, inalienable power of alternative choice, in order to freedom of the will. But in order that there may be tliis constant power, the will must have no inclination in either direction. Consequently indifference or indetermination, not positive self-determination, is the sine qua non of moral freedom for the Pelagian. The text Dent. 30 : 19, is quoted to prove indifference, and the power of alternative choice. " I have set before you life and death : therefore choose life." But no alternative between these two final ends, and no indifference, is allowed. Only one final end is permitted. Men are not bidden to choose either life or death, but to clioose life. Death is set before them that it may be rejected, not that it may be elected. Life is set before them that it may be elected, not that it may be rejected. Simple self-determination to good is required. Indifference is forbidden. " Choose

MAN'S PRIMITIVE STATE. 109

lifey Tlie election of good is ipso facto the rejection of evil, and vice versa. The holiness of Immanuel is described in a similar manner, in Isa. 7 : 16 : " Before the child shall know to refuse the evil, and choose the good," etc. lie is not indifferent, choosing either evil or good, "but positively inclined to good, and ipso facto disinclined to evil. In brief, tlie difference between tlie Angustinian and the Pelagian doctrine of freedom is this : The Pelagum asserts that the will as nninclined and indifferent chooses, lie postulates a volition antecedent to any inclination. The Angustinian asserts that the will is never nninclined or indifferent. There is no volition pi'ior to inclination. The former places freedom in an act of the will prior to inclining ; the latter places it in the very act itself of inclining.

The objections to the theory that freedom is indetermination, or indifference, are the followino; :

1. The free will, in this case, has no contents. The power of choosing either one of two contrary ways implies that as yet there is no action of the will at all. The will is undetermined. But we have seen that an undetermined will is a contradiction in terms. " Libertas indifferentiae est impossibilis,'' says Leibnitz. De Libertate. Ed. Erdmann, 669.'

' Sometimes "• indifference " is employed to denote the possibilitas peccandi connected with Adam's mutable holiness. Maresius (Systema, VI. 23) so uses it. " Libertatem tribuimus homini primo, non solum spontmicitatis, quod nempe ultro et absque coactione ruerit in pecsatum, sed etiam indifferentiae, juxta quam potuisset abstinere a pecsato, et in illo statu permanere." But this is not the ordinary use of the term. Nor is it a proper use of it. Holy Adam, while ''able to abstain from sin and to continue holy," was not i)uUjfere7it ta holiness.

Howe also asserts that the human will " was created without any determination to good ; it was made in such a state of liberty as to be in a certain sort of equipoise, according as things should be truly or falsely represented by the leading faculty, the mind or understanding." Oracles, II. xxii. Howe supposes this, in order to explain the possibility of the fall. The understanding of Adam was capable of being deceived, because it was finite. And the will was capable of yielding to the deception. This capability he calls an "equipoise"

110 ANTHROPOLOGY.

2. The freedom of indifference is never found in actual existence. There is no example of it. The so-called " formal freedom" is indifference. It is defined by Midler (Sin, II. 28) as " the ability, from an undetermined state, to self-determine." This supposes the faculty to be in e

The freedom of the will is primarily a self-determination to a single end, not a choice between two yet unchosen contrary ends. The central and deepest activity of the will is to incline or tend, not to select or choose. It moves forward by self-motion, and self-decision, to one point. Two contrary objects or ends are not requisite in order to selfdetermination. It is not necessary that there should be a

of the will. But a will not in eqmpoise, but inclined to holiness, is capable of yielding to deception, or any other temptation, provided it be a finite and mutable will. It is not necessary to assume absolute indifference to holiness and sin, in order to account for the apostasy of Adam's will. While, however, asserting this indifference, Howe does not regard it as a necessary element in freedom. It was necessary only iu order to probation. It is " not a perfection belonging immutably to the nature of man," he says. After the fall, it disappears. The sinful will is not in equipoise. Nor is the holy will, in its perfect state in heaven.

MANS PRIMITIVE STATE. Ill

comparison of one object with a contrarj' one, and a choice of the one rather than of the other, in order to the self-determination of the will. If the will shonld know of but one object, saj, its Creator, it might tend or incline to that object, and the tendency or inclination would be the free voluntariness of the will. It is true that the M'ill, in this case, would not \)Q forced to incline to the one object before it. It would have an option to incline, or to disincline, to the one object. But this is already said, in saying that the inclining is self-motion. This liberty to incline or to disincline to one object is very different, however, from the liberty to choose either of two contrary objects. In the latter case, there is a comparison of one object with anothei" ; in the former, there is no such comparison. But what is far moi-e important, in the latter case there is indifference towards both objects ; but in the former, thei'e is no indifference towards the single object. For if thei-e is not inclination to it, there is aversion to it ; if there is not desire for it, there is liatred of it; if the will does not incline to God, it disinclines and is at enmity with him ; if there is not the spiritual mind, there is the carnal mind ; if there is not holy self-determination, thei'e is sinfid self-determination. The will, in this instance, is not indifferent, as in the other, but is committed to an ultimate end ; if not to its Creator, then to itself.

That self -determining, or inclining is the ultimate fact in the freedom of the will, is evident from considering the relation of motives to the will. The will, it is said, is determined by motives. This is often understood to mean, that the will is efficiently and idtimaiely detei-mined by a motive out of itself, and other than itself. This is an error. The will is only proximately and occasionally determined by external motives. Take a case. A man's will is determined by wealth, as a motive. But only because his will is already so se^-determined or inclined, that wealth is a motive for him ; that is, is desirable to him. Were his

112 ANTHROPOLOGY.

will self-determined or inclined to ambition instead of avarice, wealth would not be a motive for him, but power would be. Again, were his will inclined or self-determined to sensual pleasure, this would be the motive that would move or determine it, and neither wealth nor power would be. Thus it is evident tliat the motivitv of a motive, tliat is, its power to move or influence the will, depends primarily and ultimately upon the will's prior inclination, or self-determination. The inclination makes the motive, instead of the motive making the inclination. But the inclination itself is self-made, in the sense of being self-motion. If the will is inclined to the Creator as an ultimate end, then the only motives that influence and move it are spiritual and heavenly. If the will is inclined to the creature as an ultimate end, then the only motives that influence and move it are carnal and earthly. The motives in each instance are determinants, only because of tlie prior bias or self-determination of the will ; they influence the person, only because of his existing inclination. They are only the proximate and occasional, not the ultimate and efiicient cause of the will's action.

The first activity, therefore, of the will, considered as a faculty, is inclination, not volition. Man is always disposed or biassed in his will, before he exerts choices. The will does not incline, because it first chooses from out of a state of indifference ; but it chooses, because it has already inclined. Inclining or self-determining is the primary and central action of the will, and volition or choice is the secondary and superficial. The will, therefore, in its idea and nature, is causative and origwative, rather than elective. Hence guilt is denoted in Greek by acria. It implies causation. " The notion of pure will," says Kant (Practical Eeason, 205, Abbott's Tr.), "contains that of a causality accompanied with freedom, that is, one which is not determinable by physical laws."

The truth of this view of voluntary freedom is evident

MAN'S PRBUTIVE STATE. 113

from considering the case of Adam, first as holy, and secondly as sinful. 1. First, the will of holy Adam was by the creative act inclined to God as the chief good, before it exerted any volitions and made any choices. Adam as a created spirit was self-determined to God and goodness the instant he was created, and in consequence of this internal bias and disposition chose the various means of gratifying it. Holy Adam at the instant of his creation did not find himself set to choose either the Creator or the creature as an ultimate end, being indifferent to both, but he found himself inclined to the Creator, and choosing means accordingly. He was committed to one and only one supreme end of existence, God and goodness, and selected means corresponding. That Adam's self-determination to God was created with his will itself, is not inconsistent with its being s€^-determination. His will if created at all must have been created as voluntary ; since it could not be created as involuntary or uninclined. This inclination was selfmotion. It was the spontaneity of a spiritual essence, not an activity forced ab extra. God necessarily creates a selfdetermining, self-moving faculty, in creating a will. Consequently, holy inclination is both a creation and a selfdetermination, according as it is viewed. Viewed with reference to God, it is created : inclinatio originata. Viewed with reference to the voluntary faculty, it is spontaneous and self-moving : inclinatio originans. Holy inclination is at once the Creator's product, and the creature's activity.

2. Secondly, the will of sinful Adam by his oicn act had been inclined to the creature as the chief good, before it exerted sinful volitions and made sinful choices. Adam as fallen was 56^-determined to evil, and in consequence of this inward bias of his will chose the various means of gratifying it. The first of these choices was plucking and eating of the tree of knowledge. But there is this important difference ; namely, that the evil inclination was not created by God, but was originated by Adam. Sinful inclinaVoL. II.— 8

114: ANTHROPOLOGY.

tion is both the creature's product, and the creature's activity. It is referable to the creature, both as inclinatio originans, and origin ata.

Thus the term "self-determination" has two significations. It may mean that the self-motion is in the self, but •not from the self as the ultimate author. This is created self-determination, which is always holy. Or it may mean that the self-motion is both in the self, and from the self as the ultimate author. This is sinful self-determination. Holiness is self-determined, but not self-originated. Sin is both self-determined and self-originated.

Created self-determination, or holy inclination, is only relatively meritorious or deserving, because man is not the efficient in its oi'igination. Being either con-created in creation, or i-e-created in regeneration, the reward due to a holy inclination of the will is gracious. " Eternal life is the gift of God," Tlom. 6 : 23. Self-originated self-determination, or sinful inclination, on the contrary, is absolutely demeritorious or ill-deserving. Man is the sole efficient in its origination, and therefore the retribution due to it is a strict debt. "Eternal death is ih.e wages of sin." Justice owes retribution to the sinner. Man is absolutely rewardable for trangression, but only relatively rewardable for obedience.

Augiistine: City of God, XTV. vi. Gangauf: Psychologie des Augustinus, VI. i.-v. Anselm : De Libertate Arbitrii. Aquinas : Summa, I. cv. 4. Calvin : Institutes, II. ii. 4-12 ; iii. 5-11. Witsius : Covenants, III. vii. 4-5. Howe : Oracles, I. xxiv. ; II. xxv. Des Cartes : Passions, Pt. I. Art. 17-19. TuiTettin : Institutio, VI. V. Owen : Indwelling Sin, III. Hooker : Polity, I. xi. Burgess : Original Sin, III. iv. J. Taylor : Efficient Causes of Human Actions. Edwards : Religious Affections (in initio) ; Will, III. iv. ; Reality of Spiritual Light. Hopkins : Works, I. 83. Locke : Understanding, II. xxi. Butler : Nature of Virtue (in initio). Reid : On the Intellectual and Active Powers. Shedd : Theological Essays, 230243 ; Literary Essays, 324-328. Kant : Practical Reason (Abbott's tr.) 94, 197, 205-212, 269-289. Coleridge : Aids, Harper's Ed., I. 154, 263, 271-274. Marsh: Remains, 368-390. Delitzsch : Biblical Psychology, IV. v. xii. Beck : Biblical Psychology. Miiller : Sin, III. i. 1-3. Baur : Gegensatz, 118-173. Smith : Theology, 236-252. Green : Prolegomena to Ethics. Hamilton : On the Conative Power. Hopkins : Outline Study of Man, 225-257. Hickok : Empirical Psychology, 382-292.

In discussing the subject of original sin, ranch depends •upon the definition of the "Will ; whether it be taken in a wide, or in a narrow sense. The elder psychology divides the powers of the soul into Understanding and Will ; the later ps^^chology divides them into Intellect, Sensibility, and Will. The former includes the moral affections and desires in the Will ; the latter excludes them from it. For the former, inclination is the principal characteristic of voluntariness ; for the latter, volition is the principal characteristic. In classifying the powers of the soul under two

116 ANTHROPOLOGY.

modes, it is not meant that there is a division of the soul into two parts. The wliole soul as cognizing, is the understanding ; and the whole soul as inclining, is the will.

Locke laid the foundation for the later view of the will, by excluding moral desire and affection from the faculty. " I iiud," he says (Essay II. xxi.), " the will often confomidbd with several of the affections, especially desire, and one put for the other. This, I imagine, has been no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter, and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that shall turn his thoughts inwards upon what passes in his mind when he wills, shall see that the lolll, or power of volition, is conversant about nothing but t\ia,t pa rtlcida?' determination of the mind whereby, barely by a thought, the mind endeavors to give rise, continuation, or stop to any action which it takes to be in its power. This, well considered, plainly shows that the vnll is perfectly distinguished from desire, which may have quite a contrary tendency from that which our will sets us upon. A man whom I cannot deny may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail with him. In this case, it is plain the will and desire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrarj-." Here, " will" denotes a _2^arilc2dar act of the faculty, namely, a volition, and excludes a general act of it, namely, desire or inclination. A man's desire, according to Locke's use of terms, is involuntary. If " will " means on\y volition, then a man's inclination is not "will," because inclination is the same as desire.

Edwards (Will, I. i.) combats Locke, and contends that " a man never wills anything contrary to his desires, or desires anything contrary to his will. In the instance cited, it is not carefully observed what is the thing willed, and what is the thing desired : if it were, it would be found that will and desire do not clash in the least. The thing

THE HUMAN WILL. 117

willed, on some consideration, is to utter such words ; and certainly, the same consideration so influences him that he does not desire tlie contrary : all things considered, he chooses to utter such words, and does not desire not to utter them. x\nd so, as to the thing which Mr. Locke speaks of as desired ; namely, that the words, though tliey tend to persuade, should not he effectual to that end ; his w^ill is not contrary to this ; he does not will that they should be effectual, but rather wills that they should not, as he desires. In order to prove that will and desire never run counter, it should be shown that they may be contrary one to the other in the same thing ; but here tlje objects are two ; and in each, taken by themselves, the will and desire agree." '

Kant, on the other hand, defines the will as the faculty of desire : Begehrungsvermogen. " The notion of the chief good determines the faculty of desire." " The will may be defined as the faculty of ultimate ends (das Yermogen der Zwecke), since these are always determinants of the desires." Kant also denominates the will the practical reason, "because the objects of the practical reason are good and evil. By good, is meant an object necessarily desired according to a principle of reason ; by evil, one necessarily shunned according to a principle of reason." Practical Reason, 210, Abbott's Translation. Green (Prolegomena to Ethics, 152) contends that will is desire towards a moral end. " The man as desiring, or putting himself forth in desire for the realization of some object present to him in idea, is the same thing as willing. Will is desire having

'In this reasoning, however, Edwards, as is frequently the case, does cot mark off choice, or volition, from desire. He calls a volition, a desire. "All things considered," he says, " the man chooses to utter such words, and does not desire not to utter them." Here, the volition by which the v/ords are spoken is called a " desire." But this is not desire as spoken of by Locke, when he says that the man does not desire that the words shall be effectual to persuade. The desire and the volition, in Locke's use of the terms, which is also the correct use, are two different acts of the will ; and one may not agree with the other. But the desire and the volition, in Edwards's use, in this place, are one and the same act, and of course cannot disagree with each other.

118 ANTHROPOLOGY.

the action of a self-determining self npon and within it."

We regard the elder psjcholog}' as correct, in including the moral desires and affections in the total action of the will, and in making two faculties of the soul : namely, understanding and will.'

The Understanding is the cognitive faculty or mode of the soul. It comprises the intellect and the conscience. These are percipient and preceptive powers. They are destitute of desire and inclination ; and they are not self-determining and executive powers. The intellect perceives what ought to be done, and the conscience commands what ought to be done, but they never do anything themselves. They do not incline to an end. They have no love and desire for what is commanded ; and no hatred and aversion towards what is forbidden. The intellect neither loves nor hates ; neither desires nor is averse. The conscience approves and disapproves ; but approbation is not love and desire, nor is disapprobation hatred and abhorrence. Shedd : Sermons to the Natural Man (XY.).

The understanding is the fixed and stationary faculty or mode of the soul. It can be vitiated and injured, but not radically changed. The operation of the human intellect cannot be totally reversed and revolutionized, as that of the human will may be. After the apostasy, the understanding of man obeys the same rules of logic as before, and possesses the same mathematical and ethical ideas and intuitions. And the same is true of the human conscience, as involving the perception of right and wrong. Its structure and laws are unaltered by apostasy. After the fall, man does not have moral perceptions that are exactly contrary to those he had before it. He does not perceive that the

' A full classification on this basis would be, understanding, will, and instinct : using the latter term in a wide sense. The old psychology, however, did not formally appropriate the term instinct, to designate the involuntary side of man's nature, but left it undesignated.

THE HUMAN WILL. 119

love of God is evil, and the love of sin is good. He does not approve of disobedience of law, and disapprove of obedience. The enei'gy with which both intellect and conscience operate after apostasy is, indeed, greatly diminished ; but the same general mode of operation continues. The effect of sin upon the cognitive side of the human soul is to darken, dim, and stupefy, but not radically to change. This fixedness of the understanding is in striking contrast, as we shall see, with the mobility and mutability of the will.

The Will is that faculty or mode of the soul which selfdetermines, inclines, desires, and chooses in reference to moral and religious objects and ends. These objects and ends are all centred and summed up in God. We say moral and religious objects and ends, because there is a class of propensities and desires that refer to non-moral and nonreligious objects. They are the natural or instmctive desires, which are involuntary. Speaking generally, the voluntary and moral desires relate to God. They are either inclined or averse to him ; they are either love or hatred. The natural and instinctive desires, on the other hand, relate to the creature. Of these latter, there are four kinds, («) Physical appetites, (b) Family affections, (c) Social affections, {d) ^Esthetic feeling. These all relate to some form or phase of the Finite, and therefore are not in themselves of the nature of virtue or religion, because religion relates to the Infinite. They may be sanctified by the moral and relio-ious desires, and are so sanctified when the relisrious desires coexist with them ; but they are in themselves neither sinful nor holy. They are constitutional, non-moral propensities, flowing necessarily from man's physical and mental structure. Unregenerate men have them, as well as regenerate. They are none of them the object of a divine command or prohibition, like the moral and religious desires. AVhen husbands are commanded to "love their wives " (Col. 3 : 19), and wives to " love their husbands and

120 ANTHROPOLOGY.

children '' (Titns 2 : 4), they are commanded to love " in the Zo/y/." The mere instinctive love itself is not commanded. This is provided for in the created relation of linsband and wife; of parent and child. The instinctive affection as sanctified by a connection and union with the religions affection of supreme love of God, is what is enjoined. The same is true of the love and obedience of children towards their parents (Col. 3 : 20), of the love and care of parents towards their children (Col. 3 : 21), of the relation of the citizen to the state (Rom. 13 : 5 ; 1 Pet. 2 : 13, 14), of the relation between master and servant (Col. 3 : 22 ; 1 Tim. 6 : 1, 2), and of the physical appetites (Rom. 14 : 6 ; 1 Cor. 10 : 31). None of these are commanded merely as natural instinctive desires and affections, but as sanctified instinctive desires and affections.

The instinctive or natural desires and affections are transient. They relate to the temporal, not the eternal. The famil}', and the state, are institutions that are confined to earth and time. This fact shows that they are non-moral in their nature. The moral and religious is eternal. Kone of the natural and instinctive desires were lost by the fall, though all of them were vitiated and corrupted by it. None of them were converted into their contraries, by the apostasy of Adam. Compare Edwards : Nature of Virtue, Y.-YIir. Calvin : Inst. II. ii. 13.'

The elder theolo2;ians include the moral and religious desires and affections in the Will. Edwards (Affections, in initio) states the view in the following terms : " The will and the affections of the soul are not two faculties ; the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination

' The classification of the instinctive desires is various. Hopkins (Outlines, Lect. IX.), besides the physical appetites, enumerates the desire of existence, of good (happiness), of power, of knowledge, of property, of esteem, of libert,y, of society, of beauty. These can all be brought under the category of the Finite. No one of them is desire for God, and spiritual good.

THE HUMAN WILL. 121

of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of exercise." Again he says (Will, III. iv.), "The affections are only certain iiiodes of the exercise of the will." " The inclination of the will h?^ leading act of the will." In this sense of the term " will," the religious affections are voluntary affections. Edwards identifies the will with the heart, and contradistinguishes it from the understanding. "In the former case, is exercised merely the speculative faculty, or the understanding strictly so called, in distinction from the will or disposition of the soul. In the latter, the will, or hiclination, or heart, is mainly concerned." Spiritual Light. Works, lY. 442. Augustine's psychology is the same : " Amor seu dilectio valentior est voluntas." Trhiity, XV. xxi. 41. " What are desire and joy, but a will inclined towards the things we desire and rejoice in. And what are fear and hatred, but a will disinclined towards the things we fear and hate ? " City of God, XIV. vi. Clement of Alexandria (Miscellanies, II. xv.) says that " what is voluntary is either what is by desire, or what is by choice." It is the common view among the elder theologians. " Affectus in deo nihil aliena sunt quam actus voluntatis divinae." Van Mastricht, II. xv. 19. " The will of God, according to its divers objects, hath different names, to wit : of holiness, goodness, love, mercy, and such like." Koss's Wollebius, p. 17. The elder Calvinists often defined the wnll as rational appetency : " Voluntas, quae est appetitus rationalis, semper est conjuncta cum appetitu sensitivo, ita quidem, ut ipse appetitus sensitivus in homine proportionaliter respondeat voluntati." Keckermann : in Heppe's Reformirte Dogmatik, Locus XV. Consequently, they regarded the inward motions of this rational appetency as sinful and punishable, and refnsed to call them involuntary. "Non omnino invohmtarii sunt isti motus, quia nostra voluntate eos attraximus. Nihil obstat, quominus ad peccatum actuale eos etiam motus referamas : quia nirnirum concupiscent la actuale peccatum est : motus

122 ANTHROPOLOGY.

autem isti aut partes, aut prima puiicta, concnpiscentiae." Keckerman : in Ileppe, ut supra. "As tlie will doth now work upon that object [viz., God] by desire, which is as it were a motion towards the end as yet unobtained, so likewise upon the same hereafter received, it shall work also by love." Hooker : Polity, I. xi. '' The knowledge of man is of two kinds : the one respecting his understanding and reason, and the other respecting his will, appetite, and affections ; whereof the former produceth position or decree, the latter action or execution." Bacon : Advancement of Learning, II. " The difference of men is very great ; you would scarce think thetn to be of the same species ; and yet it consists more in affection than in intellect." Selden : Table Talk, p. 71, Ed. Auber.

The terms inclination, desire, and affection, are interchangeable. The " desire " of the Psalmist's heart is one and the same thing with the " inclination " of his will. He often asks God to " incline " his heart. The inclination of the will is its constant self-determination. The affections or desires are the various phases or aspects of the inclination. Love of God is an affection of the heart ; but it is also one variety of the disposition or inclination of the Christian. Hatred of sin is the aversion of a good man's will, its disinclination to evil. " Yelle, nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedani in objectum voluntatis, quod est bonum universale." Aquinas: Summa, I. cv. 4.

In the Authorized version, " willing " sometimes means '"desiring," and sometimes "purposing," according as it translates Se\w or ^ovXofiat. Pom. 9 : 22, " AVhat if God [though] willing (inclined, ^eXcov) to show his wrath [yet] endured," etc. 2 Pet. 3 : 5, "Willingly (SeXovraf;) ignorant" = desiring to be ignorant. Compare 1 Tim. 2 : 4. Acts 27 : 43, " The centurion willing {/3ou\ofxevo

THE HUMAN WILL. 123

the same as sinful inclination, when he sajs, " Ye lust {tirc^viielre) and have not, ye desire to have [i^rfkoiire) and cannot obtain." When Christ (John, 5 : 0) asks, "Wilt thou be made whole ? " " will " means desire.

The will, unlike the understanding, is mutable. It is capable of a radical and total change, or revolution. It has met with such a change in the apostasy of Adam. Man now is inclined exactly contrary to what he was by creation. In respect to moral and religions ends and objects, he inclines, desires, loves, and acts directly contrary to what he did when he came from the Creator's hand. This great chanire is denominated a "fall." It is an overthrow, a catastrophe. It is not a mere difference in the degree or intensity with which the will operates, but it is an entire alteration of the direction of its activity. The fall of the will was a revolution, not an evolution.

The elder psychology, by regarding the moral desires and affections as modes of the inclination of the will brings them within the sphere of responsibility; and distinguishes in kind between the moral or voluntary, and the natural or involuntary desires. In this way, it precludes necessitating theories of human nature and agency. Spinoza, for example, breaks down the distinction between the natural and the moral, the instinctive and the voluntary, by rejecting Des Cartes' view of the moral affections as voluntary inclination, and contending that " the affections of hatred, anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and force (virtus) of nature as other things." Ethics, III., Pi-eface. The physical appetites, together with the family, social, and aesthetic desires and affections, are clearly different from such affections as envy, pride, hatred, and malice, in their origin and nature. The report and verdict of conscience concerning them is wholly different. They are instinct, not will. That a man craves food is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy. That he feels love and desire towards his kindred, his country, and artistic

124: ANTHROPOLOGY.

beaut}-, is neitlier praiseworthy nor blameworthy. But to feel love and desire when God is presented as the supreme object and end, is holiness; and to feel hatred and aversion, is sin. These latter are not instinctive and constitutional affections, but modes of the man's moral inclination, for which he is approved or condemned.

Moral desires and affections are the self-activity of the M'ill ; its inclination and tendency showing itself in the phases of love or hatred of God ; of desire or aversion towards goodness. They are commanded or prohibited by the moral law ; M-hicli proves that they are voluntary. The feelings of supreme love towards God, and of equal love towards a fellow-creature, are not instinctive, but voluntary. Such love and inclination is not, like the storge of the parental relation, or the involuntary affection of the citizen for his country, a merely natural and necessary efflux from the human constitution, deserving neither praise nor blame ; but it is the tree determination of the human will. To have it, is meritorious. Kot to have it, or to have its contrary, is guilt requiring atonement and remission. Again, the feeling of aversion towards God, or of hatred towards a fellow-man, is not like tlie shrinking of animal life from death, say, the recoil of a child from a viper, an involuntaiy activity of the soul which stands in no relation to law and justice, and is deserving of no punishment. This aversion towards God is called " enmity " (Rom. 8 : 7), the positive hostility of the inclination, the disinclination of the will in its deepest recesses. This hatred of a fellow-creature is the repugnance of the will, and is murderous in its quality ; for "he that hatetli his brother is a murderer," 1 John 3 : 15. Accordingly, in Scripture, hol}^ desire is holy inclination. Ps. 63 : 1, "My soul tliirsteth for thee, my Hesli longetli for thee." Ps. 42 : 1, " So panteth my soul after thee." Such desire is the object of command. Ps. 37 : 4, " Delight thyself in the Lord." The sum of the moral law is a command to love. " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God

THE HUMAN WILL. 125

with all thy heart." And evil desire is evil inclination. Ps. 112 : 10, " The desire of the wicked shall perish." Ps. 140 : 8, " Grant not, O Lord, the desires of the wicked." Prov. 10 : 28, " The expectation of the wicked shall perish." Job 21 : 14, " Depart from ns ; for we desire not the knowledge of thy ways."

The recent psychology distribntes thefacnlties of the sonl into three divisions: Intellect, Sensibility, and Will. The objections to this classification are the following:

1. The moral desires and religions affections must, if anywhere, be included under the Sensibility, by this arrangement. But this is too narrow and shallow a term, to denote those profound feelings, desires, and inclinations that relate to religion. " Sensibility," by its etymology, refers us to the five senses. Properly speaking, it comprises only sensuous feelings and desires. Hence it is wholly inadequate to denote feelings and desires that have no connection at all with the five senses : such as the holy affections of reverence, faith, hope, humility, joy, peace, love ; or the sinful affections of pride, envy, malice, hatred, and the like. Both holy and sinful affections, in their deeper forms, are mental, and disconnected with a physical organism. They. have no connection with the sensuous sensibility. The seraph who adores and burns does not inhei'it flesh and blood. His religious desires and feelings are purely mental. The fiend, also, is intellectual in his depravity. Lucifer, the ethereal son of the morning, was not tempted to apostasy by any sensuous appetite ; and his existing moral condition is mainly intellectual. The wickedness of the fallen angels is denominated by St. Paul, " spiritual wickedness," Eph. 6 : 12. " Sensibility," thei-efore, is an inadequate term to cover that wide domain which includes the moral desires of the heart, and the inclination of the will, and which is entirely distinct from the physical and fleshly side of man.

2. The explanation of the moral desires, and religious affections, is inadequate, by this classification. According to

126 ANTHROPOLOGY.

this division, the will excludes inclination and desii-e, and is only the power of exerting volitions; and the sensibility includes onlj^ the physical appetites, together with certain instinctive, involuntary, and innocent desires. The love of approbation, and the love of happiness, are mentioned as the principal of these latter. When these physical appetites and involuntary desires are " adopted " and " strengthened" by a volition, or are weakened and rejected by it, then sinful or holy affections arise. Virtue and vice thus differ only in degree, not in kind. The love of approbation intensified by volition, becomes pride; diminished by volition, becomes humility. The love of happiness strengthened by volition, becomes selfishness ; weakened by volition, becomes benevolence. The rudimental base of virtue and vice is neither virtuous nor vicious. Thus there is no positive intrinsic morality upon this theory. Those sinful affections mentioned in Gal. 5 : 19, 20, " hatred, variance, emulations wi-ath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders," instead of being regarded as the simple and innnediate inclination of the will, and therefore culpable in their own intrinsic nature, are regarded as complex and compounded. They are made out of innocent and involuntary material derived from the " sensibility," which when intensified by volitions or particular choices becomes guilt.

Furthermore, when a list of involuntary and innocent sensibilities sufficiently large to account for all the virtuous and vicious moral affections is asked for, it is not forthcoming. It is impossible to find innocent bases for " malice, env}^, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, murders, and such like." Neither can " the fruits of the Spirit, love, joy, peace, long-suffering gentleness, goodness, meekness, temperance " (Gal. 5 : 22), be explained out of involuntary and characterless materials.

The theory, moreover, breaks down when the so-called innocent sensibility, the "love of approbation," is examined. This is really nothing but the love of human applause ; the

THE HUMAN WILL. 127

sinful desire mentioned by St. John (5 : 44 ; 12 : 43), when he speaks of those wlio " receive lionor one of another, and seek not the honor that cometh from God only," and who "love the praise of men more than the praise of God;" and by St, Paul, in 1 Cor. 4 : 3, affirming that " it is a very small thing to be judged of man's judgment." This desire for popular approbation is not the same thing as the desire for self -^:^\)l•oha,tlon, or the approval of conscience. The latter is virtuous and proper ; but the former is the base of all egotism, pride, and ambition. It is exactly contrary to the meekness and lowliness of Christ, and utterly opposed to that poverty of spirit, and humbleness of mind which every sinful man ought to have, and upon which Christ pronounces a blessing. Such a " sensibility " as this cannot be the elementary base of holy affections. And the other "sensibility," also, the "love of happiness," is essentially selfish. It underlies the selfish theory of morals, which is ethically nnsound. Ko mere modification of the love of happiness can possibly produce the love of God, or the love of holiness, or the love of man. This scheme, in reality, derives and explains virtue out of vice. Pope describes the method, with his usual condensation and brilliancy.

" As fruits ungrateful to the planter's care, On savage stocks inserted, learn to bear ; The surest virtues thus from passions shoot, Wild nature's vigor working at the root. What crops of wit and honesty appear From spleen, from obstinacy, hate, or fear I See anger, zeal and fortitude supply ; E'en avarice, prudence, sloth, philosophy ; Lust, through certain strainers well refined, Is gentle love, and charms all womankind ; Envy, to which th' ignoble mind 's a slave, Is emulation in the leam'd or brave ; Nor virtue male or female can we name, But what will grow on pride, or grow on shame."

Essay on Man, II.

128 ANTHROPOLOGY.

Spinoza represents all affections, good and bad, as alike springing out of " the endeavor of a thing to persevere in its being." From this one source, he derives the affections of anger, revenge, jealousj, ambition, sensuality, covetousness, love, benevolence, humility, compassion, hatred, joy, grief, envy, contempt, hope, fear, self-distress, pride, repentance, etc. Ethics, Part III.

The elder psychology agrees with Scripture, in its definition of the will. In the Biblical ps^^cholog}^, the will includes the moral desires, and is antithetic to the understanding. In the New Testament, KapBia, !^e\r)fia, and ^ovXtj are terms for the voluntary side of the soul ; and in the Old Testament, nb denotes the same. Tlie cognitive side of the soul is designated in the New Testament by irvevfjia, 1/0D9, and <^pr]v ; and in the Old Testament, by dd_3 and n^i. Girdlestone : Synonyms of the Old Testament.

The primary and dominant meaning of KapZia is will, as antithetic to understanding. It includes the inclination, together with the moral desires, and affections. Rom. 1:24, "Lusts of the heart." Rom. 2:5, "Impenitent heart." 2 Cor. 9:7, " Purposed in the heart." Rom. 10 : 0, 10, " With the heart man believeth." Luke 1 : 17, " Turn the hearts." Deut. 4 : 29, " If thou seek with all thy heart." Deut. 6:5," Love with all thy heart." Ps. 119:112, "I have inclined my heart." Prov. 31:11, " The heart of her husband doth trust her." Lament. 3 : 33, " Doth not afflict willingly " (lieb., " from the heart ").

These passages evince that in the Biblical psychology, the will comprehends the heart. It comprises all that moral activity of the soul which is manifested in loving, liating, inclining, desiring, purposing, seeking, repenting, turning, delighting, trusting, hoping, believing. Each and all of these aifections are phases of the will. They are modes of a man's inclination and self-determination. If they are conformed to the moral law, they are right affecTHE HUMAN WILL. 129

tions, and the will is a liolj' will. If they are contrai-y to the moral law, they are evil affections, and the will is a sinful will. This species of psychical activity is not intellectual and percipient, but affectionate and executive. " The KapSia, or heart," says Owen (On the Spirit, III. iii.), " in Scripture, is to irpaKriKov in the soul, the practical principle of operation, and so includes the will also. It is the actual compliance of the will and affections with the mind and understanding, with respect to the objects proposed by them."

@e\r}/jia denotes inclination and desire, in distinction from volition. Matt. 6 : 10, " Thy will be done." Matt. 7 : 21, " Do the will of my Father." Matt. 18 : 14, '• It is not the will of your Father." John 4 : 34, " The will of him that sent me." Rom. 2 : IS, " Ivnowest his will." Eph. 1:5, " Good pleasure of his will." Eph. 2 : 3, " The desires (-^eXT^/iara) of the flesh, and of the mind." In these passages, the " will " is the will of desire and delight. See Bruder, in voce.

BovXi] and /SovXrjf^a denote volition, in distinction from inclination and desire. Luke 23 : 51, " The same had not consented to the counsel [decision] of them." Acts 18 : 15, " I will be [decide to be] no judge of such matters." Acts 19 : 30, " When Paul would have [purposed to] entered." Acts 25 : 22, " I would [decide] also hear the man, myself." 2 Cor. 1 : 15, " I was minded [purposed] to come unto you." Acts 2 : 23, " The determinate counsel [purpose] of God." Heb. 6 : 17, " God willing [purposing] to show more abundantly unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his council." See Bruder, in vocibus. In these passages, /SovXt] denotes, not a continuous and steady inclination of the will, but its single decision or volition in a particular instance. This decision may agree, or disagree with the inclination. When Christ was crucified by God's will of purpose (Acts 2 : 23), it was contrary to his will of desire and delight. Vol. II.— 9

130 ANTHROPOLOGY.

The primary and dominant meaning of irvevfia, and its cognates vov'i and <^pTi)v, is understanding, as antithetic to will. It comprises all the perceptive agencies of the soul. Mark 2:8," Knowing in his spirit." 1 Cor. 2:11, " What man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man that is in him ? " 1 Cor. 14 : 20, " Be not children in understanding " {(ppecriv). Luke 21 : 45, " Opened their understanding " (vovv). 1 Cor. 14 : 15, " Sing with the understanding -' {vol). Ps. 139 : 14, " My soul {mp) knoweth right well." Prov. 19 : 2, " That the soul be without knowledge is not good." Deut. 4:9," Keep thy soul diligently, lest thou forget." Job 20 : 3, " The spirit (n^"i) of my understanding." Isa. 29 : 24, " They that erred in spirit shall come to understanding." Ex. 28 : 3, " The spirit of wisdom."

As the understanding and will are one soul or person, the terms for each are frequently interchanged. KapSia is put for TTi/eO/ia, in Mark 2:6," Reasoning in their hearts." Rom. 2 : 15, " The law [of conscience] written in their hearts." 2 Cor. 4:6, " Shined in the heart, to give the light of the knowledge of God." 1 John 3 : 20, " God is greater than our heart [conscience] and knoweth all things." Job 9:4, " Wise in heart " (n^). Prov. 7 : 7, " Void of understanding " (nb). Job 12 : 3, " I have understanding (nb) as well as you." 1 Kings 10 : 2, " She spake with him all that was in her heart," i.e. all she knew. Gesenius in loco. Hodge on Eph. p. 249.

Similarly, Trvevfxa is put for Kaphia, in Matt. 5:3, " Poor in spirit." 1 Cor. 4 : 21, " Spirit of meekness." Rom. 7:6," Newness of spirit," Rom. 8:6," Mind {(f)p6vr}fxa) of the spirit." Rom. 8 : 27, " He who searcheth the heart {Kaphia) knoweth what is the mind {(f)p6vr]jjLa) of the spirit (TTi/eO/xaTo?)." Luke 10 : 21, " Rejoiced in spirit." Isa. 42:1, "In whom my soul (idcd) delighteth." Ps. 42:2, " My soul thirsteth for God." Gen. 23 : 8, " If it be your mind (mcp.)." 2 Kings 9 : 15. 1 Chron. 28 : 9, " With a

THE HUMAN WILL. 131

willing mind (uicp)." In the Old Testament, cc?. is very often used to denote the heart and will.

The distinction between the will's inclination, and its volition, is of the highest importance in both psychology and theology. The key to the distinction is found in the following discrimination by Des Cartes (Les Passions, Partie I. Article xviii.). " Onr acts of will are of two kinds. One are the actions of the soul wliicli terminate on the soul itself ; as when we will to love God. The other kind are the actions of the soul that terminate on the body ; as when from the mere will to take a walk, there follows the movement of our limbs, and we go forward.'' The first of these acts of will is inclining ; the last is the exertion of a volition. The same distinction is referred to by Constant : " Je puis faire de bonnes et fortes actions ; je ne puis avoir de bons procedes."

When I say, " I will pick up that stone," this is volition. The action of the will terminates on the body. I am conscions of ability to do it, or not. In this instance, there is a power of alternative choice. I can do one as easily as the other. But when I say, " I will love Grod supremely," this is inclination. The action of the will terminates on the win. I am not conscious of ability to do it, or not. In this instance, there is not a power of alternative choice. I cannot do one as easily as the other. And the reason is, that I am already loving myself supremely. I am already inclined or self-determined. I am already doing the contrary of loving God supremely. And the existing inclination precludes the other. I can do the one which I am doing, but not the other which I am not doing. But when I said, " I will pick up that stone," I was not already inclined to the contrary act — -namely, not to pick it up. In this instance, I was indifferent and undetermined in regard to the act of picking up the stone. Consequently, I could do one thing as easily as the other. In the instance of a proposed change of self-determination or inclination, there is a con132 ANTHROPOLOGY.

trarj self-determination or inclination already existing and opposing. In the instance of a change of volition, there is indifference, or the absence of inclination or self-determination.

The difference between inclination and volition is seen by considering the moral desires and affections. The desire of human applause, or ambition, does not rise by a volition. In this sense, it is involuntary, and those who resolve all the action of the will into volition so denominate it. Yet it is free and unforced activity. It rises by spontaneous inclination. In this sense, it is voluntary. The man is willingly proud and ambitious, and is punishable for it. His desire for fame is the determination of the self. If it is not 5eZ/-determination, it must be determination by some cause other than self. But in this case, the sense of guilt which accompanies it is inexplicable. The same reasoning applies to envy, hatred, malice, and .all other sinful desires. They are not volitionary, but they are voluntary ; they are the inclination of the will, not its volition.

The following particulars mark the difference between inclination and volition :

1. Inclination is the central action of the will ; volition is the superficial action. The inclination is the source of volitions. " It is," says Edwards (Original Sin, 11. i. 1), " the general notion, not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed." By " principles" Edwards means, as he teaches in the context, the disposition or inclination; and by "actions" he means particular choices or volitions. That the inclination is more profound action than a volition, is proved by the fact that a man cannot incline himself by a volition, or resolution. When he is already inclined, no exertion of that volitionary power by which he lifts a hand, or applies his mind to a given subject, like geometry for example, can originate a contrary inclination. lie may, by volitionary eft'ort, fix his

THE HUMAN WILL. 133

thoughts upon God as the Being towards wliom he ought to incline, but this is as far as he can go, if lie is not already inclined. No conceivable amount of resolution, even though it rise to spasm, can start that profound and central action of the will which is its inclination, and is identical with its moral affection and disposition. The central action of the will in inclining is better denominated " voluntary'," and the superficial action in choosing, " volitionary." The voluntary is the spontaneous. Milton speaks of " thoughts that voluntary (i.e. spontaneously) move harmonious numbers." If the term " voluntary " is made to do double duty, and designate both the central and the superficial action of the will, both inclination and volition, it leads to confusion. Some things are predicable of a volition that are not of an inclination. Volitions can be originated at any instant, and in any number ;' an inclination cannot be. If, however, the term "choice" be used to denote the inclination, it should be qualified as the choice of an ultimate end, in distinction from the means to it ; and also, as not proceeding from an indifferent state of the will.'

2. The volition has the same moral quality with the inclination. This is taught by Christ, in Matt. 7 : 17 : " Every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit." Hence the volition has been denominated " executive volition," and the inclination " immanent volition," by those who do not discriminate technically between inclination and volition.

All the volitionary acts of particular choice are performed in order to gratify the prevailing inclination, or determination of the will. A man is inclined to ambition ; and he endeavors to attain the ambitious end to which he is self-determined, by thousands and tens of thousands of voli^ Preference is inclination, not choice, though Locke (Understanding, IV. xxi. ) considers them to be identical. Preference is bias. A man can choose what he does not prefer. He can choose pain in a particular instance, though he prefers pleasure. He can control his choice by a volition, but not his preference.

134 ANTHROPOLOGY.

tions. These are all of them of the same moral quality with the inclination. Thej are vicious, not virtuous. Selfseeking or selfishness is the generic character of human inclination ; pride, envy, malice, covetousness, etc., are varieties of this. These are modes of man's inclination, all of which have the creature not the Creator for the ultimate end. Yolitious are exercised in choosing and using means, in order to gratify these varieties of inclination. In their moral quality, they are the sanje as the inclination. A volition exerted to attain an ambitious end, and gratify an ambitious inclination, is ambitious. A volition exerted to attain a malignant end, is malignant. And so through the entire list. Yolitions cannot be morally different from the inclination which prompts them. This also is taught by our Lord, in Matt. 7 : IS. " A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit."

The volition sometimes seems to run counter to the inclination, but really it does not. A drunkard, from fear or shame, may by a volition reject the cup that is offered to him. He acts contrary, in this particular instance, to his physical appetite for alcohol, but not contrary to the central inclination of his will to self. By the supposition, he is still determined to the creature as the ultimate end, not to the Creator, lie still loves himself supremely. The motive, consequently, from which he rejects the intoxicant in the instance supposed, is a selfish one : shame, pride, fear of man, or some other merely prudential consideration. He is still controlled by his inclination to self. The volition by which he rejected the cup agrees in its moral quality with the state of his heart. It is not holy, because not prompted by the desire and determination to please and obey God. Had he rejected the intoxicant from regard to the Divine command against drunkenness, this would prove him to have obtained a new inclination of the will. But in the case supposed, his volition, though counter to his physiTHE HUMAN WILL. 135

eal appetite, yet agrees with his moral character and disposition of win. He has carried out his selfish inclination bj jiis volition ; only in a different manner from common. His volition in this instance ministered to his pride, instead of to his physical appetite.'

3. The inclination of the will is the result of self-determination, not of a volition, because the inclination is the self-determination viewed objectively. Consider the facts. Adam as created was inclined to holiness. This inclination, although created with his will, was at the same time the self-motion of his will. Viewed with reference to its first author and origin, it was the product of his Maker ; but viewed with reference to his own will, it was the activity of his will, and in this secondary sense the product of his will. This holy inclination was both con-created, and self-determined ; the former, because it was a created voluntariness ; the latter, because of the intrinsic nature of voluntariness.

Kow it is evident that this lioly inclination was not the product of a volition exerted prior to the inclination, and when there was no inclination, but it was the simple selfmotion of the will. The will of Adam moved spontaneously to God as a supreme end, and this spontaneity of the will was identical with the will's inclination. The will as uninclined did not choose to incline, and by this choice made an inclination, but it simply inclined, and this inclining M'as its inclination.

And the same is true of Adam's evil inclination. This, also, was the result of self-determination, not of a volition. Adam, in the act of apostasy, did not make a choice between two contraries, God and the creature, to neither of which was he yet inclined ; but he passed or " lapsed " from

1 Sometimes a volition may be exerted without any inclination prompting it. Out of thirty silver dollars, all newly minted and all alike, a man may take one arbitrarily. He has no motive or inclination to take the one he does take, rather than another. Stat jiro ratione voluntas. This is raprirc. Such a volition is uncommon, and has no morality. It is only a sporadic spasmodic act of the will that moves the muscles convulsively.

136 ANTHROPOLOGY.

one inclination to another ; from one self-determination to another. This instant, he is wholly inclined to good ; the next instant, he is wholly inclined to evil. Such a, fall of the will, cannot be accounted for by an antecedent choice from an indifferent state of the will. It is explained by the possibilitas peccandi. This is the power of self-determining to evil, implied in the mutable holiness of a creature who is not self-sustaining and onmipotent. When God created Adam's will with a holy inclination, this inclination, because ji.nite^ was not immutable. Mutable Adam, unlike his immutable Maker, could lose holiness. lie was able to persevere in his holy self-determination, and he was able to start a sinful self-determination. God left it to Adam himself to decide whether he would continue in his first created inclination, or would begin a second evil inclination. This was his probation. The first sin was the self-determining of the will to evil, which expelled the existing self-determination to good, and not a volition in a state of indifference. It was self-determination to an ultimate end, not a choice of means to an ultimate end. Sinful inclination began in Adam immediately by self-determination, and not mediately by a foregoing volition. He did not choose to incline to evil, but he inclined.

In the instance of regeneration, also, a new inclination is begun immediately by the Holy Spirit, not mediately by the exertion of a human volition. The Holy Spirit regenerates the fallen will instantaneously, and the effect is a new inclining or self-determining of the faculty. The will is " powerfully determined," as the Westminster Confession phrases it. The sinner does not choose or resolve to incline to God, but God the Spirit immediately inclines him. The inclination or self-determination of regeneration differs from that of apostasy, in that it is the effect of God " working in the will to wilV God, in this instance, determines the will by renewing it ; while in the instance of the apostasy, Adam determined himself to evil without any

THE HUMAN WILL. 137

immediate operation of God. Yet there is no compulsion of the will in regeneration, because the Holj Spirit operates as spirit upon spirit ; that is, in accordance with the nature of a mental and self-moving substance, and not as matter operates upon matter. The new inclination of the will is real and true spontaneity, or self-determination. But, there are two beings concerned in it : namely, the Holy Spirit the efficient, and the human spirit the recipient. In the case of the sinful self-determination in the apostasy, there was only a single being concerned, namely, man.

Consequently, inclination or self-determination may be viewed either subjectively or objectively ; either as an activity, or as a result ; as an act, or as a fact. Holy inclination, viewed subjectively, is the activity of the will, its voluntary spontaneity : justitia originans. Viewed objectively, it is this spontaneity as originally created, or subsequently re-created by God : justitia originata. Sinful inclination, viewed subjectively, is tlie activity of the will, its voluntary spontaneity : peccatum originans. Yiewed objectively, it is this spontaneity considered as an abiding state of the will originated by the will itself, in Adam's fall : peccatum originatum.^

4. Inclination differs from volition, as the end differs from

1 This designation of fche subjective and objective aspect of an active principle by the active and passive participle, is employed by the philosopher as well as the theologian. A force of nature contemplated subjectively, as energizing and producing effects, is called natura natural ; contemplated objectively, as having energized and produced an effect, it is called natura naiurata. Gravitation viewed subjectively, as cause, is the invisible force. This is natura naturans. Gravitation viewed objectively, as effect, is the visible phenomenon or fact : e.g., the falling apple. This is natura naturata. The old English poet Hawes (Pastime of Pleasure, Capit. 2.5, 39) employs the terms :

" The right hye power Nature, naturying Naturate, made the bodyes above, In sundry wise, to take their workyng That aboute the wo ride naturallye do move.''

" TiU that dame Nature naturying had made AU thinges to growe."

138 ANTHROPOLOGY.

the means. Inclination is self-determination to an ultimate end, God or the world. When Adam apostatized, his will inclined to self and the creature, as the supreme end. This was a self-originated self-determination. "When this new inclination to self and sin had begun, then began a series of choices or volitions by means of which he might attain the new end of existence which he had set up. And the first of these choices, the first volition that succeeded the origination of the inclination, Avas the reaching forth of the hand and taking the forbidden fruit. This volitionarj act was the means of attaining the selfish end he had now assumed, lie gratified his new inclination bj a choice. For Adam had fallen in his heart and will, before he ate the fruit of the tree of knowledge. lie was already inclined to self, prior to this outward act ; and the volition by which he reached forth the hand and took the fruit was executive of his new inclination. It did not originate his inclination, but expressed and exhibited it.

The term " choice,'' as has been observed, is applied indiscriminately to the election of the end as well as of the means, by those wdio do not distinguish between voluntary and volitionary action. Adam, thej' say, chose self as the ultimate end, instead of choosing God. But this indiscriminate use of the term is confusing. It is preferable to appropriate each term to its proper act. The will " inclines " to an end, and " chooses " a means. Edwards sometimes appropriates the term " choice " to volitions, and uses the term " disposition," or " affection," to denote inclination. " It is agreeable," he says (Original Sin, II. i. 1), " to the sense of the minds of men in all nations and ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but the good choice itself from which that effect proceeds; yea, and not only so, but also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or aifection of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice is virtuous." In this passage, three elements are mentioned : (a) The outTHE HUMAN WILL. 139

ward act : " the fruit or effect of a good choice." (h) The choice, or volition that caused the outward act. (c) The " disposition, temper, or affection " which produced the volition. Edwards's position in regard to each of them is : (a) That the outward act is preceded and produced by the volition, {h) That the volition is preceded and produced by the disposition, or inclination, {c) That the disposition or inclination, if holy, is either con-created with the will, or else re-originated in regeneration ; if sinful, is originated in Adam's apostasy. But inasmuch as Edwards does not formally and technically appropriate the term " choice " to volitions, but employs it oftentimes to designate the inclination ; and still more, because he uses the term " voluntary," as his Arminian opponents did, to denote alike what is volitionary or " caused by antecedent choice " (Works, II. 122), and what is bias or inclination, he has exposed himself to the misinterpretation which his views have sometimes met with.'

Julius Muller (Sin, I. 31) remarks that " the true conception of the will does not lie in the element of self-determination alone. This Ave must attribute in a certain sense to creatures without rational intelligence. Self-determination becomes will, only when it is conscious of itself." But it is incorrect to call the volitions of animals, " self-determination;" and to make the only difference between human and animal will, to lie in an act of hwvjledge. There is a difference in the khul of activity. Will in man is rational, nnnecessitated self-activity towards a moral end.

1 The following are examples of the indiscriminate use of inclination and choice, by Edwards : " If the will, all things now considered, indiues or chooses to go that way, then it cannot choose, all things now considered, to go the other way, and so cannot choose to be made to go the other way." Will, III. iv. Edwards, here, is speaking of inclination, not of volition. Again, he says, " The thing which has led men into this inconsistent notion of action when applied to volition, as though it were essential to this wternal action" etc. Will, IV. ii. Here, Edwards designates the internal action, or inclination of the will, by the term volition.

140 ANTHROPOLOGY.

Will in animals is irrational, necessitated activity in choosing means to a physical end necessitated by physical instinct. The former is real self-determination ; the latter is not. The animal \^ forced by the law of his physical nature to the end aimed at in his volitions ; the man is not. The brute nntLst attain the end of his creation ; the man may or may not. Instinct in the animal is involuntary ; inclination in man is voluntary.'

5. Volition is common to man and the animal creation ; inclination or self-determination belongs only to man, and other rational beings. The movements of the lingers of a pianist are each caused by an act of choice, in distinction from an act of self-determination to an ultimate end. There are thousands of volitions exerted in a few moments. Volition is also seen in insects, and is inconceivably rapid in them. Volition here is innervation. Excitement of the nerve results in excitement of the muscle. If the molecular theory of vitality were true, volition in insects would be rightly defined as Haeckel defines will : namely, " the habit of molecular motion." It would be the molecular process in the nervous-muscular system. A gnat, according to a French naturalist, vibrates its wings five hundred times in a second. The vibrations of the wings of the common fly, according to an English naturalist, are as many as six hundred in a second. Pouchet : Universe, p. 112. These are each and every one of them volitionary, not voluntary acts ; choice, not self-determination ; and ai'e the same in kind with those by which the pianist plays a tune, or a drummer beats a tattoo. For if the vibrations of the gnat's wing were not caused by volitions, it could not stop flying. The motion would be mechanical, and animals

' Hartmann, in his Philosophy of the Unconscious, makes will synonymous with vitality. Animal growth, animal instinct, animal lust, equally with human inclination and volition, are alike modes of will, according to this theorist. The distinction between nature and spirit, matter and mind, is denied, and the whole universe is converted into a blind pantheistic movement of physical appetite and bestial desire, called "will."

THE HUMAN WILL. 141

would be machines as Descartes asserted in his curious theory. Naturalists are now distinguishing between vegetable or passive life, and active or wilful life. The vegetable puts forth no volitions ; the animal does.

But volition in the animal or the insect has soniethhig behind it as its ground and cause, as volition in man has. This back-ground and originating source in the animal is instinct. This takes the place of self-determination or inclination, in man. All the volitions of an animal or an insect are exerted for the purpose of attaining the end prescribed by animal instinct, just as the volitions of a man are exerted for the purpose of reaching the end prescribed by his moral inclination. Yolitionary action in man is responsible, because the disposition or inclination prompting it is self-moved. But in the animal, volitionary action is irresponsible, because instinct is not self-moved. Instinct is the necessitated motion of physical substance, in accordance with physical properties and laws. Inclination is the free motion of mental and spiritual substance, which is not controlled by physical law.

6. Inclination or self-determination is inherited ; volitions or choices are not. The bias of the will is born with the individual. His choices or volitions are not born with him, and do not begin until self-consciousness begins. The sinful self-determination began in Adam, prior to birth ; sinful volitions begin in the individual, after birth.

7. Inclination is free, because it is self-determined ; volition is necessitated, because it is determined in its morality by the inclination of which it is the executive. The selfishly inclined drunkard may drink or not drink in a particular instance, and thus seems to be free in regard to volition, but in either case, his volition is selfish like his inclination. Apparently and formally it is free, but really, it is necessitated. 'No volition can be holy, if it is the executive of a sinful inclination ; or sinful, if it is the executive of a holy inclination. Hence man's freedom must be

142 ANTHROPOLOGY.

sought for in his ijidmatio?i, not in liis volitions. Moral necessity can be predicated of volitions, but not of inclination. There is a necessary connection between volitions and the foregoing inclination of which they are the index and executive ; but no such necessary connection exists between an inclination and a foregoing inclination, or between an inclination and a foregoing volition. It is improper to say, that a person must incline in a certain manner, but proper to say that he fnicst choose in a certain manner. If he has an evil inclination, his choices are necessarily evil ; but his inclination itself is not necessarily evil. Inclination has no antecedent, but constitutes an absolute beginning ex nihilo ; but a volition does not.

This is what Kant means, when he asserts that the will as noumenon, or " thing in itself," is free, but as phenomenon is necessitated. Practical Reason. Abbott's Trans., 2G9-2S9. The law of cause and effect, or of the antecedent causiug the consequent, operates in regard to the phenomenal series of volitions in time, but not in regard to the abiding inclination which underlies them, and which is referable to no particular moment of time. The inclination is not a series, but a unit. There is only one inclination (noumenon), but myriads of volitions (phenomena). The inclination is not caused either by an antecedent inclination, or by a volition, but is self-caused. And the inclination is the real will of the man : the Ding an sich. Ritschl (History of Justification, YII.) states Kant's doctrine as follow^s : " Freedom denotes the will as unconditioned causality out of time, in distinction from the phenomena of will that run on in time, and are subject to natural necessity. The reason why every recollection of an act committed lono- ao-o calls forth sorrow is, that reason in all that pertains to our moral existence recognizes no distinctions of time, but asks only if the action was really mine." Edwards teaches the same truth in his doctrine of moral necessityaccording to which, the volition in its moral quality necesTHE HUMAN WILL. 143

sarilj follows the inclination. M. Hopkins, also, says that "choice" is free, but "volition" is necessary. Study of Man, 212, 231, 257.

8. Self-determination is causative, and originative of character. It starts a bias or disposition in the will. Volition is unproductive of character and disposition. A volition leaves the man's inclination exactly as it found it. It makes no alteration in the bias of the will. This is seen in the futile attempt of the moralist to change liis inclination by volitionary resolutions. Inclination is a positive determination of the will in one direction, and towards one final end. Volition or choice is the selection of one out of two or more things, not from any interest in one rather than another, but because it is best adapted to the end in view. A volitionary choice is indifferent towards the thing chosen. If the drunkard could gratify his selfish inclination to physical pleasure better by water than by alcohol, he would choose water.

9. Inclination is spontaneous ; volition is nervous and often spasmodic. Inclination is easy and genial ; volition is more or less an effort, whether exerted against the inclination, or in accordance with it. When the drunkard by a volition refuses the cup because of his selfish inclination in the form of shame or fear, this volition costs him a great effort. When the drunkard by a volition takes the cup because of his selfish inclination in tlie form of desire of sensual pleasure, the volition is still an effort, though not a great one. He is, at least, compelled to exert his will sufficiently to move his muscles and limbs. Volition moves the body ; and this requires a distinct and separate resolution of the will back of the bodily movement. Inclination moves the will itself ; but this does not require a distinct and separate resolution of the will back of the mental and voluntary movement. The inclining is itself the mental activity ; the cause and the effect are one and the same thing. But the volition is not itself the muscular bodily

144 ANTHROPOLOGY.

action : the cause and the effect are two different things. When a person loves or hates, he does not need to resolve to do it. Cut when he picks up a pin, or applies his mind to a geometrical proposition, he must resolve to do so. Love and hatred are easy because spontaneous ; volitions are more or less an effort.

To recapitulate, then, we say that the total action of the Will is to be distinguished into voluntary and volitionary action, according as we speak of the central abiding inclination, or the superficial momentary choice. " Voluntary " action both originates, and is inclination, according as the action is viewed as subjective or objective ; as originans or originata. It has only three points at which it may begin. 1. The instant of creation, when a holy inclination commenced by being con-created in the will of the specific Adam. 2. The instant of apostasy, when a sinful inclination commenced in the will of the specific Adam, by solitary self-determination without Divine co-operation. 3. The instant of regeneration, when a holy inclination is re-originated in the sinful will of the individual man, by the Holy Ghost. The beginning of a self-determined inclination is consequently an epoch in the history of the human will, and epochs are infrequent and rare from the nature of the case. Creation, apostasy, and regeneration are the great epochal points in man's existence.' But volitions are beginning continually, and are numberless. " Yolitionary " action has innumerable points of beginning, and in every instance supposes a prior inclination to an ultimate end.''

1 " The subject of the Paradise Lost is the origin of evil — an era in existence ; an event more than all others dividing past from future time ; an isthmus in the ocean of eternity. " Campbell: Essay on English Poetry.

2 Of American writers, Hopkins, in his Outline Study of Man, distinguishes between "choice" and " volition" in a manner that approximates to the distinction between inclination and volition. "Rational choice is the fundamental, the voluntary, the moral part of the will ; volition is the executive part of the will," p. 224. "The point of freedom is in choice, and in that only. Choice being made, volition follows of course. The one is the essential element of freedom manifesting itself in the spiritual realm, and is the immediate ob'

THE HUMAN WILL. 145

Tliis distinction, between "voluntary" and " volitionary " action, or between inclination and choice, is marked in German, by Wille and Wilkiihr; in Latin, by voluntas and arbitrium ; and in Greek by ^iXrjfia and ^ovXrj. Compare Cicero : Tusc. Quaest., IV. 6. The neglect of the distinction results in confusion and misunderstanding. If he who makes this distinction asserts that " original sin is voluntary, but not volitionary," he is understood to say that original sin is the inclination of a man, and not a successive series of single choices; that it is the constant and central determination of the will to self and sin, and not the innumerable outward transgressions that proceed from this. But if one who does not make this distinction between voluntary and volitionary action asserts that " original sin is voluntary," he may be understood to mean that there is no sin but that of volitions ; that original sin is the product of a volition, and can be removed by a volition.

Theologians who in fact agree with each other, appear to disagree in case the distinction is not recognized. Owen, for example, remarks (Indwelling Sin, XII.,) that " the will is the principle, the next seat and cause of obedience and disobedience. Moral actions are unto us, or in us, so far good or evil as they partake of the consent of the will. He spake truth of old who said : ' Every sin is so voluntary, that if it be not voluntarj' it is not sin.' " In this statement, " will " is employed in the comprehensive sense as antithetic to the understanding, and " voluntary " does not mean "volitionary." Owen would not say that "every sin is so volitionary, that if it be not volitionary it is not sin." Hodge

ject of the divine government ; the other simply instrumental and executive, and is that of which human governments chiefly take cognizance," p. 225. Compare pp. 212, 231, 257. Hickok also tends towards the distinction between inclination and volition, in his threefold discrimination of '' immanent preference," "governing purpose," and " desultory volition." and in his definition of " spiritual susceptibility " and " spiritual disposition." Empirical Psychology, pp. 283-292. But both Hopkins and Hickok adopt the classification of intellect, sensibility, and will.

Vol. II.— 10

146 ANTHROPOLOGY

(Theology, I. 403), on the other hand, asserts that " freedom is more than spontaneity," and that " the affections are spontaneous, but not free. Loving and hating, delighting and abhorring do not depend upon the will." This agrees with the modern psychology, not with the elder. For by " will," Hodge here means the volitionary power, and by " freedom " the power to the contrary in the exercise of single choices.' If this is the true psychology, and freedom means the power of contrary choice, then it is correct to say that " the affections are not free ; " because they are most certainly not the product of volitions. Yet Hodge holds that evil affections are guilty and punishable. But this requires that they be free in the sense of inclination or disposition ; that they are not the product of compulsion and necessity. And in saying that " the affections are spontaneous," he implies tliat they are from the will (ex sponte). For spontaneity in a rational being is free will. Spontaneity in an animal, is mere physical instinct ; but in man, it is rational self-determination. Leibnitz (De Libertate, Ed. Erdmann, 669) says, " libertas est spontaneitas intelligentis, itaque, quod spontaneum est in bruto vel alia substantia intellectus experte, id in homine vel in alia substantia intelligente, altius assurgit et liberum appellatur." ° Instinct in a brute is necessitated, because it is grounded wholly in sense and animal nature ; inclination in man is free, because it is grounded in reason and a spiritual essence. Inclination is the subject of command, and prohibition. Man is bidden to have a good inclination, and forbidden to have an evil one. The command to love (Deut. 6:5; Lev. 19 : 18 ; Matt. 28 : 39, 40), to " make the tree good " (Matt. 12 : 33),

1 Hodge (Theology, II. 807) defines a self-determined will, as " acting independently of reason, conscience, inclinations, and feelings." This is the Arminian volitionary self-determination, which is accompanied with the power to the contrary.

^ Owen (Arminianism, XII.) defines freedom, with Prosper, as " a spontaneous appetite of what suemeth good unto it : liberum arbitrium est rei sibi placitae spontaneus ajjpetitus."

THE HUMAN WILL. 147

to love not (1 John 2 : 15), to lust not (Ex. 20 : 17), are examples.

The great question in anthropology, and in reference to sin and holiness, relates to inclination rather than volition. How does an inclination begin — either a holy or a sinful inclination— is the true subject of inquiry. Had unfallen man power to change his holy inclination ? Has fallen man power to change his sinful inclination e That man has power over his volitions is undisputed.

Augustine : City of God, XIII. Gangauf : Psychologie des Augustinus, VI. ^ 5, 6. Anselm : De Casu Diaboli, XXVI. Calvin : Institutes, II. i. Ursinus : Christian Religion, Qu. 7. Witsius : Covenants, I. ii. 10. Charnocke : Holiness of God, 476, 477. Ed. Bohn. Tunettin ; Institutio, IX. vii. viii. Howe : Oracles, II. xxii. ; Man Created Mutable. Owen : Perseverance of Saints, I. Miiller : Sin, IV. iii., iv. Dorner : Christian Doctrine, | 74-75. Macdonald Creation and the Fall. Shedd : History of Doctrine, n. 56 sq.

" OuK first parents, being left to the freedom of their own will, through the temptation of Satan transgressed the commandment of God in eating the forbidden fruit, and thereby fell from the estate wherein they were created. Gen. 3 : 6-8, 13. Eccl. 7 : 29. 2 Cor. 11 : 3." Westminster L. C, 21. In this statement, it is not meant that the external act of eating the forbidden fruit was the whole of the first transgression, and constituted the whole of human apostasy. A part is put for the whole. The full statement would be, that " our first parents transgressed the commandment of God, by lusting 2iite\\ and eating the forbidden fruit. This is evident from the proof text cited by the Westminster divines : " When the woman saw that the tree was a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat," Gen. 3 : 6. According to the inspired account, the first sin began witli a lustful desiring of the heart, which is the same thins; as a sinful inclinino; of the will.

The possibility of such a lustful desiring, or wrong inclining in Adam's will supposes its mutability. " God erePROBATION AND APOSTASY. 149

ated man male and female, with rigliteoasness and true holiness, having the law of God written in their hearts, and power to fulfil it : and yet under a possibility of transgressing, being left to the liberty of their own will, which was subject unto change.^'' Westminster Confession, IV. 2 ; L. C. 17.

Adam was holy by creation, but not indefectibly and immutably so. The inclination of his will, though conformed to the moral law, was mutable, because his will was not omnipotent. When voluntary self-determination is an infinite and self-subsistent power, as it is in God, the fall of the will is impossible. But when voluntary self-determination is a finite and dependent power, as it is in nian or angel, the fall of the will is possible. A will determined to good with an omnipotent energy is not " subject to change ;" but a will determined to good with a finite and limited force is so subject. By reason of the restricted power of his created will, Adam might lose the righteousness with which he was created, though he was under no necessity of losing it. His will had sufficient power to continue in holiness, but not so much additional power as to make a lapse into sin impossible. By the terms of the covenant of works, perseverance and indefectibility in holiness were made to depend upon Adam's own decision. In this respect they differed from the believer's perseverance and indefectibility under the covenant of grace, which are infallibly secured by the operation of the Holy Spirit. The regenerate man is " kept from falling." Jude 24; Eph. 1:10; John 10:28,29; 1 Thess. 4 : 17 ; Rev. 21 : 4. God imparted such a measure of grace to holy Adam as enabled him to continue inclined to the Creator, if he would ; but not such a measure of grace as to preclude inclining to the creature if he would. The power to the contrary ; the j^oss'ibilitas peccandi, or power to originate sin ; belonged to Adam's will because of its finiteness. The use of this power was left wholly to himself. He might continue to believe and trust in God,

150 ANTHROPOLOGY.

in which case he would persevere in holiness, and obtain indefectibility as his reward ; or he might believe and trust in Satan, in which case he would apostatize and lose holiness. The already existing power to incline rightly, and to persevere in this inclination was real and true freedom, and did not need this additional power to incline wrongly, in order to be such. The power to originate sin was not requisite in order to make Adam a free agent, but to make him a, prohationary agent.

Consequently, the paradisiacal state, though a holy and happy state, was not equal to the heavenly state. It had not the safety and security of the latter. Eden differed from heaven, as holiness differs from indefectibility of holiness ; as a mutable perfection differs from an immutable. The perfection of holy Adam was relative, not absolute. It differed from that of God, who by reason of his omnipotence and infinity cannot fall from holiness, James 1 : 13 ; from that of the elect angels, who were kept from falling by a special measure of grace that was not gi'anted to the fallen angels, whose perseverance like that of Adam was left to themselves ; and from that of redeemed men, who like the elect angels are preserved by special grace. Howe : Man Created Mutable, vi.

God created man with relative perfection, or the possibility of sinning, for the purpose of placing him in probation. Had the Creator given Adam indefectibility in the outset, by bestowing upon him that extraordinary measnre of grace which infallibly secures perseverance in holiness, Adam's own strength of will would not have been tested. In this case, God would have prevented the nse of the power to the contrary, by intensifying the existing self-determination to holiness. Adam would have been kept from falling by God, and would not have kept himself.'

' The possibility of sinning must not be confounded with the tendency to sin. The possibility of sinning is merely the power to originate sin ex nihilo, by the act of self-determination. The tendency to sin implies that the originating or

PROBATION AND APOSTASY. 151

The object of this probation was, that Adam, by resisting Satan's temptation and persevering in holiness, might secure by his own work indefectibility, or immutable perfection. This was to be an infinite reward for standing the trial of his faith and obedience. God did not place Adam in a state of probation from mere curiosity to see if he would fall ; or from malevolence to cause him to fall ; but from the benevolent desire that Adam, in the exercise of the ample power with which he was endowed, might merit and obtain, as the recompense of his fidelity, a final and everlasting deliverance from the possibility of sinning. The possibility of sinning is in itself an evil. It is one of the perils of finite freedom. To be delivered from it, is an infinite and eternal good. The cry in Wesley's hymn, " Take away the power of sinning," is the cry of the Christian heart. A will that is so strongly determined to holiness, by its union with the Divine will, that it is beyond the hazard of apostasy, is a greater good than a will which though holy is exposed to this hazard. Everlasting holiness is better than temporary ; immutable perfection is more desirable than mutable ; heaven is more blessed than paradise.

The righteousness Mdiich Adam had by creation did not merit indefectibility. God owed nothing at the instant of creation to a creature M'hom he had just originated from nonentity, to whom he had given holiness, and whom he was upholding by his power. He had a right to terminate Adam's existence, and reduce him to nonentity again if he so pleased. A creature, from the very definition of a creature, cannot bring the Creator under an obligation, except so far as the latter by covenant and promise permits him to do so. Witsius (Covenants, I. iv. 12) cites " Durandus's

self-determining power has been inwardly exerted, though it may not have been externally. A tendency to sin is an inclination to sin. It is a propensity of the heart, and a disposition of the will. The posbibility of sinning is innocent ; the tendency to sin is sinful.

152 ANTHROPOLOGY.

reasoning, wliicli Bellarniine was nnable to refute : ' What we are, and what we have, whether good acts, habits, or practices, are all of them from the bounty of God, mIio both gives freely and preserves them. And because no one after having given freely is obliged to give more, but rather the receiver is the more obliged to the giver ; therefore from good habits, acts, or practices given us by God, God is not bound by any debt of justice to give anything more.' " Says Calvin (Inst., I. xv. 8), " Adam could have stood if he would, since he fell merely by his own M'ill, because his will was flexible to either side, and he was not endued with constancy to persevere. If any object, that he was placed in a dangerous situation on account of the imbecility of his will, I reply, that the station in which he was placed was sufficient to deprive him of all excuse. For it would have been unreasonable that God should be confined to this condition, to make man so as to be altogether incapable either of choosing or of committing any sin. It is true that such a nature would have been more excellent ; but to expostulate with God as though he had been under any obligation to bestow this upon man, were unreasonable. Why he did not sustain him with the power of perseverance, remains concealed in his own mind. Yet there is no excuse for man ; he received so much, that he was the voluntary procurer of his owm destruction ; but God was under no necessity to give him any other than a mutable will, midway between sin and indefectibility (medium et caducam)."

God graciously entered into a covenant with holy Adam, and with his posterity in him, to the effect, that if he obeyed the command not to eat of the forbidden fruit, he should receive as his reward indefectibility of holiness and blessedness. This is proved by Gen. 2 : IT, " In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die;" which implies the converse, " If thou dost not eat thereof, thou shalt surely live." The " life " here implied and promised is a

PROBATION AND APOSTASY. 153

good additional to what Adam already had ; otherwise it would not be a reward. Adam already had spiritual life, namely holiness and happiness ; but it was nnitable. The additional good, therefore, must have been immutable holiness and happiness. He Nvas to have had spiritual life as indefectible. He was to have passed beyond all possibility of apostasy and misery.

This covenant is denominated " the covenant of works.*' Gal. 4 : 24, " These women are [represent] the two covenants : " one of works, and the other of grace. Rom. 9 : 4. Hosea 6:7, " But they like man (margin, Adam) have transgressed the covenant."

The consent implied in the covenant of works was by acquiescence on the part of man ; like that between child and parent, and between the citizen and the state. Assent cannot be righteously or wisely refused to that which is both equitable and advantageous. Adam, being holy, would not refuse to enter into a righteous engagement with his maker ; and being intelligent, would not decline an improvement in his condition. See Howe : Man Created Mutable (sub fine).

The merit to be acquired under the covenant of workswas pactional. Adam could claim the reward, in case he' stood, only by virtue of the promise of God ; not by vii'tue of the original relation of a creature to the creator. Upoiii the latter basis, he could claim nothing, as Christ teaches in Luke 17 : 10.

The probationary statute was a positive precept.. It was not sinful per se to eat of the tree of knowledge, but only because God had forbidden it. The Eden statute was, thus,, a better test of implicit faith and obedience than a moral statute would have been, because it required obedience for no reason but the sovereign will of God. At the same time,, disobedience of this positive statute- involved disobedienceof the moral law. It was contempt of authority ; disbelief of God and belief of Satan 'y discontent with the existing

154: ANTHROPOLOGY.

state; impatient curiosity to know; pride and ambition. Anselm : Cur Dens Homo, I. xxi.

The " tree of knowledge " was an actnal tree bearing fruit in the garden. It might have been a date-tree, or any other kind of tree, and still have been the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Because, M'hen once God had selected a particular tree in the garden, and by a positive statute had forbidden our first parents to eat of it, the instant they did eat of it they transgressed a Divine command, and then hneio consciously and bitterly what evil is, and how it differs from good. The tree thus became " the tree of the knowledge of good and evil," not because it was a particular species of tree, but because it had been selected as the tree whereby to test the implicit obedience of Adam.

The first sin was unique, in respect to the statute broken by it. The Eden commandment was confined to Eden. It was never given before or since. Hence the first Adamic transgression cannot be repeated. It remains a single solitary transgression ; the " one" sin spoken of in Rom. 5 : 12, 15-19.

The first sin was wilful and wanton in a high degree, because committed under circumstances that made it easy not to commit it. Charnocke : Holiness of God, 4-77. Ed. Bohn. Adam was holy, and had full power to remain so. And, still more, the temptation that assailed him -was much weaker than that which now assails his posterity. Fallen man is now tempted by solicitation addressed both to innocent desire and susceptibility, and to sinful desire and susceptibility : but unfallen man was tempted by a solicitation addressed only to innocent desire and susceptibility. Holy Adam had no rebellious inward lust to which Satan could appeal ; none of that selfish and sinful desire which St. James speaks of, when he says that a man " is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed " (James 1 : 1-1). The only subjective susceptibility in Adam which Satan could address, was the natural and innocent

PROBATION AND APOSTASY. 155

desire for the frnit of the tree of knowledge considered as " good for food, and pleasant to the eyes " (Gen. 3 : 6). This was a desire and susceptibility founded in the created relation between the nature of man and that of the tree. The other desire for the fruit as " making wise like the gods " (Gen. 3 : 6) was forbidden desire, and forbidden desire is sin (Gen. 20 : 17 ; Matt. 5 : 28 ; Eom. 7 : 7). Forbidden and sinful desire was not provided for in the creative act, and the established relation between man's nature and the outward object, as permitted and innocent desire was. Adam was not created with a desire for that knowledge of good and evil which would make him like the " gods " : that is, like Satan and his angels. Such a kind of knowledge as this is falsehood, not truth, and to desire it is wrong and sinful. " Thou shalt not covet," is a command that prohibits such a species of desire. On the contrary, Adam was created with a desire for true knowledge, and this desire was satisfied by the knowledge of God which he possessed as made in his Maker's image. He was created "in [true] knowledge, and true holiness." If Adam was already lusting after the spurious knowledge of good and evil, and was already proudly desiring to be like the " gods," when Satan suggested the temptation to eat of the fruit, this would have proved that he was already fallen, and would have very greatly increased the force of the temptation, and made it far more difficult for him to refrain from eating of it. But he was not lusting after and desiring this kind of knowledge, when Satan proposed that he should eat of the fruit. This kind of rebellious, disobedient desire required to be originated by Adam himself, as something not previously existing in his submissive heart and obedient will. God had not implanted any such wrong desire as this. This proud and selfish lust for a false and forbidden knowledge had to be started by Adam himself, as something entirely new and aboriginal. It was not a primary God-created desire of the finite will, but a secondary

156 ANTHROPOLOGY.

self -originated one. It was not the j) rod net of the creative act, but of vohnitarj self-determination.

Such being the facts in the case, it is evident that inward lust, or sinful desire, did not contribute to the force of temptation in the instance of unfallen Adam, as it does in that of his fallen posterity, nor can it be postulated as helping to explain his fall. Sinful desire was hegun by an act of pure self-determination, and therefore could not have been the cause of this act. Unfallen Adam was not " drawn away of his own lust and enticed," as his fallen posterity now are. He wilfully and wantonly yielded to an external suggestion of Satan which had by no means the violent strength of an internal desire. To disobey the command of God imder the stress of no greater temptation than this, was wilfulness and wickedness in a high degree. That a holy and happy being, not dragged down in the least by inward lust, with full power to remain holy and happy, should by an act of sheer self-determination convert himself into a sinful and miserable being, under a moderate temptation like tliat in Eden, was strange and not to be expected. The fall of Adam was intrinsically improbable. A spectator would have prophesied that the holy and happy man would continue in holiness and happiness, and not plunge into sin and misery.

Hence, the origin of sin has somewhat of the characteristic of caj>rice. It was not a ntitural, or a rational act ; but unnatural and irrational. Sin is " the viystery of iniquity." The fall of man cannot be rationalized : that is, explained on natural and rational grounds. This would require that it be accounted for not by pure self-determination, but by the operation of the law of cause and effect. In the physical world, a fact can be explained and made to look rational, by pointing to a foregoing cause for it that is different from the fact itself. But the fact of sin cannot be so explained and rationalized. There was no prior sinful act or sinful inclination of Adam, by which to account

PROBATION AND APOSTASY. 157

for the fact of his apostasy. The sinful self-determination of Adam's will was both the cause of the first sin and the first sin itself. Sin is self-ca,nsed, and therefore cannot be an effect proper of a cause proper, because an effect is different from its cause. " Let no one," says Augustine (City, XII. T), " look for an efiicient cause of the evil will ; for it is not efiicient, but deficient, since the evil will itself is not an effecting of something, but a defect. To seek for an efiicient cause of sin [out of the will, and other than the will], is like attempting to see darkness, or hear silence." Again he says (City, XIY. ii.), " God made man upright, and consequently with a good inclination. The good inclination, then, is the work of God. But the first evil inclination, which preceded all of man's evil acts, was rather a kind of falling away from the good work of God to its own work, than any positive work ; the will now not having God, but the will itself, for its end." See, also, De Libero Arbitrio, II. xx.

And this action of Adam's will in apostatizing was not only self-determination, but self-determination with no good and sufficient reason. The good reasons were all against it. Self-determination to evil is contrary to pure reason. Sin is the divorce of will from reason. Says Miiller (Sin, II. 1Y3-1Y5), " we must acknowledge that evil is in its nature inconceivable and incomprehensible ; that is to say, is the product of arbitrariness (AYilkiihr), and arbitrariness is a violation of right reason and true sequence. The inexplicableness of evil is contained in the very conception of evil. The incomprehensibleness of its origin arises not so much from the limitcdness of our knowledge, as from the nature of evil itself. Hence its inexplicableness does not dwindle and disappear with the increase of our knowledge ; and at no future stage of development and growth in wisdom do we pass from this incomprehensibleness, to an insight into a higher necessity of evil. On the other hand, the purer and more perfect our moral and religious knowledge becomes,

158 ANTHROPOLOGY.

the more attentively we listen to tlie solemn voice of our inmost consciousness and to the word of divine revelation, the more thoroughly do we perceive evil to be contrary to nature and to reason, and thoroughly unaccountable and groundless,"

The death threatened in Gen. 2 : 17 was physical, spiritual, and eternal. That it was physical, is proved by Gen. 3 : 19, " Unto dust thou shalt return." Kom. 5 : 14, " Death reigned from Adam to Moses." Gen. 5 : 5, " Adam died." Physical death as a mortal principle befell Adam immediately, though he did not actually die on the day he sinned. When a man is smitten with mortal disease he is a dead man, though he may live some months. Adam's body immediately became a mortal body. Symmachus translates the Hebrew by ^1/77x69 ear), " thou shalt become mortal." Compare Edwards : Original Sin, Works, 11. 103.

That the body of Adam was not mortal by creation, is proved by the threatening of death in Gen. 2 : IT ; which implies that as things then were, there was no liability to death. No sin, then no death. Also by Gen. 3 : 22, God " drove out the man from the garden, lest he take of the tree of life and live forever." This implies that in the original plan provision was made for the immortality of the body. After the transgression, it was necessary to prevent the immortality of the body by a special act of God. " In my opinion," says Augustine (De Peccatorum Meritis, I. 3), " Adam was supplied with sustenance against decay from the fruit of the various trees, and with security against old age from the tree of life." In Rev. 2 : T, the Holy Spirit promises to him " that overcometh," the privilege of " eating of the tree of life which is in the midst of the paradise of God." Complete redemption places man beyond the possibility of death, either physical or spiritual. See also Rom. 8 : 11, 23, where the glorified body is connected with the sinless perfection of the soul. The perfecPROBATION AND APOSTASY. 159

tion of unf alien Adam's body, also, excluded an inherent mortality.

The difference between the immortal body of holy Adam and the mortal body of fallen Adam is, that prior to the fall the human body was not liable to death from internal causes, but only from external. It had no latent diseases, and no seeds of death in it. l^either had it inordinate and vicious physical appetites, such as craving for stimulants, gluttonous appetite for food, licentious sexual appetite, etc., all of which tend to destroy the body. It could, however, be put to death. If it were depi'ived of food, or air, it would die. It was not a celestial body like that of the srloriiied saints, but a body of flesh and blood. The question was raised in the Patristic church, Mdiether Christ's body previous to his resurrection was like that of unfallen Adam, or of fallen. Smith's Ilagenbach, § 103 ; Schalf : History, § 143. Christ was weary, and liimgry, and thirsty ; but it is never said that he was sick with any bodily disease. And he certainly had no inordinate physical appetites. That he might have had a diseased and dying body, is compatible with his sinless perfection. For although a sinless soul like that of our Lord deserves an undying and immortal body, yet he might have voluntarilj' submitted to that part of the "curse" of sin which consists in a diseased and dying body, without thereby becoming a partaker of sin itself. Gal. 3:13.

This original immortality of the body, like Adam's moral perfection, was mutable and relative only. It might be lost. In case he fell from holiness, his body would be affected by his sin. The seeds of mortality would be implanted, the organism would begin to die from the moment of its birth, and the temperate physical appetite would become intemperate and inordinate. On the contrary, if Adam stood probation, that possibility of being put to death (posse mori) which was associated with Adam's relative perfection would become, an impossibility (posse non

160 ANTHROPOLOGY.

mori), like that connected with the glorified body of Christ and the resurrection-body of believers. These latter not only have no seeds of death in them, but they cannot be put to death by external agency. Says Augustine (De peccatorum meritis, I. 2), " If Adam had not sinned, he would not liave been divested of his body, but would have been clothed upon with immortality and incorruption, that 'immortality might have been swallowed up of life ;' that is, that he might have passed from the natural body into the spiritual body."

The mere possibility of death is not the same as a tendency to death. Unfallen Adam might have the former, but not the latter. A tendency implies the germinal base or seed of the thing. There is a possibility that every man may have all the physical diseases ; but there is no tendency to all of them in every man.

That the death threatened w^as spiritual, is proved by Rom. 5 : 18, where it is opposed to " spiritual life." So also in Rom. 5 : 21 ; 6 : 23 ; 2 Tim. 1 : 10. The description of the consequences of apostasy discloses mental characteristics that belong to spiritual death ; namely, terror and shame before God. Gen. 3 : 8, 10, 21.'

That the death M'as endless, is proved by the texts that represent it as the contrary of life ; because the life is nnquestionably endless. Rom. 5 : 18, 21 ; 6 : 23. Also by the texts that prove endless punishment. See Eschatology, pp. 677 sq.

Adam and Eve fell from the state of holiness by an act of self-determination, as the efficient cause. " Being left to the freedom of their own will, our first parents transgressed, and thereby fell." Westminster L. C., 21. They also fell by the external temptation of Satan addressed to their innocent susceptibility, as the occasional cause. " Through the temptation of Satan, they transgressed."

' Wesley held that the death caused by the first sin was spiritual, not physical ; yet that it brought physical death upon the brutes. Southey : Wesley, Ch. XX.

PROBATION AND APOSTASY. 161

Westminster L. C, 21. On tlie freeness of the first sin, see Charnocke : Holiness of God, pp. 476, 477. Ed. Bohn.

Adam and Eve were already holy, and did not need to originate holiness. In being holy, that is enlightened in their understanding and rightly inclined in their will, they had plenary power to continue and persevere in holiness. The temptation by Satan had no power to force their decision. To fall under these circumstances, was as free and unnecessitated an act of self-determination as can be conceived of. As previously remarked, it was a species of voluntary caprice which cannot be made to look rational or natural. All sin after the first sin is explicable by selfish inclination and strong evil propensities concurring with outward temptation. But the first sin had not these antecedents. There was nothing but an external temptation addressed to an innocent susceptibility. " This sin was aggravated in being committed when man had full light in his understanding; a clear copy of the law in his heart; when he had no vicious bias in his will, but enjoying perfect liberty ; and when he had a sufficient stock of grace in his hand to withstand the tempting enemy ; in being committed after God had made a covenant of life with him, and given him express warning of the danger of eating the forbidden fruit." Fisher : Catechism, Q. 15.'

If the will of Adam and Eve had been in a state of indifference, the probability of the fall would have been far greater, because the resistance of an undetermined will is less than that of a determined holy will. Under the circumstances, the fall of the holy pair was unlikely. That it occurred, proves that it was a very wilful act : wanton and gratuitous. It was also an extremely guilty act, because of being committed against great light, and under no great stress of temptation.

» Compare, Howe: Oracles IL, xxiv. Augiistine : City of God, XIV. xiL xiv ; XXI. xii. xv.

Vol. XL— 11

162 ANTHROPOLOGY.

The trial of man upon the Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian theories was very disadvantageous, compared with his trial upon tlie Angustinian and Calvinistic. An indifferent and undecided will is extremely liable to succumb to temptation. A will positively inclined to holiness can very readily resist temptation. It is, therefore, a defect in Miiller's theory (Sin, II. TO), and also in Howe's, that the human will at the instant of its creation is regarded as " created without any determination to good ; it was made in that state of liberty as to be in a certain sort of equipoise, according as things should be truly or falsely represented to it by the mind or understanding." Howe : Oracles, II. xxii. If this was the original condition of Adam when subjected to temptation and probation, he was unfavorably placed by his Creator.

" Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of the law of God."' Westminster L. C, 14. Rom. 3 : 23, " All have sinned, and come short of the glory of God." Rom. 3 : 12, " All have deviated " {e^eKkivav). 1 John 3 : 4, " Sin is lawlessness " {avofxla). Gal. 5 : 19-21, Sin is " the work of the flesh." Rom. 8 : T, Sin is "the carnal mind, and enmity towai'd God."

The intrinsic and inmost characteristic of sin is its culjpahility or guilt. Guilt is desert of punishment. Sin is damnable and punishable before the moral law. Consequently sin must be the product of free agency. ^Necessitated sin is a contradiction. The primary source and seat of sin, therefore, is the villi, because this is the causative and originating faculty of the soul. "Our first parents being left to the freedom of their will fell." From this inmost centre of the soul, it passes into the understanding, and through the entire man. The inclination and affections having become contrary to what they were by creation, the understanding is darkened, and the conscience benumbed.

Some theologians explain the origin of sin by the understanding, rather than the will. Eve was deceived, 1 Tim.

PROBATION AND APOSTASY. 163

2 : 14. Deception is cognitive. The human mind by creation was enlightened so that it knew God and divine things spiritually. But it was not omniscient. It was capable therefore of being deceived by an apparent good : namely, the knowledge of good and evil. The tempter addresses his temptation to the understanding ; " Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." This was a plausible temptation to a creature already knowing nuich, and capable of knowing more. But this does not account for the first sin. For this temptation through an apparent good ought to have been repelled, and might have been, by an act of tlie will. Eve ought to have remained content with the knowledge she already possessed by creation. By self-determination, she should and could have continued to be satisfied with her Maker's arrangement, and refused this promised increase of knowledge. Had she done so, she would have remained unfallen and sinless. In this way, it appears that the proximate and efficient cause of the first sin was the will rather than the understanding. It was not necessary that unfallen Eve should incline, or self-determine in accordance with an apparent good. Even though her understanding did perceive a species of good in the forbidden knowledge of good and evil, yet her still holy will could have rejected it. Her understanding had no power to compel her will by means of an apparent, or seeming good. This is expressed in the lines of Dante :

" Then through the glowing air was sweetly sent A strain so ravishing to mortal sense, It made me Eve's audacity lament : That when both heaven and earth obedient were, Woman alone, and she but just created. Refused the veil of ignorance to bear ; To which had she submitted patiently, O how extended, how much antedated Had been these joys ineffable."

PURGATOKY, xxix. 22.

164 ANTHROPOLOGY.

The deception of the understanding is a mis-judgment of the understanding that does not of necessity carry the will with it. Free will can reject a seeming good, as well as a real good ; can decide against a false judgment, as well as against a true one. Furthermore, a deceived understanding is rather an effect of an evil will, than its cause. A false judgment results from a sinful inclination, rather than the converse. Error in the head comes from error in the heart. When the will has once substituted self and the creature for God and the creator, as its ultimate end, then false judgments respecting what is good, and what is happiness, and what is true knowledge, iannediately arise. Then finite objects take on a false appearance, and are deemed to be the summum bonum. '• When once man surrenders himself to the sway of that perverted principle which makes his own satisfaction the aim of all his endeavors, there will necessarily spring from this foul root a nmltitude of erroneous notions as to wdiat this satisfaction consists in." Miiller: Sin, I. 165. But if the will continues true in its primary created determination to God as the chief end, the understanding is not thus hoodwinked, but sees through all the deceptions of temptation, and rejects them.

Still less is the origin of sin to be sought for in the sensuous nature of man — a theory at one time considerably current in Germany, and which has received a thorough examination by Miiller. Sin, I. 295-334:. The gi-eat objection to it is, that it finds the source of sin outside of the voluntary faculty. Man's sensuous nature is not his will ; crap^ is not irvevixa. Sense is not causative and originative, in its working. Consequently, sin does not begin in the lower physical nature and ascend to the will and reason ; but vice versa. The will and reason fall first in the order. The soul sins, and then the body becomes vitiated.

In respect to its having no sinful antecedent out of which it is made, sin is origination ex nihilo. Sin is the beginning

PROBATION AND APOSTASY. 165

t)f something fi'om nothing, and there is this resemblance between it and creation proper. In holy xVdam, there was no sinful inclination or corruption that prompted the first transgression. Adam started the wicked inclination itself ex nihilo, by a causative act of self-determination. The first sin was an act of origination, not of selection or choice. If the first sinful act were one of choice between good and evil, this would require an existing indifference towards both, and the absence of inclination. But if it was a selfdetermining and causative act, this would be compatible with an existing holy inclination. The will, in this case, passed or "lapsed'' from one inclination to another, by the inherent energy of self-motion that originated something new. As in regeneration, a new holy inclination originated by the Holy Spirit expels the existing sinful inclination, so in apostasy, a new sinful inclinatioTi originated by the human will expels the existing holy inclination. See p. 135 sq.

But sin differs from creation proper, in that it is not a substance. Creation originates beings and things ; but sin is neither a being nor a thing. Yet it is not " nothing," in every sense of the term " nothing." Anselm denominated it " essentia," and denied that it is " substantia." But " essentia " is too strong a tei-m for sin. "Habit" and "accident " are better terms. These are the terms employed by the Keformed theologians. Inasmuch as sin is a habitus inhering in the will and infecting the understanding, it is not a strict nonentity. To commit sin, is not to do nothing. To do evil, is to do something. Compare Turrettin, IX. i. Neither is sin a " propei-ty " of a substance, because properties necessarily belong to a substance. Sin is an " accident : " that is, a characteristic that may or may not belong to a spiritual substance. " When we say that God is the cause of all things, we mean of all such things as have a real existence [i.e. substances^ ; "which is no reason why those things themselves should not be the cause of some accidents, such

166 ANTHROPOLOGY.

as actions are. God created man, and some other intelligences superior to man, with a liberty of acting ; which liberty of acting is not itself evil, but may be the cause of something that is evil." Grotius : Christian Religion, I, viii. " Peccatum non est quid substantiale, lit Flacius Illyricus, hand procul a Manichaeismo, saltem de originale labe statuebat. Materia peccati proxima est ipsamet vel e^t9 vel actio vitiosa." Maresius : Systema, VI. 6, 8. The term e^t? is used by Plato and Aristotle to denote the habitual disposition of a faculty of the mind, in distinction from the substance of the faculty itself. " Sin," says Calvin (Inst., II. i. 11), " is rather an adventitious quality or accident, than a substantial property originally innate."

The first sin of man, though proximately and formally the violation of the Eden statute, was ultimately and implicitly the violation of the whole moral law. The contempt of the Divine authority in transgressing the commandment not to eat of the tree of knowledge, was the contempt of Divine authority generally. "He that offendeth in one point is guilty of all," James 2 : 10. Hence sin is defined as " the transgression of law," or lawlessness. 1 John 3 : 4.

The moral law violated by the free will of man is both written, and unwritten : the law of nature, and the decalogue. Rom. 2 : 1-1-16. The points of difference between them have been specified under the head of Revelation. Yol. I., p. 62 sq. The two laws are originally and essentially the same. The ethics of man's rational nature as he came from the Creator's hand, and of the decalogue, are identical. The now existing difference between the two is due to apostasy. " The natural law," says Ursinus (Christian Religion, Quest. 92), " doth not differ from the moral in nature not corrupted ; but in nature corru/pted, a good part of the natural law is darkened by sins, and but a little part only concernino; the obedience due to God was left remaining in man's mind after the fall : for which cause, also, God hath

PROBATION AND APOSTASY. 167

in his church repeated again and declared the whole sentence and doctrine of his law in the decalogue. Therefore the decalogue is a restoring and re-entering or reinforcing of the law of nature ; and the law of nature is a part only of the decalogue." Such being the connection between the unwritten and written law, it follows that sin in the heathen is the same in hind with sin in Cliristendoni. Free and responsible human will, in both instances, transgresses a common law and ethics. The difference between the violation of the unwritten law and the written, is one of degree only. " As many as have sinned without law, shall also perish without law ; and as many as have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law," Rom. 2 : 12.

Augustine : City of God, XIV. xii. xiii. ; De natura et gratia ; Contra Julianum ; Opus imperfectum contra Julianum. Anselm : De conceptu virginali et originali iJeccato. Aquinas : Summa, 11. (1) Ixxix.-lxxxvii. Lombard : Sententiarum, II. xxii. 12. Calvin .• Institutes, II. i.-v. Ursinus : Christian Religion, Qu. 7-9. Turrettin : Institutio, IX. viii.-xii. Placaeus : De Imputatione. Burgess: Original Sin. Charnocke : Attributes (Holiness). Owen: Vindiciae, VI ; Arminianism, VII. VIII. Howe : Oracles, II. xxiii.-xxvii ; Temple, II. viii. Episcopius : Opera, II. vii. (Apologia). John Taylor : Original Sin. Jeremy Taylor : Original Sin. Davenant : Justification, Ch. XIV. Usher : Original Sin. Butler : Sermons on Human Nature. Edwards : Original Sin. King : Origin of Evil. Nitzscli : Christian Doctrine, § 107, 111. Wiggers : Augustinianism and Pelagianism (Emerson's Tr.). Watson: Institutes, Pt. II. Ch. xviii. Baur : Gegensatz (Lehre von der Siinde). Gangauf : Aug. Psychologie, VI. 7, 8. Heppe : Dogmatik der Evangelish-Reformirten Kirche ; Dogmatik des Deutschen Protestantismus. Schweitzer : Glaubenslehre der Evangelisch-Reformirten Kirche. Rivetus : Testimonia de Imi^utatione. Landis : Original Sin and Gratuitous Imputation. Princeton Essays : On Imijutation. Fisher: Discussions (Augustinian and Federal Theories). Miiller: Sin, I. i. ii. ; IV. i. ii. Shedd : History of Doctrine, II. 50-177 ; Theological Essays (Original Sin). Thornwell : Works, II. 109 sq.

"The sinfulness of that estate [status, or condition] whereinto man fell consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of the whole nature : which is commonly called original sin ; together with all actual transgi-essions which proceed from it." Westminster Shorter Catechism, 18.

Accordino; to this doctrinal statement, there are three

ORIGINAL SIN. 169

particulars under the general head of Sin. 1. The guilt of the first sin. 2. The corruption of nature resulting from the first sin. 3. Actual transgressions, or sins of act, which result from corruption of nature.

1. The first part of the sinfulness of man's estate or condition is the guilt of the first sin. The first sin of Adam, strictly and formally considered, was the transgression of the particular command not to eat of the tree of knowledge. This was a positive statute, and not the moral law. It tested obedience more severely than the moral law does, because the latter carries its own reason with it, while the former containing no intrinsic morality appealed to no reason except the mere good pleasui-e of God. To disobey it, was to disregard the authority of God, and involved disobedience of all law. The guilt of Adam's first sin is the guilt of transgressing the law of Eden explicitly, and the moral law implicitly. " The rule of obedience revealed to Adam, besides a special command not to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, was the moral law." Westminster L. C, 92.

The first sin of Adam was twofold : (a) Internal ; (J) External. The internal part of it was the originating and starting of a wrong inclination. The external part of it was the exertion of a wrong volition prompted by the wrong inclination. Adam first inclined to self instead of God, as the ultimate end. He became an idolater, and " worshipped and served the creature more than the creator," Rom. 1 : 25. Then, in order to gratify this new inclination, he reached forth his hand and ate of the forbidden fruit. " Our first parents fell into open disobedience, because already they were secretly corrupted ; for the evil act had never been done had not an evil inclination (voluntas) preceded it. And what is the origin of our evil inclination but pride ? And what is pride but the craving for undue exaltation ? And this is undue exaltation, when the soul abandons Him to whom it ought to cleave as its end, and

170 ANTHROPOLOGY.

becomes an end to itself. The wicked desire to please himself secretly existed in Adam, and the open sin was but its consequence." Augustine : City of God, XIY. xiii. Edwards (Original Sin, Works, II. 385) directs attention to the internal part of Adam's first sin, in the following manner. His opponent Taylor had said that " Adam could not sin [externally] without a sinful inclination." Edwards replies that " this is doubtless true ; for although there was no natural sinful inclination in [holy] Adam, yet an inclination to that sin of eating the forbidden fruit was hegotten in him by the delusion and error he was led into, and this inclination to eat the forbidden fruit must precede his actual eatiu<'." The rising of this sinful desire and inclination, Edwards considers to be the first sin itself. There was not a first sin prior to it of which the sinful inclination was the effect ; but tlie very inclining away from God to the creature w^as Adam's fall itself, and that of his posterity in him. " I am humbly of the opinion," he says (Original Sin, Works, II. 481), " that if any have supposed the children of Adam to come into the world with a double guilt, one the guilt of Adam's sin, another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart, they have not so well conceived of the matter. The guilt a man has upon his soul at his first [individual] existence, is one and simple, viz., the guilt of the original apostasy, the guilt of the sin by which the species first rebelled against God. This, and the guilt arisino- from the first corruption or depraved disposition of the heart, are not to be looked upon as two things, distinctly imputed and charged upon men in the sight of God. It is true that the guilt that arises from the corruption of the heart as it remains a conjirmed princijyle, and appears in its subsequent operations, is a distinct and additional guilt ; but the guilt arising from t\\e first existing [the start, or origination] of a depraved disposition in Adam's posterity, I apprehend is not distinct from their guilt of Adam's first sin. For so it was not in Adam himself. The first evil disposiORIGINAL SIN. 171

tion or inclination of the heart of Adam to sin was not properly distinct from his first sin, but was included in it. The external act he committed was no otherwise his, than as his heart was in it, or as that action proceeded from tlie wicked inclination of his heart. Nor was the guilt he had double, as for two distinct sins : one, the wickedness of his heart and \vill in that affair ; another, the wickedness of the external act caused by his heart. His guilt was all truly from the act of his inward man ; exclusive of which, the motions of his body were no more than the motions of any lifeless instrument. Ilis sin consisted in M'ickedness of heart, fully sufficient /br, and entirely amounting to all that appeared in the act he committed." '

The internal part of Adam's first sin was the principal part of it. It was the real commencement -of sin in man. It was the origination from nothing, of a sinful disposition in the human wull. There was no previous sinful disposition to prompt it, or to produce it. When Adam inclined away from God to the creature, he exercised an act of pure self-determination. He began sinning by a real beginning, analogous to that by w'hich matter begins to be from nothing. In endowing Adam with a mutable holiness, God made it possible, but not necessary, for Adam to originate a sinful inclination, and thereby expel a holy one. The finite will can fall from holiness to sin, if it is not " kept from falling " (Jude 24) by God's special grace, because it is finite. The finite is the mutable, by the very definition.

Since this first inclinino- of the human will had no sinful

1 Hodge (Princeton Essays, I. 150, 168) thinks that Edwards here " abandons " the doctrine of immediate imputation which '" he maintains in two-thirds of his work on Original Sin," and adopts mediate imputation. But Edwards, in this place, explicitly imputes the guilt of the. first rising of evil desire as well as of the corruption resulting from it ; and this rising of evil desire he says was the first sin, which was inseparable from its consequence, namely, corruption of nature. Had Edwards asserted that only the corruption as the effect, but not the rising of evil desire itself as the cause of the effect, is imputed, he would have been liable to the charge of holding mediate imputation.

172 ANTHROPOLOGY.

antecedent, it is denominated " original " sin. There is no sin before it, by which to expLain it. " If it be asked," sa^ys Lombard (Liber II., Distinctio xxii. 12), "whether incHnation (voluntas) preceded that first sin, we answei-, in the first place, that inasmuch as that first sin consisted both of inclination (voluntas) and of outward act (actus), inclination preceded outward act, but another evil inclination did not precede the evil inclination itself ; and, secondly', that through the persuasion of Satan, and by the arbitraiy decision (arbitrio) of Adam, that evil inclination was produced by which he deserted righteousness and began iniquity. And this inclination (voluntas) itself was iniquity." The following dialogue in Anselm's De Casu Diaboli, Cap. 27, is to the same effect. '• Disciple. Why did the wicked ano-el will what he ouurht not to have willed ? Master. No cause preceded this wrong act, except it were that the angel could so will. Disciple. Did he then will wickedly because he was able to ? Master. No, because the good angel had the same power, but did not will wrongly. No one wills wrongly merely because he can so will. Disciple. Why then does he will wrongly ? Master. Only because he will. The wicked will has no other cause but this, why it determines to sin. It is both an efiicient and an effect in one." The internal part of Adam's first sin was '' voluntary," not " volitionary." It was will as desire, not will as volition ; will as inclining, not will as choosing. The fall was the transition from one form of self-motion to another form of selfmotion, and not the beginning of self-motion for the first time. The fall was a self-determining to evil expelling an existing self-determination to good. It was inclining awny from one ultnnate end to another, not choosing between two ultimate ends to neither of which was there any existing inclination. Adam before he fell was self-determined to God and goodness. Consequently, in the garden of Eden, he had not to choose eitliei- good or evil as two contraries to both of which his will was indifferent. By creaORIGINAL SIN. 173

tion, he was positively inclined to good. The question put hefoi-e him in the probation and temptation was, whether he would remain holy as he was, or begin a new inclination to evil ; not whether, having no inclination at all, he would choose either good or evil. His act of apostasy, if it occurred, was to be an act of new and wrong desire in place of the existing holy desire ; of new and wrong self-determination, in place of the existing and right self-determination. The fall was a change of inclination, not the exertion of a volition.

The internal part of Adam's first sin is described in Gen. 3 : 1-6. According to this narrative, Eve first listened to the crafty query of Satan, whether God could have given such a command ; then she entered into a discussion with him ; then she believed him. All this internal agency of the soul occurred prior to plucking and eating the forbidden fruit. But this listening, discussing, and believing on the part of Eve, occurred because she was seci'etly desiring the forbidden knowledge by which she would " be as. the gods," Gen. 3 : 5. Lust for that false knowledge which Satan had promised, explahis these mental processes. Dalliance with temptation always implies a desire for the tempting object. Had Eve continued to desire and to be content with that true knowledge which she had by creation, she would have abhorred the false knowledge proposed by the Tempter, and this abhorrence would have precluded all parleying with him, and all trust in liim.

A comparison of the manner in which our Lord dealt with the same Tempter is instructive. Christ, in the wilderness, entered into no parley and debate with Satan, as Eve did in paradise. He did not dally with temptation, because no desire for what God had forbidden arose within him. The second Adam did not lust, like the first Adam, after the false good presented by the Tempter. The first two of Satan's suggestions he instantaneously rejects, giving reasons therefor in the decisive language of Scripture.

174 ANTHROPOLOGY.

And the tliird and more blasphemous suggestion, he thrusts away with the avaunt of abhorrence. There was not the slightest swerving from God, the faintest hankering after prohibited good, in the most secret soul of our Lord. His will from centre to circumference, both as inclination and volition, both in desire and act, remained steadfast in holiness. Christ met Satan's temptation with aversion and loathing. Eve met it with inclination and liking.

The history of the rise of evil desire or lust is given by Divine inspiration. Along with the listening, the debating, and the believing on the part of Eve, there was, according to the narrative in Genesis, a yet more important activity that occurred in the soul of Eve, prior to the eating of the forbidden fruit. " The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to he desired to make one loise^^ Gen. 3 : 6. Eve looked upon the tree of knowledge not only with Innocent, -but with sinful desire. She not only had the natural (Created desire for it as producing nourishing food, and as a .beautiful object to the eye, but she came to have, besides this, the unnatural and self-originated desire for it as yielding a Idnd of knowledge which God forbade man to have. She " lusted " after that " knowledge of good and evil " which eating of the fruit would impart. This knowledge was not the true wisdom and spiritual knowledge which Adam and Eve already had by creation, and which is the intellectual side of holiness, but it was the false knowledge which " the gods," that is Satan and his angels, had acquired by apostasy.' This lusting of Eve for a knowledge

I If it be objected to this explanation of the term "gods" in this place, that in Gen. 3 : 33 the knowledge is described as like that of God himself ("one of Ms"), the reply is, that there are two ways of knowing evil : the one as Satan knows it, namely, by personal sinfulness and self-consciousness ; the other as God knows it, namely, by the intuition of omniscience without personal sinfulness and self-consciousnesB. The knowledge can therefore be spoken of from either point of view. As prohibited, it must have been as a had knowledge : that is, the knowledge of "the gods " in the bad sense, the knowledge which Batan and his angels had.

ORIGINAL SIN. 175

that God ]]ad prohibited was her apostasy. Tliis was the self-determining and inclining of her will away from God as the chief end and chief good, to self and the creature as tlie chief end. To desire what God has forbidden is to prefer self to God, and this is to sin. This concupiscence was the beginning of sin in her will. It was the same thing, in kind, with the concupiscence which God forbids in the tenth commandment. The command not to covet, or lust, is a command not to desire anything that God has forbidden, God has forbidden theft. To inwardly desire another man's property is theft. God has forbidden murder. To be inwardly angry at a fellow-man is murder. God lias forbidden adultery. To inwardly desire another man's wife is adultery. In like manner, God had forbidden to Adam Satanic knowledge of good and evil. To inwardly desire it, was the first sin. Achan's sin began with inward desire, or lust. " When I saw among the spoils a goodly Babylonish garment, and two hundred shekels of silver, and a wedge of gold, then I coveted them, and took them," Joshua 7 : 21.

All this internal action of the soul of Eve, then, occurred prior to the outward act of plucking and eating. Says Fisher (Catechism, Q. 3), " Were not our first parents guilty of sin before eating the forbidden fruit ? Yes : they were guilty in hearkening to the devil, and believing him before they actually ate it. Why, then, is their eating of it called their j^r5^ sin ? Because it was the first s^m finished. James 1 : 15." " The first sin," says Pictet (Theology, lY. 2), " commenced when Eve began to doiibt whether she had rightly understood the intention of God in forbidding the fruit of the tree. Afterwards, when she ought to have consulted God upon this subject, she helieved the devil, who said that they should not die ; in the next place, she was flattered with the hope held out to her by Satan of hiowing all things, and being equal to God ; and at last, she reached forth her hand to the fruit." " From the account in Genesis," says

176 ANTHROPOLOGY.

Hodge (Theology, 11. 128), "it appears that doubt, unbelief, and pride, were the principles which led to this fatal act of disobedience. Eve doubted God's goodness ; she disbelieved his threatening ; she aspired after forbidden knowledge." '

The account given in Gen. 3 : 1-6 favors the supposition that Eve had the colloquy with Satan by herself, as Milton represents it in his poem. The woman alone entered into the discussion with Satan of a subject that ought not to have been discussed at all. " And when," continues the narrative, " the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant {n'l^T)) to the eyes, and a tree to be desired (t^I?.) *^o make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof and did eat ; and gave also unto her husband, and he did eat," Gen. 3 : 6. St. Paul (1 Tim. 2 : 14) affirms that " Adam was not deceived [by Satan], but the woman being deceived by him fell into the transgression {ev irapd/3acrei yijovey This implies that Adam did not believe the tempter's assertion that a good would follow the eating of the forbidden fruit, and that death would not be the consequence. According to St. Paul, Adam was seduced by his affection for Eve, rather than deceived by the lie of Satan. He fell with his eyes wide open to the fact that if he ate he would die. But in loving his wife more than God, he " worshipped and served the creature instead of the Creator," and like Eve set up a diiferent final end from the true one.

The account in Gen. 3:6 describes: (a) The innocent 2)hysical desire of man's unfallen nature for the fruit of the tree of knowledge ; (b) The rising of sinful moral desire for it. " The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant (a desire, m^n) to the eyes." This denotes merely the correlation between the created qualities of man's physical constitution and this particular product of God's creation. It was not wrong, but perfectly

' The lustful looking of Eve is indicated in Luther's version of Gen. 3 : & Lange, in loco.

ORIGINAL SIN. 177

innocent, to perceive that the tree was good for food and to desire it as such, and to be pleasantly affected by the beauty of it. This Divinely established relation between man's physical nature and that of the tree of knowledge, constituted the subjective basis for the temptation. Had the tree been repulsive to the sight and taste, its fruit would not have been employed by Satan as a means of solicitation. Up to this point in the description, the phraseology is the same as that in Gen. 2 : 9, respecting all the trees in the garden. " Out of the ground, made the Lord God to grow every tree that is pleasant ("rrnp) to the sight, and good for food." All the physical products of God, the tree of knowledge included, were agreeable and pleasant objects for the newly created and sinless man.

Bat the account in Gen. 3 : 6 further adds, that the tree of knowledge came to be for Eve a tree " to be desired ("-^n.^.), i^ make one wiseP The sinful moral desire, here mentioned, is different from the innocent physical desire spoken of in the preceding part of the verse. It was a mental hankering after the fruit as im,j[)arting to the eater a kind of knoioledge which God had forhidden to man. This is something new, and different from the innocent craving belonging to man's sensuous nature. To desire the fruit simply as food, and as a beautiful object, was innocent. But to desire a knowledge of good and evil such as the "gods" had, which the eating of it would communicate, was rebellious and wicked, because this kind of knowledge had been prohibited. The word "Tana, descriptive of Eve's longing after the prohibited knowledge, is the same employed in the tenth commandment (Ex. 20 : 17), which the Seventy render by ovk l'Ki^v{ir\(jei<^. Eve's evil desire was also the same in kind with the iTril^ujuia of St. Paul, which he declares to be dfiapTia. Rom. 7:7. It was also the same in kind with the inri^vfjuia mentioned in James 1 : 14, " Every man is tempted when he is drawn away by his own lust and enticed." Vol. II.— 12

178 ANTHROPOLOGY.

The self-willed origination and rising of this desire for a knowledge that God had forbidden^ was the fall of Eve. It was a new inclination of her will to self, directly contrary to that inclination to God with which she liad been created. As regeneration is denominated a " birth " of the soul because of the totality of the moral change, so apostasy may be called a " birth " of the soul for the same reason. By the fall, the children of God became the children of Satan. John 8 : 44 ; Matt. 13 : 38. Each " birth" alike is an entire revolution in liuman character ; one upward the other downward. As regeneration is the origination by the Holy Spirit of holy desire and inclination, so apostasy was the origination by Adam of sinful desire and inclination. God had not forbidden the existence of the desire for the fruit as " good for food and pleasant to the eye," and had this continued to be the only desii'e in Eve in regard to the tree, she would have remained sinless as ehe was created. But God had forbidden the desire for the fruit as fitted " to make one wise " with the knowledge of good and evil. The instant the desire " to be as gods " arose in Eve's heart, she sinned. God's command, in its full form, was: "Thou shalt not lust after but ahhor the knowledge of good and evil ; thou shalt not choose but refuse it." The prohibition in the instance of the Eden statute, as in that of the tenth commandment, included both the inward desire and the outward act ; both inclination and volition. If a man hates his brother, he violates the sixth commandment, even if he does not actually kill him. Matt. 5 : 22. So, too, if when Eve had desired the forbidden knowledge, she had been prevented from reaching out the hand and plucking the fruit, she would still have transgressed the Eden statute. For obedience to God required that she ahhor and reject the knowledge proffered by Satan. But to lust after it, was to prefer and love it. Even, therefore, if she had been forcibly stopped from completing, or as St. James ,(1 : 15) phrases it " finishing " the sin of desiring, by the outORIGINAL SIN. 179

ward act of eating, she would still have been gnilty of disobej'ing God. For the Divine command is, to choose the good and refuse the evil. Dent. 30 : 19. The holiness of Imraannel, which is true holiness, is described as " refusing the evil and choosing the good." Isa 7 : 16. But whoever desires the evil that is prohibited " chooses " it, and thereby refuses the good that is commanded. Had Eve continued to desire and love the true knowledge which she already had by her creation in the Divine image, this desire and love would have been the rejection and abhorrence of the false knowledge offered in the temptation. But when she began to desire and love the false knowledge, this was the rejection and hatred of the true knowledge. And this was apostasy. Neutrality or indifference was impossible in the will of Eve, or any will whatever. For her to incline to self, was to disincline to God ; to desire false knowledge, was to dislike true knowledge ; to choose the evil, was to refuse the good ; to love the creature, was to hate the Creator. The rising of her evil desire, consequently, was the expulsion of her holy desire ; the starting of her new sinful self-determination, was the ousting of her existing holy self-determination. She could not have two contrary desires or inclinations simultaneously. Hence the universal command, " Thou shalt not covet : " that is, " Thou shalt not desire anything that God has forbidden;" because this is the same thing as to dislike and hate what God has commanded.

This evil inclining and desiring is denominated " concupiscence," in the theological nomenclature. In the Augustinian and Calvinistic anthropology, it includes mental as well as sensual desire ; in the Pelagian anthropology, it is confined to sensual appetite. " Man," says Calvin, II. i. 9, " has not only been ensnared by the inferior appetites, but abominable impiety has seized the very citadel of his mind, and pride has penetrated into the inmost i-ecesses of his heart ; so that it is weak and foolish to restrict the corrup180 ANTHROPOLOGY.

tion which has proceeded thence to wliat are called the sensual appetites. In this the grossest ignorance has been dis' covered bj Peter Lombard, who when investigating the seat of it says it is in the fiesli according to the testimony of Paul, Rom. 7 : 18, not indeed exclusively, but because it principally appeal's in the flesh ; as though Paul designated only a part of the soul, and not the whole of our nature which is opposed to supernatural grace. Now Paul removes every doubt by informing us that the corruption resides not in one part only, but that there is nothing pure and uncontaminated by its mortal infection. For, when arguing respecting corrupt natui-e, he not only condemns the inordinate motions of the appetites, but principally insists on the blindness of the mind, and the depravity of the heart, Eph. 4 : 17, 18." Says Luther, On Galatians 5 : 17, " When Paul says tliat the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, lie admonishes us that we must feel the concupiscence of the flesh, that is to say, not only carnal lust but also pride, wrath, slothfulness, impatience, unbelief, and such like." See Heppe : Reformirte Dogmatik, Locus XY., for definitions from the elder Calvinists.

Concupiscence is different from natural created appetency or desire. Hunger and thirst are not evil concupiscence. They are instinctive, constitutional, and involuntary. Gluttony on the contrary is voluntary, not constitutional. It is not pure instinctive craving for food. There is will in it. It is the inclining and desire of the will for a more intense pleasure from eating food, tlian the natural healthy appetite provides for. Innocent hunger makes use of the appointed food, and when satisfied it rests. If a man simply quiets his hunger with bread convenient for it, he does not have or exhibit concupiscence. But if he craves sensual pleasure from eating, and gratifies the craving by tickling the palate, he has and exhibits concupiscence or evil desire.

Concupiscence is not natural and innocent appetite inten. sified. It is not a difference in degree, but in kind. A

ORIGINAL SIN. 181

starving man is not concupiscent, though his desire for food is intense to the very highest degree. His famine-struck craving for food is not a ghittonous craving for sensual pleasure. It is purely physical. But gluttony is the mental in the physical. Gluttony is the will's selfish inclination manifested in a bodily appetite. It is the vpill in the senses.

These remarks apply to thirst, and the sexual appetite. As created and constitutional, neither of these is evil concupiscence. But as mixed with will and moral inclination — the form in wliich they appear in drunkards who " shall not inherit the kingdom of God," and " whoremongers and adulterers whom God will judge " — they are sinful concupiscence/ Concupiscence is not confined to the sensuous nature. There is concupiscence or lust of the reason, as well as of the sense. Pride and ambition is a lust of the mind. "We had our conversation in times past, in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires {B^ekrjfiara) of the flesh and of the mi7icV {twv Biuvolmv), Eph. 2 : 3. According to 2 Cor. 7 : 1, there is a " filthiness of the flesh and the spij'it " {7rvevfiaro<;).

The external part of Adam's first sin was the act of eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge. After the sinful inclination had arisen, a sinful volition followed, " When the woman saw that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof and did eat," Gen. 3 : 6.

This first sin in both of its parts, internal and external, is imputed to Adam and his posterity as sin and guilt, because they committed it. The evil desire and the evil act were the desiring and acting of the human nature in the first human pair. The Biblical proof of this fundamental and nnich disputed position is found in Rom. 5 : 12, " Death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." Rom. 5 : 15, " Through the offence of one (man) many be dead " (aTreS^avov).

' Compare Heppe : Reformirte Dogmatik, IL 249. Aagustine : Opus Imperfectum, V. ; De Natura sana, et vitiata.

182 ANTHROPOLOGY.

Eom. 5:16, "The judgment was by one (offence) unto condemnation." Kom. 5:17, "By one man's offence (or, by one offence) death reigned by one." Rom. 5 : 18, " By the offence of one (one offence, Lachm. Tisch.), judgment came upon all men to condemnation." Rom. 5 : 19, " By one man's disobedience many were made sinners." 1 Cor. 15 : 22, " In Adam (to3 'ASafji) all die."

The very important discussion of St. Paul in Rom. 5 : 1219 teaches: 1. That the death which came upon all men as a punishment came because of one sin, and only one ; and 2. That this sin was the one committed by Adam and his posterity as a unity. Three explanations have been given of rjixaprov, in this passage. 1. It is active in its meaning, and denotes the first sin of Adam and his posterity as a unity : his posterity being one with him by natural union, or else by representation, or by both together. 2. It is active in its meaning, and denotes the first sin of each individual after he is born. In this case, rjjxaprov does not denote Adam's first sin. 3. It is passive in its meaning, signifying, either, " to be sinful," or, " to be reckoned as having sinned." Sliedd : On Romans, 5 : 12-19.

That rjfxapTov is active in its signification is proved : (a) By the fact, that icf c5 TraVre? rjp.apTov means the same as h\a rrf^ ajxaprla^i in the preceding context ; and ofjuapTiaf is active in signification, (b) By the invariable use of the word rjfiapTov elsewhere. Matt. 27:4; Luke 15 : 18 ; John 9:2; Acts 25 : 8 ; Rom. 2 : 12 ; 3 : 23 ; 5 : 14, 16 ; 6:15; 1 Cor. 7 : 28 ; Eph. 4 : 26 ; 1 Tim. 5 : 20 ; 1 Pet. 2 : 20. (c) By the invariable signification of the substantive a/jbaprca. A verb has the same meaning as its noun, (d) By the interchange of afxapTia with irapaTTToj/xa, which is active in meaning. Rom. 5:16-21.

Turrettin (Institutio, IX. ix. 16) denies that ijfiaprov signifies "to be sinful." " Yerbum rjixaprov proprie non protest trahi ad habitum peccati, vel ad corruptionem habitualem et inhaerentem, sed proprie peccatum alitpiod actuale

ORIGINAL SIN. 183

notat, idque praeteritum, quod non potest aliiid esse quain ipsum Adarai peccatum ; aliud quippe est peccatorein esse vel nasci, aliud vero reipsa peccare." So also Witsius : Covenants, I. viii. 81. Edwards (Original Sin, Works, II. 448) denies that ^/xaprov signifies " to be regarded as sinners." " There is no instance wherein the verb ' sin,' which is used by the apostle when he says, 'all have sinned,' is anywhere used in our authors [Taylor's] sense, for being brought into a state of suffering, and that not as a punishment for sin, or as anything arising from God's displeasure. St. Paul is far from using such a phrase, to signify a being condemned without guilt or any imputation or supposition of guilt. Vastly more, still, is it remote from his language, so to use the verb ' sin,' and to say, man ' sinneth,' or ' has sinned,' hereby meaning nothing more nor less than that he by a judicial act is condemned."

Unless, therefore, St. Paul departed from the invariable Scripture use of the word ijfxapTov, when he asserts that death, as a just punishment, passed upon all men " because all sinned," he employs the word " sinned " actively. And if he does depart here from the invariable Scripture meaning of -^fiaprov, he is the only inspired writer that does so ; and this is the only instance in his own writings in which he does so — his nse of the verb dfiaprdvei.v in scores of other instances being the ordinary nse.

But while rjpbapTov in Rom. 5:12 is active in signification, it does not denote the transgressions of each individual subsequent to birth, and when no longer in Adam, but the transgression of Adam and Eve inclusive of their posterity. This is proved by the following considerations : 1. One^ and but one sin is specified as the ground of the penalty of death. This is asserted five times over, in succession, in Rom. 5 : 15-19. In Rom. 5 : 12, rjfxaprov unquestionably refers to the same sin that is spoken of in Rom. 5 : 15-19.

2. In Rom. 5 ; 14, some who die, namely, infants, " did

184 ANTHROPOLOGY.

not sin after the similitude of Adam's first transgression." That is, they did not repeat the first sin. They must, therefore, have sinned in some other manner, because they are a part of the " all " (Trai^re?) who sinned, and because they experience the death which is the wages of sin. The only other conceivable manner of sinning is that of participation in the first sin itself. But participation in Adam's first sin is not the repetition of it by the individual.

From these considerations, it is evident that the word " sinned " in Rom. 5 : 12 is active in its signification ; but the action is specific, not individual : the action of the common nature in Adam prior to any conception and birth, and not the action of the individuals one by one after conception and birth.

The passive signification given to '^fiaprov, is twofold : (a) To be sinful (Calvin), (h) To be reckoned as having sinned (Chrysostom). The first has never had much currency. The last has been extensively adopted by SemiPelagian and Arminian theologians, and also by many Later-Calvinists. The objections to this explanation are the following : 1. It is contrary to invariable usage. This would be the only instance in the New Testament in which the verb d/j^apTavco would have such a meaning. 2. Had St. Paul intended to bring in the notion of regarding or treating as sinners, this would require the combination of ajxaprdveiv with hval, and he would have used the compound form, 7rdvT€<; rjfiapTr}K6Te

4. According to the passive signification, ■^fiaprov would denote God's action, not man's : God's act of imputing sin, not man's act of committing it. But it is the sinner's act, not that of the judge, which is the reason for punishment.

5. It destroys the logic. All die, because all are reckoned

ORIGINAL SIN. 185

to deserve death. This is one reason for death, but not the particular one required here. The argument demands a reason founded upon the act of the criminal, not of the judge. To saj that all die because all are condemned to die, is to give no sufficient reason for death. For the question immediately arises, why are they condemned to die ? 6. It tends to empty BdvaTo

The total guilt of tlie first sin, thus committed by the entire race in Adam, is imputed to each individual of the race, because of the indivisibility of guilt. If two individual men together commit a murder, each is chargeable with the whole guilt of the act. One-half of the guilt of the murder cannot be imputed to one, and one-half to the other. Supposing that the one human nature which committed the " one offence" (Rom. 5 : 17, 18) became a family of exactly a million individuals by propagation, it would not follow that each individual would be responsible foi- only a millionth part of the offence. The whole undivided guilt of the first sin of apostasy from God would be chargeable upon each and every one of the million individuals of the species alike. For though the one common nature that committed the '' one offence " is divisible by propagation, the offence itself is not divisible, nor is the guilt of it. Consequently, one man is as guilty as another of the whole first sin ; of the original act of falling from God. The individual Adam and Eve were no more guilty of this first act,

186 ANTHROPOLOGY.

and of the whole of it, than their descendants are ; and their descendants are as guilty as they.

The same principle applies also to the indivisibility of merit. The merit of Christ's obedience is indivisible, and the whole of it is imputed to every individual believer alike. A million of believers do not each obtain by imputation a millionth part of their Redeemer's merit. One believer is as completely justified by gratuitous impntation as another, because all alike receive by faith the total worthiness and desert of their Lord's obedience, not a fractional part of it. As the unmerited imputation of Christ's obedience conveys the total undivided merit of this obedience to each and every believer, so the merited imputation of Adam's disobedience conveys the total undivided guilt of this disobedience to each and every individual of the posterity.

The first sin of Adam, being a common, not an individual sin, is deservedly and justly imputed to the posterity of Adam upon the same principle upon which all sin is deservedly and justly imputed : namely, that it was committed by those to whom it is imputed. "AH men die, because all men sinned," says St. Paul. Free agency is supposed, as the reason for the penalty of death : namely, the free agency of all mankind in Adam. This agency, though differing in the manner, is yet as real as the subsequent free agency of each individual.

The imputation either of Adam's sin or of Christ's righteousness must rest upon a union of some kind. It is just to impute the first sin of Adam to his posterity, while it would be unjust to impute it to the fallen angels, because Adam and his posterity were a unity when the first sin was committed, but Adam and the fallen angels were not. " llaud justum fuisset uuius angeli crimen alteri imputari, vel unius hominis peccatum alterius censei-i, posito quod siniruli seorsim essentcreati sicut angeli. Sed estimitasnaturae, cui unitas f oederalis erat innixa." Leydecker : SynopORIGINAL SIN. ISl

sis, 164, in Heppe : Reformirte Dogmatik, Loc. XV. The fact that the fallen angels have committed individual transgressions of their own, would not justify imputing a common race-transgression to them. Again, it is just to impute Christ's righteousness to a believer, but not just to impute it to an unbeliever, because the former has been united to him by faith, and the latter has not.

The popular explanation of the imputation of Adam's sin, by the fact that under the Divine government children inherit the poverty and disease of their vicious parents, is inadequate. The Divine government does not punish the children of vicious parents for their inherited poverty and disease. If Adam's posterity merely inherited moral corruption, but were not punished for it, this explanation would be pertinent. But inherited corruption is visited with Divine 7'etribution, according to Eph. 2 : 3. And this requires participation in the origin of it. Men must sin in Adam, in order to be justly punished for Adam's sin. And participation requires union with Adam.

There is a similar fallacy in citing the Biblical instances in which innocent individuals suffer for the sins of guilty individuals, in proof that Adam's posterity though innocent of his sin are punishable for it. To suffer in consequence of the sin of another, is not the same as to he punished for it. The sufferings that came upon the descendants of Ham because of his individual sin were not retributive, like those which come upon the whole human race because of the one specific sin of Adam, or like tiiose which come upon an individual for his own transgressions. Ham's descendants have suffered for centuries on account of their ancestor's sin, but have not been under eternal condemnation on account of it. They are exposed to eternal death, in common with the rest of mankind, because of the sin in Adam and of their own individual sins, but not because of the individual sin of Ham. The same is true of the sin of Korah, in relation to his family. In reference to all individual transgressions, Ezekiel

;;88 anthropology.

(18 : 20) asserts that '* the son shall not bear the iniquity of liis father; " that is, he shall not he j^unished iov it, though he may suffer for it. Suffering and affliction are sovereign acts of God, and may or may not be connected with the individual sin of a secondary ancestor, according to his good pleasure; but punishment is a judicial act that is necessarj', and necessarily connected with the specific sin of the first ancestor, and the individual sins of the person himself.

The imputation of Adam's sin rests upon a different kind of union from that upon which the imputation of Christ's righteousness rests. The former is founded upon natural union : a union of constitutional nature and substance. The possibility of an existence, a probation, and a free fall in Adam has been considered under the head of traducianism. The entire human species, as an invisible but substantial nature, acts in and with the first human pair. Traducianism is true only in anthropology, and with reference to apostasy. It has no application at all to soteriology and redemption. There is no race-unity in redemption. All men were in Adam when he disobeyed ; but all men were not in Christ when he obeyed. All men are propagated from Adam, and inherit his sin. No man is propagated from Christ, or inherits his righteousness. Apostasy starts with the race. Redemption starts with the individual. All men fall. Some men are redeemed. Union in Adam, is substantial and physical ; in Christ, is spiritual and mystical (L. C. QQ) ; in Adam, is natural ; in Christ, is representative ; in Adam, is by creation ; in Christ, is by regeneration ; in Adam, is with man as a species ; in Christ, is with man as an individual ; in Adam, is universal ; in Christ, is particular and by election. Shedd : On Romans 5 : 19.

The tlieory of Schleiermacher, Rothe (Steirnneyer : History of Christ's Passion, p. 15), and Nevin as criticised b}' Hodge, supposes that Christ united himself with the entire human nature. This is an error. In the incarnation, the

ORIGINAL SIN. 189

Logos assmned into union with liiniself only a fractional ])art of human natm-e : namely, that flesh and blood which was derived from the Virgin. There was no union, in the incarnation, with the human race as a whole. This would have required the Logos to have united with the human natnre as it was in Adam, prior to any division and individualization of it. Furthermore, in regeneration, Christ is united with only a particular individual who has been elected and separated (Gal. 1 : 15) from all other individuals.

The principal objection to the tenet of the participation of the posterity in the first sin is, that the individual has no self-conscious recollection of such an event, and that he cannot be held responsible for an act of which he is not self-conscious and cannot remember.

The reply to this is: 1. That upon any theory, no individual man is self-conscious of and remembers the first act of sin. Neither Pelagianism nor Semi-Pelagianism, neither Socinianism nor Arminianism, has any advantage in this respect over Augustinianism and Calvinism. ISI^either does creationism have any advantage over traducianism. Upon any theory that recognizes the fact of sin in man, the first act of sin is not observed by self-consciousness at the time of its occurrence. No man remembers the time when he was innocent, and the particular first act by which he became guilty before God.

2. Guilt is caused by self-determination, not by self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is not action, but vision; and it is action, not the sight of an action that constitutes crime. A man is wrongly inclining all the time to self and the creature, but he is not self-conscious all the time that he is wrongly inclining. If it be said, that he miglit hecome self-conscious that he is so inclining, this does not prove that such a self-consciousness is necessary in order to responsibility for the wrong inclining. Even if he does not become self-conscious of his wrong inclining (as he may not for days and weeks), this docs not destroy the fact that he

190 ANTHROPOLOGY.

is so inclining. It is the inclining, not the self-conscionsness of inclining, which constitutes the free action of his will; and it is this free action which constitutes the sin and guilt. This is true also of the momentary volition, as well as of the abiding inclination. If a man commits a murder, it is not necessary that at the time when he stabs his victim he should have that clear apprehension of the enormity of the act which he subsequently has, in order to be chai"geal)le with murder. Sins of thoughtlessness are as truly sinful, as deliberate sins. Leviticus 5 : 17, 18 ; Luke 12 : 48. Men generally are not self-conscious of the "secret sins" (Ps. 19 : 12 ; 90 : 8) of feeling and desire which tbey are committing inwardly all the time. The purpose of preaching the law is to produce the self-consciousness of sin. The "darkness" in which, according to St. Paul (Eph. 4:18), men "walk," is the thoughtless unconsciousness in which they live and act. It is a provei-b, that man sins the more, the less God and sin are in his thoughts. The clearness of the self-consciousness is not the measure of the intensity of the self-determination. The two may be in inverse proportion. The will may be vehemently resolute and determined to a particular end, and yet the understanding be very blind to the will's activity. It is fi-equently the case, that great strength and energy in voluntariness are accompanied with great obtuseness and stupidity in moral perception. The most wicked and devilish men are oftentimes the most apathetic and hardened of men. The will is awake and full of force, but the conscience is asleep. "When the sinner is convicted by the truth and Spirit of God, he does not excuse or extenuate his guilt on the ground of his past unconsciousness in sin. Even the heathen, when convinced of the abominations of idolatry and of selfish lust in its varied forms, do not plead '"the ignorance that was in them because of the blindness of their hearts," in excuse for having " given themselves over to work all uncleanness with greediness." Eph. 4 : 19.

ORIGINAL SIN. 191

It is on this ground, that Samuel Hopkins contends that Infants are moral agents. " Many have supposed," he sajs (Works, I. 233), " that none of mankind are capable of sin, or moral agency, before they can distinguish between I'ight and wrong. But this wants proof which has never yet been produced. And it appears to be contrary to divine revelation. Persons may be moral agents and sin without knowing what the law of God is, or of what nature their exercises are, and while they have no consciousness." Hamilton (Bowen's Ed., xiii., xiv.) contends that there are agencies of the soul deeper than self-consciousness. Pascal, in the fourth of his Provincial Letters, shows the consequences of the position of the Jesnit, that "nothing is voluntary but what is accompanied with deliberation, and clear consciousness of the nature of the act." '

3. There was, comparatively, more self-consciousness attending the first sin for the posterity, if it was committed by them in Adam, than can be found npon any other theory. The first sin of every man must have been committed either : (a) In Adam, (h) In the womb, (c) In infancy. We cannot conceive of any relation to, or connection with self-consciousness, in the last two cases. We can in the first. For the individuals Adam and Eve were self-conscious. So far as they were concerned, the first sin was a very deliberate and intensely wilful act. The human species existing in them at that time acted in their act, and sinned in their sin, similarly as the hand or eye acts and sins in the murderous or lustful act of the individual soul. The hand or the eye has no separate self-consciousness of its own, parallel with the soul's self-consciousness. Taken by itself, it has no consciousness at all. But its union and oneness with the selfconscious soul, in the personal union of soul and body, affords all the self-consciousness that is possible in the case. The hand is co-agent with the soul, and hence is

' See Ritschl : History of Justificatiou (Black's Tr.), 390-410. Shedd : TheoJogical Essays, 3-13-254.

192 ANTHROPOLOGY.

particeps ciiiniuis and has a common guilt with tlie souL

In like manner, the psychico-physical hnman nature existing in Adam and Eve had no separate self-consciousness parallel with that of Adam and Eve. Unlike the visible hand or eye, it was an invisible substance or nature capable of being transformed into myriads of self-conscious individuals ; but while in Adam, and not yet distributed and individualized, it had no distinct self-consciousness of its own, any more than the hand or eye in the supposed case. But existing^ and acting in and with these self-conscious individuals, it participated in their self-determination, and is chargeable with their sin, as the hand, and eye, and whole body is chargeable with tlie sin of the individual man. As in the instance of the individual unity, everything that constitutes it, bod}' as well as soul, is active and responsible for all that is done by this unity, so in the instance of the specific unity, everything that constitutes it, naujely, Adam and the human nature in him, is active and responsible for all that is done by this unity.

2. The second part of " the sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell," consists in " the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of the whole nature." This part of human sinfulness stands to the first, in the relation of effect to cause. Human nature in Adam and Eve inclined from holiness to sin, and as a consequence that nature became destitute of its original righteousness and morally corrupt.

It is easy to see how this negative destitution of righteousness and positive inclination to evil, with all the moral corruption attending it, should be imputed as guilt, provided it be conceded that the first sin is really committed and rio-hteously imputed. If it is just to impute the cause, it is certainly just to impute the effect. But, on the contrary, it is impossible to see why the corruption of nature should be imputed as sin, if the first sin is not. It is imORIGINAL SIN. 193

proper to impute the effect when the cause cannot be imputed.'

It is here that the illogical character of the theory of mediate imputation is apparent. This was first advanced by Placaeus, in 1640. To relieve, as he supposed, the Calvinistic doctrine of original sin of some of its diflBculties, he maintained that the corruption of natui-e which is inherited from Adam is chargeable upon each individual as sin and guilt, but the act of transgressing the probationary statute given in Eden is not chargeable. This is to be imputed only to Adam and Eve as individuals. . A man is guilty and punishable for his evil heart, but not for Adam's first sin. His own personal corruption is imputable, because it is personal ; but the act of another person is not imputable, because it is another's act. Placaeus would impute Adam's sin as a state, but not as an act ; the " corruption of nature," but not the " guilt of the first sin," in the Westminster formula.

This theory made a greater difficulty than it relieved. The corruption of nature, according to Placaeus himself, is the effect of Adam's first sin. Why should the effect be imputed, and not the cause ? Such a kind of imputation looked unreasonable, and, as the Formula Consensus says> "imperilled the whole doctrine of original sin." It would be difficult to retain the imputation of the corruption of nature, by this method ; and both the first sin and corruption would cease to be imputed.

The Synod of Charenton, in 1644, condemned the view of Placaeus, and also charged him with denying the imputation of Adam's sin. He objected to this, saying that he did not deny the imputation of Adam's sin, altogether, but only when stated in a certain manner. " Illis enim verbis [in the decree of the synod] aut exposita non est Placaei

* " Sin," as Miiller (Sin, II. 163) remarks, " must begin, not in a state, but in an act." Yet the first act of sin, it must be remembered, causes and produces a state of sin.

Vol. II.— 13

194 ANTHROPOLOGY.

seiitentia, aiit male exposita est. Is eiiim prirai peccati Adae impntationem nunquam simpliciter negavit, nunqnam negatam volnit. Cnm igitur impntationem primi illius peccati quandam aiRrraet, quandam neget, iion exponitiir ejus sententia, si dicitur simpliciter, et nulla distinctione adhibita, primi peccati Adae imputationem negare." Placaeus : De Imputatione, I. iii.

The criticism of Turrettin (IX. ix. 5) upon this is as follows : " To break the force of the statement of the Synod of Charenton, Placaeus distinguished between iimnediate or antecedent imputation, and mediate or consequent imputation. The former he calls that imputation [of Adam's sin] by which the first act of Adam was imputed immediately to all his posterity, Christ only excepted, and antecedently to any inherent corruption. The latter, he calls that imputation [of Adam's sin] which follows upon seeing in the posterity that hereditary corruption derived to them from Adam, and which is brought about by it [hereditary corruption], as the means or medium [of the imputation]." The first " immediate " imputation Placaeus rejects, the second " mediate " imputation he accepts ; and upon this ground contends that he does not reject the imputation of Adam's sin absolutely, and without qualification.

But, as Turrettin proceeds to say, " this distinction does in fact do away with the imputation of Adam's [first] sin altogether. For if the sin of Adam is imputed to us only in this mediate manner, according to which we are constituted guilty before God, and made liable to penalty, on account of an hereditary corruption which we derive from Adam, there is no real and proper imputation of Adam's \^firsi\ sin, but only of inherent corruption. This the synod intended to prevent and proscribe, by distinguishing original sin into two parts : namely, inherent corruption, and imputation proper [i.e., tlie imputation of \\\q first ^\\\ itself] — a thing that could not be done, if imputation cannot be except upon the ground of a foregoing cojTuption of nature.

ORIGINAL SIN. 195

For it is one tiling to be exposed to the wrath of God on account of inherent and liereditarj corruption, and quite another thing to be exposed to this wrath on account of Adam's first act of sin."

The phrase '* original sin," in the Westminster statement (S. C, 18), comprises both the first sin and the corruption of nature : Adam's sin both as an act, and a resulting state of the will. Edwards (Original Sin, in initio) remarks that original sin " is vulgarly understood in that latitude, as to include not only the depravity of nature, but the imputation of Adam's first sin." The whole truth of the doctrine of original sin includes the imputation of both the first sin and the ensuing corruption. The first sin of Adam and his posterity is immediately imputed to them as sin, antecedently, in the order of nature, to inherent corruption, because it was their voluntary act. And then the resulting inherent corruption is imputed as sin ; not, however, as in Placaeus's theory, through itself &% the medium of the imputation, but through the medium of t\\Q Ji7'st sin, because this was the cause of it. Both the cause and the effect, both the first sin and the corruption caused by it, are imputed to Adam and his posterity.

The phrase " original sin " is sometimes employed to denote only the corruption of nature, in distinction from the sins of act that proceed from it. In this use of the term, original sin is equivalent to the Scripture phrases : The " evil treasure of the heart," Matt. 12 : 35 ; the " corrupt tree," Matt. 12 : 33 ; the " heart from which proceed evil thoughts," Mark 7 : 21 ; the " stony heart," Ezek. 11 : 19 ; the "carnal mind," Rom. 8:7; the "flesh," Eom. 8:4, et alia.

It is also equivalent to the theological phrases : The "corrupt nature;" the "sinful inclination;" the "evil disposition ; " the " apostate will." When the term " nature " is applied to sin, it does not denote " nature" in the primary but the secondary sense. In the primary sense,

196 ANTHROPOLOGY.

" nature " denotes a substance, and one that is created by God. In this sense, Augustine denies that sin is " nature," and asserts that it is '' intentio." Shedd : History of Doctrine, II. 82 ; Theological Essays, 220. Howe (Oracles, II. xxiv.) remarks that " that evil heart, that nature, not as it is nature but as it is depraved nature, is now transmitted." When " nature " signifies created substance, it is improper to call sin a nature. Aristotle (Politics, I. ii.) says : " What every being is in its j^er/^^c^ state, that certainly is the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or a house." Sin is imperfection, and therefore not "nature" in this sense. But there is a secondary meaning of the word. In this use of it, " nature " denotes " natural inclination," or " innate disposition." In this sense, sin is a " nature," and the adjective "natural" is applicable to the corruption of sin. In the same sense, holiness is called a " nature," in 2 Pet. 1 : 4. Believers are " partakers of a divine nature," by being regenerated and coming to possess a holy disposition or inclination. " It is true that sin is a nature, but then it is a second nature, a state of degeneration." Nitzsch : Christian Doctrine, § 107. Calvin, on Eph. 2 : 3, says : " Since God is the author of nature, how comes it that no blame attaches to God if we are lost by nature ? I answer, there is a twofold nature : The one produced by God, and the other is corruption of it. We are not born such as Adam was at first created." See Formula Concordiae, I. xii. ; Calvin : Institutes, II. ii. 12.

1. Viewed as natural corruption, original sin may be considered with respect to the understanding, (a) It is blindness. Is. 42 : 7, " A light to open blind eyes." Luke 4 : 18, " Recovering of sight to the blind." Rev. 3 : 17, " Knowest not that thou art blind." 2 Cor. 4:4," The god of this world hath blinded their minds." All texts that speak of regeneration as " enlightening." 2 Cor. 4:6; Eph. 5 : 14 ; 1 Thess. 5 : 5 ; Ps. 97 : 11, etc. All texts that call sin " darkness." Pro v. 4:19; Is. 60 : 2 ; Eph. 5 : 11 ; Col.

ORIGINAL SIN. 197

1 : 13 ; 1 John 2:11; 1 Thess. 5:4; Eph. 4 : 18, " Having the nnderstanding {BLdvoia) darkened ; '^ E.om. 1 : 28, " Reprobate mind (ww)."

Sin blinds and darkens the nnderstanding, by destroying the consciousness of divine things. For example, the son] destitute of love to God is no longer conscious of love ; of reverence, is no longer conscious of reverence, etc. Its knowledge of such affections, therefore, is from heai-say, like that which a blind man has of colors, or a deaf man of sound. God, the object of these affections, is of course unknown for the same reason. The spiritual discernment, spoken of in 1 Cor. 2 : 6, is the immediate consciousness of a renewed man. It is experimental knowledge. Sin is described in Scripture as voluntary ignorance. " This they willingly are ignorant of, that by the word of God the heavens w^ere of old," 2 Pet. 3 : 5. Christ says to the Jews : " If I had not come and spoken unto them they had not had sin : " the sin, namely, of " not knowing him that sent me," John 15 : 21, 22. But the ignorance, in this case, was a willing ignorance. They desired to be ignorant.

Another effect of original sin upon the understanding as including the conscience is : (Ij) Insensibility. It does not render conscience extinct, but it stupefies it. 1 Tim. 4 : 2, "Having cauterized their own conscience." (c) Pollution. Titus 1 : 15, " Even their reason {vov

198 ANTHROPOLOGY.

needing cleansing bj atoning blood " from dead works," Heb. 9 : 14. Dead works, being no fulfilment of the law, leave the conscience perturbed and unpacified.

2. Considered with respect to the will, original sin is : (a) Enmity. Kom. 8:7; James 4:4:, " The friendship of the world is enmity towards God ; " Dent, 1 : 26, " They rebelled against God ;" Job 34 : 37 ; Is. 1 : 1 ; 30 : D ; 45 : 2 ; Ezek. 12 : 2. {h) Hatred. Eom. 1 : 29 ; Ps. 89 : 23; 139 : 21 ; Ex. 20 : 5 ; Prov. 1 : 25 ; 5:12; John 7:7; 15 : 18, 23, 24. (c) Hardness of heart, or insensibility. Ex. 7 : 14, 22 ; 2 Kings 17 : 14 ; Job 9:4; Is. 63 : 17 ; Dan. 5 : 20 ; John 12 : 2(> ; Acts 19 : 9 ; Ileb. 3 : 8, 15 ; 4:7. {(l) Aversion. John 5 : 40, '*• Ye will not " (ou ^k\r)Te), ye are disinclined ; Eev. 2 : 21. {e) Obstinacy. Deut. 31 : 27, "stife-necked';" Ex. 32:9; Ps. 75:5^; Is. 26:10; 43 : 4 ; Acts 7 : 51 ; Pom. 10 : 21. (/) Bondage. Jer. 13 : 23 ; Mark 3 : 23 ; John 6 : 43, 44 ; 8 : 34 ; Pom. 5:6; 6 : 20 ; 7 : 9, 14, 18, 23 ; 8 : 7, 8 ; 9 : 16 ; 2 Pet. 2 : 14.

Original sin, considered as corruption of nature, is sin in the sense of guilt. " Danniant Pelagianos et alios, qui vitium originis negant esse peccatum." Augsburg Confession, II. " Every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God, and made subject to death, temporal and eternal." Westminster Confession, VI. vi. " Corruption of nature doth remain in those that are regenerated, and although it be through Christ pardoned and mortified, yet both itself and all the motions thereof are truly and properly sin." Westminster Confession, YL v. The Semi-Pelagian, Papal, and Arminian anthropologies differ from the Augustinian and Keformed, by denying that corruption of nature is guilt. It is a physical and mental disorder leading to sin, but is not sin itself.'

» Shedd : History of Doctrine, II. 35-43 ; 180-186 ; On Romans, 7 : 15-17. MiiUer : Sin, II. 400.

ORIGINAL SIN. 199

Conniption of nature is guilt because : (a) The scriptures do not distinguish between sin proper, and improper. 'Afxapria, as denoting the principle of sin, is exchanged with 7rapd7rT(o/Ma, denoting the act of sin, and vice versa. Rom. 5 : 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21. {h) 'Afiapria is the equivalent of eTTiSv/jiLa and ardp^. Rom. Y : 7, " I had not known sin, except the law had said, Thou shalt not lust." Rom. 8 : 3, 5. (c) The remainders of corruption in the regenerate are hated as sin by the regenerate himself, Rom. 7 : 15 ; and by God, who slays them by his Spirit, Rom. 8:13. (d) Evil desire is forbidden in the tenth commandment, Ex. 20 : 17. Compare 1 John 2 : 16. The tenth commandment, which the Septuagint renders 6vk eVt^u/iT^o-ei?, prohibits that internal lusting which is the chief characteristic of the corrupt nature. It is also forbidden by Christ in his exposition of the seventh commandment. Matt. 5 : 28. 1 John 3 : 15, " Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." (e) Corruption of nature is guilt, because it is the inclination of the will. It is " voluntary " though not " volitionary." It is conceded that the inclination to murder is as truly culpa ble as the act of murder. " The thought (purpose, n^T) of foolishness is sin," Prov. 24: 9. (y) Corruption of nature is guilt, upon the principle that the cause must have the same predicates as its effects. If actual transgressions are truly and properly sin, then the evil heart or inclination which prompts them must be so likewise. If the stream is bitter water, the fountain must be also. If the murderer's act is guilt, then the murderers hate is. (r/) If corruption of nature, or sinful disposition is not guilt, then it is an extenuation and excuse for actual transgressions. These latter are less blameworthy, if the character which prompts them and renders their avoidance more difficult is not selfdetermined and culpable. (A) If corruption of nature is not culpable, it is impossible to assign a reason why the dying infant needs I'edemption by atoning blood. Christ came " by water and blood ; " that is, with both expiat200 ANTHROPOLOGY.

ing and sanctifying power. 1 John 5 : 6. But if tliere be no guilt in natural depravity, Christ comes to the infant " by water only," and not "by blood ; " by sanctification, and not by justification. Infant redemption implies that the infant has guilt as well as pollution. The infant has a rational soul ; this soul has a will ; this will is inclined ; this inclination, like that of an adult, is centred on the creature instead of the Creator. This is culpable, and needs pardon. It is also pollution, and needs removal. (/) God forgives original sin as well as actual transgression, when he bestows the " remission of sins." The " carnal mind," or the enmity of the heart is as great an offence against his excellence and honor, as any particular act that issues from it. Indeed, if there be nnitual goodwill between two parties an occasional outward offence is less serious. " Suppose," says Thirlwall (Letters, p. 46), " two friends really loving one another, but liable now and then to quarrel. They may easily forgive the occasional offence, because their habitual disposition is one of mutual good- will ; but should the case be the reverse — hatred stifled, but occasionally venting itself by unfriendly acts — how little would it matter though they should forget the particular offence, if the enmity should continue at the bottom of the heart." This illustrates the guilt of sin as a state of the heart towards God, and the need of its forgiveness and removal.

With the Scriptures, the theologians assert that corruption of nature is sin. " We must not only abstain from evil deeds, but even from the desire to do them. Christ commanded not only to abstain from things forbidden by the law, but even from longing after them. Our Lord foi bade concupiscence itself, as well as the act of adultery." Irenaeus : Contra Haereses, TV. xiii. "The command not to lust condemns the beginnings of sin, that is, unruly desires and wishes, no less than overt acts." Tertullian : De Pudicitia. Augustine, according to Turrettin (IX. i. 3), deORIGINAL SIN. 201

fines sin to be " aliqiiid concupitnni, dictum, factum, contra legem dei." Augustine, according to Calvin (Institutes III. iii. 10), " sometimes denominates concupiscence infirmity, teaching that it becomes sin in cases where action or consent is added to the conception of the mind ; but sometimes he denominates it sin ; as when he savs, ' Paul gives the appellation of sin to this from which all sins proceed ; that is, to carnal concupiscence.' " " If lust which wars against the soul (1 Pet. 2: 11) be already sin (Ex. 20 : 17; Matt. 5 : 28), then nnist the act of sin be regarded as augmenting its degree." Ils^itzsch : Christian Doctrine, § 111. "By the precept concerning the tree of knowledge, man was taught that God is Lord of all things, and that it is uidawful even to desire, but with his leave. Man's true happiness is placed in God alone, and nothing is to be desired but with submission to him." Witsius : Covenants, I. iii. 21. Hales, qnoted by Davenant (Justification, II. 214), says that " the irregular pleasure proceeding from the sensualized mind, inasmuch as it is corrupt, is sin ; because it ought to have been subject to reason, and moves in an undue manner contrary to reason." Owen (Justification, XYII.)says: "To root out the pernicious error of selfrighteousness, our Lord gives the spii-itual intention of the law, and declares : 1. That the law had regard to the regulation of the heart with all its first motions and actings. For he asserts that the first motions of concupiscence, though not consented to, much less actually accomplished, are directly forbidden in the law. This he doth in his exposition of the seventh commandment. 2. He declares the penalty of the law upon the least sin to be hell-fire, in his assertion of causeless anger to be forbidden in the sixth commandment." " Have M^e," says Calvin (Institutes, II. viii. 58), "felt any evil desire in our heart ? we are already guilty of concupiscence, and are become at once transgressors of the law ; because the Lord forbids us not only to plan and attempt anything that would prove detrimental to an202 ANTHROPOL.OGY.

other, but even to be stimulated and agitated with concupiscence. The curse of God always rests on the transgression of the law. We have no reason, therefore, to exempt even the most trivial emotions of concupiscence from the sentence of death." Says Bullinger : " Lex ' ne concupiscito ' inquit. Itaque et si cupiditate, quae te incendit, non assentiaris, ipse tamen carnis tuae impetus peccatum est."

The position that original sin is voluntary inclination has been maintained in anthropology, from the beginning of speculation upon the subject. Augustine argues as follows with Julian: " Says Julian, ' If sin is from will, then it is an evil will that produces sin ; but if from nature, then an evil nature produces sin.' I quickly reply that sin is from will. Then he asks, ' whether original sin is also from will ? ' I answer, certainly, original sin also ; because this was transmitted from the will of the first man." De i^uptiis, II. xxviii. 2. Tun-ettin defines sin as " inclinatio, actio, vel omissio pugnans cum lege dei." Institutio-, IX. i. 3. Ursinus, speaking of corruption of nature in infants, says that " infants want not the faculty of will, and though in act they do not will sin, yet they will it by inclination." Christian Religion, Original Sin, Q. 7. Rivetus asserts that "concupiscentia est inclinatio voluntaria." Explicatio Decalogi, verse 15. William of Auxerre, quoted by Davenant (Justification, 11. 214), asserts that " the movement of wrong desire in man is a voluntary act, and it is sin, even when it moves before the reason has had time to exercise its judgment." Says Charnocke (Holiness of God, p. 476), " there is no sin but is in some sort voluntary; voluntary in the root, or voluntary in the branch; voluntary by an immediate act of the will [volition], or voluntary by a general or natural inclination of the will [self-determination]. That is not a crime, to which a man is violenced without any concurrence of the faculties of the soul to that act." Says Owen (Yindiciae, VI.) : " Original

ORIGINAL SIN. 203

sin, as peccatam originans, was voluntary in Adam ; and as it is originatuni in us, is in our wills habitually [as a habitus], and not against them, in any actings of it or tliem. The effects of it, in the coining of sin and in the thoughts of men's liearts, are all voluntary." Compare Indwelling Sin, VI. xii. Says Howe (Oracles, II. xxiv.), " We must understand that an evil inclination, or a depraved nature, is that which doth first violate the law of God ; and so that it is not infelicity only to be ill-inclined, but it is sin : sin in the highest and most eminent sense thereof. It is the habitual frame and bent of the soul which the law of God doth in the first place direct. So that the empoisoned nature of man, the malignity of the heart and soul, is that which makes the first and principal breach upon the law of God."

It must be remembered that sin in its entire history is iiiclination and self-determination. While it is true that the first sin of Adam is the fall of the human race, and decides its eternal destiny apart from redemption, yet it must not be supposed that after the first act of Adam, all self-determination ceases. Original sin, as corruption of nature in each individual, is only the continuation of the first inclining away fi'om God. The self-determination of the human will from God to the creature, as an ultimate end, did not stop short off with the act in Eden, but goes right onward in every individual of 'Adam's posterity, until regeneration reverses it. As progressive sanctification is the continuation of that holy self-determination of the human will which begins in its regeneration by the Holy Spirit, so the progressive depravation of the natural man is the continuation of that sinful self-determination of the human will which bes-an in Adam's transg-ression.

In connection with the doctrine that the corruption of nature is the same as the free inclination of the will, a position of Edwards is sometimes misundei-stood and misapplied. Edwards (Will, IV. i.) asserts that "the virtuous204 ANTHROPOLOGY.

ness or viciousness of a disposition consists not in the origin or cause of it, but in the nature of it." This position cannot be understood without taking into view the error wliich Edwards was combating. lie was opposing the view of Arminian writers, Taj'loi-, Whitby and others, that a disposition or inclination cannot be chargeable as guilt unless it has been originated by a voUtionary act preceding it. Tiieir doctrine of the will implied that inclination can be produced by volition, and must be, in order to I'esponsibility for the inclination. This Edwards denies. "It is agreeable," he says, '• to the natural notions of mankind tliat moral evil, with its desert of dislike and abhorrence, and all its other ill-deservings, consists in a certain deformity in the nature of certain dispositions of the heart and acts of the will ; and not in the deformity of somethhig else, diverse from the very thing itself which deserves abhorrence, supposed to be the cause of it." Tiiat is to say, the disposition of the heart, or inclination of the will, is in its own quality and nature an evil disposition, and does not get its evil quality from " something else " — namely a volition that went before it, and caused it. If a man is inclined or disposed to sin, this inclination or disposition is itself sin. It is not necessary that he should, previously to tlie inclining, resolve to incline, or choose to incline, in order that the inclination should be sinful. Tlie inclining itself is sin and guilt. " Thus, for instance," he says, " ingratitude is hateful and worthy of dispraise, according to common sense, not because something as bad, or worse than ingratitude, was the cause that produced it ; but because it is hateful in itself by its own inherent deformity. So the love of virtue is amiable, and worthy of praise, not merely becanse something else went before this love of virtue in our minds which caused it to take place there (for instance our own choice [volition] — we chose to lov^e virtue, and by some method or other wrought ourselves into the love of it), but because of the amiableness and condecency of such a disposi

ORIGINAL SIN. 205

tion and inclination of the heart.*' In other words, Edwards here teaches that a man does not choose to incline, but he inclines ; he does not choose to lo^e, but he loves. The first thing in the order is not a volition, and then after this a disposition or inclination ; but the first thing is a disposition or inclination, and then a volition.

Now it is only with reference to the relation of a volition to a disposition or inclination, that Edwards lays down the position that " the virtuousness or viciousness of a disposition lies not in the origin of it, but in the nature of it." He does not carry the position any further than this. When the volition is left out of the account, and only the disposition or inclination is considered, Edwards teaches that this must have a free origin, or else it is not sin. The whole purpose of his celebrated argument to prove that Adam and his posterity were one agent in the origin of sin is, to show how the sinful disposition is the working of spontaneity, or unforced inclination. When it comes to that act of will by which man inclines to sin, Edwards affirms that man is the self-moved and guilty actor and author of it. In his treatise on the Will {TV. i.), he remarks as follows : " If any shall still object and say : Why is it not necessary that the cause should be considered in order to determine whether anything be worthy of blame or praise ? Is it agreeable to reason and common sense, that a man is to be praised or blamed for that which he is not the cause or author of, and has no hand in ? I answer, such phrases as ' being the cause,' ' being the author,' ' having a hand in,' and the like, are ambiguous. They are most vulgai-ly understood for being the designing voluntary [volitionary] cause, or cause by antecedent choice : and it is most certain that men are not in this sense tlio causes or authors of the first act of their wills [i.e., of their inclination, or disposition], in any case ; as certain as anything is or ever can be ; for nothing can be more certain than that a thing is not before it is, nor a thins: of the same kind before the first thing of that

206 ANTHROPOLOGY.

kind ; and so no choice before tlie first choice. As, however, the phrase ' being the author ' may be understood, not of being the producer by an antecedent act of will [i.e., a volition] ; but as a person may be said to be the author of the act of the will itself by his being the iramediate agents or the heing that is acting, or in the exercise of that act / if the phrase ' being the author' is used to signify this, then doubtless common sense requires men's being the authors of their own acts of will, in order to their being esteemed worthy of praise or dispraise on account of them. And common sense teaches that they must be the authors of external actions in the former sense, namely, their being the causes of them by an act of will or choice [volition], in order to their being justly blamed or praised ; but it teaches no such thing in respect to the internal acts of will themselves." ' In this last remark, Edwards concedes that a volition precedes an outivard act, and is the cause of it. The Arminian position in respect to volitionary action is true up to this point. An external act is not sinful or holy unless preceded by a volition. But with reference to that internal action of the will which is denominated its inclination or disposition, he holds that the Arminian position is not true. There is no need of a volition to precede this in order to make it sinful or holy ; but it is so in its own nature, because it is the spontaneity of the man ; because it is the action of " the immediate agent, or the being that is acting, or in the exercise of the act."^

' Edwards defines inclination as the ^'■Jeadinrj act" of the will. See ante, p. 131.

2 The Arminian and the Calvinistic view of freedom are contrasted in the following statement of Edwards : " Natural sense does not place the moral evil of volitions and dispositions in the cause of them, but the nature of them. An evil thing's being ./Vom a man in the sense of from something antecedent in him, is not essential to the original notion we have of blameworthiness ; but it is its being the choice of the heart. When [on the other hand] a thing \sfrom a man in the sense that it is from his will or choice, he is to blame for it because his will is in it : so far as the will is in it blame is in it, and no further. Neither do we go any further in our notion of blame, to inquire whether the bad will be

ORIGINAL SIN. 207

"When the question is asked : Is man the responsible author of his sinful inclination not by an antecedent volition to incline, but by a present actual inclining, Edwards answers in the afRrmative. " As a person may be said to be the author of the act of the will itself, not by an antecedent act of will [i.e., by a foregoing volition], but by his being the immediate agent, or the being that is acting, or in the exei'cise of that act ; if the phrase ' being the author ' is used to signify this, then, doubtless, common sense requires men's being the authors of their own acts of will, in order to their being esteemed worthy of praise or dispraise on account of them."

Edwards's objection to the doctrine that the will chooses to choose, or chooses its choices : namely, that it supposes " a choice before the first choice," and that this is as absurd as that " a thing is before it is," or that there is " a thing of the same kind before the first thing of the same kind," implies that there is such a thing as a " first choice." But since he employed the term "choice" indiscriminately to include all the action of the will, the first choice with him meant an inclination or disposition of the will, not a volition (proper). There is no action of the will that precedes its inclination or disposition. Consequently this is the primary action, the " first choice " of the will. The other action of the will in volitions (proper) is second choice. This " first choice " of the will in spontaneously inclining, Edwards denominates ^'•Heading act," an '"''original act," the ''''first determining act." Will, III. iv. The word " act" in this instance means activity, or self-motion, or self-determination: not in the Arminian sense of self-determination, which is a volition coupled with power to the contrary, and is really indetermination not self-determination, but selfdetermination in the Calvinistic sense of spontaneously infrom a bad will : there is no consideration of the original of that bad will : because, according to our natural apprehension, blame originally consists in it " [i.e., the bad will]. Will, sub fine : Works, II. 174.

208 ANTHROPOLOGY.

dining, or in the sense of " the immediate agent, or the being that is acting, or in the exercise of the act,'' as Edwards phrases it.

Again, that Edwards held the inclination or disposition of the will to be volnntary agency, is proved by his position that the inclination or disposition is an object either of command or of prohibition. A man is commanded to have a holy inclination, and forbidden to have a sinfnl one. lie is so commanded, when he is commanded to love God with all his heart. Love is inclination. He is prohibited from having a sinfnl inclination, when he is prohibited from lust in any form. The tenth commandment prohibits a sinfnl inclination. But commands and prohibitions are addressed to the will, and require or forbid something that is truly voluntary. The following is the phraseology of Edwards upon this point : " The will itself [i.e., the inclination of the will], and not only those actions which are the effects of the will [inclination], is the proper object of precept or command. That is, such or such a state or act of men's wills is in many cases properly required of them by command ; and not merely those alterations in the state of their bodies or minds only that are consequences of volition." Again he remarks, " the will itself [i.e., the inclination] may be required, and the being of a good will is the most proper, direct, and immediate subject of command." Will, III. iv^ ; IV. xiii.

It is important to notice, by reference to the connection, in what sense Edwards uses the term " choice " or " volition." Sometimes the term denotes volition in distinction from inclination ; sometimes it denotes inclination considered as voluntary agency. Had he appropriated the terms " choice " and " volition " to only one form of the will's activity, he would have been less liable to misapprehension. The charge of fatalism urged by some against Edwards arises from a failure to observe, that while Edwards taught that volitions necessarily agree with the inclination and

ORIGINAL SIK 209

liave no power over it, he also taught tliat the inclination itself is free not necessitated agenc}'. In the instance of a holy inclination, it was either created, or re-created by God. In the instance of a sinful inclination, it was self-originated in the fall of Adam. The inclination of the will is free spontaneity in both instances. In the former, it results from God working in the will to will ; in the latter, it is the will in its solitary self-motion.

The dictum of Edwards to which we have referred is misapplied, sometimes, by writers whose view of sin and the will is substantially that of Edwards. They agree that a man is responsible for his sinful volitions, because they issue from his sinful inclination ; but wlien asked why a man is responsible for his sinful inclination, instead of answering that this had a free and self-determined origin in Adam, they take refuge in the dangerous position that the sinfulness of an inclination does not depend upon its origin, but upon its nature, and that it is of no consequence how it originated. " Malignity is evil, and love is good, whether concreated, innate, acquired, or infused. A malignant being is a sinful being, if endowed with reason, whether lie was so made or so hornP Hodge : Theoloo-y, II. 808. In this statement, holiness and sin are made to hold precisely the same relation to God and the human will, when in fact they hold totally different relations. All four of these adjectives will apply to " love," but only two of them to " malignity : " namely, " innate " and " acquired." God creates a holy inclination or disposition, whenever he creates a holy will in man or angel ; and he re-creates a holy inclination whenever he regenerates a sinner. Holiness is good and meritorious, " whether concreated, innate, acquired, or infused." But then it is meritorious only in a relative sense. Since God is the ultimate author of holiness in both the creation and the regeneration of the will, to him belongs the glory of it. Man is not the originating agent, when holy Vol. XL— 14

210 ANTHROPOLOGY.

inclination is the instance. God works in him to will. But the case is wholly different in the instance of an evil disposition or inclination. Man is the sole author, here. The demerit here is absolute, not relative. The doctrine of created holiness is true, but not of created sin ; of infused holiness, but not of infused sin. To say that God can "create" and "infuse" a malignant inclination, is to contradict the explicit teaching of Scripture which asserts that God cannot sin, and that he hates sin with an infinite hatred. God cannot create and infuse what he hates and punishes. And it shocks alike the moral sentiment of the natural man, and the holy reverence of the renewed man. An evil inclination may be " innate " or " acquired." But it cannot be " created " or " infused." There may be a created merit, but not a created demerit. God can create and infuse holiness, but not sin.

The testimony of Scripture and of consciousness is to this eifect. AVlien David, in the fifty -first psalm, is brought to a sense of the wickedness of his heart, or sinful disposition, he never dreams of referring tliis disposition to God as its creator and author. He imputes his inboi'n depravity to himself. He acknowledges that the demerit of it is absolute. It is the creature's agency, and the creature's only. He describes it as " innate." but not as " created " or " infused " by God. He derives it from his mother, but not from his Maker. But when David rejoiced over his own holy disposition, and that of the people, to honor God in the erection of a temple, his utterance is verj^ different. " Who am I, and what is my people that we should be able to offer so willingly after this soi't ? For all things come of thee, and of thine own have we given thee." 1 Chron. 29 : 14.

Because holiness can be created and infused, it does not follow that sin can be, unless it can be shown, first, that the demerit of sin is only a relative demerit, as the merit of holiness is only a relative and gracious merit; and, secORIGINAL SIN. 211

ondlj, that God's creative agency can be exerted in the origination of sin in the same manner that it is in the origination of holiness: namely, by direct spiritual efficiency and operation.

When it is said that " malignity is evil," it is meant of course that it is morally evil, i.e., damnable and punishable. The punishableness of it, is what constitutes it evil. It is not evil in the sense that poverty or sickness are evils. To say, therefore, that such a form of evil as sin can be understood without looking at the origin of it, is self-contradictory. A malignant disposition is morally evil, that is damnable and punishable, only in case it is guilt. If it is misfortune, it is not moral evil at all. If therefore it is not the product of the human will solely, but the product of God working in the human will ; if it is " created " and " infused ; " it is certainly neither damnable nor punishable. Auctor mali non ultor mail. It is no answer to say that a hoh^ disposition is commendable and rewardable, and yet this is created and infused. The merit in this case, we repeat, is gracious and pactional, and does not rest upon any absolute and primary obligation in God to reward. God in this case rev/ards his own grace, and his own work in his creature. But the demerit of a sinful disposition is absolute, and its reward necessary ; that is, resting upon an absolute and primary obligation in God as just to punish sin. God in this case does not punish his own co-operating agency in a creature's M'ill, or visit with judicial infliction his own work.

Thus it appears that the " nature " of man's sinful inclination or disposition cannot be determined except by knowing its " origin." If it originates in one way, it is not sin ; if in another, it is sin. Suppose that a judge should say to a jury : " You are not to look at the origin of this act of killing, but only at the nature of it ; killing a man, is killing a man, whatever may be the source from which the act originated." The reply w^ould be, that it is impossible to

212 ANTHROPOLOGY.

determine the nature of the act in this instance, without tracing it to its origin. Killing is of the nature of murder, only in case it originates in a mui-derous inclination and purpose. The nature depends upon the origin. In like manner, it is impossible to decide that a particular human disposition or inclination is of a culpable and damnable nature, until it has been decided whether God or man is the author of it. The very epithet " original," applied to Adam's iirst sin, implies that its origin is a feature that is vital to the understanding of it ; that its nature cannot be determined but by examining its first source. The term " original,"" when applied to sin, implies that it originates in man. But the veiy same term, when applied to righteousness, implies that it originates in God. "In all agency, whether of good or evil, much is wont to be attributed to this : who waajlrst in it ? In point of good, the blessed God hath no competitor ; he is the nndoubted Iirst fountain of all good, and is therefore acknowledged the Supreme Good. In point of evil (viz. moral) there is none prior to the devil, who is therefore eminently called the evil or wicked one." Howe : Living Temple, IL, viii.

Original sin is to be distinguished from indwelling sin. The latter is the remainder of original sin in the regenerate. Its workings are described in Rom. 7: 14 — 8: 27. Shedd : Commentary, in loco. It is not, like original sin, a dominant and increasing principle in the believer, but a subjugated and diminishing one. Indwelling sin is the minuendo movement of sin. "It hath a dying fall." Original sin is the crescendo movement. " Original sin does not remain in the same manner after regeneration as it i-emained before ; for there are two remarkable differences. In the unregenerate, it occupies all the faculties of the soi\\peacedbly^ and rules'xw their mind, will, and affections ; but in the regenerate, it neither dwells peaceably, because grace from above is infused into them, which daily opposes this disease, and more and more expels it from every faculty of the

ORIGINAL SIX. 213

60ul ; nor does it rule over them, because grace prevailing and predominating restrains it and sends it as it were under the yoke. The other difference is, that in the unregenerate it has the guilt of eternal death annexed to it ; but in the regenerate it is absolved from this fruit, for the sake of Christ the mediator." Davenant : Justification, XV. Says Luther (Table Talk, Of Sins), " Original sin after regeneration is like a wound that begins to heal ; though it be a wound, 3'et it is in course of healing, though it still runs, and is sore. So, original sin remains in Christians until they die, yet itself is mortified and continually dying. Its head is crushed to pieces, so that it cannot condemn ns." Indwelling sin is denominated "the law in (not of) the members," Eom. 7 : 23 ; original sin is denominated " the law of sin and death," Rom. 8 : 2.

The l;)ondage of sin is defined in the Westminster Larger Catechism, 25. It describes the corruption of nature, called original sin in distinction from actual transgression, as that corruption "whereby man is utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all that is spiritually good." The Westminster Confession describes this corruption as that "whereby we are uttei-ly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evih" The symbols of the Lutheran and Calvinistic churches are equally explicit npon this point.' For the Scripture proof, see ante, p. 198.

This introduces the subject of the inability to good of the apostate will, respecting which the following particulars are to be noted, {a) The inability relates to spiritual good. ih) The inability is self-caused and voluntary.

1. In the Westminster statement, the inability and opposition of the will relates to all that is " spiritually good." Spiritual good is holiness, and holiness is supreme love of God and eqnal love of man. The creed-statement there» Calvin: Institutes, n. ii. v. Shedd : ffistory of Doctrine, II. 164-177; Theological Essays, 2J5-243 ; Sermons to the Natural Man, Sermon XI.

214 ANTHROPOLOGY.

fore is, that apostate man, alone and of himself, is unable to love God with all his soul, and his neighbor as himself. He cannot start such an affection as this in his heart. He cannot originate within his will an inclination, or disposition that is " spiritually good." The inability relates to voluntary action, in distinction from volitionary ; to self-determination to an ultimate end, in distinction from the choice of particular means.

The doctrine in question does not imply that fallen man is unable to be moral ; but that he is unable to be spiritual, holy, and religions. St. Paul teaches (Rom. 2 : 14) that some unregenerate pagans practise morality ; that they " do by nature the things contained in the law : " that is, some things contained in the law (ra tov vojjLov), not all things.' Their obedience is fractional and imperfect. Under the natural stimulus of conscience, they refrain more or less from vice, and live more or less virtuously, as compared with others around them. But this morality is not supreme love of God, and perfect obedience of his law. St. Paul denies that these virtuous heathen are spiritually good and holy, when he affirms that, if tested by the law that requires supreme love of God, " every mouth must be stopped, and all the world become guilty before God," Rom. 3:19; that " all have sinned and con^e short of the glory of God," Rom. 3 : 23 ; and that '' there is none righteous, no, not one," Rom. 3:10.

Again, this inability and opposition to all that is " spiritually " good, does not imply that fallen man is destitute of certain natural and instinctive affections that are attractive and beneficent.^ First in tlie list, are the family affections. The love of the parent for the child, of the children for the parents, of brothers and sisters for each other, is an amiable

' Had St. Paul intended to teach that these virtuous heathen do all things required by the law, he would have said rhv v^^iov iroiTh ^^ ^^ GaX. 5 : 3.

- On the natural instincts, and the moral and religious affections, see ante,

p. 119 sq.

ORIGINAL SIN. 215

sentiment, and oftentimes leads to great self-sacrifice. But the self-sacrifice is for the brother or sister, not for God. Family affection may and often does exist without any supreme love of God. It may and often does lead to disobedience of God. The workings of natural affection must be subordinated to the claims of Clirist, in order to become religious affection, or " spiritually good." " He that loveth father or mother moi'e than me is not worthy of me," Matt. 10 : 37. AVhen the two come in conflict, the instinctive liuman affection if allowed sway is positively idolatrous and irreligious.

Secondly, there are the social affections. Man is instinctively interested in his fellow-man, and performs many acts of self-sacrifice and generosity towards him. The sailor will share his last crust with his fellow-sailor ; the fireman will risk his own life for a fellow-creature whom he never saw before, and will never see again. But both actions may be performed, and often have been, by one who takes the name of God in vain, and breaks every other commandment of the decalogue whenever he is tempted to it. The selfsacrifice in this instance, also, is for man, not for God. The act in this case is one of gallantry, or courage, and the common sense of man never denominates it a spiritual and holy act. Men call it " noble," and reward it by some token of admiration : a silver cup, or a purse of money. They would not think of so rewarding a spiritual or holy act, like that of the martyr who dies for his faith in Christ, or of the missionary who lays his bones among the savages to whom he has preached the gospel.

Thirdly, there are the civil affections. Man is by his constitution a political animal, as Aristotle denominates him. He is interested in the nation and country to which he belongs, by reason of his birth. This patriotic feeling, like the social and family affections, rises up instinctively and uniformly in every man, the unregenerate as well as regenerate. This, too, like the others, is not spiritual and

216 ANTHROPOLOGY.

holy in its nature. The most intense patriotism may be accompanied with atlieism, and unbelief, and immorality. Such patriotism is expressed in the sentiment : " My countr\', right or wrong."

Fourthly, the aesthetic feeling is not spiritual or religious. A love for the beautiful in art has nothing of holy virtue in it. " AVho will atiirm that a disposition to approve of the harmony of good music, or the beauty of a square, or equilateral triangle, is the same with true holiness, or a truly virtuous disposition of mind." Edwards : Nature of A^irtue. Good taste is not piety and religion. A refined voluptuary is oftentimes a good judge in line art ; and even a coarse sensualist may be. Turner, one of the first painters that England has produced, was an example of the latter. Good taste may be spiritualized and elevated, by being associated with and subordinated to a higher affection. But until this is done, it is of the earth earthly. It terminates only on that which is finite and temporal ; and anything that terminates solely upon earth and time is unspiritual and unreligious. The same is true of the love of literature and science. Human discipline and culture is not holiness of heart, and spirituality of mind.

In all these instances, we have to do with a portion of man's constitution that is outside of the voluntary nature. We are concerned with instinct, using the term in a wide sense, not with will. In its narrow and common signification, instinct signifies only the impulse of animal nature in brutes. But it may be used to denote all the constitutional impulses of human nature. Man did not lose aesthetic impulse and feeling by the apostasy of his will ; neither did he lose the familj', the social, or the civil affections. When he inclined away from God he did not incline away from art, from science, from the family-state, from society, from government and country. His instinctive and constitutional interest in all these objects continued after tlie apostasy. His will was revolutionized, but not his instinctive

ORIGINAL SIN. 217

nature. His love of God was gone, but not his love of family, of country, of beauty. Man continued to take pleasure in Unite objects and relations, but lost delight in infinite and eternal objects and relations.

The foundation of all these affections is natural instinct^ not will. The}' are constitutional, not voluntary ; physical, not moral. Their source aud basis is physical, using the term etymologically and broadly, to denote that which belongs to the (})vcn

There is nothing voluntary in the love of a parent for his child ; in the love of a citizen for his country' ; in the love of the artist for beauty. They are not the inclination of the will. This is proved by the fact that the apostasy of the will does not radically change them. If they belonged to the will, they would be converted into their contraries when the will is. When man began to be destitute of love to God, he would begin to be destitute of love for his famil}'-, and his nation. In becoming an enemy of God and holiness, he would become an enemy of his family, of society, and of culture and art. In becoming disinclined and averse toward the Creator, he would become disinclined and avei'se toward these forms of the creature also.

218 ANTHROPOLOGY.

2. Ill the Westminster statement, tlie disability or inability is connected with the disposition and inclination of the will. Man is " indisposed to all spiritual good, and inclined to all [spiritual] evil." It follows from this, that the cause and seat of the inability in question is in the action and state of the voluntary faculty. It is moral or willing inaljility. " iSTani servit voluntas peccato, non nolens sed volens. Etenim voluntas non noluntas dicitur." Second Helvetic Confession, IX.

In denominating it " moral " inability, it is not meant that it arises merely from habit, or that it is not " natural" in any sense of the word nature. A man is sometimes said to be morally unable to do a thing, when it is very difficult for him to do it by reason of an acquired habit, but not really impossible. This is not the sense of the word "moral" when applied to the sinner's inability to holiness. He is really and in the full sense of the word impotent. And the cause of this impotence is not a liabit of doing evil which he has formed in his individual life, but a natural disposition which he has inherited from Adam. The term " moral," therefore, when applied to human inability denotes that it is voluntary, in distinction from created. Man's impotence to good does not arise from the agency of God in creation, but from the agency of man in apostasy.

Whether, therefore, it can ever be called " natural " inability, will depend upon the meaning given to the term " nature." {a) If " nature " means that which is created by God, there is no natural inability to good in fallen man. But if " nature " means " natural disposition," or "natural inclination," there is a " natural " inability to good in fallen man. (J) Again, " natural " sometimes means something which is born with man, in distinction from that which he acquires after birth ; something in man at birth, yet not caiosed hij birth. In this sense, man's inability to good is " natural." It is innate inability. The Scriptures sometimes employ the word in this sense. 1 Cor. 2 : 14, " The natural man

ORIGINAL SIN. 219

receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, neither can he know them." Eph. 2:3, " And were by nature {

Owing to this ambiguity in the signification of the terms "natural" and "moral," the elder Calvinistic theologians did not use either term exclusively, to denote the sinner's inability to good. Sometimes they employ one and sometimes the other, and explain their meaning. The symbols of the Lutheran and Calvinistic churches frequently use the word "natural," and assert entire inability with great decision and unanimity. "When God converts a sinner, he freeth him from liis natural bondage under sin." Westminster Confession, IX. iv.'

The elder Edwards differs from the old Calvinists in two particulars. 1. In refusing to denominate the bondage of the human will "natural inability ;" 2. In denying that " moral inability," by which term exclusively he designates the sinner's bondage, is " inability proper." As these positions bring Edwards into contradiction with himself, and open the way for a different anthropology from that contained in his writings generally, and particularly in his treatise on Original Sin, we direct attention to them. His view is contained in the following statements : " ^Natural

1 Compare Formula Consensus Helvetic!, Ed. Niemeyer, 737. For Turret, tin's account cf the distinction, see Instiiutio, X. iv. 39.

220 ANTHROPOLOGY.

inability alone is properlj- called inability." Will, Works, 11. 104, "jSTo inability which is merely moral is properly called by the name inability." Will, Works, II. 103.'

In his treatise on the Will (Works, 11. 104), Edwards deiines "natui-al inability" as the want of the reqnisite mental facnlties. Conseqnently " natural ahility^'' for him, is the possession of the reqnisite mental facnlties viewed apart from their moral state and condition. In so viewing them, he differs from the elder Calvinists, who regarded a mental faculty and its moral condition as inseparable. Edwards conceives of the will abstractly and separate from its inclination, and as so conceived contends that it is " naturally able" to obey the law of God. The elder Calvinists denied that the will can be so conceived of.

"JS^atural inabilitj'," says Edwards, " arises from the want of natural capacity, or from external hindrance." A man would be naturally unable to obey the divine law, if he were destitute of any of the faculties of the human soul, or if he were prevented from obeying the divine law by external force. Xovv, argues Edwards, inasmuch as man is not destitute of either understanding or will, and is not compelled to sin by outward circumstances or by another being, it cannot be said that man is naturally unable to obey the divine law. This is true of the fallen man as well as of the unfallen.

Again, Edwards defines " natural inability " with reference to inclination or dis[)Osition. If a man is inclined to do a thing and is prevented, he is natm-ally unable. " We are said," he remarks (Will, Works, II. 15), "to be naturally unable to do a thing when we cannot do it if we will [i.e., are inclined], because what is most commonly called nature does not allow of it, or because of some impeding

' On page 102 (Works, II.), Edwards, liowever, speaks doubtfully on this point: " If moral inability can truly be called inability." Compare his doubt whether it is proper to call God a part of "being in general." See Nature and Definition of God. Vol. L p. 91 sq.

ORIGINAL SIN. 221

defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will, either in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects.''

There are two criticisms to be made upon this statement. 1. In the first place, if " the impeding defect or obstacle in the faculty of understanding" should amount to the total absence of reason, it would not be possible for a man to have an inclination to obey. An idiot or an insane person is not a moral agent, and is incapable of moral inclination. If, however, Edwards means only a deficiency in intelligence that hinders the man in acting out his inclination — as when a man, though inclined to a right course, does not know what is the best means of accomplishing it — then, in this case, the will or inclination would be taken for the deed, and this would not be an instance of inability.

2. In the second place, if a man is inclined to obey God, but is prevented in a particular instance from performing the outward service, by sickness, or by imprisonment — by " constitution of body," or by " external objects " — he is regarded by God, who always looks upon the truth or reality of things, as an obedient servant. " If there be a willing mind {irpo^vixia), it is accepted according to what a man hath, and not according to what he hath not," 2 Cor. 8 : 12. The inclination is the obedience; and Edwards supposes the inclination. This case, also, is not an instance of inability to obey the divine law. " The very willing is the doing," says Edwards himself. Will, Works, II. 17.

Edwards's denial of "natural inability " is equivalent inferentialhj and indirectly to the assertion of " natural ability." But he nowhere formally and directly asserts '* natural ability," and in one instance directly and explicitly denies and combats it. " It will follow,'' he remarks (Original Sin, Works, II. 464), " on our author's pi'inciples, that redemption is needless, and Christ is dead in vain. For God [according to him] has given a sufficient power and ability, in all mankind, to do all their duty and wholly

222 ANTHROPOLOGY.

to avoid sin. Yea, tliis author insists upon it tliat wlien men have not sutiicient power to do their duty, thej have no dut}^ to do. These tilings fairly imply that men have in their own natural ability sufficient means to avoid sin, and to be perfectly free from it ; and so from all the bad consequences of it. And if the means are sufficient, then there is no need of more ; and therefore there is no need of Christ's dying, in order to it."

The explanation is this. Edwards was combating the doctrine of Whitby and Taylor, that apostate man has plenary power to keep the divine law. Consequently, he had no motive to advocate the doctrine of ability in any foi'm. His great object in the controversy was to establish the doctrine of inahiUty. When, however, he is pushed b}' his opponents with the objection, that if there be no power in fallen man to keep the divine law there is no obligation to keep it, instead of recurring, as the elder Calvinists did, to the fall in Adam and the loss of ability by a free act of will,' Edwards meets the objection by asserting that fallen man is under no " natural inahility'''' to keep the divine law, and in this way implies that he has a "natural ahility^^ to keep it. But when his deiinition of the " natural ability" thus wicZ«Vgc'?'/y attributed to fallen man is examined, it proves not to be efficient and real power, but only a quasiability that is incapable of producing the effect required in the objection, namely, perfect obedience. In this way, he evades the objection of his opponent, rather than answers it. " It is easy," he says (Will, Works, IL IT), " for a man to do the thing if he will [is inclined], but the very willing [inclining] is the doing. Therefore, in these things

' So Ursinus argues. " Objection 5. They who cannot but sin, are unjustly punished ; but the unregenerate cannot but sin : therefore God doth unjustly punish them. Answer. They who necessarily sin are unjustlj' punished, except that necessity come voluntarily, and by their own will. But men have drawn iipon them that necessity voluntarily in the first parents, and themselves do willingly sin. Therefore God doth justly punish them. " Christian Religion, Question 8.

ORIGINAL SIN. 223

to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability, is not just ; because the tiling wanting is not a being able, but a being willing. There are faculties of mind, and capacity of nature, and everything sufficient but a disposition ; nothing is wanting but a will [inclination]." But this amounts only to the truism tliat the sinner is able to obey the law of God, if he is inclined to obey it, and avoids the point in dispute. For the real question is, whether the sinner can originate the " thing that is wanting " in order to obedience : namely, " a being willing," or a disposition to obey. Edwards alwaj's and everywhere asserts that he cannot ; but for the purpose of meeting the objection that if the sinner is unable to obey he is not obligated to obey, he contends that it is improper to call the inability to " be willing" or inclined, an inability, because the mere existence of the faculty of will without the power to change its disposition constitutes ability. " To ascribe a non-performance," says Edwards, " in these things, to the want of power is not just; because the thing wanting is not a being able, but a being willing. There are faculties of mind, and a capacity of nature, and everything sufficient but a disposition.^'' But the absence of a disposition to obey is fatal. The presence of a disposition to obey is necessary in order to obedience. Xo man can obey the divine law without being willing or inclined to obey it ; and Edwards asserts over and over again that the sinner is unable to incline himself to obedience. A man destitute of an inclination to obey the divine law, cannot obey it merely because he has the abstract faculty of will. Yolitionary acts can be performed, l)ut since they do not proceed fi'om a right inclination, they are not obedience. The siimer's so-called "natural ability," consisting of everything except a " disposition" to obey, consists of everything necessar}^ to efficient power except efficiency itself. The ability to obey is an ability to incline^ because it is the inclin'ation of the will that constitutes true obedience. Consequently, if inclining to good is

224 ANTHROPOLOGY.

not witliin the competence of the sinner, he is unable to obey.

In order, therefore, that a man destitute of an inclination to obey the divine law may be said without any equivocation to be " able " to obey, he must be able to originate such an inclination. The question that settles the question respecting " ability," and precludes all evasion, is this : Has fallen man the ability to start and begin that right inclination of will which is the essence of obedience, and without which it is impossible to obey the law of God ? If so, he has without any ambiguity the " ability " to perfectly obey the divine law. But if not, he is unable to obey it, and this impotence is properly called inability. In answering this question, Edwards is explicit in the negative, and stands upon the position of Augustine and Calvin, in respect to the bondage and helplessness of the apostate will. See Edwards, Will, Works, II. 101 ; Endless Punishment, Works, I. 615, 616, et alia.

Pascal (Provincial Letters, II.) illustrates this equivocation respecting " natural ability " (a distinction employed by the Jesuits) in the following manner : " A man setting out on a journey is encountered by robbers who wound him, and leave him half dead. He sends for aid from three neighboring surgeons. The first on examining his wounds pronounces them mortal, and tells him that God alone can restore him. The second tells him that he has strength enough to carry him back to his dwelling, and that he will recover by the force of his system. The patient, perplexed between the two, calls upon the third surgeon. This latter after examination sides with the second surgeon, and ridicules the opinion of the first. The patient naturally supposes that the third surgeon agrees with the second ; and in fact receives in reply to his inquiries an assurance that he has strength sufficient to prosecute his journey. The poor man, however, conscious of his weakness, asks on what his conclusions are founded ? 'Because,' said he, 'you still

ORIGINAL SIN. 225

have your legs, and the legs are the natural organs for walking.' ' But,' saj-s the sick man, ' have I strength to make use of them ; for they seem to me useless, in my state of weakness ? ' ' Certainly not,' replied the doctor ; 'and ill reality you never will walk, unless God shall send you supernatural aid to sustain and lead you.' 'What!' cries the patient, ' have I not then in myself sufficient strength for walking ? ' ' Yery far from it,' replied the surgeon. ' Your opinion then is entirely opposed to the second surgeon respecting my state ? ' ' I confess it is,' he replied."

When " ability " is attributed to the human will, it is naturally understood to mean the power to use and control the energetic force of the faculty. Inclining to an ultimate end is the energy of the will, and its most important activity. But if the sinful will is unable to incline to God as the supreme end and good, it is improper to say that it has a " natural ability " to do this. Because, " ability " properly denotes efficient power. The man, in Pascal's illustration, who " still had his legs," but had lost the power to use them, could not properly be said to be able to walk ; and the man who " still has a will," but is unable to incline it to good, cannot properly be said to be able to obey. If when Edwards replied to his opponent that "it is easy for a man to do the thing if he will," he had added that " it is easy for a man to will," this would have been an unequivocal assertion of ability. But Edwards not only denied that it is easy for the sinner to will rightly, but asserted that it is impossible.

Ability must not be confounded with capability, or power with cajmcity. The sinner is capable of loving God supremely, but not able to love him supremely ; and probably this is all that is intended by many who assert "natural ability." Capacity implies possibility only ; as when it is said that man has the capacity for all the diseases to which flesh is heir. But something more than capacity is requiVoL. II.— 15

326 ANTHROPOLOGY.

site to warrant the assertion that lie is able to have them all. The ability to have all the diseases of the human body would require the germ of them all. A man is not able to have the small-pox, unless he has the contagion, or been inoculated with it. But he is capable of having the smallpox, without either contagion or inoculation. Adam before the fall had the capacity to sin, rather than the ability ; the possibility, not the propensity. It is, therefore, more strictly proper to say that it was possible for holy Adam to sin, than to say that he had the ability to sin. Accurately speaking, the ability to sin, is inward sin itself ; and the ability to be holy, is inward holiness itself. Hence Augustine attributed to the unf alien Adam the jpossibilitas peccandi, and denied the potestas. In moral things, the ability implies the inclination and tendency.

Consequently, in ethics and religion, moral ability is the only kind of power that is properly designated by the term " ability." In reference to obedience and disobedience, holiness and sin, if there is not moral or voluntary ability, there is no ability at all. And moral or voluntary ability cannot be separated from inclination. jSTo inclination, no ability. If inclination, then ability. A man who is able to love God supremely, is inclined to love Him. A man who is able to steal, is inclined in his heart to theft. In common parlance we say of a bad man : " He can do anything ; he can lie, he can steal." This is the same as saying : " He is a thief, he is a liar." If we say that he is capable of lying, we do not say so much, as when we say he is able to lie.

" Natural ability " is, properly, only physieal force. It is the power of matter, not of mind, A man has the natural ability to lift one hundred pounds. This is the power of matter ; of his body. But we can think of this kind of power as not exerted, and as never exerted. The man may have this species of ability, and yet never lift a hundred pounds weight. In the case of natural ability, we can abORIGINAL sm. 227

straet and separate the faculty from its exercise and use. The faculty, in the instance of natural ability, is the body of the luaa. We say that there is in this body the ability or power to lift one hundred pounds weight. Whether this ability shall be exerted or not, depends not upon the body but upon the man's will. But tlie man's body and the man's will are distinct and separate substances and faculties. We can therefore conceive of this natural or physical ability as inactive, and doing nothing, until a volition employs it. We can conceive of natural power or ability without an}'effect produced by it.

Bat in the instance of moral or voluntary power or ability, we cannot thus abstract and separate the faculty from its use and exercise, and conceive of it as inert and producing no effect. The faculty in this case is not the body, but the will itself. But the will cannot be inactive and inert, as matter may be. It is inclined and active by its very idea and definition. There is no conceivable separation, therefore, in this instance, between the faculty and its use and exercise, as there is in the instance of the body and the volition that uses the body. Moral or voluntary power is necessarily in exercise. A man may be naturally able to lift a hundred pounds, and yet not do it. But a man may not be morally able to love God, and yet not do it. The ability to an act in this latter case, is one with the act itself. Ability to incline, is inclination itself. Ability to love, is love itself. Ability to hate, is hatred itself.

In the instance of natural ability or physical power, the ability is in one subject, and the use or exercise of it in another subject. The natural force is in the bodily limbs, and the moral force that exerts and uses it is in the will. But in the instance of moral ability or voluntary power, there is only one subject, namely, the human will. The will is the faculty, and the inclining of the will is the use and exercise of the faculty. We cannot, therefore, conceive

228 ANTHROPOLOGY.

of the will as being inert and inactive until another agent makes it active. Keither can we conceive of the will as inactive until some act of its own makes it active. Edwards was unquestionably correct, in denying that the will can be started out of indifference and inaction by its own antecedent volition. But we can conceive of this, in the instance of natural or physical power. We can conceive of the body as inert and inactive until another agent than itself, namely the soul, onakes it active by an antecedent volition. In the instance of moral ability, the faculty of will and its use and exercise are inseparable. If there be a will, it is necessarily in action ; it is necessarily inclined. We cannot say that it is able to incline, not yet having inclined. It can pass from one inclination to another; bnt it cannot exist an instant M'ith no inclination at all. Consequently, if the will is able to do a thing, it is doing it. But in the instance of natural ability, the faculty and its exercise are separable. If there be a body, it is not necessarily exerting its physical force. In this case, we can say that it is able to do a thing, and yet is not doing it.

It is ambiguous and misleading, therefore, to apply the term " natural ability " to a moral faculty like the will ; as it confessedly would be to apply the term " moral ability " to a physical faculty like the human body. ISTo one would attribute to the human body a moral ability to swim ; and no one should attribute to the human will a natural ability to love or obey, because a natural ability may not be in use and exercise. Andrew Fuller (Memoir, 15, Bohn's Ed.) quotes from Gill the distinction between a thing " being in the power of our hand, and in the power of our heart." Natural ability is the power of the hand ; moral ability is the power of the heart. Referring to Des Cartes' distinction between the act of the will that terminates on the will itself, and the act of the will that terminates on the body, natural ability would designate the latter, and moral ability the former. Obedience of the divine command, " Thou

ORIGINAL SIN. 229

shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heai't," is the product of moral, not of natiiral ability.

Edwards asserts " moral inability," and defines it to be either the absence of right inclination, or the presence of wrong inclination. " A man may be said to be morally unable to do a thing ; when he is under the influence or prevalence of a contrary inclination, or has a want of inclination. Moral inability consists either in want of inclination, or the strength of a contrary inclination. It may be said, in one word, that moral inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination. A man is truly morally unable to choose ' contrary to a present inclination. A child of great love to his parents may be unable to be willing to hill his father." Will, Works, II. 15, 16, 101, 102.

This is the inability that is meant in the Westminster statement, that " man is utterly indisposed and disabled to all that is spiritually good." And this species of inability is real inability. It is not a figure of speech, but an impotence as helpless and insuperable by the subject of it, as natural inability. The substantive '' inability " has its full and strict meaning. Tiie adjective " moral " does not convert the notion of impotence into that of power, but only denotes the species of impotence. It is true that the " cannot " is a " will not," but it is equally true that the " will not " is a " cannot." The sinful will is literally unable to incline to good, apart from grace.

ISTotwithstanding his assertion that moral inability is improperly called inability, Edwards strenuously maintains that moral inability is utter and helpless impotence. This is the self-contradiction in his theory. " By reason of the total depravity and corruption of man's nature, he is utterly unable, without divine grace, savingly to love God, believe in Christ, or do anything truly good." Worics, II. 177. He

1 " To choose," here means "to incline," or "to be willing." It does not riean, " to exert a volition/' for a man is able to exert a volition " contrary to a present inclination."

230 ANTHROPOLOGY.

also asserts the same thing in his doctrine of moral necessity. " Moral necessity," he says, " may be as absolute as natural necessity — that is, the [moral] effect may be as perfectly cormected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause. When I use this distinction of moral and natural necessity, I would not be understood to suppose, that if anything comes to pass by the former kind of necessity, the nature of tilings is not concerned in it, as well as in the latter." Will, I, iv. Edwards means that the connection between the volition and the inclination is as necessary, or as much founded in the nature of things, as that between a physical effect and its physical cause. Given a wrong inclination, and wrong volitions must follow. If the disposition of the will be vicious, the volitions of the will cannot be virtuous, any more than the fruit can be grapes if the root is that of the thistle.

Now in thus asserting that moral necessity is properly called necessity, Edwards is inconsistent in denying that moral inability is properly called inability. For the sinner's moral necessity of sinning is the very same thing as his moral inability to obedience. If, therefore, Edwards was willing to say that moi-al necessity is as real and absolute as natural necessity, he should have been willing to say that moral inability is as real and absolute as natural inability. If the term " necessity " is properly applicable to moral necessity, the term "inability" is properly applicable to moral inability. Necessity is a stronger term than inability, and it is singular that while Edwards was not afraid to employ the former in connection with voluntary action, he should have shrunk from the latter. The same general argument that proves that moral necessity, taken in its full unambiguous sense, is consistent with the freedom of the will, would prove that moral inability, taken in its full unambiguous sense, is likewise consistent with it. The nature of Edwards's answer to the Arminian objection that if there is not ability in the sinful

ORIGINAL SIN. 231

will there is no obligation resting upon it, explains the inconsistencj. Instead of denying, with the Calvinistic creeds generally, the Arminian premiss that all inability however brought about is inconsistent with obligation, he concedes itj and endeavors to show that there is ability.

Moral necessity is asserted by Augustine and Calvin. It means that necessity in the moral character of the volitions which arises from a habitus of the will ; fronr a bias or disposition of the voluntary faculty. A holy will has a holy habitus, and is thereby under a moral necessity of exerting holy volitions. " A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit." Hence St. Paul denominates the spiritual man " a servant (slave) of righteousness," Rom. 6 : 18. St. John asserts that " whosoever is born of God cannot sin," 1 John 3:9. A sinful will has a sinful habitus, and is thereby under a moral necessity of exerting sinful volitions. "Ye were servants (slaves) of sin," Rom. 6 : 17. "Whosoever committeth sin is the servant (slave) of sin," John 8 : 34. A holy will is unable to disobey ; and a sinful will is unable to obey.

Fatalism has been charged upon this doctrine of moral necessity, but erroneously. Were the sinful disposition of the will itself necessitated, the charge would be well founded. Were the sinful inGlinatioih the necessary effect of some antecedent act or arrangement of God, as the volition is the necessary effect of the antecedent inclination, man would not be responsible for sin. But it is not. The sinful inclination is the abiding self-determination of the human will. Its origin is due to an act of freedom in Adam ; and its continuance is due to the unceasing self-determination of every individual of the posterity. Each individual man prolongs and perpetuates in himself the evil inclination of will that was started in Adam. Sinful inclination began freely in the one sin of the whole race, and is continued freely in the millions of individual inclinations in the millions of individuals of the race. Had sinful inclination been created and infused by God, then as the sin232 ANTHROPOLOGY.

fill volitions are referred to the inclination as their cause, tlie sinful inclination must have been referred to God as its cause. The doctrine of moral necessity means only that the volitions must necessarily be lilce the inclination. It does not mean that the inclination itself is originated and necessitated by God.

A habitus or disposition in the will intensifies and confirms free voluntary action, instead of weakening or destroying it. For a habitus is a vehement and total selfdetermination. But that which promotes determination by the self^ of course precludes compulsion by that which is not self. Hence the bondage of the will to sinful inclination does not destroy either the voluntariness, or the responsibility of the will. The enslaved will is still a selfdetermining faculty ; the bondage of sin is a responsible and guilty bondage, because proceeding from the ego, not from God. Calvin (Institutes, II. ii. 5) maintains this in the following manner : " Bernard subscribing to what is said by Augustine, thus expresses himself : ' Among all the animals, man alone is free ; and yet by the intervention of sin, he also suffers a species of violence ; but from the will^ not from nature, so that he is not thereby deprived of his innate liberty.' For what is voluntary is also free. And a little after, Bernard says, ' The will being, by I know not what corrupt and surprising means, changed for the worse, is itself the author of the necessity to which it is subject ; so that neither necessity, being voluntary, can excuse the will, nor the will, being fascinated (illecta), can exclude necessity.' For this necessity is in some measure voluntary. Afterwards he says, that we are oppressed with a yoke, but no other than that of a voluntary servitude ; that therefore our servitude renders us miserable, and our will renders us inexcusable ; because the will, when it was free, made itself the slave of sin. At length he concludes, ' Thus the soul, in a certain strange and evil manner, under this kind of voluntary and free yet pernicious necessity, is both

ORIGINAL SIN. 233

enslaved and free ; enslaved by necessity, free by its will [inclination] ; and, what is more wonderful and more miserable, it is guilty because free ; and enslaved wherein it is guilt3' ; and so therein enslaved wherein it is free.' From these passages, the reader clearly perceives that I am teaching no novel doctrine, but what was long ago advanced by Augustine, with the universal consent of pious men, and which for nearly a thousand years after was confined to the cloisters of monks. But Lombard, for want of knowing how to distinguish necessity from coercion, gave rise to a pernicious error."

The moral inability of the sinner, then, is the inability to incline rightly from a wrong state of the M'ill ; to convert sinful into holy inclination. He is already sinfully inclined. This sinful inclination is moral spontaneit}', or self-determination to an ultimate end. From the standpoint and starting-point of evil, it is impossible to incline or self-determine to God. The sinner may exert volitions, and make resolutions, in hope of producing another inclination, but they are failures. A holy inclination cannot be originated by this method. This is moral inability. What are the grounds of it ?

1. The finiteness and limitation of the created will is a ground. Holy inclination, we have seen (ante, p. 99 sq.), must be given in creation. Neither man's nor angel's will can be first created without character, and from this involuntary state originate holy inclination. The beginning, therefore, of holiness must always proceed from God. It can no more be originated by the creature, than the spiritual substance itself of the will can be. But if this is true of man as finite, and of angel as finite, it is still more so of man as sinful. When he is already preoccupied by a sinful inclination, it would be still more impossible for him to originate a holy inclination.

The mutability of the finite w^ill is the possibility of falling from holiness to sin, not the possibility of rising from

234 ANTHROPOLOGY.

sin to holiness. If the will of man or angel becomes evil, it is evil immutably, apart from regenerating grace. When holy, it can change its inclination by its own energy without the co-agency of God. But when sinful, it cannot do this. The finite will is mutably holy, but immutably sinful, so far as its own force is concerned.

2. The derivative nature of finite holiness is a second ground of moral inability. Holiness is a concreated quality of man, like intelligence, or rationality. But concreated qualities are incapable of self-origination. We perceive immediately that man cannot be the author of his own intellectuality. He cannot be created without the ideas of space and time, of God and self ; in brief, without innate ideas ; and then originate them by his own power. He cannot come from the creative hand an idiot without reason, and then rationalize himself. Rationality and intelligence are derived characteristics, and therefore they are beyond man's power to produce. In like manner, holiness is a derived characteristic, and therefore cannot be man's product. The creature cannot do the Creator's work. It would be absurd to say that matter can be created lacking one of the necessary properties of matter, say impenetrability, and can then originate for itself the lacking property. But it would be a like absurdity, to afiirm that man or angel can be created lacking one of the necessary characteristics of moral perfection, namely, holiness, and can then originate it.

This reasoning does not hold good in regard to sin. Man can be created without sin, and afterwards originate it himself, for three reasons : («) Because sin is not a derivative quality. Sin starts in the finite will, not in the Infinite. If it were derived from God, it would not be damnable, and therefore not sin. (b) Because sin is not an element in moral perfection. Everything that comes from the (creator's hand must be perfect after its kind. A created moral being must have created moral perfection. This implies holiness, and excludes sin. {c) Because sin is not a priORIGINAL SIN. 235

mary and normal characteristic of human nature. It does not enter into the idea and ideal of man. Sin, unlike holiness, does not belong to man as man. The human will can originate sin, because it is a secondary and abnormal quality. God is the author of the normal, but the creature is the originator of the abnormal. All that belono;s to man as ideal and perfect must come from God ; but all that belongs to man as fallen and imperfect must come from man himself. Hence man can originate sin, but not holiness.

3. The adorableness of a self-originated holiness is a third proof of moral inability. If man or angel were the sole and ultimate author of holiness in himself, his holiness would be underived and self-subsistent, and he would deserve the glory due to such holiness. Strictly self-originated holiness is worthy of worship. But the testimony of the Christian experience is against this. " By the grace of God I am what I am," 1 Cor. 15 : 10. The testimony of the ano-elic consciousness is also aojainst this. The seraphim cried " Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts," Is. 6 : 3. The trisagion attributes absolute and original holiness only to God. The testimony of Christ is against this. " None is good but one," Luke 18 : 19. If man or angel should begin a holy inclination, his merit before God and law would be absolute and not relative. This contradicts Luke 17 : 10, " When ye shall have done all those things that are commanded you, say. We are unprofitable servants." God in this case would be under an original and primary obligation to the creature.

4. The reflex action of sin upon tlie will itself is a fourth ground of moral inability. Self-determination to evil destroys self-determination to good. The voluntary faculty, like every other faculty of the soul, cannot escape the consequences of its own action. Self-determination to sin reacts upon the will and renders it unable to holiness. The slavery of the will is an effect of the will upon its self. Whosoever commits sin, in and by this very voluntary act

236 ANTHROPOLOGY,

becomes the slave of sin. John 8 : 24, Says Augustine (Confessions, VIII. v.), " My will the enemy held, and thence had made a chain for me, and bound me. For of a perverse will comes lust ; and a lust yielded to becomes custom ; and custom not resisted becomes necessity. By which links, as it were, joined together as in a chain, a hard bondage held me enthralled. And that new will, to serve Thee freely and to enjoy Thee, O God, which had begun to be in me, was not able to overcome my former long-established wilfulness. In these spiritual things, ability is one with will, and to will is to do ; and yet the thing is not done. Whence is this strange anomaly (monstrum) % The mind commands the hody^ and it obeys instantly ; the mind commands itself^ and is resisted. The mind commands the hand to be moved, and such readiness is there that command is scarce distinct from obedience. The mind commands the mind, its own self, to will ; and yet it doth not will. It commands itself, I say, to will, and would not command unless it willed ; and yet what it commands is not done. But it willeth not entirely^ therefore doth it not command entirely. For it commandeth only so far forth as it willeth. The will commandeth that there be a will [inclination] ; not another's will, but its own will. But it doth not command entirely; therefore, what it commandeth does not take place."

" It is certain," says Samuel Hopkins (Works, I. 233-235), " that every degree of inclination contrary to duty, which is and must be sinful, implies and involves an equal degree of difficulty and inability to obey. For indeed, such inclination of the heart to disobey, and the difficulty or inability to obey, are pi'ecisely one and the same. The kind of difficulty, or inability, therefore, always is great according to the strength and fixedness of the inclination to disobey ; and it becomes total and absolute [inability], when the heart is totally corrupt and wholly opposed to obedience. l!^othing but the opposition of the heart or will of niau to

ORIGINAL SIN. 237

coming to Christ, is or can be in the way of his coming. So long as this continues, and his heart is wholly opposed to Christ, he cannot come to him ; it is impossible, and will continue so, until his unwillingness, his opposition to coming to Christ, be removed by a change and renovation of his heart, by divine grace, and he be willing in the day of God's power."

The excess of will to sin is the same as defect of will to holiness. The degree of intensity with which any being inclines to evil, is the measure of the amount of power to good which he has thereby lost. If the intensity be total, the loss is entire. Sin is the suicidal action of the human will. To do wrong destroys the power to do right. This is illustrated in the effect of a vicious habit in diminishing a man's ability to resist temptation. But habit is the continual repetition of wrong self-decisions, every one of which reacts upon the will as a faculty, and renders it less strong and energetic to good. ISTo man can do a wrong act, and be as sound in his will, and as spiritually strong, after it as he was before it.

Again, the totality of the depravity of the wdll destroys moral ability, or ability to good. The whole and not a mere part of the will is determined. Consequently, when a self-determination to a final end has occurred, there is no remainder of uncommitted power in reserve, as it were, behind the existing determination, by which the direction of the will may be reversed. This total and intense determination to evil is inability to good.

The debilitating effect of self-determination upon the will itself is too often overlooked. When cause and effect are in different subjects, the impotence of the cause itself after its own action is always taken into account ; but when, as in the case of a sinful inclination, cause and effect are in one and the same subject, viz., the human will, the impotence of the cause itself after its own action is not always noticed, or is practically denied. If, for illustration, one

238 ANTHROPOLOGY.

man kill another man, all know that the murderer cannot restore the murdered man to life. The cause cannot undo its effect when thej are in different subjects. But the same is true when a man kills himself. Here the cause and the effect are in one and the same subject. Now this is true also of the human will, in reference to the sin of whicli it is the cause. Sin is the effect of free will as the cause ; and because the will originates sin, it is assumed that the will can nullify sin ; can destroy what it originated. But the effect in this instance is as much beyond the power of the cause, when once the cause has acted, as in any other instance. A man certainly cannot undo the guilt of his sin, and neither can he undo the inclination to sin.

"A certainty," says the younger Edwards (Against Chauncy, XIII.), "that has been established by the will of man with respect to the will itself, as effectually binds that will, and is equally inconsistent with its liberty [to the contrary], as if that certainty were established by any other cause. Suppose the will of any man shall establish in itself a certain and unfailing bias to any particular action or series of actions ; it cannot be pretended that this fixed bias already established is any more consistent with liberty [to the contrary], and moral agency [?], in the man in whom the bias exists, than if it had been established by any other cause. If a man were to cut off his own leg, though he might be more blamable for the act of cutting it off than he would be for the same act performed by another, yet the effect, as to his subsequent ability to walk, would be the very same." '

But if man, either unfallen or fallen, cannot begin a holy inclination, how is it that he can begin an evil one ? If he cannot be the ultimate and meritorious author of holiness, how can he be the ultimate and ill-deserving author of sin ?

' Shedd : Sermons to the Natural Man, XI. and XIV.

ORIGINAL SIN. 239

Why may there be a power to tlie contrary downward from a holy position, but no power to tlie contrary npward from a sinful position ? Why can man ruin, but not save himself?

1. Because of the difference between self-determination to holiness, and self-determination to sin. The first is relative, the last is absolute self-determination. Relative self-determination is self-determination with a Divine element in it ; absolute self-determination is self-determination without a Divine element in it. The former is selfdetermination under the Divine impulse and actuation ; the latter is solitary self-determination without the Divine impulse and actuation. Holiness in man is Divine-human : the product of God working in the creature to will and to do. Sin in man is human simply and only : the product of the finite will uninfluenced and nnimpelled. Augustine, as quoted by Calvin (Inst., II. ii. 4), defines liberum arbitrium as " a power of reason and will by which good is chosen when grace assists, and evil is chosen when grace is Avanting." Aquinas, as quoted by JSTeander (History, lY. 481), says that holy " free will is not an independent causality. God works in the finite will in the way that the nature of it requires that he should ; although, therefore, he changes the inclination of man to another direction, nevertheless, by his almighty power he causes that man should freely will the change which he experiences ; and thus all constraint is removed. For to suppose otherwise, that the man willed not the change which is a change in his will, would be a contradiction."

The difference between the two kinds of self-determination is marked in language. The noun "sin" has a verb active to correspond with it; the noun "holiness" has none. Sin is " sinning," or "to sin;" but holiness is not " holying," or " to holy." Only the passive is employed in the latter case : " to be holy," or, " to become holy." But both the active and passive are employed in the former. Man is willing in holiness ; and he is willing in

240 ANTHROPOLOGY.

sin. Bnt the willingness in the first case is complex. God works in man to will. Phil. 2 : 13. The willingness in the second case is simple. Man works alone. In the first instance, the human will harmonizes with the Divine ; in the second, it antagonizes. In the first instance, the voluntariness is recipient. 1 Cor. 4:7," What hast thou that thou didst not receive ? " Rom. 8 : 15, "Ye have received the spirit of adoption." In the second instance, the voluntariness is originant.

The question arises whether the Divine element in holy self-determination does not, in reality, destroy the s^Zf-determination. If God creates voluntary spontaneity when he creates a holy man, or re-creates it when he regenerates him, is it in either case real and genuine spontaneity ? Must not the human will act alone and independently^ in order to act voluntarily ; and is not the sinful will the only free will, because it is not influenced by God in its action ? The answer is in the negative : («) Because revelation teaches this agency of God in and on the finite will, and at the same time teaches that the resulting holiness is true freedom. John 8 : 36, " If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." (J) Because consciousness reports that the holy inclination is spontaneous, and unforced, (c) Because if the human will in order to act freely must not experience any influence or impulse from God, then all Divine influence is necessitating. And the same is true of human influence.

2. Man can originate sin, because sin is imperfection. The Infinite will cannot originate imperfection. Deut. 32 : 4, "God's work is perfect." 2 Sam. 22:31; Ps. 18:30. This is one of the differentia between the Creator and the creature. Infinite, uncreated, and eternal Avill cannot cause any defective thing; but finite, created, and temporal will can. Sin is defective, because it has less of being in it than holiness has. There was once a time when it was not ; but holiness always was. Sin has no

ORIGINAL SIN. 241

positive and eternal right to be ; holiness has such a right. Sin is not necessary in the universe of God ; had God so decreed, the created will would never have originated it. But holiness is necessary. Because of these facts, the schoolmen defined sin as a negation ; a defect rather than an effect. To originate it, is not the sign of power, but of weakness. Hence the possibility of sinning is not an excellence, but a deficiency. It is one of the limitations of the finite. That it does not belong to God does not prove that God is not free, or that he has less power than a man or angel has, any more than the impossibility of having a physical disease, or of dying, proves that God is inferior to man. The possibility of doing an evil thing is weakness rather than power.

The foundation of man's obligation to perfectly obey the Divine law, was the holiness and plenary power to good with which he was endowed by his Creator. Because God made man in his own image, he was obliged to sinless obedience. Moral obligation rested upon the union and combination of the so-called " natural ability " with the " moral." It did not rest upon the first alone. Xot a will without any inclination, but a will with a holy inclination, was the basis of the requirement of sinless obedience. The possession of a will undetermined would not constitute man a moral agent. God did not make man without moral character, and then require perfect obedience from him. When man was created and placed under law, he was endowed not only with the faculties of a man, bnt with those faculties in a normal condition. The understanding was spiritually enlightened, and the will was rightly inclined. He had both "natural" and "moral" ability. He had real and plenary power to obey the law of God. In the beginning of man's moral existence, ability must equal obligation. And the ability did equal it. Kant's dictum : " I ought, therefore I can," was true of holy Adam and his posterity in him. If at the instant man came from the Vol. II.— 16

242 ANTHROPOLOGY.

liaiid of God he had been unable to obey, he would not have been obligated to obey. " The law was not above man's strength when he was possessed of original righteousness, though it be above man's strength since he was stripped of original righteousness. The command was dated before man had contracted his impotency, when he had a power to keep it, as well as to break it. . Had it been enjoined to man only after the fall, and not before, he might have had a better pretence to excuse himself, because of the impossibility of it ; yet he would not have had sufficient excuse, since the impossibility did not result from the nature of the law, but from the corrupted nature of the creature. It ' was weak through the flesh ' (Rom. 8 : 3), hut it was promulged when man had a strength proportioned to the commands of it." Charnocke : The Holiness of God.

Obligation being thus founded upon the Creator's gifts, cannot be destroyed by any subsequent action of the creature. If he destroys his ability, he does not destroy his obligation. If man by his own voluntary action loses any .or all of the talents entrusted to him, he cannot assign this i;loss as a reason why any or all the talents, together with iiiisuvy, should not be demanded of him in the final settlement. See Christ's parable of the talents. " Praecepta dei non sunt mensura virium, sed regula officii; non docent quid Bunc possumus, sed quid debeamus, et quod olim potuerimiis." Turrettin, Institutio, X. iv. 23. The Heidel,berg Catecliism thus represents the subject. Q. 9. " Does not God, then, wrong man by requiring of him in his law ithat which he cannot perform ? A. No ; for God so made man that he f?ould perform it ; but man through the instigation of the devil, by M'ilful disobedience deprived himself and all his posterity of this power."

1. It is objected, that if man is unable to keep the law, he is not obligated to keep it. This depends upon the nature of the. inability, and its cause.

ORIGINAL SIN. 243

If man were destitute of reason, conscience, will, or any of the faculties of a moral being, he would not be obligated. If he were internally wrought upon by an almighty being, and prevented from obeying, he would not be obligated. If he were prevented by any external compulsion, he would not be obligated. If he had been created sinful, he would not be obligated. If he had been created indifferent either to holiness or sin, he would not have been obligated. !None of these conditions obtain in the case of man. He was created holy, with plenary power to keep perfectly the moral law, and therefore was obligated to keep it. At the point of creation, ability and obligation were equal.

But if after creation in holiness and plenary power, any alteration be made in the original ratio between ability and obligation by the creature's voluntary agency, this cannot alter the original obligation. If ability is weakened by an act of self-determination, obligation is not weakened. If ability is totally destroyed by self-determination, obligation is not destroyed. The latter is the fact in the case. There is a total inability, but it is not an original or created inability. It came to be by man's act, not by God's. " Man's inability to restore what he owes to God, an inability brought upon himself, does not excuse man from paying the satisfaction due to justice ; for the result of sin cannot excuse the sin itself." Anselm : Curdeus homo, I. xxiv.

The principle, that if a moral power once possessed is lost by the voluntary action of the possessor he is not thereby released from the original duty that rested upon it, is acknowledged by writers upon ethics. Aristotle (Ethics, III. V.) remarks that it is just in legislators " to punish people even for ignorance itself, if they are the cause of their own ignorance ; just as the punishment is double for drunken people. For the cause is in themselves ; since it was in their own power not to get drunk, and drunkenness is the cause of their ignorance. And they punish those who are ignorant of anything in the laws which they ought

244 ANTHROPOLOGY.

to know, and which it is not difficult to know ; and likewise in all other cases in which thej are ignorant through negligence ; upon the ground that it was in their own power to pay attention to it. But perhaps a person is unable to give his attention ? But he himself is the cause of this inability, by living in a dissipated manner. Persons are themselves the causes of their being unrighteous, by performing bad actions ; and of being intemperate, by passing their time in drunken revels and such-like. When a man does those acts by which he becomes unjust, he becomes unjust voluntarily [that is by the action of his own will]. Nevertheless, he will not be able to leave off being unjust and to become just, whenever he pleases. For the sick man cannot become well whenever he pleases, even though it so happen that he is voluntarily sick owing to an incontinent life, and from disobedience to physicians. At the time indeed, it was in his own power not to be sick ; but when he has once allowed himself to become sick, it is no longer in his power not to be sick ; just as it is no longer in the power of a man who has thrown a stone to recover it. And yet the throwing of it was in his own power ; for the origin of the action was in his own power. In like manner, in the beginning it was in the power of the unjust and the intemperate man not to become unjust and intemperate; and therefore they are so voluntarily. But when they have become so, it is no longer in their power to avoid being unjust and intemperate. . . . And not only are the faults of the soul voluntary, but in some persons those of the body ai'e 80 likewise, and with these we find fault. For no one finds fault with those who are disfigured and ugly by birth ; but only with those who are so through neglect of gymnastic exercise, or through carelessness. The case is the same with bodily weakness and mutilation. For no one would blame a man Mdio is born blind, or who is blind from disease or a blow ; but would rather pity him. But everybody would blame the man who is blind from drunkenness, or

ORIGINAL SIN. 245

any intemperance. For those faults of the body wliicli are in our own power originally, and which result from our own action, we are blamable."

The assertion of Plato (Laws, Y. 731) that "the unjust man is not unjust of his own free will; because no man of his own free will would choose to experience the greatest of evils," if it were true, would relieve the unjust man of obligation. The ethics of Plato in such an assertion is defective. He, however, contradicts himself; because elsewhere he teaches the guiltiness of the unjust man. Even in this very connection (Laws, Y. 734), he reasons in a selfcontradictory manner. The temperate life, he says, is pleasant, and the intemperate is painful, " and he who would live pleasantly cannot possibly choose to live intemperately. If this be true, the inference clearly is that no man is volnntarily intemperate ; but that the whole multitude of men lack temperance in their lives, either from ignorance, or from want of self-control, or both." But " want of selfcontrol " is voluntariness. The probability is, that Plato in the above extract employs " voluntary " in the sense of " volitionary."

In secular commercial life, the loss of ability does not release from obligation. A man is as much a debtor to his creditors after his bankruptcy, as he was before. The loss of his property does not free him from indebtedness. He cannot say to his creditor, " I owed yon yestei-day, because I was able to pay you, but to-day I owe you nothing, because I am a bankrupt.'' It is a legal maxim, that bankruptcy does not invalidate contracts.

That obligation remains fixed and immutable under all the modifications of ability introduced by the action of the human will, is proved by the case of the drunkard, and the habit which he has formed. The drunkard is certainly less able to obey the law of temperance than the temperate man is. But this law has precisely the same claim upon him that it has upon the temperate. The diminution of ability

24:0 ANTHROPOLOGY.

has not diminished the obligation. If obligation must always keep pace with tlie changes in the ability, then there are degrees of obligation. The stronger the will is, the more it is obliged ; the weaker it is, the less is it bound by law. In this case, sin rewards the sinner by delivering him from the claims of law. The most vicious man would be least under obligation to duty.

2. It is objected, that if the apostate will is imable to perfectly obey the divine law, it is not free. The reply to this objection requires a defniition of finite freedom, both negatively and positively. jS^egatively, finite freedom is not: (a) The freedom of omnipotence. Owen: Arminianism, XII. There are many things out of man's power, but this does not prove that he is necessitated within his own proper sphere of action, ih) ^or the freedom of independence. This species of freedom requires self-existence and self-sustentation. It is beyond the reach of an influence from another being. It is pure aseity (aseitas), or self-sufficiency, (c) Nor freedom from the internal consequences of voluntary action. The formation of a habit is voluntary ; but when the habit has been voluntarily formed, it cannot be eradicated by a volition, {d) Kor freedom from the external consequences of voluntary action. The objective fact caused by the will cannot be destroyed by the will. The snicide cannot restore himself to life ; the homicide cannot reanimate his victim, {e) Xor freedom from action itself. The will is not free not to act at all. The will must will something, as the mind must think something. Inaction of the will is impossible, like inaction of the nnderstanding. {f) x\or freedom from the regulation and restraint of law. Even in God, freedom is not unbridled almightiness unregulated by other attributes. God can do all that he wills to do, but there are some things which he cannot will because certain of his attributes prevent : for example, logical contradictions, and sinful acts. Freedom in God is rational freedom. Kant denominates the practical reason the will, beORIGINAL SIN. 247

cause, ideally, the will is one with reason. " Subjection {Sovkela) to righteousness " (Rom. 6 : 19) is " obedience from the heart," or spontaneity, (Rom. 6 : 17) ; and also " glorious liberty," Rom. 8 : 21. The moral law is " a law of liberty," James 1 : 25. The believer is " free indeed," John S : Si. (g) Nor the possibility of willing contrary to what is already being willed. The possibility of willing the contrary is an accident, not the substance of freedom. It ma}' be associated, temporarily, with an existing self-determination, for the purpose of testing the strength of it, but not for the purpose of making the self-determination an}' more self-detennined. than it already is in its own nature. Freedom is the present actual willingness, and not the power to will something else in addition to the present actual willingness. Suppose, for illustration, that a man thinks of only one single act, say, to walk to a certain tree before him. No other act is in his mind. He walks spontaneously to this tree. Here, he does not choose between two actions, but he self-determines to one action. He walks to the tree, and is free in so doing, not because he could have walked away from the tree if the thought of so doing had occurred to him, but because he actually walked to the tree proprio motu, and without compulsion. (A) Nor indiiference, or freedom from a bias or inclination. A bias or inclination of the will is the central and dominant self-determination of the will. The stronger the bias, the more intense is the self-determination, and hence the intenser the freedom. The more the will is self-determined and inclined, the farther off it is from indifference ; and hence indifference is not the characteristic of freedom. {i) Nor the mere liberty of performing an outward act. Edwards, in his polemics against the Arminian, finds the substance of freedom in this.' According to this, a man is free to worship God only when he is permitted to act out

' Will, Works II. 1 7. So also does Locke : Understanding, 11. 8, 21 ; and Hobbes : Works, II. 410.

24:8 ANTHROPOLOGY.

his inclination and to worship externally ; and if he is not so permitted, he is not free to worship God. But the truth is, that if he has the inclination to worship he is a free worshipper, whether he is allowed to put his inclination into volition and act, or not. He is the Lord's freeman, and a true worshipper, by virtue of his spontaneous inclination itself. " Fool," says the lady in Comus,

" Fool do not boast : Thou canst not touch the freedom of my mind "With all thy charms, although this corporal rind Thou hast immanacled, while Heaven sees good."

The same truth is embodied in the fine lines of Lovelace, written while confined in prison :

" Stone walls do not a prison make, Nor iron bars a cage, Minds innocent and quiet take That for an hermitage.

If I have freedom in my love,

And in my soul am free, Angels alone, that soar above,

Enjoy such liberty." — Pekcy : Reliques.

And on the other hand, if a man has an evil inclination, say to earthly ambition and power, he is free in sin, that is self-determinedly sinful, whether he is permitted to carry it out in volition and act or not. Shut him in prison, so that he can take no part in earthly affairs, he is still Satan's freeman, by virtue of the inclination of his will.

And the reason of this is the fact, that the suhjective energy of the human will is all that a man can call his own, and be responsible for. The realization of this personal inward energy in outward act depends upon others, and especially upon the providence of God, and not upon the man himself. The circumstances of a man are no part of

ORIGINAL SIN. 249

his spontaneous self-determination, and lie is not responsible for them, lie is not free in regard to them. As in the case supposed, a man may have the inclination to worship God, but his surroundings prevent. These surroundings are no part of his volnntarj' agency, and ought not to be taken into account, in determining whether he is a free agent. If the subjective personal energy of his own will, as seen in his inclination, is truly free from compulsion and really spontaneous, he is free, whether he can give it outward form in a particular act or not. Says Calvin (Inst., II, iv. 8), " The ability of the human will is not to be estimated from the event of things, as some ignorant men are accustomed to do. For they imagine that they disprove the freedom of the human will, because even the greatest monarchs have not all their desires fulfilled. But the ability of which we are speaking is to be considered as xoitJiin man, and not to be measured by external success. For in the dispute concerning fi-ee will, the question is not whether a man notwithstanding external impediments can perform and execute whatever he may have determined in his mind, but whether in every case his understanding exerts freedom of judgment (judicii electionem), and his will freedom of inclination (affectionem voluntatis). If nien possess both of these, then Attilius Regulus when confined in the small extent of a cask stuck round with nails, will possess as much free will as xVugustus Caesar when governing a great part of the world with his rod." To the same effect, Edwards (Will, III. iv.) remarks, that " if the will [inclination] fully complies, and the proposed effect does not prove, according to the laws of nature, to be connected with his [executive] volition, the man is perfectly excused ; he has a natural inability to the thing required. For the will [inclination] itself, as has been observed, is all that can be directly and immediately required by command ; and other things only indirectly, as connected with the will. If, therefore, there be a full compliance of will [inclination], the person has

250 ANTHROPOLOGY.

done his duty ; and if other things do not prove to be connected with his [executive] volition that is not owing to him." Compare E,eid : Intellectual Powers, III. iv. 1.

Defining positively, finite freedom is («) Self-determination in the sense of moral spontaneity ; not self-determination and power to the contrary, but self-determination alone, pure, and simple. The first is true, the last is spurious self-determination, and should be denominated indetermination. {Jj) Fi'eedom from compulsion, either internal or external. " God hath indued the will of man with that natural liberty, that it is woi forced to good or evil." Westminster Confession, IX. i. (c) Freedom from physical necessity, or the operation of the law of cause and effect. " God hath indued the will of man with that natural liberty, that it is not by any absolute necessity of nature determined to good or evil." Westminster Confession, IX. i. Physical necessity is seen in the sequences of physical cause and effect. There is no freedom in such a series of seqiiences, because there is no true beginning and first start. The cause is itself an effect of a foregoing cause, and this again is the effect of another foregoing cause, and so backward indefinitely. Causa causae causa causati. Ko responsible cause can be found in such a line of antecedents and consequents, because as fast as the responsibility is found in a particular cause, it is thrown back upon the cause of this cause. No real and true author or beginner is found until the chain terminates in God, who is not a part of the chain, but the creator of it. All physical and material events and phenomena must be referred to the Prime Mover. There is no real author, and no first cause, within the chain of nature itself. Put in the sphere of mind, the case is different. The law of cause and effect, operating in matter, has no operation in the human will. This latter is the faculty of self-motion. Even when the Holy Spirit works in it " to will and to do," the motion is still self-motion — spiritual not physical, volunORIGINAL SIN. 251

tary not necessitated. In the origin of sin, the will cannot refer its action back to a physical cause, and thus convert it into a mere effect, and transfer its responsibility to a foregoing cause of its agency. In respect to sin, it is itself a true originating cause. It begins its own movement ab intra, by an act of self-determination. There is a first inclining of the will to the creature, and away from the creator, which is not the effect of a foregoing sin, but is the original nisus or start of self-will. And in the origin of holiness, though the Mall must refer its action back to God, yet not to him as 2i physical cause producing a physical effect. Holy inclination is the activity of mind, not of matter. It is not produced by the operation of the law of cause and effect, because the Divine Spirit works in the human will in accordance with the nature of mind, not of matter.

If this be the true definition of freedom, it follows that the apostate will is free in being inclined or self-determined, and that this inclination to evil constitutes an inability to good. The sinner is at once voluntary in sin, and impotent to holiness. lie is enslaved by himself to himself. He cannot love God supremely, because lie loves himself supremely. lie cannot incline rightly, because he is iuclining wrongly. He is spontaneously and freely evil, and therefore is unable to be spontaneously and freely good. Self-determination is a hazardous endowment. It may be an evil as well as a good. Wlien free-will is wicked will, it is a curse.

The answer to the question, " Can the sinner repent if he will?" depends on the meaning of the term " will : " whether it denotes inclination or volition. " Can the sinner repent if he incline? Yes. But the inclining is the repentance itself. So that this answer is the truism, " He can repent, if he repents." " Can the sinner repent, if lie choose, or resolve f " No. A volition of the will cannot produce an inclination of the will. If a muu inclines to

252 ANTHROPOLOGY.

repent, he repents in so inclining ; but if a man resolves to repent, lie does not repent in so resolving.

3. It is objected, that if the sinner has no power to obey the law, he has nothing to do in the matter of religion. He may say with Macbeth,

" If chance will have me king, why let chance crown me, Without my stir."

This does not follow. Because the sinner cannot do the primary work, it does not follow that he cannot do the secondary. He has a very important work to do ; namely to discover his inahility. A wide field is open hei-e for his agency, {a) He can compare his character and conduct with the requirements of the law ; this tends to convince him of his inability to perfectly obey the law. " I have seen an end of all perfection ; thy commandment is exceeding broad," Ps. 119 : 96. (J)) He can try to obey the law ; this will convince him of his inability still more.

A sinner has power under common grace to find out that he has no power to the " spiritually good."' This is a preparative work to regeneration. The discovery that he is " without strength " leads to the discovery that " Christ died for the ungodly," Rom. 5 : 6. When he is Aveak then he is strong. God has appointed certain means to be employed by common grace prior to his exercise of regenerating grace ; nr)t meritoriously, but as congruous or adapted to the end. The sinner is to use them. Says Howe (Decrees, III. 7), " Where there is not as yet the light of a saint, there is that of a man, and that is to be improved and made use of in order to our higher light ; and if there be that self-reflection to which God has given to every man a natural ability, much more may be known than usuallv is. It belongs to the nature of man to turn his eyes inwards. Men can reflect and consider this with themselves : Have I not an aversion towards God ? Have not "worldly concernments and affairs, by the natural inclination

ORIGINAL SIN. 253

of my own mind, a greater room and place there than heaven and the things of heaven ? Are not other thouglits more grateful ? And have they not a more pleasant relish with me than thoughts of God ? Men, I say, are capable of usinor such reflections as these. And therefore of considering : This can never be well with me. If there remain with me 'an habitnal aversion to God, who must be my best and eternal good, I cannot but be eternally miserable. If I cannot think of and converse with him with inclination and pleasure, I am lost. If my blessedness lie above, in another world, and my mind is carried continually downward towards this world, I must have a heart attempered to heaven, or I can never come there. Well, then, let me try if I can change the habit of my own mind, make the attempt, make the triaL The more you attempt and try, the more you will find that of yourselves you cannot ; you can do nothing of yourselves, you do but lift a heavy log, you attempt to move a mountain upwards, when you would lift at your own terrene hearts. Then is this consideration obvious : I must have help from Heaven, or I shall never come there. Therefore fall a-seeking, fall asupplicating, as one that apprehends himself in danger to perish and be lost, if he have not another heart, a believing heart, a holy heart, a heavenly heart." '

4. It is objected, that if the sinner's ability to keep the moral law depends upon the sovereign grace of God, he must wait God's time. The reply is, that God's time is noio^ and therefore excludes waiting for it. 2 Cor. 6 : 2, " God saith, I have heard thee in a time accepted, and in the day of salvation have I succored thee : behold now is the day of salvation." Ileb. 4:7, " God limiteth (opt^et) a certain day: saying. To-day if ye will hear his voice harden not your hearts." God offers the Holy Spirit as a regenerating Spirit this very instant, but confines the offer

' See also Howe : Blessedness of the Righteous, XVIII. ; Boston : Fourfold State, II. iii. 13; and especiall3-, Owen : Holy Spirit, III. ii.

254 ANTHROPOLOGY.

to this very instant. ISTowhere in revelation does God offer to pai-don sin or regenerate the sonl at a future time. Tills work is always described as to be done in the sinner's heart, now, this very moment, ^o future redemption is promised.

5. The sinner excuses himself from faith and repentance, by saying, " I cannot believe. I am unable to repent." He is to be made to feel the truth of his statement, not to be told that his statement is untrue. He needs to become conscious of that inability which in words he asserts, but not in sincerity. The difficulty in the instance in which this objection of inability is urged is, that the sinner does not really believe what he says. He does not realize his inability ; but he perceives that to urge it is a good verbal objection, an argumentura ad hominem for the preacher. In this case, the work of the preacher is to make the objector eat his own words, and seriously feel the truth of his assertion. And in doing this, he will bring out the important fact that the sinner's inability is guilty, because self-originated ; that the sinner is the sole author of the inability.

6. It is objected that the doctrine of inability is incompatible with commands and exhortations to believe, repent, and obey the law of God. It is said that we would not command a dead man to rise from the grave, or a man without legs to walk. To this it is to be replied, that we would so command, if God bade us to utter this commandment hi a given instance, and promised to accompany the word from our lips with his own omnipotent and creative power. Christ's command to preach the gospel to men " dead in trespasses and sins," and who " cannot come unto the Son except the Father draw them " (John 6 : 44), is coupled with the promise to accompany the truth with the Holy Spirit.

The doctrine of the sinner's ability is exposed to great objections. 1. It contradicts consciousness. The process of " conviction " is a growing sense of inability to everyORIGINAL SIN. 255

tiling spiritually good in heart and eondnct. Sinful man cannot be made conscious of ability. This form of consciousness has never been in the human soul.

2. The tenet undermines the doctrine of atonement. It is conceded that the sinner has no ability to make atonement for his guilt ; it would follow from this theory of abilit}^ that he is not obligated to make one, in other words, that punitive justice has no claims upon him.

3. The tenet conflicts with the doctrine of endless punishment. If the power to the contrary belongs inalienably to the apostate will, self-restoration in the future world is possible, and endless punishment is not certain. The Alexandrine theologians, Clement and Origen, founded their denial of endless punishment upon this view of tlie will. If the sinner is able at all times to believe and repent, he may do so at any time, and under the impressions of the other world it is probable that he will. Clement and Origen founded the final recovery of Satan and his angels, together with fallen man, in the future world, upon the abiding existence of free will to good. It is no reply to this objection, to say that the lost man can, but certainly never will repent. If latent power be given in the premise, the natural inference is that it will be used, not that it will not be. Suppose that previous to the fall it had been said, " Adam has the power to sin, but he certainly never will sin." Suppose that it were said, " Gunpowder has the inherent power of self-explosion, but it certainly never will explode." To say that it was certain that Adam would use his power to sin, because it was decreed that he would use it, is not to the point ; because this is inferring the certainty as relative to the Divine decree, not as relative to the power of the human will, M'hich is the matter in dispute.

4. The tenet of ability encourages the sinner to procrastination, and neglect of the gospel offer. If he believes that from the very nature of free will he has the power to believe and repent at any moment, he will defer faith and

256 ANTHROPOLOGY.

repentance. A sense of danger excites ; a sense of security puts to sleep. A company of gamblers in the sixth story are told that the building is on fire. One of them answers, " We have the key to the fire-escape," and all continue the game. Suddenly one exclaims, " The key is lost ; " all immediately spring to tlieir feet, and endeavor to escape. While there was the belief of security, there was apathy ; the instant there was a knowledge of insecurity, there was action.

5. If the law can be perfectly obeyed by " natural ability," or by will without right inclination, then " moral ability " is superfluous. But if the law cannot be obeyed except by the nnion of natural and moral ability, or by will with right inclination, then either alone is insufficient.

The following propositions comprise the substance of the Augustino-Calvinistic doctrine of inability. 1. There is a free self-determination or inclining to evil, in the sinner's will. 2. There is an inability of the sinner to self-determine or incline to good, that results from his self -determining or inclining to evil. This inability is culpable, because it is the product of the sinner's agency. 3. The Holy Spirit re-originates self-determination or inclination to good, in the sinner's will. 4. The sinner's will is wholly, not partially, dependent npon the Divine Spirit for a holy self-determination or inclination. 5. God has elected an immense " multitude whom no man can number," to be the subjects of his regenerating power.

Actual transgressions are the particular sins that proceed from original sin. They are the individual's sins of act, in distinction from his inherited nature and inclination. Original sin is one ; actual sin is manifold. " Actual " in this connection is not the contrary of " imaginary." Actual transgressions are accompanied with more or less of selfconsciousness.

Actual transgressions are : (a) Interior, namely, a particular conscious doubt in the mind, or a particular conscious

ORIGINAL SIN 257

lust in the lieart. These are single manifestations of the general inclination. The worship of the creature, or idolatry (Rom. 1 : 25), is the generic corruption, and an internal actual ti'ansgression is the outwoi'king of this in a particular ambitious purpose, or a proud aspiration, or a malignant emotion, etc. (b) Exterior, namely, a theft, a lie, a homocide, a suicide, etc.

The depravity or corruption of nature is total. Man is " wholly inclined to evil, and that continually." Westminster L, C, 25. Gen. 6:5, " God saw that every imagination of the thoughts of man was only evil continually." There can be but a single dominant inclination in the will at one and the same time ; though with it there may be remnants of a previously dominant inclination. Adam began a new sinful inclination. This expelled the prior holy inclination. He was therefore totally depraved, because there were no remainders of original righteousness left after apostasy, as there are remainders of original sin left after regeneration. This is proved by the fact that there is no struggle between sin and holiness, in the natural man, like that in the spiritual man. In the regenerate, " the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh," Gal. 5 : IT. Holiness and sin are in a conflict that causes the regenerate to "groan within themselves," Rom. 8 : 23. But there is no such conflict and groaning; in the natural man. Apostasy was the fall of the human will, with no remnants of original righteousness. Regeneration is the recovery of the human will, with some remnants of original sin.

Total depravity means the entire absence of holiness, not the highest intensity of sin. A totally depraved man is not as bad as he can be, but he has no holiness, that is, no supreme love of God. He worships and loves the creature rather than the creator, Rom. 1 : 25. Vol. II.— 17

Athanasius : Third Discourse against the Arians. Augustine : Letter cxxxvii. (To Volusianus). Anselm : Cur Deus Homo, II. vii.-ix. Aquinas : Summa, III. i.-xxxv. Petavius : De Incarnatione. Calvin : Institutes, II. xii.-xiv. Ursinus : Christian Eeligion, Qu. 35. Paraeus : Corpus Doetrinae, Qu. 35. Witsius : Apostles' Creed, Diss. XTV. De Moor : Commentarius, Caput XIX. | xiv. Turrettin : Institutio, XIII. iv.-xiv. Gerhard : Loci, IV. xii. Usher : On the Incarnation. Hooker : Polity, V. li. Hi. Van Mastricht : I. x. 5, 6. Pearson: Creed, Art. III. Owen : Person of Christ, XVIII. ; Vindiciae, VIII. XIII. XIX. ; Holy Spirit II. iii. iv. Bunyan : On Imputed Righteousness. Edwards : On the Will, II. ii. Hopkins : System, Vol. I. 283. Fisher : On the Catechism, Qu. 21, 22. Dor ner : Person of Christ. Hagenbach : History of Doctrine, ^ 64-67, 98-105, 179, 266, 267, 299. Hase : Hutteras, | 94-98. Neander : History, II. 478-616. Hengsteuberg : Christology of the Old Testament. Martenseu : Dogmatics, § 125-147. TJllmann : Sinlessness of Jesus. Schaff: History, III. 705-772. Shedd : History of Doctrine, I. 392-408. Gess : Person of Christ. Bruce : Humiliation of Christ (Kenotic Theories). Briggs : Messianic Prophecy. Dod : On the Incarnation. Wilberforce : On the Incarnation. Liddon : Divinity of Our Lord. Leathes : Witness of O. T. and N. T. to Christ. Delitzsch : Messianic Prophecies. Riehm : Messianic Prophecy.

Chkistology (Xpia-Tov X0709) is that division of theological science which treats of the Person of the Redeemer.

As the doctrine of the Trinity is found in the Old Testament, so is that of the Redeemer. As there is an Old Testament Trinitarianism, so there is an Old Testament

262 CHRISTOLOGY.

Cliristologv. Botli doctrines, however, are less clearly revealed under tlie former economy than under the latter. Christ is explicit in asserting that the doctrine of his person is fonnd in the Old Testament. " Many prophets and righteous men have desired to see those things which ye see," Matt. 13 : 17. " Abraham saw my day, and was glad," John 8 : 5G. Compare John 12 : 41 ; Luke 24 : 27. 1 Pet. 1 : 10-12, " The prophets searched diligently what the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow." '

The Redeemer is announced under several names in the Old Testament. The earliest designation is the " Seed of the woman," Gen. 3 : 15. Christ himself adopts this designation in the title " Son of man," employed by himself but never by his apostles. The next name in order is Shiloh, Gen. 49 : 10. Luther, Gesenius, Hosenmuller, Hengstenberg, and others, explain this to mean the " Peacemaker." This is favored by other Messianic texts. In Isaiah 9 : 6, Messiah is denominated " prince of peace." In Micah 5 : 5, of the Redeemer it is said, " This man shall be our peace." In Zech. 9 : 10, he is denominated the "speaker of peace;" and in Eph. 2:14, "our peace." ^ Others explain the term Shiloh to mean "the desired One" (Ilaggai 2:7); "he who shall be sent;" " his son" (Calvin) ; "he whose right it is" (Sept. Aquila, Symmachus, Onkelos) ; " the place Shiloh " (Eichhorn, Bleek, Ilitzig, Ewald, Delitzsch, Kalisch).^ In Isaiah 7 : 14, the Re1 The Patristic and Reformation divines find both the Trinity and the Godman in the Old Testament. Irenaeus (Adversus Haereses, IV. xxxiii. xxxiv. ) makes ample quotations in proof of both doctrines. For the Lutheran and Reformed citations, see Gerhard, Chemnitz, Hase, Heppe, and Schweitzer, in locis.

* See Kitto : Dictionary; Speaker's Commentary: Genesis 49 : 10; and Newton : Prophecies, Dissertation IV.

•"' The connection is strongly against this last interpretation. " Probably the town Shiloh did not exist in Jacob's time, and Judah neither acquired nor lost the pre-eminence over the other tribes at Shilub. He was not the leader in the

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 203

deeiner is called Immanuel ; in Daniel 9 : 25, Messiah ; in Zech. G : 12, the Branch ; in Malachi 8 : 1, the Messenger of the Covenant. The designation of the Redeemer that was most common among the Jews was Messiah, or the Annointed One (n-in?:), rendered in the Septnagint by XptaTo<;. It is found 39 times in the Old Testament. See Alexander on Isa. 52 : 13.

The time of the Redeemer's advent is distinctly foretold in Gen. 49 : 10. " The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between his feet, until Shiloli come."' Historically, the sceptre, that is, self-government, did not depart from the Hebrew nation, represented by the tribe of Judah (Judaei, Jews), until the destruction of Jerusalem, a.d. TO. The time is again specified very particularly in Daniel 9 : 24-27. " Seventy weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon thy holy city, to finish the transgression, and to make an end of sins, and to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness, and to seal up the vision and prophecy, and to anoint the Most Holy." In this prophecy, a day stands for a year ; seventy weeks denoting 490 years. The prophet announces that in seven weeks, that is 49 years, from the end of the captivity, Jerusalem should be rebuilt; that in sixty-two weeks, that is 434 years from the rebuilding, Messiah should appear ; and that in one week, that is 7 ^^ears from his appearance, he should " confirm the covenant," and should be "cut off" " in the midst of the week." ' In the different calculations of exegetes

wilderness, for the people were led by Moses and Aaron ; nor did he gain any fresh authority at Shiloh. Every ancient version, paraphrase, and commentator, makes Sliiloh, not the objective case after the verb, but the nominative before the verb." Speaker's Commentary, in loco.

1 "It is supposed that John the Baptist began his ministry about three and a half years before Christ; so that John's ministry and Christ's put together made seven years, which were the last of Daniel's weeks. Christ came in the midst of the week, as Daniel foretold : 'And in the midst of the week he shall cause the sacrifice and oblation to cease.' " Edwards : Work of Redemption, Works, I. 407.

264 CHRISTOLOGY.

there is a difference of only ten years. Tlie difficnlty is to know exactly when the seventy weeks l)egin. Hales sra's that they begin from the twentieth year of Artaxerxes Longimanus. W. Smith supposes that " \.\\e final and effectual edict of Artaxerxes was the commencing date, and that this was issued in b.c. 457. Exactly 490 years may be counted from this to the death of Christ in a.d. 33."

That the Jesus Christ of the Xew Testament is the Messiah promised in the Old Testament, is proved by the agreement between the descriptions of the personage in each. In both he is: {a) The seed of the woman, Gen. 3 : 15 ; Ps. 22 : 10 ; Micah 5:3; Gal. 4:4; 1 Tim. 2:15; Rev. 12 : 15. {h) Born of a virgin, Isa. 7 : 14 ; Matt. 1 : 23 ; Luke 1 : 26-35. (c) Of the family of Shem, Gen. 9 : 26-27. {d) Of the Hebrew race, Ex. 3 : 18. {e) Of the seed of Abraham, Gen. 12 : 3 ; 18 : 18 ; Matt. 1:1; John 8 : 56 ; Acts 3 : 25. (/) Of the line of Isaac, Gen. 17 : 19 ; Eom. 9:7; Gal. 4 : 23-28; Heb. 11 : 8. {g) Of the line of Jacob or Israel, Gen. 28 : 4-14 ; l^umbers 24 : 517 ; Isa. 41 : 8 ; Luke 1 : 68 ; 2 : 32 ; Acts 28 : 20. {h) Of the tribe of Judah, Gen. 49 : 10 ; 1 Chron. 5:2; Micah 5 : 2 ; Matt. 2:6; Ileb. 7 : 14 ; Rev. 5 : 5. (^) Of the house of David, 2 Sam. 7 : 12-15 ; 1 Chron. 17 : 11-14; Ps. 89 : 4-36 ; Isa. 9:7; Matt. 1:1; Luke 1 : 69 ; 2:4; John 7 : 42 ; Acts 2 : 30 ; Rom. 1 : 3 ; 2 Tim. 2:8; Rev. 22 : 16. {j) Born at Bethlehem, Micah 5:2; Matt. 2:6; Luke 2:4; John 7:42. {h) To suffer an agony. Gen. 3:15; Ps. 22 : 1-18 ; Isa. 53 : 1-12 ; Zech. 13 : 6, 7 ; Matt. 26 : 37 ; Luke 24 : 26. (Z) To die, and in a peculiar manner, Isa. 53 : 9 ; Dan. 9 : 26 ; Numbers 21 : 9 compared with John 3 : 14 ; Ps. 22 : 18 compared with John 19 : 24. {m) To be embalmed and entombed, Isa. 53 : 9; Matt. 27: 57; Luke 23 : 56 ; John 19 : 38-41. {n) To rise from the dead, Ps. 16 : 10 ; Acts 3 : 15. {o) To ascend into heaven, Ps. 68:18 compared with Eph. 4:8; Ps. 110:1; Luke 24: 51. {p) To come a second time spiritually in regeneration,

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 265

Isa. 40 : 10 ; 62 : 11 ; Jer. 23 : 5, 6 ; Ilosea 3:5; Micah 5 : 4 ; Dan. 7 : 13, 14 ; John 14 : 3, 18, 23 ; 16 : 23, 26. {q) To come a second time visibly, Job 19 : 25 ; Ps. 50 : 1-6 ; Dan. 12 : 1, 2 ; Matt. 25 : 31 ; 1 Cor. 15 : 23 ; 1 Thess. 1 : 10; Eev. 20:11 sq.

The Biblical representations of the person of the Redeemer make him to be a com^dex person, constituted of two natures. lie is not merely God, or merely man ; but a union of both. lie is a God-man. The AYestminster statement defines him as follows : " The Redeemer of God's elect is the Lord Jesus Christ, who being [originally] the eternal Son of God became man, and so was, and continueth to be, God and man in two distinct natures and one person, forever," S. C, 21. The principal proof texts are John 1 : 1, 14, The " Word was God," and "The Word was made flesh ; " Phil. 2 : 6, Y, " Who being in the form of God took upon hira the form of a servant ; " Gal. 4:4; Luke 1:35; Rom. 9:5; Coloss. 2:9; Rom. 1 : 3, 4 ; 1 Tim. 2 : 5.

In order to a self-consistent scheme of Christ's complex person, the following particulars are to be marked :

1. The divine nature in Christ's person is the second person of the Godhead, the Eternal Son, or Logos. This is asserted in John 1 : 14, " The Word was made flesh." Neither God the Father, nor God the Spirit, became man. The Godhead did not become incarnate, because the Godhead is the divine essence in all three modes ; and the essence in all three modes did not become incarnate. Says Turrettin (XIII. vi. 4), " non ipsa trinitas bene incarnata dicatur, quia incarnatio non terminatur ad naturam divinam absolute, sed ad personam tov Aoyov relate." And Aquinas (III. ii. 1, 2) remarks, that " it is more proper to say that a divine person assumed a liuman nature, than to say that the divine nature assumed a human nature." It was only the divine essence in that particular mode of it which constitutes the second triuitarian person, that was united with

266 CHRISTOLOGY.

man's nature. There was, consequently, something in the triune Godhead which did not enter into Christ's person. Tiiis something is the personal characteristic of the Fathei', and of the Holy Spirit. The paternity of the first person, and the procession of the third person, do not belong to Jesns Christ.

The following reasons for the incarnation of the second person, rather than of the first or third, are mentioned by Paraeus (Xotes on the Athanasian Creed) : First, that by the incarnation the names of the divine persons should remain unchanged ; so that neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit should have to take the name of a Son. Secondly, it was fitting that by the incarnation men should become God's adopted sons, through him who is God's natural Son. Thirdly, it was proper that man, who occupies a middle position between angels and beasts, in the scale of creatures, should be redeemed by the middle person in the trinity. Lastly, it was proper that the fallen nature of man who was created by the Word (John 1 : 3) should be restored by him. In addition to these reasons, it is evident that it is more fitting that a father should commission and send a son upon an errand of mercy, than that a son should commission and send a father.

2. Incarnation must be distinguished from transmutation, or transubstantiation. The phi'ase "became man'" does not mean that the second person in the trinity ceased to be God. This would be transubstantiation. One substance, the divine, would be changed or converted into another substance, the human ; as, in the Papal theory, the substance of the bi"ead becomes the substance of Christ's body. See Anselm ; Cur deus homo, II. vii.

In saying that " the Woi'd was made flesh " (John 1 : 14), it is meant that the Word came to possess human characteristics in addition to his divine, which still remained as before. The properties of the divine nature cannot be either destroyed or altered. A human nature was united

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 20?

with the divine, in order that the resulting person migb.t liave a liuman form of consciousness as well as a divine. Previous to the assumption of a human nature, the Logos could not experience a human feeling because he had no human heart, but after this assumption he could ; previous to the incarnation, he could not have a finite perception because he had no finite intellect, but after this event he could ; previous to the incarnation, the self -consciousness of the Logos was eternal only, that is, without succession, but subsequent to the incarnation it was both eternal and temporal, M'ith and without succession. This twofold consciousness may be illustrated by the union between the human soul and body. Prior to, or apart from its union with a material body, a man's immaterial soul cannot feel a physical sensation or a sensuous appetite ; but when united with it in a personal union, it can so feel. In like manner, prior to the incarnation, the second person of the Trinity could not have human sensations and experiences; but after it he could. The unincarnate Logos could think and feel only like God ; he had only one form of consciousness. The incarnate Logos can think and feel either like God, or like man ; he has two modes or forms of consciousness.

When, therefore, it is said that " God became man," the meaning is that God united himself with man, not that God changed himself into man. Unification of two natures, not transmutation of one nature into another is meant. We might say of the union of soul and body, in the instance of a human person, that " spirit becomes matter;" that is, is materialized or embodied. We would not mean by this phrase, that spirit is actually changed into matter, but tliat it is united with matter in that intimate manner which is denominated personal union. In the incarnation, God is humanized, as in ordinary human generation, spirit is materialized or embodied. Each substance, however, still retains its own properties. In an ordinary' man, spirit re268 CHRISTOLOGY.

mains immaterial, and body remains material ; and in tlie God-man, the divine nature remains divine in its properties, and the human remains human.

3. The distinctive characteristic of the incarnation is the union of two diverse natures, a divine and a human, so as to constitute one single person. A single person may consist of one nature, or of two natures, or of three. A Irinitarian person has only one nature : namely, the divine essence. A human person has two natures : namely, a material body, and an immaterial soul. A theanthropic person has three natures : namely, tlie divine essence, a human soul, and a human body. By the incarnation, not a God, not a man, but a God-man is constituted. A theanthropic person is a trinitarian person modified by union with a human nature, similarly as a trinitarian person is the Divine essence modified by generation, or spiration. A theanthropic person is constituted, consequently, in the same general manner in which an ordinary human person is : namely, by the union of diverse natures. In the case of a human individual, it is the combination of one material nature and one immaterial that makes him a person. Says Howe (Oracles, II. xxxvii.), " the production of a human creature [individual] doth not lie in the production of either of the parts, but only in the uniting of them substantially with one another. It neither lies in the production of the soul, nor doth it lie in the production of the matter of the body ; but it lies in the beginning of these into a substantial union with one another." Says Hooker (V. liv.), " the incarnation of the Son of God consisteth merely in the union of natures, which union doth add perfection to the weaker, to the nobler no alteration at all." The divine-human person, Jesus Christ, was produced by the union of the divine nature of the Logos with a human nature derived from a human mother. Before this union was accomplished, there was no theanthropic person. There was the divine person of the Logos existing in the Trinity

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 269

before this union, and there was the nnindividualized substance of Christ's human nature existing in the virgin Mary before this union ; but until the two were united at the instant of the miraculous conception, there was no God-man. The trinitarian personality of the Son of God did not begin at the incarnation, but the theanthroj}ic personality of Jesus

Christ did.

4. It is the divine nature, and not the human, which is the base of Christ's person. The second trinitarian person is the root and stock into which the human nature is grafted. The wild olive is grafted into the good olive, and partakes of its root and fatness.

The eternal Son, or the Word, is personal per se. He is from everlasting to everlasting conscious of himself as distinct from the Father, and from the Holy Spirit. He did not acquire personality by union with a human nature. The incarnation was not necessary in order that the trinitarian Son of God might be self-conscious. On the contrary, the human nature which he assumed to liimself acquired personality by its union with him. By becoming a constituent factor in the one theanthropic person of Christ, the previously impersonal human nature, " the seed of the woman," was personalized. If the Logos had obtained personality by uniting with a human nature, he nmst have previously been impersonal. The incarnation would then have made an essential change in the Logos, and thereby in the Trniity itself. But no essential change can be introduced into the triune Godhead, even by so renuirkable an • act as the incarnation.

{a) If the human nature and not the divine had been the root and base of Christ's person, he would have been a man-God and not a God-man. The complex person, Jesus Christ, would have been anthropotheistic, not theanthropic. This was the error of Paul of Samosata, Photinus, and Marcellus; according to whom, Christ was an dv^pcaTro^ eV^eo?, a deified man : the base of the complex person being

270 CHRISTOLOGY.

the linman nature. Christ is humanized deity, not deified humanity.

(J) Tliat the personality of the God-man depends primarily upon the divine nature, and not upon the human, is also evinced by the fact that this complex theanthropic personality was not destroyed by the death of Christ. At the crucifixion, the union between the human soul and the human body was dissolved temporarily, but the union between the Logos and the human soul and body was not. Christ's human soul and body were separated from each other during the " three days and three nights," in which he " lay in the heart of the earth." This was death. The humanity of Christ was thus dislocated for a time, and its complete personality was interrupted. For a soul wdthout its body is not a full and entire human person, although it is the root and the base of the person. Between death and the resurrection, when the human soul and body are separated, although there is self -consciousness in the disembodied spirit, and so the most important element in personality, yet there is an incomplete human personality until the resurrection of the body restores the original union between soul and body.

But there was no such interruption and temporary dissolution of the unity of Christ's theanthro])iG personality, caused . by the crucifixion. The divine nature was of course unaffected by the bodily dissolution ; and although the huTTiau soul and body were separated from one another by the crucifixion, they were neither of them separated from the Logos^ by this event. Between Christ's death and resurrection, both the human soul and the human body were still united with the Logos. That the body was still united to the Logos, is evinced by the fact that it " did not see corruption," Acts 2 : 31. " The divine and the human natures," says Hooker (T. 53), '^frora the moment of their first combination, have been and are forever inseparable. For even when Christ's human soul forsook the tabernacle

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 271

of his body, liis deity forsook neither body nor soul. If it had, then could we not truly hold, either that i\\e j)erson of Christ was buried, or that the 2)ersoii of Christ did raise up himself from the dead. For the body separated from the "Word can in no true sense be termed the person of Christ ; nor is it ti'ue to say, that the Son of God in raisin^ up that body did raise up himself, if the body were not both with him, and of him, even during the time it lay in the sepulchre. The like is also to be said of the soul ; otherwise we are plainly and inevitably ]^estorians. The very person of Christ, therefore, forever one and the selfsame, was only touching bodily substance concluded within the grave, his soul only from thence severed ; but by personal union his deity still inseparably joined with both." Turrettin (XIII. vi. 9) makes the same statement : "Naturalis unio animae et corporis in unam naturam humanam est separabilis, quae soluta fuit morte Christi; personalis unio duarum naturarum, divinae et humanae, in unam personam est inseparabilis, quia quod semel yloyo? assumpsit nunquam deposuit." Owen also affirms (Holy Spirit, II. iii.) that the theanthropic personality of Christ " was necessary and indissoluble, so that it was not impeached, nor shaken in the least, by the temporary dissolution of the humanity by the separation of the soul and body. For the union of the soul and body in Christ did not constitute him a [theanthropic] person, so that the dissolution of them should destroy his [theanthropic] personality ; but he was a [theanthropic] person by the uniting of both into the Son of God,"' Compare Belgic Confession, Art. 19.

The unification, then, of the three factors, the Logos, the human soul, and the human body, Avhich was effected in the miraculous conception, and which continued through

> lu a similar manner, the body and soul of a believer, though separated from each other between death and the resurrection, are both as truly united to Christ during this disembodied period as they were before it. Westminster L. C, 86. But in this case the union is mystical, not theanthropic.

272 CHRISTOLOGY.

the whole earthly life of our Lord, was not interrupted by the crucifixion. The God-raan existed between the crucifixion and the resurrection, notwithstanding the separation between the human soul and body, as truly as he did before, or as he does this instant. And this, because it was the immutable divinity, and not the mutable humanity, which constitutes the foundation of his personality.

(c) That the divinity and not the humanity is dominant and controlling in Christ's person, is proved by the fact that his acts of power were regulated by it. If the Logos so determined, Jesus Christ was powerless ; and if the Logos so determined, Jesus Christ was all-powerful. When the divine nature withdrew its support from the human, the latter was as helpless as it is in an ordinary human creature. And when the divine nature imparted its power, the liuman nature became " mighty in word and deed." ' When the Logos so pleased, Jesus of Nazareth could no more be taken by human hands and nailed to the cross, than the eternal Trinity could be ; and when the Logos so pleased, he could be arrested without any resistance, and be led like a lamb to the slaughter. This is taught repeatedly in the Gospels, when it is related that no man could lay violent hands upon him, " because his hour had not come." Jesus Christ, the Son of Mary, speaking generally, had so much power, and only so much, as the divine nature in his complex person pleased to exert in him. Sometimes, consequently, he was almighty in his acts, and sometimes he was " a worm, and no man," Ps. 22 : 6.

{d) Again, the knowledge of the God-man depended upon the divine nature for its amount, and this proves that the divinity is dominant in his person. The human mind of Jesus Christ stood in a somewhat similar relation

' It did not become strictly omnipotent, according to the Later-Lutheran doctrine, for this would be, in so far, the conversion of the human nature into the divine. But it became powerful enough to do anything which the Logos willed it to do.

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 2Y3

to the Logos, that the mind of a prophet does to God. Tliongh not the same in all respects, because the Logos and the human mind in the instance of Jesns Christ constitute one person, while the Holy Spirit and the inspired prophet are two persons, vet in respect to the point of dependence for knowledge, there is an exact similarity. As the prophet Isaiah could know no more of the secret things of God than it pleased the Holy Spirit to disclose to him, so the human mind of Christ could know no more of these same divine secrets than the illumination of the Logos made known. And this illumination, like that of the material sun, was dimmed by the cloud through which it was compelled to penetrate. The finite and limited human nature hindered a full manifestation of the omniscience of the deity. This was a part of the humiliation of the eternal Logos. He condescended to unite himself with an inferior nature, through which his own infinite perfectionscould shine only in part. When deity does not work assimple deity untrammelled, but works in " the form of a servant," it is humbled. The Logos in himself knew the time of the day of judgment, but he did not at a particular moment make that knowledge a part of the human consciousness of Jesus Christ. In so doing, he limited and conditioned his own mamfestation of knowledge in the theanthropic person, by the ignorance of the human nature. The same is true respecting the retention of knowledo-e. Though the Logos himself cannot forget anyuLiing, yet he might permit the human nature to forget many things for a season, and afterwards bring them to remembrance. The Gospels, however, mention no instance of Christ's ignorance excepting that respecting the day of judgment : supposing this to be an instance of ignorance. See note on p. 276.

The difficult subject of the ignorance of Christ, and his growth in wisdom and knowledge, has light thrown upon it, by distinguishing between the existence of the Logos in Vol. il.— 18

274 CHRISTOLOGY.

Christ's person, and the manifestation of this existence. This is the key to the doctrine of the kenosis. The Logos constantly existed in Jesus Christ, but did not constantly act through his human soul and body. He did not work miracles continually ; nor did he impart to the human soul of Christ the whole of his own infinite knowledge.

Compare the infancy of Jesus Christ with his manhood. When Christ lay in the manger at Bethlehem, the eternal Logos was the root and base of his person as nnich, and as really, as it was when he appeared at the age of thirty on the banks of the Jordan and was inaugurated to his office. Christ in the manger was called the messianic King, and was worshipped as such by the Magi. Even the theanthropic embryo {to yevvciofMevov) is denominated the " Son of God," Luke 1 : 35. In Ileber's In^mn, the " infant Redeemer " is styled " Maker, and Monarch, and Saviour of all." But the Logos, though present, could not properly and fittingly make such a inanifestation of knowledge through that infant body and infant soul, as he could through a child's body and a child's soul, and still more through a man's body and a man's soul. It would have been unnatural, if the Logos had empowered the infant Jesus to work a miracle, or deliver the sermon on the Mount. The repulsive and unnatural character of the apocryphal gospels, compared with the natural beauty of the canonical gospels, arises from attributing to the infant and the child Jesus acts that were befitting only a mature liumanity.

During all these infantile years of the immature and undeveloped human nature, the Logos, though present, was in eclipse in the person of Jesus Christ.' By this is meant,

' The term occultatio is used by Zanchius, Heidegger, Ursinus, and others, to denote the self-emptying [koMTtiv exeVoxre) of the Logos spoken of by St. Paui, in Phil. 2 : 7. The exinanition related to the use and manifestation of divine ■excellences, not to their possession. Traces of this are seen in Ambrose (Dc In■carnatione, I.), who employs the terms retentio and retraxit. Van Mastricht

THEAI^THROPIC PERSON. 275

that the Logos made no manifestation of his power through the hninar. nature he had assumed, because this human nature was still infantine. When the infant Jesus lay in the manger, the Logos was present and united with the human nature as really and completely as he is this instant, but he made no exhibition of himself. There was no more thinking going on in the infant human mind of Jesus, than in the case of any other infant. The babe lay in the manger unconscious and inactive. Yet the eternal Logos was personally united with this infant. There was a God-man in the manger as truly as there was upon the cross.

It will not follow, however, that because there was no thinking going on in the human mind of the infant Jesus, there was none going on in the Logos. For it must be remembered, that though the Logos has condescended to take " the form of a servant," he has not ceased to exist in " the form of God." "While he voluntarily submits to the limitations of human infancy, and will do no more in the sphere of the finite infant with the feeble instrument which he has condescended to employ than that instrument is fitted to perform, yet in the other infinite sphere of the Godhead he is still the same omniscient and omnipotent person that he always was. The Son of man M^as on earth and in heaven, at one and the same instant, John 3 : 13. Because the Logos was localized and limited by a human body on the earth, it does not follow that he did not continue to exist

uses subducere with occultare. Francis Junius says : " In humana natura, gloriam et majestatem apud homines non exercuerit Christus ut post resurrectionem et ascensionem, sed veluti represserit et occultam continuerit: vel (uti loquitur Irenaeus) quieverit, ut humana natura tentari et mori possit, quamvis interim divinae naturae quaedam vindicia ad fidei confirmationem prodierint." Theses Theologicae (De Humiliatione Christi). The words of Irenaeus are the following : "As Christ became man in order to undergo temptation, so also was he the Word that he might be glorified ; the Word remaining quiescent, that he might be capable of being tempted, dishonored, crucified, and suffering death." Adv. Haereses, III. six. Paraeus quotes this passage. Doctriuae Christianae, Quaest. xxxvii.

276 CHRISTOLOGY.

and act in heaven. And because tlie Logos did not think in and by the mind of the infant Jesus, it does not follow that he did not think in and bj his own infinite mind. The humanity of Jesus Christ, then, knew as much, and only as much as the Logos pleased to disclose and manifest throngii a human mind. Says Beza : " Ipsa ^eorijTo^ plenitudo sese, prout et quatenas ipsa libuit, humanitati assumtae insinuavit." Grotius, on Mark 13 : 32, says : " Videtur miiii, hie locus non impie posse exponi hunc in modum ; ut dicamus divinam sapientiam menti humanae Christi effectus suos impressisse pro temporum ratione." Says Tillotson : " It is not unreasonable to suppose that the Divine Wisdom, which dwelt in our Saviour, did communicate itself to his human soul according to his pleasure, and so his human nature might at some time not know some things." Christ's knowledge was, and ever is, dependent upon the amount of information vouchsafed by the deity in his person. He did not know the time of the day oi judgment, "quia Yerbum hoc illi non releverat,'' says Turrettin, XIII. xiii. 5.' He could therefore " increase in wisdom " (Luke 2 : 52) as a child and a youth, because from the unfathomable and infinite fountain of the divine nature of the Logos there was inflowing into the human imderstanding united with it a steady and increasing stream. But that infinite fountain was never emptied. The human nature is not sufficiently capacious to contain the whole fulness of God.

The ignorance of Jesus Christ may still further be illus» Bengel, on Mark 13 : 33, adopts the explanation favored by Augustine. "Christ's words may be understood to mean, that he does not know the time of the judgment day, because it was not among his instructions from the Father to declare the time. An apostle was able both to know and not to know one and the same thing, according to the different point of view ('I know that I shall abide,' Phil. 1 : 25) : how much more Christ ? " In 1 Cor. 3 : 2, to " know " means to "make known :" "I determined not to know anything among you but Christ, and him crucified." The same is the meaning of " know," in Gen. 22 -.12: "Now I know that thou fcarest God. seeing thoi hast not withheld thy son from me." God had made Abraham's faith to be known, by this trial

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 277

trated by the forgetfulness of an ordinary man. Xo man, at each and every instant, holds in immediate consciousness all that he has ever been conscious of in the past. He is relatively ignorant of much which he has previously known and experienced. But this forgetting is not absolute and total ignorance. This part of his consciousness may reappear here upon earth ; and will all of it re-appear in the day of judgment. But he cannot recall it just at this instant. He is ignorant, and must say : " I do not know." Similarly, if we suppose that Christ when he spoke these words to his disciples was ignorant of the time of the judgment, he may subsequently have come to know it as his human nature increased in knowledge through the illumination of the Divine. Says Bengel, " The stress in Matt. 24 : 36 is on the present tense, ' No man hnoioeth,'' In those days, no man did know, not even the Son. But afterwards he^knew it, for he revealed it in the Apocalypse." Christ was relatively ignorant, not absolutely, if he was destined subsequently to know the time of the judgment day. It is more probable that the glorified human mind of Christ on the mediatorial throne now knows the time of the day of judgment, than that it is ignorant of it.

The dawning of Christ's messianic consciousness, as seen in the incident of the youth in the temple with the doctors, illustrates the gradual illumination and instruction of the humanity by the divinity in his person. It is not necessary, in order to explain this occurrence, to suppose that the Virgin Mother had informed Jesus respecting his miraculous conception. On the contrary, as she did not feel authorized to inform her husband of the fact but left its disclosure to God, so neither did she feel authorized to inform her child of it. Christ's self-consciousness of his theanthropic person and mediatorial office was formed gradually, as he passed from youth to manhood, by the increasing illumination of the humanity by the divinity, similarly as in an ordinary human person, the self-con278 CHRISTOLOGY.

sciousness gradually forms and increases Lj the interpenetration of the lower sensuous nature by the higher rational.

(e) That the divinity is the dominant factor in Christ's complex person, is proved by the fact that the degree of his happiness was determined by it. The human nature had no more enjoyment than the divine permitted. The desertion of the humanity by the divinity is implied in the cry : " My God, why hast thou forsaken me ? " The Logos at this moment did not support and comfort the human soul and body of Jesus. This may be regarded equally as desertion by the Father or by the Logos, because of the unity of essence. Li the promise: "If ye shall ask anything [of the Father] in my name I Avill do it" (John 14 : 14), the official work of the first person is attributed to the second. As God the Father raised Christ from the dead, and Christ also raised himself from the dead, so also God the Father deserted the human nature, and God the Logos also deserted it.

(y) That the foundation of Christ's complex personality is the divine nature, is proved by his immutability. " Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, and to-day, and forever," Heb. 13:8. What has been said concerning the effect of the crucifixion upon the theanthropic personality will apply here. Christ is immutably the God-man, notwithstanding the temporary separation between his human soul and body.

5. The theanthropic personality of the Redeemer began in time. The God-man was a new person, as well as a unique one. There was no God-man until the moment when the incarnation began. This beginning is to be placed at the instant of the miraculous conception, and this at the instant of the salutation, when the angel Gabriel uttered the words : " Hail thou that art highly favored, the Lord is with thee ; blessed art thou among women," Luke 1 : 28. At this punctum temporis, the eternal Logos united

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 279

with a portion of human nature in the Virgin Mary, The union was embryonic in its first form. Previous to this instant, the only person existing was the second triuitarian person : the human nature existing in the Virgin Mary being yet nnpersonalized. This trinitarian person was not complex, but simple ; God the Son, but not God-man ; the nniucarnate Logos {A6>yo

6. Though beginning in time, the theanthropic personality of the Redeemer continues forever. This is taught in Rom. 9 : 5, '*' Of whom as concerning the flesh Christ came, who is over all God blessed forever ; " in Col. 2:9, " In him dwelleth [now and forever] all the fulness of the Godhead, bodily ; " in Heb. 13 : 8, "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever ; " in Eph. 2:6," Believers sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus ; " in Heb. 4 : 14, 15, " We have a great high priest who hath passed into the heavens."

7. The incarnation makes no change in the constitution of the Trinity. It leaves in the Godhead, as it finds in it, only three persons. For the additioTi of a human nature to the person of the Logos, is not the addition of another person to him. The second trinitarian person, though so much

280 CHRISTOLOGY.

modified by the incarnation as to become a God-man, is not so much modified as to lose his proper trinitarian personality, because incarnation is not tlie juxtaposition of a human person with a divine person, but the assumption of a human nature to a divine person. The incarnation produces a change in the humanity that is assumed, by exalting and glorifying it, but no change in the deity that assumes. " The divine nature," says Bull (De Subordinatione, IV. iv. 14), " flows through (immeat) the human nature, but the human nature does not flow through the divine." If the Logos had united himself with a distinct and separate individual, the modification of the Logos by incarnation would have been essential, and a fourth person, namely a human person, would have thereby entered into the Godhead ; which would have been an alteration in the constitution of the trinity, making it to consist of four persons instead of three. " We must consider," says Usher (Incarnation, Works, I. 580), "that the divine nature did not assume a human person, but the divine person did assume a human natui'e ; and that of the three divine persons, it was neither the first nor the third that did assume this nature, but it was the middle person who was to be the middle one [mediator] that must undertake the mediation between God and us. For if the fulness of the Godhead should have thus dwelt in any human person, there should have been added to the Godhead a fourth kind of person ; and if any of the three persons besides the second had been born of a woman, there should have been two Sons in the Trinity. Whereas, now, the Son of God and the Son of the Blessed Yirgin, being but one person, is consequently but one Son ; and so, no alteration at all made in the relations of the persons of the Trinity." See Hooker, y. liv.

The Logos, by his incarnation and exaltation, marvellous as it seems, took a human nature with him into the depths of the Godhead. A finite o-loi-ified human nature is now

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 281

etenuilly united with the second trinitarian person, and a God-niau is now the middle person of tlie Trinity.

" No Paean there, no Bacchic song they raise ; But the three Persons of the Trinity, And the two natures joined in one they praise."

Dante : Paradise xiii. 25-27.

Yet the Trinity itself is not altered or modified by the incarnation. Only the secoTid person is modified. The Trinity is not divine-human ; nor is the Father; nor is the Holy Spirit. But the Eternal Son is. For this reason, tlie Son stands in a nearer relation to redeemed man tlian either the Father or the Spirit can. Keither of them is the " elder brother " of the redeemed. iSTeither of them is the " liead " of which the church is the " body." Keither of them is the divine person of whom it can be said, "We are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones," Eph. 5 : 30. The union of the Logos with a human nature does not disturb either the trinitai'ian relation of the Logos, or his relation to the created universe. When the Logos consents to unite with a liumaii natui-e, he consents to exist and act in "the form of a servant." But, as previously remarked, this does not imply that he ceases to exist and act " in a form of God." Incarnation is not transubstantiation. Consequently, when incarnate, the Logos is capable of a twofold iriode of existence, of consciousness, and of agency. Possessing a divine nature, he can still exist and act as a divine being, and he so exists and acts within the sphere of the infinite and eternal Godhead without any limitation. Possessing a human nature, he can also exist and act as a human being, and he so exists and acts wdthin the sphere of finite and temporal humanity and under its limitations. The Son of man was in heaven, and upon eai'th simultaneously, John 3 : 13. In heaven he was in glory ; on earth he was in sorrow and death. The God-man is both unlimited and limited, illocal and local. He has consequently a two282 CHRISTOLOGY.

fold consciousness : infinite and finite. He tliinks like God ; and he thinks like man. He has the eternal, allcomprehending, and successionless consciousness of God ; and he has the imperfect, gradual, and sequacious consciousness of man. In this way, the trinitarian relations of the second person remain unchanged by his incarnation. The divine nature, though it condescends to exist and act in and through a human soul and body, and to be trammelled by it, at the same time is existing and acting in an untrammelled manner throughout the universe of finite being, and in the immensity of the Godhead.

Consider, for illustration, Christ's relations to space. He lived a double life in this reference, M-hen he lived in Palestine eighteen centuries ago. He subsisted in both forms — that of God, and that of a servant — at one and the same moment. He was simultaneously the absolute and eternal Spirit, unlocalized, filling immensity ; and he was also that same Spirit localized, dwelling in and confined to the soul and body of Jesus of Kazareth. Because the Logos voluntarily confined and limited himself to the latter, it does not follow that he could not also continue to be unconfined and unlimited God. Because the sun is shining in and through a cloud, it does not follow that it cannot at the same time be shining through the remainder of univei'sal space unobscured by aiiy vapor whatever. ^The omnipresence of the Logos is that of the infinite Spirit. Consequently he is all in every place, and at every point. He is all in the human soul and body of Jesus of Xazareth, and simultaneously he is all at every other point of space. His total presence in the man Christ Jesus did not prevent his total presence throughout the universe. He was therefore, both onniipresent, and locally present. Says Calvin (Institutes, II. xv), " although the infinite essence of the Logos is united in one person with the nature of man, yet we have no thought of its incarceration or confinement. For the Son of God mii'aculously descended from heaven, yet in such a

THEANTHROPIC P:^RSON. 283

inauner that he never left heaven : he chose to be miraculously conceived in the womb of the Virgin, to live on earth, and to be suspended on the cross ; and jet he never ceased to fill the universe in the same manner as from the beginning." " Who will say," says Paraeus (Upon llunnius, XXI.), " that the deity of the Word was only where his body was, say, in the mother's womb, in the temple, on the cross, in the sepulchre, and was absent in other places where his body was not ? Who will say that he did not fill heaven and earth ; that he was not at Rome, at Athens, and everywhere outside of Judea, at the same time when his body was within the limits of Judea alone ? " " The Word of God," says Augustine (Letter 137, To Volusianus), " did so assume a body from the Virgin, and manifest himself with mortal senses, as neither to destroy his own immortality, nor to change his eternity, nor to diminish his power, nor to relinquish the government of the world, nor to withdraw from the bosom of the Father, that is from the secret place where he is with him and in him." Says Aquinas (III. V. 2), " Christus dicitur de coelo descend isse ratione divinae naturae, non ita quod natura divina in coelo desierit ; sed quia in infimis novo modo coepit, scilicet secundum naturam assumptam."

As the inspiration of a prophet by the Holy Spirit, or his indwelling in a believer, does not interfere with the trinitarian relations of the third person, so neither does the incarnation interfere with those of the second. The Holy Spirit makes intercessions that cannot be uttered, and thereby unites himself to a certain degree to a particular man, but is still the same distinct person in the trinitv. Moreover, this intercession of the Holy Ghost in the soul of the believer does not disturb or prevent the single selfconsciousness of the believer. Here are two distinct persons, confessedly, and yet only one self-consciousness in the believer. But if a single self-consciousness is not dualized and destroyed in the instance when the Divine nature and

284 CHRISTOLOGY.

tlie Imman, the Holy Ghost and the believer, do not constitute a God-man, still less need it be when they do. The two different modes or forms of consciousness, the divine and the human, in the God-man, do not constitute two selfconsciousnesses, or two persons, any more than two or more different forms of consciousness in a man constitute two or more self -consciousnesses or persons. A man at one moment has a sensuous form of consciousness, and at another moment a spiritual form ; but he is one and the same person in both instances, and has but a single self-consciousness.

S. In the incarnation, the Logos does not unite himself with a human iierson^ but wuth a human nature. This is taught in Scripture. Heb. 2 : 16, Christ " took upon him the seed {crirepixa) of Abraham." Rom. 1 : 3, Christ " was made of the seed of David." In the first promise (Gen. 3 : 15), the Redeemer is denominated the "seed of the woman." Heb. 2 : 1-1, " Forasmuch as the children were partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same."

The terms " seed," "flesh and blood," imply that the humanity wliich the Logos laid hold upon, and assumed into personal union with himself, was not yet personalized. At the instant when it was assumed, it was human nature unindividualized, not a distinct individual person. This is the interpretation of the Scripture statement which is found in the symbols generally. More particular attention was turned to the distinction between a nature and a person by the Kestorian controversy, and ever since that time the creeds have been careful to state that tlie Logos united a human nature with himself, but not a human person.

The orthodox statenieiit in the Patristic church is made in the following extract from John of Damascus (De Orthodoxa Fide, III. ii.) : " The Logos was not united with a flesh which previously existed by itself as an individual man, but, in and by his own infinite person dwelling in the womb

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 285

of the holy Virgin, lie personalized {vTreaTTjadro) of the chaste blood of the Ever- Virgin a flesh enlivened with a rational and intellectual soul ; the Logos thereby assuming the first-fruits of the human lump, and becoming a [divine] person in the flesh."

The Westminster Confession (VIII. ii.) accords with the Ancient, Mediaeval, and Reformed Christology, in its statement that " the Son of God, the second person in the Trinity, did take upon him man's nature with all the essential properties thereof ; so that the two whole perfect and distinct natures, the Godhead [Godhood] and the manhood, were inseparably joined together in one person." The Athanasian symbol (29) denominates Christ "homo ex suhstantia matris in saeculo natus." In the theological nomenclature, " nature " is designated by " substance," and person by " subsistence."

Hooker (V. lii.) enunciates the doctrine in the following language : " The Son of God did not assume a man's person into his own person, but a man's nature to his own person ; and thei'efore he took semen, the seed of Abraham, the very first original element of our nature before it w^as come to have any personal human subsistence." In similar terms, Owen (Holy Spirit, II. iii.) expresses himself. He remarks that the Son of God took the nature formed and prepared for him in the womb of the Virgin, by the operation of the Holy Ghost, " to be his own, in the instant of its formation, thereby preventing [going before] the singular [single] and individual subsistence of that nature in and by itself." Again (ut supra) he says, that " as it is probable that the miraculous conception was immediate upon the angelical salutation, so it w\as necessary that nothing of the human nature of Christ should exist of itself antecedently unto its union with the Son of God." By the phrase " exist of itself," Owen here means " exist by itself " as constituted and formed into a distinct and separate individual jjerson. That the human nature as bare nature existed an286 CHRISTOLOGY.

tecedentlj to its nnioii witli the Logos, Owen abniidaiitly teaches in all that he says of the work of the Holv Ghost in preparing and forming the human nature as it existed in the Virgin motlier. In another passage (Trinity Vindicated), Owen is still more explicit. "The person of the Son of God, in his assuming human nature to be his own, did not take an individual person of any one into a near conjunction with himself, but preventing the personal subsistence of human nature in that flesh which he assumed, he gave it its subsistence (i.e. its personality) in his own person, whence it hath its individuation, and distinction from all other persons whatever. This is the personal union." Again, Owen (Vindiciae, XIX.) says: "Jesus Christ the Mediator, ^edv^pwiro^, God and man, the Son of God, having assumed a'^iov to yevvcofzevov, Luke 1 : 35, that holy thing that was born of the Virgin, avvTroa-rarov, having no subsistence of its own, into personal subsistence with himself, is to be worshipped with divine religious worsliip, even as the Father." See Owen : Person of Christ, Ch. XVIII. Says Charnocke (Wisdom of God), " Christ did not take the person of man, but the nature of man into subsistence with himself. The body and soul of Christ were not united in themselves, had no [personal] subsistence in themselves, till they were united to the [trinitarian] person of the Son of God. If the person of a man were united to him, the human nature w^ould have been the nature of the person so united to him, and not the [human] nature of the Son of God, according to Lleb. 2 : 14, 16. The [trinitarian] Son of God took ' flesh and blood ' to be his own [human] nature, perpetually to subsist in the person of the Logos ; which must be by a personal union, or no way: the deity united to the humanity, and both natures to be one person."

Turrettin (XTII. vi. 18) says: "Although the human nature of Christ is a spiritual and intelligent substance, and perfect in respect to the existence and properties of

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 287

such a substance, jet it is not at first (statim) a person ; ' because it has not that peculiar incommunicable property which constitutes a subsistence as distinguished from a substance [or a person as distinguished from a nature]. Just as soul (anima) taken by itself is a particular intelligent substance, jet not a person, because it is an incomplete part of a greater whole. It requires to be joined to a body, before there can be an individual man. It does not derogate from the reality and perfection of Christ's human nature to say that before it was assumed into union with the Logos it was destitute of personality', because we measure the reality and dignity of a human nature by the essential properties of the nature, and not by the characteristic of individuality subsequently added to it. These essential properties belong to it by creation, but the individual form is superinduced after creation by generation. The definition of substance or nature, consequently differs from the definition of subsistence or person. Personality is not an integral and essential part of a nature, but is, as it were, the terminus to which it tends ° (nee pars integralis nee essentialis naturae, sed quasi terminus) ; and Christ's human nature acquired a more exalted and perfect personality by subsisting in the Logos, than it M^ould had it acquired personality by ordinary generation." Similarh', Quenstedt (Hase : Ilutterus, p. 233) asserts that " subsistentia non ad essentiara hominis pertinet, sed ad terminationem huraanitatis." He also remarks (Hase : Ilutterus, p. 232) " non enim persona (alioquin duae essent in Christo personae), sed natura humana, propria personalitate destituta, assumpta est." Calovius teaches that Christ as man was " natus e massa seminali ; " Hollaz says, " e semine animate ; " Baier says, " e massa sanguinea virginis."

' It is noticeable that in this place Turrettin describes Christ's " human nature," while existhig in the Virgin Mother^ as a "spiritual" and "intelligent" substance, and not as merely physical. This is inconsistent with the creationist view, adopted by Turrettin.

2 This agrees with Aristotle's, " materia appetit formam."

288 , . CHRISTOLOGY.

An American tlieologian, Samuel Hopkins, I. 283, adopts the catholic Cliristology. " The personality of Jesus Christ is in his divine nature, and not in the human. Jesus Christ existed a distinct, divine person from eternity, the second person in the adorable trinity. The human nature which tliis divine person, the Word, assumed into a personal union with himself is not and never was a distinct person by itself, and personality cannot be ascribed to it, and does not belong to it, any otherwise than as united to the Logos, the Word of God. The Word assumed the human nature, not a human person, into a personal union with himself, by which the complex person exists, God-man. Hence, when Jesus Christ is spoken of as being a man, ' the Son of man, the man Christ Jesus,' etc., these terms do not express the personality of the manhood, or of the human nature of Jesus Christ; but these personal terms are used with respect to the human natui-e as united to a divine person, and not as a mere man [i.e. as merely human nature]. For the personal terms, He, I, and Thou, cannot with propriety or truth be used by, or of, the human nature considered as distinct from the divine nature of Jesus Christ." *

In a similar manner, Hodge explains the subject. After remarking (Theology, H. 391) that " though realism may not be a correct philosophy, the fact of its wide and longcontinued prevalence may be taken as a proof that it does not involve any palpable contradiction," he proceeds to make use of realism, in the statement that " human nature although endowed with intelligence and will may be, and in fact is, in the person of Christ, impersonal.^ That it is

1 The human nature of Christ, viewed by itself, and prior to the union with the Logos, must be designated by the impersonal pronoun, " It." We could not call it " He ; " nor could we address it as " Thou." In Luke 1 : 35, the neuter is employed : rh yevi'dnevov, "that holy thing which shall be born ; " or rather, " which is being conceived."

* The more accurate statement would be, that the human nature in the Virpin Mother, antecedent to the assumption of it by the Logos, is impersonal. Strictly speaking, the human nature when once " in the person of Christ" is

THBANTHROPIC PERSON. 289

SO, is the plain doctrine of Scripture, for the Son of God, a divine person, assumed a perfect human nature, and nevertheless remains one person,"

Van Mastricht (Tlieologia, V. iv, 7) defines tlie hjpostatical union as, " ineffabilis quaedam relatio divinae personae ad humanam naturam per quam haec liumana natura peculiariter est humana natura secundae personae deitatis." Wollebius (I. xvi.) sajs that " Christ assumed not man, but the liuinaiiitj ; not the person, but the nature." Jolin Bunvan (On Imputed Tlighteousness) says that " the Son of God took not upon liim a particular person, though he took to him a human body and soul ; but that which he took was, as I may call it, a lump of the common nature of man. ' For verily he took not on him the nature of angels, but he took on him the seed of Abraham.' " '

Since much depends in Christology upon the important distinction between "nature" and "person," or "substance" and " subsistence," we shall enlarge somewhat upon it.

When we speak of a human nature, a real siibstance having physical, rational, moral, and spiritual j>ropcrtles is meant. This human nature, or substance, is cai)able of becoming a human person, but as yet is not one. It requires

no longer impersonal, because it has been personalized by the vmion. As Owen Bays, the Logos " gave it its subsistence in his own person, whence it hath its individuation, and distinction from all other persons whatever."

' Dorner (Christian Doctrine, § 93) objects to " the anhypostania, or impersonality of the human nature," and asserts that "it has passed into no creed, and is only to a moderate extent the doctrine of theologians." The extracts given above disprove the latter assertion. Dorner's objection to the tenet is, that " if a divine ego is supposed to take the place of the human, there is an abridgment of the humanity, according to its complete idea — a more subtle kind of Apollinarism." But the divine ego does not take the place of the human ego, for the reason that there is no human ego. There is, at the moment of the assumption, only the seed, or unindividualized substance of the Virgin. Dorner assumes that a human nature without a human individuality is "abridged" and incomplete humanity. But all the essential 2''i'oprrties of humanity are in this nature. Only it has not been constituted a particular person, by conception in the womb. This personalizing, which in the case of Christ's hiiraanity is produced miraculously by its union with deity, adds no new properties to the human nature. It only gives it a new form. Vol. II.— 19

290 CHRISTOLOdY.

to be personalized, in order to be a self-conscious individual jTian. A human person is a fractional part of a specific human nature or substance which has been sejyarated from the common mass, and formed into a distinct and separate individual, by the process of generation. Prior to tliis separation and formation, this fractional portion of the common human nature has all the qualities of the common mass of which it is a part, but it is not yet individualized. It is potentially, not actually personal. It has all the properties that subsequently appear in the particular individual formed of it, such as spirituality, rationality, voluntariness — viewing the nature upon the psychical side of it — and sensuonsness with general adaptation to a visible and material world — viewing the nature upon the physical side.'

Accordingl}', the Westminster Confession (YIII. ii.) affirms that " the second person in the trinity did take upon him man's nature with all the essential jproj)eHles thereof." It does not say, with the individual form thereof. The fact that the nature has all the properties of man, though it has not as yet the form of an individual man, is sufficient to make it human nature. A brute's nature does not have all the properties of human nature ; and neither does an angel's nature. Therefore, the Logos " took not upon him the nature of angels, but he took on him the seed (airepfxa) of Abraham," Ileb. 2 : 16.

Saint Paul's figure of the potter's clay, ami the vessels to be shaped from it, may be employed in illustration. A lump of clay has all the properties of matter that belong to the vessel of honor or dishonor. But it has not as yet the individual form of the vessel. An act of the potter must intervene, whereby a piece of clay is separated from the lump and moulded into a particular vase having its own peculiar shape and figure. In like manner, human nature as an entire whole existing in Adam possessed all the ele• This description is traducian. The creationist concedes only one side to the nature, namely the sensuous ; and finds only physical properties.

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 291

mentary properties that are requisite to personality, thougli it was not yet personalized. And in like manner, 2ii\y portion of this entire human nature, when transmitted from Adam and existing in nearer or remote ancestors, is also possessed of all the properties requisite to personalit\^, thougli it is not yet, in Owen's phrase, "individuated," or transformed from a nature to a pei'son. The difference, then, between nature and person is virtually that between suhstanGe and/brw. As a material substance may exist without being shaped in a particular manner, so a human nature may exist without being individualized. See Anthropology, pp. 71 sq.

Thus it appears, that although a human nature is not actually personal, that is, a distinct person, it is nevertheless potentially personal ; that is, it is capable of becoming a separate self-conscious individual man. Every individual of Adam's posterity has precisely the same properties or qualities in his person, that there are in the specific nature of which he is a part and portion. He is physical, rational, intelligent, and voluntary, only because the human nature out of which he is formed is a physical, rational, intelligent, and voluntary substance created by God on the sixth day when he created the species man. It is the projjerties of a substance that make it what it is, not the particular individual form which it may assume. As Turrettin says, in the extract previously quoted, " We measure the reality and dignity of a human nature by the essential properties of the nature, not l)y the characteristic of individuality snbsequen*tly added to it. Personality is not an integral and necessary part of a nature, but, as it were, the terminus to which it tends."

It is evident, then, from this discussion, tliat the term "nature" is a more impersonal term than the term "person." A human nature, though not absolutely impersonal, like a brute-nature, or like inorganic matter, is yet less personal than a human person. This may be illustrated by consid292 CHRISTOLOGY.

ering the divine nature, and the trinitarian persons. In the discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity, we liave seen that if we abstract from the divine essence its trinalitj, we have nothing left bnt the impersonal substance of pantheism, or the unreflecting unit of deism. It is only when the divine nature is contemplated, as it is in Scripture, as " subsisting,'' or " modified," or, if we may so speak, metamorphosed in the eternal Three, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, that we have full and clear personality. This is what is meant in Phil, 2 '. 6 by i^opjirj SeoO. This is not the same in every respect with ovaia S^eov or (f)vcn<; SeoO. It is a personal " form " of the ovcrta or (pvai'i Seov. God is self-conscious, self-knowing, and self-communing, in other words is personal, because he subsists in tiiree individual distinctions. As an untrinalized nature merely and only, he is the impersonal unit of deism or pantheism ; but as a nature in three persons, or a nature personalised by trinality, he is a unity: the self-conscious and "living" God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The eternal trinitarian processes of generation and spiration personalize the divine nature, as ordinary generation analogously individualizes the human nature. The one human nature, or species, is personalized gradually in time by division into millions of human individuals ; and the one divine nature is personalized simultaneously in eternity by subsisting indivisibly and wholly in three divine hypostases. If the human nature were never individualized by ordinary generation ; if it remained a mere nature in Adam ; though it would be human nature still, and not brutal nature or inorganic matter, yet it would be impersonal for our minds. It would have no history, and none of the interest and impression of individuality. And if the divine nature had no trinality in it ; if there were no Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but only the one substance of pantheism or deism ; the deity would present no personal characteristics appealing to man's personal feeliugs and wants.

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 293

To apply all this to the subject of Christ's theanthropic person : we say, that iu the act of incarnation, the Logos, who is already a conscious trinitarian person, takes into personal union with himself a human nature — what the Scripture denominates the " seed of David," the " seed of Abraham," the " seed of a woman," the " flesh and blood," of man. This human nature previous to this assumption is not a person (" for the personal being which the Son of God already had, suffered not the substance which he took to be a person," says Hooker), yet it is capable of being personalized, and becoming an individual man. It is actually personalized, and made to have an individual life and liistory, by being miraculously quickened, formed, and sanctified by the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mother, and assumed by the eternal Logos into union with himself. Hence Athanasius (Contra Arianos, HI. li.) defines Christ as " a man impersonated into God ; " and describes Christ's human body and soul as an instrument which the Logos appropriates personally {opjavov evvTroaTarov I'SiOTrotrjcrd). AVitsius: Creed, Dissertation XYL The human nature thus becomes an integrant constituent of one complex person, the God-man, Jesus Christ. In the phraseology of Owen (Person of Christ, XVIII.) " assumption is unto [in order to] personality ; it is that act whereby the Son of God and our nature become one person.'' Francis Junius (Theses Theologicae, XXVII.) similarly remarks : " Xatura humana, prius dvvTroararo'i, in unitatem personae assumpta est a Aoyo) et facta ivvTroa-Taro'^.'''' Aquinas (III. ii. 2) contends that the human nature of Christ, by being personalized through assumption into union with a trinitarian person, obtained a more exalted personality in this way than it would have obtained by being personalized by ordinary generation ; just as the animal soul, when personalized by its union with a rational soul, in the case of a man, is more excellent than when, as in the case of a dog, or any mei'e animal, it is not personalized at all by union with a rational soul.

294 CHRISTOLOGY.

Still another point of difference between a " nature " and a " person " is the fact that a nature cannot be distinguished from another nature, but a person can be from another person. One fractional portion of human substance has no marks by which it can be discriminated from another portion. It is not until it has been individualized by generation, that it has a personal peculiarity of its own that differentiates it. When human " flesh and blood " has acquired personal characteristics, it can then be distinguished from the parents, and from the species. " Human nature," says Owen (Person of Christ, XVIII.), " in itself is dvv7r6aTaTo

In the case of an ordinary human person, the body or the material nature is personalized by the soul or the spiritual nature within it. The body as a mere corpse, and separate from the soul, is impersonal. Similarly, the human nature of Christ considered as the substance of the Virgin is personalized by the Logos uniting with it. " Humana natura, ut Damascenus dicit, habet suam personalitatem in Christo." Aquinas : Summa, III. ii. 3. Viewed merely as the substance, the " blood " and " seed " of the Virgin prior to its assumption, it was impersonal. It could not be distinguished as the particular individual man Jesus of Nazareth, until the miraculous conception had individualized it. As the mere " substance " and " seed " of the Virgin, it had nothing to distinguish it from the "substance" and "seed" of any other woman; or from other " substance " of Mary herself, who could have conceived still other sons by ordinary generation.

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 295

9. In the incarnation, the Logos did not unite himself with the whole human nature, but with only a 2)art of it. The term " human nature " may signify tlie entire human species as it existed in Adam, or only a pai't of it as it exists in near or remote ancestors. In the first case, it is the human nature ; in the second, it is a human nature. The proper stateuient is, that the Logos united himself with a human nature, not with the human nature. Whenever there is any conception of human nature, either ordinary or miraculous, there is abscission of substance. Turrettin (XIII. xi. 10) speaks of Christ's humanity as " materiam ex beatissimi Yii-ginis substantia decisam." The union between God and man, in the incarnation, is not a union with the human species as an entirety. At the time of the incarnation of the Logos, the human nature considered as an entire whole had been in the process of generation and individualization for four thousand years, and millions of separate and distinct individuals had been formed out of it. The Logos did not unite himself with this already propagated part of the human nature or species. Neither did he unite with that whole remainder of the common nature which had not yet been individualized by generation. This latter was latent and unindividualized, in the population existing at the time of the incarnation. The Logos united with only a fraction of this remainder ; namely with that particular portion of human nature which he assumed from the virgin mother. The Eternal Word took into a personal union with himself, not the whole human nature both distributed and undistributed, individualized, and unindividualized, but only a transmitted fractional part of the undistributed remainder of it, as this existed in the Virgin Mary.*

' It is at this point that the strongest objection to the traducian theory arises. How can unextended substance be subdivided ? How can that have parts which has none of the geometrical dimensions ? See Anthropology, pp. 83 sq.

296 CHRISTOLOGY.

That theory of universal redemption which rests upon the hypothesis of a union of the Logos with the whole human species finds no support in Scripture, and we may add in reason or the nature of the case. The humanity of Christ was not a specific whole, but only a part of a specific whole. " Dicenduni quod Verbum Dei non assumpsit humanain naturam in universali sed in atonio, id est, in individuo, sicut Darnascenus ait, Orthod. Fid., III. vii. ; alioqnin oporteret quod cuilibet homini conveniret esse Dei Verbum, sicut convenit Christo." Aquinas: Summa: III. ii. 2.

10. The human nature assumed into union with the Logos was miraculously sanctified, so as to be sinless and perfect. John 1 : li, " The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us full of grace and truth." John 3 : 34, "God giveth not the Spirit by measure unto him." Is. 11 : 2, " The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon liim, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of council and might, the spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord." Ileb. 4: 15, " Christ was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." ' Ileb. 7 : 26, " Such an high priest became us, who is holy, hai'mless, undefiled, separate from sinners." Luke 1 : 35, " That holy thing which shall be born " : literally, " which is being conceived " {to yevvco/jievov). Isa. 7 : 14, 15, " Butter and honey shall Immanuel eat, that he may know to refuse the evil and choose the good." Ileb. 10 : 5, " A body hast tliou prepared for me." Matt, 3 : 17, '' This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased." 1 John 3:5, " In him is no sin."

In accordance with these texts, the symbols afiirm the perfect sanctitication of the human nature, in and by the incarnation. The Westminster Larger Catechism, Q. 37, teaches that " the Son of God became man by being con' In this passage, x'^pls auaprlas qualifies TreTreipatr/uf rpv : showing that all of Christ's temptations were sinless. He was not "tempted and drawn away by inward lust," James 1 : 14.

THEANTHBOPIC PERSON. 297

ceived by the power of the Holy Ghost in tlie womb of the Virgin Marj^, of her substance, and born of her, yet without sin." The Formula Coneordiae (De peccato originis, Hase, 574), after saying that the Son of God assumed the " seed of Abraham," adds: "eaudanihumanam nostram naturam (opus videlicet suum) Christus redemit, eandam (quae ipsius opus est) sanctificat, eandam a mortuis resuscitat, et ingenti gloria (opus videlicet suum) ornat." Comp, Aug.: Enchiridion, 36. With these statements of the symbols, the theologians agree. They assert the sinfulness of the Virgin Mai-y, the consequent sinfulness of human nature as transmitted by her, and the necessity of its being redeemed and sanctified, in order to be fitted for a personal union with the Logos. Says Augustine (Letter 104), " If the soul of Christ be derived from Adam's soul, he, in assuming it to himself, cleansed it so that when he came into this world he was born of the Virgin perfectly free from sin either actual or transmitted. If, however, the souls of men are not derived from that one soul, and it is only by the flosh that original sin is transmitted from Adam, the Son of God created a soul for himself, as he creates souls for all other men, but he united it not to sinful flesh, but to the ' likeness of sinful flesh,' Rom. 8 : 3. For he took, indeed, fi'om the Virgin the true substance of flesh ; not however ' sinful flesh,' for it was neither begotten nor conceived through carnal concupiscence, but was mortal and capable of change in the successive stages of life, as being like unto sinful flesh in all points, sin excepted." See also Enchiridion, xxxvi. xxxvii. Athanasius (Contra Arianos, II. Ixi.) explains the clause, " first-born of every creature," Col. 1:15, as meaning the same as " first-born among many brethren," Rom. 8 : 29 ; and adds that Christ '• is the first-born of us in this respect, that the whole posterity of Adam lying in a state of perdition by the sin of Adam, the human nature of Christ was first redeemed and sanctified (i(T(t)!^rj kuI rj\evS€pct)Sr)), and so became the means of our regeneration, redemption,

298 CHRISTOLOGY.

and sanctification, in consequence of the commnnity of nature between him and us." Jolin of Damascus (Do Fide, III. ii.) teaches the same doctrine. Savs Anselm (Cur deus homo, II. 17), " Christ's mother was purified by tlie power of his death. The virgin of whom he was born could be pure onlj^ by true faith in his death." Ansehn supposes that the Virgin Motlier was perfectly sanctified, but does not hold the later dogma of the immaculate conception of the Virgin. Yet he prepares the way for it, by teaching her immaculateness by regeneration. Says Paraeus (Corpus Doctrinae, Q. 35.), " Non conveniebat Aojm, filio dei, assuniere naturam pollutam peccato. Quicquid enim natum est ex carne, peccatrice scilicet et non sanctificata, caro est, mendacium et vanitas. Spiritus Sanctus optime novit separare peccatum a natura hominis ; substantiam ab accidente. Peccatum enim non est de natura hominis, sed aliunde a diabolo naturae accessit. Separavit a foetu onmem impuritatem, et contagionem peccati originalis." Says Ursinus (Christian lleligion. Quest. 35), "Mary was a sinner; but the mass of flesh which was taken out of her substance was, by the operation of the Holy Ghost, at the same instant sanctified when it was taken." Says Pearson (Creed, Art. III.), " The original and total sanctification of the human nature was first necessary to fit it for the personal nnion with the AYord, who out of his infinite love humbled himself to become flesh, and at the same time out of his infinite purity could not defile himself by becoming sinful flesh. Therefore the human nature, in its first original, without any precedent merit, was formed by the Spirit, and in its formation sanctified, and in its sanctification united to the Word ; so that grace was co-existent and in a manner co-natural with it." Says Owen (Holy Spirit, II. iv.), " The human nature of Christ, being thns formed in the womb by a creating [supernatural] act of the Holy Spirit, was in the instant of its conception sanctified and filled with grace according to the measure of its receptivity." Owen

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 299

adds that the human nature, " being not begotten by natural generation, derived no taint of original sin or corruption from Adam, that being the only way or means of its propagation." Says Quenstedt (III. iii.), " Idem Spiritus, singularissima praesentia et virtute, Mariam semper virginem ad concipiendum mundi Salvatorem foecundam reddidit, semen pi'olificum ex castis ejus sanguinibus elicuit, ab omni adhaerente peccato purgavit, ipsique Mariae virtutem praebuit qua conciperet ipsum Dei Filinni."

Usher (Incarnation, Works, TV. 583) speaks of the effect of the incarnation upon the human nature of Christ, not merely in sanctifying it, but in preserving it from certain innocent defects. " As the Son of God took upon him not a human person but a human nature, so it was not requisite that he should take upon him any personal infirmities such as madness, blindness, lameness, and particular kinds of diseases which ai-e incidental to some individuals only, and not to all men generally ; but those infirmities which do accompany the whole nature of manhood, such as are hungering, thirsting, weariness, grief, pain, mortality." Says Gill (Divinity, p. 165), " Christ was made of a woman, took flesh of a sinful woman, though the flesh he took of her was not sinful, being sanctified by the Spirit of God, the former of Christ's human nature." Turrettin (XIII. xi. 10), describing the operation of the Holy Spirit in respect to the incarnation, remarks that "the Holy Spii-it nnist prepare the substance abscided from the substance of the blessed Yii-gin by a suitable sanctification, not only by endowing it with life and elevating it to that degree of energy which is sufficient for generation without sexual connection, but also by purifying it from all stain of sin (ab omni peccati labe) so that it shall be harmless and undefiled, and thus that Christ may be born without sin. Hence there is no need of having recourse to the doctrine of the immaculate conception of Mary. For although there is no created power which can bring a clean thing from an unclean (Job

300 CHRISTOLc

14 : 4), yet the Divine power is not to be so limited. To this there is nothing impossible. This calls things which are not, as if tliej were." Wollebius (I. xvi.) says that " tlie material cause of Christ's conception was the blood of the blessed Virgin. The formal cause of Christ's conception consisteth in the preparing and sanctifying of the Virgin's blood by the virtue of the Holy Ghost." Edwards (Excellency of Christ) remarks that " though Christ was conceived in the womb of one of the corrupt race of mankind, yet he was conceived without sin."

Marck (Persona Christi, XI. xiv.) teaches that the Virgin's substance was preserved from original sin. After saying "carnem humanam habuit Christus ex substantia virginis Mai-iac, cum ejus filitis, Luc. 11 : 7, et ex muliere factus, Gal. 4 : 5, dicatur," he adds respecting the miraculous conception : " Actio Spiritus fere triplex fuit ; foecundatio seminis virginei, humanae naturae formatio, et ab omni labe praeservatio ; quae inde bene derivari potest, quod Christus, supernaturaliter generatus, culpa Adamica non tenetur, hinc labe illius iniici non potest." Here nothing is said respecting positive sanctification, but only of preservation fi-om corruption. De Moor, however, in his commentary upon Marck (XIX. xiv.), adopts the statement of Altin/iy«2C«, a qua, suo tempore, pecTHEANTHROPIC PERSON. 301

catiim potnissot resultare, ant saltern nativitatem ab omni impiiritate praeservavit, ad hoc, ut qiiod ex eo iiasceretnr esset sanctum. Luc. 1 : 35." In lY. x. 6, lie says, " istud autem semen, licet per 2>G<^G<^iores ad Mariam f nerit propagatum ; peccato tamen, sen malitiae morali, non fnit obnoxium, cum malitia ista non cadat in inaniniatura et irrationale, licet inteinperiem naturalem possit habere, quae postmodnm peccato possit occasionem praebere, qnam hinc, a semine Mariano, per Spiritum Sanctum sublatam diximus." '

That the human nature derived from Mary, in itself and apart from the agency of the Holy Ghost in the incarnation, was corrupt, is proved by Rom. 8:3, " God sent his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh.'' Tiiis means that the " flesh " as it existed in the mother, and before its sanctification in the womb, was sinful. John 3:6," That which is born of the flesh is flesh." Job 14 : 4, " Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? ISTot one." Job 25: 4, " How can he be clean that is born of a woman ? " The Formula Concordiae (De peccato originis, Ilase, G44) says that "in primo conceptionis nostrae momento, ipsuin semen ex quo homo formatur peccato contaminatum et corrnptum est." It also condemns the Anabaptists who asserted " quod Christum carnem et sanguinem suum non e Maria virgine assumpserit, sed e caelo attulerit." ^

' The impossibility of harmonizing the Angustino-Calvinistic tenet that origi.ial sin as culpability is transmitted by propagation, with creationism, is here virtually acknowledged by Van Mastricht. Only physical corruption can be inherited, if only the body is propagated ; but physical corruption without moral, as Van Mastricht teaches, is not ■peccatum. And the cleansing from it is qnasi cleansing. In IV. x. 24, Van Mastricht assigns as the principal reason for the absence of original sin from the human nature of Christ, that this nature though " naturaliter in Adam, velut in capite et radice naturae humanae," was not " foederaliter" in him. But, in his reasoning, he apparently confounds the simple humanity of Christ with the composite ^eavStpcoiros, who of course was neither naturally nor federally in Adam. See Dorner : Person of Christ, II. 30S, rA\, Note.

2 Even if the Romish dogma of the immaculate conception of Mary were true, it would not follow that a human nature transmitted by her would also be immaculate. Regeneration and sanctification by the Holy Ghost are confined to

302 CHRISTOLOGY.

In the Adoptian controversy, in the 8th centnrj'', Felix of Ura:ellis maintained that the Logos united with a human nature that was unsanctified ; that Clirist liad a corrupted nature though he never committed actual transgression. He thought this to be necessary, in order that Christ might be tempted in all points like as we are, yet without sin. But this implies that corruption of nature is not sin. He was opposed by Alcuin. See Guerike's Church History, § 107. The theory was revived, about 1830, in Germany by Menken, and in Great Britain by Irving.' Schleiermacher (Glaubenslehre, § 97) departs from the catholic doctrine, in holding that Christ had an earthly father, but that by a

the individual. They do not affect the specific nature ia h;in. See Anthropology, p. 91 sq.

• Irving'3 view is, that Christ's human nature after its union with the Logos was still fallen and "sinful flesh" (Rom. 8:0) as it was before the union, but that by means of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit Christ repressed all stirrings of this sinful flesh, so that he not only never committed an outward transgression, but never exercised a sinful desire. At the same time, Irving contends that Christ experienced all the temptations which sinful man experiences. His words are .is follows : Christ's humanity " was flesli in the fallen state, and liable to all the temptations to which [fallen] fiesh is liable ; but the soul of Jesus, thus anointed with the Holy Ghost, did ever resist the suggestions of evil. 1 wish it to be clearly understood, that I believe it to be nocessary unto salvation, that a man should believe that Christ's soul was so held in possession by the Holy Ghost, and so supported by the Divine Nature, as that it never assented unto an ev.l suggestion, and never originated an evil suggestion." Irving : On the Incarnation (Its iMethod, Pt. I.). This last assertion is inconsistent with the assertion that Christ "was liable to all the temptations to which sinful flesh is liable." If his human nature "never originated an evil suggestion," he could not have been tempted by inward lust, which is one species of temptation that sinful man experiences, according to James 1 : 14.

Irving's view of Christ's holiness seems to be that of spiritual regeneration by the Holy Spirit as in the case of a believer, rather than of a supernatural transformation by the miraculous conception. Only, the regeneration in Christ's case complclcbj subjects the inward corruption, while in the believer it imperfectly subjects it. According to the catholic doctrine, the corruption is entirely extirpated from the human nature of Christ ; according to Irving's doctrine, it remains, but is repressed and subdued. " They argue for an inherent holiness ; we argue for a holiness maintained by the person of the Son through the operation of the Holy Ghost. The substance of our argument is, that Christ's human nature was holy in the only way in which holiness under the fall exists or can exist, namely, through inworking or energizing of the Holy Ghost." Irving : Works, V. 504.

THEANTIIROPIC PERSON. 303

supernatural operation on the embryo it was cleansed from original sin.

The possibility of a perfect sanctification of the human nature of Christ appears from considering the mode of Jiis conception, and comparing it with that of an ordinary man. The individualizing of a portion of human nature is that process by which it becomes a distinct and separate person, and no longer an undistinguishable part of the common species. A part of human nature becomes a human person by generation. In all instances but that of Jesus Christ, the individualization of a portion of human substance is accomplished through the medium of the sexes, and is accompanied with sensual appetite. By ordinary generation, human nature is transmitted and individualized without any change of its characteristics, either physical or moral. The individual lias all the qualities both of soul and body wliich fallen Adam had. There is no sanctification of the nature possible by this mode. Ordinary generation transmits sin. " That which is born of the flesh [in this manner] is flesh."' But in the instance of the conception of Jesus Christ, the God-man, there was no union of the sexes, and no sensual appetite. The quickening of a portion of human nature in the Virgin Mother was by the creative energy of God the Holy Ghost. This miraculous conception, consequently, was as pure from all sensuous quality as the original creation of Adam's body from the dust of the ground, or of Eve's body from the rib of Adam. As the dust of the ground was enlivened by a miraculous act, and the result was the individual body of Adam, so the substance of Mary was quickened and sanctified by a miraculous act, and the result was the human soul and body of Jesus Christ,'

' Here, we notice an important point of Hifference between traducianism and creationism. According to the former theory, both the soul and body of Christ were formed simultaneously, and by one act of the Holy Spirit, out of the psychico-physical substance of the mother. According to the latter, only the body was formed out of the Virgin's merely physical substance, the soul being subsequently created ex nihilo, and infused into the body. Turrettin

304 CHRISTOLOGY.

The miraculous quickening of the substance of the Yirgin Mother is not sufficient, alone and by itself, to account for its sanctification. As her substance, it was a part of the fallen and corrupt human species. Merely to quicken or vitalize it, even though miraculously, would not change its moral quality. Plence we must postulate a renewing and sanctifying operation of the Holy Spirit, in connection with his quickening energy. Witsius (Covenant?, II. iv. 11) quotes Cloppenburg as saying, " that the miraculous impregnation of the Virgin's womb, of itself alone, could not secure, in the least, an exemption to the flesh of Christ from the inheritance of sin ; for the origin of sin is not derived from the male sex alone, or male seed ; nor did the apostle, in Rom. 5, so understand one man Adam as to exclude Eve: wbich is the leading error of some.'' Similarly, Calvin (Inst., II. xiii. 4) remarks that " they betray their ignoi'ance, in arguing that if Christ is perfectly immaculate and was begotten of the seed of Mary by the secret operation of the Spirit, then it follows that there is no impurity in the seed of women, but only in that of men. For we do not represent Christ as perfectly immaculate merely because he was born of the seed of a woman unconnected witb an}^ man, but because he was sanctified by the Spirit, so that his generation was pure and holy, such as it would liave been before the fall of Adam." The doctrine of the sinlessness of Christ is, thus, necessarily connected with the doctrine of the miraculous conception by the Holy Ghost. The one stands or falls with the other. " It is," says Howe (Oracles, II. xxxvii.), " a mighty confirmation of the natural descent of sin with the nature of man in the ordinary way, that when God designed the incarnation of his own

presents this view, in Inst. XIII. xi. 11-15. As in the creation of Adam, God lirst made his body out of the substance of the earth, and then by a second act created and imbreathed his soul, so, according to the creationist, in the origination of the humanity of our Lord two acts must be postulated : one by which his human body was conceived out of the substance of the Virgin, and another by which his human soul was created from nothing.

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 305

Son, to avoid the corrnj)tiou of nature descending to liim, lie then steps out of the ordinary course ; a consideration that hath that weight with it, that if any one allow himself to think, it must overbear his mind, in that matter, that surely there is some secret profound reason in the counsel of God, whether obvious to our view, or not obvious, that the descent of corrupt nature was in the oi'dinary way unavoidable : that when God had a design to incarnate his own Son, when it was intended God should be manifested in the flesh, to avoid that contagion and corruption which in the ordinary course is transmitted, he doth in this single instance recede and go off from the ordinary natural course. Because the human nature had been corrupted if it had descended in the ordinary way, therefore the ordinary course of procreation is declined and avoided : a most pregnant demonstration that in the ordinary course sin is always naturally transmitted."

Although the human nature of Christ was individualized and personalized by a miraculous conception, and not by ordinary generation, yet this was as really and truly a conception and birth as if it had been by ordinary generation. Jesus Christ was really and truly the Son of Mary. He was bone of her bone, and flesh of her flesh. He was of her substance, and of her blood. He was consubstantial with her, in as full a sense as an ordinary child is consubstantial with an ordinary mother. And she was the mother of his human soul, as well as of his human body. All the stages in the process of generation and growth are to be found, from the embryo up to the niatui-e man. The union of deity with humanity was first embryonic, then foetal, then infantine, then that of childhood, then that of youth, and lastly that of manhood. The God-man was conceived in the womb, grew in the womb, was an infant, a child, a youth, and a mature man.

Contemplating the mystery of the God-man in this way, as pointed out in Scripture, it is easier to see how only one Vol. II.— 20

306 CHRISTOLOGY.

person and one self-conscionsncss sliall result. If we do not distinguish between nature and person — if we assume that there is no sucli reality as an unindividualized, or nonindividualized nature, and that we must think of a distinct individual or we must thinlv of nothing — then we must say that the Logos united with a human person. This person nmst he a self-conscious ego, and when united with the second person of the Godhead, which is likewise a self-conscious ego, must still have its own distinct self-consciousness. The God-man, consequently, must be two persons with two S6'Z/-consciousnesses.

But when it is said that the trinitarian person of the Logos assumes into union with himself a portion of human nature, which portion is not yet a distinct ego, but is capable by reason of its properties of becoming one, then the problem of the single self-consciousness of the God-man becomes much easier of solution. The human nature possessing, on the psychical side, all the properties requisite to personality, such as spirituality, rationality, and voluntariness, upon being assumed into union with the eternal Son is thereby personalized, that is to sa}', individualized. The properties of finite reason and finite will, potential in the human nature, now manifest themselves actively in the single self-consciousness of the God-man. He reasons like a man, thinks like a man, feels like a man, and wills like a man. These are truly personal acts and operations of Jesus Christ. But, unlike the case of an ordinary man, these are not the v)Jwle of his personal acts and operations. Over and besides these, there is in his complex theanthropic person another and higher series of acts and operations ■wliich spring from another and higher nature in his person. He thinks, and feels, and wills like God. And these are also, and equally with the others, tlie personal acts of Jesus Christ.

Li the one person of Jesus Christ, consequently, there are two different kinds of consciousness or experience : one

THEANTHROPIC PERSON. 307

divine and one human. But these two kinds of consciousness do not constitute two persons, any more than the two kinds of experience or consciousness, tlie sensuous and tlie mental, in a man, constitute liim two persons. There can be two general forms or modes of conscious experience in one and the same person, provided there enter into the constitution of the person two natui-es tliat are sufficiently different from each other to yield the materials of such a twofold variety. This was the case with the God-man. If he had had only one nature, as was the case previous to the incarnation, then he could have had oidy one general form of consciousness : the divine. But having two natures, he could have two corresponding forms of consciousness. He could experience either divine feeling, or human feeling; divine perception, or human perception. A God-man has a twofold variety of consciousness or experience, with only one self-consciousness. When he says " I thirst," and " I and my Father are one," it is one theanthropic ego with a finite human consciousness in the first instance, and an infinite divine consciousness in the second.

A man can have two forms of consciousness, yet with oidy one self-consciousness. lie can feel cold with his body, while he prays to God wnth his mind. These two forms of conscious experience are wholly diverse and distinct, lie does not pray with his body, or feel cold with his mind. Yet this doubleness and distinctness in the consciousness, does not destroy the unity of his se//'-consciousness. So, also, Jesus Christ as a theanthropic person was constituted of a divine nature and a human nature. The divine nature had its own form of experience, like the mind in an ordinary human person ; and the human nature had its own form of experience, like the body in a common man. The experiences of the divine nature were as diverse from those of the human nature, as those of the human mind are from those of the human body. Yet there was but one person who was the subject-ego of both

308 CHRISTOLOGY.

of these experiences. At the very time when Clirist was conscious of weariness and thirst by tlie well of Samaria, he also was conscious that he was the eternal and only -begotten Son of God, liie second person in the trinity. This is proved by his words to the Samaritan woman : " Whosoever driiiketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst ; but the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing np into everlasting life. I that speak nnto thee am the Messiah." Tlie first-mentioned consciousness of fatigue and thirst came through the human nature in his person ; the second-mentioned consciousness of omnipotence and supremacy came through the divine nature in his person. If he had not had a human nature, he could not have had the former consciousness ; and if he had not had a divine nature, he could not have had the latter. Because he had both natures in one person, he could have both.'

» Shedd : Presbyterian Review, July 1881, pp. 61S-631.

CHAPTER 11.

The subject of the Divinity of Christ has been examined under the head of Theology (Doctrine of God). See Vol. I. pp. 312-328. All Scripture texts and data prove the deity of Christ that prove his Trinitarian position and relations. The act and process of incarnation makes no essential change in the Logos. The incarnate Word has all the properties of the unincarnate Word. To the God- man are ascribed in Scripture, the divine names, attributes, worky, and adorableness.

There is a class of texts which taken by themselves would imply an inferiority to God, in Jesus of Nazareth. They are such as describe his acts and experiences from the side of the humanity in his person, and of his estate of mediatorial humiliation. This inferiority may run all the way from the comparatively exalted view of the SemiArian, to the low humanitarian view of the Socinian. All of these parties really contemplate Jesus Christ only Kara adpKa, omitting that aspect of him pi-esented in the other class of passages which describe him Kara irvevfjLa aytcoavvrj^i (Rom. 1 : 4), as 6 wv iirl nravraiv (Rom. 9 : 5), as eV fiop^j) Seov vTrdpxoiv (Phil. 2 : 6), and as ^eo? (John 1 : 1).

Strictly speaking, none of these parties accept the theanthroj>ic personality of Christ. The divine nature is left out in the constitution of his person, so that it is really only anthropic. For although the Semi-Arian conceded a complex personality in Christ composed of two natures, one of which was immensely higher than the other, and in refer310 CHRISTOLOGY.

ence to which he cherished a feeling akin to adoration, yet since tliere is no true mean between the infinite and finite, the creator and the creature, tliis exalted higher nature must fall into the same finite class with the lower one. Such a Christology cannot be harmonized with the Scripture repi-esentations, except by omitting those passages which attribute to Jesus of Nazareth a ifature to which the divine titles, attributes, and works are ascribed, and which is the obieet of woi'ship both in heaven and on earth.

Christ's Hnmanity is undisputed, being demonstrable from all the descriptions uf liim given in the Gospels. Some of the more important of the numerous texts are : Gen. 3 : 15, " The seed of the woman.'' Matt. 13 : 37, " The Son of man." Isa. T : 11, " A virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel." Luke 1 : 32, " God shall give unto him the throne of his father David." Luke 3 : 23-38, Christ was " the son of David, of Abraham, and of Adam." Gal. 4 : 4, Christ w\as " made of a woman." Rom. 1:3," Jesus Christ concerning the flesh was made of the seed of David." 1 Tim. 2 : 5, " The man Christ Jesus." Christ was born and died, hungered and thirsted, o-rew from infancy to childhood and manhood, was subject to the alternations of pleasure and pain, was tempted and struggled with temptation— in short, had all the experiences of man excepting those which involve sin. Luke 2 : 52 ; 21 : 36-14 ; Matt. 4:1; John 11 : 33, 35 ; 13 : 23; Heb. 4:15; 5:8; Phil. 2:7, 8.

What is implied in humanity has never been a dispute within the Church ; but as some heretical parties have asserted a defective or mutilated humanity in Christ, the Church has specified particulars.

1. Christ had " a true body." Westminster L. C, 37. This was maintained in opposition to the Docetae {SoKelv), who asserted that Christ's body was seeming only, and spectral, a phantom of ghostlike appearance and not so4id

312 CHRISTOLOGY.

flesh and blood. This heresy is refuted by Luke 24 : 39, " A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have." John 20 : 27, " Keaeh hither thy hand, and thrust it into my side." Luke 24 : 43, " He did eat before them."

2. Clirist had " a rational soul." Westminster L. C, 37. This was held in opposition to Apollinarism ; which would find the rational element for the human nature in the eternal reason of the Logos. Apollinaris at first asserted that the Logos united with a human body only. Afterwards he modified this, by asserting that he united with a body and an irrational animal soul. Socrates : History, II. Ixvi. Texts that disprove this are : Matt. 26 : 38, " My soul is sorrowful." Mark 6 : 6, Jesus " marvelled." Matt. 8 : 10. Luke 7 : 9. Sorrow and wonder are rational emotions, proper to man, but not to God. Apollinaris, from the account given of him by Gregory of Isyssa (Adv. Apollinarem), seems to have blended and confused the human and divine natures even in the Godhead ; for he asserted a human element in the divine essence itself. The Divine, he contended, is also essentially and eternally human. There is, thus, an eternal humanity. The Divine nature necessarily tends to the human form ; inherently yearns to become man, and is unsatisfied until it is incarnate. This is the worst feature in Apollinaris's scheme, who was nevertheless a strong advocate of the Athanasian trinitarianism against the Arians. Apollinaris also held that the mental suffering of Christ was suffering of the divine nature ; otherwise it could not be a real atonement. See Dorner : Person of Christ.

The rational objections to Apollinarism are the following :

{a) A human nature destitute of finite reason would be either idiotic or brutal. If the Logos assumed into niiiou only the body and the animal soul — the aSifia and y]rv^% and not the irvev^ta, in St. Paul's classification in

CHRIST'S HUMANITY. 313

1 Thess. 5 : 23 — he did not unite himself witli a rational nature, {b) In this case, also, he did not unite with a complete, but a defective humanity. Some of the essential properties of human nature, namely, rationality and voluntariness, would have been wanting, (c) In this case, none of Christ's mental processes could have been of a finite kind. jSTothing but infinite and divine reason could have been manifested in his self-consciousness. The same would be true of his voluntary action. This must have been infinite only. There could liave been no exhibition of finite human will, or of finite human reason in his earthly life.

3. Christ " continues to be God and man in two distinct natures.-' Westminster L. C, 36. This statement is in opposition to Eutychianism, which asserts that the union of the Logos with a human nature results in a single nature of a third species, which nature is neither divine nor human, but theanthropic. Eutychianism is contradicted by Koni. 1 : 3, 4, which describes Christ Kara (xdpica and Kara irvevfxa ayLoiavvq'i ; and by Rom. 9 : 5, which describes him Kara adpica and as eVt Travroiv ^eo^. Christ, in these and similar passages, is represented as having two natures, not one onlj'. A nature is necessarily incomplex and simple. A person may be incomplex, like a trinitarian person who has only one nature, or complex, like a human person who has two natures, and a theanthropic person who has three natures. A person may have two or more heterogeneous natures, but a nature cannot have two or more classes of heterogeneous properties. A substance or nature is homogeneous as to its qualities. A theanthropic nature, therefore, such as Eutyches supposed, having two classes of heterogeneous properties, the divine and the liuman, is inconceivable. Wo cannot think of a substance composed of both immaterial and material properties ; a substance which is both mind and matter. This is Spinoza's error. But we can think of a person so composed. We cannot logically conceive of a

314 CHRISTOLOGY.

diviiie-buman nature. It would be like an immaterial' material nature. But a person may be immaterial-material. Man is sucli.'

' Domer (Christian Doctrine, III. 280) is Eutychian, in asserting that Christ had " a God-human nature ; " and in denominating " the God-human personality "" a God-humanity." This is confounding and mixing the natures. A " God-human nature " would be a theanthropic nature. There is a " God-human," or theanthropic ^;f7'sow having two natures, but not a " God-human," or theanthropic nature having two sets of properties, divine and human. A " God -humanity, " strictly speaking, would be a Divine humanity : that is, a, human nature that is divine. But this is very difierent from a Divine-human person. Hooker's statement is excellent, upon this point. " Let us set it down for a rule or principle necessary to the plain deciding of all doubts and questions about the union of natures in Christ, that of both natures there is a co-operation often, an association always, but never any mutual participation, whereby the properties of the one are infused into the other." Polity, V. liii. Hooker quotes the following from Gregory of Nyssa, and adds that it is " so plain and direct for Eutyches," that he " stands in doubt that the words are his whose name they carry " : " The nature which Christ took weak and feeble from us, by being mingled with deity, became the same which deity is ; so that the assumption of our substance into his was like the blending of a drop of vinegar with the huge ocean, whereby although it continue still, yet not with those properties which severed it hath ; because since the instant of the conjunction all distinction of the one from the other is extinct, and whatsoever we can now conceive of the Son of God is nothing else but mere deity."

It may be objected, that the traducianist seems to affirm a nature with two sets of properties, when he postulates a " human nature " that is both psychical and physical. But this does not mean that one and the same substance has both psychical and physical properties, but that two distinct and different substances, the psychical and the physical, are combined in a complex unity to which the general title of "human nature" is given. Each substance has its own properties diverse from those of the other. But the two are associated in a complex whole, a common " specific nature," from which each individual man is derived both mentally and bodily.

That the two natures, the divine and the human, constitute only one person, is proved by the following Scripture texts : Rom. 1 : 3. Here, the one person called " Jesus Christ our Lord" is said to be " made of the seed of David according to the flesh," and " declared to be the Son of God, according to the spirit of holiness." This latter phrase, being antithetic to the phrase " according to the flesh," means " according to the divinity." Shedd: On Romans

1 : 4. Christ is described hy St. Paul, Kara adpKa and Kara TTvevfxa ar/io)avvrj

2 : 6-11 ; 1 Tim. 3 : 16 ; Ileb. 1 : 6-9 compared with Heb. 2 : 14 ; John 1 : 14 ; 1 John 1 : 1-3 ; 4 : 3 ; Gal. 4 : 4. Usher (Incarnation, Works, TV. 5S0) combines the Scripture data as follows : '• Ho 'in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily ' is the 2}e?'son; that fulness which so doth dwell in him is the natures. Now, there dwelleth in him not only the fulness of the Godhead, but the fulness of the manhood also. For we believe him to be both perfect God, begotten of the substance of his Father before all worlds ; and perfect man made of the substance of his mother in the fulness of time. And therefore we must hold that there are two distinct natures in him ; and two so distinct that they do not make one compounded nature ; but still remain uncompounded and unconfounded together. But he in whom the fulness of the manhood dwelleth is not one

316 CHRISTOLOGY.

person, and he in whom the fulness of the Godliead dwelleth, another person ; but he in whom tlie fulness of both these natures dwelleth is one and the same Immanuel, and consequently it must be believed as firmly that he is but one person."

That the two natures constitute only one person, is also proved by the fact that in Scripture human attributes are ascribed to the person as designated by a divine title ; and divine attributes are ascribed to the person as designated by a human title. This interchange of titles and of attributes in respect to one and the same person proves that there are not two different persons, each having its own particular nature and attributes, but only one person having two natures and two classes of attributes in common.

1. Passages in which human attributes are ascribed to the person designated by a divine title are : Acts 20 : 28, The " blood of God." ' Rom. 8 : 32, " God spared not his own son " (iStbu viov). 1 Cor. 2:8, " They crucified the Lord of glory." Coloss. 1 : 13, 14, " Redemption through the blood rod vcov rrj'i d

2. Passages in which divine attributes are ascribed to the person designated by a human title are : John 3 : 13, " No man hath ascended up to heaven, but the Son of man which is in heaven." John 6 : 62, " What and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where he was before ? " Rom. 9 : 5, " As concerning the flesh Christ came, who is God over all." Rev. 5 : 12, " Worthy is the Lamb that was slain to receive power."

From these Biblical representations, therefore, it follows that both human and divine qualities and acts may be attributed to the God-man under any of his names. If the

> The reading dfov is supported by ^ B, Vulg. Svr. Rec. Hort ; Kuplov is supported by A C D Ej Sahidic, Coptic, Tisch, Lachm.

CHRIST'S UNIPERSONALITY. 317

God-man be called Jesus Christ, then it is proper to saj that Jesus Christ raised the dead, and Jesus Christ died ; that Jesus Christ is God, and Jesus Christ is man. If the God-man be called the Redeemer, then it is proper to saj that the Redeemer created all things, and the Redeemer hungered and thirsted ; that the Redeemer existed before Abraham, and the Redeemer was born eighteen centuries after Abraham. If the God-man be called Messiah, then it is proper to say that Messiah is seated upon the eternal throne, and Messiah was crucified, dead, and buried. In 1 Cor. 15, the God-man is called "Man," the "Second Man," and the " Last Adam," and divine acts are attributed. " By Man came also the resurrection of the dead." *■' The second Man is the Lord from heaven." " The last Adam was made a quickening spirit." It would be correct to say : " The last Adam groaned and wept : and the last Adam will judge the world." In Acts 20 : 28, the God man is called " God," and human characteristics are attributed : viz., blood, and the pains of death. " Feed the church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood." The term " God " here denotes incarnate God : a complex person, not an incomplex nature. In this use, the ecclesiastical phrase " God's blood" is proper.' So also is the expression, " God the mighty Maker died ; " because " God " liere designates the theanthropic person having two natures — God in the flesh — not the one abstract divine nature. It would be improper to say, "God's nature died," because this can have but one meaning. But it is proper to say "God died," because this may mean either " God's nature," or the " God-man ; " either unincarnate or incarnate God ; either the Logos or Jesus Christ. It would be proper to speak of the blood of Iramanuel. But Immanuel means " God with us."

' "Virgo Maria non nudum aut raemm hominem, sed verum dei filiuin, concepit et genuit; unde recte mater dei appellatur." Formula Concordiae, viii.

318 CHRISTOLOGY.

The humanity assumed by the Logos is the Logos's of God's humanity ; just as the body is the soul's body. When, therefore, the humanity suffers, it is as proper to say that it is " God's suffering," as it is when the body suffers, to say that is the " soul's suffering " — not meaning, thereby, the suffering of the soul considered separately as an immaterial substance, but of the soul as put for the total person. We speak of " the blood of souls," because the soul is united with a body that bleeds. Similarly, Scripture speaks of " the blood of God," because God is united with a humanity that has blood. " The matter of which the human body is composed does not subsist by itself, is not under all those laws of motion to which it would be subject if it were mere inanimated matter ; but by the indwelling and actuation of the soul it has another spring within it, and has another course of operations. According to this then, to ' subsist by another ' is when a being is acting according to its natural properties but yet in a constant dependence upon another being ; so our bodies subsist by the subsistence of our souls. This may help us to appi'ehend how that as a body is still a body, and operates as a body, though it subsists by the indwelling and actuation of the soul, so in the person of Jesus Christ, the human nature was entire, and still acting according to its own character, yet there was such an union and inhabitation of the Eternal Word in it, that there did arise out of that such a communication of names and characters as we find in the Scriptures. A man is called tall, fair, and healthy, from the state of his body ; and learned, wise, and good, from the qualities of his mind ; so Christ is called holy, harmless, and undefiled, is said to have died, risen, and ascended up into heaven, with relation to his human nature. He is also said to be in the form of God, to have created all things, to be the brightness of the Father's glory, with relation to the divine nature." Burnet: Thirty-nine Articles (Art. II.).

CHRIST'S UNIPERSONALITY. 319

In accordance with this complex constitution of Christ's person, we find that his consciousness, as expressed in laneuao-e, is sometimes divine and sometimes human, Wlien he spoke the works: "I and my Fatlier are one" (John 10: 30), the form of his consciousness at that instant was divine. The divine nature yielded the elements in this particular experience. When he spoke the words : " I thirst " (John 19 : 28), the form of his consciousness at that instant was human, or an experience whose elements were furnished by the human nature. When he said : " l^ow, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was " (John 17 : 5), his mode of consciousness at that instant was that of the eternal Word who was in the beginning with God. When he said : " My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me ? " (Matt. 27 : 46), his mode of consciousness was that of a finite creature deserted of his Creator.

In each of these instances, it was one and the same person, viz., Jesus Christ, who possessed the consciousness. The ego denoted by " I," in the phrase, " Which I had with thee before the world was," is the very same ego denoted by " I," in the phrase, " I thirst.'" There is no alteration in the person, but there is in the form of the consciousness. And this alteration arises from the fact that there are two natures in the person which furnish the materials of consciousness. Had Christ possessed, like an ordinary man, only a human nature, there could not have bee-n this variet}in the modes of his consciousness. A brute can have some of the forms of human consciousness. He can feel hunoer, and thirst, and physical pain, like a man, because he has a physical nature like that of man. But he cannot experience religious emotions like joy in Godi, or aesthetic emotions like delight in beauty, or rational perceptions like the intuitions of geometry, because he has no rational nature like man. These modes of consciousness are precluded in his case, because there does not belong to his constitution

320 CHRISTOLOGY.

tliat rational, aesthetic, and moral nature which alone can furnish the materials of such a consciousness. Man has two general forms of consciousness, the animal and the rational, because he is complex in his constitution ; but the brute has only one form of consciousness, the animal, because he is simple in his constitution.

Similarly, there arise in the person of the God-man two general forms of consciousness, the divine and the human, because there are two distinct and specific natures in his person. When the human nature yields the matter of consciousness, Jesus Christ hungers, thirsts, sorrows, rejoices, and expresses his consciousness accordingly. When the divine nature yields the matter of consciousness, the very same Jesus Christ commands the rao-infr sea to be still and it obeys ; commands the dead Lazarus to rise and he obeys ; says, " My Father M^Orketh hitherto and I work ; " " Befoi-e Abraham was, I am ; '' "I say unto you, that in this place is One greater than the temple."

This fluctuation of consciousness in the identity of a perison is occurring continually in the sphere of human life. When a man says, " I am thirsty," the elements and form of his consciousness, at this particular instant, are furnished from his material and physical nature. When the same man says, with David, "I love the Lord, because he hath lieard my voice and my supplications " (Ps. 116 : 1), the elements and form of his consciousness issue from his mental and spiritual nature. The difference between these two modes of consciousness, the sensuous and the spiritual, is as real and marked, though it is not as great, as between the divine and the human consciousness in the person of the God-man. And yet there is no schism in the person, or duplication of the person. It is the very same individual man who says, " I thirst," and " I love God." '

I When St. Paul says: " I hate what I do," and "with the mind I myself serve the law of God, but with the flesh I myself serve the law of sin " (Rom. 7:15, 25), the two modes of consciousness spring out of one nature, viz., the

CHRIST'S UNIPERSONALITY. 321

These varying modes and forms of consciousness chase each other over the field of human personality like the shadows of the clouds over a landscape. At one moment, the man's experience is sensuous. At another, perhaps the very next moment, it is intensely spiritual. If the nature of the individual person should be inferred from the sensuous consciousness in him, we should say that he is nothing but an animal ; if only from the spiritual consciousness in him, we should say that he is nothing but a spirit. Putting the two together, we say that the person who has these different modes of conscious experience is " human." We do not say, using terms strictly, that he is a sensuous person, though he has a sensuous nature. We do not say that he is a spiritual person, though he has a spiritual nature. "Human " is the proper denomination of the person.

In like manner, in the complex person of Christ there was a continual fluctuation of consciousness, according as the divine or the human nature wms uppermost, so to speak, in the self-consciousness. At one moment, he felt and spoke as a weak, dependent, and finite creature ; at the next instant, he felt and spoke as an almighty, self -existent, and infinite being. The finite and infinite, man and God, the creature and creator, time and eternity, met and mingled in that wonderful Person who was not divine solely, or human solely, but divine-human. " There is," says Bengel, on Mark 13 : 32, " an admirable variety in the motions of the soul [i.e., in the self -consciousness] of Christ. Sometimes he had an elevated feeling, so as hardly to seem to remember that he was a man walking on the earth ; sometimes he had a lowly feeling, so that he might almost have seemed to forget that he was the Lord from heaven. And he was wont always to express himself according to his mental feeling for the time being; at one time, as he who was one with the Father ; at another time, again, in such a manner as if

mental or spiritual, and are both alike mental. This would not illustrate the difference in the consciousness that arises from two diverse natures. Vol. II.— 31

322 CHRISTOLOGY.

he were only of that condition in wliicli are all ordinary and human saints. Often, these two are blended together in wonderful variety."

At this point, it is proper to notice the effect of Christ's exaltation upon his humanity. When the humiliation of Christ ends and his exaltation begins, the human nature, though still unchanged in its essential properties, no longer yields certain elements of consciousness which it previously yielded. Christ on the mediatorial throne hungers no more, and suffers no more. Certain accidental properties are left behind, but all essential properties of humanity are retained. The exalted human nature still keeps its finiteness. It is not invested with infinite properties. It does not acquire omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence by Christ's exaltation. It is man's nature still. The change wliich occurs in the instance of the perfected nature of a redeemed man illustrates the alteration in Christ's human nature. " Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God," and yet the redeemed are as really and truly men as they ever were. But there will be certain modes of consciousness which the redeemed experienced when upon earth that will be impossible to them in heaven. Not because they are different persons in heaven from what they were upon earth, but because there has been a change wrought in their physical nature by the resurrection and glorification of their bodies, so that this nature, though human and physical still, does not need meat and drink as it did while upon earth, and is not liable to sickness, suffering, and death, as it was here below. Those modes of consciousness which involved pain and suffering, which man was capable of here upon earth by reason of the state and condition of his body while liere upon earth, are no longer possible to him as redeemed and glorified in heaven. And so, likewise, those experiences of earthly suffering and sorrow which Christ passed through in his state of humiliation, will constitute no part of his self-consciousness in his state of exaltation.

CHRIST'S UNIPERSONALITY. 323

While, in this way, the acts and qualities of either nature may be attributed to the one theanthropic person, the acts and qualities of one nature may not be attributed to the other nature. It would be erroneous to say, that the divine nature suffered, or that tlie human nature raised the dead ; as it would be erroneous to say that the human body thinks, or that the human soul walks. The man, or " person" whose is the body and whose is the soul, both thinks and walks ; but the natures by whose instrumentality he performs these acts do not both of them think and walk. One thinks, and the other walks.

I'roperties belong to a nature, and are confined to it. Hence properties are always homogeneous. A material natui'e or substance can have only material properties. It cannot be marked partly by material and partly by immaterial properties. Natures, on the other hand, belong to a person, and may be heterogeneous. A nature must be composed wholly of material, or wholly of immaterial properties ; but a person may be composed partly of a material, and partly of an immaterial nature. Hence two, or even three kinds of natures may be ascribed to a person, but only one kind of properties may be attributed to a nature.

By ovei'looking the difference between person and nature, the Later-Lutherans liave partially revived the ancient error of Eutyches, of confounding or mixing the natures in Christ's person. They distinguish three kinds of "communicatio idiomatum," or communication of properties : namely, genus idiomaticum — the attribution of the properties of either nature to the person ; genus apotelesmaticum— the attribution of the mediatorial acts to either nature ; and genus majestaticum. The last of these is of such an exalted species as to amount to a communication of the properties of one nature to the other. It is founded upon those texts in which, according to Hase's definition of this genus, the Scriptures speak of " the liuman nature as exalted by divine attributes : quibus natura humana attri324 CHRISTOLOGY.

biitis divinis effertur," Ilntterns, p. 238. The texts in which til is is supposed to be done are sucli as John 3 : 13, " The Son of man is in heaven ; " John 5 : 27, " The son of man has authority to execute judf^ment ; " Matt. 28 : 18, 20, "All power is giv^en unto mc. I am with ^'^ou alway ;" Iwom. 9 : 5, '•Concerning the flesh, Christ is God over all, blessed forever;" Phil. 2 : 10, "At the name of Jesus, every knee shall bow." In these passages, the titles " Son of man," "Jesus," and "Christ," according to the advocate of the genus majestaticum, denote, not the theantliropic person^ but the human nature j and this human nature is exalted by the divine attributes of omnipresence — being upon earth and in heaven simultaneously; of sovereignty — being the judge of mankind ; of omnipotence — having all power in heaven and earth ; of absolute deity — being God over all.

The foundation for this view is laid in the Formula Concord iae, though this creed is somewhat wavering and contradictory, and not so pronounced as later individual theologians. It affirms that by the glorification of the liuman nature, after Christ's resurrection, this human nature received, in addition to its own natural essential properties, certain " supernatural, inscrutable, ineffable, and celestial prerogatives of majesty, glory, virtue, and power above everything that is named in time or eternitj'," Hase : Libri Symbolici, T7-1. This, however, is guarded by the affirmation that " hae duae naturae in persona Christi nunquam confunduntur, vel altera in alteram mutatnr," Ilase : Libri Symbolici, 762 ; that " unius naturae proprietates essentiales nunquam alterius naturae proprietates essentiales fiimt," Hase : Libri Symbolici, 763 ; " that in hac unione, utraque natnra essentiam et proprietates suas retinet." Hase : Libri Symbolici, 765. But these statements, again, are modified, and seemingly contradicted, by the affirmation that Christ " non tantum ut deus, verum etiam ut homo, ubique praesens dominatur et regnat a mari ad mare, et

CHRIST'S UNIPERSONALITY. 325

usque ad terminos terrae ; " and that Christ's promise to be continually with his apostles, co-operating with them, and confirming their word with attending miracnlous signs, was fulfilled " not in an earthly manner (non terreno modo), but as Luther was wont to say, after the manner and method of God's right hand : which certainly does not mean a certain circumscribed locality in heaven, as the Sacramentarians claim, but denotes the omnipotent energy (virtus) of God, which fills heaven and earth, into possession of which Christ according to his hmnanity (juxta humanitatem suam) really and truly came, yet without any confusion or equalizing of the natures," Ilase : Libri Symbolic!, 768. This last clause is contradictory to preceding statements in the creed, unless it can be shown that Christ's human nature can have the attributes of omnipresence and omnipotence without any equalizing of the natures, and without causing any essential property of the divine nature to become a property of the human nature.' In a similar contradictory manner, Brentz (De incarnatione Christi, p. 1001) afiirms that the humanity of Christ is omnipotent and omnipresent, and yet is not omnipotence itself. Quoted by Bruce : Humiliation of Christ, p. 113.

Later Lutheran theologians are more explicit and selfconsistent, than the Formula Concordiae. Ilollaz defines the " genus majestaticum " as that mode " quo filius dei idiomata divinae suae naturae humanae naturae, propter uniunem personalem, vere et realiter communicavit, ad communem possessionem, usurpationem, et denominationem," Ilase : Hutterus, p. 238. lie asserts that "subjectum, cui data est majestas divina, est Christus secundmn hunumam iiaiuravi, vel quod idem est, humana natura in viroaraaLv rov Aoyov assumpta," Ilase : Ilutterus, p. 238. He defines the communicatio idiomatum in the following terms : " CommuniI A similar self-contradiction is found in the Formula Concordiae, respecting the doctrine of predestination and election. See Muller : Sin, U. pp. 228-230. Ur wick's Trans.

326 CHRISTOLOGY.

catio naturaram in persona Christi est miitua divinae et huinanae Christi naturae participatio, per quam naturadivina rov Aoyov particeps facta humanae naturae, hanc perraeat, periicit, inhabitat, sibique appropriat ; humana vero particeps facta divinae naturae, ab hac permeatur, perficitur et inliabitatur," Hase : Hutterus, p. 23'J:. According to this Lutheran definition, the " communication of idioms," or of properties, means far more than the Reformed divines meant by it. Tlie latter intended by it only the communication of the properties of both natures to the p^rso/i constituted of them. In the Lutheran use, it denotes the communication of the properties of one nature to the other nattire. It is thus the communication of a nature to a nature, rather than of properties to a person.' Similarly, Halm ( Hase : Hutterus, p. 238) says : " Genus majestaticum continet propositiones quibus de natura humana idiomata naturae divinae praedicantur." Gerhard (Loci TV. xii.) says: "We teach that the [human] soul of Jesus in the very first moment of the incarnation was personally enriched, as with other excellences, so also with the proper omniscience of the Logos, through, and in virtue of, the intimate union and communion with the Logos. But as he did not always use his other excellences in the state of exinanition, so also the omniscience personally communicated to him he did not always exercise." Quoted by Bruce : Humiliation of Christ, p. 143.

The principal motive for the Lutheran tenet of the ubiquity of Christ's humanity is, to explain the presence of the entire Christ. The God-man promises to be with his disciples upon earth, '* alway, even unto the end of the world," Matt. 28 : 20. The Beformed explanation is, by the conjunction and union of the limited and local humanity with the illocal and omnipresent divinity. "Bresence by way of conjunction is in some sort presence," says Hooker (Y. Iv.). The divine

1 Dorner so understands it. "Ths Reformed disown the communication of essence, of the Lutherans." Christian Doctrine, § 9J, 95.

CHRIST'S UNIPERSONALITY. 327

nature of Christ is present with his human nature wherever the latter may be, though his human nature is not, as the Lutheran contends, present with his divine nature wherever the latter may be. But this continual presence of the deity with the humanity is equivalent to the presence of the humanity with the deity. The humanity is in effect ubiquitous, because of its personal connection with an omnipresent nature, and not because it is in itself so immense as to be ubiquitous. Christ's deity never is present anywhere in isolation and separation from his humanity, but always as united with and modified by his humanity. But in order to this union and modification, it is not necessary that his humanity should be locally present wherever his deity is. Distance in space is no bar to the personal union between the Logos and his human nature. Suppose, for illustration, the presence of the divine nature of Christ in the soul of a believer while partaking of the sacrament in London. This divine nature is at the same moment conjoined with, and present to, and modified by the human nature of Christ which is in heaven, and not in London. This coi] junction between both is equivalent to the presence of both. The whole Christ is present in this London believer's soul, because, though the human nature is in heaven and not in London, it is yet personally united with the divine nature which is both in heaven and in London. There is no separation between the two natures ; so that whatever influence or effect the divine nature exerts in the believer's soul as he i-eceives the sacrament is a divine-human influence — an influence proceeding from the union of the divine with the human in Jesus Christ.

The union of the two natures in Christ's person is denominated hijpostatical^ that is personal. The two natures, or substances {ovaiat), constitute one personal subsistence {vTToaTaa-L'i). A common illustration employed by the Chalcedon and later fathers is, the union of the human soul and body in one person, and the union of heat and iron,

328 CHRISTOLOGY.

neither of which loses its own properties. Formula Concordiae, Hase : Libri Symbolici, p. 765.

The doctrine of the two natures implies the doctrine of two wills in Christ. Either nature would be incomplete and defective, without the voluntary quality or property in it. Each nature, in order to be whole and entire, must have all of its essential elements. A human nature without voluntariness would be as defective as it would be without rationality.

The Monothelite party regarded the two natures as having only one iheanthropio will between them : yuta ^eavSpUr) ipapyela. From the union of the two natures there resulted a will that was not divine solely, nor human solely, but divine-human. The Monothelite contention was, that " the one Christ works that which is divine, and that which is human, by one divine-human mode of agency." Neander : History, HI. 177. This was in reality a conversion of the two natures, so far as the voluntary property in the nature is concerned, into a third species which is neither divine nor human. It was thus a modified Eutychianism.

In opposition to this error, the catholic theologians asserted two wills in order to the completeness of each nature, and met the objection of the Monothelites that there must then be two persons, by affirming that by reason of the intimate personal union of the two natures neither will works without the other's participation in the efficiency. If the human will acts, the divine will submits and co-acts. This is the humiliation of the divine. If the divine will acts, the human will submits and co-acts. This is the exaltation of the human. One and the same Christ, therefore, pei'forms the divine or the human action, as the case may be, although each action is wrought in accordance with the distinctive qualities of the will that corresponds with it, and takes the lead in it. Moreover, as the human will in Christ was sinless, there was no antagonism between it and the will of the Logos. This is taught in the words, " JN'evertheless,

CHRIST'S UNIPERSONALITY. 329

not my will, but thine be done," Luke 22 : 42. Thus, in any agency of the God-man, although there are two wills concerned in it, a divine and a human, there is but one resulting action. Two wills are not incompatible with a single selfconsciousness, even when they are not hypostatically united iu one person. The divine will works in the regenerate will " to will and to do," and yet there is not duality in the self-consciousness of the regenerate man.

We have already observed, that the personalizing of the human nature by its union with the Logos is seen in the fact, that the activities of the human nature appear as factors in the single self-consciousness of the God-man. He is conscious of finite inclination, and finite volitions ; this proves that there is voluntariness in the human nature that has been individualized. He is conscious also of finite and limited perceptions, judgments, and conclusions; this proves that there is rationality in the human nature that has been individualized. These two elements or properties of human nature, the rational and the voluntary, are no longer dormant, as they are in all non-individualized human nature, but are active and effective in the one self-conscious person Jesus Christ. And one of them is as necessary as the other, to the wholeness and completeness of the human nature. To omit the will from the Inimanity, is as truly an error as to omit the reason ; and therefore the Monothelites deviated from the true doctrine as really as did the Apollinarians.

CHRIST'S IMPECCABILITY.

The doctrine of Christ's person is not complete without considering the subject of his impeccability. That he was sinless is generally acknowledged.' But the holiness of the God-man is more than sinlessness. The last Adam differs from the first Adam, by reason of his impeccability. He was characterized not only by the posse non peccare, but the non posse peccare. He was not only able to overcome temptation, but he was unable to be overcome by it.

An impeccable will is one that is so mighty in its selfdetermination to good that it cannot be conquered by any temptation to evil, however great. A will may be positively holy and able to overcome temptation, and yet not be so omnipotent in its holy energy that it cannot be overcome. The angels who fell could have repelled temptation with that degree of power given them by creation, and so might Adam. But in neither case was it infallibly certain that they would repel it. Though they were holy, they were not impeccable. Their will could be overcome, because it was not omnipotent, and their perseverance was left to themselves and not made sure by extraordinary grace. The case of Jesus Christ, the second Adam, was different, in that he was not only able to resist temptation, but it was infallibly certain that he would resist it. The holy energy

1 Neander : Life of Christ, p. 77 sq. Ed. Bohn. Jeremy Taylor : Life of Christ, Sect. iii. Ullmann : Sinlessness of Jesus, III. i. ii. Trench : Studies in the Gospels (The Temptation). Ullmann is profound and thoughtful upon Christ's sinlessness, but deficient on the subject of his impeccability. Edwards (Will, nL ii.) asserts Christ's impeccability.

CHRIST'S IMPECCABILITY. 331

of his will was not only sufficiently strong to overcome, bnt was so additionally strong that it could not be overcome.

The Scripture proof of Christ's impeccability is the following :

1. The immutability of Christ, taught in Heb. 13 : 8, pertains to all the characteristics of his person. His holiness is one of the most important of these. If the Godman, like Adam, had had a holiness that was mutable and might be lost, it would be improper to speak of him in terms that are applicable only to the unchangeable holiness of God. He would not be " holy, harmless, and undefiled, yesterday, to-day, and forever,"

2. A mutable holiness would be incompatible with other divine attributes ascribed to the God-man. {a) The possibility of being overcome by temptation is inconsistent with the omnipotence of Christ. It implies that a finite power can overcome an infinite one. All temptation to sin must proceed from a created being: either man, or fallen angel. Temptation proper, in distinction from God's paternal trial, must always be finite. God tempts no man, in the strict sense of the term (James 1 : 13). But if a finite temptation is met by an infinite power of resistance, the result must be the failure of the temptation, and not the defeat of the tempted person. (5) The success of temptation depends, in part, upon deceiving the person tempted. " Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression," 1 Tim. 2 : H. A finite intelligence may be deceived, but an infinite intelligence cannot be. Therefore, the omniscience which characterizes the God-man made his apostasy from good impossible.

3. A mutable holiness is irreconcilable with the fact that the God-man is the author of holiness. He is the " author and finisher of our faith," Heb. 12 : 2. He is denominated the " last Adam " in distinction from the first, and as such he is "a quickening spirit," 1 Cor. 15:45. This means that unlike the first Adam he is the fountain of spiritual and

332 CHRISTOLOGY.

holy life for others ; and this implies the unchangeable nature of his own holiness. In Rom. 1 : 4, the divine nature of Christ is described as " a spirit of holiness." The genitive, here, is not equivalent to an adjective, but denotes that the noun which it limits is a source of the qualitj^ spoken of.

In accordance with these statements of Scripture respecting the person of Christ, the symbols and theologians have generally affirmed his impeccability.' Augustine and Anselm attribute this characteristic to him. IS^eander: History, lY. 495, iyo. Also Athauasius: Cout. Arianos, I. 35.

The truth and self -consistence of the doctrine of Christ's impeccability appear, also, from a consideration of the constitution of his person.

Christ's person is constituted of two natures : one divine, and the other human. The divine nature is both intemptable, and impeccable. " God cannot be tempted with evil," James 1 : 13. " It is impossible for God to lie," Hebrews 6 : 18. The human nature, on the contrary, is both temptable and peccable. When these two natures are united in one theanthropic person, as they are in the incarnation, the divine determines and controls the human, not the human the divine. See pp. 269 sq. The amount of energy, therefore, which the total complex person possesses to resist temptation, must be measured not by the human nature but by the divine ; and the amount of energy to resist teniptation determines the peccability or impeccability of the person. Jesus Christ, consequently, is as mighty to ovei'come Satan and sin, as his mightiest nature is. His strength to prevent a lapse from holiness is to be estimated by his divinity, not by his humanity, because the former and not the latter is

' It is remarkable, that a theologian of such soundness and accuracy as the elder Hodge should deny the impeccability of the God-man. " The sinlessness of our Lord," he says (Theology, II. 457), " does not amount to absolute impeccability. It was not a non potest peccare. Temptation implies the possibility of sin. If from the constitution of his person it was impossible for Christ to sin, then his temptation was unreal and without efi'ect, and he cannot sympathize with his people." Theodore Mops, and Abelard denied impeccability.

CHRIST'S IMPECCABILITY. 333

the base of his personality, and dominates the whole complex person.

Consequently, what might be done by the human nature if alone, and by itself, cannot be done by it in this union with omnipotent holiness. An iron wire by itself can be bent and broken in a man's hand ; but when the w^ire is welded into an iron bar, it can no longer be so bent and bi'oken. And A'et iron, whether in a bar or in a wire, is a ductile and flexible metal ; and human nature, whether in a God-man or a mere man, is a temptable and fallible nature. A mere man can be overcome by temptation, but a Godman cannot be. When, therefore, it is asked if the person named Jesus Christ, and constituted of two natures, was peccable, the answer must be in the negative. For in this case the divine nature comes into the account. As this is confessedly omnipotent, it imparts to the person Jesus Christ this divine characteristic. The omnipotence of the Logos preserves the finite human nature from falling, however great may be the stress of temptation to which this finite nature is exposed. Consequently, Christ while having a peccable human nature in his constitution, was an impeccable ])erson. Impeccability characterizes the God-man as a totality, while peccability is a property of his humanity.

But it may be asked, If the properties of either nature may be attributed to the person of the God-man, why may not both peccability and impeccability be attributed to the person of the God-man. We say that Jesus Christ is both finite and infinite, passible and impassible, impotent and omnipotent, ignorant and omniscient, why may we not also say that he is both peccable and impeccable? If the union in one person of the two natures allows of the attribution of contrary characteristics to the one God-man in these former instances, why not also in this latter ?

Because, in this latter instance, the divine nature cannot innocently and righteously leave the human nature to its own finiteness without any support from the divine, as it can in

334 CHRISTOLOGY.

the other instances. Wlieu the Logos goes into union with a huaiau nature, so as to constitute a single person witli it, he becomes responsible for all that this person does through the instrumentality of this nature. The glory or the shame, the merit or the blame, as the case may be, is attributable to this one person of the God-man. If, therefore, the Logos should make no resistance to the temptation with which Satan assailed the human nature in the wilderness, and should permit the humanity to yield to it and commit sin, he would be implicated in the apostasy and sin. The guilt would not be confined to the human nature. It would attach to the whole theanthropie person. And since the Logos is the root and base of the person, it would attach to him in an eminent manner. Should Jesus Christ sin, incarnate God would sin ; as incarnate God suffered, when Jesus Christ suffered.

In reference, therefore, to such a characteristic as sin, the divine nature may not desert the human nature and leave it to itself. In reference to all other characteristics, it may. The divine nature may leave the hunum nature alone, so that there shall be ignorance of the day of judgment, so that there shall be physical weakness and pain, so that there shall be mental limitation and sorrow, so that there shall be desertion by God and the pangs of death. There is no sin or guilt in any of these. These characteristics may all attach to the total person of the God-man without any aspersion upon his infinite purity and holiness. They do, indeed, imply the humiliation of the Logos, but not his culpability. Suffering is humiliation, but not degradation or wickedness. The Logos could consent to suffer in a human nature, but not to sin in a human nature. The God-man was commissioned to suffer (John 10 : IS), but was not commissioned to sin.

Consequently, all the innocent defects and limitations of the finite may be attributed to Jesus Christ, but not its culpable defects and limitations. The God-man may be weak, or sorrowful, or hungry, or weary ; he may be crucified, dead,

CHRIST'S IMPECCABILITY. 335

and buried ; but he may not be sinful and guilty. For this reason, the divine nature constantly supports the human nature under all the temptations to sin that are presented to it. It never deserts it in this case. It empowers it with an energy of resistance that renders it triumphant over the subtlest and strongest solicitations to transgress the law of God. It deserts the humanity so that it may suffer for the atonement of sin, but it never deserts the humanity so that it may fall into sin itself. When Christ cried, "My God, why hast thou forsaken me? " the desertion of the finite by the infinite nature occurred in order that there might be suffering, not that there might be sin. The divine nature, at the very moment of this agony and passion, was sustaining the human nature so that it should not sinfully yield to what was the most powerful temptation ever addressed to a human nature : namely, the temptation to flee from and escape the immense atoning agony, which the God-man had covenanted with the Father to undergo. This is implied in Christ's words, " If it be possible, let this cup pass ; nevertheless, not my will but thine be done. The cup that my Father giveth me, shall I not drink it ? "

Again, the impeccability of Christ is proved by the relation of the two wills in his person to each other. Each nature, in order to be complete, entire, and wanting nothing, has its own will ; but the finite will nevei" antagonizes the infinite will, but obeys it invariably and perfectly. If this should for an instant cease to be the case, there would be a conflict in the self -consciousness of Jesus Christ similar to that in the self-consciouness of his apostle Paul. He too would say, " The good that I would, I do not ; but the evil which I would not, that I do. It is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me ? " Kom. 7 : 19, 20, 24. But there is no such utterance as this from the lips of the God-man. On the contrary, there is the calm inquiry of Christ : " Which of you convinceth me of sin ? " John 8 :, 46 ; and

336 CHRISTOLOGY.

the confident affirmation of St. John : " In him was no sin," 1 John 3 : 5. There is an utter absence of personal confession of sin, in any form whatever, either in the conversation or the prayers of Jesus Christ. There is no sense of indwelling sin. He could not describe his religious experience as his apostle does, and his people do : " The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh," Gal. 5:17.

It is objected to the doctrine of Christ's impeccability tlxali it is inconsistent with his temptabilitj'. A person who cannot sin, it is said, cannot be tempted to sin.

This is not correct ; any more than it would be correct to say that because an army cannot be conquered, it cannot be attacked. Temptability depends upon the constitutional suseejptihility, while impeccability depends upon the will. So far as his natural susceptibility, both physical and mental, was concerned, Jesus Christ was open to all forms of human temptation excepting those that spring out of lust, or corruption of nature. But his peccabilit}', or the possibilitj' of being overcome by these temptations, would depend upon the amount of voluntary resistance which he was able to bring to bear against them. Those temptations were very strong, but if the self-determination of his holy will was stronger than they, then they could not induce him to sin, and he would bo impeccable. And yet plainly he would be temptable.

That an impeccable being can be tempted, is proved by the instance of the elect angels. Having " kept their first estate," they are now impeccable, not by tlieir own inherent power, but by the power of God bestowed upon them. But they might be tempted still, though we have reason to believe that they are not. Temptability is one of the necessary limitations of the finite spirit. ]^o creature is beyond the possibility of temptation, though he may, by grace, be beyond the possibility of yielding to temptation. The only being who cannot be tempted is God : 6

CHRIST'S IMPECCABILITY. 337

'fCLp -Seo? d7reipaaTo

Again, redeemed men in heaven are impeccable through the grace and power of Christ their head. Yet they are still temptable, though not exposed to temptation. Redemption, while it secures from the possibility of a second apostasy, does not alter the finite nature of man. He is still a temptable creature.

And, in like manner, Christ the God-man was temptable, though impeccable. But his impeccability, unlike that of the elect angels and redeemed men, is due not to grace but to the omnipotent and immutable holiness of the Logos in his person. One of the reasons mentioned in Scripture (Heb. 2:14-18) for the assumption of a human nature into union with the second person of the Trinity is, that this person might be tempted. The Logos previous to the incarnation could not be tempted. The human nature was the avenue to temptation ; but the divine nature so empowered and actuated the human, the divine will so strengthened the human will, that no conceivable stress of temptation could overcome Jesus Christ, and bring about the apostasy of the second Adam.

The temptability of Christ through his human nature may be illustrated by the temptability of a man through his sensuous nature. A man's body is the avenue of sensual solicitation to his soul. A certain class of human temptations are wholly physical. They could not present themselves through the mental, or immaterial part of man. Take away the body, and the man could not be assailed by Vol. II.-22

338 CHRISTOLOGY.

this class of temptations. These, it is true, do not constitute the whole of human temptations. Fallen man is tempted through his soul, as well as through his body. But we can distinguish between the two inlets of temptation. ]S[ow, as the mind of man, which may be called his higher nature, is approached by temptation through the body, which is his lower nature, so the divinity of Christ, which is his higher nature, was approached by temptation through his humanity, which is his lower nature. The God-man was temptable through his human nature, not though his divine ; and he was impeccable because of his divine nature, not because of his human.

Temptability and peccability may be in inverse proportion to each other, and this proves that the two things are entirely distinct and diverse. There may be a great temptation with little possibility of its succeeding, owing to the great strength of character, and the great voluntary resistance that is made. Here, there is great temptability, and little peccability. A very strong temptation is required to overcome a very virtuous person. The God-fearing num must be plied with far more solicitation than the irreligious man, in order to bring about a fall into sin. Some saintly men repel a species and stress of solicitation, which, if it were applied to some vicious men, would cause them to sin immediately. To such apply the lines of Watts :

* ' Nor can a bold temptation draw His steady soul aside."

The patriarch Joseph was as strongly tempted as ever Charles II. was, but there was less possibility of yielding to temptation, that is, less peccability. A godlj^ poor man with a suffering familj' whom he tenderly loves may be as strongly tempted to steal, or embezzle, for the sake of his family, as an ungodly poor man in a similar case, but the peccability of the former is less than that of the latter. And for the reason that has been mentioned, namely that

CHRIST'S IMPECCABILITY. 339

the temptability is in the susceptibility, but the peccability is in the will. And while the susceptibility, or sensibility to the solicitation, may be the same in two men, the wills of the two men have become very different from each other. The will of one has been renewed, and endowed with a divine energy of resistance, while the other possesses only the power of a self-enslaved faculty.

Upon the same principle, there may be the very greatest degree of temptation, where there is no possibility at all of its succeeding ; there may be the highest temptability and absolute impeccability. Such we suppose to have been the case of the God-man. He had a perfectly pure human nature which was exceedingly sensitive, because of this purity, to all innocent desires and cravings. No human being ever felt the gnawings of hunger as he experienced them after the forty days' fast, during which he was miraculously kept alive " and w^as afterwards an hungered," Matt. 4 : 2. iSTo human being ever felt a deeper sorrow under bereavement, than he felt at the death of Lazarus, when the God-man wept. JSTo human soul was ever filled with such an awful agony of pain, as that which expressed itself in the words, " My God, why hast thou forsaken me ? " and which had previously forced the globules of blood through the pores of the flesh. '' The Lord Jesus endured most grievous torments immediately in his soul, and most painful sufferings in his body." Westminster Confession, YIIL iv. It is to this extreme sensibility, and susceptibility, and temptability, that our Lord alludes, when he says (Luke 22 : 28, 29), " Ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations. And I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed unto me, that ye may eat and drink at niv table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." And when he says (Matt. 26 : 41) with the deepest emphasis, because of the expei-ience he had just passed through, and of the experience which he knew he was yet to have, " Watch and pray that ye enter not

340 CHRISTOLOGY.

into temptation ; the spirit indeed is willing but the flesh is weak." And when, in reference to this whole subject, he hoth permits and commands tempted man to praj, "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil."

The fact is, that as there may be the most violent attack upon a strategic point where there is an invincible power of resistance, so there may be the most extreme and powerful of temptations addressed to a person in whom there is absolute impeccability. A holy God-man, who can meet Satan's solicitation with an almighty energy of opposition, will be assailed by a fiercer trial than an irresolute sinful man would experience. A far heavier ordnance will be brought to bear upon Gibraltar than upon a packet-boat. Christ was exposed to a severer test and trial than the first Adam was. And this, for the very reason that his resistance was so steady, and so mighty. Had he showed signs of yielding, or had he succumbed in the outset, the stress of the temptation would have been far less than it actually was. Had the first temptation in the wilderness succeeded, it would not have been followed by the second and third. But the more the God-man baffled the tempter, the more the tempter returned to the charge, and intensified his attack.

ITeither let it be supposed that our Lord's temptations were slight, because they were sinless. An innocent temptation may be greater in its force than a sinful one. Christ was solicited by sinless temptation more strongly than any man ever was by sinful temptation. I^o drunkard, or sensualist was ever allured by vicious appetite so fiercely as Christ was by innocent appetite, when after the forty days " he was a hungered." For the stress of the appetite wa.^ supernaturaily heightened in this instance. A natural appetite may be stronger, and more difficult to control, than an unnatural and vicious one. The craving of the glutton for artificial sauces, and highly seasoned food, is not so intense as the huno-er of the traveller in the desert who is

CHRIST'S IMPECCABILITY. 341

upon the brink of starvation. The thirst of the inebriate, great as it is, is not so dreadf nl and overpowering as that of an Englisli soldier in tlie Bhick Hole of Calcutta, or of a negro slave in the middle passage.

Furthermore, the innocent temptations of Christ were made more stringent and powerful, by reason of the steady resistance which he offered to them. Temptations that are accompanied with struggle and opposition against them are fiercer than those that are not so accompanied. The good man, in this way, often feels the distress of temptation far more than the bad man. The latter yields supinely, and making no opposition does not experience the anguish of a struggle. The former is greatly wearied and strained by his temptation, though he is not conquered by it. Christ "resisted unto blood, striving against sin, and offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears unto him that was able to save him from death." But his people " have not so resisted." Heb. 12:4; 5:7.

At this point, it is necessary to notice the difference between the temptability of Christ, and that of a fallen man ; for while there is a resemblance, there is also a dissimilarity between them. Christ's temptations were all of them siiiless, but very many of the temptations of a fallen man are sinful : that is, they are the hankering and solicitation of forbidden and wicked desire. The desire to steal, to commit adultery, to murder, is sinful, and whoever is tempted by it to the act of theft, or adultery^ or murder, is sinfully tempted. St. James (1 : 14) refers to this species of temptation, when he says that " a man is tempted, when he is drawn away by his own lust and enticed." Tlie eiTL^vfila here spoken of is the same which St. Paul mentions in Rom. 7:7, as the equivalent of dfiapTia. It is also the same thing that is forbidden in the tenth commandment, "Thou shalt not lust"— which Luther (Yon Gerlach's Ed., Y. 25) renders: " Du sollst nicht bose Begierden haben." St. James (1:2,3) bids the believer to "count it all joy

342 CHRISTOLOCxY.

when he falls into divers [innocent] temptations" by the will and providence of God, '' knowing this, that the trial of his faith worketh patience," but he does not bid him to count it all jov when he is tempted and drawn away by his own lust.

A man, for illustration, is sinfully tempted, when he is solicited to perform a certain outward act, say to preach a sermon, by the craving of pride or ambition. This craving or inward lust after human applause is itself sin (John 5 : 44 ; 12 : 43 ; Eom. 1 : 25), and to be tempted by it, is to be sinfully tempted. It is idolatry, or creature- worship, in the heart. Even if he does not perform the outward act to which his pride or ambition tempted and urged him, he must repent of his wicked lust or pride of heart, and obtain forgiveness for it. This is taught in Acts 8 : 21, 22. " Thy heart is not right in the sight of God. Repent, therefore, of this thy wickedness [of heart], and pray God if peradventure the thought (eVtVota, pui'pose) of thine heart may be forgiven thee." Simon Magus's particular Just was avarice ; it was wickedness (/ca/cia), and needed the exercise of mercy. Had it been an innocent desire, he might have continued to have it, and needed not to repent of it.

When, again, a man is solicited by the lust of gluttony to perform the external act of intemperate eating of food for the sake of the sensual pleasure of eating, he is not innocently but sinfully tempted. This is wholly different from the solicitation of the natural and innocent appetite for food, such as a famishing sailor on a wreck experiences ; such as our Lord felt when having "fasted forty days and forty nights he was afterwards a hungered." The craving of gluttony is vicious, and whoever is tempted by it is sinfully tempted. Gluttony is not merely and only physical appetite, but contains also a mental and voluntary element. It thinks of eating as enjoyment, and calculates for this. JHunger, pure and simple, on the contrarj^, is physical

CHRIST'S IMPECCABILITY. 343

nierelv, not mental and volnntarj. Gluttony is a part of original sin ; it is the corruption of liumau nature as respects the body.

]^o\v our Lord was not tempted by the sinful lusts of pride, ambition, envy, malice, liatred, anger, jealousy, avarice, gluttony, voluptuousness, drunkenness ; in short by evil desire or " concupiscence " of any kind. lie never felt the hankering of pride and vain-glory so common to man, but was always in his inmost spirit meek and lowly. The appeal of Satan, in the last of the three temptations, to a supposed pride and ambition in Christ, was met with the avaunt : " Get thee hence, Satan." Christ had no sinful lust of any sort. This is taught in Christ's own words : " The prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in me," John 14 : 30. It is also taught in Ileb. 4 : 15, " We have a high priest who was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." This text teaches that the temptations of Christ were " without sin " in their source and nature^ and not merely, as the passage is sometimes explained, that they were " without sin " in their result. The meaning is not, that our Lord was tempted in every respect exactly as fallen man is — by inward lust, as well as by other temptations — onlj^ he did not outwardly yield to any temptation ; but that he was tempted in everj^ way that man is, excepting by that class of temptations that are sinful because originating in evil and forbidden desire.' This is evident, because, in the original, xwph afJiapTia<; qualifies TreTreipaa-fMevov. Christ was tempted without sin, or sinlessly, iu all points like as we are." *

1 When the Westminstor Larger Catechism, 37, affirms that " Christ was born of the Virgin Mary, yet without sin," the meaning is not that he "was born of the Virgin Mary, yet did not commit sin," but that he " was born sinless of the Virgin Mary."

"^ The preposition x^i^h denotes entire separation (xcopi^eiy). The author of this Emstle frequently uses it. Heb. 7 : 21, " Those priests werD made without an oath" (x^^p's dpKwuomas). Their consecration was oathless. Heb. 9:18, " The first testament was not dedicated without blood " (X'^/'^s ai/iaros). The

344 CHRISTOLOGY.

Temptations from evil desire have a different moral quality from those presented through innocent desire. The former are Bl d/jiapTca<;, or e^ dfMapTLa

CHRIST'S IMPECCABILITY. 345

sible of these things tlian any of the children of men. JJnt as to our bodily diseases, and distempers, wliich personally adhere unto us upon the disorder and vice of our constitutions, he was absolutely free from them." If Christ, like fallen man, were subject to that class of forbidden appetences and selfish desires mentioned in Gal. 5 : 19, 21, namely, " idolatry, hatred, emulation, envyings, murder, wrath, uncleanness, drunkenness, and such hke," the dignity and perfection of his character would be gone, and he could not be looked up to with the reverence that he is. The words of the dead kings to the fallen king of Babylon would apply : " Art thou also become weak, as we ? art thou become like unto us ? " Isa. 11: : 10,

The reasons why Christ was tempted are the following ;

1. The suffering involved in his temptations was a part of his humiliation and satisfaction for sin. x\. tempted being is, in so far, a sufferer. Hence we have reason to believe that no temptation is experienced in the heavenly world.

2. In submitting to temptation, Christ sets an example to his disciples, of constancy in obedience and resistance to evil. Believers are bidden to " look unto Jesus, who for the joy that was set before him endured the cross despising the shame," and to " consider him that endured such contradiction of sinners against himself lest they be wearied and faint in their minds," Heb. 12 : 2, 3.

The fact that Christ was almighty and victorious in his resistance, does not unfit him to be an example for imitation to a weak and sorely tempted believer. Because our Lord overcame his temptations, it does not follow that his conflict and success was an easy one for him. His victory cost him tears and blood. " His visage was so marred more than any man," Isa. 52 : 14. There was '" the travail of his soul," Isa. 52 : 14. In the struggle he cried, " O my Father, if it be possible let this cup pass from me ! " Matt. 26 : 39. Because an army is victorious, it by no means follows that the victory was a cheap one. " One more such

346 CHRISTOLOGY

victory," said Pjrrhiis after the battle of Asciilnin, "will ruin me." The physical agonj of the martyr is not diminished in the least by the strength imparted to him by God to endure it. The fire is as hot, and the pain as great, in his case as in that of an unbeliever. Divine grace does not operate like chloroform, and deaden pain. The bereavement of a believer by the death of a beloved object is none the less sore and heavy, because of the grace which helps him to bear it. The promise is, " Cast thy burden on the Lord and he shall sustain thee " — not the burden. Such facts show that victory over a temptation does not imply that the temptation is a slight one ; that because Christ could not be overcome by temptation, therefore his temptation must have been less severe than that of his people.

On the contrary, Christ's human nature, while it was supported and strengthened by the divine, Avas for this very reason subjected to a severer strain than an ordinary human nature is. Suppose that an additional engine shonld be put into a vessel that is adapted to carry only one, and that a safe passage is guaranteed to it. When it comes into port after boring through three thousand miles of billows, it will show marks of the strain snch as an ordinary ship, nnder ordinary pressure, will not. " Gemnit snb pondere cj'mba." Aeneid YI., 413. The traditions of the Church, and the representations of the old painters, founded npon tlie Scripture statements, present Christ's humanity as weighed down and worn by the awful burden of that heavy cross which the finite nature supported by the infinite was compelled to bear, and which without that support it could not have borne. For " it was i*equisite that the mediator should be God, that he might sustain and keep the Imman nature from sinking nnder the infinite wrath of God, and the power of death." "Westminster Larger Catechism, 38.

3. By this almighty and victorious resistance of temptation, Christ evinced his power to succor those that are

CHRIST'S l.MPECCABILITY. 347

tempted, and to carry tliem through all temptation. He sliowed that he is Lord and conqueror of Satan, and his kingdom. Coloss. 2 : 15, " Having spoiled principalities and powers, he made a show of them openly, triumphing over them." Ps. 2: 2, -i, "The kings of the earth set themselves against the Lord's anointed. He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh ; the Lord shall have them in derision." 1 Cor. 15: 25, "He must reign till he hath put all enemies nndor his feet." Heb. 2 : 10, " It became him for whom are all things, to make the captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings." The " perfection " spoken of here is not sanctification from sin ; but a suitable preparation and accomplishment for his mediatorial office and work by trial and grief, whereby he is able to sympathize with those that are tempted. Hence rekiSio-ai, and not ayid^eiv is the word employed.

1. In the first place, then, the Redeemer of sinful men must be truly human, not weakly human ; nnfallen man, not fallen ; the ideal man, not the actual; temptable not peccable. He must be truly human, in order to be assailable by temptation and thereby able to sympathize with every tempted man. In order to sympathize with a person, it is not necessary to have had exactly the same affliction that he has. It is only necessary to have been afflicted. A different kind of affliction may make a man all the more sympathetic. Because Christ was sinlessly tempted, he feels a deeper and more tender sympathy with sinfully tempted man, than he would had he been lustfully and viciously tempted. And this, for three reasons. («) Lustful desire deadens the sensibility, and blunts the tenderness and delicacy of the nature, {h) There is much selfishness in the sympathy of vice with vice ; of one drunkard with another. Misery loves company. But the sympathy of a benevolent temperate man for a dri:nkard is disinterested. (

348 CHRISTOLOGY.

make for the miserable, rather than in the mere fact that one has felt precisely the same misery himself. Tested bj this, Christ has infinitely more sympathy for man than any man has had, or can have. " Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends," John 15 : 13. One man may know very vividly from personal experience how another man feels, and yet not be willing to undergo any suffering for him, for the purpose of delivering huu from sufferino;. Drunkards have a common feeling- of misery, but they do not make sacrifices for one another. On the contrary, they " bite and devour one another," Gal. 5 : 15. Satan well knows from personal experience what remorse is, and how his fellow-angels suffer from remorse, but he has no disposition to help them at his own expense. 2. Secondly, the Redeemer of man must not be weakly and peccabiy human, because he must be " mighty to save, travelling in the greatness of his strength," Isa. 63 : 1. He must have power to overcome all temptation when it assails himself personally, in order that he may be able " to succor them that are tempted," Ileb. 2 : 18. Fallen and helpless man cannot trust himself to one who is himself liable to fall from God. The second Adam must be mightier to repel temptation than the first Adam. And certainly if good and evil were so proportioned to each other in Christ that they trembled in the balance, as they sometimes do in his disciples, no fallen man could go to him with confidence of victory over evil. After the cry, " O wretched man that I am : who shall deliver me from the body of this death ? " there would not be the exulting shout, " I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord." If Christ could meet all the temptations that approached him through his innocent and sinless human nature, from the wiles of Satan, and from suffering positively inflicted by eternal justice upon the sinner's voluntary substitute; if Christ could meet this vast amount of temptation with only a feeble finite will not reinforced and strengthened

CHRIST'S IMPECCABILITY. 349

by an infinite will ; he would not be " mighty to save," nor would he " travel in the greatness of his strength." The Monophjsite error, which makes Christ to be nothing but God, is not so great and discouraging as the Socinian, w^iich makes him to be nothing but man. For it would be possible for a helpless sinner fainting in the conflict with sin and death to trust in a merely infinite person, but not in a merely finite one.

Calvin : Institutes, II. xv. Ursinus : Christian Religion, Q, 2931, Turrettin : Institutio, XIV. i.-vii., xv.-xvii. Witsius : Apostles' Creed, Dissertation X. Van Oosterzee : Dogmatics, | cviii.-cxiii. Martensen : Dogmatics, § 148-180. Hodge : Theology, II. 455-608.

SoTERiOLOGY ((TGjTTypta? \6jo

When we pass from the complex constitution of Christ's person to the work which he wrought for man's redemption, we find him represented in Scripture as a Mediator. " There is one God, and one mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus," 1 Tim. 2:5. In this passage, the term "man" denotes the entire theanthropic person Jesus Christ, not the human nature. The human nature is not the Mediator. Man, here, designates the God-man under a human title, and is like the title " Son of man," or "last Adam" (1 Cor. 15: 45); or "second man" (1 Cor. 15 : 47). Again, the God-man is described in Scripture as being appointed nu>l consecrated to the work of human redemption by God the Father as the representative of the Trinity. Plence the incarnate Word is also denominated the Messiah, the Anointed One. Dan. 9 : 25 ; Ps. 2 : 2 ; 45 : 7.

Speaking generally, Messiah is the Old Testament term Vol. II.— 23

354 SOTERIOLOGY.

for the Redeemer, and Mediator is the New Testament term» The word Christ which translates Messiah is generally a proper name in the New Testament, not an official title. Sometimes, however, the God-man is denominated Jesus "the Christ," or "that Christ." Matt. 1(3 : 20 ; Luke 9 : 20 ; John 1 : 25 ; 0 : 29. The Christian church prefers the New Testament designation of Mediator, to the Old Testament designation of Messiah. The Westminster Larger Catecliism (Q. 36) denominates Christ " the only Mediator of the convenant of grace."

There are several characteristics of Christ as the Mediator that must be carefully noted, in order to avoid misconception.

1. The mediator between God and man cannot be God only, or mail only. This is taught in Gal. 3: 20, "A mediator is not of one, but God is one." A mediator supposes two parties between whom he intervenes ; but God is only one party. Consequently, the mediator between God and man must be related to both, and the equal of either. lie caimot be simply God, who is only one of the parties, and has only one nature. Therefore the eternal Word must take man's nature into union with himself, if he would be a mediator between God and man. As a trinitarian person merely, he is not qualified to mediate between them. The same truth is tauo-lit in 1 Sam. 2:25, ''For if one man sin against another, the judge shall judge him ; but if a man sin against the Lord, who shall entreat for him;" and in Job 9 : 33, " There is not any days-man betwixt us, to lay his hand upon us both ;" and in Heb. 10 : 5, " Therefore when he [the mediator] cometh into the world, he saith, A body hast thou prepared for me."

2. Secondly, the office of a mediator between God and man is one of condescension and humiliation : (a) Because it involves the assumption of a human nature by a divine person. This is taught in Phil. 2 : 5, 8, " Let this powly] mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus, who being

CHRIST'S MEDIATORIAL OFFICES, 355

ill the form of God made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant." To unite the finite with tlie infinite is to humble the infinite. Incarnate deity is a step down from unincarnate deity. The latter is wholly unconditioned ; the former is conditioned by the inferior nature which it has assumed, {h) Because to be a mediator between God and man implies a condition of dependence. When the second person in the Trinity agrees to take the place of a mediator between the Trinity and rebellious man, he agrees to be commissioned and sent upon a lowlj' errand. lie consents to take a secondary place. A king who volunteers to become an ambassador to his own subjects condescends, and humbles himself. The office of a commissioner sent to offer terms to rebels is inferior to that of the king. This is taught in many passages of scripture. Matt. 11 : 27, "All things are given me of my Father;" Matt. 28:18, " All power is given to me in heaven, and in earth ; " John 17:2, "Thou has given unto him power over all flesh ; " Col. 1 : 19, " It pleased the Father that in him all fulness should dwell ; " llev. 1 : 1, " The revelation of Jesus Christ, which God gave unto him to show unto his servants;" Phil. 2:8, "lie became obedient unto death;" Gal. 4 : 4, The Son of God " was made under the law ; " Eph. 1 : 22, 23, " lie put all things under his feet, and gave liim to be head over all things." This class of texts is cited by Socinus to disprove the doctrine of Christ's original deity. But it has reference to Christ in his capacity and office of mediator, which is an assumed not an original office. These texts do not describe the Logos prior to his incarnation, but subsequent to it. When Christ speaks of his pre-existent and eternal place in the Trinity, he does not employ such phraseology. He says, " I and my Father are one," John 10 : 30 ; " Glorify thou me with the glory which I had with thee before the world was," John 17 : 5 ; " Before Abraham was I am," John 8 : 58 ; " My Father worketh hitherto, and I work," John 5 : 17 ; " The Son of man

356 SOTERIOLOGY.

is Lord of the Sabbath," Luke 6:5; "I am the resurrection and the life," John 11 : 25; "I am the living bread which came down from heaven," John 6:51; "Whoso eateth mj flesh, and drinketh my blood hath eternal life," John 6 : 54. But when Christ refers to his incarnate and mediatorial position, he says, " My Father is greater than I," John 14 : 28 ; " Say ye of him whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world. Thou blasphemest : because I said, I am the Son of God ? " John 10 : 36 ; "I came down from heaven not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me," John 6 : 38 ; "I have finislied the work which thou gavest ine to do," John 17:4;" Then shall the Son be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all," 1 Cor. 15 : 28. Accordingly, the AYestminster Confession, YIIL iii., speaking of Christ's office of mediator, says that " this office he took not unto himself, but was thereunto called by his Father ; who put all power and judgment into his hand, and gave him commandment to execute the same." {c) Because the office of mediator is temporary. It begins to be exercised in time, and a time will come when it will cease to be exercised. This is taught in 1 Cor. 15: 24, 28. "Then cometh the end [of the economy of redemption], when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father, when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power. And when all tilings shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that did put all things under him, that [the triune] God may be all in all." As there was once a time when there was no mediatorial work of salvation going on, so there will be a time when there will be none. The Logos was not actually and historically a mediator until he assumed human nature. It is true that in the Old Testament church the second trinitarian person discharged the office of a mediator by anticipation, and men were saved by his mediatorial work ; but it was in view of his future advent, and future performance of that work.

CHRIST'S MEDIATORIAL OFFICES. 357

Types and symbols stood in the place of the incarnate Word. Not however until the miraculous conception, was there actually a God-man ; and not until then, was there an actual historical mediator. And although there will now always be a God-man, yet there will not always be a mediatorial work going on. The God-man will one day cease to redeem sinners. St. Paul is explicit in sajnng that a day will come when Christ will deliver up and return his mediatorial commission to the Father, from whom as the representative of the Trinity he received it. There will then " remain no more [available] sacrifice for sin,'' Heb. 10 : 26 ; and there will be no longer an access to a holy God for sinful men througli Christ's blood. Hence it is said: "j^ow is the accepted time, and now is the day of salvation ; " '' To-day if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts;" "He limiteth a certain day, saying, To-day, if ye will hear his voice," Heb. 3 : 13, 15, 18 ; 4: 1, 7.' But a function that begins in time and ends in time, when discharged by a Divine person is evidently one of condescension and secondary nature. Tlie second person of the Trinity as a creator holds no position of condescension and humiliation, and pei'forms no function that is secondary and temporary in its nature. He is a creator by reason of his absolute and eternal deity, and is so from everlasting to everlasting. There never was a time when he was not a creator, and there never will be a time when he will cease to be a creator. He never was commissioned to the office of creator ; he never assumed this office ; and he will never lay it down. It belongs to him by virtue of his divinity. Creation is a primary, not a secondary function. But the second person as mediator assumes an office and takes a position which is not necessarily implied in his deity. He might be God the Son, without bemg God the mediator ; but he could not be God the Son without being God the creator, {d) Because the office of mediator is one

1 See also Christ's parables of the foolish virgins, Matt. 25, and the wedding, garment, Matt. 22, Compare Witsius : Apostles' Creed, X. 42-44; XXVL 76.

358 SOTERIOLOGY.

of reward. The condescension and Immiliation of the Logos in assnming a finite nature, and executing a commission, is to be recompensed. It is a self-sacrifice that merits a return from the person wlio commissioned and sent the mediator upon this service. This is taught in Phih 2: 5-11. " Christ Jesus took upon him the form of a servant ; wherefore God also hath higlilj exalted him and given him a name which is above every name ; that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth ; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." This is not a reward for that which the Logos was and did as unincarnate, and as the second person of the Trinity, but of what he was and did as the incarnate Logos, and as the commissioned mediator between God and man. A Divine person, as such, cannot be either exalted or rewarded. This phraseology of St. Paul refers not to the eternal and pre-existent state and position of Jesus Christ, but to his post-existent state and condition. It does not relate to the "foi'm of God" which he had originally -and from all eternity, but to the "form of a servant" which ■he assumed in time, and which he retains forever. The same truth is taught in lleb. 2:9, " We see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels [i.e. was made a man, ver. 7.], for the suffering of death crowned with glory and honor; " and in Rev. 3 : 21, " To him that overcometh will I grant to sit with me in my throne, even as I also overcame and am set down with my Father in his throne." ie) Because the Son of God enters into a convenant with the Father to take a mediatorial office and position. But if he were originally in a subordinate position, he could not covenant or agree to become subordinate.

Jesus Christ is represented in Scripture as the mediator of a covenant, lleb. 12 : 24, '' Jesus the mediator of tiie new covenant ; " lleb. 8:6," lie is the mediator of a better ^covenant;" Malachi 3: 1, "The Lord whom ye seek shall

CHRIST'S MEDIATORIAL OFFICES. 359

suddenly come to his temple, even the messenger of the covenant;" Luke 22: 20, " This cup is the new covenant {Sta^nfcr}) in mv blood." Compare Matt. U : 24 ; 26 : 28. Accordingly, the symbols so represent him. " The only mediator of the covenant of grace is the Lord Jesus Christ." Westminster L. C. 3G.

A difference in the Scripture representations has given rise to a distinction between the covenant of grace, and the covenant of redemption. The covenant of grace is made between the Father and the elect. This is tauglit in those passages which speak of Christ as the mediator of the covenant. Ileb. 9 : 1.5, " For this cause, he is the mediator of the new covenant ; " Heb. 8:6," He is the mediator of a better covenant." This implies that the promises of the covenant are made by God the Father to his people, and that Christ stands between the two parties. The same is taught in Gal. 3 : 16, " ]N^ow to Abraham and his seed were the promises made. He saith not. And to seeds, as of many [seeds] ; but as to one [seed], And to thy seed, which is Christ." The contracting parties here are the Father and the elect " seed." This also has its type in the Sinaitic theocratic covenant between Jehovah and the Hebrews as a chosen nation, of which national covenant Moses was the mediator. Gal. 3 : 19, '• The law was ordained by angels in the hands of a mediator." The following passages mention the covenant of God the Father with the elect church: Isa. 43: 1-6, " Fear not, O Israel, for I have redeemed thee : thou art mine. When thou passest through the waters, I will be with thee ; and through the rivers, they shall not overflow thee ; " Isa. 59 : 21, " This is my covenant with them, saith the Lord : My spirit that is upon thee, and my words which I have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, saith the Lord, from henceforth and for ever."'

' "Israel, as well as the Messiah, and in due dependence on him, was to be the light of the Gentiles, ■'•,he redeemer of apostate nations." Alexander on Isa. 59 :

360 SOTERIOLOGY.

The covenant of redemption is made between the Father and the Son. The contracting parties here are the iii'st and second persons of the Trinity ; the first of whom promises a kingdom, a glory, and a reward, npon condition that tlie second performs a work of atonement and redemption.' The following are passages in which it is spoken of. Isa, 42 : 1-6, " Beliold ray servant whom I uphold. lie shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street. I the Lord have called thee, and will hold thy liand, and will keep thee, and will give thee for a light of the Gentiles, to open the blind eyes ; " Luke 22 : 29, " I appoint [SiaTi!^€fxai, covenant] unto you a kingdom, as my father hath appointed unto me ; " Isa. 53 : 10-12, " When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed ; " Isa. 49 : 6, " I will give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the ends of the earth ; " Ps. 89 : 3436, " My covenant will I not break. Once have I sworn, that I will not lie unto David. His seed shall endure forever ; " Ps. 2 : 8, '' Ask of me, and I will give thee the lieathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession."

Though this distinction is favored by the Scripture statements, it does not follow that there are two separate and independant covenants antithetic to the covenant of works. The covenant of grace and that of redemption are two modes or phases of the one evangelical covenant of mercy. The distinction is only a secondary or subdistinction. For when, as in Isa. 43 : 1-6, the elect are spoken of as the party with whom God the Father makes a covenant, they

21. In Isaiah, the " servant of the Lord " is sometimes national, i.e. the Church ; and sometimes personal, i.e. the Messiah. This is the key'to the interpretation. ' Christ is the mediator of the covenant of redemption as well as of grace ; for though no one mediates between the Father and the incarnate Son, yet as the elect are one with him in the former covenant as well as the latter, he is a mediator in respect to them in the former case as well as in the latter. All the benefits that come to the church from the covenant between the Father and the Son are mediated to it through the Son.

CHRIST'S MEDIATORIAL OFFICES. 361

are viewed as in Christ and one with him. The covenant is not made with them as alone and apart from Christ. This is tang-ht in Gal. 3 : IG, " To Abraham and his seed were the promises made ; '' but this seed " is Christ." The elect are here (as also in 1 Cor. 12 : 12) called " Christ," because of the union between Christ and the elect. And in like manner, wlien Christ, as in Isa. 42 : 1-6, is spoken of as the party with whom the Father covenants, the elect are to be viewed as in him. As united and one with him, his atoning suffering is looked upon as their atoning suffering, Gal. 2 : 20, " I am crucified with Christ ;" his resurrection involves their resurrection, Rom. 6:5, " Grown together in the likeness of his resurrection ;" his exaltation brings their exaltation. Matt. 19 : 28, " Ye shall sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel;" 1 Cor. 6: 3, "We shall judge angels." The covenant of redemption is not made with Christ in isolation, and apart from his people. It is with the Head and the members. Eph. 1 : 22, 23, " He gave him to be the head over all things to the church, which is his body, the fulness of him that fiUeth all in all."

The following statement, then, comprises the facts. There are only two general covenants, the legal, and the evangelical. " These are the two covenants, the one from Mount Sinai which gendereth to bondage," Gal. 4 : 24. The first in order is the legal covenant of works. It is founded upon the attribute of justice. Its promise is, " Do this and thou shalt live." This covenant failed upon the part of man, in the fall of Adam. The second is the evangelical covenant, founded upon the attribute of mercy. Its promise is twofold : {a) To the Mediator. " Make thy soul an offering for sin, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession," Isa. 53 : 10 ; Ps. 2 : 8. (h) To the elect. " Fear not, for 1 have redeemed thee, I have called thee by thy name; thou art mine. When thou passest through the waters, I will be with thee ; and through the rivers, they shall not overflow

362 SOTERIOLOGY.

thee," Isa. 43 : 1, 2 ; " Believe on tlie Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved, and thy house," Acts 16 : 31. The evangelical covenant, as opposite to the legal convenant, may therefore be called the covenant of redemption when Christ and his offices are the principal thing in view ; and the covenant of grace, when the elect and their faith and obedience are the principal thing under consideration.

Respecting the validity of the distinction, there is some difference of opinion, though the weight of authority is in favor of it. TnrrettinfXII. ii. 12) adopts it ; also Witsius, Covenants II. ii. 1 ; and Hodge, Theology II. 358. Fisher, on the Catechism (Q. 20, § 57), asserts that the Westminster " standards make no distinction between a covenant of redemption, and a covenant of grace." The phrase " covenant of redemption " is not found in them. In the Larger Catechism, Q. 31, it is said that "the covenant of grace was made with Christ, and in him with all the elect." This would be the covenant of redemption. In the Westminster Confession, YII. iii., it is stated that " the Lord was pleased to make a second covenant, commonly called the covenant of grace, wherein he freely offereth unto sinners life and salvation by Jesus Christ, requiring of them faith in Him that they may be saved, and promising to give unto all those that are ordained unto life his Holy Spirit, to make them willing and able to believe." Here the covenant is made with the elect. The phraseology in the twentieth question of the Shorter Catechism is somewhat ambiguous ; " God, having elected some to everlasting life, did enter into a covenant of grace, to deliver them out of the estate of sin and misery, and to bring them into an estate of salvation b}' a Hedeemer." Whetlier the '' covenant " mentioned is made with the elect, or with the mediator, is not to be indisputably determined from the wording of the statement.

The evangelical covenant, as the opposite of the legal covenant, is essentially one and the same under the Old

CHRIST'S MEDIATORIAL OFFICES. 363

dispensation and the New, The difference is only in the mode of administration. In the Old dispensation, comprising the Patriarclial and Jewish churches, it was administered through animal sacrifices and visible types and symbols ; in the New dispensation, by the advent and sacrifice of Christ. The old administration was ceremonial and national ; the new is spiritual and universal. This difference is mentioned in 2 Cor. 3 : 14. " Moses put a vail [of types and ceremonies] over his face, that the children of Israel could not steadfastly look to the end of that which is abolished ; but their minds were blinded ; for until this day, remaineth the same vail untaken away in the reading of the old testament; which vail is taken away in Christ." In Ileb. 8 : 6-13, the " first covenant " is the covenant of grace made " with their fathers when God took them by the hand to lead them out of Egypt," administered l)y types and symbols ; and the " second covenant " is the covenant of grace under the administration of Christ personally, who is " the mediator of a better covenant." Heb. 9 : 15 speaks of the " new covenant " in distinction from the " first covenant " (which had " ordinances of divine service, and an earthly sanctuary"), and of the " redemption of trangressions under the first covenant." This shows that the " first covenant " was a gracious one.'

' The difference between these two phases oE one and the same evangelical covenant, is marked in the authorized version of the New Testament by the translation of StaS^^/crj. It is generally rendered "covenant," when it refers to the administration of mercy in the Old dispensation, and " testament " when it refers to the administration of mercy in the New. But the only passage in which it can with any plausibility mean "testament," is Heb. 9 : 10, 17; and in this, "covenant " might be used, in accordance with the following rendering : "For where a covenant is, the death of the covenantor (tov SiaSre/xeyov) of necessity is implied {dvdyKfj

Christ, the God-man, as the mediator of tlie evangelical covenant, discharges three offices ; those of prophet, priest, and king. " Our mediator was called Christ, because he was anointed with the Holv Ghost above measure ; and so set apart and fully furnished with all authority and ability, to execute the offices of prophet, priest, and king of his church, in the estate both of his humiliation and exaltation." AVestminster L. C, 42. His prophetical office is taught in Deut. 18 : 15, 18 ; Acts 3 : 22, " The Lord thy God will raise up nnto tliee a prophet from the midst of thee, of thy brethren, like unto mc ; " Isa. IG : 1 ; Luke 4: 18, "The spirit of the Lord God is upon me ; because the Lord hath anointed me to preach good tidings." His priestly office is taught in Ps. 110 : 4: ; Heb. 5 : 5, 6,. '"Thou art a priest forever after the order of Melchisedec ; " Lleb. 4 ; 14:, 15, " We have a great high priest that is passed into the heavens." His kingly office is taught in Isa. 9 : 6, 7, " He shall be called the prince of peace ; " Ps. 2:6, "I have set my king upon my holy hill of Zion."

These offices were each and all of them executed by the mediator before, as well as after his advent. Westminster Confession, YIL v.; Ylll. vi. This is proved by Kev. 13 : 8, " The Lamb slain from the foundation of the world ; " Gen. 3 : 15, " The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head;" Pom. 3: 25, "To declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past ; " Heb. 9 : 15, " He is the mediator of the new testament, that by means of death for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first testament, they which are called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance ; " Gal. 3 : 8, 14, 16-18, compared with Gen. 17:7; 22 : 18 ; Acts 15 : 11, " We believe that through the grace of Christ we shall be saved even as they " [the fathers] ; Acts 10 : 43, " To him

nantor is reckoned to have died, when his vicarious victim dies. Such a phrase as " the death of the covenantor," would not have seemed strange in the least to the Hebrews, to whom the epistle was addressed.

CHRIST'S MEDIATORIAL OFFICES. - 365

give all the prophets witness that through his name whosoever believeth in him shall receive remission of sins;" lleb. 10 : 1-10, " For the law [Jewish dispensation] having a shadow of good things to come ; " Coloss. 2 : 17, The Jewish ordinances " are a shadow of things to come ; but the body is of Christ ; " Isa. 53 ; Isa. 42 : 6, "I the Lord have called thee, and will give thee for a light of the Gentiles; " Heb. 4:2, "Unto us was the gospel preached, as well as unto them."

Faith in the Mediator was the unmeritorious, but indispensable condition of salvation,' before the advent as well as after it, "The just [i.e. the justified] shall live by faith," Ilab. 2 : 4. This is quoted by St. Paul in Rom. 1 : 17. " Blessed are all they that put their trust in him," Ps. 2 : 12. " Abraham believed God and it was counted to him for righteousness," Pom. 4:3. "David saith, Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin," Pom. 4:8. " These all died in faith," Ileb. 11 : 13. Enoch " pleased God " by his faith, Ileb. 11:5. " The Old Testament is not contrary to the Kew : for both in the Old and Kew Testament everlasting life is offered to mankind by Christ, who is the only mediator between God and Man," Thirty-nine Articles, Art. YII. Says Calvin, on Gal. 4 : 1-7, " We learn from this passage, that the fathers under the Old Testament had the same liope of the inheritance which we have at the present day, because they were partakers of the same adoption. Notwithstanding their outward servitude, their consciences were still free. Though bearing the yoke of the [ceremonial] law upon their shoulders, they nevertheless with a free spirit worshipped God. More pai'ticularly, having been instructed concerning the free pardon of sin, their consciences were delivered from the tyranny of sin and death. They held the same doctrine, were joined with us in the true unity of faith, placed re' On the use of the term " condition," applied to the covenant of grace, see Witsius : Apostles' Creed, Vol. I., Note xliv.

306 SOTERIOLOGY.

liaiice on one Mediator, called on God as their Father, and were led by the same Spirit. Hence it appears, that the difference between us and these ancient fathers lies not in substance, but in accidents or circumstantials."

The Old Testament believer had both the penitent conscionsness of sin, and of the remission of sin. The account of the religious experience of Abraham, Moses, David, and Isaiah, discloses a contrite spirit before the absolute holiness of God. The Old Testament saint cast himself upon the Divine mercy. Ps. 32 : 1-11 ; Ps. 51 ; Ps. 103 : 2, 3. And this mercy he expected through the promised " seed of the woman," the Messiah; and through an atonement typified by the Levitical sacrifices. The forgiveness of sin was both promised and received under the Old dispensation.

The Prophetical ofiice of Christ is thus described in the Westminster Larger Catechism, Q. -13 : " Christ executeth the oflSce of a prophet in revealing to the church, in all ages, by his Spirit and word, the whole will of God in all things concerning edification and salvation." The prophetical function of Christ is not confined to the prediction of future events. The idea is wider than that of mere vaticination, though it includes this. Christ, as " that prophet that should come into the world " (John G : 14 ; John 1 : 21 ; Luke 24 : 19j, is the source and teacher of truth ; and particularly of that truth which relates to human redemption. This is implied in the names that are given to him in Scripture. He is called the Counsellor, Isa. 9:6; the Witness, Isa. 55 : 4 ; the Intei-preter, Job 33 : 23 ; the Apostle, Heb. 3:1; the Word, John 1:1; the Truth, John 14 : 6 ; and Wisdom, Prov. 8. In the Logos-doctrine of St. John, all the previous statements respecting the prophetical or teaching function of the Mediator are summed up, and more fully unfolded. He is " the light of men," John 1:4; the " light of the world," John 9:5; the " true light which coming into the world lighteth every man," John 1:9; " the light to lighten the Gentiles," Luke 2 : 32 ; Isa.

CHRIST'S MEDIATORIAL OFFICES. 367

60 : 3 ; '* the Word dwelling among us full of truth," John 1 : 14; the " Christ iu whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge," Coloss. 2 : 3. Hence the voice from heaven to mankind, "This is my beloved Son, hear ye him," Matt. 17:5.

The great characteristic of Christ as a prophet is his consciousness of infallibility. " He spake as one having authority, and not as the scribes," Mai-k 1 : 22 ; '- But 1 say unto you," Matt. 5 : 3-1. Merely hunian prophets, like Isaiah (Ch. 6), are abashed in the presence of deity when receiving communications from him, Christ never shows the least trace of such a feeling. " jS^o man knows the Father but the Son, and no one knows the Son but the Father," Matt. 11 : 27. This implies co-equality with the Father in tlie knowledge of the mystery of the Trinity. Christ speaks out of the fulness of his own immediate intuition. He never says, " The word of tlie Lord came unto me," From the omniscience of his own divine nature he draws all his teachings, as a prophet. " In him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," Coloss. 2 : 9. He is the source to others of prophetical knowledge. He "opened the understanding of his disciples that they might understand the scriptures," Luke 24 : 45. The Old Testament prophets "prophesied of the grace that should come, searching what, or what manner of time, tlie Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand the suiferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow," 1 Pet. 1 : 10, 11.

1. Christ executes the office of prophet personally and directly. This he did : {a) In all the theophanies of the Old Testament. The appearances of Jehovah to individuals before the flood, to the patriarchs and Moses after the flood, to the prophets of Israel and Judah, were a discharge of the prophetical function of the Mediator, These were all harbingers and adumbrations of his incarnation, (J) In his incarnation itself. This was as direct and personal teaching as is possible. The second person of the Trinity when in368 SOTERIOLOGY.

carnate upon earth spoke as never man spake, and spoke face to face to man. And his teaching was not confined to his words, though most of his instruction was so conveyed. The works of Clirist as well as his words, and especially his miraculous works, taught man. " If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works," John, 10 : 37, 38. His disciples describe him as " a prophet mighty in deed and word before the people," Luke 24 : 19. This prophetical office continues to be discharged personally by the incarnate Word, in his state of exaltation. In the description of the heavenly world, the " Lamb " is said to be " the light thereof," Kev. 21 : 23.

2. Christ executes the office of prophet mediately : (a) Through the Holy Spirit. All the truth that was conveyed previous to the advent through the inspired prophets of the Old Testament, and subsequent to it through the apostles of the New Testament, comes to man in the discharge of the prophetical function of the Mediator. Hence it is said (1 Pet. 1 : 10-12) that it was "the Spirit of Christ" that was in the prophets " who prophesied of the grace that should come," and who " testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ." By this same Holy Spirit, Christ "preached unto those that were disobedient in the days of ISToah," and who are now and forevermore " in prison " for their disobedience. 1 Pet. 3: 19, 20. SeeEscliatology,p. 609. Christ as prophet is thus the source of all revelation, unwritten and written. The truths of natural religion come to man througli him. Lie is the " light of men," in the sense that what " may be known of God " is an unwritten and intei-nal revelation to them. Rom. 1 : 19. And he is the "light of the world," in the sense that all that higher and more perfect knowledge respecting God and human salvation which constitutes the written word has him for its author. " The only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him," John 1 : 18. {b) Through the instrumentality of the Christian

CHRIST'S MEDIATORIAL OFFICES. 369

ministry and church. Christ, in the first place, commissioned his apostles as inspired agents both to teach and to preach the gospel. Their writings are the infallible documents by which the church is to be instructed and guided. Matt. 28 : 19, 20, " Go ye and teach all nations ; '' John IG : 13, 14, " The Spirit of truth will guide you into all truth ; he shall glorify me, for he shall receive of mine and show it unto you." Again, secondly, Christ provided for successors to the apostles considered as preachers and ministers of the word, and through this ministry he instrumentally executes his prophetical office. The supernatural gifts of inspiration and miracles which the apostles possessed were not continued to their ministerial successors, because they were no longer necessary. All the doctrines of Christianity had been revealed to the apostles, and had been delivered to the church in a written form. There was no further need of an infallible inspiration. And the credentials and authority given to the first preachers of Christianity in miraculous acts, did not need continual repetition from age to age. One age of miracles well authenticated is sufficient to establish the divine origin of the gospel. In a human court, an indefinite series of witnesses is not required. " By the mouth of two or three witnesses," the facts are established. The case once decided is not reopened. With the exception, therefore, of the two supernatural gifts of inspiration and miracles, the ministry who took up the work of preaching the word had the same preparation for the work that the apostles had. They were like them regenerated, sanctified, and enlightened by the Holy Spirit. This is taught in Eph. 4 : 11, 12. Having " ascended far above all heavens," and being seated upon the mediatorial throne, the Mediator "gave some to be apostles, and some to be prophets, and some to be evangelists, and some to be pastors and teachers : for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ." Accordingly, the preaching of the gospel by his ministers is called Christ's Vol. II.— 24

370 SOTERIOLOGY.

preaching. Acts 13 : 12, " Then the deputy Sergius Panhis, when he saw what was done to Eljnias the sorcerer, believed, being astonished at the doctrine [teaching] of the Lord [through Paul]." In 1 Cor. 1 : 6, and Kev. 1 : 2, the preaching of the gospel is denominated " the testimony of Christ." In 2 Cor. 5 : 20, Paul represents himself and his co-laboi'ers as ambassadors for Christ, and beseeches men in Christ's stead to be reconciled to God. In 1 Pet. 3 : 19, and Eph. 2 : 17, the preaching of Noah and the apostles is called Christ's preaching.

Again, the mass of the church, as well as the Christian ministry, are represented as an agency by which the Mediator executes his prophetical office. After the death of Stephen, all the church " excepting the apostles " were scattered by persecution, and " went everywhere preaching the word," Acts 8 : 4. The church is represented as " a chosen generation, a royal priesthood," to " show forth the praises of him who hath called it out of darkness into his marvellous light," 1 Pet. 2 : 9. The Holy Spirit dwelling in the church, in all the fulness of his graces and gifts, enriches it with wisdom and knowledge, so that it is capable both by word and example of proclaiming Christ crucified to the sinful world of which it is said to be the light. Matt. 5 : 14-16. The superiority of the church to the secular world, in regard to the comprehension of religious truth and of everything relating to the eternal destiny of mankind, is boldly and strongly asserted by St. Paul. " We speak wisdom among them that are perfect [saints enlightened] ; even the hidden wisdom of God which none of the princes of this world knew. The natural man cannot know the things of the Spirit of God, because they are spiritually discerned. He that is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged of no man," 1 Cor. 2 : 6-15. The Christian mind is qualified to be a critic of secular knowledge ; but the secular mind is not qr.rJified to be a critic of Christianity. Christ crucified is foolishness to the Greek ;

CHRIST'S MEDIATORIAL OFFICES. 371

yet this foolishness of God is wiser than men. 1 Cor. 1 : 23, 25.

The Priestly office of Christ is thus defined in the Westminster Larger Catechism, Q. 44: "Christ executeth tlie office of a priest, in his once offering himself a sacrifice without spot to Grod, to be a reconcilation for the sins of his people ; and in making continual intercession for them." The function of a priest is described in Ileb. 5:1. " Every high priest is ordained for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts, and sacrifices for sins." ' The priest is a mediator in religion, as an ambassador is one in politics. He is appointed to officiate between God and man, in religious matters. And since the fact of sin is a cardinal fact in the case of man, the function of a mediating priest for man must be mainly expiatory and reconciling. Since " every high priest is ordained to offer gifts and sacrifices, it is of necessity that Jesus Christ have somewhat to offer," Heb. 8:3."

Accordingly, we find the expiatory priest in existence long before the Mosaic institute. Noah, at the cessation of the deluge, nearly a thousand years before the exodus of the Israelites, officiated as the priest of his household. "Noah builded an altar unto the Lord ; and took of every clean beast, and of every clean fowl, and offered burnt offerings on the altar. And Jehovah smelled a sweet savour," Gen. 8 : 20. This implies that the system of sacrifices was then in existence. There was an altar, and a victim. The distinction between clean and unclean beasts and birds was made, a distinction w^hich has its principal significance in reference to a piacular offering. Not any and everything may be offered as an atonement, but only that which is specified.

Still more than this, there is evidence in the first chapters

1 Compare article "Priest," in Kit to : Encyclopaedia; Lowman : Hebrew Ritual ; Outram : On Sacrifice ; Kurtz : The Mosaic Sacrifices : Cave ; On Sacrifice ; Blunt : Coincidences, 14-33.

372 SOTERIOLOGY.

of Genesis that atoning sacrifices, and an officiating priest to offer tliem, were instituted iintnediatelj after the apostasy, and in connection with the promise of a Mediator. It was a common Jewish opinion that Adam was the first hnman priest. The correctness of this opinion is favored by the following considerations. The permission to eat vegetable food is given to Adam in Gen. 1 : 29, but nothing is said of animal food. The permission to eat both vegetable and animal food is given to I^oah, in Gen. 9 : 3. Yet animals were slain by Adam ; for " the Lord God made coats of skins and clothed both Adam and Eve," Gen. 3 : 21. It is a natural explanation of this fact, to suppose that animals had been killed and offered in sacrifice by Adam. For even if it bo assumed that animal food was permitted to Adam, the narrative respecting the coats of skins implies that more animals were slain than would be required for the food of Adam and E\^e. Again, in Gen. 4:3,4:, both Cain and Abel are represented as offering sacrifices; the former, the bloodless oncharistic offering of the fruit of the ground, the latter, the bloody expiatory offering of the firstlings of the flock. The}' are described as "bringing" their offering (Gen. -i : 3, 4) ; and to a locality which is described as the "face of the Lord," and the " presence of the Lord " (Gen. 4 : 14, 16). This looks like a sacred place appointed for the offering of sacrifice, and a sacred person to officiate, namely Adam the head and priest of his family, as Noah was of his. The words of God to Cain (Gen. 4 : 7) teach that a piacular offering for sin liad been appointed. " If thou doest not well, sin [a sin offering] lieth at the door." Subsequently, the lamb or goat was to be brought " to the door of the tabernacle." Again, the prohibition, in Gen. 9 : 4, 16, to eat blood, given to Noah, is the same that is afterwards given to the Israelites, in Leviticus 17:10, 12; and the reason assigned when the command is laid upon the Israelites is, that the blood is the life of the flesh, and is to be poured upon the altar " to make atonement for your souls."

CHRIST'S MEDIATORIAL OFFICES. 373

From this it follows with great probability, that the statute as given to Moses was only a re-enactment of the statute as given to Noah, and given for the same reason ; namely, that the blood of animals must be used only for piacular purposes. Even under the Levitical law, the use of animal food was considerably restricted. The blood and fat were interdicted in all cases. The sin offering and trespass offering were to be eaten only by the priests ; and the more solemn sin offerings could not be eaten even by them. The burnt offerings, the most numerous of all, were wholly consumed.

Similar proofs of the institution of an expiatory sacrifice, and an officiating priest, are found in the history of Abraham and the other patriarchs. On first entering Canaan, Abram " built an altar and called upon the name of the Lord," Gen. 12 : 7, 8. When he returned from his victory over the kings, he is congratulated and blessed by Melchisedec the Canaanite king of Salem, who is called " the priest of the most high God," Gen. 14 : 18, 19. Isaac builds an altar. Gen. 26 : 25. Jacob offers sacrifice. Gen. 31 : 54.

The indications of a priest and a sacrifice are plain in the book of Job. It was the "continual" custom of this patriarch, who probably lived between the deluge and Abraham, as the head of his family to " offer burnt offerings according to the number of them all," Job 1 : 5. The Septuagint rendering of Job 12 : 19 is, " lie leadeth priests [A. V. * princes '] away spoiled." In Job 33 : 23, 24, the idea of one who furnishes a ransom is presented. The rite of sacrifice under the Old Testament tanght that God is both just and merciful: just, in that his law requires death for sin ; merciful, in that he permits and provides a vicarious death for sin. In this way it deepened fear, and inspired hope ; fear of the divine holiness, and hope in the divine mercy.

The priestly office of the Mediator, unlike his prophetical, is not administered mediately but directly. The priests of

374 SOTERIOLOGY.

the Old dispensation, both Patriarchal and Mosaic, were types of Christ, not his agents or delegates. The human priests " were many, because they were not suffered to continue by reason of death ; " but the divine high priest is one and alone, " because he continueth ever, and hath an unchangeable priesthood," Heb. 7 : 23, 24. And because he constantly discharges his priestly office, he does not delegate it to others. This unique and solitary character of Christ's priesthood is taught in the comparison of him to Melchisedec, in Heb. 7. The king of Salem was the only one of his class. He was " without father, without mother, without descent (ayet'eaA-o-yT/ro?), having neither beginning of days nor end of life." That is, he was not one of a line of priests having predecessors and successors. In this respect he was like the Son of God, who was also alone and solitary in his priesthood.

The Romish theory of an ecclesiastical priesthood acting, since Christ's ascension, as the delegates and agents of the great high priest, has no support in scripture. Had Christ intended to discharge his sacerdotal office through a class of persons in his church, he would have appointed and commissioned such a class, and provided for its continuation. He did this in regard to his prophetical office. He appointed " apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, and teachers, for the perfecting of the saints and the work of the ministry," Eph. 4 : 11, 12. But he did not appoint any to be priests to " offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins," Heb. 5 : 1. On the contrary, he abolished the earthly priesthood, when he formally assumed his own priestly office. The substance having appeared, the shadow disappeared. The antitype makes the type useless, Heb. 9 : 23-26. The earthly sacrifice was done away, and the earthly priest with it.

The two parts of Christ's priestly work are : {a) Atonement. Heb. 9 : 14, 28, " How much more shall the blood of Christ purge your conscience." Christ " was once offered

CHRIST'S MEDIATORIAL OFFICES. 37i>

to bear the sins of many." John 1 : 29, " The lamb of God which taketli away the sin of the world." Heb. 2: 17, " A merciful and faithful high priest to make reconciliation for the sins of the people." Matt. 20 : 28, " A ransom for many." Luke 22 : 20, " My blood is shed for you." 2 Cor. 5 : 21, " He made him to be sin for us." Gal. 3 : 13, "Christ was made a curse for us." 1 Pet. 3:18, "Christ suffered for our sins the just for the unjust." 1 John 2: 2, "He is the propitiation for our sins." Isa. 53 : 10, "lie made his soul an offering for sin." Rom. 8 : 32, " He spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us." Kom. 5:11, "By him we have received the atonement." Kom. 5 : 6, 7, " Christ died for us ; scarcely for a righteous man will one die." Eph. 5:2, " Christ hath loved lis, and given himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God." {h) Intercession. 1 John 2 : 1, " If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous." Heb. 7: 25, "Wherefore he is able to save them to the uttermost, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them." John 17 : 9, 20, "I pray for them which thou hast given me ; neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word."

The intercession of Christ is intimately connected with his atoning work. The Westminster Confession (VIII. viii.), after saying that Christ " effectually applies and communicates redemption to those for whom he has purchased it," adds that " ho makes intercession for them." Compare Larger Catechism, Q. il. This is in accordance with the Scriptures. The apostle John (1 John 2 : 1, 2) asserts that " if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father," and adduces as the ground of his success as an advocate two facts : that he is " Jesus Christ the righteous," and is " the propitiation for our sins." The apostle Paul, in Rom. 8 : 34, states that Christ is " at the right hand of God making intercession for us," and mentions as the renson wliy he is fitted for this work, the fact that he " died, and is risen

376 SOTERIOLOGY.

again." In Heb. 4 : 14-lG, believers are encouraged to " come boldly unto the throne of grace," because they " have a great high pi'iest who is passed into the heavens, and is touched with the feeling of their infirmities." Again, in Ileb. 7 : 2-i, 25, Christians are assured that because Christ has an " unchangeable priesthood, he is able to save them to the uttermost that come unto God bj him, seeing he ever livetli to make intercession for them." In Ileb. 9:7-12, the writer reminds the reader that the Jewish " high priest went alone once everj year into the second tabernacle, not without blood, which lie offered for himself and the errors of the people ; " and then states that Christ, " a high priest of good things to come, by his own blood entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us."

Still farther proof of the close connection of Christ's intercessory work with his atoning work, is found in that class of texts which represent the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit as being procured by Christ's intercession. These teach that that plenary effusion of the Holy Ghost which is the characteristic of the Christian economy, is owing to the return of the Mediator to the Father, and his session upon the mediatorial throne. Matt. 3 : 11, " I indeed baptize with water ; he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost." John 7: 39, " Jesus spake this of the Spirit, which they that believe on him should receive, for the Holy Ghost was not yet given, because that Jesus was not yet glorified." John 16: 7, " It is expedient for you that I go away ; for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you ; but if I depart I will send him unto you." In John 14 : 10-26 ; 15 : 26, Christ assures his disciples that after he has left them and returned to the Father " where he was before," he *' will pray the Father, and lie will give them another Comforter, that he may abide with them, even the Spirit of truth," and furthermore that he will himself " send the Comforter unto them from the Father."

CHRIST'S MEDIATORIAL OFFICES. 377

In accordance with these statements of Christ, we find Peter referring the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost to the mediatorial agency and intercession of Christ. Acts. 2 : 33, " Therefore being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the gift of the Holy Ghost, he hath shed forth this which ye now see and hear." And the whole book of Acts contains frequent allusions and references to the person and work of the Holy Spirit, in a manner and to a degree which are not seen in the four Gospels, showing that immediately after the ascension of Christ a more powerful agency and influence of the third trinitarian Person began to be experienced in the church. This descent and gift of gracious operation and influence was directly connected with Christ's presence and intercession in heaven. And this intercession rested for its ground and reason of success, upon that atoning work which he had performed upon earth.

The same connection between Christ's atonement and Christ's intercession is noticed in the Epistles. Christ was " made a curse for us, that we might receive the promise of the Spirit, through faith," Gal. 3 : 13, 14. The Holy Spirit is " shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour," Titus 3:5, 6. When Christ " ascended up on high, he received gifts for men," Eph. 4:8. The intercession of Christ relates : {a) To the application of his own atonement to the individual ; (h) To the bestowment of the Holy Spirit as enlightening and sanctifying the believer. Compare Smith : Theology, 481-490.

Anselm : Cur deus homo (Bib. Sacra, 1844-5). Aquinas : Summa, III. xlvi.-xlix. Calvin: Institutes, II. xvi.,xvii. Ursinus : Christian Religion, Q. 37-43. Turrettin : Institutio, XIV. viii.-xiv.; De necessitate satisfactionis Christi. Grotius : De satisfactione. Witsius : Apostles' Creed, Diss. XV., XVI., XVIII. Owen : Divine Justice ; Vindiciae, XX. -XXV. Bates : Harmony of Attributes in Eedemption. Pearson : Creed, Art. IV. Howe: Living Temple, II. v.-xi, Outram : On Sacrifice. Magee : On Atonement. Cave : On Sacrifice. Crawford : On Atonement. Smeaton : On Atonement. Kui'tz : Mosaic Sacrifices. Lowman : Hebrew Eitual. Blunt : Coincidences of Old and New Testament (j^p. 14-22). Baur : Versuhnungslehre (pp. 142282) ; Critique of Grotius. tr. in Bib. Sacra, 1852. Watson : Institutes, II. xx.-xxii. Dorner : Theology, ^ 112-122. Hodge : Theology, II. 464-591. Dabney : Theology, XLH., XLIII. Smith : Theology, 442-461. Wines : Laws of the Hebrews. Shedd : On Atonement (Theol. Essays) ; History of Doctrine, II . 201-386. Candlish : On Atonement. Wardlaw : Nature and Extent of the Atonement, Symington : On Atonement. Hill : Theology, IV. (Extent of the Atonement). Maurice : The Doctrine of Sacrifice. Bushnell : Vicarious Sacrifice. Campbell : Nature of the Atonement. Park : Collection of Essays on Atonement. Van Oosterzee : Dogmatics, II. 594-597.

The atonement of Christ is represented in Scripture as vica/'ious. The satisfaction of justice intended and accomplished by it is for others, not for himself. This is abundantly taught in Scripture. Matt. 20 : 28, " The Son of man came to give his life a i-ansom for (avrl) many." Mark 10 : 45, " This is my body which is given for (avrl) you." In these two passages the preposition avrl indisputably denotes substitution. Passao;es like Matt. 2 : 22, " Archelaus

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 379

reigned in the room {avrl) of his father Herod ; " Matt. 5 : 38, "An eje for an eye ; " Luke 11 : 11, " Will he for a fish give him a serpent," prove this.

In the majority of the passages, howevei', which speak of Christ's sufferings and death, the preposition vTrep is employed. Luke 22 : 19, 20, " This cup is the new covenant in my blood which is shed for (virep) you." John 6 : 51, " The bread that I will give is my flesh which I will give for the life of the world." John 15 : 13, " Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Rom. 5 : 6-8, " Christ died for the ungodly ; while we were yet sinners Christ died for us." Rom. 8 : 32, " He delivered him up for us all." 2 Cor. 5 : 14, 15, "If one died for all then all died." 2 Cor. 5 : 21, " He made him to be sin for us." Gal. 3 : 13, " Being made a curse for us." Eph. 5 : 2, 25, " Christ gave himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God." 1 Tim. 2 : 5, 6, '• The man Christ Jesus gave himself a ransom for all." Ileb. 2 : 9, Christ " tasted death for every man." 1 Pet. 3 : 18, Christ " suffered the just for the unjust."

The preposition virep, like the English preposition " for," has two significations. It may denote advantage or benefit, or it may mean substitution. The mother dies for her child, and Pythias dies for Damon. The sense of " for " in these two propositions must be determined by the context, and the different circumstances in each instance. Christ (John 15 : 13) lays down the proposition : " Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for (yirep) his friends." The preposition virep, here, may mean either " for the benefit of," or " instead of." In either case, the laying down of life would be tlie highest proof of affection. The idea of substitution, therefore, cannot be excluded by the mere fact that the preposition virep is employed ; because it has two meanings. In 2 Cor. 5 : 20, 21, virep is indisputably put for avrl. " Now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us ; we pray you

380 SOTERIOLOGY.

in Christ's stead {virep Xpcarov), be ye reconciled to God. For he hath made hiai vvlio knew no sin to be sin for us {vTrep r]^wv)y In Philemon 13, vTrep is clearly equivalent to avTl. '* Whom I would have retained wuth me, that in thy stead {virep crov) he might have ministered unto me." In 2 Cor, 5 : 14, it is said that " the love of Christ constraineth us ; because we thus judge that if one died for all {virep TrdpTcov), then all died {•jrdvre'i direl^avov).''^ Here, the notion of substitution is plain. If Christ died in the room and place of the " all," then the " all " are reckoned to have died. The vicarious atonement of Christ is regarded as the personal atonement of the believer. It would be nonsense to say, that " if one died for the benefit of all, then all died."

There is also abundant proof from classical usage that inrep may be used in the sense of dvrl. Magee (Atonement, Dissertation XXX.) quotes the following : Xenophon (Anabasis, VII. iv) relates that the Thracian prince Seuthes asked Episthenes if he would be willing to die, instead of the young lad who had been captured in war (»; koI iBe\oi

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 381

wolil in den Stellen, E,om. 4: 25 ; Gal. 1:4; Rom. 8:3; 1 Cor. 15 : 3 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 14, der Begriff der Stellvertretnng, wenigsten der Sache nacli, nicht zuriickgewiesen werden."

The meaning, therefore, of virep must be determined by the context. Since both classical and New Testament usage permit of its being employed to signify either benefit or substitution, it is plain that it cannot be confined to either signification. It would be as erroneous to assert that it uniformly' means "for the ad\^antage of," as to assert that it uniformly means " in the place of." The remark of Magee (Dissertation XXX.) is just. "The word 'for,' or the Greek words avrl, virep, Soa, Trepl, of which it is the translation, admitting of different senses, may of course be differently applied, according to the nature of the subject, and yet the doctrine remain unchanged. Thus it might be proper to say that Christ suffered instead of us {avrl r^jjbwv), although it would be absurd to say that he suffered instead of our offences (avrl twv dfiaprrjfidTcov i)yboyv). It is sufficient if the different applications of the word carry a consistent meaning. To die ' instead of us,' and to die ' on account of our offences,' perfectly agree." But this change of the expression necessarily arises from the change of the subject. And, accordingly, the same difficulty will be found to attach to the exposition proposed by these writers (Sykes and II. Taylor): since the word 'for,' interpreted 'on account of,' i.e. ' for the benefit of,' cannot be applied in the same sense in all the texts. For although dying ' for our benefit' is perfectly intelligible, dying 'for the benefit of our offences ' is no less absurd than dying ' instead of our offences.' "

In the liglit of these facts, it is easy to see why the New Testament writers employ virep so often, rather than avrl,

1 The first of these statements might be either vTrlp fjiicov, or avrl rjuwv; the second might be virtp tUv a/xapT7)ua,Ta)!/ 7]/j.iov, onrepi, or 5io, but not avr). The preposition avrl has only the one meaning of substitution : the others have more than this meaning.

382 SOTERIOLOGY.

to denote the relation of Christ's death to man's salvation. The latter preposition excludes the idea of benefit or advantage, and specifies onlj the idea of substitution. The former maj include both ideas. Whenever, tlierefore, the sacred writer would express both together and at once, he selects the preposition virep. In so doing, he teaches both that Christ died in the sinner's place, and for the sinner's benefit. Vicariousness implies substitution. A vicar is a person deputed to perform the function of another. In the case under consideration, the particular function to be performed is that of atoning for sin by suffering. Man the transgressor is the party who owes the atonement, and who ought to discharge the oflice of an atoner; but Jesus Christ is the party who actually discharges the office, and makes the atonement, in his stead. The idea of vicariousness or substitution is, therefore, vital to a correct theory of Christ's priestly ofiice. Man the transgressor would make his own atonement, if he should suffer the penalty affixed to transgression. So far as the penalty is concerned, retributive justice would be satisfied if the whole human race were punished forever.' And if God had no attribute but retributive justice, this would have been the course that he would have taken. A deity strictly and simply just, but destitute of compassion for the guilty, would have inflicted the penalty of the violated law upon the actual transgressor. lie would not have allowed of a substituted satisfaction of justice, and still less would he have provided one. It is important to notice this fact, because it shows the senselessness of a common objection to the doctrineof vicarious atonement, namely, that it is incompatible with mercy. If God, it is asked, insists npon satisfying justice by allowing his Son to suffer

' The law aspreccpt, however, would not be satisfied. This proves that endless punishment is not excessive punishment. It still leaves the sinner in debt. According to strict justice, the law could require from the lost an active as well an a passive obedience ; perfect obedience in the present aad future, as well aa suffering of penalty for past disobedience.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 383

ill the place of sinners, wliere is his mercy ? The ready answer is, that it is mercy to the criminal to permit the substitution of penalt}-, and still more to provide the substitute after the permission. If God had no compassionate feeling towards the sinner, he would compel the sinner himself to satisfy the demands of the law which he has transgressed. But in permitting, and still more in providing a substitute to make that satisfaction which man is under obligation to make for himself, God manifests the greatest and strangest mercy that can be conceived of. For, the vicarious atonement of Christ is the Sovereign and the Judge putting himself in the place of the criminal.

It is important, at this point, to mark the difference between jpersonal and vicariotts atonement. («) Personal atonement is made by the offending party ; vicarious atonement is made by the offended party. The former is made by the sinner ; the latter is made by God : " our great God and Saviour, Jesus Christ," Titus 2 : 13. (R. Y.) If a citizen pays the fine appointed by the civil law, he satisfies justice for his own civil transgression. If the murderer is executed, he atones for his own crime before the human law, though not before the divine. And when a sinner suffers endless punishment, he personally satisfies eternal justice for his sin. (5) Personal atonement is given by the criminal, not received by him ; but vicarious atonement is received by the criminal, not given by him. This is indicated in the scripture phraseology. In Pom. 5 : 11, it is said that the believer " receives the atonement " vicariously made for him by Christ. If he had made an atonement for himself, he would have given to justice the atonement, not received it. (c) Personal atonement is incompatible with mercy, but vicarious atonement is the highest form of mercy. When the sinner satisfies the law by his own eternal death, he experiences justice without mercy ; but when God satisfies the law for him, he experiences mercy in the wonderful form of God's self-sacrifice, id) Personal atone384 SOTERIOLOGY.

ment is incompatible with the eternal life of the sinner, but vicarious atonement ol)tains eternal life for him. When the sinner suffers the penalty due to his transgression, he is lost forever, but when God incarnate suffers the penalty for him, lie is saved forever.

Vicarious atonement in the Christian system is made by the offended party. God is the party against whom sin is committed, and he is the party who atones for its commission. Vicarious atonement, consequently, is the highest conceivable exhibition of the attribute of mercy. " Herein is love, that God sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins," 1 John 4 : 10. For God to remit penalty without inflicting suffering upon God incarnate, would be infinitely less compassion than to remit it through such infliction. In one case, there is no self-sacrifice in the Godhead ; in the other there is. The pardon in one case is inexpensive and cheap; in the other, costly and difficult of execution.

The Socinian objection that vicarious atonement is unmerciful because it involves the full and strict satisfaction of justice, has no force from a Trinitarian point of view. It is valid only from a Unitarian position. If the Son of God who suffers in the sinner's stead is not God but a creature, then of course God makes no self-sacrifice in saving man through vicarious atonement. In this case, it is not God the offended party who makes the atonement. The Trinitarian holds that the Son of God is true and very God, and that when he voluntarily becomes the sinner's substitute for atoning purposes, it is very God himself who satisfies God's justice. The penalty is not inflicted upon a mere creature whom God made from nothing, and who is one of countless millions ; but it is inflicted upon the incarnate Creator himself. The following extract from Channing (Unitarian Christianity) illustrates this misconception. " Unitarianism will not listen for a moment to the common errors by which this bright attribute of mercy is obscured. It will not hear of a vindictive wrath in God which must

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 385

be quenched by blood, or of a justice which binds his mercy with an iron chain, until its demands are satislied to the full. It will not hear that God needs any foreign influence to awaken his mercy." The finger must be placed upon this word ^'■foreign?'' The Trinitarian does not concede that the influence of Jesus Christ upon God's justice is an influence " foreign " to God. The propitiating and reconciling influence of Jesus Christ, according to the Trinitarian, emanates from the depths of the Godhead ; this suffering is the suffering of one of the Divine persons incarnate. God is not propitiated (1 John 2:2; 4 : 10) by another being, when he is propitiated by the only begotten Son. The term "foreign," in the above extract, is properly applicable only upon the Unitarian theory, that the Son of God is not God, but a being like man or angel alien to the Divine essence.

This fallacy is still more apparent in the following illustration from the same writer. " Suppose that a creditor, through compassion to certain debtors, should persuade a benevolent and opulent man to pay in their stead? Would not the debtors see a greater mercy, and feel a weightier ob-^ ligation, if they M-ere to receive a free gratuitous release? " (Unitarian Christianity). Here, the creditor and the debtors' substitute are entirely different parties. The creditor himself makes not the slightest self-sacrifice in the transaction, because he and the substitute are not one being, but two. Consequently, the sacrifice involved in the paj-ment of the debt is confined wholly to the substitute. The creditor has no share in it. But if the creditor and the substitute were one and the same being, then the pecuniary loss incurred by the vicarious payment of the debt would be a common loss. Upon the Unitarian theory, God the Father and Jesus Christ are two beings as different from each other as two individual men. If this be the fact, then indeed vicarious atonement implies no mercy in God the Father. The mercy would lie wholly in Jesus Christ, beVOL. II.— 25

386 SOTERIOLOGY.

cause the self-sacrifice -would be wholly in him. But if the Trinitarian theory is the truth, and God the Father and Jesus Christ are two persons of one substance, being, and glory, then, the self-sacrifice that is made by Jesus Christ is not confined to him alone, but is a real self-sacrifice both on the part of God the Father and also of the entire Trinity. This is taught in Scripture. " God [the Father] so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son,'' John 3 : 16. " He spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all," Rom. 8 : 32. [The Triune] " God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us," E.om. 5:8.'

Though it was God the Son, and not God the Father, who became incarnate, and suffered, and died, it by no means follows that the first person of the Trinity made no selfsacrifice in this humiliation and crucifixion of the incarnate second person. He gave up to agony and death, his " dear," and " beloved " son. He passed the sword, as Zechariah (13 : T) says, through " the man who was his fellow." Such scriptures imply that the redemption of ;6inful man caused God the Father a species of sorrow : the

' The following are the principal points of difference between Unitarianism •and Calvinism, respecting the subject of Christ's redemption. Unitarianism contends : (a) That God is inherently and spontaneously merciful, (b) That justice is only a form of benevolence, and opposes no obstacles to the exercise of God's inherent and spontaneous mercy, (c) That Christ was not God, but an exalted creature sent to announce the Divine mercy, set a holy example, and proffer spiritual assistance to imitate it. It was no part of his mission to satisfy legal claims and harmonize justice with mercy, because there is no need of harmonizing them, (rf) That the doctrine of vicarious atonement implies that God is not inherently merciful, but needs to be made so by the agency of another being, namely, Christ. Channing's Life, I. 294, 344, 349, 354. Calvinism contends : (a) That God is inherently and spontaneously merciful, (b) That justice is an attribute distinct from benevolence, requiring satisfaction for sin, and prohibiting the exercise of mercy until this requirement is met. (c) That Jesus Christ was incarnate God himself, who suffered vicariously for sinners in order to satisfy the legal claims which obstructed the exercise of the Divine mercy. (d) That this vicarious satisfaction of justice by God himself is the way in which God shows his inherent and spontaneous mercifulness, and not a means .employed by a third party, other than Cfod, to make him merciful.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 387

sorrow of " bruising and putting to grief " (Tsa. 53 : 10) the Son of his love ; the Son who is " in the bosom of the Fatlier," John 1 : 18. The self-sacrifice, therefore, that is made by the Son in giving himself to die for sinners, involves a self-sacrifice made by the Father in surrendering the Son for this purpose. Xo person of the Godhead, even M-hen he works officially, works exclusively of the others. The unity of being and nature between Father and Son makes the act of self-sacrifice in the salvation of man common to both. " lie that hath seen me hath seen the Father. I and my Father are one," John 14 : 9 ; 10 : 30. " The Mediator," says Augustine (Trinity, IV. xix.), " was both the offerer and the offering ; and he was also one with him to whom the offering was made." See South: Sermon XXX.

And this does not conflict with the doctrine that the Divine essence is incapable of suffering. The Divine impassibility means that the Divine nature cannot be caused to suffer from any external cause. Nothing in the created universe can make God feel pain or misery,' But it does not follow that God cannot himself do an act which he feels to be a sacrifice of feeling and affection, and in so far an inward suffering. When God gave up to humiliation and death his only begotten Son, he was not uttei'ly indifferent, and unaffected by the act. It was as truly a sacrifice for the Father, to surrender the beloved Son, as it was for the Son to surrender himself. The Scriptures so represent the matter. " God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son." " God spared not his own Son, but freely gave him up." When the Father, in the phrase of the prophet, " awoke the sword against the man who was his fellow," he likewise pierced himself.

Vicarious atonement, unlike personal atonement, cannot be made by a creature. Ps. 49 : 7, " None of them can by

1 The Divine vfrath against sin, we have seen (Vol. I. p. 176 sq.), causes no unhappiness or misery in GJod, because of its righteousness and legitimateness.

388 SOTERIOLOGY.

anj means redeem his brother, nor give to God a ransom for him." Micah G : 7, " Shall I give raj first-born for mj transgression ? "' Matt. IG : 2G, " What shall a man give in exchange for his soul ? " This is acknowledged in the province of human law. No provision is made in human legislation for the substitution of penalty. In the case of capital punishment, one citizen may not be substituted for another ; in the case of civil penalty such as fine or imprisonment, the state cannot seize upon an iimocent person and compel him to suffer for the guilty. And even if there should be a willingness upon the part of the innocent to suffer for the guilty, legislation makes no provision for the substitution. The state would refuse to hang an innocent man, however willing and urgent he might be to take the place of the murderer. The state will not fine or imprison any but the real culprit.

The reason for this is twofold. First, each citizen owes duties towards man that could not be performed if he should assume the obligations of another citizen. There are debts to the family, to society, and to the commonwealth, of which these would be defrauded, if the life or pi-operty of one person should be substituted for that of another. Secondly, each individual owes duties towards God which would be interfered with by the substitution of one man for another within the sphere of human relations. And the state has no right to legislate in a manner that interferes with God's claims upon his creatures.

The instances in Pagan or Christian communities in which there seems to be substitution of penalty are exceptional, and irregular. They are not recognized as legitimate by Pagan authorities, and still less by Chi-istian jurists. When, as in the early Roman history, an individual citizen was allowed to devote himself to death for the w-elfare of the state, this was an impulse of the popular feeling. It was not regularly provided for and legitimated by the national legislature. It was no part of the legal

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 389

code. And human sacrifices among savage nations cannot be regarded as parts of the common law of nations.

That vicarious atonement cannot be made by a created being within the province of divine law, will be made evident when we come to consider the nature of Christ's substituted work. At this point, it is sufficient to observe, that if within the lower sphere of human crimes and penalties one man caimot suffer for another, it would be still more impossible in the higher sphere of man's relations to God. !No crime against man is of so deep a guilt as is sin against God ; and if the former cannot be expiated by a human substitute, still less can the latter be.

It should bo remembered, however, that the reason why a creature cannot be substituted for a creature for purposes of atonement is not that substitution of penalty is inadmissible, but that the creature is not a proper subject to be substituted, for the reasons above mentioned. Substitution is sometimes allowed within the province of commercial law. One man may pay the pecuniary debt of another, if this can be done without infraction of any rights of other parties. If, however, it cannot be, then vicarious payment is inadmissible. A man would not be permitted to take money due to one person to pay the debt of another. A man is not allowed in the State of l^ew York to leave all his property to benevolent purposes, if he has a family dependent upon him.

The priestly office of Christ cannot be understood without a clear and accurate conception of the nature of atonement.

The idea and meaning of atonement is conveyed in the following statements in Leviticus G : 2-7, and 4:13-20.' "If a soul sin and commit a trespass against the Lord, he

> " It was in China that a Baptist missionary found his converts slow to appreciate the vahie of Christ's atoning blood, until the book of Leviticus threw light upon the sacrificial offering, and showed the relation between shedding of blood and remission." Bible Society's Record, Nov. 31, 1878.

390 SOTERIOLOGY.

sliall bring his trespass offering unto the Lord, a ram without blemish, and tlie priest sliall 'make an atonement for him before the Lord, and it shall hQfot'given him." This is individual atonement for individual transgression. " If the whole congregation of Israel sin and are guilty, then the congregation shall offer a young bullock for the sin, and the elders of the congregation shall lay their hands upon the head of the bullock, and the bullock shall be killed, and the priest shall make an atonement for them, and it shall be forgiven them." This is national atonement for national transgression. Two particulars are to be noticed in this account, {a) The essence of the atonement is in the suffering. The atoning bullock or ram must bleed, agonize, and die. And he who offers it must not get any enjoyment out of it. It must be a loss to him, and so far forth a suffering for him. He must not eat any of the trespass offering. The sin offering must be wholly burned : " skin, flesh, and dung," Lev. 16 : 27. In harmony with this, our Lord lays stress upon his own suffering, as the essential element in his atonement. " The son of man must suffer many things," Luke 9 : 22 ; Matt. 16 : 21, et alia. " It behoved Christ to suffer," Acts 3:18; Luke 24 : 26. Christ refused the anodyne of " wine mingled with gall" that would have deadened his pain. Matt. 27:34." (5) The forgiveness is the non-injliction of suffering upon the transgressor. If the substituted victim suffers, then the criminal shall be released from suffering. In these and similar passages, the Hebrew word "n^^, which in the Piel is translated '• to make an atonement," literally signifies " to cover over " so as not to be seen. And the Hebrew word nbo. translated

■ Ba.hr, in his Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus, denies that there is anything piacular in the Levitical sin-offering. The slain victim is emblematic of selfconsecration and self-sacrifice, not of penal satisfaction. The death of the lamb or goat teaches, not that the offerer deserves to die for his past transgression, but that he ought to live for future consecration to obedience. This interpretation lies under all the moral theories of the atonement. Its inconsistency is ap^ parent in making the shedding of blood, or deatli, the symbol of life.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 391

" to forgive," has for its primary idea tliat of " lightness, lifting up," perhaps " to be at rest or peace." Geseuius in voce.

The connection of ideas in the Hebrew text appears, then, to be this: The suffering of the substituted bullock or ram has the effect to cover over the guilt of the real criminal, and make it invisible to the eve of God the holy. This same thought is conveyed in Ps. 51 : 9, " Blot out my transgressions. Hide thy face from my sins ; " in Is. 38 : 17, "Thou hast cast all my sins behind thy back;" in Micah 7 : 19, " Thou wilt cast all their sins into the depths of the sea." When this covering over is done, the conscience of the transgressor is at rest.

These Hebrew words, however, are translated in the Septuagint by Greek words which introduce different ideas from " covering " and " resting." The word 'i&3 is rendered by i^c\daKo/u,at, which means to "propitiate" or "appease;" and the word nibo is translated by ac^ir^fjbi, to " release," or "let go." The connection of ideas in the Greek translation appears, therefore, to be this : By the sufferuig of the sinner's atoning substitute, the divine wrath at sin is propitiated^ and as a consequence of this propitiation the punishment due to sin is released, or not inflicted upon the transgressor. This release or non-infliction of penalty is "forgiveness," in the Biblical representation. This is conceded by the opponents of the evangelical system. Says Wegscheider (Institutiones, § 140), " Yenia sive condonatio peccatorum, ex vulgari et biblica dicendi consuetudine, est dbolitio jjoenae peccatis contractae, et restitutio benevolentiae divinae erga peccatorem." In the Lord's prayer, the petition for forgiveness is a^e? rjfjblv to, 6(fiet\7]/jLaTa rjiMOiv, Matt. 6 : 12. Christ assures the paralytic that his sins are forgiven, in the words, a^ewvraL (TOL at a/uiapTtat aov, Matt. 9: 2. The preaching of the gospel is the preaching of the " release of sins " (a^eo-t? afMapTtMv), Acts 13 : 38.

It is highly important to notice that in the Biblical repre392 SOTBRIOLOGY.

sentation, the " forgiveness " is insejyaTohly connected with the " atonement,'''' and the " j'emission " with the ^^propitiatio7iy The former stands to the latter in the relation of effect to cause. The Scriptures know nothing of forgiveness, or remission of penalty, in isolation. It always lias a foregoing cause or reason. It is because the priest has offered the ram, that the individual transgression is "forgiven : " that is, not punished in the person of the individual. It is because the priest has offered the bullock upon whose head the elders have laid their hands, that the national sin is "forgiven -."that is, not visited upon tlie nation. "Without this vicarious shedding of blood, there would be no remission or release of penalty, Heb. 9 : 22. Kot until the transgression has been " covered over " by a sacrifice, can there be "peace" in the conscience of the transgressor. Not until the Holy One has been "propitiated" by an atonement, can the penalty be " released." ^Neither of these effects can exist without the antecedent cause. The Bible knows nothing of the remission of punishment arbitrarily : that is, without a ground or reason. Penal suffering in Scripture is released, or not infl.icted upon the guilty, because it has been endured by a substitute. If penalty were remitted by sovereignty merely, without any judicial ground or reason whatever ; if it were inflicted neither upon the sinner nor his substitute ; this would be the abolition of penalty, not the remission of it.

According to the Biblical view, the Divine mercy is seen more in the cause than in the effect ; more in the " atonement" for sin than in the " remission " of sin ; more in " expiation " than in " forgiveness ; " more in tlie vicarious infliction than in the personal non-infliction. After tlie foundation has been laid for the release of penalty, it is easy to release it. When a sufficient reason has been established why sin should be pardoned, it is easy to pardon. It is the first step that costs. This is taught by St. Paul in Pom. 5 : 10. " If when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 393

his Son, much more being reconciled wo shall be saved bj his life." The greater includes the less. If God's mercy is great enough to move him to make a vicarious atonement for man's sin, it is certainly great enough to move him to secure the consequences of such an act. If God's compassion is great enough to induce him to lay man's punishment upon his own Son, it is surely great enough to induce him not to lay it upon the believer. If God so loves the world as to atone vicariously for its sin, he certainly so loves it as to remit its sin.

In looking, therefore, for the inmost seat and centre of the Divine compassion, we should seek it rather in the work of atonement than in the act of forgiveness ; rather in the cause than in the effect. That covenant-transaction in the depths of the Trinity', in which God the Father commissioned and gave up the Only-Begotten as a piacular oblation for man's sin, and in which the Only-Begotten voluntarily accepted the commission, is a greater proof and manifestation of the Divine pity, than that other and subsequent transaction in the depths of a believer's soul in which God says, " Son, be of good cheer, thy sin is forgiven thee." The latter transaction is easy enough, after the former has occurred. But the former transaction cost the infinite and adorable Trinity an effort, and a sacrifice, that is inconceivable, and unutterable. This is the mystery which the angels desire to look into. That a just God should release from penalty after an ample atonement has been made, is easy to understand and believe. But that he should himself make the atonement, is the wonder and the mystery. " Hereby perceive we the love of God, because he laid down his life for us," 1 John 3 : IG.

It follows from this discussion, that atonement is objective in its essential nature. An atonement makes its primary impression upon the party to whom it is made, not upon the party by M'hom it is made. When a man does a wrong to a fellow man, and renders satisfaction for the wrong, this

394 SOTERIOLOGY.

satisfaction is intended to influence the object, not the subject; to produce an effect upon the man who lias suffered the wrong, not the man who did the wrong. Subjective atonement is a conti-adiction. Atonino; to one's self is like lifting one's self.' The objective nature of atonement is wrought into the very phraseology of Scripture, as the analysis of the Biblical terms just made clearly shows. To "cover" sin, is to cover it from the sight of God, not of the sinner. To " propitiate," is to propitiate God, not man.

The Septuagint idea of " propitiation," rather than the Hebrew idea of " covering over," is prominent in the Xew Testament, and consequently passed into the soteriology of the Primitive church, and from this into both the Romish and the Protestant soteriology. The difference between the two is not essential, since both terms are objective ; but there is a difference. The Hebrew term 152 denotes that the sacrificial victim produces an effect upon sin. It covers it up. But the corresponding Septuagint term IXdcrKOfiai denotes that the sacrificial victim produces an effect upon God. It propitiates his holy displeasure. When St. John (1 John 2 : 2 ; 4: 10) asserts that "Jesus Christ the righteous is tiie propitiation {lXaafj,6<:) for our sins," and that God " sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins," the implication is that the Divine nature is capable of being conciliated by some propitiating act. This propitiating act under the Old dispensation was, typically and provisionally, the offering of a lamb or goat as emblematic of the future offering of the Lamb of God ; and under the ISTew dispensation it is the actual offering of the body of Jesus Christ, who takes the

' If it be objected that in the statement of the doctrine of vicarious atonement it is maintained that God atones to God (pp. ;J99sq. ), the reply is, that Jesus Christ does not make satisfaction to himself as Jesas Christ, but to the Trinity. The incarnate Word satisfies the justic? of the God-/*i?a^/. The relation of his death is therefore objective. It has reference to the Divine Nature, not to his own theauthropic per.->oi;aLty.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 395

sinner's place and performs for him the propitiating and reconciling act.

The objective nature of atonement appears, again, in the Kew Testament term KaraWayr] and the verb KaraXkdo-aecv. These two words occur nine times in the New Testament, with reference to Christ's atoning work. Eom. 5 : 10, 11, 15 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 18-20. In the authorized version, KaraWayr) is translated " atonement " in Rom. 5:11; but in the other instances, "reconciliation" and '• reconcile " are the terms employed. The verb KaraWdaaeiv primarily signifies, " to pay the exchange, or difference," and secondarily " to conciliate, or appease." The following from Athenaeus (X. 33) brings to view both meanings of the word. " Why do we say that a tetradrachma KaTaWaTTerai, when we never speak of its getting into a passion ? " A coin is " exchanged," in the primary signification; and a man is "reconciled," in the secondary. Two parties in a bargain settle their difference, or are " reconciled," by one paying the exchange or balance to the other. In like manner two parties at enmity settle their difference, or are "reconciled," by one making a satisfaction to the other. In each instance the transaction is called in Greek KaraWayr]. The same usage is found in the Anglo-Saxon language. The Saxon hot, from which comes the modern boot, denotes, first, a compensation paid to the offended party by the offender ; then, secondly, the reconciling effect produced by such compensation ; and, lastly, it signifies the state of mind which prompted the boot or compensation, namely repentance itself. Bosworth : Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, sub voce.

The term " reconciliation " is objective in its signification. Keconciliation terminates upon the object, not upon the subject. The offender reconciles not himself but the person whom he has offended, by undergoing some loss and thereby making amends. This is clearly taught in Matt. 5 : 2-1. " First, be reconciled to thy brother " {BLuWdynSc Tw dheXcfxp). Here, the brother who has done the injury is

396 SOTBRIOLOGY.

the one who is to make up the difference. lie is to propitiate or reconcile his brother to himself, by a compensation of some kind. Reconciliation, here, does not denote a process in the mind of the offender, but of the offended. The meaning is not : " First conciliate thine own displeasure towards thy brother," but, " First conciliate thy brother's displeasure towards thee." In the Episcopalian Order for the Holy Communion, it is said: "If ye shall perceive your offences to be such as are not only against God, bnt also against your neighbors ; then ye shall reconcile yourselves unto them : being ready to make restitution and satisfaction.! according to the uttermost of your powers, for all injuries and wrongs done by you to any other." The Biblical phraseology, "Be reconciled to thy brother," agrees with that of common life, in describing reconciliation from the side of the offending party, rather than of the offended. We say of the settlement of a rebellion, that " the subjects are reconciled to their sovereign," rather than that " the sovereign is reconciled to the subjects ; " though the latter is the more strictly accurate, because it is the sovereign who is reconciled by a satisfaction made to him by the subjects who have rebelled. In Bom. 5 : 10, believers are said to be "reconciled to God by the death of his Son." Here the reconciliation is described from tlie side of the offending party ; man is said to be reconciled. Yet this docs not mean the subjective reconciliation of the sinner toward God, but the objective reconciliation of God towards the sinner. For the preceding verse speaks of God as a being from whose " wrath " the believer is saved by the death of Christ. This shows that the reconciliation effected by Christ's atoning death is that of the divine anger against sin. Upon this text, Meyer remarks that "the death of Christ does not remove the wrath of man towards God, but it removes God's displeasure towards man." Similarly, De Wette remarks that " the reconciliation must mean the removal of the wrath of God ; it is that reconciliation of God to man which not only

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 39 <

here, but in Rom. 3 : 25 ; 2 Cor. 5 : IS, 19 ; Coloss. 1 : 21 ; Eph. 2 : IG, is referred to the atoning death of Christ." '

The priestly work of Christ is also represented in Scripture under the figure of a price or ransom. This, also, is an objective terra. The price is paid bv the subject to the object. Matt. 20 : 28, " The Son of man is come to give his life a ransom (\vrpov) for (avrl) many." Acts 20 : 28, " The church of God which he hath purchased (irepLeTrot^aaro) with his own blood." Iloni. 3 : 21:, " The redemption {d7ro\vTp(o(n<;) that is in Jesus Christ." 1 Coi". G : 20, "Ye are bought (TjyopdaS^rjre) with a price." Gal. 3 : 13, " Christ hath redeemed {i^Tjyopacrev) us from the curse." Eph. 1 : 7 ; Col. 1 : 14, " Redemption through his blood." 1 Tim. 2:6, " Who gave himself a i-ansom {dvrlXvTpov) for all." The allusion in the figure is sometimes to the payment of a debt, and sometimes to the liberation of a captive. In either case, it is not Satan but God who holds the claim. Man has not transgressed against Satan, but against God. The debt that requires cancelling is due to a divine attribute, not to the rebel archangel. The ransom that must be paid, is for the purpose of delivering the sinner from the demands of justice, not of the devil. Satan cannot acquire or establish legal claims upon any being whatever.

Some of the early fathers misinterpreted this doctrine of a " ransom," and introduced a vitiating element into the patristic soteriology, which however was soon eliminated, and has never reappeared. They explained certain texts which refer to sanctification, as referring to justification. In 2 Tim. 2 : 26, sinful men are said to be "taken captive by the devil at his will." In 1 Tim. 1 : 20, Hymenaeus and Alexander are " delivered unto Satan." In 1 Cor. 5 : 5, St. Paul commands the church to " deliver over " the incestuous member " to Satan for the destruction of the flesh." Ln these passages, reference is had to the power

'SecMagee: Dissertation XX. ; Owen: Vindiciae, Ch. XXI.; Shedd: Theological Essays, 265-273.

398 SOTERIOLOGY.

which Satan has over the creature who has vohmtarily subjected himself to him. The sinner is Satan's captive upon the principle mentioned by Chi'ist in John 8 : 34, " Whosoever committeth sin is the servant {Sov\o<;) of sin ; " and by St. Paul in Rom. 6 : 16, " Know ye not, that to wliom ye yield yourselves servants {SovXov^) to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey ; whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness ? " There is in these passages no reference to any legal or rightful claim which the devil has over the transgressor, but only to the strong and tyran^ nical grasp which he has upon him. This captivity to Satan is related to the work of the Holy Spirit, more tlian to the atoning efficacy of Christ's blood ; and deliverance from it makes a part of the work of sanctification, rather than of justification. This deliverance is preceded by another. In the order of nature, it is not until man lias been first redeemed by the atoning blood from the claims of justice, that he is redeemed hy the indwelling Spirit from the captivity and bondage of sin and Satan.

"When, therefore, the efficacy of Christ's death is represented as the payment of a ransom price, the same objective reference of Christ's work is intended as in the previous instances of " propitiation " and " reconciliation." By Christ's death, man is ransomed from the righteous claims of another being than himself. That being is not Satan, but God the holy and just. And these claims are vicariously met. God satisfies God's claims in man's place. God's mercy ransoms man from God's justice.

We have tlius seen from this examination of the Scripture representations, that Christ's priestlj- work has an objective reference : namely, that it affects and influences the Divine Being. Christ's atonement " covers sin " from God's siglit. It " propitiates " God's Avrath against sin. It " reconciles " God's justice toward the sinner. It "pays a ransom" to God, for the sinner. Kone of these acts terminate upon man the subject, but all terminate upon God the obVICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 399

ject. Christ does not "cover sin" from the sinner's siglit. He does not " propitiate " the sinner's wrath. He does not " reconcile " the sinner to the sinner. He does not " pay a ransom " to the sinner. These acts are each and all of them outward and transitive in their aim and reference. They are directed toward the Infinite, not the finite ; toward the Creator, not the creature. Whatever be tiie effect wrought by the vicarious death of the Son of God, it is wrought upon the Divine nature. If it ap2)eases, it appeases that nature ; if it propitiates, it propitiates that nature ; if it satisfies, it satisfies that nature ; if it reconciles, it reconciles that nature. It is impossible to put an}' other interpretation upon the Scripture ideas and representations. A merely subjective reference, which would find all the meaning of them within the soul of man, requires a forced and violent exegesis of Scripture, and a self-contradictory use of the word " atonement."

At the same time, revelation plainly teaches that the author of this atoning influence and effect upon the Divine Being is the Divine Being himself. God propitiates, appeases, satisfies, and reconciles God. None of these are the acts of the creature. In all this work of propitiation, reconciliation, and redemption, God himself is the originating and active agent. He is therefore both active and jMSsive' both agent ?indi patient. God is the Being who is angry at sin, and God is the Being who propitiates this anger. God is the offended party, and he is the one who reconciles the offended party. It is Divine justice that demands satisfaction, and it is the Divine compassion that makes the satisfaction. God is the one who holds man in a righteous captivity, and he is the one who pays the ransom that frees him from it. God is the holy Judge of man who requires satisfaction for sin ; and God is the merciful Father of man who provides it for him. This fact relieves the doctrine of vicarious atonement of all appearance of severity, and evinces it to be the height of mercy and compassion. If it

400 SOTBRIOLOGY.

were man and not God who provided the atonement, the case would be otherwise. Tliis peculiarity of the case is taught in Scripture. In 2 Cor. 5 : 18, 19, it is said that "God hath reconciled us to himself {eavrw, his own self), by Jesus Christ ; " and that '• God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto JdmseJf {eavTw).'' The statement is repeated in Coloss. 1 : 20, " It pleased the Father through the blood of Christ's cross, to reconcile all things unto himself.'''' According to this, in the work of vicarious atonement God is both subject and object, active and passive. He exerts a propitiating influence when he makes this atonement, and he receives a propitiating influence when he accepts it. lie performs an atoning work, and his own attribute of justice feels the effect of it. Says Augustine (Trinity, IV. xiv. 19), " The same one and true Mediator reconciles us to God by the atoning sacrifice, remains one with God to whom he offers it, makes those one in liimself ybr whom he offers it, and is himself both the offerer and the offering." Similarly, Frank (Christian Certainty, 352) remarks that " freedom from guilt is possible for man, because it has been provided for by God, and this provision rests upon a transaction of God with himself, whereby as other [i.e. as Son] he has made satisfaction to the claims of his own justice upon the sinner." This doctrine of Scripture has passed into the creeds and litanies of the Church. In the English litany there is the petition: "From thy wrath and from everlasting damnation, Good Lord, deliver us." Here, the very same Being who is displeased is asked to save from the displeasure. The very same holy God who is angry at sin is implored by the sinner to deliver him from the effects of this anger. And this is justified by the example of David, who cries (Ps. 38 : 1), " O Lord, rebuke me not in thy wrath, neither chasten me in thy hot displeasure ; " and by the words of God himself addressed to his people through the prophet Isaiah (60 : 10), " In my wrath I smote thee, but in ray favor have I had mercy upon thee." The prophet Hosea

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 401

(6 : 1) says to the unfaithful church : " Come and let us return unto the Lord : for he hath torn, and he will heal us; he hath smitten, and he will bind us up," In Zechariah 1 : 2-4, Jehovah is described as " sore displeased," and yet at the same time as exhibiting clemency towards those with whom he is displeased. " The Lord hath been sore dis- . pleased with your fathers. Therefore say thou unto them, Tims saith the Lord of hosts. Turn ye unto me, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will turn unto you, saith the Lord of hosts." Also (Job 42 : Y, 8), " The Lord said to Eliphaz, My wrath is kindled against thee, and against thy two friends. Therefore take unto you seven bullocks and seven rams, and offer up for yourselves a burnt offering, lest I deal with you after your folly." Here, the very same God M'ho was displeased with Job's friends devises for them a method whereby they may avert the displeasure. Upon a larger scale, God is displeased with every sinful man, yet he himself provides a method whereby sinful man may avert this displeasure. This is eminently the case with the believer. " When," says Calvin (Inst., III. ii. 21), " the saints seem to themselves to feel most the anger of God, they still confide their complaints to him ; and when there is no appearance of his hearing them, they still continue to call upon him." Says Anselm (Meditatio II.), " Respira, o peccator, respira ; ne desperes, spera in eo quem times. Aff uge ad eum a quo anfugisti. Invoca importune quem superbe provocasti." The doctrine of vicarious atonement, consequently, implies that in God iJiey^e exist simultaneously hot/i wrath and comjpassion. In this fact, is seen the infinite difference between Divine and human anger. When God is displeased with the sinner, he compassionately desires that the sinner may escape the displeasure, and invents a way of escaping it. But when man is displeased with his fellow-man, he does not desire that his fellow-man may escape the displeasure, and devises no way of escape. The Divine wrath issues from the constitutional and necessary antagonism between Vol. II.— 26

402 SOTERIOLOGY.

the Divine holiness and moral evil. The Divine compassion springs from the benevolent interest which GcTd feels in the work of his hands. The compassion is founded in God's paternal relation to man; the vvTath is founded in his judicial relation to him. God as a creator and father pities the sinner; as a judge he is displeased with him. Wrath against sin must be both felt and manifested by God ; compassion towards the sinner must be felt, but may or may not be manifested by Him. Justice is necessary in its exercise, but mercy is optional. The righteous feeling of wrath toward sin is immutable and eternal in God, but it may be propitiated by the gracious feeling of compassion toward the sinner, which is also immutable and eternal in God. God the father of men may reconcile God the judge of men. Whether this shall be done, depends upon the sovereign pleasure of God. He is not obliged and necessitated to propitiate his own wrath for the sinner, as he is to punish sin ; but he has mercifully determined to do this, and has done it by the atonement of Jesus Christ. By the method of vicarious substitution of penalty, God satisfies his own justice and reconciles his own displeasure towards the transgressor. That moral emotion in the Divine essence which from the nature and necessity of the case is incensed against sin, God himself placates by a self-sacrifice that inures to the benefit of the guilty creature. Here, the compassion and benevolent love of God propitiates the wrath and holy justice of God. The two feelings exist together in one and the same Being. The propitiation is no oblation ab extra : no device of a third party, or even of sinful man himself, to render God placable towards man. It is wholly ab intra : a self-oblation upon the part of the deity himself, in the exercise of his benevolence towards the guilty, by which to satisfy those constitutional imperatives of the divine nature which Avithout it must find their satisfaction in the personal punishment of the transgressor, or else be outraged by arbitrary omnipotence.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 403

Upon this point, Augustine (Tractatns in Joannem, ex. 6\ remarks : " It is written, ' God conimendetli liis love towards us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us.' He loved us, therefore, even when in the exercise of enmity towards him we were working iniquity. And yet it is said witli perfect truth, ' Tliou hatest, O Lord, all workers of iniquity.' Wherefore, in a wonderful and divine maimer, he both hated and loved us at the same time. He hated us, as being different from what he had made us; but as our iniquity had not entirely destroyed his work in us, he could at the same time, in every one of us, hate what we had done, and love what he had created. In every instance it is truly said of God ' Thou hatest nothing which thou hast made ; for never wouldst thou have made anything, if thou hadst hated it.' " Calvin, after quoting the above from Angustine, remarks (Institutes, II. xvi. 3) that " God who is the perfection of righteousness cannot love iniquity, which he beholds in us all. We all, therefore, have in us that which deserves God's hatred. Wherefore, in respect to our corrupt nature and the consequent depravity of our lives, m'o are all reall}^ offensive to God, guilty in his sight, and born to the damnation of hell. But because God is uuMnllincr to lose that in us which is his own, he still finds something in us which his benevolence (benignitas) can love. For notwithstanding that we are sinners by our own fault, we are yet his creatures ; though we have brought death upon ourselves yet he had created us for life."

Turrettin (De veritate satisfactionis Christi, I. i.) distinguishes between "compassion" and "reconciliation." Because God is compassionate in his own excellent and perfect nature, he can become reconciled towards a transgressor of his law. If he were inherently destitute of compassion, he would be incapable of reconciliation. Compassion is a feeling, reconciliation is an act resulting from it. The former is inherent and necessary ; the latter is optional and sovereign. If God were not compassionate and placable, he

404 SOTERIOLOGY.

could not be propitiated by the sacrifice of Christ. An implacable and merciless being could not be conciliated, and M'ould do nothing to effect a reconciliation. God is moved by a feeling of compassion and a benevolent affection towards sinners, prior to and irrespective of the death of Christ. "When we w^ere yet sinners, Christ died for us," Rom. 5 : 8. The death of Christ did not make God compassionate and merciful. He is always and eternally so. But God's holy justice is not reconciled to sinners, unless Christ die for their sin. The compassion is prior in the order of nature to the death of Christ ; the reconciliation of justice is subsequent to it. "Before the death of Christ, God was already compassionate (misericors), and placable. This moved him to provide salvation and redemption for man. But he was actually reconciled and propitiated, only upon the condition and supposition of that death of Christ which was required by eternal justice."

In this manner, compassion and wrath coexist in God. "To us indeed," says Turrettin (ut supra), "it seems difficult to conceive that the same person who is offended with us should also love us ; because, when any feeling takes possession of us we are apt to be wholly engrossed with it. Thus if our anger is inflamed against any one, there is usually no room in us for favor towards him ; and on the other hand, if we regard him with favor, there is often connected with it the most unrighteous indulgence. But if we could cast off the disorders of passion, and clothe ourselves in the garments of righteousness, we might easily harmonize these things with one another. A father offended with the viciousness of his son loves him as a son, yet is angry with him as being vicious. A judge, in like manner, may be angry and moved to punish, yet not the less on this account inclined by compassion to pardon the offender, if only some one would stand forth and satisfy the claims of justice for him. Why then, should not God, who is most righteous and benevolent, at once by reason of his justice demand penVICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 405

alty, and by reason of bis compassion provide satisfaction for us ? " Turrettin quotes in proof of tbis view tbe follovring from Aquinas (III. xlix. 4). " Non dicimur recouciliati quasi deus de novo amare incipiret, nam aeterno amore dilexit, sed quia per banc reconciliationem sublata est omnis odii causa, turn per ablutionem peccati, tum per recompensatiouem acceptabilioris boni." lie also remarks tbat "scbolastici loquntur, dilexit deus bumanum genus quantum ad naturam quam ipse fecit ; odit quantum ad culpam quam bomines contraxerunt."

In all tbat is said, consequently, respecting tbe wratb of God, in Cbristian tbeology, it is of tbe utmost importance to keep in view tbe fact tbat this wrath is compatible with 'benevolence and compassion. Tbis is tbe infinite difference in kind between divine and buman anger. At tbe verj' moment wben God is displeased, be is capable of devising kind tilings for tbe object of bis displeasure. " Wbile we were yet sinners Cbrist died for us," Rom. 5 : 8. And at tbe very instant wben guilty man is conscious tbat tbe Divine wratb is resting upon bim, be may address bis supplication for a blessing to tbe very Being wlio is angry witb bis sin, and may pray : " From tby wratb, good Lord, deliver me." And tbe great and ample warrant and encouragement for men to do tbis, is found in tbe sacrifice of tbe Son of God. For in and by tbis atoning oblation, tbe Divine compassion conciliates tbe Divine wratb against sin. In tbe deatb of tbe God-man, " rigbteousness and peace, justice and mercy, kiss eacli otber," Ps. 85 : 10. Tbe mercy vicariously satisfies tbe justice ; tbe Divine compassion in tbe sinner's stead receives upon itself tbe stroke of tbe Divine wratb ; God tbe Fatber smites God tbe Son, in tbe transgressor's place. " Awake, O sword, against tbe man tbat is my fellow, saitb tbe Lord of bosts," Zecbariab 13:7.'

1 The same principle applies to the afflictions of life. The strength and comfort must come from the very same Being who afflicts. God is the source of affliction, and he is the God of all comfort. God wounds, and God heals the

406 SOTERIOLOGY.

This subject is elucidated still further, by noticing the difference between the holy wrath of God and the wicked wrath of man. " The wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God," James 1 : 20. When man is angry at man, this feeling is absolutely incompatible with the feeling of compassion and benevolent love. Selfish human anger and benevolence cannot be simultaneous. They cannot possibly co-exist. When a man, under the impulse of sinful displeasure, says to his brother man, " Raca," or " Thou fool " (Matt. 5 : 22) ; when he feels passionate and selfish wrath ; he cannot devise good things for his brother man. On the contrary, he devises only evil things. He plots his neighbor's destruction. The wrath of the human heart is not only incompatible with benevolence, but is often intensely malignant. It is even increased by the moral excellence that is in the object of it. Holiness in a fellow-creature sometimes makes wicked human anger hotter and more deadly. The Jews gnashed their teeth in ra2:e at the meekness and innocence of Christ. " The hatred of the wicked," says Rousseau (Confessions, IX.), " is only roused the more from the impossibility of finding any just grounds on which it can rest ; and the very consciousness of their own injustice is only a grievance the more against him who is the object of it." " Oderunt quem laeserint," says Tacitus. This kind of wrath requires complete eradication, before compassion can exist. " Better it were," says Luther (Table Talk, Of God's Works), " that God should be angry with us, than

wound. See Pascal's Letter to his brother-in-law, on the death of his own father. The same truth is expressed in the lines of George Herbert.

" Ah, my dear, angry Lord ! Since Thou dost love, yet strike ; Cast down, yet help afford ; Sure, I will do the like.

I will complain, yet praise ; I will bewail, approve ; And all my sour-sweet days, I will lament, and love."

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 407

that we be angry with God, for he can soon be at an union with us again, because lie is merciful ; but when we are angry with him, then the case is not to be helped."

Still further elucidation of this subject is found in the resemblance tiiere is between the holy wrath of God, and the I'io-hteous an^er of the human conscience. The sinful feeling of passionate anger to which we have just alluded is an emotion of the heart ; but the righteous feeling of dispassionate anger to which we now allude is in the conscience. This is a diifei'ent faculty from the heart.' Its temper towai'ds sin is unselfish and impartial, like the wrath of God. And this feeling can exist simultaneously with that of benevolence. When a man's own conscience is displacent and remorseful over his own sin, there is no malice towards the man himself, " for no man ever yet hated his own flesh," Eph. 5 : 29. At the very moment when a just and righteous man's conscience is offended and incensed at the wickedness of a fellow-man, lie can and often does devis^ good things towards him. The most self-sacrificing philanthropists are those whose conscience is the most sensitive towards the moral evil which they endeavor to remove, and whose moral displeasure against sin is the most vivid and emphatic. It is not the sentimental Rousseau, but the righteous Calvin who would willingly lay down his life, if thereby he could save men from eternal retribution. The conscience of Rousseau was dull and torpid, compared with the keen and energetic conscience of Calvin ; but the desire of the latter for the spiritual and eternal welfare of sinful men was a thousand times greater than that of the former, supposing that there was in Rousseau any desire at all for the spiritual and eternal welfare of man. When St. Paul says respecting Alexander the coppersmith, "The Lord reward him according to his works " (2 Tim. 4 : 14),

' " La conscience est la voix de I'ame, les passions sont la voix du corps." Rousseau : Emile, IV. This is borrowed from Des Cartes : Les passions de Tame, Art. xviii. xix.

408 GOTERIOLOGY.

he gives expression to the righteous displeasure of a pure conscience towards one who was opposing the gospel of Christ, and the progress of God's kingdom in the earth. It was not any personal injury to the apostle that awakened the desire for the Divine retrihution in the case, but a zeal for the glory of God and the M^elf are of man. Could St. Paul by any self-sacrifice on his own part have produced repentance and reformation in Alexander, he wonld gladly have made it. As in the instance of his unbelieving Jewish kindred, he would have been willing to be " accursed from Christ," for this purpose. Rom. 9 : 3. But when a profane man angrily says to his fellow-man : " God damn you," this is the malignant utterance of the selfish passion of the human heart, and is incompatible with any benevolent feeling.'

We find, then, that in the exercise of Christ's priestly office the agency is whollj- within the Divine Nature itself. The justice and the mercj^, the wrath and the compassion, are qualities of one and the same Eternal Being. It follows, consequently, that the explanation of the great subject of the Divine I'econciliation lies in the doctrine of the Trinity. The doctrine of vicarious atonement stands or falls with that of the Triune God. If God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three distinct persons, each one of them really objective to the others, then one of them can do a personal work not done by the others, that shall have an eifect upon the Godhead. And if God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are also one nndivided Being in nature and essence, then this effect, whatever it be, is not limited and confined to any one of the persons exclusive of the others, but is experienced by the one whole nndivided nature and essence itself. The Godhead, and not merely God the Father, or God the Son, or God the Spiiit, is reconciled to guilty man by the judicial suffering of one of the persons of

1 On the difference between divine and human anger, see Shedd : Theological Essays, 359-284.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 409

the Godhead, incarnate. The Son of God is a person dis^ tinct from, and objective to the Father and the Spirit. Hence, he can do a work which neitlier of them does. lie becomes incarnate, not they. lie suffers and dies for man, not they. And yet the efficacy of this worlc, which is liis work as a trinitarian person, can terminate upon that entire divine nature which is all in God tlie Father, and all in God the Spirit, as it is all in God the Son. "Christ," says Frank (Christian Certainty, 366), "experienced as a [vicarious] sinner both subjection to God, and rejection hy God ; but yet as one who can call the God who has rejected him, Ms God, and who while the wrath of God goes forth upon him and delivers him up to the punitive infliction, nevertheless can pray : ' Not my will, but thine be done.'"

Before leaving the subject of vicarious atonement, it is in place here to notice its relation to the soul of man. For, while Christ's atonement has primarily this objective relation to the Divine nature, it has also a secondary subjective relation to the nature of the guilty creature for whom it is made. The objective atonement is intended to be subjectively appropriated by the act of faith in it.

1. In the first place, the priestly work of Christ has an influence upon the human conscience similar to that which it has upon the divine justice. Man's moral sense is pacified by Christ's atonement. Peace is everywhere in Scripture represented as the particular effect produced by faith in Christ's blood. " Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with God," Rom. 5:1. " We are made nigh to God by the blood of Christ, for he is our peace," Eph. 2 : 13, 14. " Having made peace through the blood of his cross," Coloss. 1 : 20. " Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you," John 14 : 27. " The peace of God passeth all understanding," Philip. 4:7.

The human conscience is the mirror and index of the divine attribute of justice. The two are correlated. What

410 SOTERIOLOGY.

therefore God's justice demands, man's conscience demands. " Is othing," sajs Matthew Henr}^, " can pacify an offended conscience but tliat which satisfied an offended God." The peace which the believer in Christ's atonement enjoys, and which is promised by the lledeemer to the believer, is the subjective experience in man that corresponds to the objective reconciliation in God. The pacification of the human conscience is the consequence of the satisfaction of the divine justice. God's justice is completely satisfied for the sin of man by the death of Christ. This is an accomplished fact. " Jesus Christ the righteous is the propitation for the sins of the whole world," 1 John 2 : 2. The instant any individual man of this world of mankind helieves that divine justice is thus satisfied, his conscience is at rest. The belief of a fact is always needed in order to a pei-sonal benefit from it. Belief is not needed in order to establish the fact. Whether a sinner believes that Christ died for sin or not, will make no difference with the fact, though it will make a vast difference with him. " If we believe not, yet he abideth faithful : he cannot deny himself," 2 Tim. 2 : 13. Unbelief cannot destroy a fact. Should not a soul henceforth believe on the Son of God, it would nevertheless be a fact that he died an atoning death on Calvary, and that this death is an ample oblation for the sin of the world. But it must be remembered that the kind of belief by which a man obtains a personal benefit from the fact of Christ's death is experimental, not historical, or hearsay. A man may believe from common rumor that the death of Christ satisfies divine justice for the sin of the woi-ld, and yet experience no benefit and no peace from his belief ; even as a blind man may believe from common rumor that there is a mountain in front of him, and yet have none of the pleasing sensations and personal benefits that accompany the vision of it. The blind man may have no doubt of the fact that there is a mountain before him ; he may even argue to pi'ove its existence ; and still have all the

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 411

wretched sensations of blindness, and obtain no personal advantage from his hearsay belief. And a sinful man may have no skeptical doubt that the death of Christ on mount Calvary has completely expiated human guilt, and may even construct a strong argument in proof of the fact, and still have all the miserable experience of an unforgiven sinner ; may still have i-emorse, and the fear of death and the damnation of hell The belief by which men obtain personal benefit, namely, mental peace and blessedness, from the fact of Christ's atonement, involves trust and reliance npou Christ. A man may believe Christ, and yet not believe on him. Christ himself marks the difference between historical or hearsay belief, and experimental faith, in Matt. 13 : 13-15. " Seeing, they see not ; and hearing, they hear not, neither do they understand. In them is fulfilled the prophecy of Esaias, which saith. By hearing ye shall hear, and shall not understand ; and seeing ye shall see, and shall not perceive." Whenever there is an experimental belief of the actual and accomplished fact of Christ's atonement, there is a subjective pacification of the conscience corresponding to the objective reconciliation of the divine justice. But this subjective effect of Christ's death is neither the primary nor the whole effect of it. It presupposes the objective satisfaction or propitiation. In this instance, as in all others, the object is prior to the subject and determines its consciousness.

2. Secondly, the subjective appropriation of Christ's atonement is the evidence and test of genuine repentance. An unselfish godly sorrow for sin is shown by a willingness to suffer jpevsonally for sin. In Leviticus 26 : 41, 43, the truly penitent are described as " accepting the punishment of their iniquity." The criminal who complains of punishment, or resists it, or endeavors to escape from it, evinces by this fact that he cares more for his own happiness than he does for the evil and wickedness of his act. If he were certain of not being punished, he would repeat his transgres•il2 SOTERIOLOGY.

sion. There is of course no genuine sorrow for sin in such a temper. If, on the contrary, a wrong-doer approves of, and accepts the punishment denounced against his crime, and voluntarily gives himself up to suffer for his transgression, he furnishes the highest proof of true sorrow. He does not make his own happiness the first thing, but the maintenance of justice. With Angelo (Measure for Measure, V. i.), he says :

" So deep sticks it in my penitent heart, That I crave death more willingly than mercy ; 'Tis my deserving, and I do entreat it."

With the penitent thief, he saj's, " We are in this condemnation justly, for we receive the due reward of our deeds," Luke 23 : 41. "ISTo one can deny," says Dorner (Christian Doctrine, I. 302), " that true penitence includes the candid acknowledgment of actual desert of punishment, and that the denial of this desert and the unwillingness to suffer punishment and to surrender to the disgrace of justice, is the most certain proof of a mere semblance of penitence. And it is not essentially different, when repentance and the resolution to live a better life are put in the place of that suffering which constitutes satisfying atonement, and gives a title to remission of sin. Such views are a poisoning of penitence, which, in order to be genuine, must stand the test of being ready to suffer punishment and approve of the retribution of justice."

The first impulse consequently of true penitence is, to make a. personal atonement. This distinguishes penitence from remorse ; the godly sorrow from the sorrow of the world, 2 Cor. 7 : 10. Mere remorse has no desire or impulse to suffer and make amends for what has been done. Its impulse and desire is wholly selfish, namely, to escape suffering. Remorse leads to suicide, penitence never. The suicide's motive is to put an end to his misery. lie supposes that he will be happier by dying, than by continuing

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 413

to live. This was the motive of the impenitent Judas.* But the broken and contrite heart is willing to do and to suffer anything that would really satisfy God's holy law. This is taught in Psalm 51 : 16. David in his genuine sorrow for his great transgression says: "Thou desirest not sacrifice, else would I give it." He perceives that any expiation which he could make for his sin would be unequal to what justice requires; but this does not render him any the less ready to make it if he could. And when the true penitent perceives that another competent person, Divinely appointed, has performed that atoning work for him which he is unable to perform for himself, he welcomes the substitution witli joy and gratitude. Any aversion, therefore, to Christ's vicarious atonement, evinces that there is a defect in the supposed sorrow for sin. The lust of self is in the expei'ience. The individual's happiness is in the foreground, and the divine holiness is in the background. And the positive and deliberate rejection of Christ's atonement, upon the same principle, is absolute and utter impenitence. A hostile and polemic attitude towards the blood of Christ as atoning for human guilt, is fatal hardness of heart. Christ refers to it in his awful words to the Pharisees : " If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in j'our sins," John 8 : 24. Impenitence shows itself both in unwillingness to make a personal atonement for sin, and to trust in a vicarious atonement for it.

It becomes necessary now, to consider the question : How does the suffering of Christ meet the requisitions

' Suicide, if the act of sanity, is ipso facto proof of insubmission and rebellion towards God, and impenitence in sin. Socrates (Phaedo, 61) contends that to take one's own life, is to defraud and dishonor the Creator. "The gods," he says, '' are our guardians, and we are a possession of theirs. If one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example, took the liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no intimation of your wish that he should die, would you not be displeased with him, and would j'ou not punish him if you could ? " It was upon this view of suicide, that the self-murderer was denied burial by the Church in consecrated ground.

414: SOTERIOLOGY.

involved in the case of substitution of penalty, or vicarious atonement ? We have seen that suffering is the inmost essence of an atonement. The sacrificial victim must agonize and die. Without shedding of blood there is no remission of penalty. Even in cases where physical suffering does not take place, a suffering of another kind does. A citizen, within the province of civil law, is said to make amends for his fault when he pays a fine and suffers a loss of money as the compensation to civil justice. What, then, is suffering ?

Suffering is of three kinds : 1. Calamity. 2. Chastisement. 3. Punishment, or penalty.

1. Calamity does not refer to sin and guilt. It is a kind of suffering that befalls man by the providence of God for other reasons than disciplinary or judicial. Calamitous suffering, however, it should be noticed, occurs only in a sinful world. Consequently it is never found isolated, and by itself alone. It is associated either with cliastisement : as when a calamity falls upon a child of God ; or with punishment: as when it falls upon the impenitent sinner. Calamity is therefore rather an element in suffering, than the whole of the suffering. When, for illustration, some of the Galilaeans had been cruelly put to death by Pilate (Lnke 13 : 1-5), our Lord distinctly told those who informed him of this fact, that these Galilaeans " were not sinners above all the Galilaeans because they suffered such things." They were sinners, but not the worst of sinners. In other words, he taught them that the wliole of this suffering was not penal. As sinners, they deserved to suffer ; and some of this suffering was for their sins. But as they were not greater sinners than other Galilaeans, they did not deserve a suffering that was so much greater than that of tiie Galilaean people as a whole. A part of this extraordinary suffering, therefore, was calamity, not punishment. As such, it had no reference to the guilt of the Galilaeans. If it had, it would have been a proof that they " were sinners above

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 416

all the Galilaeans." Our Lord then repeats and emphasizes the same truth, hv an allusion to the fall ot" the tower in Siloam upon some of the inhahitants of Jerusalem. This event did not prove that these few persons were sinners " ahove all men that dwelt in Jerusalem." There was therefore a calamitous as well as a penal element, in this fall of the tower. The same doctrine is taught br the extraordinary sufferings of the patriarch Job. Job's friends contended that these were all and wholly penal. They inferred that Job had been guilty of some extraordinary sin which merited this extraordinary punishment, and they urged him to confess it. The patriarch, though acknowledging himself to bo a sinner, and deserving to suffer for sin (Job 42 : 5, 6), was not conscious of any such extraordinary act of transgression as his friends supposed he must have committed, and cannot understand why he should have been visited with such enormous afflictions. Both he and they are finally informed by God himself, out of the whirlwind, that the extraordlnariness of the suffering is due to the will of God ; that it is of the nature of calamity, not of penalty. Jehovah resolves the mystery in the uncommon treatment of Job, into an act of almighty power by an infinitely wise being who gives no reason for his procedure in this instance. Job, Chapters 38-41. Elihu, the youngest of the speakers, seems to have had an intimation in his own mind that this was the true explanation of the dark problem. "I will answer thee that God is greater than man. Why dost thou strive against him ? For he givetli not account of any of his matters," Job 33 : 12, 13.

2. The second species of suffering is cJiastisement. This is spoken of in Heb. 12 : 6. " For whom the Lord loveth, hechasteneth (TratSeuet, treats like a child)." Chastisement and pnnishment are distinguished from each other in 1 Cor. 11 : 32, " When we are judged, we are chastened of the Lord, that we should not be condemned with the world." The purpose of chastisement is discipline and moral im416 SOTERIOLOGY.

provement. The reason for it is not secret and unknown, as in the case of calamity. It is adapted to reform. It is administered by parental affection, not b}' judicial sevei'ity. It is the form which suffering assumes within the family. Tlie parent does not cause the child to feel pain for the satisfaction of justice, but for personal improvement. The suffering does indeed remind the child of his guilt, and is suggestive of penalty, but it is not itself penal. Family discipline is not of the nature of retribution.

Hence analogies drawn from the family do not apply to the civil government, and still less to the Divine government, when guilt and retribution are the subjects under consideration. Guilt and retribution are not res domi ; they are not family affairs. The family was not established for the purpose of punishing criminals, but of educating children. Because a human father may foi'give a child, that is, may forego the infliction of suffering for an offence, without any satisfaction being rendered for him by a substitute, and without any reference to the claims of law, it does not follow that the state can do this, or that the Supreme Ruler can. Within the sphere of family life, there is nothing judicial and retributive. There is, therefore, no analogy between the two spheres. There can be no legitimate arguing from a sphere in which the retributive element is altogether excluded, such as that of the father and the child, over into a sphere in which the retributive is the prime element, such as that of God the just and man the guilty. It is //.era^acTi? et? uX\o

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 417

graduated by justice and the degree of the offence, but bj expediency and the aim to reform. Sometimes a small fault in a child may be chastised with a severe infliction, and a great fault with a mild one. The object not being to weigh out penalty in exact proportion to crime, but to discipline and reform the character, the amount of suffering inflicted is measured by this aim and object. A very slight offence, if there is a tendency frequently to repeat it on the part of the child, may require a heavy chastisement, so that the habit may be broken up. And on the other hand, a very grave offence which is exceptional in its nature, and to which there is no habitual tendency on the part of the child, may be best managed with a slight infliction of pain, or even with none at all. A rebuke merely may be better adapted to promote the reformation of the offender. All this is illustrated in God's dealings with his own children. A Christian of uncommon excellence to human view sometimes experiences a great affliction, while one of less devoutness, apparently, is only slightly afflicted, or perhaps not at all. This difference is not caused by the degree of demerit in each instance, but by what the Divine eye sees to be required in each case in order to the best development of character.

J^ow the relation of a believer to God, is like that of the child to the earthly father. Man enters into God's heavenly family by the act of faith in Christ. All tlie suffering that befalls him in this sphere is therefore of the nature of chastisement, not of punishment or retribution. It is not intrinsically endless and hopeless, as Divine retribution is. " I will visit their transgression with the rod ; nevertheless my loving kindness I will not utterly take from him." " He will not always chide ; neither will he keep his anger forever." Ps. 89 : 31-34 ; 103 : 9 ; Jer. 10 : 24. The penalty due to the believer's sin lias been endured for him by his Redeemer, and therefore there is no need of his enduring it. Justice does not exact penalty twice over. Vol. II.— 27

418 SOTERIOLOGY.

Consequently, whenever the believer suffers pain from any cause or source whatever, he is not suffering retributive punishment for purposes of law and justice, but corrective chastisement for purposes of self-discipline and spiritual improvement : eVl TO avfjb(f)epov, Ileb. 12 : 10. This suffering, though for the present moment not joyous but grievous, yet after it has been submissively endured, works out the peaceable fruit of righteousness, Ileb. 12 : 11. Even death itself, which is the climax of suffering, is not penal for a believer. Its sting, that is, its retributive quality, is extracted, 1 Cor. 15: 55, 56. Suffering is penal when it is intended and felt to be such ; and is chastisement when it is not so intended and felt. God intends a benefit, not a punishment, M'hen he causes a believer in Christ to suffer the pains of dissolution ; and the believer so understands it. He feels that it is fatherly discipline. When a penitent believer dies, God supports and comforts the departing soul ; but when an impenitent unbeliever dies, the soul is left to itself without support and comfort from God. The tranquillizing presence of God converts death into chastisement ; the absence of such a presence makes it penalt}-.

The relation of a rebellious and unbelieving man to God is like that of a rebellious citizen to the state. All that isuch a citizen can expect from the government under which he lives is justice, the due reward of his disobedience. The state is not the family, and what is peculiar to tlie one is not to the other. The disobedient citizen cannot expect from the magistrate, the patient forbearance, and affectionate tuition which the disobedient child meets with from a parent with a view to his discipline and moral improvement. The citizen is entitled only to justice, and if he gets it in the form of the righteous punishment of his crime he must be silent, ]^o man may complain of justice, or quarrel with it. To do so is an absurdit}-^, as well as a fault. By ci-eaition, man was within the circle both of the Divine governiment and the Divine family. Holy Adam M^as at once a

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 419

subject and a child. By apostasy and rebellion, he threw himself out of the circle of God's famil}-, but not out of the circle of God's government. Sinful man is invited and even commanded to re-enter the Divine family, when he is invited and commanded to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ for the remission of liis sins. But so long as he is an unbeliever, he has not re-entered it, and is not an affectionate or " dear" child of God. The phraseology in Jer. 31 : 20, Ephraim is " my dear son ; " in Eph. 5:1," Be ye followers of God as dear children ; " in Kom. 8 : 16, 17, " The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God, and if children, then heirs ; " in Gal, 3 : 26, "Ye are the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus; "' and in Matt. 5:9," The peacemakers shall be called the children of God " — this and the like phraseology is not applicable to men indiscriminately, but only to believers. The childhood and the fatherhood in this case is special, because it is founded in redemption.

There is a providential fatherhood and childhood, spoken of in scripture, which is not sufficient to constitute fallen man a member of God's heavenly family. In Acts 17 : 28, all men are called the " offspring" of God ; and in Malachi 2 : 10, the question is asked, " Have we not all one father ? " This providential fatherhood and childhood is founded in creation. This is proved by a second question in Malachi 2 : 10, which follows the one already cited and explains it : " Hath not one God created us ? " And in Acts 17 : 26, the reason given why all nations are the offspring of God is, that the}' are " made of one blood " by their Creator. Creation is a kind of paternity. In Job 38 : 28, 29, this is extended even to the inanimate creation. " Hath the rain a father? or who hath begotten the drops of the dew? Out of whose womb came the ice ? And the hoary frost of heaven, who hath gendered it ? " In Jer. 2 : 27, idolatrous Israel is represented as " saying to a stock, Thou art my father : and to a stone, Thou hast brought me forth."

420 SOTERIOLOGY,

In acknowledging a false God to be their maker, they acknowledged him to be their providential father. In accordance with this, God says to a wicked generation '' whose spot is not the spot of his children," who are not "dear" children in the special sense, "Do ye thus requite the Lord, O foolish people and unwise ? Is not he thy father that bought thee ? Hath he not made thee, and established thee ? " Dent. 32 : 6. Our Lord (Matt. 7 : 11) teaches that "evil" men have a "father in heaven," and explains this fatherhood by God's readiness to bestow "good things" in his general providence. This association of paternity with creation and providence is found also in secular literature. Plato (Timaeus, 9) says that " to discover the creator and father of this universe is indeed difficult." Horace (Carrainum I. 12) speaks of " the Father of all, who governs the affairs of men and gods." Creation, together with providence and government which are necessarily associated with creation, is a solid basis for this kind of paternit3% It implies benevolent care and kindness towards its objects, and these are paternal qualities. God's providential and o-overnrnental goodness towards all his rational creatures is often referred to in Scripture. Matt. 5 : 45, " Your Father which is in heaven maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendetli rain upon the just and the unjust." Acts 14 : 17, " He left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, fillino; our hearts with food and gladness."

The fact, then, that God creates man after his own image a rational and immortal being, that he continually upholds him and extends to him the blessings of a kind and watchful providence, and still more tliat he compassionates him in his sinful and guilty condition, and provides for him a way of salvation — all this justifies the use of the term " father" in reference to God, and the term "child " in reference to man. But the fatherhood and childhood, in this case, are different from those of redemption and adoption.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 421

The former may exist without the latter. God as the universal Parent, while showing providential benevolence and kindness to an impenitent sinner, "filling his mouth with food and gladness " all the days of his earthly existence, may finally punish him forever for his ungrateful abuse of paternal goodness, for his transgression of moral law, and especially for his rejection of the offer of forgiveness in Christ. And this lost man is still, even in his lost condition, one of God's " offspring." Abraham, speaking in the place of God, calls Dives in hell a child of the universal Parent. " Son, remember that thou in thy lifetime receivedst thy good things," Luke 16 : 25. And Dives recognizes the relationship, when he says, " Father Abraham, have mercy on me," Luke 16 : 24. The providential fatherhood of God is thus shown to be consistent with the punishment of a rebellious son. It is also consistent with the refusal to abate the merited punishment. Dives asks for a drop of water to cool his tongue, and is refused. Dives was an impenitent man. He did not confess his sin, or implore its forgiveness. He only asked for deliverance from suffering. He lacked the spirit of the prodigal son, and of the penitent thief. He did not say, " Father, I have sinned, and am no more worthy to be called thy son, make me as one of thy hired servants. I am in this condemnation justly. I am receiving the due reward of my deeds."

The universal fatherhood and childhood may exist without the special ; but not the special without the universal. There may be creation, providence and government, without redemption ; but not redemption without the former. A man may experience all the blessings of God's general paternity without those of his special ; but not the blessings of God's special fatherhood without those of his general. Christ speaks of those who are not God's children in the special sense, when he says, in reply to the assertion of the Jews, "We have one Father, even God," "If God were your Father, ye would love me. Ye are of your father, the

422 SOTBRIOLOGY.

devil," John 8 : 41-44. St. John refers to the same class in the words, " In this the children of God are manifest, and the children of the devil," 1 John 3 : 10.

When men universally are commanded to say " Our Father which art in heaven," they are commanded to do so with the heart, not with the lips merely. They have no permission to employ the terms of the family from the position of a rebel. Says Christ, "Why call ye me Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say ? " Luke 6 : 46. In like manner God says, "A son honoreth his father: If I be a father, where is mine honor ? " Malachi 1 : (3. The fact of the providential fatherhood, as previously remarked, is not sufficient to constitute /alien men members of God's heavenl}' family. Unfallen man was a member of the heavenly family merely by the fatherhood of creation and providence; but after his rebellion and apostasy this ceased to be the case. Redemption was needed in ordei* to restore him to membership. The whole human family are not now God's heavenly family. Only a part of it are the dear children of God. Those only are members of God's family who are members of Christ, "of whom the whole family in heaven and earth [the church above and below] is named," Eph. 3 : 15. All others " are bastards, and not sons," Heb. 12 : 8.'

3. The third species of suffering is jnmis/iment. This is pain inflicted because of guilt. The intention of it is the satisfaction of justice. Retributive justice is expressed in the saying, " An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." This is the lex talionis, or law of requital.^ Our Lord, in the Sermon on the Mount, did not abolish this law, but placed its execution upon the proper basis. " That which was addressed to tlie judges," says Calvin (Henry's Life, I. 28T), "private individuals applied to themselves, and it was this abuse which our Lord Jesus Christ would correct."

' See the excellent treatise of Crawford : The Fatherhood of God. - See the explanation and defence of it by Kalisch : On Ex. 'il : 22-25.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 423

The private person may not put out the eye of him wlio has put out an eye, but the government may. Ketribution is not the function of the individual. It belongs to God, and to the government, which is ordained of God. " Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves ; for it is written. Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord," Rom. 12 : 19. This retributive function is delegated by God to the magistrate ; " for he is the minister of God, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doetli evil," Rom. 13 : 4. When the private individual takes the lex talionis into his own hands, it is revenge. Christ forbade this. When God or the government administers it, it is vengeance. Christ did not forbid this. The former is selfish and wrong ; the latter is dispassionate and right.

That particular amount and kind of suffering which is required by the law of requital is punishment. Its primary aim is the satisfaction of justice, not utility to the criminal. The criminal is sacrificed to justice. Ills private interest is subservient to that of law and government, because the latter is of more importance than the former. Even if he derives no personal benefit from the retribution which lie expei'iences, the one sufficient reason for it still holds good, namely, that he has voluntarily transgressed and deserves to suffer for it. Both the quantity and the quality of the suffering must be considered, in order to penalty, (a) In the first place, the amount of the suffering nnist be proportionate to the offence. To take human life for a petty larceny would be unjust. To take money as an offset for murder would be unjust, (h) In the second place, suffering must be intended as penal and felt to be penal, in order to be penal. It must have this retributive quality. Two men might snffer from God precisely the same amount of suffering, and in one case it might be retribution, and in the other chastisement, because in the one case his intention was the satisfaction of law, in the other the correction of his child. Physical death in the case of a wicked man is

424 SOTERIOLOGY.

penal evil, because it is designed as a punishment on tlie part of God, and is felt to be such by the man. God grants no comfort to the wicked in his death ; the sting is not extracted, and death is remorseful and punitive. But the very same event of death, and the same suffering in amount, is chastisement and not punishment for a believer, because it is accompanied with inward strength from God to endure it, and is known to be the means of entrance into heaven.

The sufferings of Christ the mediator were vicariously penal, or atoning, because the intention, both on the part of the Father and the Son, was that they should satisfy justice for the sin of man. They were not calamity, for their object is known. The reason for calamitous suffering is secret. And they were not disciplinary, because Christ having no sin could not pass through a process of progressive sanctification. Scripture plainly teaches that our Lord's sufferings were vicariously retributive ; that is, that they were endured for the purpose of satisfying justice in the place of the actual transgressor. 1 Pet. 3 : 18, " Christ hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust." Gal. 3 : 13, " Christ was made a curse for us." Isa. 53 : 5, " Immanuel was wounded for our transgressions, and bruised for our iniquities." Rom. 4 : 25, " Jesus our Lord was delivered for our offences." 2 Cor. 5 : 21, " lie hath made him to be sin [a sin-offering] for us, who knew no sin." 1 John 2 : 2, " lie is the propitiation for our sins." John 1 : 29, " Behold the Laml) of God which taketh away the sins of the world." Rom. 8 : 32, " He spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all." With this, compare 2 Pet. 2:4, " He spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell." Penalty in the case of Christ was vicarious ; in that of the fallen angels was personal.

The penal and atoning sufferings of Christ were twofold : {a) Ordinary. (5) Extraordinary. The first came upon him by virtue of his human nature. He hungered, thirsted,

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 425

was weary in body, was sad and grieved in mind, by the operation of the natural laws of matter and mind. All that Christ endured by virtue of his being born of a woman, being made under the law, living a human life, and dying a violent death, belongs to this class. The extraordinary sufferings in Chrisfs experience came upon him by virtue of a positive act and infliction on the part of God. To these belong, also, all those temptations by Satan which exceeded in their force the common temptations incident to ordinary human life. Through these Christ was caused to suffer more severely than any of his disciples have. And that this was an intentional and preconceived infliction on the part of God, for the purpose of causing the sinner's substitute to endure a judicial suffering, is proved by the statement that " Jesus was led up of the Spirit into the wilderness, to be tempted of the devil," Matt. 4: 1. These severe temptations from Satan occurred more than once. " The devil departed from him for a season," Luke 4 : 13. But still more extraordinary was that suffering which was caused in the soul of Christ by the immediate agency of God, in the garden and on the cross. That agony which forced the blood through the pores of the skin, and wrung from the patient and mighty heart of the God-nian the cry, "My God, why hast thou forsaken me ! " cannot be explained by the operation of natural laws. There was positive desertion and infliction, on the part of God. The human nature was forsaken, as the words of Christ imply. That support and comfort which the humanity had enjoyed, in greater or less degree, during the life of the God-man upon earth, was now withdrawn utterly and entirely. One consequence of this was, that the physical suffering involved in the crucifixion was unmitigated. Christ had no such support as his confessors have always had in the hour of martyrdom. But this was the least severe part of Christ's extraordinary suffering. The pain from the death of crucifixion was physical only. There was over and above this a mental distress

426 SOTERIOLOGY.

that was far greater. This is indicated in the terms employed to describe the spiritual condition of Christ's soul, in the so-called "agony" in the garden. " He began to be sore amazed, and to be very heavy, and saith unto them, My soul is exceeding sorrowful unto death," Mark. 14 : 33, 34. The words e«^a/u./3etcr-9at and ahrjiMOvelv imply a species of nieutal distress that stuns and bewilders. This mental suffering cannot be explained upon ordinary psychological principles, but must be referred to a positive act of God. Christ was sinless and perfect. His inward distress did not result from the workings of a guilty conscience. The agony in the gai'den and on the cross was not that of remorse ; though it was equal to it. Keither was it the agony of despair ; though it was equal to it.'

The positive agency of God, in causing a particular kind of suffering to befall the Mediator which could not have befallen him by the operation of natural causes, is spoken of

1 Christ felt that he was forsaken of God, but not, like a despairing person, that he was eternally forsaken. The desertion was only temporary. The comforting presence of God returns to Christ, as is indicated in the statement of Luke (33 : 40) that " Jesus cried with a loud voice, saying, Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." Again, the agony of Ciirist was not despair, because in this very cry he says, " J/y God." A despairing man or angel would say, "0 God;" and would not exclaim, saying, '•'■Why hast thou forsaken me V " Again, Christ did not experience despair, because he knew that the union between the divine and human natures was indissoluble. He also knew that the covenant of redemption between him and the Father could not fail. His distress did not relate to either of these two particulars. It arose : {a) From his view of the nature of the curse upon sin which he had vicariously come under ; (b) Because the comforting influences from the union of the divine with the human nature were temporarily restrained ; (t) From temporary desertion of God ; (d) From positive infliction when the ' ' sword was awakened " against him. Owen: Third Sacramental Discourse. The words, "Why hast thou forsaken me ? " express wonder, not ignorance, or unbelief, or complaint. Christ well knew why he was deserted at this hour, had perfect faith and confidence in his Father, and was entirely submissive to his will. But he was amazed axidi paralyzed at the immensity of the agony. " Why," is not interrogative, but exclamatory. The words are equivalent to : " How thou hast forsaken me ! " This is Hugh St. Victor's explanation. See Hooker, V. xlviii. When a Christian exclaims, " Why am I so unbelieving and sinful V " it is only another way of saying, " How unbelieving and sinful I am ! " He is not asking for informatioDr He well knows the reason why.

VICA'RIOUS ATONEMENT. 427

in Isa. 53 : 5, 6, 10. " lie was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities. The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us alL It pleased the Lord to bruise him." And again in Zechariah 13 : 7, " Awake, O sword, against my shepherd, and against the man that is my fellow, saith the Lord of hosts ; smite the shepherd." This language teaches, that the incarnate second person of the Trinity received upon himself a stroke inflicted by the positive act of another divine person. The Son of God was bruised, wounded, and smitten by God the Father, as the officer and agent of Divine justice, and the effects of it appear in that extraordinary mental distress which the Mediator exhibited, particularly during the last hours of his earthly life. '" While he was buffeted, scourged, and nailed to the cross, we hear nothing from him ; but like a lamb before the shearers, he was dumb. But when God reached forth his hand, and darted his immediate rebukes into his very soul and spirit, then he cries out. My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me ! " '

The nature of this suffering is inexplicable, because it has no parallel in human consciousness. The other forms of Christ's suffering are intelligible, because they were like those of men. Thirst, hunger, weariness, grief at the death of a friend, were the same in Christ that they are in us. But that strange and unique experience which uttered itself in the cry, " My God, why hast thou forsaken me?"' belongs to the consciousness of the God-man. Only he who occupied the actual position of the sinner's substitute can experience such a judicial stroke from eternal justice, and only he can know the peculiarity of the suffering which it produces. Suffering is a form of consciousness, and consciousness can be known only by the possessor of it.

There are some particulars respecting this positive infliction upon the Mediator which must be carefully noted. 1.

» South : Serraon on Messiah's SuflFering. Edwards : Excellency of Chiist. Works, IV. 189.

428 soteriology!

Though the Father " smote," " wounded," and " bruised " the Son, he felt no emotional anger towards the person of the Son. The emotional wrath of God is revealed only against personal unrighteousness, and Christ was holv, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners. The Father smote his " beloved Son, in whom he was well pleased," Matt. 3 : 17. At the very instant when the Father forsook the Son, he loved him emotionally and personally witli the same infinite affection with which he had loved him " before the world was." When it is said that Christ experienced the " wrath of God," the meaning is, that he experienced a judicial suffering caused by God. The "wrath " of God in this instance is not a divine emotion^ but a divine act by which God the Father caused pain in Jesus Christ for a particular purpose. This purpose is judicial and penal, and therefore the act may be called an act of wrath. " Ira dei est voluntas puniendi." Anselm : Cur deus homo, I. 6. In Rom. 13 : 4, the infliction of suifering by the magistrate upon the criminal is denominated an act of " wrath." " He is the minister of wrath." But the magistrate has no emotional anger towards the criminal. God the Father could love the Son, therefore, at the very instant when he visited him with this punitive act. His emotion might be love, while his act was wrath, j^ay, his love might be drawn forth by this very willingness of the Son to suffer vicariously for the salvation of man, " We do not admit," says Calvin (Inst, II. xvi. 11), " that God was ever hostile or [emotionally] angry with him. For how could he be angry with his beloved Son in whom his soul delighted ? or how could Christ by his intercession appease the Father for others, if the Father were incensed against him? But we affirm that he sustained the weight of the divine severit}' ; since being smitten and afflicted of God, he experienced from God all the tohens of wrath and vengeance." Says Witsius (Covenants, II. vi. 38), " To be the beloved Son of God, and at the same time to suffer the wrath of God, are not such contrary things

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 429

as that thej cannot stand together. For, as Son, as the Holy One, while obeying the Father in all things, he was always the beloved ; and indeed most of all when obedient to the death of the cross ; for that was so pleasing to the Father that on account of it he raised him to the highest pitch of exaltation, Phil. 2:9; though as charged with our sins he felt the wrath of God burning not against himself, but against our sins which he took upon himself."

2. Secondly, the Son of God understands the judicial infliction which he undergoes, in this sense. God the Son knows that the blow which he experiences frona God the Father is not for sin which he has himself committed. The transaction between the two Divine persons is of the nature of a covenant between them. The Son agrees to submit his person, incarnate, to a penal infliction that is required by the attribute of justice. But this attribute is as much an attribute of the Son as it is of the Father. The second trinitarian person is as much concerned for the maintenance of law as is the first. The Son of God is not seized an unwilling victim, and offered to justice by the Father. The Son himself is willing and desires to suffer. "I have," he says, " a baptism to be baptized with, and how am I straitened till it be accomplished," Luke 12 : 50. This explains the fact that Christ everywhere represents himself as voluntarily giving up his life. " No man taketh my life from me, I lay it down of myself," John 10 : 18. In some instances he employs his miraculous power to prevent his life from being taken, because " his hour was not yet come." But when the hour had come, though in the full consciousness that " tM^elve legions of angels " were at his couimand, he suffers himself to be seized by a handful of men, to be bound, and to be nailed to a cross. So far as the feature of mere voluntariness is concerned, no suicide was ever more voluntary in the manner of his death than was Jesus Christ.

A distinction is made between Christ's active and pas430 SOTERIOLOGY.

sive obedience.' The latter denotes Christ's siifferincrs of every kind ; the snm-total of the sorrow and pain wliich he endnred in liis estate of humiliation. The term "passive " is used etymologically. His suffering is denominated " obedience," because it came by reason of liis submission to the conditions under wliich he voluntarily placed himself, when he consented to be the sinner's substitute. He vicariously submitted to the sentence, " The soul that sinneth, it shall die," and was " obedient mito death," Phil. 2 : 8.

Christ's passive, or suffering obedience is not to be confined to what he experienced in the garden and on the cross. This suffering was the culmination of his piacular sorrow, but not the whole of it. Everything in his human and earthly career that was distressing belongs to his passive obedience. It is a true remark of Edwards, that the blood of Christ's circumcision was as really a part of his vicarious atonement, as the blood that flowed from his pierced side. And not only his suffering proper, but liis humiliation, also, was expiatory ; because this was a kind of suffering. Says Edwards (Redemption, 11. i. 2), " The satisfaction or propitiation of Christ consists either in his suffering evil, or his being subject to abasement. Thus Christ made satisfaction for sin, bv continuing under tlie power of death while he lay buried in the grave, though neither his body nor soul properly endured any suffering after he was dead. Whatever Christ was subject to that was tlie judicial fruit of sin, had the nature of satisfaction for sin. But not only proper suffering, but all abasement and depression of the state and circumstances of mankind [human nature] below its primitive honor and dignity, such as his body remaining under death, and body and soul remaining separate, and other things that might be mentioned, are the judicial fruits of sin."

Christ's active obedience is his perfect performance of

' Philippi : Der thatige GehorBam Christi.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 431

the requirements of the moral law. lie obeyed this law in heart, and in conduct, without a single slip or failure, lie was " holj, harmless, and undefiled," Ileb. 7 : 26. Some theologians confine Christ's atonement to his passive obedience, in such sense that liis active obedience does not enter into it and make a part of it.' Since atonement consists in suffering, and since obedience of the divine law is not suffering but happiness, they contend that Christ's active obedience cannot contribute anything that is strictly piacular or atoning. This would be true in reference to the active obedience of a mere creature, but not in reference to the active obedience of the God-man. It is no humilation for a created being to be a citizen of the Divine government ; to be made under the law, and to be required to obey it. But it is humiliation for the Sou of God to be so made, and to be so required to obey. It is stooping down, when the Ruler of the universe becomes a subject, and renders obedience to a superior. In so far as Christ's active obedience was an element in his humiliation, it was an element also in his expiation. Consequently, we must say that both the active and the passive obedience enter into the sumtotal of Christ's atoning work. Christ's humiliation confessedly was atoning, and his obedience of the law was a part of his humiliation. The two forms of Christ's obedience cannot therefore be so entirely separated from each other, as is implied in this theory which confines the piacular agency of the Mediator to his passive obedience.

But while there is this atoning element in Christ's active obedience, it is yet true that the principal reference of the active obedience is to the law as precept, rather than to the law as penalty. It is more meritorious of reward than it is

' Piscator was the first formally to present this view. John Taylor of Norwich went to an opposite extreme, and held that the active obedience was the sole cause of man's salvation. He denied any piacular effect of Christ's death, and held that as a reward of Christ's active obedience alone the remission of sin was given to man, as the eminent services of a soldier are rewarded by the monarch by benefits to his family.

432 SOTERIOLOGY.

piacnlar of guilt. The chief function of Christ's obedience of the moi-al law is, to earn a title for the believer to the rewards of heaven. This part of Christ's agency is necessary ; because, merely to atone for past transgression would not be a complete salvation. It would, indeed, save man from hell, but it would not introduce him into heaven. He would be delivered from the law's punishment, but would not be entitled to the law's reward. " The man which doeth the things of the law shall live by them," Rom. 10 : 5. Mere innocence is not entitled to a reward. Obedience is requisite in order to this. Adam was not meritorious until he had obeyed the commandment, "Do this." Before he could " enter into life," he must " keep the commandment," like every subject of the divine govei-nment and candidate for heavenly reward. The Mediator, therefore, must not only suffer for man, but must obey for him, if he would do for man eveTything that the law requires. Accordingly, Christ is said to be made of God unto the believer, " wisdom " and " sanctification," as well as " righteousness" and " redemption," 1 Cor. 1 : 30. Believers are described as " complete " in Christ, Coloss. 2:10; that is, they are entitled to eternal blessedness, as well as delivered from eternal misery. Christ is said to be " the end {Tk\o

The imputation of Christ's active obedience is necessary, also, in order to hope and confidence respecting the endless future. If the believer founds his expectation of an eterVICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 433

nity of blessedness upon the amount of obedience wliicli he has himself rendered to the law, and the degree of holiness which he has personally attained here upon earth, he is filled with doubt and fear respecting the final recompense. He knows that he has not, by his own work, earned and merited such an infinite reward as "glory, honor, and immortality." " We cannot by our best works merit eternal life at the hand of God, by reason of the great disproportion between them and the glory to come." Westminster Confession, XVI. v.' But if he founds his title to eternal life, and his expectation of it, upon the obedience of Christ for him, his anxiety disappears.

A distinction is made by some theologians between "satisfaction " and " atonement." Christ's satisfaction is his fulfilling the law both as precept and penalty. Christ's atonement, as antithetic to satisfaction, includes only what Christ does to fulfil the law as penalty. According to this distinction, Christ's atonement would be a part of his satisfaction. The objections to this mode of distinguishing are : (a) Satisfaction is better fitted to denote Christ's piacular work, than his whole work of redemption. In theological literature, it is more commonly the synonym of atonement. (h) By this distinction, atonement may be made to rest upon the passive obedience alone, to the exclusion of the active. This will depend upon whether " obedience " is employed in the comprehensive sense of including all that Christ underwent in his estate of humiliation, both in obeying and suffering.

Another distinction is made by some, between " satisfaction" and "merit." In this case, "satisfaction" is employed in a restricted signification. It denotes the satisfaction of retributive justice, and has respect to the law as penalt}'. Thus employed, the term is equivalent to " atonement." "Merit" as antithetic to "satisfaction" has re> See on this point, Paley : Sermon on Heb. 9 : 26, Pt. IL Vol. II.— 28

434 SOTERIOLOGY.

spect to the law as precept, and is founded upon Christ's active obedience. Christ vicariously obeys the law, and so vicariously merits for the believer the reward of eternal life. Respecting this distinction, Turrettin (Institutio XIY. xiii. 12) remarks that "the two things are not to be separated from each other. We are not to say as some do, that the "satisfaction" is by the passive work of Christ alone, and the " merit " is by the active work alone. The satisfaction and the merit are not to be thus viewed in isolation, each by itself, because the benefit in each depends upon the total work of Christ. For sin cannot be expiated, until the law as precept has been perfectly fulfilled ; nor can a title to eternal life be merited, before the guilt of sin has been atoned for. Meruit ergo satisf aciendo, et merendo satisfecit." There is some ambiguity in this distinction, also. The term " merit " is often applied to Christ's passive obedience, as well as to his active. The " merit of Christ's blood " is a familiar phrase. The Mediator was meritorious in reference to the law's penalty, as well as to the law's precept.'

Having thus considered the nature of atonement, and the sufferings of the Mediator as constituting it, we proceed to notice some further characteristics of it.

1. In the first place, atonement is correlated to justice, not to benevolence. Some have maintained that retributive justice is a phase of benevolence. They would reduce all the moral attributes to one, ultimately, namely, the divine love. This theory is built upon the text, " God is love." But there are texts aflfirming that "God is light," 1 John 1 : 5, and that " God is a consuming fire," Heb. 12 :

•Owen (Justification, Ch. X.) endorses the distinction as made by Grotius. "Whereas we have said that Christ hath procured two things for us, freedom from punishment, and a reward, the ancient church attributes the one of them to his satisfaction, the other to his merit." Edwards adopts it. " Whatever in Christ had the nature of satisfaction, it was bv virtue of the suffering or humiliation in it. But whatever had the nature of merit, it was by virtue of the obedience or righteousness that was in it." Redemption, Works, I. 403.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 435

29. The affirmation, " Holy, holy, lioly is the Lord of Hosts " (Isa. 6 : 3), is equivalent to, " God is holiness." Upon the strength of these texts, it might be contended that all the divine attributes may be reduced to that of wisdom, or of justice, or of holiness.' The true view is, that each of the attributes stands side by side with all the others, and cannot be merged and lost in any other. Justice is no more a phase of benevolence, than benevolence is a phase of justice. Each attribute has a certain distinctive characteristic which does not belong to the others, and by which it is a different attribute. The fact that one divine attribute affects and influences another, does not convert one into another. Omnipotence acts wisely, but this does not prove that omnipotence is a mode of wisdom. God's justice acts benevolently, not malevolently, but this does not prove that justice is a mode of benevolence. God's benevolence acts justly, not unjustly, but this does not prove that benevolence is a mode of justice. The divine attributes do not find a centre of unity in any one of their own number, but in the divine essence. It is the divine nature itself, not the divine attribute of love, or any other attribute, in which they all inhere.

Accordingly, the atoning sufferings and death of Christ are related to the attribute of justice, rather than to any other one of the divine attributes. They manifest and exhibit other attributes, such as wisdom, omnipotence, benevolence, and compassion, nay, all the other attributes, but the}^ are an atonement only for retributive justice. Christ's death does not propitiate or satisfy God's benevolence, nor his wisdom, nor his omnipotence ; but it satisfies his justice. Atonement cannot be correlated to benevolence, any more than creation can be correlated to omniscience. It is true that the creation of the world supposes omniscience, but

1 Bengel composed his Syntagma de Sanctitate, to prove that all the attributes of God are implied in the Hebrew ^"llp But he did not hold that all are holiness.

436 SOTERIOLOGY.

creation is an act of power rather than of knowledge, and is therefore referred to omnipotence, rather than to omniscience. In like manner, Christ's atonement supposes benevolence in God, but benevolence is not the particular attribute that requires the atonement. It is retributive justice that demands the punishment of sin. If there were in God mere and isolated benevolence, there would be neither personal nor vicarious punishment ; just as there would be no creation, if there were in God mere and isolated omniscience. Benevolence alone, and wholly disconnected from justice, would not cause pain but pleasure. It would relieve from suffering, instead of inflicting it. St. Paul, in Romans 5 : 7, teaches the diversity between the attribute of justice and that of benevolence, in saying that "scarcely for a just man will one die ; yet perad venture for a benevolent man some would even dare to die." '

2. Secondly, an atonement for sin, of one kind or the other, if not personal then vicarious, is necessary, not optional. The transgressor must either die himself, or some one must die for him. This arises from the nature of that divine attribute to which atonement is a correlate. Eetributive justice, we have seen (Vol. I., pp. 373-380), is necessary in its operation. The claim of law upon the transgressor for punishment is absolute and indefeasible. The eternal Judo-e may or may not exercise mercy, but he must exercise justice. He can neither waive the claims of law in part, nor abolish them altogether. The only possible mode, consequently, of delivering a creature who is obnoxious to the demands of retributive justice, is to satisfy them for him. The claims themselves must be met and extinguished, either personally, or by substitution. Fiat justitia ruat coelum. And this necessity of an atonement is absolute, not relative. It is not made necessary by divine decision,

» Butler (Nature of Virtue, Dissertation 11. sub fine), contends that ^' the lohole of virtue does not consist in promoting happiness." This is the same as contending that all moral qualities cannot be resolved into benevolence.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 437

in tlie sense that the divine decision might liave been otherwise. It is not correct to say, that God might have saved man without a vicarious atonement had he been pleased so to do. For this is equivalent to saying, that God might have abolished the claims of law and justice had he been pleased to do so.

3. In the third place, an atonement, either personal or vicarious, when made, naturally and necessarily cancels legal claims. This means that there is such a natural and necessar}'' correlation between vicarious atonement and justice, that the former supplies all that is required by the latter. It does not mean that Christ's vicarious atonement naturally and necessarily saves every man ; because the relation of Christ's atonement to divine justice is one thing, but the relation of a particular person to Christ's atonement is a very different thing. Christ's death as related to the claims of the law upon all mankind, cancels those claims wholly. It is an iniiuite " propitiation for the sins of the whole world," 1 John 2 : 2. But the relation of an impenitent person to this atoneinent, is that of unbelief and rejection of it. Consequently, what the atonement has effected objectively in reference to the attribute of divine justice, is not effected subjectively in the conscience of the individual. There is an infinite satisfaction that naturally and necessarily cancels legal claims, but unbelief derives no benefit from the fact.

In like manner, a personal atonement naturally and necessarily cancels legal claims. When the prescribed human penalty has been personally endured by the criminal, human justice is satisfied, and there are no more outstanding claims upon him. And this, by reason of the essential nature of justice. Justice insists upon nothing but what is due, and when it obtains this, it shows its righteousness in not requiring anything further, as it does in not accepting anything less. Consequently, personal atonement operates inevitably, and we might almost say mechanically. If a

438 SOTERIOLOGY.

criminal suffers the penalt}^ affixed to his crime, he owes nothing more in the way of penalty to the law. He cannot be punished a second time. Law and justice cannot now touch him, so far as this particular crime and this particular penalty are concerned. It would be unjust to cause him the least jot or tittle of further retributive suffering for that crime which by the supposition he has personally atoned for. The law now owes him immunity from suffering anything more. It is not grace in the law not to punish him any further, but it is debt. The law itself is under obligation not to punish a criminal who has once been punished. St. Paul says respecting grace and debt, in the case of active obedience, that " to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace but of debt ; otherwise work is no more work," llom. 4:4; 11 : 6. In like manner, it may be said that, " to him who atones for sin, the legal consequence of atonement is not reckoned of grace but of debt ; otherwise atonement is no more atonement."

This reasoning applies to vicarious atonement equally with personal. Justice does not require a second sacrifice from Christ, in addition to the first. " Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many," Heb. 9 : 28. This one offering expiated " the sins of the whole world," and justice is completely satisfied in reference to them. The death of the God-man naturally and necessarily cancelled all legal claims. When a particular person trusts in this infinite atonement, and it is imputed to him by God, it then becomes his atonement for judicial purposes as really as if he had made it himself, and then it naturally and necessarily cancels his personal guilt, and he has the testimony that it does in his peace of conscience. Divine justice does not, in this case, require an additional atonement from the believer. It does not demand penal suffering from a person for whom a divine substitute has rendered a full satisfaction, which justice itself has accepted in reference to this very person. By accepting a vicarious atonement for a particVICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 439

iilar individual, the Divine justice precludes itself from requiring a personal atonement fiom him. Accordingly, sci'ipture represents the non-infliction of penalty upon the believer in Christ's atonement, as an act of justice to Christ, and also to the believer viewed as one with Christ. " If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins," 1 John 1: 9. "AVho shall lay anything to the chai-ge of God's elect ? Who is he that condemneth ? It is Christ that died," Eom. 8 : 33, 34. The atoning Mediator can demand upon principles of strict justice, the release from penalty of any sinful man in respect to whom he makes the demand. And if in such a case we should suppose the demand to be refused by eternal justice, we should suppose a case in which eternal justice is unjust. For, by the supposition, justice has inflicted upon the Mediator the full penalty due to this sinner, and then refuses to the mediator that release of this sinner from penalty which the mediator has earned by his own suffering, and which is now absolutely due to him as the reward of his suffering. " It is," says Edwards (Wisdom in Salvation, Works, IV. 150), " so ordered now, that the glory of the attribute of divine justice requires the salvation of those that believe. The justice of God that [irrespective of Christ's atonement] required man's damnation, and seemed inconsistent with his salvation, now [having respect to Christ's atonement] as much requires the salvation of those that believe in Christ, as ever before it required their damnation. Salvation is an absolute debt to the believer from God, so that he may in justice demand it on the ground of what his Surety has done." See also Edwards : God's Sovereignty, Works, IV. 552. Similarly Anselm (Cur deus homo, II. 20) asks, " Can anything be more just than for God to remit all debt, when in the sufferings of the Godman he receives a satisfaction greater than all the debt '^ " Says Ezekiel Hopkins (Exposition of the Lord's Prayer), " The pardon of sin is not merely an act of mercy, but

440 SOTERIOLOGY.

also an act of justice. What abundant cause of comfort ma}' this be to all believers, that GocFs justice as well as his mercy shall acquit them ; that that attribute of God at the apprehension of which they are wont to tremble, should interpose in tlieir behalf and plead for them ! And yet, through the all-sufficient expiation and atonement that Christ hath made for our sins, this mystery is affected, and justice itself brought over, from being a formidable adversary, to be of our party and to plead for us." Shedd : Theological Essays, 310-316.

It may be asked. If atonement naturally and necessarily cancels guilt, why does not the vicarious atonement of Christ save all men indiscriminately, as the Universalist contends? The substituted suffering of Christ being infinite is equal in value to the personal sufteriug of all numkind ; why then are not all men upon the same footing and in the class of the saved, by virtue of it ? The answer is, Because it is a natural impossibility. Vicarious atonement without faith in it is powerless to save. It is not the inahing of this atonement, but the trusting \\\ it, that saves the sinner. "By faiili are ye saved. He that hdieveih shall be saved," Eph. 2:8; Mark 16 : 16. The making of this atonement merely satisfies the legal claims, and this is all that it does. If it were made, but never imputed and appropriated, it M'ould result in no salvation. A substituted satisfaction of justice without an act of trust in it, M'ould be useless to sinners. It is as naturally impossible that Christ's death should save from punishment one who does not confide in it, as that a loaf of bread should save from starvation a man who does not eat it. The assertion that because the atonement of Christ is sufficient for all men, therefore no men are lost, is as absurd as the assertion that because the grain produced in the year 1880 w^as sufficient to support the life of all men on the globe, therefore no men died of starvation during that year. The mere fact that Jesus Christ made satisfaction for human sin, alone and of itself, will save no

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 441

soul. Christ, conceivably, miglit have died precisely as he did, and his death have been just as valuable for expiatory purposes as it is, but if his death had not been followed with the work of the Holy Ghost and the act of faith on the part of individual men, he would have died in vain. Unless his objective work is subjectively appropriated, it is useless, so far as personal salvation is concerned. Christ's suffering is sufficient to cancel the guilt of all men, and in its own nature completely satisfies the broken law. But all men do not make it their own atonement by faith in it ; by pleading the merit of it in prayer, and mentioning it as the reason and ground of their pardon. They do not regard and use it as their own possession, and blessing. It is nothing for them but a historical fact. In this state of things, the atonement of Clirist is powerless to save. It remains in the possession of Clirist who made it, and has not been transferred to the individual. In the scripture phrase, it has not been imputed. There may be a sum of money in the hands of a rich man that is sufficient in amount to pay the debts of a million of debtors ; but unless they individually take money from his hands into their own, they cannot pay their debts with it. There must be a personal act of each debtor, in ordei- that this sum of money on deposit may actually extinguish individual indebtedness. Should one of the debtors, when payment is demanded of him, merely say that there is an abundance of money on deposit, but take no steps himself to get it and pay it to his creditor, he would be told that an undrawn deposit is not a payment of a debt. " The act of God," says Owen (Justification, Ch. X.), " in laying our sins on Christ, conveyed no title to ns to what Christ did and suffered. This doing and suffering is not immediately by virtue thereof ours, or esteemed onrs ; because God hath appointed something else [namely, faith] not only antecedent thereto, but as the means of it."

The supposition that the objective satisfaction of justice by Christ saves of and by itself, without any application of

442 SOTERIOLOGY.

it bj the Iloly Spirit, and any trust in it by the individual man, overlooks the fact that while sin has a resemblance to a pecuniary debt, as is taught in the petition, " Forgive us our debts," it differs from it in two important particulars. (a) In the instance of pecuniary indebtedness, there is no need of a consent and arrangement on the part of the creditor, when there is a vicarious payment. Any person may step up and discharge a money obligation for a debtor, and the obligation ceases ipso facto. But in the instance of moral indebtedness to justice, or guilt, there must be a consent of the creditor, namely, the judge, before there can be a substitution of payment. Should the Supreme Judge refuse to permit another person to suffer for the sinner, and compel him to suffer for his own sin, this would be just. Consequently, substitution in the case of moral penalty requires a consent and covenant on the part of God, with conditions and limitations, while substitution in the case of a pecuniary debt requires no consent, covenant, or limitations. (J) Secondly, after the vicarious atonement has been permitted and provided, there is still another condition in the case : namely, that the sinner shall confess and repent of the sin for which the atonement was made, and trust in the atonement itself.

Another error, underlying the varieties of Universalism, is the assumption that because an atonement sufficient for all men has been made, all men are entitled to the benefits of it. This would be true, if all men had made this atonement. But inasmuch as they had nothing to do with the making of it, they have not the slightest right or title to it. No sinner has a claim upon the expiatory oblation of Jesus Christ. It belongs entirely to the maker, and he may do what he M'ill with his own. He may impute it to any man whom he pleases ; and not impute it to any man whom he pleases, Rom. 9 : 18. Even the act of faith does not by its intrinsic tnerit entitle the believer to the benefits of Christ's satisfaction. This would make salvation a debt which the

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 443

Redeemer owes because of an act of the believer. It is only because Clirist has pi-omised, and thereby bound himself to bestow the benefits of redemption upon everyone that believeth, that salvation is certain to faith.

It is objected that it is unjust to exact personal penalty from any individuals of the human race, if a vicarious penalty equal in value to that due from the whole race has been paid to justice. The injustice alleged in this objection may mean injustice toward the individual unbeliever who is personally punished ; or it may mean injustice in regard to what the Divine law is entitled to, on account of man's sin. An examination will show that there is no injustice done in either respect, (a) When an individual unbeliever is personally punished for his own sins, he receives what he deserves ; and there is no injustice in this. The fact that a vicarious atonement has been made that is sufficient to expiate his sins, does not estop justice from punishing him personally for them, unless it can be shown that he is the author of the vicarious atonement. If this were so, then indeed he might complain of tlie personal satisfaction that is required of him. In this case, one and the same party would make two satisfactions for one and the same sin : one vicarious, and one personal. When therefore an individual unbeliever suffers for his own sin, he " receives the due reward of his deeds," Luke 23 : 41. And since he did not make the vicarious atonement " for the sins of the whole world," and therefore has no more right or title to it, or any of its benefits, than an inhabitant of Saturn, he cannot claim exemption from personal penalty on the ground of it. Says Owen (Satisfaction of Christ, sub fine), "The satisfaction of Christ made for sin, being not made by the sinner, there must of necessity be a rule, order, and law-constitution, how the sinner may come to be interested in it, and made partaker of it. For the consequent of the freedom of one by the sacrifice of another is not natural or necessary, but must proceed and arise from a law-con stitu444 SOTERIOLOGY.

tion, compact, and agreement, Now the way constituted and appointed is that of faith, as explained in the Scriptures. If men believe not, they are no less liable to the punishment due to their sins, than if no satisfaction at all were made for sinners."

(b) The other injustice alleged in the objection, relates to the divine law and government. It is urged that when the unbeliever is personally punished, after an infinite vicarious satisfaction for human sin has been made, justice, in this case, gets more than its dues ; which is as unjust as to get less. This is a mathematical objection, and must receive a mathematical answer. The alleged excess in the case is like the addition of a finite number to infinity, which is no increase. The everlasting suffering of all mankind, and still more of only a part, is a jinite suffering. Neither the sufferer, nor the duration, is mathematically infinite ; for the duration begins, tliough it does not end. But the suffering of the God-man is mathematically infinite, because his person is absolutely infinite. When, therefore, any amount of finite human suffering is added to the infinite suffering of the God-man, it is no increase of value. Justice, mathematically, gets no more penalty when the suffering of lost men is added to that of Jesus Christ, than it would without this addition. The law is more magnified and honored by the suffering of incarnate God, than it would be by the suffering of all men individually, because its demand for a strictly infinite satisfaction for a strictly infinite evil is more completely met. In this sense, " "Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound," Eom. 5 : 20.

It is for this reason, that finite numbers, small or great, are of no consequence when the value of Christ's oblation is under consideration. One sinner needs the whole infinite Christ and his whole sacrifice, because of the infinite guilt of his sin. And a million of sinners need the same sacrifice, and no more. The guilt of one man in relation to God is

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 445

infinite ; and tlie infinite sacrifice of Christ cancels it. The guilt of a million of men is infinite — not, however, because a million is a larger number than one, but because of the relation of sin to God — and the one infinite sacrifice of Christ cancels it. If only one man were to be saved, Christ must suffer and die precisely as he has ; and if the human race were tenfold more numerous than it is, his death would be ample for their salvation. An infinite satisfaction meets and cancels infinite guilt, whether there be one man or millions.

4. Fourthly, the vicarious satisfaction of justice is a mode or form of mercy. It is so, because it unites and harmonizes the two attributes in one Divine act: namely, the suffering of incarnate deity for human guilt. When the Supreme Judge substitutes himself for the criminal, his own mercy satisfies his own justice for the transgressor. This single act is, therefore, both an exercise of mercy, and an exercise of justice. It is certainly mercy to suffer for the sinner; and it is certainly justice to suffer the full penalty which he deserves. The personal satisfaction of justice, on the contrary, is not a mode or form of mercy, because in this case the Supreme Judge inflicts the suffering required by the violated law upon the criminal himself. Personal satisfaction of justice is justice without mercy. It is the " severity " spoken of by St. Paul, in Kom. 11 : 22.

Vicarious atonement is both evangelical and legal — gospel with law; personal atonement is merely legal — law without gospel. The former is complex : both merciful and just ; the latter is simple: just, not merciful. In the legal sphere of ethics and natural religion, where personal satisfaction rules, justice and mercy are entirely separated attributes, unblended, and unharmonized. Justice obstructs the exercise of mercy by presenting its unsatisfied claims, and " mercy stands silent by." There is "no eye to pity, and no arm to save," Is. 59 : 16 ; 63 : 5. But in the evangelical sphere of revealed religiouj the two attributes are united and harmonized.

446 SOTERIOLOGY.

" Mercy and trutli meet together ; rigliteonsness and peace kiss each other," Ps. 85:10. Divine mercj now satisfies divine justice, and divine justice accepts the satisfaction. The mercy is now infinitely just, and the justice is now infinitely merciful. The two co-ordinate and distinct attributes, which, outside of the gospel, and apart from the incarnation, are separate — the one forbidding the exercise of the other — are now blended ; the one meeting all the demands of the other, and both concurring in the salvation of the guilty sinner, for whose advantage all this costly sacrifice is made by the adorable Trinity.

5. Fifthly, the vicarious satisfaction of justice is the highest mode or form of mercy, because it is mercy in the form of self-sacrifice. A comparison of the different modes of the divine mercy will show this. "When the Creator bestows temporal blessings in his providence upon the sinner; when he makes his rain to fall and his sun to shine upon hira ; this is a form of mercy greatly inferior to that shown in Christ's atonement. There is no loss on the part of the giver involved in the gifts of providence. They do not cost the deity any sacrifice. Again, should we conceive it possible for God to waive the claims of law by a word, and to infiict no penal suffering upon either the sinner or a substitute, this would be a lower form of mercy than that of vicarious atonement, for the same reason as in the previous instance. There is no suffering and no death undergone in the manifestation of such a species of compassion. This would be the easiest and cheapest of all methods of deliverance from punishment. Again, should we conceive of God, in the exercise of ownership and sovereignty, as taking one of his creatures, say an archangel, and making him a vicarious substitute for man, this too would be a low species of mercy, and for the same reason as in the previous cases. It involves no self-sacrifice upon the part of God. The transaction does not affect anything in the Divine essence. There is no humiliation, and no suffering of God

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 447

incarnate. But when justice is satisfied for man by the extraordinary method of substituting God for man ; by tlie method of incarnating, humiliating, and crucifying a person of the Trinity ; we see the liighest conceivable form of divine compassion and pity. It is so strange and stupendous, that it requires very high testimony and proof to make it credible.

The vicarious satisfaction of justice is tlien the highest form of mercy, because : (a) The offended party permits a substitution of penalty ; (b) The offended party provides the substitute; and (

In this fact that the vicarious satisfaction of justice is selfsacrificing mei'cy, we have the answer to the objection that

448 SOTERIOLOGY.

if justice is satisfied there is no exhibition of mercy. There would be none, if the satisfaction were made personally by the sinner. But when it is made vicariously by the Eternal Judge himself, it is the acme of mercy and compassion. Says the Westminster Larger Catechism (Q. 71) : " Although Christ by his obedience and death did make a full satisfaction to God's justice in the behalf of them that are justified, yet inasmuch as God accepteth the satisfaction from a surety which he might have demanded of them, and did provide this surety, their justification is to them of free grace."

This truth is made still more evident by remarking the distinction between mercy and indulgence. The first is founded in principle ; the latter is nnpi-incipled. Mercy has a moral basis ; it is good ethics. Indulgence has no moral foundation ; it is bad ethics. Indulgence is foolish good nature. It releases from punishment without making any provision for the claims of law. Its motive is sensuous, not rational. It suffers, itself, from the sight of suffering, and this is the reason why it does not infiict it. It costs an effort to be just, and it does not like to put forth an effort. Indulgence, in the last analysis, is intensely selfish. Mere happiness in the sense of freedom from discomfort or pain is the final end which it has in view. Consequently, the action of indulgence as distinguished from mercy is highhanded. It is the exercise of bare power in snatching the criminal away from merited suffering. It is might, not right. A mob exercises indulgence, when it breaks open a prison, and drags away the criminal merely because the criminal is suffering. No member of this mob would take the criminal's place, and suffer in his stead. This would be real mercy, and mercy in its highest form of vicarious satisfaction. Should God deliver man from the claims of law without the substitution of penalty, it would be a procedure the same in principle with that of the mob in the case supposed. It would be indulgence, not mercy.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 449

In Rom. 3 : 25, indulgence in distinction from mercy is referred to. St. Paul mentions as a secondary reason why Christ was set fortli as a propitiation for sin, the fact that in the past history of the sinful world of mankind God had been indulgent towards those who deserved immediate and swift retribution. He had " passed by " and omitted to punish. Instead of inflicting penalty, he had bestowed "rain and fruitful seasons" upon rebellious men, and had " filled their hearts with food and gladness." He had " suffered {elaae) all nations to walk in their own ways," and had " winked at," that is, overlooked (virepiSMv), " the times of this ignorance." Acts 14 : 16, 17 ; 17 : 30. St. Paul does not designate this indulgent treatment of sinful men by ;\;a/3i?, the usual and proper term for forgiving mercy, but by avoxv- It is not mercy, but "forbearance." It is in itself in-egular, and requires to be legitimated. And it is explained and set right, by the piacular offering of the Son of God. Because the vicarious atonement of Christ is sufficient to atone for the sins of the whole world, therefore it is that the sins of the whole world experience the forbearance of the Holy One ; therefore it is that the whole world receives many temporal blessings instead of swift retribution; therefore it is that God '"overlooks" the times of guilty ignorance and disobedience, and delays punishment.'

This "pretermission" of trangressions differs from their " remission," in being only temporary. This forbearance, even though explained and legitimated by the pi-opitiation of Christ, is not to be eternal. Justice will finally assert its claims, and those whose unrepented trangressions have met

• That this is the correct Laterpretation, is proved by the use of the preposition 5ia, in Rom. .3 : 25. God set forth Jesus Christ "to be a propitiation, to declare his righteousness 07i account of (5ia) the pretermission of sins." Had the act of pretermission been the final cause, or chief end of the propitiation, the preposition employed would have been ets. The main and ultimate purpose of Christ's death is alvrays denoted in the New Testament by ««s &(pe(riv afiapriuy. The phrase Sia irdpeany afj.apT7)fAd.T(t)v occurs only this once in the New Testament. Vol. II.— 29

450 SOTERIOLOGY.

with this temporary indulgence and delay of punishment, on account of Christ's atonement, will in the end receive the just punishment of sin. St. Paul, in this passage, does not say that these sins had been eternally pardoned by divine grace {')(apts;), but had been only temporarily passed by through divine forbearance {avoxv)6. In the sixth place, the vicarious satisfaction of justice is the only mode of exercising mercy that is possible to a just Being. This follows from the nature of justice, and its relation to other divine attributes. If it be conceded that legal claims must be met at all hazards, and cannot be either waived in part or abolished altogether, then it is evident that the great problem before the Divine mercy is, liow to meet these claims in behalf of the object of mercy. The problem is not how to trample upon justice in behalf of the criminal, but how to satisfy justice for him. And if this problem cannot be solved, then there can be no manifestation of mercy at all by a just Being. The penalty must be endured by the actual criminal, and the matter end here. God is a perfectly just Being, and therefore cannot forever exercise mere forbearance and indulgence towards a transgressor. The mercy of the Supreme Being must be ethical-; that is, must stand the test and scrutiny of moral principle and righteousness. If therefore the merciful God desires to release a transgressor from the suffering which he deserves, lie must find some one who is fitted and willing to undergo this suffering in his place. And there is in the whole universe no being who is both fitted and willing to do this, but God himself. A creature might be willinsr, but he is unfit for the office of substitute. Tbc language of Milton (Paradise Lost, III. 209-212) respecting the transgressor, is theology as well as poetry.

" Die he, or justice mnst, unless for him Some other able, and as willing, pay The rigid satisfaction, death for death."

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 451

Tlespecting the possibility of tlie substitution of penalty, it is to be observed : 1. In the first place, that the punishment inflicted by justice is aimed, strictly speaking, not at the person of the transgrossor, but at his si7i. The wrath of God falls upon the human soul considered as an a(/ent, not as a substance. The spiritual essence or nature of man is God's own work, and he is not angry at his own work, and docs not hate anything which he has created from nothing. Man's substance is not sin. Sin is the activity of this substance ; and this is man's work, God is displeased with this activity, and visits it with retribution. Consequently, justice punishes the sin rather than the sinner, the agency rather than the agent, the act rather than the person. It does not fix its eye upon the transgressor as this particular entitij, and insist that this verj^ entity shall suffer, and prohibit any otlier entity from suffering for liim. Justice, it is true, is not obliged to allow substitution, but neither is it obliged to forbid it. If it were true that the penalty must be inflicted upon the transgressor's very substance and person itself, as well as upon the sin in his person, then there could be no substitution. The very identical personal essence that had sinned must suffer, and justice would be the only attribute which God could manifest towards a sinner.

2. Secondly, justice is dispassionate and unselfish. It bears no malice towards the criminal. It is not seeking to gratify a grudge against him personally, but only to maintain law and righteousness. It inflicts pain not for the sake of inflicting it upon a particular individual, but for the sake of a moral principle. Hence if the sin can be punished in another way than by causing the sinner to be punished ; if the claims of law can be really and truly satisfied by a vicarious method ; there is nothing in the spirit and temper of justice towards the sinner's person, or soul, to forbid this. " The aspect of the law upon a sinner," says Bates (On Forgiveness), "being without passion, it

452 SOTERIOLOGY.

admits of satisfaction bv the sufferings of another." And the same truth is condensed in the schoohnan's dictum : " Impersonaliter poenam necessario infligi omni peccato, sednon personaliter omni peccatwi."

3. Thirdly, the substitution of penalty is implied in the Divine sovereignty in administering government. If God from his very nature could not permit a proper person to take the place of a criminal, but were necessitated in every single instance to inflict the penalty upon the actual transgressor, his government would be just, but not sovereign. He could make no changes in the mode of its administration— which is what is meant by a sovereign government. But God may vary the mode of administering justice, provided the mode adopted really satisfies justice, and there be no special reason in his own mind why in a particular instance the variation may not be permitted. There were such special reasons, apparently, in the case of the fallen angels, but not in the case of fallen men. This exercise of sovereignty in permitting substitution of penalty is by some Calvinistic theologians called a " relaxation " of justice ; not in i-espect to the penalty demanded, but to the person enduring it. Justice relaxes its demands to the degree of permitting a vicar to suffer for the actual criminal, but not to the degree of abating the amount of the suffering. The vicar must pay the debt to the uttermost farthing. Owen uses the term " relaxation " in the sense of substitution, but describes our Lord's suffering as the strict and full satisfaction of retributive justice. " To see him," he says (Communion with the Trinity, I. ii.), "who is the wisdom of God, and the power of God, always beloved of the Father ; to see him, I say, fear, and tremble, and bow, and sweat, and pray, and die ; to see him lifted up upon the cross, the earth trembling under him, as if unable to bear his weight, and the lieavens darkened over him, as if shut against his cry, and himself hanging between both, as if refused by both, and all this because our sins did meet upon him ; this

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 453

of all things doth most abundantly manifest the severity of God's vindictive justice. Here, or nowhere, is it to be learned." This is very different from Scotus's and Grotius's " relaxation." The latter is a relaxation in respect to the amount of the penalty, as well as to the person enduring it.

In case the administrative sovereignty of God decides to permit and provide a substituted penalty, the following conditions are indispensable; not by reason of any external necessity, but by reason of an internal necessity springing from the divine nature and attributes. 1. First, the suffering substituted must be j'>6'??aZ in its nature and purpose, and of equal value with the original penalty. The theory of Duns Scotus, afterwards perfected by Grotius, according to which God's administrative sovereignty is so extended that he can by a volitionary decision accept a substituted penalty of inferior value, is the same in principle with the later theory of Socinus. This scheme, denominated " acceptilation" from a term of the Roman law, logically carried out is fatal to the doctrine of vicarious atonement. For the same arbitrary sovereignty which compels justice to be content with less than its dues, can compel it to be content with none at all. If a government has power and authority to say that fifty cents shall pay a debt of a dollar, it has the power to extinguish debts entirely, by a positive decision of the same kind. The principle of justice being surrendered in part, is surrendered altogether.

An illustration sometimes employed, taken from the instance of Zaleucus and his son, contains the false ethics of the theory of acceptilation. This Locrian lawgiver had decreed that a person guilty of adultery should be made blind. His own son was proved to be an adulterer. He ordered one of his son's eyes and one of his own to be put out. ^lian : Historiae Variae, XIII. xxiv. This was an evasion, not a satisfaction of the law. The penalty threat454 SOTERIOLOGY.

eiied, and intended to be threatened against adultery, was total blindness. In a substitution of this kind, no one was made blind. Two eyes were put out, but not the two eyes of one man. Had Zaleucus ordered both of his own eyes to be put out, the case would have been a proper illustration of Christ's vicarious atonement. As the case actually stood, the lawgiver had principle enough to acknowledge the claims of justice, but not principle enough to completely satisfy them. That he was Milling to lose one eye proves that he felt the claims of law ; but that he was unwilling to make himself totally blind in the place of his son, shows that he preferred to sacrifice justice to self rather than self to justice.

In saying that the suffering substituted for that of the actual criminal must be of equal value, it is not said that it must be identical suffering. A substituted penalty cannot be an identical penalty, because identical means the same in every respect. Identity is inconsistent with any exchange whatever. To speak of substituting an identical penalty is a contradiction in terms. The identical punishment required by the moral law is personal punishment, involving personal remorse ; and remorse can be experienced only by the actual criminal. If, in commercial law, a substituted payment could be prevented, a pecuniary debtor would be compelled to make an identical payment. In this case, he umst pay in person and wholly from his OM'n resources. Furthermore, he could not pay silver for gold, but gold for gold ; and not only this, but he must pay back exactly the same pieces of gold, the ipsissima pecunia, which he had received. Identical penalty implies sameness without a difference in any ])artiGular. Not only is the quantity the same, but the quality is the same. But substituted penalty implies sameness with a difference in some particular. And in the case before us, that of Christ's satisfaction, the difference is in the (jiiality : the quantity being unchanged. The vicarious suffering of Christ is of

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 455

equal value with that of all mankind, but is not the same in kind.

Equivalency, not identity, is the characteristic, therefore, of vicarious penalty. The exchange, implied in the term substitution, is of quality not of quantity. One kind of judicial suffering ; that is, suffering endured for the purpose of satisfying justice; is substituted for another kind. Christ's sufferings were of a different nature or quality from those of a lost man.' But there was no difference in quantity, or value. A less degree of suffering was not exchansed for a greater degree. The sufterino-s of the mediator were equal in amount and worth to those whose place they took. Vicarious penalty then is the substitution of an equal quantity, but a different quality of suffering. The mediator suffers differently from the lost world of sinners, but he suffers equally.

Equivalency satisfies justice as completely as identity. One hundred dollars in gold extinguishes a debt of one hundred dollars as completely as does one hundred dollars in silver. If the sufferings of the mediator between God and man are of equal value with those of the world of mankind, they are as complete a satisfaction of justice as the eternal death of mankind would be, although they do not, in their nature or quality, involve any of that sense of personal wickedness and remorse of conscience which enters into the punishment of a lost man. They get their value from the nature of the God-man, and it is the value of what is substituted which justice looks at.

The following extract from Samuel Hopkins (System of Doctrine, Works, I. 321) enforces this truth. "The mediator did not suffer precisely the same kind of pain, in all respects, which the sinner suffers when the curse is execut' Witsius (Covenants, I. iv.) finds four elements in the pains of hell: 1. Privation of the divine love. 3. Sense of the divine hatred. 3. The worm of conscience. 4. Despair of God's favor. The second, third, and fourth elements did not enter into Christ's experience. The first did, temporarily.

456 SOTERIOLOGY.

ed on him. He did not suffer that particular kind of pain which is the necessary attendant or natural consequence of being a sinner, and which none but the sinner can suffer. But this is only a circumstance of the punishment of sin, and not of the essence of it. The whole penalty of the law may be suffered, and the evil may be as much and as great, without suffering that particular sort of pain. Therefore, Christ, though without sin, might suffer the whole jpenalty / that is, as much and as great evil as the law denounces against transgression."

2. Secondly, the penalty substituted must be endured by a person who is not himself already indebted to justice, and who is not a subject of the government under which the substitution takes place. If he be himself a criminal, he cannot of course be a substitute for a criminal. And if he be an innocent person, yet owes all his own service to the government, he cannot do a work of supererogation such as is implied in vicarious satisfaction. An earthly state could not righteously allow an innocent citizen to die for another, even if he were willing so to die, because there are claims upon the person and life of every citizen which must go undischarged if his life should be taken. These are the claims of family, of society, of the commonwealth, and of God. " It is impossible," says Owen (Person of Christ, XVI.), " that by anything a man can do well, he should make satisfaction for anything he hath done ill. For what he so doeth is due in and for itself. And to suppose that satisfaction can be made for a former fault, by that whose omission would have been another fault had the former never been committed, is madness. An old debt cannot be discharged with ready money for new commodities ; nor can past injuries be compensated by present duties which we are anew obliged unto." Says Anselm (Cur deus homo, I. 20), " Cum reddis aliquid quod debes deo, non debes computare hoc pro debito quod debes pro peccato. Omnia enim debis deo." The words of the JewVICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 457

isli elders to Chi-ist respecting the Roman centnrion illustrate the point under consideration. They besought Christ to heal his servant, saying that the centurion was worthy of such a favor ; " for he loveth our nation, and he hath built us a synagogue," Luke 7 : 5. The centurion had acquired merit, because as a Roman citizen he was under no obligation to build a Jewish synagogue.

The sufferings of Christ meet all these conditions. 1. First, they wevQ penal in their nature and intent, since they were neither calamitous nor disciplinary. They were a judicial infliction voluntarily endured by Christ, for the purpose of satisfying the claims of law due from man ; and this piirjwse makes them penal. " It pleased the Lord to bruise him. lie was wounded for our transgressions," Isa. 53 : 5, 10. '• Christ was made a curse for us," Gal. 2 : 13. " No man taketh my life from me, but I lay it down of myself," John 10:17, 18.

Some writers, while defending the doctrine of vicarious atonement, object to applying the terms " penal " and " penalty" to Christ's sufferings, Magee (Atonement, Dissertation XIII.) does so. " The idea of punishment cannot be abstracted from [personal] guilt. Christ's sufferings are a judicial infliction, and may perhaps be figuratively denominated punishment, if thereby be implied a reference to the actual transgressor, and be understood that suffering which was due to the offender himself ; and which if inflicted upon him would then take the name of punishment. In no other sense, can the suffering inflicted on account of the transgressions of another be called a punishment." Ebrard (quoted by Yan Oosterzee, II. 603, wdio agrees with Ebrard) says : " If I endure the infliction due to another instead of him, this suffering which for him would have had the moral quality of a punishment has not the moral quality of a punishment for me, because I am an innocent person. For the idea of a punishment contains, besides the objective element of suffering inflicted by the judge, also in addition

458 SOTERIOLOGY.

the subjective element of the sense of guilt, or an evil conscience possessed by the guilty." This last assertion is the point in dispute. Does the idea of a punishment "contain, besides the objective element of suffering inflicted by the judge, also the subjective element of the sense of guilt? " The question is, whether the simplejpw/posd and aim of the suffering in a given instance is sufficient to constitute it punishment. If a person suffers with a view to satisfy the claims of law, be he guilty himself or not, is this a "penal" suffering ? Is such a "judicial infliction," asMagee calls it, properly denominated "penalty?" Does the existence of the objective element alone, apart from the subjective element, in the case of suffering for the purpose of atonement for sin, warrant the use of the terms "penal" and "penalty ?" There are three reasons why it does, (a) There is no other term but this, by which to designate a suffering that is endured for the sole purpose of satisfying justice. It cannot be denominated either calamity or chastisement. (J) When a commercial debt is vicariously paid by a friend of the debtor, it is as truly a " payment " as if paid personally, and the term " payment " is applied to it in the strict sense of the word. But if there is no valid objection to denominating the vicarious satisfaction of a pecuniary claim a " payment," there is none to denominating the vicarious satisfaction of a moral claim a " punishment." (c) A third reason for the use of the term punishment, or penalty, in this connection, is found in the use of the corresponding term " atonement." No objection is made to calling Christ's suffering an atonement. But atonement and punishment are kindred in meaning. Both alike denote judicial suffering. There is, consequentlj', no more reason for insisting that the term " punishment" be restricted to personal endurance of suffering for personal transgression, than there would be in insisting that the tei'm " atonement " be I'estricted to personal satisfaction for personal sin. But tiie vicarious sufferings of Christ are as truly an atonement for

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 459

sill as would be the personal sufferings of the sinner himself, and are as freely called so. It is as proper, therefore, to denominate Christ's suffering a vicarious punishment, as to denominate it a vicarious atonement. The objection of Magee and Ebrard is met by the qualifying term " vicarious," invariably joined with the term "punishment" "when Christ's sufferings are denominated a punishment. Ko one asserts that they were a " personal " punishment. Anselm (Cur deus homo, I. 15) marks the difference, by denominating the infliction when laid npon the sinner, "poena;" and when laid upon the substitute, " satisfactio." '

2. Secondly, the vicarious sufferings of Christ w'ere infinite in value. In the substitution, the amount is fully equal to that of the original penalty. A smaller suffering, an inferior atonement, was not put in the place of a greater and superior. The worth of any suffering is determined by the total suhject who suffers, not by the particular nature in the subject Mdiich is the seat of the suffering. Physical suffering in a brute is not so valuable as it is in a man, because a brute has only an animal nature, while a man has an animal united with a rational nature. Yet the nature which is the sensorium or seat of the phj'sical pain, is the same in both cases. But one hour of human suffering through the physical sentiency, is worth more than days of brutal suffering through the physical sentiency ; as " one hour of Europe is worth a cycle of Cathay." When animal life and organization suffer in a man's person, the agonj'- is human, and rational. It is high up the scale. It has the

1 While there may be vicarious as well as personal punishment, because punishment is suffering endured for a judicial purpose, and this purpose can be fulfilled by a substitute as well as by the criminal, there can be no vicarious confession of sin, and no vicarious repentance for it. Confession and repentance are necessarily personal acts. The Scriptures never represent Christ as vicariously confessing the sins of his people, or as vicariously repenting of them. Yet McLeod Campbell, while dissatisfied with the catholic doctrine of vicarious atonement, has set forth the theory that Christ has made a perfect confession of human sin, and that this is an adequate satisfaction for sin. See Crawford : Oa Atonement ; and ou The Fatherhood of God, Lecture IV.

460 SOTERIOLOGY.

dignity and greatness of degree which pertain to man. But when animal life and organization snfPer in an ox or a dog, the agony is brutal, and irrational. It is low down the scale. It has nothing of the worth and dignity that belong to the phj'sical agony of the martyr and confessor. To apply this reasoning to the case before us : When a human natuie suffers in an ordinary human person, the suffering is human, and rational, but finite. No mere man's suffering can be infinite in value, because the total subject or person is finite. Whatever a man suffers in either of his natures, body or mind, gets its value from his personality. Measured by this, it is limited suffering. But when a human nature suffers in a theanthropic person, the suffering is divine and infinite, because of the divinity and infinity of such a person. The suffering of the human nature, in this instance, is elevated and dignified by the unioTi of the human nature with the divine, just as the suffering of an animal nature in an ordinary man is elevated and dignified by the union of the animal nature with the rational. The sufferino- of a inere man is human ; but the suffering of a God-man is divine. Yet the divine nature is not the sensorium or seat of the suffering, in the instance of the God-man, any more than the rational nature is the sensorium or seat of the suft'ering, in the instance of physical suffering in the man. A man's immaterial soul is not burned when he suffei's human agony in martyrdom, and the impassible essence of God was not bruised and wounded when Jesus Christ suffered the divine agony. Hence it is said that Christ " suffered in the flesh : " that is, in liis human nature. 1 Pet. 4:1.

It has been objected that the sufferings of Christ, not being endless, cannot be of equal value with those of all mankind. But wlien carefully examined and strictly computed, they will be found to exceed in value and dignity the sufferings for which they were substituted. The suffering of the God-man during a section of time is more exactly and mathematically infinite, than would be tlie sufferVICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 461

iiig of the liuinan race in endless time. The so-called " infinitude " of human suffering is derived from the length of its duration, not from the dignity of the sufferer. It is the suffering of a finite creature, in a duration that is eternal only a parte post. This would not yield strict eternity. The suffering of the whole human race in an endless duration would, consequently, be only relatively infinite. But the vicarious suffering of the God-man obtains its element of infinitude from the person, not from the duration. And this person is absolutely, not relatively infinite. The suffering of an absolutely infinite person in a finite duration is, therefore, a greater suffering in degree and dignity, than is the suffering of a multitude of finite persons in an endless but not strictly infinite time. God incarnate is a greater Being, and a greater sufferer, than all mankind collectively; and his crucifixion involved a greater guilt upon the part of the perpetrators and a more stupendous sacrifice, than would the crucifixion of the entire human family. " If," inquires Anselm (Cur deus homo, 11. 14) of his pupil Boso, "that God-man were here present before you, and (you having a full knowledge of his nature and character) it should be said. Unless you slay that Person, the whole world and the whole created universe will perish, would you put him to death in order to preserve the whole creation ? " To this question the pupil makes answer, " I would not, even if an infinite number of worlds were spread out before me."

Another proof that the vicarious work of Christ is of greater value in satisfying the claims of the divine law, than would be the endless punishment of the whole human race, is the fact that Christ not only suffered the penalty but obeyed the precept of the law. In this case, law and justice get their whole dues. But when lost man only suffers the penalty but does not obey the precept, the law is defrauded of a part of its dues. No law is completely obeyed, if only its penalty is endured. The law does not

462 SOTERIOLOGY.

give its subjects an option either to obey, or to suffer punishment. It does not say to them, " If you will endure the penalty, you need not keep the precept." It requires ohedi6?ic;^ primarily and principally; and then it also requires suffering in case of disobedience. But this suffering does not release from the primary obligation to obey. The law still has its original and indefeasible claim on the transgressor for a sinless obedience, at the very time that it is exacting the penalty of disobedience from him. Consequently, a sinner can never comjpletely and exhaustively satisfy the divine law, however much or long he may suffer ; because he cannot at one and the same time endure the penalty and obey the precept. lie " owes ten thousand talents, and has nothing wherewith to pay," Matt. 18 : 24. But Christ did both ; and therefore he "magnified the law and made it honorable " (Isa. 42 : 21), in an infinitely higher degree than the whole human family would have done, had they all personally suffered for their sins. Compare Edwards : Redemption, Works, I. 406.

3. Thirdly, the vicarious sufferings of Christ were not due from him as from a guilty person. He was innocent, and retributive justice had no claims upon him. What he voluntarily suffered could, therefore, inure to the benefit of another than himself. The active obedience of Christ was also a work of supererogation, as well as his passive obedience. For although his human nature as such owed obedience, yet it owed only a human and Jioiite obedience. But the obedience which the mediator actually rendered to the moral law was not that of a mere man, but of a God-man. It was theanthropio obedience, not merely human. As such, it was divine and infinite. It could, thei'efore, like the passive obedience of an innocent person, inure to the benefit of another, and earn for him a title to eternal life and reward. And lastly, the God-man, not being a mere creature, but also the Creator and Lord of all things, could rightfully dispose of himself and his agency, as he pleased.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 463

lie asserted tliis sovereign lordsliip over liimself in tlie Avords, "No man taketh mj life from me, but I lay it down of myself : I have power and authority (i^ovcrtav) to lay it down, and 1 have power to take it again," John 10 : 18.

The above-mentioned grounds and reasons for the substitution of penalty abundantly demonstrate its harmony with the pi'inciples of law and justice ; but should they still be disputed, the whole question may be quickly disposed of by asking. Who objects ? Objections to any method of administering a govermnent can be urged only by some party whose rights and claims have been disregarded, or trampled upon. In the instance of the vicarious atonement of the Son of God, no objection is raised by God the Father, for he officially proposed and planned the method. No objection is raised by God the Son, for he not only consents to be a party in the transaction, but to be the sacrificial victim required by it. And no objection is raised by God the Spirit, for he likewise is a party in the transaction, and co-operates in its execution and application. This substitution of penalty is, therefore, a method devised and authorized by the entire Godhead. It is a Trinitarian transaction. Nothing is urged against it from this quarter.

And when we pass from the Divine Being to angels and men, and ask for objections from one having real grounds of complaint, there must be of course a dead silence. No angelic or human rights have been interfered with. Objections to the method of vicarious atonement from the world of mankind especiallj^, would be not merely unthankful but absurd. That the criminal, who has no claims at all before the law which he has transgressed, and under whose eternal condemnation he lies in utter helplessness ; that the criminal in whose behalf Eternal Pity has laid down its own life should object to the method, would deserve not only no reply, but everlasting shame and contempt.

4:G4 SOTERIOLOGY.

Ilavino- considered the nutiire and value of Christ's atonement, we are prepared to consider its extent.^

Some controversy would have been avoided upon this subject, liad there always been a distinct understanding as to the meaning of words. We shall therefore first of all consider this point. The term " extent " has two senses in English usage, {a) It has a passive meaning, and is equivalent to value. The " extent " of a man's farm means the number of acres which it contains. The "extent" of a man's resources denotes the amount of property which he owns. In this signification of the word, the " extent " of Christ's atonement would be the intrinsic and real value of it for purposes of judicial satisfaction. In this use of the term, all parties who hold the atonement in any evangelical meaning would concede that the " extent " of the atonement is unlimited. Christ's death is sufficient in value to satisfy eternal justice for the sins of all mankind. If this were the only meaning of "extent," we should not be called upon to discuss it any further. For all that has been said under the head of the nature and value of the atonement would answer the question, AVhat is the extent of the atonement ? Being an infinite atonement, it has an infinite value.

{I)) The word has an active signification. It denotes the act of extending. The "extent " of the atonement, in this sense, means its personal application to individuals by the Holy Spirit. The extent is now the intent. The question, What is the extent of the atonement ? now means : To whom is the atonement effectually extended ? The inquiry now is not, What is the value of the atonement ? but, To whom does God purpose to apply its benefits ? "

The active signification is the earlier meaning of the

> Hill : Theology, Book IV. Candlish : On Atonement, I. ii. Cunningham : Historical Theology, II. 323-370.

2 To "extend "the atonement might be understood to mean, to "offer" the atonement. But this is not the meaning in this connection. To extend, in the sense now being considered, is not only to offer the atonement but also to render it personally efficacious by regenerating grace.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 465

word, in English literature. The following are a few out of many instances in which "extent" means extending, or putting to use.

" Let my officers of such a nature, Make an extent [levy] upon his house and lands."

Shaivespeake : As You Like It, III. i.

" Let thy fair wisdom, not thy passion, sway In this uncivil and unjust extent [attack] Against thy peace.

Shakespeare : Twelfth Night, IV. i.

" But both his hands, most filthy feculent, Above the water were on high extent [extended], And fayned to wash themselves incessantly ; Yet nothing cleaner were for such intent."

Spensek : Fairy Queen, II. vii.

"Second him In his dishonest practices ; but when This manor is extended [applied] to my use, You'll speak in an humble way and sue for favor."

Massingeb : New Way to Pay Old Debts, IV. i.

" The rule of Solon, concerning the territory of Athens is not extendible [applicable] unto all ; allowing the distance of six foot unto common trees, and nine for the fig and olive." Browne : Cyrus's Garden, IV.

The following are examples of the use of the term in the active signification, in the older theologians and doctrinal statements : " The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, to pass by." Westminster Confession, III. vii. "According to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, God extendeth or withholdeth favor as he pleaseth." Larger Catechism, 13. In these passages, to " extend " mercy means, to effectually apply Christ's redemption, not merely to offer it. Because, Vol. XL— 30

4:QQ SOTERIOLOGY.

in tbe latter sense God does not " withhold " mercy from any man. " Is grace impaired in its extent ? We affirm it to be extended to everyone that is, or was, or ever sliall be delivered from the pit." Owen : Against Universal Redemption, lY. vii. Here, to " extend •' grace is to actually save the soul, by effectual calling.

In modern English, tbe term " extent " is so generally employed in the passive signification of value that the active signification has become virtually obsolete, and requires explanation. Writers upon the " extent " of the atonement have sometimes neglected to consider the history of the word, and misunderstanding has arisen between disputants who were really in agreement with each other.

Accordingly, in answering the question as to the " extent" of Christ's atonement, it must first be settled whether " extent " means its intended application, or its intrinsic value; whether the active or the passive signification of the word is in the mind of the inquirer. If the word means value, then the atonement is unlimited ; if it means extending, that is, applying, then the atonement is limited.

The dispute also turns upon the meaning of the preposition '• for." One theologian asserts that Christ died "for" all men, and another denies that Christ died "for" all men. There may be a difference between the two that is reconcilable, and there may be an irreconcilable difference. The preposition " for " denotes an intention of some kind. If, in the case under consideration, the intention is understood to be the purpose on the part of God, both to offer and apply the atonement by working faith and repentance in the sinner's heart, by the operation of the Holy Spirit, then he who affirms that Christ died " for " all men is in error, and he who denies that Christ died " for " all men holds the truth. These two parties are irreconcilable.

But he who asserts that Christ died "for" all men may nnderstand the intention signified by the preposition to be the purpose on the part of God only to offer the atoneVICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 467

ment, leaving it to the sinner whether it shall be appropriated through faith and repentance. The intention, in this latter case, does not include so much as in the former, and the preposition is narrower in meaning. "When the word " for " is thus defined, the difference between the two parties is reconcilable. The latter means by " for," " intended for offer, or publication ; " the former means, " intended for application."

Again, the preposition " for " is sometimes understood to denote not intention, but value or sufficiency. To say that Christ died " for " all men then means, that his death is sufficient to expiate the guilt of all men. Here, again, the difference is possibly reconcilable between the parties. The one who denies that Christ died " for " all men, takes "for" in the sense of intention to effectual!}^ ^PP^J- The other who affirms that Christ died " for " all men, takes " for" in the sense of value. As to the question. Which is the most proper use of the word " for ? " it is plain that it more naturally conveys the notion of intention, than of sufficiency or value. If it be said to a person, " This money is for you," he does not understand merely that it is sufficient in value to pay his debt, but that it actually inures to his benefit in paying it. In the scripture statement that Christ " gave himself a ransom for all " (1 Tim. 2 : 6), if the word " for" be made to denote value, so that the text reads, Christ " gave himself a ransom sufficient for all," a circumlocution is introduced. The preposition "for" does not express the idea of sufficiency or value directly, but through an explanation ; but it expresses the idea of intention immediately, and without circumlocution. And this agrees better with the term " ransom," which denotes subjective redemption rather than objective satisfaction. This remark applies to such a text as that Christ " tasted death for every man " (Heb. 2 : 9), which is explained by " many sons " in verse 10. If we interpolate, and say that Christ tasted a death that is sufiScient for every man, we indeed state a truth,

468 SOTERIOLOGY.

but we inject into the preposition "for" a larger meaning than accords with the strictly idiomatic use of it.

The distinction between the " sufficiency " of the atonement, and its " extent " in the sense of " intent " or effectual application, is an old and well-established one. It is concisely expressed in the dictum, that Christ died " sufficienter pro omnibus, sed efficaciter tantum pro electis." The following extracts from Owen (Universal Redemption, ly. i.) illustrate it. " It was the purpose and intention of God that his Son should offer a sacrifice of infinite worth, value, and dignity, sufficient in itself for the redeeming of all and every man, if it had pleased the Lord to employ it for that purpose ; yea, and of other worlds, also, if the Lord should freely make them, and would redeem them. Sufficient we say, then, was the sacrifice of Christ for the redemption of the whole world, and for the expiation of all the sins of all and every man in the world. This is its own true internal perfection and sufficiency ; that it should be applied unto any, made a price for them, and become beneficial to them, according to the worth that is in it, is external to it, doth not arise from it, but merely depends upon the intention and will of God. It was in itself of infinite value, and sufficienc}'', to have heen made a price to have bought and purchased all and every man in the world. That it did formally hecome a price for any, is solely to be ascribed to the purpose of God intending their purchase and redemption by it. The intention of the offerer and acceptor [of the sacrifice] that it should be for S2ick, some, or any, is that which gives the formality of a price unto it ; this is external [to the sacrifice]. But the value and fitness of it to be made a price ariseth from its own internal sufficicTicy." In respect to such phraseology as a " ransomprice for all " (1 Tim. 2 : C), Owen remarks that it must be understood to mean that Christ's blood was sufficient to he m,ade a ransom for all, to he made a price for all ; but that the terras " ransom " and " ransom-price " more propVICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 469

erly denote the application than the vahie of Christ's sacrifice, lie adds that " the expression, ' to die/b?' any person,' liolds out the intention of our Saviour in the laving- down of the price, to be their redeejner."

Atonement must be distinguished from redemption. The latter term includes the apiylication of the atonement. It is the term ''redemption," not "atonement," which is found in those statements that speak of the work of Christ as limited by the decree of election. In the Westminster Confession, VIII. viii., it is said that " to all those for whom Christ hath purchased 7'edemption, he doth certainly and effectually apply and comnninicate the same." In chapter VIII. v. it is stated that "the Lord Jesus hath purchased not only reconciliation., but an everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven, for all those whom the Father hath given unto him." Since redemption includes reconciliation with God and inheritance in the kingdom of heaven, it implies something subjective in the soul : an appropriation by faith of the benefits of Christ's objective work of atonement. Reconciliation and inheritance of heaven are elements and parts of redemption, and are limited to those wlio have believed ; and those who have believed are those who have been called and chosen. Eph. 2:8, " Faith is the gift of God." 1 Cor. 3:5, " Ye believed, even as the Lord gave to every man." Acts 1 3 : 48, " As many as were ordained to eternal life believed." Accordingly the Scriptures limit redemption, as contradistinguished from atonement, to the Church. Christ " makes reconciliation for the sins of his people," Ileb. 2 : 17. His M'ork is called " the redemption of the purchased possession," Eph. 1 : 14. He is " the mediator of the ]S"ew Testament, that by means of his death they which are called might receive an eternal inheritance," Heb. 9 : 15. He " hath visited and redeemed his people," Luke 1 : 68. David, addressing Jehovah, says, " Remember thy congregation which thou hast purchased of old, the rod of thine inheritance which thou hast re470 SOTERIOLOGY.

deemed," Ps. 74 : 2. The elders of Epbesiis are commanded to " feed the churcli of God which he iiath purchased with his own blood," Acts 20 : 28. " He sent redemption nnto his people," Fs. 111:9. "O Israel, fear not; for I have redeemed thee," Isa. 43 : 1. " He shall save his people from their sins," Matt. 1 : 21. Christ is " the Saviour of his body the church," Eph. 5 : 23. " He said, surely they are my people : so he was their Saviour," Isa. 63 : 8. "I will save my people from the east country and from the west country," Zech. 8 : 7. See the Old Testament passages in which Jehovah is called the Saviour of Israel ; and the Xew Testament passages in which God is called " our Saviour," that is, of the church.

Since redefnption implies the application of Christ's atonement, tioiwersal or unlhnited redemption cannot logically be affirmed by any who hold that faith is wholly the gift of God, and that saving grace is bestowed solely by election. The use of the term " redemption," consequently, is attended with less ambiguity than that of " atonement," and it is the terra most commonly employed in controversial theology.* Atonement is unlimited, and redemption is limited. This statement includes all the Scripture texts: those which assert that Christ died for all men, and those which assert that he died for his people. He who asserts unlimited atonement, and limited redemption, cannot well be misconceived. He is understood to hold that the sacrifice of Christ is unlimited in its value, sufficiency, and publication, but limited in its effectual application. But he who asserts unlimited atonement, and denies limited redemption, might be understood to hold either of three views: 1, The doctrine of the Universalist, that Christ's atonement, per se, saves all mankind ; or, 2, the doctrine of the Arminian, that personal faith in Christ's atonement is necessary to salvation, but that faith depends partly upon

■Owen, in his treatise against Arminianism, presents "Arguments against Universal Redemption."

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 471

the opei-ation of the Holy Spirit, and partly upon the decision of the sinful will ; or, 3, the doctrine of the school of Sauniur (Hypothetic Universalisni), that personal faith in Christ's atonement in the first arrangement of God depended in part upon the decision of the sinf nl will, but since this failed, by a second arrangement it now depends wholly upon the work of the Spirit, according to the purpose of election.

The tenet of limited redemption rests upon the tenet of election, and the tenet of election rests upon the tenet of the sinner's bondage and inability. Soteriology here runs back to theology, and theology runs back to antliropology. Everything in the series finally recurs to the state and condition of fallen man. The answer to the question, How is the atonement of Christ savingly appropriated ? depends upon the answer to the question, How much efficient power is there in the sinful will to savingly trust in it ? If the answer be, that there is efficient power, either wholly or in part, in the sinful will itself to believe, then faith is either wholly or in part from the sinner himself, and is not wholly the gift of God, which is contrary to Eph. 2:8; and justification does not depend wholly upon electing grace, which is contrary to 1 Pet. 1:2; and redemption is not limited. But if the answer be, that there is not efficient power in the sinful will itself, either wholly or in part, to savingly believe, then faith is wholly the gift of God ; is wholly dependent upon his electing grace ; and redemption is limited by election, as is taught in 1 Cor. 3:5: " Who then is Paul, and who is Apollos, by whom ye believed, even as the Lord gave to every man ; " and in Rom. 9:16: "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy."

The difference between the Calvinist and the Arminian appears at this point. Both are evangelical, in affirming that salvation is solely by faith in Christ's atoning blood. This differentiates them from the legal Socinian, avIio denies the doctrine of vicarious atonement, and founds salvation

472 SOTERIOLOGY.

from condeinnation on personal character and good works. But they differ regarding the origin of faith. Tlie Calvinist maintains that faith is wJiolly from God, being one of the effects of regeneration ; the Arminian, that it isjyar^^y from God and partly from man. Tlie Calvinist asserts that a sinner is unconditionally elected to the act of faith, and that the Holy Spirit in regeneration inclines and enables him to the act, without co-operation and assistance from him. The Arminian asserts that a sinner is conditionally elected to the act of faith, and that the Holy Spirit works faith in him with some assistance and co-operation from him. This co-operation consists in ceasing to resist, and yielding to the operation of the Spirit. In this case, the Holy Spirit does not overcome a totally averse and resisting will, which is the Calviuistic view, but he influences a partially inclining will.

The Calvinist contends that unconditional election and total inability agree best with the Scripture representations, and that the Arminian really adopts them when he sings with Charles Wesley :

"Other refuge have I none, Hangs my helpless soul on thee."

Conditional election is inconsistent with the Biblical texts which describe God as independent and sovereign, in bestowing faith and salvation. It is no suflicient reply to say that plenary ability to appropriate the atonement of Christ is not attributed to the fallen soul, but only a partial ability ; that it is not contended that sinful man can exercise faith in the atonement without atiy aid at all from God, but only that he can and must contribute a certain degree of voluntary power which if united with that of God the Spirit will produce faith, and that the exercise of this is the condition of election. This position of partial ability or synergism comes to the same result with that of plenary ability,

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 473

SO far as the Divine independence and sovereignty are concerned. For it is this decision of the sinner to contribute his quota, to "do his part" in the transaction, which conditions the result. It is indeed true, upon this theory, that if God does not assist, tlie act of faith is impossible ; but it is equally true, that if the sinner does not assist, the act of faith is impossible. Neither party alone and by himself can originate faith in Christ's atonement. God is as dependent in this respect, as man. In this case, therefore, it cannot be said that faith depends wholly upon the divine purpose, or that redemption is regulated and limited by election.

The middle theoiy of partial ability, and conditional election, is found in tiie Greek anthropology, and the SemiPelagian fathers generally ; and is opposed by Calvin (Inst., III. xxiv. 1) as follows : " The proposition of Paul, 'It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy,' is not to be understood in the sense of those who divide saving power between the grace of God and the will and exertion of man ; who indeed say that human desires and endeavors have no efficacy of themselves unless they are rendered successful by the grace of God, but also maintain that with the assistance of his blessing these things have their share in procuring salvation. To refute their views, I prefer Augustine's M'oi-ds to my owm : ' If the apostle only meant that it is not of him that wills, or of him that runs, without the assistance of the merciful Lord, we may retort the converse proposition, that it is not of [God's] mercy alone without the assistance of [man's] willing and running. But it is certain that the apostle ascribes everything to the Lord's mercy, and leaves nothing to our wills or exertions.'" Again (Institutes, III. xxiv. 13), Calvin marks the difference between Augustine and Chrysostom in the following terms : " Let us not hesitate to say with Augustine that God could convert to good the will of [all] the wicked, because he is

474: SOTERIOLOGY.

omnipotent. Why then does he not? Because he would not, VV^ij he would not, remains with himself. For we ou2;ht not to aim at more wisdom than becomes us. That would he much better than adopting the evasion of Chrysostom, ' that God draws those who are willing, and who stretch out their hands for his aid,' so that the difference may not appear to consist in the decree of God, but in the will of man." Luther took the same ground with Calvin. "Some allege that the Holy Spirit works not in those tliat resist him, but only in such as are willing and give consent thereto, whence it follows that free will is a cause and helper of faith, and that consequently the Holy Ghost does not alone work through tlie word, but that our will does something therein. But I say it is not so ; the will of man works nothing at all in his conversion and justification ; non est efficiens causa justificationis sed materialis tantum. It is the matter on which the Holy Ghost works (as a potter makes a pot out of clay), equally in those that resist and are averse, as in St. Paul, But after the Holy Ghost has wrout'-ht in the wills of such resistants, then he also manages that the will be consenting thereunto." Table Talk, Of Free Will.'

In saying that Christ's atonement is limited in its application, and that redemption is particular not universal, it is meant that the number of persons to whom it is effectually applied is a fixed and definite number. The notion of definiteness, not of smallness, is intended. In common speech, if anything is " limited," it is little and insignificant in amount. This is not the idea when the redemptive work of Christ is denominated a " limited " work. The circle of election and redemption must indeed be a circumference, but not necessarily a small one. Ko man is redeemed outside of the circle. All the sheep must be within the fold. But the circle is that of the heavens, not

1 Compare Dabney : Theology, 580, 581 ; Watson : Institutes, II. 395 sq.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 4.75

of the earth. The fold is that of the Great Shepherd, not that of au iiuder-shepherd. The Biblical representation is to this effect. Matt. 6 : 13, " Thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory." 1 Cor. 15 : 25, " Christ must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet." Ps. 103 : 19, " The Lord hath prepared his throne in the lieavens and his kingdom ruleth over all." Ilev. 21 : 3, " The tabernacle of God is with men, and they shall be his people." Kev. 14:6, "The angel having the everlasting gospel to preach to every nation, kindred and tongue." Ilev. 19 : 6, " The voice of a great multitude, and as the voice of many waters." Hev. 21 : 16, The new Jerusalem " lieth foursquare, and the length is as large as the breadth." Kom. 5 : 20, " Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." Ps. 68 : 17, " The chariots of God are twenty tiiousand, even thousands upon thousands."

Although Christ's atonement, in the discussion of its value and sufficiency, can be separated from the intention to apply it, 3'et in the Divine mind and decree the two things are inseparable. The atonement and its application are parts of one covenant of redemption, between the Father and Son. The sacrifice of Christ is offered with the intention that it shall actually be successful in saving human souls from death. It is not rational to suppose that God the Father merely determined that God the Son should die for the sin of the world, leaving it wholly, or in part, to the sinful world to determine all the result of this stupendous transaction ; leaving it wholly, or in part, to the sinful world to decide how many or how few this death should actually save. Xeither is it rational to suppose that the Son of God would lay down his life upon such a peradv^enture ; for it might be that not a single human soul would trust in his sacrifice, and in this case he would have died in vain. On the contrary, it is most rational to suppose that in the covenant between the Father and Son, the making of an atonement was inseparably connected with the purpose to apply it : the

476 SOTERIOLOGY.

purpose, name]y, to accompany the atoning work of tlie Son with the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit. The Divine Father, in giving the Divine Son as a sacrifice for sin, simultaneously determined that this sacrifice should be appropriated through faith by a definite number of the human famil}', so that it miglit be said that Christ died for this number with the distinct intention that tliey should be personally saved by this death.

This is taught in Scripture. " The good shepherd layeth down his life for the sheep," John 10 : 15. " Greater love hath no man tlian this, tliat a man lay down his life for his friends," John 15 : 13. " Being high priest that year he prophesied that Jesus should die for that nation ; and not for that nation only, but that also he should gather together in one, the children of God that were scattered abroad," John 11 : 51, 52. " Christ loved the church, and gave himself for it," Eph. 5 : 25. The annunciation to Joseph respecting the miraculous conception, described the Saviour as one who " should save his people from their sins," Matt. 1 : 21. Furthermore, in accoi'dance with this fact of an intention to apply tlie atonement at the time when the atonement is provided, we find that believers are said to have been "chosen in Christ before tlie foundation of the world," Eph. 1:4; that they have been given to Christ by the Father, John 10 : 29 ; that Christ knows them as so given, John 10 : 27 ; tliat he claims them as his sheep before they have actually believed, and even before they have been born, saying, " Other sheep I have wliich are not of this fold, them also I must bring, and they shall hoar my voice, and there shall be one flock {iroifivr]), and one shepherd," Jolm 10 : 16. And when Paul was at Corinth, Christ encouraged his apostle to continue his laboi's, notwithstanding that little success had thus far attended them, by saying, " I have much people in this city," Acts 18 : 10.

That the atonement, in the mind of God, was inseparable from his purpose to apply it to individuals, is proved :

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 477

(«) By the fact tliat atonement in and by itself, separate from faith, saves no soul. Christ niiglit have died precisely as he did, but if no one believed in him he would have died in vain. Hence it is said, that " God hath set forth Christ to be a propitiation through faith in his blood," Kom. 3 : 25. It is only when the death of Christ has been actually confided in as an atonement, that it is completely " set forth " as God's propitiation for sin. In like manner, Christ is said to have been "delivered for our offences, and raised again for our justification," Rom. 4 : 25 If Christ had not risen from the dead, he could not have been believed in. A dead and buried Christ could not have been an object of personal trust and confidence. Consequently, although it was the suffering and death of Christ, and not his resurrection and exaltation, that properly constitutes the atoning sacrifice, yet this sacrifice in itself, and apart from its vital appropriation, is useless. In order therefore to man's justification, Christ must not only be delivered to death for offences, but raised again from death so that he might be an object of faith. " It cannot be said," says Ovren (Justification, IX.), " that Christ's satisfaction was made in such a way as to render it uncertain whether it should save or not. Such an arrangement might be just in pecuniary payments. A man may lay down a sum of money for the discharge of another, on such a condition as may never be fulfilled. For on the failure of the condition, his money may and ought to be returned to him ; whereupon, he hath received no injury or damage. But in penal suffering for crime and sin, there can be no righteous arrangement that shall make the event and efficacy of it to depend on a condition absolutely uncertain, and which may not be fulfilled. For if the condition fail, no recompense can be made to him that hath suffered. Wherefore the application of the satisfaction of Christ unto them for whom it was made, is sure and steadfast in the purpose of God." (J) If in the mind of God the death of Christ was sep478 SOTERIOLOGY.

ai-ate from the intention to apply it, then it would be as true that Christ died for lost angels as for lost men ; because his atonement, being infinite, is sufhcient in value to atone for their sin as well as that of mankind. When it is said that Christ died for the sin of the loorld, it is implied that he did not die for any sin but that of man. The offer of Christ's atonement is confined to the human race, and not made to the angelic world. Now as the divine intention accompanies the provi din (/ of an atonement, in respect to the difference between angels and men, so it accompanies the cqjjjUcatlon of the atonement, in respect to the difference between elect and non-elect men. As the atonement of Christ is not intended to be offered to the angels thouirh it is siiiffcient for them, so it is not intended to be applied to non-elect men though it is sufficient for them, (c) If in the mind of God the purpose that Christ should die had not been accompanied with the purpose that his death should be effective for individuals, the former purpose would have been an unproductive and useless one. It would have accomplished nothing, because of man's unbelief and rejection of the gospel offer. But no purpose of God is unproductive and useless, {d) The analogy of the typical atonement under the Mosaic economy shows that Christ's atonement is intended for application only to believers. The lamb offered by the officiating priest was offei-ed for the particular person who brought it to the priest to be offered. Each man had his own lamb, and there was no lamb that belonged to no one in particular, but to every one indiscriminately, {e) The atoning woi'k of Christ in its intended application is no wider than his intercessory work. He pleads the merit of his death for those to whom the Father purposed to impute it, and only for those. " I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me," John 17 : 9. This was Christ's intercessory prayer. He here teaches that he does not discharge the particular office of intercessor, for the non-elect (the " world"), as distinguished

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 479

from those whom the Father had o;iven him. It is logical therefore to condude that he does not discliarge the particidar office of priest for them.

There are Biblical passages which are cited to teach unlimited redemption. Ileb. 2 : 9, Christ " tasted death for every man." 1 John 2 : 2, Clirist is the "propitiation not for our sins only, but for the sins of the whole world."

1 Tim. 2 : 6, Christ "gave himself a ransom for all." John 1 : 29, The lamb of God " taketh away the sins of the world." John 3 : 16, 17, "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son." Respecting this class of passages, the following particulars are to be noticed. 1. Scripture must be explained in harmon}'- with Scripture. Texts that speak of the universal reference of Christ's death must, therefore, be interpreted in such a way as not to exclude its special reference. 1 Tim. 4 : 10, " God is the Saviour of all men, specially of those that believe." Heb.

2 : 17, Christ "makes reconciliation for the sins of his people." Eph. 5 : 23, " Christ is the Saviour of his body, the church." Luke 1 : 68, Christ " hath visited and redeemed his people." Matt. 20 : 28, Christ "gives his life a ransom for many." Matt. 1 : 21, " Jesus shall save his people from their sins." Ps. 74 : 2 ; 111 : 9. Isa. 63 : 8. Matt. 26 : 28. Heb. 9 : 28.

2. The word " world," in Scripture, frequently denotes a part of the world viewed as a collective whole, and having a distinctive character; as we speak of the scientific, or the religious world, {a) Sometimes it is the world of believers, the church. Examples of this use are : John 6 : 33, 51, " The bread of God is he which giveth life to the world" [of believers]. Eom. 4:13, Abraham is "the lieir of the world" [the redeemed]. Rom. 11 : 12, "If the fall of them be the riches of the world." Rom. 11 : 15, " If the casting away of them be the reconciling of the world." In these texts, " church " could be substituted for " world." [h) Sometimes the word " world " denotes the

480 SOTERIOLOGT.

contrary of the clmrcli. Ps. 17:14, "Men of the world." John 1 : 10, " The world knew him not." John T : T, " The world cannot hate 3'ou, bat me it hateth." John liilT, 22, 27 ; 15 : 18, 19 I 16 : 20, 33 ; 17 : 9, " I pray not for the world." John 17 : 14, 16, 25 ; 1 Cor. 2 : 12 ; 1 John 2 : 1517 ; 3 : 1 ; 4 : 5 ; 5 : 4. (c) Sometimes the term " world " means all nations, in distinction from the Jews. Matt. 26 : 13, " This gospel shall be preached in the whole world." Matt. 13 : 38, " The field is the world." John 3 : 16, " God so loved the world." 1 Cor. 1 : 21, " By wisdom the world knew not God." 2 Cor. 5 : 19, " Reconciled the world nnto himself." 1 John 2:2, " Propitiation for the sins of the whole world." These texts teach that redemption is intended for all races, classes, and ages of men.

Similarly the word " all" sometimes has a restricted signification, denoting all of a particular class. 1 Cor. 15: 22, " As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive." The " all " in Adam is a larger aggregate than the " all " in Christ, because Scripture teaches that all men without exception are children of Adam, and that not all without exception are believers in Christ. 2 Cor. 5 : 14, " If one died for all, than all died" [with that one]. The " all" here denotes the body of believers, because it is described as " the living" (ofc ^(bvre'i, ver. 15). Rom. 5:18, "As the judgment came npon all men to condemnation, even so the free gift came upon all men unto justification." The " all " in one instance is described (ver. 17) as "receiving abnndance of grace," but not in the other.'

' As a specimen of exegesis that tlirows out the qualifying -words and explanatory statements of the author, consider the following from Farrar (St. Paul, II. 201): "The word all is the governing word in the Epistle to the Romans. All — for whatever may be the modifications which may be thought necessary, St. Paul does not himself make them — all are equally guilty, all are equally redeemed. All have been temporarily rejected, all shall be ultimately received. All shall be finally brought into living harmony with that ' God who IS above all, and through all, and in all,' Eph. 4:6." The words of St. Paul in Eph. 4:6, are: "God who is in you all" — the reference being to believen

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 481

The passage, 1 Cor. 8 : 11, " Shall the weak brother perish for whom Christ died ? " and also Ileb. 6 : -1-10 ; 10 : 26-30, is a supposition, for the sake of argument, of something that does not and cannot happen : like 1 Cor. 13 : 1-3 ; Gal. 1 : 8. The influence and natural tendency of the conduct spoken of is to spiritual death. It is not said that the actual result will be the death of the " weak brother." On the contrary, it is said that "God shall hold him np," Rom. U : 4. In the text, 2 Pet. 2:1: " Denying the Lord that bought them," the " false teachers" are described according to their own profession, not as they are in tlie eye of God. They claim to have been bought by the blood of Christ, and yet by their damnable heresies nullify the atonement, Turrettin explains the "purchase" in this case, as redemption from the errors of paganism. See verse 20, " Escaped the pollutions of the world." Only the outward call is meant. Turrettin defends this, by the use in the passage of SecTTroTrj'i instead of awrrjpa, and of dyopa^eiv instead of XvTpovaSdc. In 2 Pet. 3:9," The Lord is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance," the will is that of decree, and the reference is to believers only. The Greek shows this : ii-q ^ovkofj^evo'^ rivw? diroXia-!^ai — " not purposing that any [of us] should perish." The preceding clause : " long-suffering to us-\xavd " (et

Vol. II.— 31

482 SOTERIOLOGY.

ing, that is contained in this text. Calvin and Gesenins explain : " What more was there to be done, or was I bound to do ? " Alexander in loco.

The question arises, If the atonement of Christ is not intended to be universally applied, why should it be universally offered ?

The gospel offer is to be made to every man because : 1. It is the divine command. Matt. 16 : 5. God has forbidden his ministers to except any man, in the offer. 2. No offer of the atonement is possible, but a universal offer. In order to be offered at all, Christ's sacrifice must be offered indiscriminately. A limited offer of the atonement to the elect onl}^, would require a revelation from God informing the preacher who they are. As there is no such revelation, and the herald is in ignorance on this point, he cannot offer the gospel to some and refuse it to others. In this state of things there is no alternative but to preach Christ to everybody, or to nobody. 3. The atonement is sufficient in value to expiate the sin of all men indiscriminately ; and this fact should be stated because it is a fact. There are no claims of justice not yet satisfied ; there is no sin of man for which an infinite atonement has not been provided. "All things are now ready." Therefore the call to "come" is universal. It is plain, that the offer of the atonement should be regulated by its intrinsic nature and sufficiency, not by the obstacles that prevent its efficacy. The extent to which a medicine is offered is not limited by the number of persons favorably disposed to buy it and use it. Its adaptation to disease is the sole consideration in selling it, and consequently it is offered to everybody. 4. God opposes no obstacle to the efficacy of the atonement, in the instance of the non-elect, (a) He exerts no direct efficiency to prevent the non-elect from trusting in the atonement. The decree of reprobation is permissive. God leaves the non-elect to do as he likes, {h) There is no compulsion from the external circumstances in which the

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 483

providence of God has placed the non-elect. On the contrary, the outward circumstances, especially in Christendom, favor instead of hindering trust in Christ's atonement. And so, in a less degree, do the outward circumstances in Heathendom. " The goodness, forbearance, and long-suffering of God [tend to] lead to repentance," liom. 2:4; Acts 14 : IT ; 17 : 26-30. (e) The special grace which God bestows upon the elect does not prevent the non-elect from believing; neither does it render faith any more difficult for him. The non-elect receives common grace, and common grace would incline the human will if it were not defeated by the human will. If the sinner should make no hostile opposition, common grace would be equivalent to saving grace.' Acts 7 : 51, " Ye stiff-necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost.'' 2 Tim. 3:8, " As Jannes and Jambres withstood Moses, so do these also withstand the truth." See Howe's remarks on common grace. Oracles, II. ii. 5. The atonement of Christ is to be offered indiscriminately, because God desires that every man would believe in it. " God," says Turrettin (IV. xvii. 33), " delights in the conversion and eternal life of the sinner, as a thing pleasing in itself,, and congruous with his infinitely compassionate nature, and therefore demands from man as a duty due from him (tanquam officium debitum) to turn if he would live." Substitute in this passage "faith and repentance " for " conversion and eternal life," and it is equally true. It is the divine delight in faith and repentance, and the divine desire for its exercise, that warrants the offer of the benefits of Christ's atonement to the non-elect. Plainly, the offer of the atonement ought to be regulated by the divine desire, and not by the aversion of the nou-elect. God in

' To say that common grace if not resisted by the sinner would be equivalent to regenerating grace, is not the same as to say that common grace if assisted by the sinner would be equivalent to regenerating grace. In the first instance, God would be the sole author of regeneration ; in the second he would not be.

484 SOTERIOLOGY.

offerino- liiss own atonement should be guided bj his own feelin

The universal offer of the benefits of Christ's atonement springs out of God's will of complacency. Ezek. 33 : 11, " I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his evil way and live." God may properly call upon the non-elect to do a thing that God delights in, simply because he does delight in it. The divine desire is not altered by the divine decree of preterition. Though God decides not to overcome by special grace the obstinate aversion which resists common grace, yet his delight in faith and repentance remains the same. His desire for the sinner's faith and repentance is not diminished in the least by the resistance which it meets from the non-elect, nor by the fact that for reasons sufficient he does not decide to overcome this resistance. 6. It is the non-elect liimself, not God, who prevents the efficacy of the atonement. For the real reason of the inefficacy of Christ's blood is impenitence and unbelief. Consequently the author of impenitence and unbelief is the author of limited redemption. God is not the cause of a sinner's impenitence and unbelief, merely

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 485

because he does not overcome his impenitence and unbelief. If a man flings liimself into tlie water and drowns, a spectator upon the bank cannot be called the cause of that man's death. Non-prevention is not causation. The efficient and responsible cause of the suicide is the suicide's free will. In like manner, the non-elect himself, by his impenitence and unbelief, is the responsible cause of the inefficacy of Christ's expiation. God is blameless in respect to the limitation of redemption ; man is guilty in respect to it.' God is only the indirect and occasional cause of it ; man is the immediate and efficient cause of it. This being the state of the case, there is nothing self-contradictory in the universal offer of the atonement upon the part of God. If either of the following suppositions were true, it would be fatal to the universal offer: («) If at the time of offering Christ's atonement God was actively preventing the non-elect from believing, the offer would be inconsistent, (b) If at the time of offering it God were working upon the will of the non-elect to strengthen his aversion to the atonement, the offer would be inconsistent, (c) If God were the efficient author of that apostasy and sinfulness which enslaves the human will and renders it unable to believe in Christ withont special grace, then the offer of the atonement unaccompanied with the offer of special grace would be inconsistent. But none of these suppositions are true. 7. The offer of the atonement is universal, because, when God calls upon men universally to believ^e, he does not call upon them to believe that they are elected, or that Christ died for them in particular. He calls upon them to believe that Christ died for sin, for sinners, for the world ; that there is no other name under heaven given among men whereby we must be saved ; that the blood of Christ cleanseth from all sin ; and that there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus. The atonement is not offered to an individual either as an elect

» See Owen : Works, XIV. 411. Russell's Ed.

486 SOTERIOLOGY.

man, or as a non-elect man ; bnt as a man, and a sinner, simply. Men are commanded to believe in the sufficiency of the atonement, not in its predestinated application to themselves as individuals. The belief that Christ died for the individual himself is the assurance of faith, and is more than saving faith. It is the end, not the beginning of the process of salvation. God does not demand assurance of faith as the first act of faith. " Assurance of grace and salvation not being of the essence of faith, true believers may wait long before they obtain it." L. C. 81. " In whom, after ye believed, ye were sealed with that Holy Spirit of promise," Eph. 1 : 13.' 8. The atonement is to be offered to all, because the preacher is to hope and expect from God the best and not the worst for every man.^ He is consequently to expect the election of his hearer, rather than his reprobation. The fact of the external call favors election, not reprobation. The external call embraces the following particulars : (a) Hearing the word, (h) Religious education by parents and friends, (c) Common grace, experienced in conviction of sin, fear of death and judgment, general anxiety, and dissatisfaction with this life. Upon such grounds as these, the individual is to be encouraged to believe that God's purpose is to elect him rather than to reprobate him. If a person fears that he is of the non-elect, he should be assured rather that he is mistaken in this fear than that he is correct in it ; because God has done more for him that tends to his salvation than to his perdition. 9. The atonement is to be offered to all men, because even those who shall prove in the day of judgment to be nonelect do yet receive benefits and blessings from it. Turrettin, (XVI. xiv. 11) mentions the following benefits : (a) The preaching of the gospel, whereby paganism with its idolatry, superstition, and wretchedness is abolished, {h) The extremes of liuman depravity are restrained, (c) Many tem' Owen : Display of Arminianism, IV. i. viii.

2 Zanchius: On Predestination, p. 67. Toplady's Tr.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 4b7

poral blessings and gifts of providence are bestowed. Rom. 2:4; Acts 14: 17. {d) Pimisliinent is postponed and delayed. Acts IT : 30 ; Rom. 3 : 25. " The grace of the Redeemer," says Bates (Eternal Judgment, II.), " is so far universal, that upon his account the indulgent providence of God invited the heathen to repentance. His renewed benefits that sweetened their lives, Rom. 2 : 4, and his powerful patience in forbearing so long to cut them off, when their impurities were so provoking, was a testimony of his inclination to clemency upon their reformation. Acts 14 : 17. And for their abusing his favors, and resisting the methods of his goodness, they will be inexcusable to themselves, and their condemnation righteous to their own conscience."

The reasons for the universal offer of the atonement, thus far, have had reference to GocVs relation to the offer. They go to show that the act upon his part is neither self-contradictory, nor insincere. But there is another class of reasons that have reference to mail's relation to the offer. And these we now proceed to mention. 1. The atonement is to be offered to every man, because it is the duty of every man to trust in it. The atonement is in this particular like the decalogue. The moral law is to be preaclied to every man, because it is every man's duty to obey it. The question whether every man will obey it has nothing to do with the universal proclamation of the law. It is a fact that the law will have been preached in vain to many persons, but this is no reason why it should not have been preached to them. They were under obligation to obey it, and this justified its proclamation to them. Still more than this, the moral law should be preached to every man even though no man is able to keep it perfectly in his own strength. The slavery of the human will to sin is no reason why the primary and original duty which the human will owes to God should not be stated and enjoined, because this slavery has been produced by man, not by God. In like manner faith in Christ's

488 SOTERIOLOGY.

atonement should be required as a duty from every man, notiiwitlistanding the fact that " no man can come unto Christ except tlie Father draw him," John 6 : 44 ; that "faith is not of ourselves, but is the gift of God," Eph. 2:8; and that Christ is " the author and finisher of faith," Heb. 12 : 2. Man's inability, without the grace of God, to penitently trust in Christ's atonement, being self -caused like his inability to perfectly keep the moral law without the same grace, still leaves his duty in the case binding upon him. The purpose of God to bestow grace is not the measure of man's duty. Xeither is the power that man has as fallen the measure of man's duty. Only the power that man had as unfallen, and by creation, is the measure of it. 2. The offer of Christ's atonement for sin should be universal, because it is the most impressive mode of preaching the law. In exhibiting the nature of Christ's sacrifice, and its sufficiency to atone for all sin, and especially in showing the necessity of it in order to the remission of any sin whatever, the spirituality and extent of the divine law are presented more powerfully than they can be in any other manner. The offer of the atonement is consequently a direct means of producing a sense of guilt and condemnation, without which faith in Christ is impossible. 3. The offer of the atonement to an unbeliever is adapted to disclose the aversion and obstinacy of his own will. This method of forgiving sin displeases him. It is humbling. If he were invited to make a personal atonement, this would fall in with his inclination. But to do no atoning work at all, and simply to trust in the atoning work of another, is the most unwelcome act that human pride can be summoned to perform. Belief in vicarious atonement is distasteful and repulsive to the natural man, because he is a proud man. AVhen, therefore, a man is informed that there is no forgiveness of sin but through Christ's atonement, that this atonement is ample for the forgiveness of every man, and that nothing but unbelief will prevent any man's forgiveness, his attention is inimediatel}'

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT. 489

directed to liis own disinclination to trust in this atonement, and aversion to this method of forgiveness. Uut this experience is highly useful. It causes him to know his helplessness, even in respect to so fundamental an act as faith. The consequence is, that he betakes himself to God in prayer that he may be inclined and enabled to believe. Larger Catechism, 59, 67.

Augustine : De predestinatione sanctorum ; Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, Lib. IV. ; De gratia et libero arbitrio ; De correptione et gratia. Calvin : Institutes, III. i. ii. Ursinus : Christian Keligion, Q. 89, 90. Witsius : Covenants, III. vi. Charnocke : OnKegeneration. Owen : Holy Spirit, III. Leighton : On Eegeneration. Howe : On Eegeneration (Sermons, xxxviii.-xlis.) Turrettin : Institutio, XV. i.-xi. (De Vocatione). "Witherspoon : On Eegeneration. Edwards : On Spiritual Light. Faber : Primitive Doctrine of Eegeneration. Hodge : Theology, II. 639-732 ; III. 3-40. Shedd : History of Doctrine, II. 102-110 ; 186-194 (Synergism).

In the Westminster symbol (S, C.,30, 31), the application of redemption is attributed to a particular work of God denominated Effectual Calling, " Tlie Spirit applieth to us the redemption purchased by Christ, by working faith in us, and thereby uniting us to Christ in our effectual calling ; " and this effectual calling is defined to be " the work of God's Spirit, whereb}^ convincing us of our sin and misery, enlightening our minds in the knowledge of Christ, and renewing [Larger Catechism, 67, adds, " and powerfully determining"] our wills, he doth j>ersuade and enahle us to embrace Jesus Christ freely offered to us in the gospel." According to this definition, the effectual call produces : {a) Conviction of conscience ; (^) Illumination of the understanding ; (d) Renovation of the will ; {d) Faith in Christ's atonement. Everything in redemption runs back, ultimately, to God. " His divine power hath given unto us all things that pertain unto life and godliness," 2 Pet. 1 : 3.

REGENERATION. 491

But such effects in the soul as conviction, illumination, renovation, and faith, imply a great change within it. These are fruits and evidences of that spiritual transformation which in Scripture is denominated a " new birth,"' a " new creation," a " resurrection from the dead," a " death to sin and life to righteousness," a "passage from darkness to light." Consequently, effectual calling includes and implies regeneration. Hence it is said in the Westminster Confession, XIII. i., that " they who are effectually called and regenerated, having a new heart and a new spirit created in them, are farther sanctified." In the Westminster Confession, X. ii., effectual calling is made to include regeneration, because man is said to be " altogether passive, until he is enabled to answer the call." '

The term "regeneration" has been used in a wide, and in a restricted sense. It may signify the whole process of salvation, including the preparatory work of conviction and the concluding work of sanctification. Or it may denote only the imparting of spiritual life in the new birth, excluding the preparatory and concluding processes. The Eonjish Church regards regeneration as comprehending everything in the transition from a state of condemnation on earth to a state of salvation in heaven, and confounds justification with sanctification. The Lutheran doctrine, stated in the Apology for the Augsburg Confession and in the Formula Concordiae, employs regeneration in the wide meaning, but distinguishes carefully between justification and sanctification. In the Reformed Church, the term regeneration was also employed in the wide signification. Like the Lutheran, while carefull}^ distinguishing between justification and sanctification, the Reformed theologian brought under the term " regeneration " everything that pertains to the development as well as to the origination of the new spiritual life. Regeneration thus included not only the new birth,

• In the older theological treatises, Regeneration commonly does not constitute a separate topic, but is discussed under the head of Vocation.

492 SOTERIOLOGY.

bat all that issues from it. It comprised the converting acts of faith and repentance, and also the whole struggle with indwelling sin in progressive sanctilication. Thus Calvin (Institutes, III. iii. 9) remarks : " I apprehend repentance (poenitentiam) to be regeneration (regenerationem), the end of which is the restoration of the divine image within us. In this regeneration, we are restored by the grace of Christ to the righteousness of God from which we fell in Adam. And this restoration is not accomplished in a single moment, or day, or year ; but by continual even tardy advances the Lord destroys the carnal corruptions of his elect." Here, regeneration is employed to denote not merely the instantaneous act of imparting life to the spiritually dead, but also the processes of conversion and sanctification that result from it.

This wide use of the term passed into the English theology. The divines of the seveiiteenth century very generally do not distinguish between regeneration and conversion, but employ the two as synon^nns. Owen does this continually : On the Spirit, III. v. And Charnocke likewise : Attributes, Practical Atheism. The AVestminster symbol does not use the term regeneration. Instead of it, it employs the term vocatiou, or effectual calling. This comprises the entire work of the Holy Spirit in the application of redemption. Under it, belongs everything pertaining to the process of salvation, from the first step of conviction of sin to the act of saving faith in Jesus Christ. Compare Fisher : On the Catechism, 31, 32.

The wide and somewhat vague use of the term regeneration was suggested by a few scripture texts. The apostle, in Eph. 4:22-25, gives the injunction: "Put oif the old man," " put on the new man," and " be renewed {avaveova^at) in the spirit of your minds." In Rom. 12 : 2, he exhorts Christians to " be transformed by the renewing (avaKaipcoarei) of their mind." In 2 Cor. 4 : 16, he says that the " inward man is renewed {avaKaivovvTaC) day by day."

REGENERATIOK 493

In these instances, as the use of dvaveoa and avaKaivow^ instead of yevvdo), shows, the notion of moulding or forming, rather than that of regenerating, is in St. Paul's mind. He is addressing those in whom the principle of the new life has been implanted ; who have been born again ; and now urges them to the exercise and nurture of the new life. Similarly, the prophet Ezekiel (IS : 31), addressing the house of Israel, the church of God, says : " Make you a new heart, and a new spirit." Here, the return from backsliding, and the reformation and culture of the spiritual life, not the actual regeneration of the soul, are what is demanded. Neither of these two texts refers to regeneration in the restricted signification of the term. God does not, in either of them, command man to quicken himself ; to create life from the dead ; to command the light to shine out of darkness ; to call things that be not as though they were. 2 Cor. 4:6; Eom. 4 : 17. In them both, he exhorts regenerate but backsliding man, as he, does the church at Ephesus, to " repent, and do the first works," Rev. 2:5. In the T^ew Testament, the renewino; of resreneration is denoted by Kri^€iv, yevvdv, ^cooTroieiv ; and that of sanctification, by dvaveovaSat, Eph. 4: 23, dvaKuivovuraL, 2 Cor. 4: 16, dvaKaivwaiq, Rom. 12 : 2.

But this wide use of the term regeneration led to confusion of ideas and views. As there are two distinct words in the language, regeneration and conversion, there are also two distinct notions denoted by them. Consequently, there arose gradually a stricter use of the term regeneration, and its discrimination from conversion. Turrettin (XY. iv. 13) defines two kinds of conversion, as the term was employed in his day. The first is " habitual " or " passive " conversion. It is the production of a habit or disposition in the soul. " Conversio habitualis sen passiva fit per habituum supernaturalium infusionem a Spiritu Sancto." The second kind is " actual " or " active " conversion. It is the acting out in faith and repentance of

494 SOTERIOLOGY.

this implanted liabit or disposition. " Conversio actnalis sen activa fit per bonorum istornm habituum exercitium, quo actus fidei et poenitentae, et dantur a deo, et honiine eliciuntur." After thus defining, Turrettin remarks that the first kind of conversion is better denominated " regeneration,'' because it has reference to that new birth by wliich man is renewed in the image of his Maker ; and the second kind of conversion is better denominated "conversion," because it inchides the operation and agency of man himself. De Moor on Marck (XXIII. il.), after distinguishing between conversio activa and passiva, says that the latter is synonymous with vocation.

We shall adopt this distinction between regeneration and conversion. Regeneration, accordingly, is an act ; conversion is an activity, or a process. Regeneration is the origination of life ; conversion is the evolution and manifestation of life. Regeneration is wholly an act of God ; conversion is wholly an activity of man. Regeneration is a cause ; conversion is an effect. Regeneration is instantaneous ; conversion is continuous.

The doctrine of regeneration was taught by Christ to Kicodemus. John 3:3, 6, " Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God. That which is born of the Spirit is spirit." John 1 : 13, " The sons of God are born not of the will of man, but of God." It had previously been taught in the Old Testament. Ezek. 11 : 19, " I will put a new spirit within you ; and I will take the stony heart out of your flesh, and will give you an heart of flesh," Ezek, 36 : 26, " A new heart will I give you." Jer. 31 : 33, " I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts." The vision of dry bones (Ezek. 37) taught the doctrine symbolically. Moses taught the doctrine in Deut. 30 : 6. " The Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart and with all thy bouI." Compare Ps. 51 : 10.

REGENERATION. 495

Respecting regeneration, the following characteristics are to be noted : 1. Regeneration is solely the work of God. The terms employed in Scripture prove this. " Creating anew," Eph. 4 : 24. " Begetting," James 1 : 18. " Quickening, " John 5 : 21 ; Epli. 2:5. " Calling out of darkness into light," 1 Pet. 2:9. " Commanding the light to shine out of darkness," 2 Cor. 4 : C. " Alive from the dead," Rom. 6 : 13. '• Xew creature," 2 Cor. 5 : 17. " Born again," John 3 : 3-7. " God's workmanship," Eph. 2 : 10. These terms denote a work of omnipotent power. The origination of life is impossible to the creature. He can receive life ; he can nurture life ; and he can use and exert life. But he cannot create life.

2. Regeneration as the creative and life-giving act of God produces an effect on the human understanding. It is " illumination : " " enlightening the mind," "Westminster L. C, 67. " God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath sliined in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ," 2 Cor. 4:6. 1 Cor. 2 : 12, 13. " The eyes of your understanding being enlightened," Eph. 1 : 18. Phil 1 : 9. Coloss. 3:10. 1 John 4 : 7 ; 5 : 20. John 17 : 3. Ps. 19 : 7, 8 ; 43 : 3, 4. The distinguishing peculiarity of the knowledge produced by regeneration is, that it is experimental. By this is meant, that the cognition is that of immediate co7isciousness. This is the highest and clearest form of cognition. When, for example, the truth that God is merciful is stated in language, the natural man understands the language grammatically and logically, but nothing more. He has no accompanying consciousness of God's mercy. In common phrase, he does not feel that God is merciful. But a knowledge that is destitute of inward consciousness is an inferior species. It is a blind man's knowledge of color. The blind man understands the phraseology by which the color is described. It conveys logical and self -consistent notions to his understanding; but it is unattended with

496 SOTERIOLOGY.

sensation. Such a knowledge of color is inadequate, in reality is ignorance, compared with that of a man possessed of vision. It is the knowledge of a sensuous object without any sensation. It is quasi-knowledge ; such as Christ refers to, W'hen he says of the natural man : " Seeing he sees not ; and hearing he hears not."

Illumination, or instruction by the Holy Spirit, implies then the production of an experimental consciousness of religio-ns truth. In this respect, it differs from human teaching. This is alluded to in John 6 : 63, " The words I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life : " that is they are spiritual life. Yital and conscious knowledge of religious truth is the effect of the operation of the Holy Spirit in the human understanding. One man can teach religious truth by grammatical propositions to another, but he cannot illumine his mind in respect to it. He can tell a man that God is holy ; is love ; that sin is hateful, and virtue is lovely ; but he cannot impart the consciousness that God is holy; that God is love ; that sin is hateful; that virtue is lovely. The production of an experience upon such subjects is the prerogative of God.

Hence all the unexperimental knowledge of the natural man upon religious subjects is denominated "ignorance," in Scripture. Said Christ to the Jews, " Ye neither know me nor my Father," John 8 : 19. To his disciples he said, " It is given to you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of Heaven," Matt. 13 : 11. " This is life eternal to know thee, the only true God and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent," John 17: 3. " No man knoweth the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him," Matt. 11 : 27. The books of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes are filled with the praise of a kind of knowledge which they represent sinful man to be destitute of, and which is the gift of God. Christ the great high-priest " has compassion upon the ignorant," Heb. 5 : 2. Scoffers are " willingly ignorant," 2 Pet. 3 : 5. Unbelieving Jews were " ignorant of

REGENERATION. 497

God's righteousness," Rom. 10 : 3. Before regeneration, men fashion themselves "accordino- to their hists in ignoranee," 1 Pet. 1 : I'l. The sinful condition of the pagan world is called a " time of ignorance " which God in his forbearance temporarily overlooked, Acts 17 : 30. Sin is often denominated folly. The Psalmist mourning over the remainders of sin exclaims : " So foolish was I, and ignorant," Ps. 73 : 22.

St, Paul explains the difference between the knowledge of the natural man and that of the regenerate, in 1 Cor. 2 : 14. "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him." " There is a wide difference," says Owen (Holy Spirit, III. iii), " between the mind's receiving doctrines notionally, and its receiving the things taught in them really. The first, a natural man can do. It is done by all who, by the use of outward means, do know the doctrine of Scripture in distinction from human ignorance, and error. Hence men unregenerate are said ' to know the way of righteousness,.' 2 Pet. 2 : 21." This true and real reception of divine truth, according to Owen, denotes : {a) An apprehension that these "spiritual things" agi-ee with the divine attributes, and express them. The doctrine of gratuitous justification, for example, when received by the regenerate mind is perceived to accord with all the attributes of God, and thus to be a manifestation of the glory of God. (b) An apprehension that the particular '•' spiritual thing " is suited to the end proposed. The death of Christ, for example, is adapted in every way to meet the demands of God's holy nature, and of man's sinful nature. It is not " foolishness," but wisdom, or an adaptation of means to ends, and is so perceived and understood by the spiritual man, but not by the natural. That there is this power of illuminating the understanding, is proved by the fact that good men pray that it may be exercised. Ps. 119 : 34, " Give me understanding and I shall \-eep thy law." Ps. 119 : 68, " Teach me thy statutes." Vol.. II.- 32

498 SOTERIOLOGY.

3. Regeneration with respect to the linman ivill is " renewal." The Westminster Larger Catechism (Q. 67) describes one part of effectnal calling, as the " renewing and powerfully determining " of the will. Biblical texts that prove this are : Ezek. 11 : 19, " I will put a new spirit within you : and I will take away the stony heart out of their flesh, and will give them a heart of flesh." Ezek. 36 : 26, 27. Ps. 51 : 10, " Renew a right spirit within me." Heb. 13 : 21, " May the God of peace make you perfect to do his will, working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight." Rom. 9:16, "It is not of him that willeth, but of God that showeth mercy." Phil. 2 : 13, " God worketh in you to will." Ps. 110: 3, "Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power." 2 Thess. 3:5, " The Lord direct your hearts into the love of God." Those texts, also, which describe regeneration as a "quickening" prove that the will is renewed.

Recurring to the distinction which we have made between ■^' inclination," and " volition " or " choice," regeneration is to be defined as the origination of a new inclination by the Holy Spirit, not as the exertion of a new volition, or making a new choice by the sinner.' Keeping this distinction in mind, we say that in regeneration God inclines man to holiness, and disinclines him to sin. This change of the disposition of the will is attributable solely to the Holy Spirit. The sinner discovers, on making the attempt, that he is nnable to reverse his determination to self and the creature. He cannot start a contrary disposition of his will. He is unable to incline himself to God as the chief end of

1 Edwards denominates it the origination of a new " principle." " By a principle," he says, " I mean that foundation which is laid for any particular kind of exercise of the faculties of the soul. A new holy disposition of heart is not a new faculty of will, but a foundation laid for a new kind of exercise of the faculty of will." Affections, III. i. Similarly, Owen remarks : " As the principle of holiness hath the nature of a habit, so also hath it the properties thereof. And the first property of a habit is, that it inclines and dinposeth the subject syherein it is unto acts of its own kind. " On the Spirit, IV. i.

REGENERATION. 499

liis existence. He can choose the antecedents or preparatives to inclining, but cannot incline. By a volition he can read his Bible. This is a preparative or antecedent to supreme love of God, but it is not supreme love, and cannot produce it. By volitions he can listen to preaching, and can refrain from vicious actions. These also are preparatives or antecedents to a holy inclination of the will, but are not this inclination itself, and cannot produce it. It is a fact of consciousness, that while the sinner can put forth single volitions, or particular choices, that are favorable to a new voluntary disposition because they evince the need of it, he cannot begin the new disposition itself. He cannot incline himself b}^ any volition whatsoever. " The will," says Edwards (Will, HI. iv.), " in the time of a leading act or inclination that is opposite to the command of God, is not able to exert itself to the contrary. The sinful inclination is unable to change itself; and for this plain reason that it is unable to incline to change itself." To employ a phrase of Edwards, the unregenerate is " unable to he willing " in the direction of holiness. The reason and ground of this inability has been explained in Anthropology. The inability is voluntary, in the sense that it is the consequence of an act of self-determination, and this act was the sin in Adam by which the human will became sinfully inclined.

By the operation of the Holy Spirit in regeneration, the man is enabled to incline to holiness instead of sin. In the Scripture phraseology, he is " made willing," Ps. 110 : 3. God " works in him to will," Phil. 2 : 13. In the phraseology of the Westminster statement (L. C, 67), he is "powerfully determined." By renewing the sinful and self-enslaved will, the Holy Spirit empowers it to self -determine or incline to God as the chief good and the supreme end. This new self-determination expels and takes the place of the old sinful self-determination. From this new self-determination, or inclination, or disposition, or principle, holy

500 SOTERIOLOGY.

volitions or choices proceed, and from the holy choices, holy actions.

That God the Spirit possesses the power to originate an inclination to holiness in the human will, is proved by the Biblical representations. David frequently asks God to exert this power. Ps. 119 : 36, " Incline my heart unto thy testimonies." Ps. 119 : 35, " Make me to go in the path of thy commandments." Ps. 119 : 37, " Turn away mine eyes from beholding vanity." Ps. 51 : 10, " Create in me a clean heart." Ps. 51 : 15, " Open thou my lips and my mouth shall shew forth thy praise." Isa. 61 : 8, " We are the clay, and thou our potter." Acts 16 : 14, " The Lord opened the heart of Lydia, that she attended to the things which were spoken by Paul." Tlie assurance of Christ that the Holy Spirit shall be given to every one that asks, implies the power of the Spirit to incline the human will.

While the operation of the Holy Spirit upon the human will is inexplicable (John 3 : 8), yet certain particulars are clear : («) The influence of the Spirit is distinguishable from that of the truth ; from that of man npon man ; and from that of any instrument or means whatever. His energy acts directly upon the human soul itself. It is the influence of spirit upon spirit ; of one of the trinitarian persons upon a human person. Neither the truth, nor a fellow-man, can thus operate directly upon the essence of the soul itself. It is in this respect, that theologians have defined the influence of the Holy Ghost upon the human will to be " physical." ' The (f)vcrt

»Owen : Works, II. 357 sq. Russell's Ed.

REGENERATION. 501

in creation, or providence. This fact is supported by the metaphors whicli describe the intimacy of the union between the believer and Christ. The one is the head, and the other is a member of the same body. Christ is the very life of the regenerate soul. In two instances the church is called " Christ :" Gal. 3 : 16, " To thy seed, which is Christ ; " 1 Cor. 12 : 12. Christ is "formed in the believer," Gal. 4 : 19. It is also supported by the Biblical statements respecting the working of the Holy Spirit in the soul, liom. 8 : 26, 27, "The Spirit maketh intercession." The operation of the Spirit is so intimate, that his working cannot in consciousness be distinguished from that of the soul itself. The believer is a " temple " of the Holy Spirit, 1 Cor. 6 : 19. That the influence of the Holy Spirit is directly upon the human spirit, and is independent even of the word itself, is further proved by the fact that it is exerted in the case of infants without any employuient of the truth. John the Baptist was " filled with the Holy Ghost even from his mother's womb," Luke 1 : 15.' (l) By reason of this peculiarity in the operation of the Holy Spirit, it does not force the human will. It is purely spiritual agency exerted upon a spiritual being. If matter could operate by contact and directly upon mind, the consequence would be compulsion. The two things are heterogeneous. But when God operates directly upon man, the two beings are homogeneous. It is a scholastic maxim, that " quicquid recipitur, recipitur in modum recipientis." Sensuous organs, alone, are adapted to receive sensuous impressions from objects of sense ; the immaterial spirit, alone, is adapted to receive an impression from the Eternal Spirit. Man's body cannot experience spiritual influences, and his soul cannot be affected by matter, (c) The operation of the Holy Spirit is in the will ; that of the truth, and of man upon man, is

' Meyer, in loco, explains en literally : " Still from his mother's womb." After birth, he was still the subject of the Holy Spirit's influences as he was before it.

502 SOTERIOLOGY.

on the will. The more interior an influence is, the farther is it from being compulsory. It is better able to work in accordance with the natui'e and constitution of that within which it works. If it were operating ab extra, it would be more apt to work across or against the constitutional structure. " Proprium est del movere voluntatem, maxime iu« terius earn inclinando." Aquinas : Summa, I. cv. 4.

4. Man is passive in regeneration. lie cannot actively originate spiritual life. His relation to regeneration is that of a recipient. This is a part of the meaning of "passivity" in this connection. In that particular instant when the divine and holy life is implanted, the soul of man contributes no energy or efficiency of any kind. Being dead in sin, it cannot produce life to righteousness. A corpse cannot originate animal life. Lazarus was passive at that punctum temporis when his body was reanimated. The same is true of the soul of man, in respect to regeneration. But since regeneration is instantaneous, the sinner's passivitv is instantaneous also. Man is passive only for a moment, during the twinkling of an eye. God's regenerating act is like the sounding of the last trumpet. The resurrection of dead bodies is instantaneous, and the regeneration of dead souls is so likewise. The doctrine that the sinner is passive in regeneration does not imply that the passivity extends over a great length, or even any length of time in his existence. On the contrary, it is only a punctum temporis in his history. Up to that point of time, he is active : active in enmity to God. After that point of time he is active : active in submission to God. The carnal mind is enmity ; the spiritual mind is love. Enmity and love are activities of the soul. Between the carnal mind and the spiritual mind, there is nothing but the instant of regeneration. In this instant when the new life is imparted, the activity is solely that of God the Holy Ghost.

5. Man cannot co-operate in regeneration. This follows logically from the fact that he is passive in regeneration.

REGENERATION. 503

A dead man cannot assist in his own resurrection. It also follows from the fact that co-operation implies some agreement between the parties. God and the sinner must harmonize, before thej can work together. Two forces cannot co-operate unless they are co-ordinate and co-incident forces. But up to the instant of regeneration, man is hostile to God. " The carnal mind is enmity toward God," Rom. 8 : 7. Enmity cannot co-operate with love.

Upon the Semi-Pelagian, the Tridentine, and the Arminian theory of depravity, there may be co-operation, but not upon the Augustinian and Calvinistic. According to the former theories, there are slight remainders of holiness m the natural man which, though feeble, j^et afford a point of contact, and an element of force in his regeneration. Calvin (Inst., III. xxiv. 13) attributes synergism to Chrysostom ; and also to Bernard and Lombard, in Institutes, II. ii. 6. " Lombard, in order to establish the position that the human will performs its part in regeneration, informs us that two sorts of grace are necessary. One he calls operative, by which we efficaciously will wliat is good ; the other co-operative, which attends as auxiliary to a good will. This division I dislike, because, wliile he attributes an efficacious desire of what is good to the grace of God, he insinuates that man has of his own nature, antecedent though ineffectual desires after what is good ; as Bernard asserts that a good will is the work of God, but yet allows that man is self-impelled to desire such a good will. But this is very remote from the meaning of Augustine, from whon;, however, Lombard claims to have borrowed this distinction." Synergism is enunciated in the canons of the council of Trent (vi. 4). Kegeneration is explained as taking place by some co-operation of the human will with the divine. The will is said to be " excited and assisted" by divine grace. Similarly, Limborch (Tlieologia, lY. xiv. 21) says that "grace is not the solitary, yet it is the primary cause of salvation ; for the co-operation of free will is due to

oO-i SOTERIOLOGY.

grace as a primary cause ; for unless the free will had been excited (excitatum) bj prevenient grace, it would not be able to co-operate with grace." These are not the terms which the Scriptures employ. To " excite " and " assist " sinful man is not the same as to "quicken" and "renew" him. To excite the human will is to stimulate it, not to impart life. Excitement supposes some vitality which is in lowtone and requires a tonic. Assistance implies that the will already has some force in the right direction which only needs to be added to. This is very different from the view presented in Ezek. 37 : 14, " I will put my spirit in you, and ye shall live." If there be some spiritual life in the natural man, he can co-operate in regeneration. But if he is " dead in trespasses and sins " (Eph. 2 : 11) he cannot. The truth upon this subject is well stated in the Westminster Confession, X. ii. " This effectual call is of God's free and special grace alone, not from anything at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, until being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer the call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it." According to this statement, man is passive until he is quickened ; after which Divine act he is actively holy.

It is said by some, that the sinful will has the power to cease self-determination to evil, though it has not the power to self-determine or incline to good. It can stop resistance to God, though it can do nothing more. But this would involve a cessation of all action in the will, both sinful and holy action, at the instant of regeneration, and this would make the will characterless at this instant. But in Anthropology (pp. 99, 109, 227) we have shown that the will cannot be inactive or destitute of an inclination, either good or evil. The will must be incessantly inclined, in order to be a will, as the understanding must be incessantly intelligent, in order to be an understanding. Consequently, the cessation of sinful inclination must be caused by the

REGENERATION. 505

origination of holy inclination. Sin does not first stop, and then holiness comes into the place of sin ; but holiness positively expels sin. Darkness does not first cease, and then light enters ; but light drives out darkness. Sin goes out, as Chalmers phrases it, by " the expulsive power of a new affection." Consequently, the regeneration of the will is the only way to stop the evil inclination of the will, xlgain, it is said that there is receptivity for holiness in the fallen will, though there is no energy to produce it. But receptivity is more than capacity. It is a faint desire or inclination. Hence St. Paul says that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him," 1 Cor. 2 : 14. There is repulsion, not recipiency, in the natural man. " The carnal mind ((^povrjixa) is enmity against God," Horn. 8 : 7. "When Christ (Luke 18 : 42) said to the blind man : " Receive thy sight," there was no receptivity in the eye, no favoring condition of the organ, that facilitated the restoration of sight. The causing of vision was wholly miraculous. Simultaneously with the words, " Receive thy sight," there was the exertion of creative power upon the sightless eye. enabling it to the act of vision.

6. Regeneration is a work of God in the human soul that is below consciousness. There is no internal sensation caused by it. No man was ever conscious of that instantaneous act of the Holy Spirit by which he was made a new creature in Christ Jesus. And since the work is that of God alone, there is no necessity that man should be conscious of it. This fact places tlie infant and the adult upon the same footing, and makes infant regeneration as possible as that of adults. Infant regeneration is taught in scripture. Luke 1 : 15, " He shall be filled with the Holy Spirit, even from his mother's womb." Luke 18 : 15, 16, " Suffer little children to come unto me ; for of such is the kingdom of God." Acts 2 : 39, " The promise is unto your children." 1 Cor. 7 : 14, " Now are your children holy." Infant re506 SOTERIOLOGY.

generation is also taught symbolically, (a) By infant circumcision in the Old Testament ; {h) By infant baptism in the New Testament.

7. Regeneration is not effected by the use of means, in the strict signification of the term " means." The Holy Spirit employs means in conviction, in conversion, and in sanctification, but not in regeneration. The appointed means of grace are the word, the sacraments, and prayer. None of these means are used in the instant of regeneration ; first, because regeneration is instantaneous, and there is not time to use them ; secondly, because regeneration is a direct operation of the Holy Spirit upon the human spirit. It is the action of Spirit upon spirit, of a Divine person upon a human person, whereby spiritual life is imparted. Nothing, therefore, of the nature of means or instruments can come between the Holy Ghost and the soul that is to be made alive. God did not employ an instrument or means, when he infused physical life into the body of Adam. There were only two factors: the dust of the ground, and the creative power of God which vivified that dust. The Divine omnipotence and dead matter were brought into direct contact, with nothing intervening. The dust was not a means or instrument by which God oi-iginated life. So in regeneration there are only two factors : the human soul destitute of spiritual life, and the Holy Spirit who quickens it. The dead soul is not an instrument by which spiritual life is originated, but the subject in which it is originated.

When Christ restored sight to the blind man, he did it by creative energy alone, without the use of means or instruments. The light of day was not a means. It contribnted nothing to the result. Nor was the blind eye a means of originating vision. When Christ anointed the eyes of the blind man with clay mixed with spittle, the act was symbolical, probably ; but certainly the spittle was not a means employed by him to work the miracle. In like manner, the word and truth of God, the most important of

REGENERATION. 507

all the means of grace, is not a means of regeneration, as distinct from conviction, conversion, and sanctification. This is evident, when it is remembered that it is the office of a means or instrument to excite or stimulate an already existing principle of life. Physical food is a means of physical growth ; but it supposes physical vitality. If the body is dead, bread cannot be a means or instrument. Intellectual truth is a means of intellectual growth ; but it supposes intellectual vitality. If the mind be idiotic, secular knowledge cannot be a means or instrument. Spiritual truth is a means of spiritual growth, in case there be spiritual vitality. But if the mind be dead to righteousness, spiritual truth cannot be a means or instrument. Truth certainly cannot be a means unless it is apprehended. But " the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned," 1 Cor. 2 : 14.

That regeneration is not effected by tiie use of means, will appear from considering those cases in which means are employed. 1. First, the word and truth of God is a means of conviction, because there is in the human conscience a kind of vitality that responds to the truth as convicting and condemning. The apostasy did not kill the conscience stone-dead. If it had, no fallen man could feel remorse. Adam's fall has benumbed and stupefied the conscience, but there is still sufficient vitality left in it for it to be a distressing witness to man. Consequently, the Holy Spirit employs truth as a means of exciting and stimulating the human conscience, not of regenerating it in the strict sense of the term. The conscience is not "made alive from the dead," in the sense that the will is. It has not lost all sensibility to moral truth. It possesses some vitality that only needs to be stimulated and toned up. This is done in conviction, and by the use of truth as an instrument. 2. Secondly, the word and truth of God is a means of conversion, because regeneration has preceded, and has

508 SOTERIOLOGY.

imparted spiritual life to the soul.' There is now a spiritual vitality that can respond to the truth. The understanding having been enlightened hy regeneration, when the particular truth that the blood of Christ cleanseth from all sin is presented, it is apprehended. This truth is now spiritually understood and is no longer "foolishness" to the mind. And the will having been renewed, and "powerfully determined " or inclined, this same cardinal truth is believed savingly. The doctrine of vicarious atonement thus becomes a means of faith in Chi'ist, and faith in Christ works b}^ sorrow for sin and love of holiness. Faith and repentance are converting acts. They are the substance of conversion, and are brought about by the use of the appropriate means : by the pi-esentation of evangelical truth to a soul in which the Holy Spirit has operated with regenerating grace. 3. Thirdlj^, the word and truth of God is a means of sanctifiGatio7i, upon the same principle. Hegeneration and conversion precede sanctiiication. By regeneration, spiritual life is originated ; by conversion, spiritual life is put in action and manifested. Of course, then, the means of sanctiiication find a spiritual vitality in tlie soul, to which they are correlated. The Holy Spirit employs the word, sacraments and prayer, afflictions and all tlie discipline of life, as instruments by which he excites and induces the renewed man to struggle with indwelling sin, and to endure unto the end.

But when we consider regeneration itself, and look into the soul for a principle of life and power to be correlated to means or instruments of regeneration, we do not find any. The unenlightened understanding is unable to apprehend, and the unregenerate will is unable to believe. Vital force is lacking in these two pi-incipal faculties. What is

' In the case of an adult, the precedence of regeneration to conversion is of order and nature only, not of time. Regeneration immediately exhibits its fruit in the converting acts of faith and repentance. In the case of infant regeneration, there is an interval of time between regeneration and conversion.

REGENERATION. 509

needed at this point is, life and force itself. Consequently, the Author of spiritual life himself must operate directly, witliout the use of means or instruments, and outright give spiritual life and power from tlie dead : that is, ex niliilo. The new life is not implanted because man pei-ceives the truth, but he perceives the truth because the new life is implanted. A man is not regenerated because he has first believed in Christ, but he believes in Christ because he has been regenerated, lie is not regenerated because he first j-epeiits, but he repents because he has been regenerated.'

8. Regeneration is the cause of conversion. The Holy Spirit acts in regeneration, and as a consequence the human spirit acts in conversion. And as the act of regeneration is not divisible between God and man, neither is the act of conversion. The converting activity of the regenerate soul moves in two principal directions : {a) Faith, which is the converting or turning of the soul to Christ as the Redeemer from sin. (b) Repentance, which is the converting or turning of the soul to God as the supreme good. Regeneration

' The words in James 1 : 18 are sometimes quoted to prove that the truth is a means of regeneration. "Of his own will, begat he us with the word of truth." The original is, fiovKriSieh airfKiirjaet' ri/xas \6yoD aXnbeias. " According to his purpose, he brought us forth by the word of truth." (R. V. ) 'AnoKveiy denotes the maternal, not the paternal act; as Tb"' primarily does in Ps. 2:7, "I have begotten thee." And \6yos aXri^elas means the gospel, as in Eph. 1 : 13, " After that ye heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation ; " and in Coloss. 1:5, " Whereof ye heard before, in the word of the truth of the gospel, which is come unto you as it is in all the world." The teaching, then, of St. James in this text is, that " in accordance with the Divine purpose man is born a child of God, under the gospel dispensation." There is a similar statement in 1 Pet. 1 : 23, '" Being born again {dvayeyevvruuLfvot) not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God." The "word of God," here, is not the "incorruptible seed" itself from which the birth proceeds. The Holy Ghost is this. But it is the sphere within which the birth takes place. It denotes the gospel dispensation, like the " word of truth " in James 1 : 18. Christians are born again of incorruptible seed, namely of the Holy Spirit, under the Christian dispensation. The Revised rendering of this verse is : " Having been begotten again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, through the word of God."

510 SOTERIOLOGY.

is instantaneous, conversion is continuous. Faith is gradual and unceasing, and so is repentance ; but regeneration is effected completely and once for all.

In connection with the doctrine that God is the sole author of regeneration, several particulars are to be noticed. 1. The reason for expecting the i-egeneration of men is found in God's promise to bestow regeneration, not in man's power to produce it. In his discourse on the day of Pentecost, Peter assigns as a reason for " repenting and being baptized for the remission of sins," the fact that God " has promised remission to as many as lie had called^'' Acts 2 : 38, 39, He expected to see men repent under liis preaching, because " God had exalted Jesus to be a Prince and a Saviour for to give rejyentance,'''' Acts 5 : 31 ; and because " God also to the Gentiles had granted 7'epentance unto life^'' Acts 11 : 18. Similarly, Paul exhorts Timothy to " be gentle unto all men, in meekness instructing those that oppose themselves, if God perad venture will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth," 2 Tim. 2 : 24. The preacher should confidently expect faith and repentance to follow from his preaching, because of God's purpose and promise to bestow regenerating grace in connection with preaching. In order to this expectation, it is not necessary that he should know who are the particular persons whom God has elected. It is enough to know that God has made an immense election ; that he has formed a purpose to regenerate " a multitude which no man can number, out of all nations, and kindreds, and peoples, and tongues," Rev. 7 : 9. 2. A second ground of hope and expectation that sinners will be regenerated, is the fact that under the gospel dispensation God's regenerating grace is being continually exerted. The Holy Ghost actually accompanies the faithful preacher of the word. The prophets '" preached the gospel unto you with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven," 1 Pet. 1 : 12. The Holy Spirit as a regenerating spirit is actually poured out among mankind. There is

REGENERATION. 511

not a moment in which lie does not regenerate many souls. Men are being born spiritually all the time, as men are being born physically all the time. 3. A third reason for the expectation that sinners will be regenerated, is the fact that God has promised to pour out the regenerating Spirit in answer to the prayers of the church. The church can obtain the Holy Spirit for the sinful Avorld. " Bring ye all the tithes into the storehouse, and prove me, saitli the Lord of hosts, if I will not open you the windows of heaven, and pour you out a blessing," Malachi 3 : 10, "If ye being evil know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him," Luke 11 : 13. The outpouring of the Spirit at Pentecost was an answer to the pi ayer of the church.

The question here arises, What is man's relation to regeneration ? The answer is, that his agency is not in regeneration itself, but in the work of conviction which is preparatory or antecedent to regeneration.

The term " preparative," as used by the Augustinian and Calvinist, is very different from its use by the Semi-Pelagian and Arminian. The former means by it, conviction of sin, guilt, and helplessness. The latter employs it in the sense of a preparative disjjosition, or a favoring state of heart. This is referred to in the Westminster Confession, IX. 3. "A natural man is not able to convert himself, or prepare himself thereto." The tenth of the Thirtynine Articles, also, excludes the Serai-Pelagian " preparatives " to regeneration. " We have no power to do good works acceptable to God, without tlie grace of God bv Christ preventing us that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will." In the Serai-Pelagian use, a "preparative" denotes some faint desires and beginnings of holiness in the natural man upon which the Holy Spirit, according to the synergistic theory of regeneration, joins. Having this sense of the terra in view,

512 SOTERIOLOGY.

Witsins (Covenants, III. vi. 27), says: "Let none think it absnrd tliat we now speak of means of regeneration, when but a little before (III. vi. 10, 12) we rejected all pi-eparatives for it.'' Owen, on the other liand, denies " means," and asserts " prepai-atives" of regeneration. Yet Owen and Witsius agree in doctrine. In the Calvinistic system, a " preparative " to regeneration, or a " means " of it, is anything that demonstrates man's total lack of holy desire and his need of regeneration. It is consequently not a part of regeneration, but something prior and antecedent to it. There is a work performed in the soul previous to the instantaneous act of regeneration, as there is a work performed in the body previous to the instantaneous act of death. A man loses physical life in an instant, but he has been some time in eominof to this instant. So man gains spiritual life in an instant, though he may have had days and months of a foregoing experience of conviction and sense of spiritual death. This is the ordinary divine method, except in the case of infants.

John the Baptist was sent to preach the law, in order " to make ready a ipeople prej)a7'ed for the Lord," Luke 1 : IT. Conviction of sin, in this instance, was an antecedent or preparative to the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit, but no part of regeneration itself. There is a grace of God that goes before regenerating grace, and makes the soul read}'' for it. It is common or prevenient grace. Man's work in respect to regeneration is connected with this. Moved and assisted by common or prevenient grace, the natural man is to perform the following duties, in order to be convicted of sin, and know his need of the new birth.

1. Readino; and hearino; the divine word. Rom. 10 : IT, " Faith Cometh by hearing." Matt. 13 : 9, " Who hath ears to hear, let him hear." " The Spirit of God raaketh the reading, but especially the preaching of the word, an effectual means of enlightening, convincing, and humbling

REGENERATION. 513

sinners, of driving them out of themselves, and drawing them unto Christ." L. C, 155.

2. Serious application of the mind, and examination of the truth in order to understand and feel its force. Luke 8 : 18, " Take heed how ye hear : for whosoever hath to him shall be given." Savs Owen (Holv Spirit, II.), "Should men be as intent in their endeavors after knowledge in spiritual things, as they are to skill in crafts, sciences, and other mj'steries of secular life, it would be much otherwise with them." The use of these means of conviction under common grace produces : [a) Illumination in regard to the requirements of the law, and failure to meet them. This is not the spiritual illumination of the regenerate mind (1 Cor. 2 : 14), but the legal illumination referred to in 2 Cor. 7 : 10. (h) Conviction and distress of conscience.' (c) Reformation of the outward life.

3. Prayer for the gift of the Holy Spirit both as a convicting and a regenerating spirit, wiiich is commanded by Christ in Luke 11:9, 13, " I say unto you. Ask and it shall be given you. If ye being evil know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him." That prayer for regenerating grace is a duty and a privilege for the unregenerate man, is proved : {a) By the ' fact that the Holy Spirit is promised generally under the gospel, as a regenerating spirit. Ezek. 36 : 24, 27, " I will take you from among the heathen and gather j^ou out of all countries, and I will put my Spirit within you. A new heart will I give you." Joel 2 : 28-32, " It shall come to pass that I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy. And whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be delivered." This is quoted by Peter on the day of Pentecost. In ac> See Edwards respecting legal and evangelical humiliation. Affections, Pt. III., Works, III. 137 sq. Howe: Blessedness of the Righteous, Ch. XVIL Owen : Works, II. 309 sq. Russell's Ed. Vol. II.— 33

514 SOTERIOLOGY.

cordancc witli these scriptures, the Westminster Confession (VII. iii.) teaches that " God promises to givennto all those who are ordained to life his Holy Spirit, to make them willing and ahle to believe." All men are to "call upon the name of the Lord " for the gift of the Holy Spirit thus promised, because no man has the right to assert that he is of the non-elect, or to affirm this of another man. As Christ's atonement is offered indiscriminately, so the Holy Spirit is offered indiscriminately ; and this warrants every man in asking for what is offered, (b) By the fact that a man must obtain the gift of the Holy Spirit as a regenerating spirit, before he can obtain it as a converting and sanctifying spirit. The Holy Ghost is not given as a converting and a sanctifying spirit, nntil he has been given as a regenerating spirit. Regeneration is the very first saving work in the order, and this therefore is the very first blessing to be asked for. " Make the tree good, and his fruit good,'' Matt. 12 : 33. " Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God," John 3 : 3. No man has any warrant or encouragement to pray either for conversion or for sanctification, before he has prayed for regeneration. Whoever, therefore, forbids an unregenerate man to pray for regenerating grace, forbids him to pray for any and all grace. In prohibiting him from asking God to create within him a clean heart, he prohibits him altogether from. asking for the Holy Spirit, {c) By the fact that the church is commanded to pray for the outpouring of the Spirit upon nnreo^enerate sinners, in order to their regeneration. It is not supposable that God would command the church to pi-ay for a blessing upon sinners which sinners are forbidden to ask for themselves.

To recapitulate, then, we say that the sinner's agency in respect to regeneration is in the antecedent woi-k of conviction, not in the act of regeneration itself. The Holy Spirit does not ordinarily regenerate a man until he is a convicted man ; until, in the use of the means of conviction

REGENERATION. 515

under common grace, he lias become conscious of his need of regenerating grace. To the person wlio inquires : " How am I to obtain the new birth, and what particular thing am I to do respecting it ? " the answer is: " Find out that you need it, and that your self-enslaved will cannot originate it. And when you have found this out, cry unto God the Holy Spirit, ' Create in me a clean heart, and renew within me a right spirit.' " And this prayer must not cease uiitil the answer comes ; as Christ teaches in the parable of the widow and the imjust judge, Luke 18 : 1-8, When men are convicted of sin and utter helplessness, they are " a people prepared for the Lord," Luke 1 : 17. A sense of guilt and danger is a " preparative " to deliverance from it. A convicted man is a fit subject for the new birth, but an unconvicted man is not. A person who denies that he is a guilty sinner before God, or that sin deserves endless retribution, or who has no fears of retribution, is not " prepared " for the regenerating work of the Spirit. It is true that the Holy Spirit, " who is free to work with means, without means, above means, and against means" (Westminster Confession, V. ii.), can convict a sinner without his co-operation, if he pleases. An utterly careless and thoughtless person is sometimes, by the power of God the Spirit, suddenly filled witli remorse and terror on account of his sins. And sometimes a convicted person does his utmost to repress conviction, and get rid of moral anxiety, and the Divine Spirit will not permit him to succeed. But this is not to be counted upon. The sinner is commanded to cooperate with the Holy Spirit in the work of conviction. " Quench not the Spirit" (1 Thess. 5 : 19), is enjoined upon him as well as upon the believer. He must endeavor to deepen, not to dissipate the sense of sin which has been produced in his conscience, or he is liable to be entirely deserted by the Spirit, and left to his own will, and be filled with his own devices. The sinner cannot co-operate in the work of regeneration, but he can in the work of conviction.

51G SOTERIOLOGY.

This " preparative " of conviction does not make the sinner deservino; of regeneration. God is not obliged to overcome the sinner's self-determination to sin because the sinner knows that he cannot overcome it himself. The sinner's helplessness does not make him meritorious of salvation, because it is self -produced ; but it does make him a suitable subject for the exercise of God's unmerited compassion in regenerating grace.

One thing is important, therefore, in giving advice to an unregenerate person : namely, to remind him of the danger of legality and self-righteousness. He must not suppose that by the use of the means of conviction — reading and hearing the word of God, avoiding all associations and practices that dissipate seriousness and quench conviction, and prayer that God would apply the truth to his conscience— he is doing a meritorious work that obliges God to the regenerating act. He must not imagine that " by doing his own part," as it is sometimes said, he can necessitate God to do his. This would make regeneration a debt, not grace. It would make it depend upon the sinner's action, and not, as St. Paul says, upon God's " purpose according to election," Rom. 9 : 11. The sinner must not require beforehand an infallible certainty that he will be regenerated, as the condition of his using the means of common grace in conviction. He must not say to the Most High : " I will do my part, provided thou wilt do thine." He must proceed upon AprohaJrility, remembering all the while that he merits not, and has no claim to the new birth. After his best endeavors, he must look np' as the leper did, saying, " Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean." He must do as the preacher does, in regard to the regeneration of his hearers. The preacher does not say to the Lord, " I will preach thy word, on condition that thou wilt regenerate every one to whom I preach." But he does as Paul bade Timothy : " In meekness instructing those that oppose themselves ; if God. ])eradve7itti,re will give them reREGENERATION. 617

pentance, to the acknowleding of the truth," 2 Tim. 2 : 25. And as the preacher has ample encouragement to preach, because of the general promise that God's " word shall not return to him void," so every convicted sinner lias ample encouragement to look up for God's grace in Christ for the new heart and right spirit which come only from this source, and which are promised generally under the gospel dispensation.

The language of Edwards (Pressing into the Kingdom, Works, lY. 392) accords with the Scripture representations. " Though God has not bound himself to anything that a person does while destitute of faith, and out of Christ, thei'e is great prohability that in a way of hearkening to this counsel you will live ; and that by pressing onward and persevering, you will at last, as it were by violence, take the kingdom of heaven. Those of you who have not only heard the directions given, but shall, through God's merciful assistance, practise according to them, are those that jprdhdbly will overcome." Of the same tenor is the following from Davies (Sermons, I. 50, Ed. Barnes) : " Men say to us, ' You teach us that faith is the gift of God, and that we cannot believe of ourselves, why then do you exhort us to it ? How can we be concerned to endeavor that which it is impossible for us to do ? ' I answer to this, I grant that the premises are true ; and God forbid that I should so much as intimate that faith is the spontaneous growth of corrupt nature, or that you can come to Christ without the Father's drawing you ; but the conclusions you draw from these premises are very erroneous. I exhort and persuade you to believe in Jesus Christ, because it is while such means [as preaching the gospel] are used with sinners, and b}' the use of them, that it pleases God to enable them to comply, or to work faith in them. I would therefore use those means which God is pleased to bless to this end. I exhort you to believe, in order to set j'ou upon the trial [to believe] ; for it is putting it to trial, and that only, which

518 SOTERIOLOGY.

can fully convince you of your own inability to believe; and till you are convinced of this, you can never expect strength from God. I exhort you to believe, because sinful and enfeebled as you are, you are capable of using various preparatives to faith. You may attend upon prayer, preaching, and all the outward means of grace, with natural seriousness ; you may endeavor to get acquainted with your own helpless condition, and as it were place yourself in the way of divine mercy ; and though all these means cannot of themselves produce faith in you, yet it is only in the use of these means that you are to expect divine grace to work it in you ; never was it yet produced in one soul while lying supine, lazy, and inactive." Compare Owen: Works, II. 272 sq. Ed. Russell.

The speculative difficulties connected with the doctrine of regeneration arise from the fact that men put their questions, and make objections, from the view-point and position of the unconvicted sinner. They deny that they are helpless sinners ; or they deny that sin deserves endless punishment ; or they deny that sin requires vicarious atonenient in order to its remission. A mind that is speculatively in this state is not " prepared " for regenerating grace. These are not the antecedents of regeneration. Such opinions as these must be given up, and scriptural views must be adopted, before the Holy Spirit will create the new heart. Or even if there be no heterodoxy, yet if the orthodox truth be held in unrighteousness ; if the person does not reflect upon the truth, and makes no eifort to know his guilt and danger, but lives on in thoughtlessness and pleasure ; this state of things must be changed. By a serious application to his own case of the law of God, the person must become an anxious inquirer, as a " preparative " to regeneration. The questions about man's relation to regeneration will give no serious trouble to any conmcted man ; to any one who honestly acknowledges that he is a guilty and helpless sinner, and seeks deliverance from the guilt and

REGENERATION. 519

bondage of sin. The questions will tlien answer tliciriselves.

1. It is objected that the prayer of the unregenerate is sinful. This proves too uiucli, because it would preclude any action whatever by the unregenerate man. The hearing of the word by the unregenerate is sinful. But the unregenerate is not forbidden to hear, upon this ground. The thinking of the wicked, like his ploughing, is sin. All the acts of the unregenerate are sinful, because none of thein spring from supreme love to God, yet some of them are better " preparatives " for, or " antecedents" to, God's work of regeneration, than others. Attendance upon public worship is better adapted to advance a man in the knowledge of his spiritual needs, than attendance upon the theatre. Prayer is better adapted than prayei'lessness, to bring a blessing to the soul. '' Behold he prayeth," was mentioned as a hopeful indication in the case of Saul of Tarsus. " An act,'^ says Owen, "may be good as to the matter of it, though sinful as to the form: for example, hearing the word by the unregenerate. And an act may be bad both as to tiie matter and the form : for example, pleasure-seeking on the Sabbath by the unregenerate. The former act is to be preferred, rather than the latter. The former act is positively commanded of God ; the latter is positively forbidden." The Westminster Confession (XVI. vii.) teaches that " works done by unregenerate men, although for the matter of them they may be things which God commands, yet because they do not proceed from faith, are sinful, and cannot please God. And yet, their neglect of them is more sinful and displeasing unto God [than their performance of them]." If the presence of sin in the soul is a reason why an unregenerate man may not pray for regenerating grace, then it is a reason why the regenerate man may not pray for sanctifying grace. A regenerate man's prayer is mixed with sin. If, then, a person may not pray until he is regenerated, neither may he pray until he is perfectly sanctified.

620 SOTERIOLOGY.

If the existence of sin is a reason for not praying in one case, it is in the other.

2. It is objected, secondly, that only the prayer of frith is infallibly granted. But this is no reason why a prayer that w'lW probably be granted should not be offered. Prayer for sanctification supposes previous regeneration. This is the prayer of faith, and is heard in every instance. But it does not follow that the prayer for regeneration, which God is able to answer, and which he encourages convicted sinners to hope that he will answer, should not be put up, because infallible certainty is not connected with the answer. Probability of an answer is good reason for asking for regenerating grace. The fact that the prayer of the unregenerate does not deserve an answer does not prove that God will not answer it. The prayer of the regenerate does not deserve an answer on the ground of merit.

{a) The first reason why prayer for sanctification is infallibly certain to be granted, while that for regeneration is not, is, that God has bound himself by a promise in the former case, but not in the latter. The foriner is connected with a covenant ; the latter is not. God has promised to sanctify every believer without exception who asks for sanctification ; but he has not promised to regenerate every convicted sinner without exception who asks for regeneration. Regeneration is according to the purpose of God in election ; and election does not depend upon any act of the creature, be it prayer or any other act. Consequently the convicted sinner's pra^'er cannot infallibly secure regeneration, as the believer's prayer can sanctification. Whenever regenerating grace is implored, the sovereignty of God in its bestowment must be recognized. The words of St. Paul apply here : " If God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth," 2 Tim. 2 : 25. The ^vords of the prophets also : " Let every man cry mightily unto God ; who can tell if God will turn and repent, that we perish not," Jonah 3:9. " Kend your heart,

REGENERATION. 521

and turn unto tlie Lord your God, for he is gracious and merciful. Who knoweth if he will return and repent, and leave a blessing behind him," Joel 2 : 13, 14. The words of the leper must always be a part of the prayer for regenerating grace : " If thou wilt, thou canst make me clean," Mark 1 : 40. When it is said that " whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord, shall be saved " (Joel 2 : 32 ; Acts 2 : 21 ; Rom. 10 : 13), the prayer of the convicted may be meant, and the general fact is that it will be answered.' Or the prayer of the regenerate for sanctification may be meant. Whosoever shall believingly and penitently call on the name of the Lord shall be saved.

(&) A second reason why the answer to prayer for regeneration is optional and sovereign, while that for sanctification is not, is, that in the latter instance it is a means to the end, while in the former it is not. The pi-ayer for sanctification is a part of the process of sanctification, but the prayer for regeneration is not a part of regeneration. Prayer as a divinely appointed means infallibly secures its end ; but prayer as an appointed antecedent, and not a means, is accompanied with probability, not absolute certainty.

Because God has not bound himself by a covenant to hear the prayer of every convicted sinner without exception, it by no means follows that he does not hear such a prayer, and that it is useless for snch a person to pray. He lias heard the cry of multitudes of this class. It is his general rule under the gospel economy to hear this cry. The highest probability of success, therefore, attends the prayer of an anxious and convicted person for regenerating grace. And this is ample encouragement for him to call upon the

1 Compare " If I be lifted up, I will draw all men unto me ; " and, " My word shall not return unto me void." These texts do not mean that every single individual shall be saved, but describe the general and common effect of the gospel.

522 SOTERIOLOGY.

merciful and miglity God for what he needs, namely, a heart of flesh in place of the stony heart. It is not true, that God never granted the prayer of an unregenerate man. Such men in peril have called upon God to spare their lives, and have been heard. This is taught in Ps. 107 : 10-14. Convicted men, from a sense of danger and the fear of the wrath to come, have prayed for the salvation of their souls from perdition, and God has saved them. In such cases, God has granted the petition, not because it was a holy one, or because it merited to be granted, but because the blessing was needed, and because of his mercy to sinners in Christ. Calvin (III. xx. 15) mentions the prayers of Jotham (Judges 9 : 20), and of Samson (Judges 16 : 2S), as instances in whicli "the Lord complied with some prayers, which, nevertheless, did not arise from a calm or wellregulated heart. Whence it appears that prayers not conformable to the rules of the Divine word are nevertheless efficacious."

But in addition to the fact that the prayer of a convicted sinner may have an effect upon God, and be answered favorably, it also has an effect on the person himself, and prepares for the regenerating act of God. Ko man can study the divine word, and receive legal illumination from it, without having some sense of danger awakened, and giving utterance to it in prayer. Even if the prayer be only the cry of fear, and is not accompanied with filial trust and humble submission, it is of use. The prayer, by its very defects, prepares for the new birth by showing the person Hiis need of it. The person in distress asks for a new heart. The answer does not come immediately. The heart is displeased, is perhaps made more bitter and rebellious. By this experience, the Holy Spirit discloses to the unregenerate man more and more of the enmity of the carnal mind, and the impotence of the self-enslaved will. This goes towards preparing him for the instantaneous act of regeneration.

REGENERATION. 523

"It is," says Owen (Holy Spirit, lY. iii.), "in noway inconsistent that faith should be required previously unto the receiving of the Spirit as a spirit of sanctification ; though it be not so as he is the author of regeneration." And the reason he assigns is, that in the instance of sanctification prayer is a means ; while in the instance of regeneration prayer is not a means but a preparative. He discusses the point in the following manner: "May a person who is yet unregenerate pray for the Spirit of regeneration to effect that work in him ? For whereas as such he is promised only to the elect, such a person not knowing his election seems to have no foundation to make such a request upon. Ans. 1. Election is no qualification on our part which we may consider and plead in our supplications, but is only the secret purpose on the part of God of what himself will do, and is known to us only by its effects. 2. Persons convinced of sin, and a state of sin, may and ought to pray that God, by the effectual communications of his Spirit unto them, would deliver them from that condition. This is one way whereby we ' flee from the wrath to come.' 3. The especial object of their supplications herein, is sovereign grace, goodness, and mercy as disclosed in and by Jesus Christ. Such persons cannot indeed plead any especial promise as made unto them. But they may plead for the grace and mercy declared in the promises as indefinitely proposed unto sinners. It may be that they can proceed no further in their expectations but unto that of the prophet, 'Who knoweth if God will come and give a blessing? ' Joel 2 : 14. Yet is this a sufficient ground and encouragement to keep them waiting at the throne of grace. So Paul, after he had received his vision from heaven, continued in great distress of mind praying until he received the Holy Ghost. Acts 9 : 9, 17. 4. Persons under such convictions have really sometimes the seeds of regeneration communicated unto them, and then as they ought to so they will continue in their supplications for the

524 SOTERIOLOGY.

increase and manifestation of it." ' When our Lord (John 14 : 17) asserts that " the world cannot receive the Holy Spirit because it seetli him not neither knoweth him," the reference is to the Holy Spirit as the spirit of sanctification. Christ is speaking of him as the " Comforter" who augments and strengthens already existing spiritual life. But if the " world," that is, the unregenerate, are incapable of receiving the Holy Ghost in his regenerating office, they cannot be regenei^ated.

There is the highest encouragement in the Word of God to pray for the regenerating grace of the Holy Ghost. It is a duty enjoined upon all men without exception, like that of hearing the word. " If ye, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him," Luke 11:13. " Thou, Lord, art plenteous in mercy unto all them that call upon thee," Ps. 86 : 5. " The Lord is nigh to all them that call upon him," Ps. 115 : 18. "The Lord is rich unto all that call upon him," Rom. 10 : 12. " Seek ye the Lord while he may be found, call ye upon him while he is near," Isa. 55 : 6. "I will that men pray everywhere, lifting up holy hands without wrath and doubting," 1 Tim. 2 : 8. * "Behold he prayeth," Acts 9 : 11. "Thou that hearest prayer, unto thee shall all fiesli come," Ps. 65 : 2. These and other similar texts relate to spiritual gifts. They invite and command men universally and indiscriminately to ask God for the Holy Spirit in aoiy of his operations, as the first and best of his gifts. " Prayer, being one special part of religious Avorship, is requii-ed by God of all men." Westminster Confession, XXI. iii."

While regeneration is a sovereign act of God according to

' See Bunyan's account of his own experience, in Grace Aboun iing. Edwards : Manner of Sseking Salvation, Works, IV. 380 sq ; Pressing into the Kingdom, Works, IV. 381 sq.

■ See the admirable remarks of Calvin, on Prayer the Principal Exercise of Faith. Institutes, III. xx. 1-17.

REGENERATION. 525

election, it is an encouraging fact both for tlic sinner and the preacher of the word that God's regenerating grace is commonly bestowed where the preparatory worlc is performed. This is the rule, under the gospel dispensation. He who reads and meditates upon the word of God is ordinarily enlightened by the Holy Ghost, perhaps in the very act of reading, or hearing, or meditating. "While Peter yet spake these words, the Holy Ghost fell on all them which heard the word," Acts 10 : 44. He who asks for regenerating grace may be regenerated perhaps in the act of praying. God has appointed certain human acts whereby to make ready the heart of man for the divine act. Without attentive reading and hearing of the word, and prayer, the soul is not a fit subject for regenerating grace. By " fitness " is not meant holiness, or even the faintest desire for holiness ; but a conviction of guilt and danger, a sense of sin and utter impotence to everything spiritually good. Such an experience as this "breaks up the fallow ground," to employ the Scripture metaphor. Jer. 4:3; Hosea 10:13. When the Holy Ghost finds this preparation, then he usually intervenes with his quickening agency. The effect of prevenient grace in conviction is commonly followed by special grace in regeneration ; the fact of the outward call is a reason both for the sinner and the minister of the woi'd, for expecting the inward call. Yet regeneration, after all the preparation that has been made by conviction and legal illumination, depends upon the sovereign will of God. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, so is every one that is born of the Spirit," John 3 : 8. Regeneration rests upon God's election, and not upon man's preparative acts ; upon special grace, and not upon common grace.

It follows, consequently, that the unregenerate man should be extremely careful how he deals with common grace. If he suppresses conviction of sin, and thus nullifies common grace, then God may withdraw all grace. This

526 SOTERIOLOGY.

was the case with some of the Jews. " For they being [willingly] ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, did not submit themselves to the righteousness of God. And because of unbelief were broken off," Rom. 10 : 3 ; 11 : 20. The same is true of some nominal Christians. God has sovereignty and liberty in respect to regenerating grace. Wlien a person has stifled conviction, God sometimes leaves him to his selfwill forever. Yet observation shows that the Holy Spirit suffers long, and is very patient and forbearing with convicted men ; that he does not hastily leave them, even when they disobey his admonitions, but continues to strive with them, and finally brings them to faith and repentance.

Upon this general fact in the economy of Redemption, that the right nse of common grace is followed by regenerating grace, both the sinner and the preacher should act. In this respect, both are like other men. The farmer has no stronger motiv^e than that of probable success, for sowing grain ; the merchant, for sending out ships ; the manufacturer, for erecting factories. Salvation is in the highest degree probable for any person who earnestly and diligently uses common grace, and the means of common grace. It is to be confidently expected that a convicted man wiil be made a new man in Christ Jesus. Every lost man ought to be thankful for such an encouraging probability. But to insist beforehand upon infallible certainty — and especially a certainty that is to depend upon his own action — is both folly and sin. It is folly, to suppose that so weak and fickle a faculty as the human will can make anything an inffjlible certain tj^ And it is sin, to attempt to divide the glory of regenerating the human soul between the Holy Spirit and the soul itself.

3. It is objected, thirdly, that to pray for regeneration is to delay faith and repentance. The sinner is commanded immediately to believe on Christ, and turn from his sin with godly sorrow ; but praying for regeneration is dallying

REGENERATION. 527

witli the use of means. It is an excuse for procrastination. To this it is to be replied : That prayer for regeneration is a prayer that God the Holy Spirit would work instantaneouslij upon the heart, and would immediately renew and incline the will. There would be force in this objection, if the sinner were taught that there are means of regeneration, and were exhorted to supplicate God to regenerate him at some future time through his own use of these means. But he who truly prays for regenerating grace, despairs of all agency in the use of means, and precludes all procrastination, by entreating an immediate and instantaneous act on the part of God by which he shall, this very instant, be delivered from the death and bondage of sin, and be brought into the life and liberty of the gospel. He implores " God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, to shine in his heart, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ," 2 Cor. 4 : 6. He asks the Son of God, " who quickeneth whom he w^ill " (John 5 : 21), to enliven his spirit now "dead in trespasses and sins," Eph. 2: 1. Consequently, prayer for regenerating grace is an evidence that the convicted person has come to know that the word, sacraments, and prayer — all the means of grace — are inadequate to reanimate the soul and make it alive to righteousness. It is not until he has discovered that legal conviction, legal illumination, resolutions to reform, external reformation, reading and hearing the word, and prayer itself cannot change the heart, that he leaves all these behind him, and begs God immediately and instantaneously to do this needed work in his soul. The prayer for regenerating grace is, in truth, the most energetic and pressing act that the sinner can perform. It is the farthest removed of any from procrastination. It is an immediate act on the part of the sinner, and it entreats God to do an instantaneous work within him.

In this manner, prayer for the instantaneous gift of regenerating grace harmonizes with the gospel-call to irame528 SOTERIOLOGY.

diate faith and repentance. Faith and repentance natnrally and necessarily result from regeneration. Whoever is regenerated will believe and repent.' To pray therefore for instantaneous regeneration is, virtually, to pray for instantaneous faith and repentance, and vice versa. He who pi-ays : " Help thou mine unbelief ; take away the stony heart, and give the heart of flesh," prays that God would " renew and powerfully determine the will," which is the definition of regeneration. At the same time, prayer for regenerating grace must not be substituted for the act of faith and repentance. Tlie direction is : " Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ." This is the Biblical answer to the question : " What must I do to be saved ? " But when the convicted person discovers that the act of faith is hindered and prevented by the blindness of his nndei'standing, and the bondage of his will to sin, and asks if he may implore the "enlightening and quickening energy of the Holy Spirit, to persuade and enable him to embrace Jesus Christ, freely offered in the gospel " (S. C, 31), he is to be answered in the affirmative. In imploring the regenerating grace of the Holy Spirit, he is " striving to enter in at the strait gate ; " he is endeavoring to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ. The act of faith in the blood of Christ, in its oion nature, is simple and easy. "My yoke is easy, and my burden is light," Matt. 11 : 30. But considered in reference to the pride and self-righteousness of the natural heart, faith is impossible without regeneration. Hence the frequent statement in Calvinistic creeds, that man needs to be jjcrsuaded and enabled to this act.''

' The regenerate child, youth, and man, believes and repents immediately. The regenerate infant believes and repents when his faculties will admit of the exercise and manifestation of faith and repentance. In this latter instance, regeneration is potential or latent faith and repentance.

= Westminster Confession, VII. iii. ; VIII. viii. ; IX. iv. ; X. i. ; XIV. L Larger Catechism, Q. 33 ; Q. 59 ; Q. 67 ; Q. 73.

g 1. Faith. Owen : Justification, XV. Turrettin : Institutio. XV. vii.-xvii. Edwards: Observations concerning Faith. Romaine : On Faith. Halyburton : On Faith. Erskine : On Faith. Hodge : Theology, III. 41-111 ; Way of Life, VI. | 2. Repentance. Calvin : Institutes, III. iii. iv. Ursinus : Christian Eeligion, Q. 21. Jeremy Taylor : Unum Necessarium : or the Doctrine and Practice of Eepentauce.' Saurin : Sermon on Eepentance.

Conversion is that action of man which results from regeneration. As the etymology implies, it is turning towards (con-verto) a certain point, and away from a certain point. Conversion consists of two acts : 1. Faith ; 2, Repentance. Faith is turning to Christ as the ground of justification, and away from self as the ground. Repentance is turning to God as the chief end of existence, and away from the creature as the chief end. Faith and repentance are converting acts ; the first having principal reference to justification, the second to sanctification ; the first to the guilt of sin, the second to its corruption.

The Westminster Confession (XIV. ii.) defines Faith in Jesus Christ as " a saving grace, whereby we receive and rest upon him for salvation." There is a difference between belief (assensus), and faith (fiducia). The first is assent to testimony ; the last is assent to testimony and also trust in the person who gives the testimony. " Justifying faith not

1 This elaborate and eloquent treatise is somewhat vitiated by a legalizing element and tendency.

Vol. II.— 31

530 SOTERIOLOGY.

only assenteth to the trutli of the promise, butreceiveth and resteth upon Clirist for pardon." L. C, 72. There may be belief without faith. A man may credit the statements made by Jesus Clirist, and yet not rest in him for salvation. Faith is a " saving grace," but belief is not. All who are not skeptics believe the testimony of Christ and his apostles, but not all who are not skeptics have faith. Faith is accompanied with love ; belief is not. " The devils believe and tremble." The natural man believes that God is merciful, but does not trust in his mercy.

This distinction is marked in the New Testament, by the use of the prepositions connected with the verb, or noun. Ilta-Tevco when used in reference to Christ is accompanied with eV, et

The same use of the prepositions is sometimes associated with the term "gospel," because of its connection with Christ. " Repent and believe {Tnarevere ev) the gospel," Mark 1 : 15. Even when there is no preposition, TnaTevo) sometimes denotes trust. "Christ did not commit himself" {ovk iirlarevev eavrbv), John 2 : 24. " Who will commit to your trust the true riches (Tt'9 Triarevaei) ? " Luke 16 : 11. " Unto them were committed the oracles " {i'jrLarev^a-av), Rom. 3:2. " The gospel of circumcision was committed to me," Gal. 2:7. "I know whom I have believed," or trusted in (cS TreTrlarevKa)^ 2 Tim. 1 : 12. An instance of mere belief in testimony is found in Mark 11 : 31, " Why did ye not believe him " {Zlcltl ovk e-marevaare avrw) ?

CONVERSION. 531

This fiducial or confiding nature of faith is taught in the phrases, '"looking" to Christ, " receiving" Christ, "eating" his flesh, " drinking" his blood. The definition which makes faith merely belief in testimony, converts Christ into a witness only. He is this, but much more : a prince and saviour ; a prophet, priest and king ; a person not to be believed merely, but to be believed in and on.

Faith is an effect of which regeneration is the cause. This is taught in 1 John 5:1," Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God." Phil. 1 : 29, " Unto you it ie given, in behalf of Christ, to believe on him." 2 Thess. 1 : 11, " We pray that God would fulfil [in you] all the good pleasure of his goodness, and the work of faith with power." 1 Cor. 2:5, " That your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God." John 6 : 44, 65, " 'No man can come to me except the Father which hath sent me draw him. No man can come unto me, except it were given him of my Father." 1 Pet. 1 : 21^ " By him, do ye believe in God, that raised him up from thedead, and gave him glory ; that your faith and hope might be in God." The order and connection between regeneration and faith is taught by our Lord. After announcing the doctrine of regeneration to Nicodemus, in John 3 : 3, " Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God," he then, in John 3 : 14-18, proceeds to speak of his own atonement for sin, and of man's trust in it, " The Son of man must be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have eternal life." That great change which Christ denominates being " born again," manifests itself first of all in an act of reliance upon Christ's blood of atonement. Saving faith in the person and work of the Redeemer follows regeneration, and always presupposes it.

The following particulars are to be noted.

1. Evangelical faith is an act of man. The active nature of faith in Christ is indicated in the Scripture phraseology^

532 SOTERIOLOGY.

whicli describes it as " coming " to Christ (Matt. 11 : 2S), "looking" to Christ (John 1 : 29), "receiving" Christ (John 3 : 11), " following Christ (John 8 : 12). The object of the epistle of James, is to teach that faith is an active principle. "Dead faith," the epistle defines to be "faith without works:" that is, pretended faith that does not work. The hypocrite merely " saijs " that he has faith (James 2 : 14).

2. Evangelical faith is an act of both the understanding and the will. It is complex ; involving a spiritual perception of Christ, and an affectionate love of him. (a) That faith is an intelligent act, is proved by John 6 : 44, 45, " They shall be all taught by God. Every man, therefore, that hath heard and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me." 2 Cor. 3: 14; 4:4. Eph. 1:17, 18, God giveth " the spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of Christ." 1 John 2 : 20, " Ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things." {h) That faith is an affectionate and voluntary act, is proved by Gal. 5 : 6, "Faith worketh by love." Eph. 6 : 23, " Peace be to the brethren, and love, with faith from God the Father." Eph. 3 : 17 ; 4 : 16 ; 5 : 2. Coloss. 2:2. 1 Thess. 3 : 12 ; 5 : 8. 1 Tim. 1 : 14. 2 Tim. 1 : 13, "Hold fast the form of sound words, in faith and love which is in Christ Jesus."

3. Evangelical faith is the particular act that unites the soul to Christ. For this reason, it stands first in the order of the acts that result from regeneration. " The Holy Spirit applieth to us the redemption purchased by Christ, by working faith in us, and thereby uniting us to Christ in our effectual calling," S. C, 30. Penitence for sin, love of holiness, hope, long-suffering, patience, temperance, etc., are none of them acts by which Christ's atonement for sin is laid hold of and made personal. Trusting faith is the special exercise of the soul by whicli this is done, and hence faith is the first thing commanded. " Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved," Acts 16 : 21. " This

CONVERSION. 533

is tlie work of God, tliat ye believe on him whom he hath sent," John 6 : 21).'

Tlie union with Christ by faith is not natural and substantial, like that between Adam and his posterity. Nor is it moral or social, like that between individuals in a corporation or state. Its characteristics are the following. {a) It is a spiritual union, because of its author, the Holy Spirit. 1 Cor. 6 : 17, " He that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit." 1 Cor. 12 : 13, " By one Spirit are we all baptized into one body." 1 John 3 : 24, " Hereby we know that he abideth in us, by the Spirit which he hath given us." 1 John 4 : 13. {h) It is a vital union, because it involves a divine and spiritual life derived from Christ. John 14 : 19, " Because I live, ye shall live also." John 11 : 25, "He that believeth in me though he were dead, yet shall he live." Gal. 2 : 20, " I live ; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." (c) It is an eternal union. John 10 : 2S, " They shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them

' The priority, in the order, of faith to all other acts, is illustrated by the following anecdote : "In a beautiful New England village a boy lay very sick, drawing near to death, and very sad. His heart longed for the treasure which was worth more to him now than all the gold of the western mines. One day I sat down by him, took his hand, and looking in his troubled face asked him what made him so sad. ' Uncle,' said he, ' I want to love Grod. Won't you tell me hovi to love God ? ' I cannot describe the piteous tones in which he said these words, and the look of anxiety which he gave me. I said to him : ' My boy, you must trust God first, and then you will love him without trying to at all.' With a surprised look he exclaimed, ' What did you say V ' I repeated the exact words again, and I shall never forget how his large, hazel eyes opened on me, and his cheek flushed as he slowly said, ' Well, I never knew that before. I always thought that I must love God first before I had any right to trust him.' 'No, my dear boy,' I answered, ' God wants us to trust him ; that is what Jesus always asks us to do first of all, and he knows that as soon as we trust him we shall begin to love him. This is the way to love God, put your trust in him first of all.' Then I spoke to him of the Lord Jesus, and how God sent him that we might believe in him, and how, all through his life, he tried to win the trust of men ; how grieved he was when men would not believe in him, and every one who believed came to love without trying at all. He drank in all the truth, and simply saying, ' I will trust Jesus now,' without an effort put his young soul in Christ's hands that very hour; and so he came into the peace of God which passeth understanding, and lived in it calmly and sweetly to the end."

534 SOTERIOLOGY.

out of my hand." Rom. 8 : 35-39, "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ ? " 1 Thess. 4 : 14, 17. {(I) It is a mystical, that is, mysterious union. The elect are " mystically joined to Christ," L. C, 67. Eph. 5 : 32, " This is a great mystery ; I speak concerning Christ and the church." The spiritual union between Christ and his people is individual, not specific. It does not rest upon unity of race and nature. It results from regeneration, not from creation. Consequently it is not universal, but particular.' Upon this spiritual and mystical union, rests the federal and legal union between Christ and his people. Because they are spiritually, vitally, eternally, and mystically one with him, his merit is imputable to them, and their demerit is imputable to him. The imputation of Christ's righteousness supposes a union with him. It could not be imputed to an unbeliever, because he is not united to Christ by faith.

4. Saving faith terminates on Christ as its object ; and upon Christ in all three of his offices : prophet, priest, and king. Since, however, guilt is a prominent fact in man's condition, the priestly office is prominent in relation to faith as described in Scripture. Under the Levitical economy, faith was indispensable. The typical sacrifice must be offered trusting in the promise of God concerning the Messiah. Merely to bring and slay a lamb, as an opus operatum, was not sufficient. There must be filial reverence for the Divine command, and confidence in the Divine promise of mercy through the coming Redeemer.

The second effect of regeneration is Repentance. The word /jLerdvota denotes a change of the mind {vov

' For twelve points of difference between union -with Adam and union with Christ, see Shedd : On Romans 5 : 19.

CONVERSION. 535

genuine sorrow that accompanies repentance. Matt. 21 : 29, " Afterwards he repented and went." 2 Cor. 7 : 8, " Though I made you sorry, I do not repent though I did repent," Matt. 21 : 32, " And ye, when ye had seen it, repented not afterwards that ye might believe him." Heb. 7 : 21, " The Lord sware and will not repent." In Matt. 27 : 3, it denotes the impenitent remoi'se of Judas. But ixerdvoia, not fieTa/xeXeia, is the technical term in the New Testament for repentance. The difference between penitence and remorse is described in 2 Cor. 7 : 9, 10. Penitence is " godly sorrow," and is one of the elements in repentance.

The definition of repentance in the Westminster Confession (XV. ii.) comprises the following particulars : (a) " A sense not only of the danger, but of the odiousness of sin." (h) " The apprehension of God's mercy in Christ." (c) "Grief for, and turning from sin."' (d) "The purpose and endeavor to walk in God's commandments." Ezek. 36 : 31, " Then shall ye remember your own evil ways, and shall loathe yourselves in your own sight, for your iniquities." Ps. 51 : 4, " Against thee, thee only, have I sinned ; that thou mightest be justified when thou speakest, and clear when thou judgest." 2 Cor. 7:11, "That ye sorrowed after a godly sort, what carefulness it wrought in you, yea what indignation, what fear, what vehement desire, what zeal." Ezek. 18 : 30, 31. Joel 2 : 12, 13. Amos 5:15. Ps. 119:128. Jer. 31:18, 19, "I have heard Ephi-aim bemoaning himself thus : Thou hast chastised me as a bullock unaccustomed to the yoke ; turn thou me, and I shall be turned ; for thou art the Lord my God."

' Sorrow for sin must be carefully distinguished from shame on account of it. The impenitent experience shame for sin, and they "awake to shame and everlasting contempt," Dan. 12:3. A person may feel degraded by his vices, and ashamed of them, without any sincere grief for them as committed against God. Such feeling as this is selfish ; while godly sorrow is disinterested. A man may be vexed and angry with himself, and despise himself, without any humble prostration of soul before God and confession of guilt. A sense ci

536 SOTERIOLOGY.

Though faith and repentance are inseparable and simultaneous, yet in the order of nature, faith precedes repentance. Zech. 12 : 10, '*' Thej shall look on me whom they have pierced, and thej shall mourn for him as one mourneth for liis only son." Acts 11 : 21, '' A great number believed and turned unto the Lord.'' This order is evinced by the following particulars : {a) Faith is the means, and repentance is the end. Faith leads to repentance, not repentance to faith. The Scriptui-es present God's mercj in redemption as the motive to repentance. Jer. 3 : 11, " Turn, O blacksliding children, saith the Lord : for I am married unto you.'' Joel 2 : 13, " Turn unto the Lord your God, for he is gracious and merciful.'' Qj) Repentance involves turning to God ; but there can be no turning but through Christ. John 14 : 6, " ]^o man cometh unto the Father but by me." John 10 : 9, •' I am the door." (c) If repentance precedes faith, then it stands between the sinner and Christ. The sinner cannot goto Christ "just as he is," but must first make certain that he has repented, {d) If repentance precedes faith, then none but the penitent man is invited to believe in Christ. This contradicts Rom. 5 : 6, " Christ died for the uiujodly.''' Impenitent sinners are commanded to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to the remission of their sins, ie) The doctrine that repentance precedes faith tends to make repentance legal : that is, a reason why Christ should accept the sinner. {/) God out of Christ, and irrespective of faith in Christ, is a consuming fire, Deut. 4 : 24. Heb. 12 : 29. It is impossible to have godly sorrow with this view of God. Only remorse and terror are possible. In such passages as Mark 1 : 15, " Repent ye, and believe the Gospel," and Acts 20 : 21, " Testifying repentance toward God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ," the end is mentioned first, and the means last. In a proposition, a term may have a position

the meanness and disgrace of sin is not the sense of its odionsness and illdesert.

COXVERSIOX. 537

verhally wliieli it has not logicallv. In Jer. 31 : 34. sanctification is mentioned before pardon. --Tiiey shall all know me, for 1 will forgive their iniquitv." ■

1 " Melanchthon taught that repentance was the effect of the law, and anterior to faith, and used forms of expression which were thought to implj' that good works or sanctification, although not the ground of justification, were nevertheless a causa sine qua non of our acceptance with God. To this Luther objected ; as true sanctification is the consequence, and in no sense the condition of the sinner's justification. We are not justified because we are holy ; but being justified, we are made holy."' Hodge : Theolo^-. Ill "-iS-S.

Angnstine : Enarratio in Ps. 50. Luther : On Galatians. Calvin : Institutes, III. xi.-xviii. Bellarmin : Disputationes (De Justilicatione). Ursinus : Christian Religion, Qu. 12-14, 21, 59-64. Turrettin : Institutio, XIV. x.-xiv. Gerhard : Loci, Tom. IV. Davenaut: On Justification, Hooker: Polity, VI. v. ; Discourse on Justification. Pearson : Creed, Art. X. Owen : On Justification ; Holy Spirit, IV. Bunyan : Justification by Imputed Righteousness. Edwards : Justification by Faith ; Wisdom displayed in Salvation. Baur : Gegensatz (Lelire von derRechtfertiguug). Mohler : Symbolics. Dorner: Christian Doctrine 1 132. Ritschl : Doctrine of Justification. Faber : Primitive Doctrine of Justification. Buchanan : On Justification (Lect. viii.-xv.). Hodge: Theology, IIL 114-212; Princeton Essays (On Imputation). Shedd : History of Doctrine, II. 203-375.

Justification is one of the most important doctrines in the Christian system. It supposes faith, and faith supposes regeneration. " Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God," 1 John 5:1. "I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts. For I will forgive their iniquity, and will remember their sin no more," Jer. 31 : 33, 34. This order is given in the Larger Catechism, Q. 67. The " mind being enlightened," and " the will being renewed," the person is " enabled to accept Christ as offered in the gospel." Faith unites with Christ, and union with Christ results in justification. This is defined in the Shorter Catechism (Q. 33) to be " an act of God's free grace wherein he pardoneth all our sins, and aceepteth us as righteous in his sight, only for the righteousness of Christ imputed to us and received by faith." Acts

JUSTIFICATION. 539

13 : 38, 39, " Through this man is preached unto jou the forgiveness of sins. And hy him, all that helieve are justified from all things from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses." Rom. 3 : 23, 24, " All have sinned and have come short of the glory of God ; being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." Rom. 4:5," To him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly ; his faith is counted for righteousness." Rom. 4:6-8; 5 : 17-19 ; 8 : 30. 1 Cor. 1 : 30, " Of God are ye in Christ Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption." 2 Cor. 5 : 19, 21. Eph. 1:7; 2:8. Phil. 3 : 9. Jer. 23 : 6. Ileb. 10 : 38, " The just [justified] shall live by his faith."

The justification of a sinner is different from that of a righteous person. The former is unmerited ; the latter is merited. The former is without good works ; the latter is because of good works. The former is pardon of sin and accepting one as righteous when he is not ; the latter is pronouncing one righteous because he is so. The former is complex ; the latter is simple.

The justification of the " ungodly " (Rom. 4:5; 5 : 6) includes both pardon and acceptance. Either alone would be an incomplete justification of the ungodly. In the case of a sinner, the law requires satisfaction for past disobedience and also perfect obedience. When a criminal has suffered the penalty affixed to his crime, he has done a part, but not all that the law requires of him. He still owes a perfect obedience to the law, in addition to the endurance of the penalty. The law does not say to the trangressor : " If you wall suffer the penalty, you need not render the obedience." But it says : " You must both suffer the penalty and render the obedience." Sin is under a doitble obligation ; holiness is under onh' a single one. A guilty man owes both penalty and obedience ; a holy angel owes only obedience.

Consequently, the justification of a sinner must not only

540 SOTERIOLOGY.

deliver hiin from the penalty due to disobedience, but provide for him an equivalent to personal obedience. Whoever justifies the %tngodly must lay a ground both for his delivery from hell, and his entrance into heaven. In order to place a transgressor in a situation in which he is BUato^, or right in evert/ respect before the law, it is necessary to fulfil the law for him, both as penalty and precept. Hence the justification of a sinner comprises not only pardon, but a title to the reward of the righteous. The former is specially related to Christ's passive righteousness, the latter to his active. Christ's expiatory suffering delivers the believing sinner from the punishment wdjich the law threatens, and Christ's perfect obedience establishes for him a right to the reward which the law promises. The right and title in both cases rest upon Christ's vicarious agency. Because his Divine substitute has suffered for him, the believer obtains release from a punishment which he merits ; and because his Divine substitute has obeyed for him, the believer obtains a reward which he does not merit.

The meaning of the term " justify " must be determined by its Scripture nse and connection, and not by the etymology merely. It may have two meanings, like " glorify " and " sanctify." To " glorify God," and to " glorify the body," are different significations of the word. The one signifies to declare to be glorious, the other, to make glorious. The clause, " Sanctify the Lord God in your hearts," employs the term " sanctify " differently from the clause, " Ye are sanctified." Similarly, "to justify" might mean to "make just" (justum facere), as well as to "pronounce just." But in Scripture, it never means to sanctify, or make inwardly holy.

In the Isow Testament, the verb Biicaioo) signifies : (a) To pronounce, or declare to be just. Luke 7:29, "And the publicans justified God." Kom. 3:4," That thou mightest be justified in thy sayings." {7j) To acquit from condemnation. Acts 13: 39, "Justified from all things from which

JUSTIFICATION. 541

ye could not be justified by the ]a.w of Moses." Rom. 4 : 5-7; 5 : 1, 9 ; 8 : 30-33 ; 1 Cor. 6 : 11 ; Gal. 2 : 16 ; 3 : 11. That StKacoco does not mean sanctifying or making just, is proved by its antithesis to "condemning:" Deut. 25:1, Prov. 17:15, Isa. 5:23, 2 Chron. 18:6, 7; and by its equivalents, "imputing righteousness" and "covering sin," Eom. 4 : 3, 6-S ; 2 Cor. 5 : 19, 21.^

In order to be justified, or pronounced righteous, a person must possess a righteousness {hiKaiocrvvr)) upon the ground of which the verdict is pronounced. There are two kinds of righteousness, upon the ground of which a person might be justified before the Divine law. («) Legal righteousness, or that of the covenant of works. This is perfect personal conformity to the law. Kom. 10 : 5, " Moses describeth the righteousness which is of the law, that the man which [perfectly] doeth those things shall live by them." A holy being is justified by this kind of righteousness. A sinner cannot be pronounced righteous upon the ground of legal righteousness, or perfect obedience, because he has not rendered it. Rom. 3 : 20, " By the deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified." Rom. 3 : 10, " There is none righteous, no, not one." Rom. 3 : 23. Acts 13 : 39. Gal. 2 : 16. The impossibilit}^ of man's being justified by legal righteousness is relative, not absolute. If he had rendered perfect obedience, he would be pronounced just upon this ground. " Tlie doers of the law shall be justified," Rom. 2 : 13. (/>) Gratuitous or evangelical righteousness, or that of the covenant of grace. This is technically denominated " the righteousness of God." Matt. 6 : 33 ; Rom. 1:17; 3 : 5, 21, 22, 25, 26 ; 10 : 3 ; 2 Cor. 5 : 21 ; Phil. 3 : 9 ; 2 Peter 1 : 1. The

1 Mohler (Symbolics, § xiii.) contends that " justificare " means " to acquit " only when applied to the innocent and holy, and is inapplicable to a transgressor. "The forgiveness of sin," he says, "is undoubtedly a remission of the guilt and the punishment which Christ has borne upon himself ; but it is likewise the transfusio7i of his Spirit into us." But St. Paul expressly says that " God iustifieth the ungodly " Rom. 4:5. So far as a person has infused righteousness, he is not ungodly.

51-2 SOTERIOLOGY.

Old Testament teaches it. " The Lord onr righteousness," Jer. 23 : 6 ; 33 : 16. It is so denominated, to distinguish it from the ordinary ethical or legal righteousness which is the righteousness of man. In Rom. 10 : 3, this latter is called Ihiav SiKacoavvrjv ; and in Phil. 3 : 9, ifi7]v SiKatocrvvrjv. If man should perfectly ohey the law, the righteousness would be the result of his own agency. It would be " his own righteousness." But the " righteousness of God" is the result of God's agency solely. Hence it is described (Rom. 4:6) as %wpii" epycov [sc. dv^pcoTrov^. Man is not the author of it, in any sense whatever.

The " righteousness of God " is the active and passive obedience of incarnate God. It is Christ's vicarious suffering of the penalty, and vicarious obedience of the precept of the law which man has transgressed. It is Christ's atoning for man's sin, and acquiring a title for him to eternal life. It is " gratuitous " righteousness, because it is something given to man outright, without any compensation or equivalent being required from him in return. "Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters, and he that hath no money ; come ye, buy and eat ; yea, come, buy wine and milk without money and without price," Isa. 55 : 1. " Being justified gratuitously (Soipeav) by his grace," Bom. 3 : 21. Since this evangelical " righteousness of God " is not inherent and personal to man, like the legal or ethical "righteousness of the law," it has to be imputed to him. Bom. 4:6, " David describeth the blessedness of the man to whom God imputeth righteousness." Bom. 4 : 9, 10. Christ's atoning death for sin is not the sinner's atoning death for sin, but God imputes it to him : that is, he calls or reckons it his. Christ's perfect obedience which merits eternal life is not the sinner's perfect obedience, but God imputes it to him ; he calls or reckons it his. Gen. 15 : 6. Bom. 4:3, 5, " Abraham believed God, and it was counted [iXoyia^r]) to him for righteousness. ]^ow to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the unJUSTIFICATION. 543

godly, his faith is counted for righteousness." James 2 : 23, "Abraham believed God, and it was imputed unto him for righteousness."

We liave observed that in order that a person may be pronounced just, there must be a reason or ground for the verdict. Justification cannot be groundless, and without a reason. The " righteousness of God " is the ground or basis upon which a believing sinner is pronounced to be riofhteous. Because Christ has suffered the penaltv for him, he is pronounced righteous before the law in respect to its penalty, and is entitled to release from punishment. Because Christ has perfectly obeyed the law for him, he is pronounced righteous before the law in respect to its precept, and is entitled to the reward promised to perfect obedience. To pardon a believer, and accept him as if he had rendered the sinless obedience which entitles to eternal reward, is to impute " the righteousness of God " to him.

The following particulars in connection with the justification of a sinner are to be noted. 1. Faith is the instrumental, not the procuring or meritorious cause of his justification. " God justifieth, not by imputing faith itself, the act of believing, but by imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ." Westminster Confession, XL i. The reasons are : {a) Because faith is an internal act or work of man. If the sinner's act of faith merited the pardon of his sin, and earned for him a title to life, he would be pronounced righteous because of his own righteousness, and not because of God's righteousness. Faith is denominated a work. John 6 : 29, " This is the work of God, that ye believe." It is the activity of the man, like hope and charity, and can no more be meritorious of reward, or atoning for disobedience, than these acts can be. " In a right conception, fides est opus ; if I believe a thing because 1 am commanded, this is opus." ' Selden : Table Talk, ih)

' For the Tridentine view of justification adopted partially by a Protestant, see Jeremy Taylor's sermon : Faith working by Love. Coleridge refers to this

544 SOTERIOLOGY.

Because, as an inward act of the believer, faith is the gift of God, being wrought wdthin him by the Holy Spirit. Eph. 2:8; Philip. 1 : 29. But a Divine gift cannot be used as if it were a human product, and made the ground of pardon and eternal reward. A debt to God cannot be paid by man out of God's purse ; though it can be so paid by God himself, (c) Because the believer's faith is an imperfect act. As such, it cannot be either atoning or meritorious, {d) Because faith is not of the nature of suffering, and consequently cannot be of the nature of an atonement. The believing sinner is "justified by faith '• only instrumentally, as he " lives by eating " only instrnmentally. Eating is the particular act by which he receives and appropriates food. Strictly speaking, he lives by bread alone, not by eating, or the act of masticating. And, strictly speaking, the sinner is justified by Christ's sacrifice alone, not by his act of believing in it,

2. The justification of a sinner is solely by Christ's satisfaction. " I*so man may look at his own graces as a part of his legal righteousness, in conjunction with Christ's righteousness as the other part. We must go M'holly out of ourselves, and deny and disclaim all such righteousness of our own." Baxter : Spiritual Peace and Comfort. Bacon's Ed. I. 273. Justification does not depend partly npon the merit of Christ's work, and partly upon that of the believer. The Tridentine theory is heretical at this point, because it makes the believer's justification to rest npon Christ's satisfaction in combination with inward sanctification and outward works. Scripture explicitly teaches that justification is by faith alone : not by faith and works combined. "A man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law," Rom. 3 : 28. Paul's " faith alone," in this passage, must not be confounded with James's, " faith that is

defect in .Teremy Taylor. Works, V. 105. Yet in an earlier period in his life, he fell into the same error himself. See the Friend, Works, II. 288. Ed. Harper.

JUSTIFICATION. 545

alone," James 2 : 17. Tlie latter is spurious faith that produces no works, or " dead " faith.'

3. The justification of a sinner is instantaneous and complete. It is a single act of God which sets the believer in a justified state or condition. E,om. 8:1," Tliere is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus." Rom. 8 : 33, 34, " Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect ? Who is he that condemneth ? " John 5 : 24, " lie that heareth my word, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation."

4. The justification of a sinner is an all comprehending act of God. All the sins of a believer, past, present, and future, are pardoned when he is justified. The sum-total of his sin, all of which is before the Divine ej'e at the instant when God pronounces him a justified person, is blotted out, or covered over, by one act of God. Consequently, there is no repetition in the Divine mind of the act of justification ; as there is no repetition of the atoning death of Christ, upon which it rests. " Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, that he should offer himself often ; for then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the world ; but now once in the end of the world hath he appeared, to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself ; and as he was once offered to bear the sins of many, unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time, without sin, unto salvation. For by one offering he hath perfected forever them that are sanctified," Heb. 9 : 24-28 ; 10 : 14.

While, however, there is no repetition of the Divine act of justification, yet the consequences of it in the soul of the believer are consecutive. In the believer's experience, God is continually forgiving his sins. The Divine mercy " is constantly absolving us by a perpetual remission of our

1 Compare Calvin : Institutes, III. xiv. 11. Shedd : History of Doctrine, IL 318-333; Sermons to the Spiritual Man, 293-298. Vol. n.— 35

546 SOTERIOLOGY.

sins." Calvin : Institutes, III. xiv. 10. The one eternal act of justification is executed &nceessively in time, as the Divine decree is. " God doth from all eternity decree to justify all the elect; nevertheless, they are not [consciously] justified, until the Holy Spirit doth in due time actually apply Christ unto them." Westminster Confession, XI. iv.

When a justified man commits sin, though his sin deserves eternal death, yet he is not exposed to eternal death as an unbeliever is, and as he himself was prior to justification. But he experiences the withdrawal of the Divine favor, and God's paternal chastisement. This may be very severe and painful ; and perhaps, sometimes, in the believer's experience may be almost equal to the distress of the unpardoned. David's experience during liis backslidings was fearful in the extreme. Ps. 116 : 3, " The sorrows of death compassed me, and the pains of hell gat hold of me." Ps. 32 : 4, " Day and night thy hand was heavy upon me : my moisture is turned into the drought of siunmer." Ps. 42 : Y, " All thy waves and thy billows are gone over me." Here in this life, the believer oftentimes suffers more than the unbeliever does. God deals with the former as with a son, and causes him great mental distress for his soul's good ; he deals with the latter as with a bastard and not a son. Heb, 12 : 8. Lazarus in this life suffered more than Dives did. At the same time, the true believer, under all this experience, is really and in the eye of God a justified and forgiven man. The believer himself may be in great doubt upon this point, and sometimes may be on the brink of despair ; but he is not cast off by God. David himself, after those dreadful passages in his experience, is enabled to hope in the Divine pity. He never falls into the absolute despair of the lost. Ps. 71 : 3, " Thou hast given commandment to save me." Ps. 42 : 5, " Why art thou cast down, O my soul ? hope thou in God ; for I shall yet praise him for the help of his countenance."

Some writers, in this reference, distinguish between

JUSTIFICATION. 547

"actual" and "declarative" justification. Cunningham and Buchanan make this distinction. Actual justification is the act in the divine mind ; declarative justification is the announcement of the divine act in the consciousness of the believer. The believer's experience has its fluctuations and varieties ; but the act of God is one and immutable. A person may be actually justified, with little or even no confident and joyful sense of it, in some chapters of his experience. Yet a justified man will not absolutely lose the hope of justification, and have the experience of blaspheming despair.

5. The justification of a sinner includes a title to eternal life, as well as deliverance from condemnation. This is denoted by the clause, " accepting as righteous," in the Westminster definition. Eternal life, as a reward, rests upon ■perfect obedience of the law. Had man rendered this obedience, he could claim the reward. He has not rendered it, and hence cannot claim it. Yet he must get a title to it, or he can never enjoy it. The rewards of eternity must rest upon some good basis and reason. They cannot be bestowed groundlessly. Christ, the God-man, has perfectly obeyed the law ; God gratuitously (Soopiav, %ft)pt? epycov) imputes this obedience to the believer; and the believer now has a right and title to the eternal life and blessedness founded upon Christ's theanthropic obedience. This is the second part of justification ; the first part being the right and title to exemption from the penalty of the law, founded upon Christ's atoning sacrifice. Justification thus includes the imputation of Christ's obedience as well as of his suffering; of both his active and his passive righteousness.

Piscator, Tillotson, Wesley, and Emmons denied the imputation of Christ's active obedience ; contending that justification is "pardon" alone, without " acceptance," or a title to life. The}' maintain that after the pardon of the believer's sin, on the ground of Christ's passive obedience,

§48 SOTERIOLOGY.

sanctification by the Holy Spirit ensues, and this earns the title to eternal life. The objections to this theory are the following: (a) The obedience of the believer is imperfect, but eternal life is the recompense of perfect obedience. The believer cannot claim such an imn)ense reward for such an inferior service, (h) Even if after his regeneration the believer's obedience were perfect and sinless, he has been disobedient previously ; but eternal life is promised only to a perfect obedience from the beginning of man's existence to tlie end of it. For these two reasons, the believer cannot establish a valid title to an infinite and eternal reward npon the ground of his imperfect and halting service of God here in this life. He must therefore found it upon the perfect obedience of his Redeemer, and expect entrance into heaven because his Substitute has obeyed for him, even as he expects to escape retribution because his Substitute has suffered for him. The reason why the believer must press forward after perfect sanctification is, that he may be^*^ for heaven, not that he may merit heaven. Sinless perfection in the next life is not the ground and reason of the believer's future reward, but the necessaiy condition of his future blessedness. If there be remaining sin, there must be, so far, unhappiness.

Passages of Scripture that prove the imputation of Clirist's active obedience are the following: Rom. 5:19, " Throngh the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." 1 Cor. 1 : 30, " Christ is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification." 2 Cor. 5 : 21, " He made him to be sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him." This " righteousness " is complete, and therefore includes a title to the reward of righteousness. Col. 2 : 10, " Ye are complete in hira." Eph. 1:6, " He hath made us accepted in the beloved." Eph. 3:12, "In Avhom we have boldness, and access with confidence." The boldness and confidence imply that there is no deficiency in the justification effected for the believer by Christ. But if

JUSTIFICATION. 549

he were resting his title to eternal life upon his own character and works, he could be neither bold nor confident in the day of judgment, 1 John 4 : 17. John 3 : 16, " Whosoever believeth shall not perish" — this is pardon; "but shall have eternal life" — this is acceptance as righteous.

It is objected that the believer is represented as being rewarded for his works, and in proportion to his works, in the last day. The reply is : {a) The reward of the last day is gracious ; resulting from a covenant and promise on the part of God. It is the recompense of a parent to a child, not the payment of a debtor to a creditor. God is not under an absolute indebtedness to the believer founded on an independent agency of the believer, but only a relative obligation established by himself and depending upon his assistance and support in the performance of the service. This is proved by the fact that the reward of a Christian is called an " inheritance." Matt. 25 : 34 ; Acts 20 : 32 ; Gal. 3 : 18 ; Eph. 5:5; Col. 1 : 12. The believer's reward is like a child's portion under his father's will. This is not wages and recompense, in the strict sense ; and yet it is relatively a reward for filial obedience. If an angel under the legal covenant fails to keep the law in a single instance, he gets no reward ; a redeemed man under the evangelical covenant, though he often fails, yet gets his reward. God graciously compensates the believer in Christ, because he is fatherly and compassionate towards his child, and not because the reward has been completely earned and is strictly due upon the principle of abstract justice. " Where remission of sins," says Calvin (Inst., III. xvii. 8, 9), "has been previously received, the good works which follow are estimated by God far beyond their intrinsic merit ; for all their imperfections are covered by the perfection of Christ, and all their blemishes are removed by his purity. Now if any one urge as an objection to the righteousness of faith, that there is a righteousness of works, I will ask him, whether a man

550 SOTERIOLOGY.

is to be reputed righteous on account of one or two lioly actions, while in all the other actions of his life he is a transgressor of the law. This would be too absurd to be pretended. I will then ask liim, If a man is to be reputed righteous on account of many good works, while lie is found guilty of any instance of transgression. This, likewise, my opponent will not presume to maintain in opposition to the law which pronounces a curse upon those who do not fulfil every one of its precepts. I will then further inquire. If there is any work of man which does not deserve the charge of impurity or imperfection. Thus he will be compelled to concede that there is not an absolutely good work to be found in man, that deserves the name of righteousness in the strict sense." Eternal life is called a " gift " in Rom. 6 : 23, while eternal death is called " wages." Again, the address of the judge in the last day to those who receive the reward of obedience is, "Come ye blessed." The reward is also a hlessing. This would not be the language of a debtor who is discliaro-ino; strict indebtedness to his creditors. The redeemed, also, when receiving their reward disclaim absolute merit : " When saw we thee an hungered, and fed thee ? Or thirsty, and gave thee drink?"

(Jb) The object in considering the works of men in the final judgment is to evince the genuineness of faith in Christ, and discriminate true from false believers ; not to show that man's works merit pardon and eternal life. Those who have done good vs^orks are described as humble, and surprised that they receive such an immense recompense for their poor service ; while those who have not done good works are described as self-righteous and proud, and surprised that they are punished and not rewarded. Matt. 7 : 22, " Many shall say unto me in that daj', Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? and then will I profess unto them, I never knew you." Matt. 25 : 44, " Then those on the left hand shall answer him, saying, Lord when saw we thee an hungered, or athirst, or a stranger, or naked, or sick, or ii:

JUSTIFICATION. 551

prison, and did not minister unto thee ? " The parable of the laborers, all of whom receive the same wages though hired at different hours, proves that the rewards of the last day are not I'egulated by the exact value of the obedience rendered. Since the reward is the consequence of a promise and not of an original obligation on the ]3art of God, God may do as he will with his own. lie never pays less than he has promised ; thereby becoming himself a debtor. The lord in the parable did not. But he may pay more than is due, and does pay more.

An error of the Perfectionist, at this point, is to be noticed. It is confounding im^nded sanctification with inherent sanctification. Imputed sanctification is mentioned in 1 Cor. 1 : 30 : " Christ was, of God, made unto us sanctification." Inherent sanctification is inward holiness : as in 1 Cor. 6 : 11, " Ye are sanctified." In the former sense, a believer's " sanctification " is instantaneous and perfect; but not in the latter. When God imputes Christ's active obedience to the believer, Christ is " made sanctification " to him. It is a complete sanctification that is imputed, and his title to life founded upon it is perfect ; but his inward sanctification, or cleansing from indwelling sin, is still imperfect. Sanctification as imputed is a part of justification ; but sanctification as infused and inherent is the antithesis to justification. The Perfectionist overlooks this distinction.

6. Justification is a means to an end. Men are justified in order that they may be sanctified ; not sanctified in order that they may be justified. Redemption does not stop with justification. Pom. 8 : 30, " Whom he justified, them he also glorified." John 8 : 11, " Neither do I condemn thee [i.e., I pardon thee] ; go and sin no more." Pardon is in order to future resistance and victory over sin. The sense of forgiveness is accompanied Math a hatred of sin, and hunger after righteousness. If the latter be wanting, the former is spurious. An unpardoned man could not be

552 SOTERIOLOGY.

sanctified, because remorse and fear of retribution would prevent struggle with sin. David prajs first for forgiveness, in order that he may obey in future. Ps. 51 : 7, 13, " Pni-ge [atone] me with hyssop ; hide thy face from my sins ; then will I teach transgressors thy ways."

Calvin: Institutes, III. vi.-x. xx. ; IV. xiv.-xvii. AKempis: Imitation of Christ. Ursinus : Christian Religion, Q. 89-91. Turrettin : Institutio, Locus XVII. Hooker : Polity, V. Ivii. Iviii. Owen : Indwelling Sin ; Mortification ; Saint's Perseverance. Jeremy Taylor : Holy Living and Dying. Scougal : Life of God in the Soul of Man. Bates : Spiritual Perfection. Charnocke : Attributes (Holiness). Fiavel : Keeping the Heart. Edwards : Religious Affections. Wesley : Christian Perfection. Watson : Institutes, II. xxix. Junkin : On Sanctification. Dabney : Theology, LVI.-LVII. Hodge : Theology, IIL 466-709 ; Way of Life, IX. Faber : Operations of the Holy Spirit. Hare : Mission of the Comforter. Buchanan : Office and Work of the Holy Spirit.

The term " sanctify " (ayid^eiv) is employed in Scripture in two senses : {a) To consecrate, or set apart to a sacred service or use. John 10 : 36, " Whom tlie Father hath sanctified and sent." Matt. 23 : 17, " The temple that sanctifieth the gold." (h) To purify and make holy. 1 Cor. 6 : 11, " But ye are washed, ye are sanctified." Ileb. 13 : 12. John 17 : 17, " Sanctify them through thy truth." The latter is the sense in which it is taken, when the doctrine of Sanctification is discussed. The AVestniinster Shorter Catechism (Q. 35) defines as follows : " Sanctification is the work of God's free grace, whereby we are renewed in the whole man after the image of God, and are enabled more and more to die unto sin, and live unto righteousness." Eph. 1:4," God hatli chosen us that we should be holy." 1 Cor. 6 : 11, " Ye are washed, ye are sancti554 SOTERIOLOGY.

fied by the Spirit of our God." 2 Thess. 2:13, "God hath chosen you to salvation, throiigli sanctification of the Spirit." 1 Thess. 5 : 23, " The very God of peace sanctify you wholly."

1. Sanctification results from the continuation of the agency of the Holy Spirit, after the act of regeneration. (a) In strengthening and augmenting existing graces : faith, hope, charity, etc. {b) In exciting them to exercise, thi'ongli reading and hearing the word, the sacraments, prayer, providences, afflictions, and chastisements. Hence it is often called " renewing," Ps. 51 : 10 ; 2 Cor. 4 : 16 ; Eph. 4 : 23 ; Col. 3 : 10 ; Rom. 12:2; Titus 3:5. " Renewing," or renovation, in this use of the term, is not synonymous with " regeneration." When St. Paul exhorts the Ephesians (4 : 23) to " be renewed in the spirit of their mind," he is not exhorting them to regenerate themselves, but to sanctify themselves. So also with the exhortation to "the house of Israel," " Make you a new heart," Ezek. 18 : 31.

2. Sanctification inchides the entire man. 1 Thess. 5 : 23, " The very God of peace sanctify you wholly ; and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body be preserved blameless." ' Sanctification aifects : (a) The higher rational and spiritual part of man's nature, the Trvev/xa, because this has been corrupted by the fall. Titus 1 : 15 ; Rom. 1 : 28 ; Eph. 4 : 18. (5) The inferior intelligence, the -^vxv- (c') The body, crw/xa. As apostasy began in the irvev/xa, and affected the other parts of human nature, so sanctification begins in the irvevfjua and passes throughout the soul and body. A man can control his physical appetites, in pi-oportion as he has a vivid spiritual perception of God and divine things. The intuition in the irvev}Jia restrains the appetites of the ■^v)(7] and aSijxa. If spiritual perception be dim, the bodily appetite is strong. That the higher nature,

1 See Shedd : On Romans 7 : 33 ; 8 : 10, for the meaning of this trichotomy.

SANCTIPICATION. 555

denominated irvevixa or i^oO?, is depraved, and needs to be sanctified, is proved by Rom. 1 : 28 ; 12 : 2. Epli.

4 ; 17 ; 2 Tim. 3:8; Tit. 1 : 15 ; Mark 1 : 23 ; 1 Tliess. 5:23.

3. Sanctification is gradual. " We are enabled more and more to die to sin." It is tlie conflict with, and victory over indwelling sin described in liom. 7 : 14-8 : 28. The eighth chapter of Romans, as well as the seventh, speaks of the struggle and groaning of the still partially enslaved will. " Even we ourselves who have the first-fruits of the Spirit groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body. For we are saved by hope. Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmities, and maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered," Rom. 8 : 23, 24, 26.

4. The means of sanctification are : {a) Internal : namely. Faith. Gal. 5:6," Faith woi-keth by love." Hope. Rom.

5 : 5, " Hope maketh not ashamed, because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts." Joy. 1 Pet. 1 : 8, 9, " In whom ye rejoice with joy unspeakable, receiving the end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls." Peace. Phil. 4:7," The peace of God shall keep your hearts and minds, through Christ Jesus." The exercise of any one of these Christian graces increases the holiness of the believer. (J) External : The Scriptures. John 17 : 17, " Sanctify them through thy truth." 1 Pet. 1 : 22, 23 ; 2:2, " Desire the sincere milk of the word, that ye may grow thereby." Prayer. John 14 : 13, 14, "Whatsoever ye shall ask in my name I will do it." Acts 2: 42. Providential discipline. John 15 : 2, "Every branch in me that beareth not fruit, he purgeth." Rom. 5:3, 4; Heb. 12:5-11. The sacrament of the Supper. Acts 2 : 42, " They continued steadfastly in the apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and in breaking of bread, and in prayers."

5. The believer co-operates with God the Spirit in the use of the means of sanctification. Sanctification is both a

556 SOTERIOLOGY.

grace and a duty. 1 Cor. 16 : 13, " Watch ye, standfast in the faith, quit you like men, be strong." Eph. 6 : 16, 18, " Take tlie shield of faith, the helmet of salvation, and the swoi'd of the Spiiit which is the word of God, praying always with all prayer and supplication in the Spirit, and watching thereunto with all perseverance." Phil. 2 : 12, 13, " Work out your own salvation, for it is God which worketh in you." Hence sanctification is the subject of a command. Eph. 4 : 22, 23, " Put off the old man, and be renewed in the spirit of your mind." Ezek. 18: 31, "Make you a new heart, and a new spirit." Regeneration, being the sole work of God, is a grace but not a duty. It is nowhere enjoined upon man as a duty, to regenerate himself.

6. Sanctification though progressive is not complete in this life. 1 John 1 : 8, 10, " If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Phil. 3 : 12-14, " Brethren, I count not m^^self to liave apprehended, but I press toward the mark." Rom. 7:18, 23, "I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing. I see another law in m}'^ members, warring against the law of my mind." Gal. 5 : 7. Sanctification is completed at death. " The souls of believers at their death are made perfect in holiness," S. C, 37. lleb. 12 : 23, The heavenly Jerusalem contains " the spirits of just men made perfect." 1 John 3:2," We shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." 2 Cor. 5 : 8, " Absent from the body, and present with the Lord." Eph. 5 : 27, " Christ loved the church that he might sanctify it, and present it to himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle." 1 Cor. 13 : 12, " Xow we see through a glass darkly ; but when that which is perfect is come, face to face." Matt. 5:8, " The pure in heart shall see God." Rev. 14 : 13, " Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord."

7. Sanctification once begun is never wholly lost. It fluctuates with the fidelity of the believer, but he never

SANCTIFICATION. 557

falls back into the stupor and death of the nnregenerate state. L. C, 79. " They whom God hath sanctified b}' his Spii'it shall constantly persevere to the end, and be saved." John 10 : 28, 29, " My sheep shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand." Rom. 11 : 29, " The gifts and calling of God are without repentance." Phil. 1:6, " lie which hath begun a good work in you, will perform it, unto the day of Jesus Christ." 1 Pet. 1 : 5, Believers are " kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation."

Exhortations to diligence, and warnings against carelessness and failure are consistent with the certain perseverance of the believer, because : (a) While the certainty is objective in God, it may not be subjective in man. God knows that a particular man will certaiidy persevere, because he purposes that he shall, and he will realize his purpose by the operation of his Spirit within him; but the man does not know this unless he has assurance of faith. Many believers do not have this highest degree of faith, and hence are more or less subject to doubts and feai-s. Exhortations to diligence, and warnings against apostasy, suit such an experience as this. But one who is assured of salvation by the witness of the Holy Spirit would not require to be warned against apostasy, while in this state of assurance, (b) Exhortations to struggle with sin, and warnings against its insidious and dangerous nature, are one of the means employed by the Holy Spirit to secure perseverance. The decree of election includes the means as well as the end. Now if success in the use of means is certain, there is the strongest motive to employ them ; but if success is uncertain, then there is little motive to use them. St, Paul employs the certainty of success as a motive to struggle. " Fight the good fight of faith ; lay hold on eternal life, whereunto thou art called,''^ 1 Tim. 6:12.

It must be remembered that salvation is certain, not be558 SOTERIOLOGY.

cause the person believes that he lias once believed in the past, but because he now consciously believes. If from his present experience and daily life he has reason to think that he is truly a believing Christian, then he has reason to expect that he will continue to be one. Cromwell, according to the anecdote, committed an error in inferring his good estate, because he believed that he was once a believer.'

That sanctification is never lost, is proved also by its connection with justification. Justification naturally tends to sanctification. Gal. 5:6, "Faith worketh by love." Trust in Christ's blood of atonement spontaneously impels to the resistance of sin ; and if there be no struo-crle against sin, it is clear proof that there is no true trust in Christ's sacrifice. Justification supplies the only efiicient motive to obedience. Hence the obedience of the believer is called " new obedience," because of the new motive from which it spi'ings, viz. : the atoning love of the Redeemer. It is also denominated "the obedience of Christ," 2 Cor. 10:5. Gratitude to Christ, and love of him for the forgiveness that comes through his death, are the springs of this evangelical obedience and sanctification. The strongest inducement for a Ciiristian to obey the divine law, is the fact that he has been graciously pardoned for having broken the law. He follows after sanctification, because he has received justification. He obeys the law not in order to be forgiven, but because he has been forgiven. 2 Cor. 5 ; 14, " The love of Christ constraineth ns not to live unto ourselves, but

1 The passage in Heb. 6: 4-6 is hypothetical, as is proved by verse 9 : "We are persuaded better things of you, and things that accompany salvation, though we thus speak." A supposition which is not an actual or even a possible case is sometimes made, for the sake of illustrating or enforcing truth. In 1 Cor. 13 : 1-3, Paul supposes the existence of Christian faith without that of Christian charity. In Gal. 1 : 8, he supposes that an angel from heaven may preach another gospel than the true one. In Matt. 13 : 21, 2'2, the stony-ground hearer is not a true believer. In 2 Pet. 2 : 20, 21, the " dog who tui-ns to his own vomit." is a false professor. His ''knowing the way of righteousness" is superficial knowledge, like that of the stony-ground hearer.

SANCTIFICATION. 559

unto him which died for us." And the love meant, is Christ's redeeming love. 2 Cor. 7:1, "Having these promises [of forgiveness], let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the tlesh and spirit." Because God has blotted out all his past sin, the believer lias the most encouraging of all motives to resist all future sin. Had God not pardoned the past, it would be futile to struggle in future. In 2 Pet. 1:4, it is said that the " exceeding great and precious promises are given to us in order that bj these we might be partakers of a divine nature, having escaped the corruption of the world through lust." Sanctification does not justify ; but justification sanctifies. And there being this close connection between the two, sanctification can no more be wholly lost than justification can be.

The necessarj^ connection between sanctification and justification is taught by both Paul and James ; between whose views there is a verbal, but not a logical contradiction. Paul, in Rom. 4: 4-13, assumes that saving faith is living faith and produces works, but he says nothing particularly upon this latter point : First, because his object is to contrast faith and works ; and, secondly, because the opponent \\\t\\ whom he was disputing did not claim to be justified b}' faith of any kind, true or false, but by works altogether. James, on the other hand, not only assumes that saving faith is living faith and produces works, but speaks particularly and emphatically upon this latter point : First, because lie is not contrasting faith and works ; and. secondly, because he was contending with hypocrites, who claimed that what they called "faith alone," and "faith only," and what James calls " dead faith," is a faith that would save the soul. Hooker (on Justification) remarks that justification is spoken of by St. Paul in the narrow sense, as exclusive of sanctification ; but by St. James in the wide sense, as inclusive of it. Paul means justification without its fruits; James means justification with its fruits. The former speaks of faith simply ; the latter of working faith.

560 SOTERIOLOGY.

Paul describes faitli as the antithesis of works ; James describes faith as producing works.'

' The seeming contradiction between Paul and James disappears, if James is understood to put, by metonomy, the effect for the cause ; the work of faith for faith itself. When he says that " Abraham was justified by works " (James 2 : 21), and " Rahab was justified by works" (James 2 : 25), he means that they were justified by a faith that produced works, or a working faith. Abraham's " work" proved that his "faith" was genuine, and therefore might well stand for and represent it. It was a "work of faith," 1 Thess. 1 : 3. Shedd : Sermons to the Spiritual Man, Sermon XIX.

The Means of Grace are means of sanctification. Tliey suppose the existence of the principle of divine life in the soul. " The outward and ordinary means whereby Christ communicates to his clmrch the benefits of his mediation, are, all his ordinances; especially the word, sacraments, and prayer ; all of which are made effectual to the elect for their salvation." L. C. 154. The means of grace are administered within the visible Church, and to its members.* Consequently, church membership is requisite to obtaining the benefits of the means of grace and sanctification. Some of these benefits cannot be enjoyed at all, outside of the visible Church : those, namely, connected with the administration of the sacraments, and the fellowship and watch of Christians; and none of them can be enjoyed in their fulness, by one who has not separated himself from the world by confessing Christ before men.''

1 WTien the world of unregenerate men are said to have the means of grace, the means of co7iviction under common grace, not of sanctification under special grace, are intended. "The Spirit of God maketh the reading, but especially the preaching of the word, an effectual means of enlightening, convincing, and humbling sinners, of driving them out of themselves, and drawing them unto Christ." L. C. 15.5.

2 Respecting the nature of the Church, Calvin (Dedication to the Institutes) presents the Protestant view in two fundamental positions : (a) That the Church may exist without a visible form, because it is both invisible and visible. The former is composed of all who are really united to Christ ; the latter, of all who profess to be united to Christ. The former has no false members ; the latter has, as the parables of the tares and the net show, (p) That the visible form of the Church is not distinguished by external splendor, but by the pure preaching of God's word, and the legitimate administration of the sacraments. The Romanist

Vol. II.— 36

562 SOTERIOLOGY.

1. Confession of faith and church fellowship is a means of sanctification. This is one of " the ordinances of Christ," all of which, according to the "Westminster statement, are means of grace. Christ commands his disciples to confess him before men. Matt. 10 : 32, 33, " Whosoever shall confess me before men, hini will I confess alsQ before my Father which is in heaven. But whosoever shall deny me before men, him will I also deny before my Father which is in heaven." Compare Matt. 16 : 16-18. The use of this means of spiritual growth is often enjoined in the Epistles. Kom. 10 : 9, 10 ; Heb. 10 : 25.

Man is a social being, and his religious like his secular welfare depends upon association with others like-minded. Confession of faith and church membership promote sanctification : («) By personal sympathy. (Ij) By the watch and discipline of fellow-Christians. Those who cherish a hope that they are believers, yet make no public acknowledgment of their faith, omit an important means of grace, and hinder their own sanctification. Moreover, such a neglect of an explicit ordinance of Christ casts doubt upon the reality of the supposed faith. There would be more ground for hope, were this doubt removed by the confession of faith.

2. The "Word of God is a means of grace and sanctification, in two aspects of it : {a) As law. The purpose of this is, to point out the duty which God requires of man as a subject of his government. The effect of the word in this form upon the believer, is to produce self-knowledge and humility. The believer by the law is made acquainted with indwelling sin. Meekness and lowliness of heart are the effect of the word, in this aspect of it. He is kept " poor in spirit." (J) As gospel. The purpose of this is, to discontends that the Church exists only in a visible form, and that this form is in the see of Rome and her order of prelates, alone. Rome makes the invisible and visible churches identical and coterminous. For a concise and able statement of the prelatical theory of the Church, see Jeremy Taylor's Consecration Sermon.

MEANS OF GRACE. 563

close the fulness of Christ to meet this spiritiial poverty. Preaching should combine the two in just proportions, in order to the sanctiti cation of believers.

The efficacy of the word is from the Holy Spirit applying it. The Spirit does not operate npon the truth, but upon the soul. John 8 : 43, 47, " Why do ye not understand my speech? even because ye cannot hear my word. He that is (!)f God heareth God's word : ye therefore hear them not because ye are not of God." 1 Cor. 2 : 14, " The natural man cannot know the things of the Spirit because they are spiritually discerned." In using the word, the Divine Spii'it works directly upon the soul, and produces two effects : (a) The understanding is enlightened, and enabled to perceive the truth spiritually, (h) The will is renewed and inclined towards it. The aversion of the heart to truth is overcome. Some Lutheran divines represent the Holy Spirit as operating upon the truth, so that the truth becomes an efficient by means of this superadded quality or power. The Reformed theologians regard the Holy Spirit as the sole efficient, and the truth as only an instrument.

3. The Sacraments are means of grace and sanctification.' In the classical meaning, " sacramentum " was the oath of allegiance taken by the soldier. It was also the money pledged by contending parties in a litigated case. It implied obligation of some kind. The classical is not the Biblical, or the ecclesiastical signification. The Latin fathers employed sacramentum as the equivalent of fivo-ri]piov. The sacrament was a " mystery." The Yulgate ti'anslates ^varrjptov, in Eph. 1 : 9 ; 3 : 23 ; 5 : 32, by sacramentum. But as a mystery is exhibited or explained by a symbol, the " sacramentum " was also a " symbolum." Calvin : Inst., ly. xiv. 2.

In the Biblical and ecclesiastical use, a "sacrament" is a sign or symbol of a Christian mystery : of the mystery of

1 On this subject, see the thorough discussion of Calvin : Institutes, IV. xiv.- ■ xviL

564 SOTERIOLOGY.

regeneration, in the case of baptism ; of the mystery of vicarious atonement in the case of the Lord's supper. These two sacraments exhibit and certify, by sensible emblems, to the believing recipient, these two mysterious facts in redemption. The Westminster Larger Catechism (Q. 162) so defines. " A sacrament is a holy ordinance instituted to signify, seal, and exhibit to believers the benefits of Christ's mediation, to strengthen their faith, to oblige them to obedience, to cherish their love and communion one with another."

The following are the fundamental positions in the Reformed theory of the sacraments, {a) They are means of grace, dependent like the other means upon the accompanying operation of the Holy Spirit and consequent faith in the soul of the recipient. Says Calvin (List,, TV. xiv. 9), " All the energy of operation belongs to the Spirit, and the sacraments are mere instruments which without his agency are vain and useless, but with it, are fraught with surprising efficacy." " The grace which is exhibited in or by the sacraments is not conferred by any power in them ; neither doth the efficacy of a sacrament depend upon the piety or intention of him that doth administer it, but upon the work of the Spirit." Westminster Confession, XXYIL iii. Matt. 3 : 11, "I indeed baptize you with water, but he shall baptize with tlie Holy Ghost." 1 Cor. 12 : 13, " By one Spirit we are all baptized into one body." 1 Cor. 11 : 28, " Let a man examine himself and so let him eat." E-om. 2:28, "Neither is that circumcision which is outward." 1 Pet. 3:21, " The antitype whereunto, namely baptism, doth also now save us (not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience towards God), bj^ the resurrection of Jesus Christ." (b) Li the sacrament of the supper, the bread and wine are both symbols, and memorials of Christ's body. They both emblematize, and remind of a particular fact : namely Christ's atoning death. This is founded on Luke 22 : 19, " This is [i.e.

MEANS OF GRACE. 565

represents] ' my body ; this do in remembrance of me." The first clause describes the sacrament as symbolic ; the second as mnemonic, " Our Lord Jesns instituted the sacrament called the Lord's supper, for the perpetual i-emembrance of the sacrifice of himself in his death, and a commemoration of the one offering of himself upon the cross." Westminster Confession, XXIX. i. ii. (c) The act of truly partaking of the Lord's Supper is mental and spiritual, not physical and carnal. The Westminster Confession (XXIX. vii.) teaches that the " worthy receiver spiritually receiv^es and feeds upon Christ crucified," and denies that he " carnally and corporally receives or feeds upon Him." It also denies that " the body and blood of Christ are corporally or carnally in, with, or under, the bread and wine," and asserts that they are " really, but spiritually, present to the faith of believers, as the elements themselves are to their outward senses."

The points in this statement of most importance are: {a) The believer, in worthily partaking of the Lord's supper, consciously and confidently relies upon Christ's atoning sacrifice for the remission of his sins. This is meant by the phrase, " Feed upon Christ crucified." The allusion is to Christ's words in John 6:53-56, "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you." The flesh and blood of Christ signify the expiatory death of Christ. To "drink Christ's blood," is to trust in Christ's atonement in a vital manner, and with a vivid feeling of its expiatory efficacy. The Lord's Supper can have no meaning, if his vicarious sacrifice is denied.

(b) The " presence " of Christ is not in the bread or the wine, but in the soul of the participant. Christ, says the Westminster Confession, is " present to the faith of believers," and faith is mental and spiritual. The statement of Hooker (Polity, Y. Ixvii.) upon this point is explicit and

' The substantive verb, in this passage, has the same signification as in Gal. 4 : 24 ; " These [women] are the two covenants."

566 SOTERIOLOGY.

excellent, " The real presence of Christ's most blessed l)ody and blood is not to be sought for in the sacrament^ but in the worthy receiver of the sacrament. I see not which way it should be gathered by the words of Christ, when and where the bread is his body, or the cup his blood ; but only in the very heart and soul of him which receiveth them. As for the sacraments, they really exhibit, but for aught we can gather out of that which is written of them, they are not really, nor do they really contain in themselves, that grace which with them, or by them, it pleaseth God to bestow." Again he remarks (V. Ixvii.), "jS'o side denieth but that the soul of man is the receptacle of Christ's presence. Whereby the question is driven to a narrower issue, nor doth anything rest doubtful but this, whether, when the sacrament is administered, Christ be whole [wholly] within man only, or else his body and blood be also externally seated in the very consecrated elements themselves. Which opinion, they that defend are driven either to consubstantiate and incorporate Christ with elements sacramental, or to transubstantiate and change their substance into his ; and so the one to hold him really, but invisibly, moulded up with the substance of those elements, the other to hide him under the only visible show of bread and wine, the substance whereof, as they imagine, is abolished, and his succeeded in the same room."

With this statement of Hooker, Calvin (Inst., lY, xvii. 31) agrees. " They are exceedingly deceived, who cannot conceive of any presence of the flesh of Christ in the supper, except it be attached to the bread. For on this principle they leave nothing to the secret operation of the Spirit, which unites us to Christ. They suppose Christ not to be present unless he descends to us ; as though we cannot equally enjoy his presence, if he elevates us to himself. The only question between us, therefore, respects the manner of this presence; because they place Christ in the bread, and we think it unlawful for us to bring him down

MEANS OF GRACE. 567

from lieaven. Let tlie reader judge on whicli side the truth lies. Only let ns hear no more of that calumny, that Christ is excluded from the sacrament unless he be concealed undei" tiie bread. For as this is a heavenly mystery, there is no necessity to bring Christ down to the earth, in order to be united to us." '

This view of Hooker and Calvin respecting the solely spiritual presence of Christ in the Supper was that of the founders of tlie English Church, and entered into their form of worship. In tlie Office for the Communion of the Sick, in the Episcopal Prayer Book, it is said : " If a man by reason of extremity of sickness, or any other just impediment, do not receive the sacrament of Christ's body and blood, the minister shall instruct him that if he do truly repent him of his sins, and steadfastly believe that Jesus Christ hath suffered death upon the cross for him and shed his blood for his redemption, earnestly remembering the benetits he hath thereby, and giving him hearty thanks therefor, he doth eat and drink the hody and hlood of our Saviour Christ profitably to his soul's health, although he do not receive the sacrament with his mouth."

The Romish theory of the sacraments is, that they convey both regenerating and sanctifying grace by their own nature and efficiency : by the mere external muscular performance (ex opere operato) of the rite of baptism, or of the supper, the effect is produced in the soul, Bellarmine (De Sacramentis, 11. i.) defines the theory thus : " The sacraments convey grace by the virtue of the sacramental action itself instituted by God for this end, and not through tlie merit of either the agent or the receiver."

The Lutheran doctrine of the sacrament of the Supper

» The presence of Christ in the bread and wine themselves would be a local and extended presence, because bread and wine are local and extended substances. But the presence of Christ to " the faith of a believer " is a presence in his soul, which is an illocal and spiritual presence, because the soul is an illocal and spiritual substance.

568 SOTERIOLOGY.

teaches : {a) That its efficacy is conditioned upon faitli in the recipient. In this, it agrees with the Reformed doctrine, {h) That its efficacy is due to an intrinsic virtue, resulting from the presence of Christ's glorified body in and with the bread and wine. This co-presence of Christ's glorified body in the emblems makes the sacrament efficacious to the believer. In this, tlie Lutheran differs from the Calvinistic doctrine. The latter finds the efficacy of the sacrament of the Supper solely in the operation of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the believer. " The sacraments become effectual means of salvation, not by any power in themselves, but only by the working of the Holy Ghost." Westminster L. C, 161.

The Lutheran asserts that Christ is " spiritually present in the sacrament of the Supper as to the manner, but corporeally present as to the substance.'''' That is to say, the substance of Christ's spiritual and glorified body as it now exists in heaven, not of his material and unglorified body as it once existed on earth, is actually present in and with the sacramental emblems. Consequently, the spiritual and glorified body of Christ is present in the bread and wine, wherever and whenever the sacrament is administered. This requires the ubiquity of Christ's glorified body, whereby it can simultaneously be in heaven and on earth. But the glorified body of Christ, like that of his people, though a spiritual body, has form, and is extended in space. The description of Christ's body after his resurrection and at his ascension proves this. But one and the same form cannot occupy two or more spaces at one and the same moment. Christ's glorified body can pass from space to space instantaneously, but cannot Jill two spaces at the same instant. When Christ's body passed througli, the " doors being shut " (John 20 : 26), and stood in the midst of the disciples, his body was no longer on the outside of the doors, and could not be.

Hooker (V. Ixvii.) defines the Lutheran, the Romish, and

MEANS OF GRACE. 569

the Reformed views of the Supper as follows : " There are but three expositions made of the words, ' This is my body.' The first : ' This is in itself, before participation, really and truly the natural substance of my body, by reason of the co-existence which my omnipotent body hath with the sanctified element of bread ' — -which is the Lutheran's interpretation. The second : ' This is in itself, and before participation, the true and natural substance of my body, by force of that deity which with the words of consecration abolishetli the substance of bread, and substituteth in the place thereof my body ' — whicli is the Popish construction. The third : ' This hallowed food, through concurrence of Divine power, is, in verity and truth, unto faithful receivers, instrumentally a cause of that mystical participation, whereby as I make myself wholly theirs, so I give them in hand an actual possession of all such saving grace as my sacrificed body can yield, and their souls do presently need. This is to them, and in them, my body.' "

According to this statement of Hooker, which agrees with that of the Reformed symbols, there are but three generic theories of the Sacraments : the Reformed, the Lutheran, and the Romish. Some would find a fourth theory represented by Zwingle. This comes from a misapprehension of the views of the Swiss reformer. The difference between Zwingle and Calvin upon sacramentarian points has been exaggerated. Zwingle has been represented as denying that the sacrament of the Supper is a means of grace, and that Christ is present in it. The following positions in his Ratio Fidei disprove this. He asserts that the sacraments are : 1. Res sanctae et venerandae. 2. Testimonium rei gestae praebunt. 3. Vice rerum sunt quas significant ; since they represent what cannot in itself be directly perceived. 4. Res arduas significant : having value not for what they are materially, but for what they signify ; as a bridal ring is not worth merely the gold of which it is made. 5. They enlighten and instruct through the analogy between the

570 SOTERIOLOGY.

symbol and the thing symbolized, C. They bring aid and comfort to faith. 7. They take the place of (vice) an oath. These positions accord entirely with those in the First Helvetic Confession, which contains Calvin's view of the sacraments ; and also with those presented in the Articles of Agreement between the churches of Zurich and Geneva. Ilagenbach (§ 258) asserts that Zwingle tauglit that the sacrament is " both a symbol (signum), and a means of strengthening faith." Sigwart and Zeller, in their monographs upon Zwingle, take the same view. The writer of the article. Lord's Supper, in Ivitto's Encyclopedia, represents Zwingle as holding that the Lord's Supper, by presenting under sensible emblems the sufferings and death of Christ, and bringing them to vivid remembrance, deepens penitence, stimulates faith, calls out love, and in this way is a means of sanctification equally with hearing the word, or any other means of grace employed by the Holy Spirit.

Zwingle asserted as strongly as Calvin the sjmntual presence of Christ in the sacrament, denying with him the carnal and corporeal presence, either in the form of transnbstantiation or consubstantiation. " Christ," he says, "is spirituallj' present in the consciousness of tlie believer (fidei contemplatione). In the recollection of his sufferings and death, and by faith in these, his body is spiritually eaten. We trust in the dying flesh and blood of Christ, and this faith is called the eating of the body and blood of Christ." Ratio Fidei (De Eucharistia). Compare Ratio Fidei, lY. 63, 64 ; Ed. Niemeyer. The corporeal presence of Christ he denied, appealing to the autliority of Augustine, as follows : " Augustinus dixit Christi corpus in aliquo coeli loco esse oportere, propter visi corporis modura. iS'^on est igitur Christi corpus magis in pluribus locis quam nostra corpora." Ratio Fidei, lY. 51. Ed. JSTiemeyer.

Zwingle regarded the sacrament of the Supper as a means of grace and sanctification, because of its didactic character ; because, by " evidently setting forth before the eyes Jesus

MEANS OF GRACE. 571

Christ crucified " (Gal. 3 : 1), it teaches in a vivid and special manner the great truth of Christ's atonement and redemption, and contirms the soul of: the believer in it. It is an object-lesson. In tliis i-espect, the function of the sacrament is like that of the word. Gospel truth is taught by both alike. I>oth alike are employed by the Holy Spirit in enlightening, strengthening, and comforting the mind of the believer. This feature in Zwingle's view is sometimes cited to prove a radical difference between him and Calvin. But Calvin is even more explicit and positive, on this point. " The office of the sacraments," he says (Inst., IV. xiv. 17), " imprecisely the same as that of the word of God, which is to offer and present Christ to us, and in him the treasures of heavenly grace ; but they confer no advantage or profit without being received by faith. It is necessary to guard against being drawn into error, from reading the extravagant language used by the fathers with a view to exalt the dignity of the sacraments ; lest we should suppose there is some secret power annexed and attached to the sacraments, so that they communicate the grace of the Holy Spirit, just as wine is given in the cup ; whereas the only office assigned to them, is to testify and confirm his benevolence towards us ; nor do they impart any benefit, unless they are accompanied by the Holy Spirit to open our minds and hearts, and render us capable of receiving this testimony. For the sacraments fulfil to us, on the part of God, the same office as messengers of joyful intelligence, or earnests for the confirmation of covenants, on the part of men." God " nourishes our faith in a spiritual manner by the sacraments, which are instituted for the purpose of placing his proTnises before our ej'es for our contemplation, and of serving as pledges of them " (lY, xiv. 12). "For this reason, Augustine calls a sacrament * a visible word ; ' because it represents the promises of God portrayed as in a picture, and places before our eyes an image of them " (IV. xiv. 5, 6). " Connected with the

572 SOTERIOLOGY.

preaching of the gospel, another assistance and support of our faith is afforded us in the sacraments" (IV. xiv. 1). " There is no true administration of the sacrament without the word. For whatever advantage accrues to us from the sacred supper requires the word j whether we are to be confirmed in faitli, exercised in confession, or excited to duty, there is need of j!>/'eacAm^. Nothing more preposterous, therefore, can be done with respect to the supper than to convert it into a mute action, as we have seen done under the tyranny of the pope " (IV. xvii. 39). " The person who supposes that the sacraments confer any more upon him than that which is offered by the %vord of God, and which he receives by a true faith, is greatly deceived. Hence also it may be concluded that confidence of salvation does not depend on the participation of the sacrament, as though that constituted our justification, which we know to be placed in Christ Jesus alone, and is to be communicated to us no less by the preaching of the word than by the sealing of the sacraments, and that it may be completely enjoyed without this participation " (IV. xiv. 14).

This view of the nature of the sacrament of the Supper as didactic, is also confirmed by considering the nature and purpose of a symbol. The purpose of a symbol is, to teach a certain truth by a visible sign or token. The ocean is a symbol of God's immensity, and the sun of his glory. The " invisible things," or truths, relating to God, are emblematized and impressed by " the things that are made," Rom. 1 : 20. The heavens are a symbol of God, because they " declare the glory of God," Ps. 19:1, The cross is a symbol in all Christendom of the sacrifice of Christ. It teaches emblematically the truth that the Son of God died for man's sin. The ark, again, is a symbol of the church, and teaches that men are safe within the kingdom of God. In the case of all these natural symbols, there is no efficacy in the symbol as such, but only in the tj'uth taught by it. The ocean, the sun, the cross, the ark, make no spiritual

MEANS OF GRACE. 573

impression as mere water, light, and wood. It is only the itnnieusity and glorj of God, as taught by the symbols of the ocean and the sun, that affect the mind. It is only the mercy of God, as suggested by the symbol of the cross and the ark, that produces the spiritual effect.

The bread and wine of the Lord's Supper are sjpecially and divinely appointed symbols, differing in this respect from all natural symbols. They are also seals as well as symbols ; differing in this respect, also, from natural symbols. But as symbols they are didactic, and teach that truth which is the heart of the Christian religion : namely, that tlie broken and bleeding body of Christ is the oblation for sin.' They are " holy signs and seals of the covenant of grace, immediately instituted by God, to represent Christ and his benefits, and to confirm our interest in him." Westminster Confession, XXYIII. 1. But in this instance, too, as in that of natural symbols, it is the truth taught by the symbols, and not the symbols themselves, that strengthens the faith of the participant, deepens his gratitude, enlivens his hope, and sanctifies his heart. As mere bread and wine, the symbols produce no spiritual effect in the soul of the believer. When the Holy Spirit enlightens the mind of the participant to perceive the gospel-truth which these emblems " exhibit, signify, and seal," then, and only then, do they become means of sanctification. It is not because the glorified body of Christ is conjoined with them, as the Lutheran asserts ; or because they are converted into the glorified body of Christ, as the Romanist asserts; that they are effectual. It is because of the spiritual presence of Christ in the soul of the participant, and the spiritual perception of the truth signified and sealed bj'' the

1 The Lord's Supper took the place of the Jewish passover. " Christ our passover is sacrified for us," 1 Cor. 5:7. The passover was a divinely appointed symbol, reminding of and setting forth the deliverance of the first-bom by the sprinkling of blood. But the paschal lamb was also typical of the Lamb of God. So that the visible emblem in the instance both of the passover and the supper teaches the expiation of sin by Christ's vicarious sacrifice.

574 SOTERIOLOGY.

etnbleins, as Calvin and llooker say, that they are means of grace.'

Tiie sacrament of Baptism is the sign and seal of regeneration. It is emblematic and didactic of this doctrine. Baptism is not a means of regeneration, as the Lord's Supper is of sanctitication. It does not confer the Holy Spirit as a regenerating Spirit, but is the authentic token that the Holy Spirit has been, or will be conferred ; that regeneration has been, or will be effected. This is taught in liom. 4 : 11. Abraham " received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the faith which he had being yet uncircumcised." Baptism is Christian circumcision (" the circumcision of Christ," Col. 2: 11), and takes the place of the Jewish circumcision ; so that what is true of the latter is of the former. Paul, Cornelius, and the eunucli were regenerated before they were baptized. As circumcision was not absolutely necessary to salvation, neither is baptism. This is shown by the omission of it in Mark 16 : 16, when damnation is spoken of.

Baptism, being the initiatory sacrament, is administered only once. While symbolical only of regeneration, it yet lias a connection with sanctification. Being a divinely appointed sign, seal, and pledge of the new birth, it promotes the believer's growth in holiness by encouragement and stimulus. It is like the official seal on a legal document. The presence of the seal inspires confidence in the genuineness of the title-deed ; the absence of the seal awakens doubts and fears. Nevertheless, it is the title-deed, not the seal, that conveys the title.

Baptism is to be administered to believers and their children.^ Acts 2 : 38, 39, " The promise [of the gift of the

' See, upon this point, Calvin : Institutes, IV. xvii. 9-12, 33, 36, 39.

= Proselyte baptism included the whole family, males and females, adults and infants. It was associated also with the circumcision of the males. Some time before the Advent, the whole nation of the Idumeans embraced Judaism rather than be expelled from their country. Josephus says that Helena, queen of

MEANS OF GRACE. 575

Holy Ghost, ver. 38] is unto you and your cliildren." Iloin. 11 : 16, "If the root be holy, so are the branches." 1 Cor. 7 : 14, " The unbelieving husband is sanctified by the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband : else were your children unclean : but now are they holy." Matt. 28 : 19, " Go teach [disciple] all nations, baptizing them." If the command had been, " Go teach all nations, circumcising them," no one would have denied that infants were included in the command. Infants are called disciples, in Acts 15 : 10. " Why tempt ye God to put a yoke [namely, circumcision] upon the neck of the disciples?" Accordingly, the Westminster Confession (XXVIII. iv.) affirms that " the infants of one or both believing parents are to be baptized." '

The baptism of the infant of a believer supposes the actual or prospective operation of the regenerating Spirit, in order to the efficacy of the rite. Infant baptism does not confer the regenerating Spirit, but is a sign that he either has been, or will be conferred, in accordance with the divine promise in the covenant of grace. The actual conferring of the Holy Spirit may be prior to baptism, or in the act itself, or subsequent to it. Hence baptism is the sign and seal of regeneration, either in the past, in the present, or in the future. The Westminster Confession (XXXYIII. vi.) teaches that " the efficacy of baptism is not tied to that moment of time wherein it is administered ; " in other words, the regenerating grace of the Spirit, signified and sealed by the rite, may be imparted when the infant is baptized, or previously, or at a future time. The baptism is administered in this reference, and with this expectation. " Baptism is to be administered, to be a sign and seal of regeneration and ingrafting into Christ, and that even to inAdiatum, and lier son, became proselytes. On this subject, See Maimonides. Wall : History of Baptism. Lightfoot. Hammond : On Baptism.

> Calvin : Institutes, II. 508-510, 516. Jeremy Taylor : Liberty of Prophesying, XVIIL

576 SOTERIOLOPxY.

fants." Larger Catechism, 177. Under the old dispensa' tion, the circumcision of the flesh was a sign and seal of the circumcision of the heart. Deut. 10 : 16 ; 30 : 6. " God," says Calvin (IV. xvi. 5), " did not favor infants with circumcision without making them partakers of all those things which were then signified by circumcision." Similarly, under the new dispensation, the baptism of the body of the infant is the sign and seal of the baptism of the soul by the Holy Ghost.

The infant of the believer receives the Holy Spirit as a regenei'ating Spirit, by virtue of the covenant between God and his people. Gen. 17 : 7, "I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee." Acts 2 : 39, " The promise [of the gift of the Holy Spirit, ver. 38] is unto you and your children." The infant of the believer, consequently, obtains the regenerating grace by virtue of his birth and descent from a believer in covenant with God, and not by virtue of his baptism. God has promised the blessing of the Holy Spirit to those who are born of his people. The infant of a believer, by this promise, is born into the church, as the infant of a citizen is born into the state. " Children born within the pale of the visible church, and dedicated to God in baptism, are under the inspection and government of the church." Directory for Worsliip, IX. They are church members by reason of their biilh from believing parents ; and it has been truly said, that the question that confronts them at the period of discretion is not. Will you join the visible church ? but, Will you go out of it ? Church membership by birth from believers is an appointment of God under both the old and the new economies ; in the Jewish and the Christian church.

Baptism is the infallible sign of regeneration, when the infant dies in infancy. All baptized infants dying before the asre of self -consciousness, are reiirenerated without exMEANS OF GRACE. 577

ception. Baptism is the prohahle sign of regeneration, when the infant lives to years of discretion. It is possible that the baptized child of believing parents may prove, in the day of judgment, not to have been regenerated, but not probable. The history of the church and daily observation show it to be the general fact that infant church members become adult church members. Yet exceptions are possible. A baptized infant, on reaching years of discretion, may to human view appear not to have been regenerated, as a baptized convert may. The fact of nnregeneracy, however, must be proved, before it can be acted upon. A citizen of the state mnst be presnmed to be such, until the contrary appears by his renunciation of citizenship, and self-expatriation. Until he takes this course, he must be regarded as a citizen. So a baptized child, in adult years, may renounce his baptism and church membership, become an infidel, and join the synagogue of Satan ; but until he does this, he must be regarded as a member of the church of Christ. Such instances are exceedingly rare, both in church and state. The possible exceptions to the general fact that baptism is the sign of regeneration are not more numei'ous in the case of baptized infants, than of baptized converts. Says Hodge (Theology, III. 590), "It is not every baptized child who is saved ; nor are all those who are baptized in infancy made partakers of salvation. But baptism signs, seals, and actually conveys its benefits to all its subjects, whether infants or adults, who keep the covenant of which it is a sign. It does not follow that the benefits of redemption may not be conferred on infants at the time of their baptism. That is in the hands of God. What is to hinder the imputation to them of the righteousness of Christ, or their receiving tlie renewing of the Holy Ghost, so that their whole nature may be developed in a state of reconciliation with God. Doubtless this often occurs; but whether it does or not, their baptism stands good ; it assures them of Vol. IL— 37

578 SOTERIOLOGY.

salvation, if tliej do not renounce their baptismal covenant."

The reason why there is not an infallible connection between infant baptism and regeneration, when the infant lives to years of discretion, so that all baptized children of true believers are regenerated without a single exception, is the fact that the covenant is not observed on the human side with absolute perfection. Should the believer keep the promise on his part with entire completeness, God would be bound to fulfil the pi-omise on his part. Cut the believer's fulfilment of the terms of the covenant, in respect to faith in God's promise, to prayer, to the nurture and education of the child, though filial and spiritual, is yet imperfect. God is, therefore, not absolutely indebted to the believer, by reason of the believer's action, in respect to the regeneration of the child. Consequently, he may exercise a sovereignty, if he so please, in the bestowment of regenerating grace, even in the case of a believer's child. We liave seen (p. 516) that the regeneration of an unbaptized adult, depending as it does upon election, cannot be made infalliblj^ certain by the use of common grace, though it may be made highly probable by it. In like manner, the regeneration of a baptized child, depending also upon election, may be made highly probable by the imperfect faith and fidelity of the parents, yet not infallibly and necessarily certain.

The mode of baptism which is by far the most common in the history of the Christian church is sprinkling or pouring. From the time of Christ to the present, a vastly greater number have been sprinkled than have been immersed. At the present day, sprinkling is the rule throughout Christendom, and immersion the exception. The former mode is catholic ; the latter is denominational.

Sprinkling was the common mode of baptism in the Old Testament, and this fact furnishes the strongest presumption that it was the mode of Christ and his apostles. As

MEANS OF GRACE. 579

the Apostolic polity confessedly grew out of the Jewish synagogue, it is eqiialh^ certain that the Apostolic ceremonial and ritual grew out of the Jewish. Polity and ritual are indissolubly associated. Baptizing under the Old economy was an important rite, and would certainly influence the mode under the Xew. The Old Testament baptism, therefore, is of the utmost consequence in settling the dispute respecting the mode of baptism and its subjects. The following particulai's are to be noted :

1. Sacramental baptism by the Levitical priest was always administered by sprinkling, never by immersion. (a) The wliole congregation at Sinai were baptized by sprinkling. Ex. 24 T 6-8. Heb. 9:19, 20. (h) The Levites when consecrated to office were baptized by sprinkling. Numbers 8 : 7, " Thus shalt thou do unto them to cleanse them : sprinkle water of purifying npon them." (c) Lepers and defiled persons when restored to the congregation were baptized by sprinkling. Lev. 14 : 4-7 ; 49-53. Numb. 19 : 18, 19 ; 31 : 19, 22, 23. Luke 5 : 14. (d) Gentiles when admitted to the Jewish church were baptized by sprinkling. Num. 31 : 12, 19. These baptisms could be performed only by a priest, or by some "clean person" appointed to act for him. Num. 19 : 18, 19, "A clean person shall sprinkle water upon the nnclean." The baptism in these instances was sacramental: i.e., had reference to gnilt, and expiatory cleansing. Hence the blood of a sacrificial victim was sprinkled upon the congregation at Sinai, and npon the Levites, and restored lepers. No individual could baptize himself, with this sacramental and expiatory baptism. It was a priestly act, and required the priest or his appointed agent.

2. Baptism by Jehovah, in both the Old economy and the New, is by sprinkling or pouring. The Jehovah of tlie Old Testament is the Christ of the New, and is the Great High Priest. He baptizes with the Holy Spirit. Matt. 3 : 11, " He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with

580 SOTERIOLOGY.

fire." This baptism is never bj immersion, Isa. 52 : 15, "He shall sprinkle many nations." Ezek. 36 : 25, "Then will I sprinkle clean water upon jon, and ye shall be clean. A new heart will I give yoa." Heb. 10 : 22, " Let us draw near to God, having our hearts sprinkled {ippavTiafievoi,) from an evil conscience." Heb. 12 : 24, " The blood of sprinkling {fjavriafxov) that speaketh better things than the blood of Abel." 1 Pet. 1:2," Elect unto sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ." Isa. 32 : 15, " Until the Spirit be poured upon us from on high." Joel 2 : 28. Prov. 1 : 23 " I will pour out my Spirit unto you."

3. Ceremonial baptisms, or washings, were administered by sprinkling or pouring; not by immersion. These baptisms had reference not to the guilt of sin, but its pollution. Sometimes they were administered by the person himself, and sometimes by the priest. When a man ceremonially washed his hands, this was called a " baptism." Luke 11 : 38, " When the Pharisee saw it, he marvelled that he had not first washed [e^aTnicT^ri) before dinner." Mark 1 : 4, " When they come from the market, except they wash [baptize, ^a-mLo-wvTai, A D F. Kec. Tisch. ; are sprinkled, pavTiacovrat, i^ B C. Lachm.Hort], they eat not ; and many other things there be which they have received to hold, as the washings (/SaTTTic/xoi"?) of cups, pots, and brazen vessels, and of tables." The ceremonial " baptism " of the hands was performed by having a servant pour water upon them ; and the ceremonial " baptism " of cups, pots, vessels, and tables, was by sprinkling or pouring ; as in Num. 19 : 18, " A clean person shall sprinkle water upon the tent, and upon all the vessels, of the unclean person." '

1 Whether the "baptism " of Naaman (2 Kings 5 : 10, 14) was sacramental or ceremonial, is doubtful. If it was sacramental, like that of the restored leper under the Levitical economy, it was performed by a priest or his deputy, and was administered by sprinkling. This is the view of Baird : Bible History of Baptism, p. 1.57. He explains the command, "Go wash" (3 K. 5 : 10), by Acta 22 : 16 : Ananias said to Saul, " Rise, baptize thyself {^dTTTicrai), and wash away thy sins. " Here the baptism is described as self -administered, as it is ia NaaMEANS OF GRACE. 581

Now, since sprinkling or pouring was the invariable mode of baptism under the Old economy, it is probable in tlie very highest degree that John the Baptist employed this mode. Baptism was a priestly act, as is implied in tlie inquiry, " Why baptizest thou, if thou be not the Christ, nor Elijah, nor that prophet?" John 1:25. John was a priest of the family of Aaron (Luke 1 : 5), and naturally administered the rite by sprinkling, or pouring, as the Jewish priest had administered it from time immemorial. There is not a scintilla of proof that he introduced immersion. And this same mode would naturally be adopted by the Apostles, when our Lord substituted baptism for circumcision, and transferred the rite from the Old dispensation to the New ; from the Jewish to the Christian church. Peter associates " preaching peace by Jesus Christ," with " the baptism which John preaclied." Acts 10 : 36, 37.'

The principal supports of the mode by immersion are : {a) The custom in tlie Patristic church of immersing in the laver of the baptistery ; and (J) The classical meaning of /SaTTTO) and ^airri^d).

Concerning the first argument, it is to be noticed, first, that the baptistery dates from a period when Christianity had become powerful, and able to erect churches with all the appointments of an imposing ritual. The Apostolic church could not do this. The baptistery and laver are as late as the fourth century. Furthermore, the first baptismal fonts were too small for inmiersing. The fresco in the catacombs of St. Calixtus (200 a.d. according to Rossi) represents the rite administered by pouring from the vessel upon the person standing upright. The " Teaching of the

man's case, though really administered by another. If, on the other hand, Naaman's "baptism " was ceremonial, like the ceremonial washing of the blind man in the pool of Siloam (John 9 : 7), it was by pouring.

» On the Old Testament baptism, see the valuable treatise of Baird : Bible History of Baptism. Mosheim : Commentaries, I. 89, 90.

582 SOTERIOLOGY.

Apostles" (ad. 160) savs that baptism may bo performed by pouring. Secondly, a more profuse application of water than that of sprinkling or pouring belongs to a period in the history of the church when baptism was held to be regeneration itself. If water be efficacious when applied by the officiating minister, then immersion would be deemed more efficacious tlian sprinkling. Immersion gi-ew with the growth of the sacramentarian theory of baptism, and the doctrine of baptismal regeneration.

Respecting the classical meaning of /SaTrrw and ^airrl^w, it is to be observed that these words had no technical or ritual signification in classical Greek. They were never used to denote a pagan rite. There were purifying rites in the Greek and Roman worship, but they were not called " baptisms." The Greeks denominated their purifying rite Ko^apa-L'i, and the Romans theirs, lustratio. Sprinkling was the mode in both. The nouns ^a7rTLafxo<;, jSaTniaixa, and ^airTvcrTT}^ are not in the classical vocabulary. They were coined by Jews and Christians from ^aTnlt^co, in order to denote the rite of purification in the Jewish and Christian churches. Consequently, it is the secondary technical use in the Jewish and Christian scriptures, not the primary untechnical meaning in the Greek classics, which must be considered in determining the mode of baptism.'

The classical meaning of /3a7rT&) and /SaTrr/^co is, to dip into water, to sink under water, to dye or tinge in a fluid. The classical meaning would favor baptism by immersion ; as the classical meaning of sacramentum would prove that the Christian sacrament is an oath. But in Hebraistic and New Testament Greek, /SaTrrw and /SairTi^co are employed in a secondary ceremonial signification, to denote a

' In the later time of the Roman Empire, when public baths ■were erected, the bathing-tub, or labrum, was called " baptisterium." The term was probably borrowed from the Christian usage. But the labrum was not large enough to immerse the whole bodj'. Water was taken from it, and poured upon the head of the person standing in it, or beside it. Anthon's Dictionary of Antiquities, Article Baths, p. 148.

MEANS OP GRACE. 583

Jewish and Christian rite. Consequently, their meaning in tiie Septuagint and xsew Testament must be determined by their ritual and historical use, not by their classical. The word "pagans" (pagani), etymologically and classically, denoted persons living in the villages (pagi) outside of the large towns and cities. Classically, " pagans " were " villagers," As Christianity spread first among the inhabitants of the cities, the villagers were the uncvangelized ; and thus " pagan " came to mean "heathen,'' instead of "villager." Similarly, /Sutttco and ySaTrir^cy, which in heathenism denoted any unceremo7i{al, rion-ritual immersion into water, when adopted by Judaism and Christianity, came to have the secondary signification of a ceremonial spriidcling or affusion of water. And he who argues that baptism means immersion in the Scriptures, because in the classics the primary meaning of ^aTrrai and ^airrl^ai is to immerse, commits the same error with him who should argue that a pagan is a villager, because this was the original signification of pagan us ; or that the Christian sacrauientum is an oath, and not a symbol, because this is its meaning in Livy and Tacitus.

The word ^airr 1^,(0 is employed in the Septuagint, to signify a ritual purification performed by applying water to a person or thing so as to wet it more or less, but not all over and entirely.' The passages that have been quoted (pp. 579, 580) prove indisputably, that the mode in which the baptismal water of ritual purification was applied under the Levitical law was sprinkling or pouring. There was no immersion of the body in the sacramental baptism for guilt,

' An example of the application of the term " baptize " to a wetting of the person that is not immersion, is found in Dan. 4: 33. Nebuchadnezzar's " body was wet (fPa.(p7i) with the dew of heaven." Another is found in Judith 12 : 7. Judith "washed herself ( ejSaTrTi'feTo) in a fountain of water by the camp." That this was not an immersion is highly certain, because the fountain would be used for drinking, and culinary purposes. And though the washing was "in the night," yet in a camp there would be nearly as little privacy by night as by day.

584 SOTERIOLOGY.

or in the ceremonial baptism for pollution. And the spiritual baptism of the Holj Ghost is pouring, not immersing. There is no good reason for supposing that the Kew Testament use of /SaTTTt'^o) is different from that of the Septuagint. Historically, there is the highest probability tliat John the Baptist, and Christ's apostles, employed the old mode, and did not invent a new one like immei'sion, so different from the mode in both Jewish and Gentile lustrations. Furthermore, the circumstances and customs of the Jews necessitated sprinkling or affusion. It is morally certain, that such baptisms as those of Pentecost (Acts 2 : 41), of the eunuch (Acts 8 : 36), of Cornelius and his family (Acts 10 :47), and of the jailer (Acts 16 : 33), were not administered by immersion. In the narrative of the baptism of the eunuch, it is said that " the way that goeth down from Jerusalem to Gaza is desert," Acts 8 : 26. The whole region is sandy and dry, with only liere and there a small spring of water. In the account of the baptism of Cornelius and " all his house " (Acts 10 : 2), the phraseology implies that the baptismal water was brought into the room. "Can any man forbid the water {jo vScop), that these should not be baptized ? " Acts 10 : 47. This phraseology would be unnatural, if the water in question were in a river, pond, or reservoir ; but natural, if it were in a vessel. ISo one would " forbid " the Hudson or Connecticut river. It is improbable, that within the precincts of the jail thei'e was either a stream or reservoir of water sufficient for immersing, in the dead of night, " the jailer and all his," The immersion of three thousand in Jerusalem on one day, at Pentecost (Acts 2 : 41), would have ]-equired the use of the public reservoirs of the citj^ which the Jewish authorities would have been as little likely to have allowed, as the common council of New York city would in a similar case.'

' The preposition fls, rendered in the authorized version, " into " (Acts 8 : 38), and "in" (Mark 1 : 9), might be rendered "unto," or "at" (comp. Acts 8;

MEANS OF GRACE. 585

Christ certainly had reference to the Old Testament baptism, and to John's baptism, when he said to Kicodemns, " Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God," John 3 : 5, Christian baptism in the name of the Trinity had not yet been instituted. Nicodemns was a Pliarisee, and our Lord wished to rid him of all self-righteousness, by teaching him that he must confess sin with " publicans and sinners," and submit to the old and connnon Jewish rite that was emblematic of forgiveness and cleansing. Though he was " a ruler of the Jews," and " a master of Israel," he must take the same attitude with the multitude who " were baptized in Jordan, confessing their sins," Matt. 3:5. " All the people that heard John, and the publicans, justified God, being baptized with the baptism of John. But the Pharisees and lawyers rejected the counsel of God against themselves, being not baptized of him," Lnke 7:29,30. This is our Lord's account of John's baptism, and of the state of mind in those who submitted to it, and those who rejected it. John's baptism was like that of Peter on the day of Pentecost, " a baptism of repentance for the remission of sins," Luke 3:3; Acts 2 : 38 ; 19 : 4. And the remission in both cases alike was through Christ, " the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world," John 1 : 29. John directed his disciples to Christ, exactly as the apostles did theirs. " John looking upon Jesus, as he walked, saitli, Behold the Lamb of God," John 1 : 36. " Then said Paul, John verily baptized with the baptism of repentance, saying unto the people, that they should believe on him which should come after him, that is, on Jesus Christ," Acts 19 : 4. The apostles were baptized with Jolin's baptism, and were not re-baptized by Christ. Apollos "knew

40), equally well. So, likewise, airh and «'« may be rendered " from," as well as "out of," in Matt. 3: 16; Mark 1 :10; Acts S : 39. The clause, " were baptized in [the] Jordan " {eu tw 'lopSdvij) does not necessarily denote immersion, any more than the phrase, " He lives in the Connecticut," does.

586 SOTERIOLOGY.

only tlie baptism of John " (Acts 18 : 25), a;id was not rebaptized.'

Immersion has been supported by the equivocal rendering of the verb avv^dina), in Rom. 6:4; Col. 2 : 12. In Eom. 6 : 4, the rendering is, "buried by baptism ; " in Col. 2 : 12, " buried in baptism." The English word " bury " is applicable either to burial in earth or in water ; but the Greek word a-vv^dinco is applicable only to burial in earth. No one would render it by " immerse." The English word "buiy" can suggest immersion, but the Greek cannot. Consequently, when a person unacquainted with the original reads in the English version of a " burial in baptism," or " by baptism," a burial in water is the only idea that enters his mind ; an idea which the Greek positively exchides. For when a dead body is "buried" in a tomb as our Lord was, it comes into no contact with water, and is carefully pi-otected f rom it. Had a-ut'^aTrro) been translated literally, by " entombed," instead of " buried," this text never would have been quoted, as it so fi-equently has been, to prove that Christian baptism is immersion. Christ's entombment, or burial in Joseph's sepulchre, has not the slightest connection with his baptism at the Jordan, and throws no light upon the mode in which he was baptized ; and, consequently, it throws no light upon the mode in which his disciples were. Matthew Henry (On Eom. 6:4) remarks as follows : " Why this ' burying in baptism ' should so much as allude to any custom of dipping under water in baptism, any more than our ' baptismal crucifixion ' and

1 There is an apparent exception to this, in Acts 19 : 5. Bengel's explanation is, that these persons, "had not known that they were bound by the baptism of repentance to faith in Jesus Christ.'" John's baptism had not b?en administered to them with an intelligent understanding, on their part, of the meaning of the rite. Had it been, they would not have been ''baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus." Says Bengel (On Acts 19:5), "the baptism which is mentioned in Matt. 3 : 6, and Matt. 28 : 19, was one ; otherwise, there would not have been 'the beginning of the gospel' in John the Baptist (Mark 1 : 1-3), and the Lord's supper in Matt. 26 would be older than baptism in Matt. 28."

MEANS OF GRACE. 587

death should have any such reference, I confess I cannot see. It is plain, that it is not the sign., but the tJiincj signijled in baptism, that the apostle here calls 'being biu-ied with Christ;' and tiie expression of 'burying' alludes to Christ's burial [in a tomb]. As Christ M'as buried [in a tomb] that he might rise again to a new and more heavenly life, so we ai-e, in baptism, buried [in a tomb], that is, cut off from the life of sin that we may rise again to a new life of faith and love."

Augustine : Enarratio in Ps. vi. Cap. 6 ; Sermo clxxviii. Cap. 3 ; City of God, XXI. xxv. Aquinas : Summa, III. (Supplement), Ixix.-lxxii. Calvin : Institutes, III. v. Ursinus : Christian Religion, Qu. 57 (§ 2). Uslaer : Answer to a Jesuit's Challenge. Witsius : Apostles' Creed, Dissertation XVIII. Cudworth : Intellectual System, III. 320-331. Turrettin : Institutio, XIII. xv. Pearson : Creed, Article V. Howe : The Redeemer's Dominion over the Invisible World. Jeremy Taylor : Liberty of Prophesying, Section VIII. Newton : Intermediate State. Watts : Souls between Death and Resurrection. Burnet : Thirty-nine Articles, Art. III. Heylin : History of Presbyterianism (On Hades). Perowne : On Immortality. Rice : On Immortality. Isaac Taylor : Physical Theory of Another Life. Edwards : Sermon on 2 Cor. 5 : 8. Whateley : The Future State. Delitzsch : Biblical Psychology, VI. Kitto : Encyclopedia, (Article Hell), Herder : Spirit of Hebrew Poetry. Stuart : Exegetical Essays (Article Sheol). Alford : State of the Blessed Dead. Konig: Christi Hollenfahrt. Huidekoper: Christ's Mission to the Underworld. Schweitzer : Hinabgefahren zur Holle als Mytlius. Pluraptree : Intermediate State. Bartlett : Life and Death Eternal. Lange : On 1 Pet. 3 : 18-22 ; Rev. xix. xx. West : On 1 Pet. 3 : 18-22 ; 4 : 6. (Presbyterian Quarterly, April, 1875 ; Presbyterian Rev., March, 1878.) Hodge : Theology, IIL 724-770. Dabney : Theology, 462, 820-829, Smith : Theology, 601-607.

EscHATOLOGY (eV^aTcof \6yo<;) is that division in Dogmatics wliicli treats of the Intermediate or Disembodied State, Christ's Second Advent, the Resurrection, the Final Judgment, Heaven, and Hell. Revelation does not give minute

592 ESCHATOLOGY.

details upon these subjects, yet the principal features are strongly drawn, and salient.

The doctrine of the Intermediate State has had considerable variety of construction, owing to the mixing of mythological elements with the Biblical. The representations of Christ in the parable of Dives and Lazarus have furnished the basis of the doctrine. The most general statement is, that the penitent, represented by Lazarus, is happy, and the impenitent, represented by Dives, is miserable.

The doctrine taught in Scripture that the body is not raised until the day of judgment, implies that the condition of all men between death and resurrection is a disembodied one. This doctrine has been greatly misconceived, and the misconception has introduced grave errors into escliatology. Inasmuch as the body, though not necessary to personal consciousness, is yet necessary in order to the entire completeness of the person, it came to be supposed in the Patristic church, that the intermediate state is a dubious and unfixed state ; that the resurrection adds very considerably both to the holiness and happiness of the redeemed, and to the sinfulness and misery of the lost. This made the intermediate, or disembodied state, to be impeifectly holy and happy for the saved, and imperfectly sinful and miserable for the lost. According to Ilagenbach (§ 142), the majority of the fathers between 250 and T30 " believed that men do not receive their full reward till after the resurrection." Jeremy Taylor (Libei-ty of Prophesj-ing, § 8) asserts that the Latin fathers held that " the saints, though happy, do not enjoy the beatific vision before the resurrection." Even so respectable an authority as Ambrose, the spiritual father of Augustine, taught that the soul '' while separated from the body is held in an ambiguous condition " (ambiguo suspenditur).'

• It is often difficult to say positively, and without qualification, what the opinion of a church father really was upon the subject of Hades, owing to the unsettled state of opinion. One and the same writer, Like Tcrtullian, or AngusINTERMEDIATE STATE. 593

The incompleteness arising from tlie absence of the bodv was more and more exaggerated in tlie Patristic church, until it finally resulted in the doctrine of a purgatory for the redeemed, adopted formally by the Papal church, according to which, the believer, between death and the resurrection, goes through a painful process in Hades which cleanses him from remaining corruption, and fits him for Paradise. The corresponding exaggeration in the other direction, in respect to the condition of the lost in the disembodied state, is found mostly in the Modern church. The modern Restorationist has converted the intermediate state into one of probation, and redemption, for that part of the human family who are not saved in this life.

The Protestant reformers, following closely the Scripture delineations, which represent the redeemed at death as entirely holy and happy in Paradise, and the lost at death as totally sinful and miserable in Hades, rejected altogether the patristric and mediaeval exaggeration of the corporeal incompleteness of the intermediate state. They affirmed perfect happiness at death for the saved, and utter misery for the lost. The first publication of Calvin was a refutation of the doctrine of the sleep of the soul between, death and the resurrection. The limbus and purgatory were energetically combated by all classes of Protestants.. "I know not," says Calvin (Institutes, II. xvi. 9), " how it

tine, for example, makes different statements at different times. This accounts for the conflicting representations of dogmatic historians. One thing, however, is certain, that the nearer we approach the days of the Apostles, the less do we hear about an underworld, and of Christ's descent into it. Little is said concerning Hades, by the Apostolical fathers. In the longer recension of Ignatius ad Smyrnaeos (Ch. ix.), they are exhorted to " repent while yet there is opportunity, for in Hades no one can confess his sins." Justin Martyr (Trypho, Ch. T. ) simply says that "the souls of the pious remain in a better place, while those of the wicked are in a worse, waiting for the time of judgment." The extracts from the fathers in Huidekoper's volume on Christ's Mission to the Underworld, show the uncertainty that prevailed. The same is true of those in Konig's Christi Hollenfahrt, notwithstanding the bias of the author. For proof of the unsettled state of opinion among the fathers on many points of doctrine, see Jeremy Taylor's Liberty of Prophesying, VUI. Vol. II.— 38

594 ESCHATOLOGY.

came to pass that anj^ should imagine a subtcrrancons cavern, to which thej have given the name of limbus. But this fable, although it is maintained by great authors, and even in the present age is by many seriously defended as a truth, is after all nothing but a fable."

The doctrine of the intermediate or disembodied state, as it was generally received in the Reformed (Calvinistic) churches, is contained in the following statements in the AVestminster standards. " The souls of believers are, at their death, made perfect in holiness, and do immediately pass into glory [The Larger Catechism (86) and Confession (32) say, " into the highest heavens"]; and their bodies, being still united to Christ, do rest in their gi-aves till the resurrection. At the resurrection, believers, being raised up in glory, shall be openly acknowledged and acquitted in the day of judgment, and made perfectly blessed in full.enjoying of God to all eternity." Shorter Catechism, 37, 38. According to this statement, there is no essential difference ■between Paradise and Heaven. The Larger Catechism (86) asserts that " the souls of the wicked are, at death, cast into hell, and their bodies kept in their graves till the resurrection and judgment of the great day." The Larger Catechism (89) and Confession (1) say that "at the day of judgment, the wicked shall be cast into hell, to be punished forever." According to this, there is no essential difference between Hades and Hell.

The substance of the Reformed view, then, is, that the intermediate state for the saved is Heaven without the body, and the final state for the saved is Heaven with the body; that the intermediate state for the lost is Hell without the body, and the final state for the lost is Hell with the body. In the Reformed, or Calvinistic eschatology, there is no intermediate Hades between Heaven and Hell, which the good and evil inhabit in common. When this earthly existence in ended, the only s])ecific places and .states are Heaven and Hell. Paradise is a part of Heaven ;

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 695

Hades is a part of Hell. A pagan underworld contaii)ing both Paradise and llades, both the happy and the miserable, like the pagan idol, is " nothing in the world." There is no such place.

This view of Plades did not continue to prevail universally in the Protestant churches. After tlie creeds of Protestantism had been constructed, in which the Biblical doctrine of Hades is generally adopted, the mythological view beo;an again to be introduced. Inliuential writers like Lowth and Herder gave it currency in Great Britain and Germany. " A popular notion," says Lowth (Hebrew Poetry, Lect, Vni.), " prevailed among the Hebrews, as well as among other nations, that the life which succeeded the present M^as to be passed beneath the earth ; and to this notion the sacred prophets were obliged to allude, occasionall}'', if they wished to be understood by the people, on this subject." Says Herder (Hebrew Poetry, Marsh's Translation, H. 21), " no metaphorical separation of the body and soul was yet known among the Hebrews, as well as among other nations, and the dead were conceived as still living in the grave, but in a shadowy, obscure, and powerless condition." The theory passed to the lexicographers, and many of the lexicons formally defined Hades as the underworld. It then went i-apidly into commentaries, and popular expositions of Scripture.

The Pagan conception of Hades is wide and comprehensive ; the Biblical is narrow and exclusive. The former includes all men ; the latter, only wicked men. The Greeks and Romans meant by Hades, neither the grave in which the dead body is laid, nor the exclusive place of retribution, but a nether world in which all departed souls reside. There was one aS;;? for all, consisting of two subterranean divisions: Elysium and Tartarus.' In proportion as the

1 The Paf^an nomenclature is self-consistent, but the Pagan-Christian is not. In the Pagan scheme, Hades is a general term having two special terms under it ; namely, Elysium and Tartarus. But in the paganized Christian scheme.

596 ESCHATOLOGY.

Later-Jews came to be inlluenced by the Greek and Roman mythology, the Septuagint Hades, M-hich is narrow and definite because confined to tlie evil, became wide and indefinite because it was made to include both the good and evil. In scripture, Hades is descriptive of moral character. Whoever goes to Hades is ipso facto a wicked man, and like Dives goes to punishment and miserj-. In mythology, Hades is non-descriptive of moral character. He who goes to Hades is not ipso facto a wicked person. He may be either good or evil ; may go either to happiness or misery. This mythological indefiniteness, when injected into the definiteness of the inspired representation of Hades, takes off the solemn and terrible aspect which it has for the sinner in Scripture, and paves the way for the assertion that when the sinner goes to Hades he does not go to punishment and misery.

This mythological influence upon the eschatology of the Later-Jews is seen in Josephus. He describes Samuel as being called up from Hades. Antiq,, YL xiv. 2. Yet in another place (Wars, HI. viii. 5), he says that " the souls of the good at death obtain a most lioly place in heaven, while the souls of the wicked are received by the darkest place in hades." Here is the same vacillation between the Biblical and the mythological view which appears in many of the Christian fathers. The mythological influence increased, until the doctrine of purgatory itself came into the Jewish apocryphal literature. Purgatory is taught in 2 Maccabees, 12:45. Manasses, in his Prayer, asks God not "to condemn him into the lower parts of the earth." The SynaHades does double duty, being both a general and a special term. When the Pagan is asked, "Of what does Hades consist?" he answers, "Of Elysium and Tartarus." But when the mythological Christian is asked, "Of what does Hades consist?" he must answer, "Of Paradise and Hades. " He cannot answer, "Of Paradise and Tartarus," because the latter is Gehenna, which he denies to be in Hades. Hence he converts the whole into a part of itself. To say that Hades is made up of Paradise and Hades, is like saying that New York City is made up of the Central Park and New York City,

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 597

gogue, according to Cliarnocke (Discourse II.) believed in a purgatory. '

That class of commentators, lexicographers, and theologians who contend that Hades denotes an underworld, and deny that it means either hell or the grave, appeal to Pagan and Rabbinical authorities in proof. This assumes that there is no essential diffei-ence between the Hades of Scripture and that of the nations ; that the inspired mind took the same general view with the uninspired, of the state of souls after death ; that Moses, Samuel, David, and Isaiah, together with Christ and his Apostles, agreed in their eschatology with Homer, Plato, Yirgil, the Egyptian " Ritual of the Dead," and the Babylonian tablets. A close adherence to the text and context of Scripture shows, we think, that this assumption is unfounded. Upon such an unknown subject as the future state, the appeal must be made to Revelation alone. Because the Assyrians, Babylonians, Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans believed that all human spirits at death go to one and the same underworld, it does not follow that it is a fact, or that the circle of inspired men who wrote the Scriptures believed and taught it. And because the Jewish Rabbins came to adopt the mythological eschatology, it does not follow that the Biblical eschatology is to be interpreted by their opinions.^

> Oa the Influence of Hellenism upon the Later-Judaism, see Edersheim : Messianic Prophecy and History. Lecture IX.

- The strong tendency of the Later-Jews to adopt both the customs and opinions of the heathen nations is noticed by Chemnitz, in his learned and thorough examination of the Tridentine doctrine of Purgatory. Examen : De Purgatorio, II. "Ex philosophorum ratiocinationibus, et ex superstitiosis gentium sacrifices, quae ubique usitata erant, cum, quidem, sicut de caris absentibus ita etiam de mortuis naturalis quaedem cura et sollicitudo animis nostris insita est, ad Judaeos etiam hujiis oii lionis contagium quoddam, inclinato jam Judaismo, serpere coepit. Quauquam enim incisio carnis, et eviilsio capillorum, ia luctu mortaorum, expresse prohibita erant (Lev. xix., Deut. xiv. ), ex conversatione tamen inter gentes, Israelitis etiam prophetarum tempore ilia usurpari coepta fuisse, ex Jeremiae, cap. xvi., non obscure colligitur. Sicut a gentibus etiam tibicines in funerum curatione mutuati sunt (Mat. ix. ), juxta versum poetae : 'cantabat moestis tibia funeribus.' Eadem ratione tandem post prophetarum

598 ESCHATOLOGY.

Revealed religion may be properly illustrated by ethnical relioion when the latter acrrees with the former : not when it conflicts with it. When mythology is an echo, even broken and irnperfect, of Scripture, it may be used to explain inspired doctrine ; but not when it is a contradiction. The meaning of Hades must therefore be explained by the connection of thought in the Scriptures themselves, and not by the imagination of uninspired man peering into the darkness beyond the grave, and endeavoring to picture the abode of departed spirits. The mythological eschatology is a picturesque and fanciful conjecture respecting the unseen world. The Biblical eschatology is the description of it by an eye-witness : namely, God speaking through prophets, apostles, and Jesus Christ.

The Pagan conception passed also into the Christian church. It is found in the writings of many of the fathers, but not in any of the primitive creeds. "The idea of a Hades C^^*"'?), known to both [the Later] Hebrews and Greeks, was transferred to Christianity, and the assumption that the real happiness, or the final misery of the departed, does not begin till after the general judgment and the resurrection of the body, appeared to necessitate the belief in an intermediate state, in which the soul was supposed to remain, from the moment of its separation from the bodyto the last catastrophe. Tertullian, however, held that the martyrs went at once to paradise, the abode of the blessed, and thought that in this they enjoyed an advantage over other Christians, while Cyprian does not seem to know about any intermediate state whatever." Hagenbach : History of Doctrine, § 77.'

tempora, etiam orationes et sacrificia pro mortuis, Judaei imitari coeperunt circa annum 170 ante natum Christum, cujus exemplum extat2 Maccabaeorum xii. Id quod tum fieri coepit, cum collapsa doctrina, et rebus omnibus, cum in imperio turn in temple, perturbatissimis, Judaei una cum foederibus, etiam lingua, appellationibus, moribus, et ritibus, conformitatem cum gentibus quaererent et afFectarent : sicut tota historia Maccabaeorum ostendit."

1 As an example of the degree to which the mythological view of the conditiou

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 599

According to this Ilellenized conception of the Intermediate State, at death all souls go down to Hades; in inferna loca, or ad inferos lioniines. This is utterly unbiblical. It is connected with the heathen doctrine of the infernal divinities, and the infernal tribunal of Minos and Ithadamanthus. The God of revelation does not have either his abode, or his judgment-seat, in Hades. From Christ's account of the last judgment, no one would infer that it takes place in an underworld. In both the Old and Xew Testament, the good dwell with God, and God's dwelling-place is never represented as " below," but " on high." Paradise is the third heaven (2 Cor. 12: 1, 4), and none of the heavens are in the underworld. Elijah " went up by a whirlwind into heaven," 2 Kings 2 : 11. The saints remaining on earth at the Advent go up " to meet the Lord [and the saints that have been with him] in the air," 1 Thess. 4: IT. Compare 2 Tliess. 4 : 14 ; Eph. 4:8; John 17:24; Acts 7:25; Luke 23:42, 43, 46; Prov. 15 : 24. David expects to be " received to glory." Christ describes the soul of a believer, at death, as ascending to Paradise. " The beggar died, and was carried by the angels to Abraham's bosom. The rich man also died, and was buried. And in Hades he lifted ^^ his eyes, being in torments, and seeth Abraham afar off, and Lazarus in his bosom." Luke 16 : 22, 23. According to this description, Abraham's bosom and Hades are as opposite and disconnected as the zenith and the nadir. To say that Abraham's bosom is a part of Hades, is to say that the heavens are a compartment of the earth. St. Matt. (8 : 11) teaches that Abraham's bosom is in heaven : " Many shall recline {avaKXi^riaovTai) with Abraham, in the kingdom of heaven." Paradise is separated from Hades by a " great chasm," Luke 16 : 26. The word 'xaaiia denotes space either lateral

of the dead had worked itself into the Christian church in the first part of the third century, see the fanciful description of Hades by Hippolytus in a fragment of his Discourse against the Greeks.

600 ESCHATOLOGY.

or vertical, but more commonly tlie latter. Sclilensner, in voce, says : " Maxime dicitur de spatio quod e loco siiperiore ad inferiorem extenditur." Hades is in infernis ; Abraham's bosom, or Paradise, is in snperis ; and Heaven, proper, is in excelsis, or siimmis.

If Paradise is a section of Hades, then Christ descended to Paradise, and saints at death go down to Paradise, and at the last day are brought up from Paradise. This difficulty is not met, by resorting to the Later- Jewish distinction between a supernal and an infernal paradise. The paradise spoken of by Christ, in Luke 24 : 33, is evidently the same that St. Paul speaks of, in 2 Cor. 12 : 3, 4, which he calls " the third heaven."

It is sometimes said that there is no " above " or " below " in the spiritual world, and therefore the special representation in the parable of Dives and Lazarus must not be insisted upon. This, certainly, should not be urged by those who contend for an u7ider\\ov\d. Paradise and Hades, like Heaven and Hell, are both in the universe of God. But wherever in this universe they may be, it is the Biblical representation (unlike the mythological), that they do not constitute 07ie system, or one sphere of being, any more than Heaven and Hell do. They are so contrary and opposite, as to exclude each other, and to constitute two separate places or worlds ; so that he who goes to the one does not go to the other.' This contrariety and exclusiveness is metaphorically expressed by space vertical, not by space lateral. Things on the same plane are alike. Those on different planes are not. If Paradise is above and Hades is beneath, Hades will be regarded as Ilell, and be dreaded. But if Paradise and Hades are both alike beneath, and Paradise is a part of Hades, then Hades will not be regarded as Hell (as some affirm it is not), and will not be dreaded. Hades will be merely a temporary resi» Respecting the entire sepaxation between the good and the evil, see 1 Sam. '^ : 29 ; Pa. 26 : 9 ; 28 : 3.

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 601

dence of the human soul, where the punishment of sin is imperfect, and its removal possible and probable.

A portion of the fathers, notwithstanding the increasing prevalence of the mvthological view, deny that Paradise is a compartment of Hades. In some instances, it nuist be acknowledged, they are not wholly consistent with themselves, in so doing. According to Archbishop Usher (Works, III. 281), " the first who assigned a resting-place in hell [Hades] to the fathers of the Old Testament was Marcion the Gnostic." This was combated, he says, by Origen, in his second Dialogue against Marcion. In his comment on Ps. 9 : 18, Origen remarks tliat " as Paradise is the residence of the just, so Hades is the place of punishment {KoXaarrjpLov) for sinners." The locating of Paradise in Hades is opposed by Tertullian (Adv. Marcionem, lY. 34), in the following terms : " Hades (inferi) is one thing, in my opinion, and Abraham's bosom is another. Christ, in the parable of Dives, teaches that a great deep is interposed between the two regions. Keither could the rich man have ' lifted up ' his eyes, and that too ' afar off,' unless it had been to places above him, and very far above him, by reason of the immense distance between that height and that depth." Similarly, Chrysostom, in his Homilies on Dives and Lazarns, as quoted by Usher, asks and answers: " Why did not Lazarus see the rich man, as well as the rich man is said to see Lazarus ? Because he that is in the light does not see him who stands in the dark ; but he that is in the dark sees him that is in the light." Augustine, in his exposition of Ps. 6, calls attention to the fact that "Dives looked uj), to see Lazarus." Again, he says, in his Epistle to Euodins, "it is not to be i^elieved that the bosom of Abraham is a part of Hades (aliqna pars inferorum.) How Abraham, into whose bosom the beggar was received, could have been in the torments of Hades, I do not understand. Let them explain who can." Again, in De Genesi ad literam, XII.

f)02 ESCHATOLOGY.

remarks : " I confess, I have not yet found that the place where the souls of just men jest is Hades (inferos). If a 2;ood conscience may figuratively be called paradise, how much more may that bosom of Abraham, where there is no temptation, and great rest after the griefs of this life, be called paradise." To the same effect, says Gregory of Nyssa (In Pascha) : " This should be investigated by the studious, namely, how, at one and the same time, Christ could be in these three places: in the heart of the earth, in paradise with the thief, and in the ' hand ' of the Father. For no one will say that paradise is in the places under the earth (eV vTro-)(^6vioi

These patristic statements respecting the supernal locality of Paradise agi'ee with Scripture. " The way of life is above to the wise, that he may depart from sheol heneaili^'' Prov. 15:24. When Samuel is represented as "coming up from the earth" (1 Sam. 28:7-20), it is because the body reanimated rises from the grave." This does not prove that the soul had been in an underworld, any more than the statement of St. John (12 : 17) that Christ "called Lazarus out of his grave " proves it. Paradise is unquestionably the abode of the saved ; and the saved are with

iThe Council of Ferrara-Florence (1438-9,), composed of Greek and Latin bishops, which attempted to unite the Latin and Greek churches, decided "that the souls of the saints are received immediately into heaven, and behold God himself as he is, three in one," Taylor : Liberty of Prophesying, VIII.

'-^ In the narrative concerning the witch of Eudor, the term Sheol is not once used.

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 603

Christ. The common residence of botli is described as on high. " When he ascended up on high, he led captivity captive," Eph. 4 : 8. " Fatlier, I will that they also whom thou hast given me be with me where I am, that they may see my glorj'," John 17:24. "Those which sleep in Jesus, God will bring with him " [down from Paradise, not up from Hades], 2 Thess. -i : l-t. At the second advent, " we which are alive and remain shall be caught up in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air," 1 Thess. 4: : 17. Stephen " looked up into heaven, and saw Jesus standing on the right hand of God," Acts 7 : 55. Christ said to the Pharisees, " Ye are from beneath, I am from above," John 8 : 23. Satan and his angels are " cast down to Tartarus," 2 Pet. 2 : -1. The penitent thief says to Christ : '' Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom." Christ replies : " This day shalt thou be with me in paradise," Luke 23 : 42, 43. This implies that paradise is the same as Christ's kingdom ; and Christ's kingdom is not an infernal one. Christ "cried with a loud voice. Father into thy hands I commend my spirit, and having said this, he gave up the ghost," Luke 23 : 46. The "hands" of the Father, here meant, are in heaven above, not in " shoel beneath." These teachings of Scripture, and their interpretation by a portion of the fathers, evince that Paradise is a section of Lleaven, not of LEades, and are irreconcilable with the doctrine of an underworld containing both the good and the evil.

Another stimulant, besides that of mythology, to the growth of the doctrine that the intermediate state for all souls is the underworld of Hades, was the introduction into the Apostles' creed of the spurious clause, " He descended into Hades." Biblical exegesis is inevitably influenced by the great oecumenical creeds. When the doctrine of the descent to Hades was interpolated into the oldest of the Christian symbols, it became necessary to find support for it in Scripture. The texts that can, with any success, be

604 ESCHATOLOGY.

used for this purpose, are few, compared with the large number tliat prove the undisputed events in the life of Christ. This compelled a strained interpretation of such passages as Matt. 12 : 40 ; Acts 2 : 27 ; Eom. 10 : 7 ; 1 Pet. 3 : 18-20 ; 4 : 6, and largely affected the whole subject of eschatology as presented in the Scriptures.

The Apostles' creed, in its original form, read as follows : " Suffered under Pontius Pilate ; was crucified, dead, and buried ; the third day he rose again from the dead." This is also the form in the two creeds of Nice (325) and Constantinople (381) : a certain proof that these great oecumenical councils did not regard the Descensus as one of the articles of the catholic faith. The first appearance of the clause, " He descended into Hades," is in the latter half of the fourth century, in the creed of the church of Aquileia. Pearson, by citations, shows that the creeds, both ecclesiastical and individual, prior to this time, do not contain it. Burnet (Thirty -nine Articles, Art. III.) asserts the same. Rufinus, the presbyter of Aquileia, says, that the intention of the Aquileian alteration of the creed was not to add a new doctrine^ but to exjdain an old one ^ and therefore tlie Aquileian creed omitted the clause, " was crucified, dead, and buried," and substituted for it the new clause, " descendit in inferna." Rufinus also adds, that " although the preceding Roman and Oriental editions of the creed had not the words, 'He descended into Hades,' yet they had the sense of them in the words, ' He was crucified, dead, and buried.' " Pearson : Creed, Article V. The early history of the clause, therefore, clearly shows that the "Hades" to which Christ was said to have descended was simplj' the "grave" in which he -was buried.'

Subsequently, the clause went into other creeds. The

' Coleridge (Works, V. 278) remarks : "This clause was not inserted into the Apostles' creed till the sixth [fourth] century after Christ. I believe the original intention of the clause was no more than vere mortuus est, in contradictioa to the hypothesis of a trance or suspended animation."

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 605

Atlianasian (600) follows that of Aqnileia, in inserting the "descent" and omitting the " bnrial." It reads: "Who suffered for our salvation, descended into Hades, i-ose again the third day from the dead." Those of Toledo, in 633 and G93, likewise contain it. It is almost invariably found in the mediaeval and modern forms of the Apostles' creed, but witJiout the omission, as at first, of the clause, " was crucified, dead, and buried : " two doctrines thus being constructed, in place of a single one as at first. If, then, the text of the Apostles' creed shall be subjected, like that of the New Testament, to a revision in accordance witli the text of the first four centuries, the Descensus ad inferos must be rejected as an interpolation.

While the tenet of Christ's local descent into Hades has no support from Scripture, or any of the first oecumenical creeds, it has support, as has already been observed, from patristic authority.' " The ancient fathers," says Pearson (Article Y.), " differed much respecting the condition of the dead, and the nature of the place into which the souls, before our Saviour's death, were gathered ; some looking on that name which we now translate hell, hades, or infernus, as the common receptacle of the souls of all men, both the just and unjust, while others thought that hades, or infernus, was never taken in the Scriptures for any place of happiness; and therefore they did not conceive the souls of the patriarchs or the prophets did pass into any such infernal place." This difference of opinion appears in Augustine, who wavered in his views upon the subject of Hades, as Bellarmine concedes. Pearson (Art. Y.) remarks of him, that " he began to doubt concerning the reason ordinarily given for Christ's descent into hell, namely, to bring up the patriarchs and prophets thence, upon this ground, that he thought the word infernus [aZrjs:^ was never taken in Scripture in a good sense, to denote the abode of the right' See Hagenbach : History of Doctrine, §g 77, 78, 141, 143. Smith's Ed.

006 ESCHATOLOGY.

eons." ' Pearson cites, in proof, the passages already quoted from Angnstine's Epistle, and Commentary on Genesis. On the other hand, in his City of God (XX. 15), Angnstine hesitatingly accepts the doctrine that the Old Testament saints were in limbo, and were delivered by Christ's descent into their abode. '* It does not seem absurd to believe, that the ancient saints who believed in Christ, and his future coming, were kept in places far removed, indeed, from the torments of the wicked, but yet in Hades (apud inferos), until Christ's blood and his descent into these places delivered them." Yet in his exposition of the Apostles' creed (De Fide et Symbolo), Augustine makes no allusion to the clause, "He descended into Hades." And the same silence appears in the De Symbolo, attributed to him. After expounding the clauses respecting Christ's passion, crucifixion, and burial, he then explains those concerning his resurrection and ascent into heaven. This proves that when he wrote this exposition, the dogma was not an acknowledged part of the catholic faith. ^ Still

1 Notwithstanding the currency which the view of Hades as the abode of the good and evil between death and the resurrection has obtained, it would shock the feelings, should a clergyman say to mourning friends : "Dry your tears, the departed saint has gone down to Hades."

2 The Episcopal Church does not regard the " descent into hell'' as a necessary part of the Christian faith. In the Order for Evening Prayer, it is said that "any churches may omit the words, 'He descended into hell.'" The Forty-two Articles of Edward VI. explain the clause to mean a descent into Hades, and preaching to the Old Testament saints in prison there. The Elizabethan Thirtjf-nine Articles give no explanation, but contain both clauses. Hence Pearson concludes that the Episcopalian has some liberty in the interpretation of this article. His own method is, first, to explain the Scripture, and then to explain the creed as it now reads in its modern form. His explanation of Scripture is, that in the clause, " Thou wilt not leave my -soul in hell," soul is metonymically put for body, and hell means the grave : Because (a) In the Hebrew, soul is frequently put for body. (6) Sheol means grave in many places. (c) The Aquileian creed so intended. Still, he says, "though this may be a probable interpretation of the words of David, yet it cannot pretend to be an exposition of the creed as it now stands " in the Thirty -nine Articles : that is, as containing both clauses. Because when both clauses are retained, as in the Thirty-nine Articles, the second must be more than a mere repetition and explanation of the first. For if one merely explains the other, one would

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 60?

later, Peter Chrysologus, archbishop of Ravenna, and Maxinnis of Turin, explain tlie Apostles' creed and make no exposition of the Descent to Hades. The diiferenee of opinion amono; the fathers of the first four centuries, too;ether with the absence of scriptural support for it, is the reason why the Descensus ad inferos was not earlier insei'ted into the Apostles' creed. It required the development of the doctrine of purgatory, and of the mediaeval eschatology generally, in order to get it formally into the doctrinal system of both the Eastern and Western churches.'

be omitted, as Rufinus says was the case in the Aquileian creed, and as is the case in the Athanasian symbol. Hence Pearson decides that the form of this article, as it is ado^ited in the Thirty-nine Articles, requires to be explained as the Descensus ad inferos, in order to avoid tautology. But the form itself, he shows to be a late addition to the Apostles' creed. If both clauses are retained, the explanation proposed by Whitby (On Acta 2 : 26, 27) is consistent with Scripture. "The scripture doth assure us that the soul of the holy Jesus, being separated from his body, went to Paradise (Luke 23 : 43), and from thence it must descend into the grave or sepulchre to be united to his body that this might be revived. And thus it may be truly said : " He was dead and buried ; his soul descended afterwards into Hades (the grave), to be united to his body ; and his body being thus revived, he rose again the third day.' "

' Baumgarten-Crusius (Dogmengeschichte, II. § 109) finds three stadia in the development of the dogma of the Descent to Hades. 1. The descent was the burial itself put into an imaginative form. 2. The descent was a particular condition or status of Christ resulting from his burial, o. The descent was entirely separate from the burial, being another and wholly distinct thing.

Van Oosterzee's history of the clause, " He descended into hell," is, as follows : " As concerns the history of this article, the conviction was expressed even by some of the earliest of the fathers — Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clemens Alexandrinus, and others — that Jesus, after his burial, actually tarried in the world of spirits, and by some of them, also, that he there preached the gospel ; while the romantic manner in which this mysterious subject is presented in the apocryphal Gospel of Nicodemus is well known. Gnosticism, especially, warmly espoused this idea ; according to Marcion, this activity of the Lord was directed to delivering the victims of the Demiurge, and leading them upwards with himself. From the symbols of the Semi-Arians, this much-debated article appears to have passed over to those of the orthodox church, according to some, with a view to controvert Apollinarism. In the Expositio Symboli Aquileiensis of Rufinus, this formula is found, and especially through his influence it appears also to have passed over into other confessions of faith ; although it is remarkable that in the Nicene Creed mention is made only of ' was buried ; ' in the Athanasian Creed, on the other hand, only of 'descended into helL' It is manifest from this, that Vjoth expressions were first employed by many interchangeably, though very soon greater stress was laid upon the latter, and its contents

The personal and local descent of Christ into Hades — wlietlier to deliver the Old Testament saints from liml)o ; or to preach judicially, announcing condemnation to the sinners there ; or evangelically, offering salvation to them — if a fact, would have been one of the great cardinal facts connected with the incarnation. It would fall into the same class with the nativity, the baptism, the passion, the crucifixion, the resurrection, and the ascension. Much less important facts than these are recorded. St. Matthew speaks of the descent of Christ into Egypt, but not of his

regarded as the iudication of a special remedial activity of the Lord. As the doctrine of purgatory became more developed, the conception found wider acceptance that the Lord had descended into the lower world, in order to deliver the souls of the Old Testament believers from their subterranean abode, the limbus patrum. Especially under the influence of Thomas Aquinas, was developed the doctrine of the Romish Church, that the whole Christ, both as to his divine and human nature, voluntarily repaired thither, to assure to the abovementioned saints the fruits of his death on the cross, and to raise them out of this prison-house to the full enjojonent of heavenly blessedness. According to Luther, on the other hand, who regards the Decensus as the first step in the path of the exaltation, the Lord, after his being made alive according to the spirit, and, immediately upon his return from the grave, descended, body and soul, into hell, there to celebrate his triumph over the devil and his powers (CoL 3 : 1.5), and to proclaim to them condemnation and judgment. The Reformed theologians either understood the expression in the sense of ' buried,' or explained it of the final anguish and dismay of the suffering Christ. This latter is the view of Calvin (Inst., II., xvi. ), and of the Heidelberg Catechism (Ans. 44). Some divines, the Lutheran Aepinus, e.g., even maintained that the reference is to the sufferings of hell, which Christ endured in his soul, while his body was lying in the grave. No wonder that the Formula Concordiae declared this article to be one ' qui neque sensibus, neque ratione nostra comprehend! queat, solo autem fide acceptandus sit ; ' which, however, did not prevent its being possible to say, on the other side, that 'there are almost as many dissertations concerning the Descensus as there are flies in the height of summer.' (Witsius.) Left by the supra-naturalism of the past century entirely in a misty obscurity, it was wholly rejected by the Rationalists, as the fruit of an exploded popular notion, to which, according to Schleiermacher, nothing but a fact wholly unnoticed by the apostles (unbezeugte Thatsache) served as a basis. Only in our day has the tide turned, and theologians of different schools have begun to return with increased interest, yea, with manifest preference to this dogma ; and to bring it into direct connection not only with soteriology, but also with eschatology." In the face of this historical account. Van Oosterzee proceeds to defend the doctrine of a local descent to Hades, founding upon Fs. IR : 10 ; Acts 2 : 25-31 ; 13 : 33-37 ; Eph. 4 : 8-10 ; 1 Pet. 3 : 19-21 ; 4 : 0. Dogmatics, XL 558 sq.

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 609

descent into Hades. Such an act of the Redeemer as going down into an infernal world of spirits, would certainly liave been mentioned by some one of the inspired biographers of Chi-ist. The total silence of the four Gospels is fatal to the tenet. St. Paul, in his recapitulation of the principal events of our Lord's life, evidently knows nothing of the descent into Hades. " I delivered unto you that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins ; and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day," 1 Cor. 15 : 3, 4. The remark of bishop Burnet (Thirty-nine Articles, Art. IH.) is sound. "Many of the fathei-s thought that Christ's soul went locally into hell, and preached to some of the spirits there in prison ; that there he triumphed over Satan, and spoiled him, and carried some souls with him into gloiy. But the account that the Scripture gives us of the exaltation of Christ begins it alwaj's at his resurrection. ISTor can it be imagined that so memorable a transaction as this would have been passed over by the first three Evangelists, and least of all by St. John, who coming after the rest, and designing to supply what was wanting in them, and intending particularly to magnify the glory of Christ, could not have passed over so wonderful an instance of it. The passage in St. Peter seems to relate to the preaching to the Gentile world, by virtue of that inspiration that was derived from Christ." ^

' Augustine, Bede, Aquinas, Erasmus, Beza, Gerhard, Hottiuger, Clericus, Leigliton, Pearson, Seeker, Hammond, Hofmann, and most of the Reformed theologians, explain 1 Pet. 3 : 18-20 to mean, that Christ preached by Noah to men who were '^ disobedient" in the days of Noah, and who for this cause were "spirits in prison " at the time of Peter's writing. The participle ir6Te, qualifying a.TTti^i](ra(n, shows that the disobedience (or disbelief) occurred "when the ark was a-preparing. " But the preaching must have been contemporaneous with the disobedience, or disbelief. What else was there to disobey, or disbelieve ? Says Pearson (Creed, Art. II.), "Christ was really before the flood, for he preached to them that lived before' it. This is evident from the words of St. Peter (1 Pet. 3 : 18-20). From which words it api)eareth, first, That Christ preached by the !^ame Spirit by the virtue of which he was raised from the dead : but that Spirit was not his [human] soul, but something of a greater Vol. XL— 30

The Earlv-Patristic and Reformed view of the Intermediate State agrees with the Scriptures, as the following particulars prove.

1. Both the Old and Xew Testaments represent the intermediate state of the soul to he a disembodied state.

power ; secondly, That those to whom he preached were such as were disobedient ; thirdly, That the time when they were disobedient was the time before the flood, when the ark was preparing. The plain interpretation is to be acknowledged for the true, that Christ did preach unto those men which lived before the flood, even while they lived, and consequently that he was before it. For though this was not done by an immediate act of the Son of God, as if he personally had appeared on earth aad actually preached to that world, but by the ministry of a prophet, by the sending of Noah ' the eighth preacher of righteousness : ' yet to do anything by another not able to perform it without him, as much demonstrates the existence of the principal cause, as if he did it himself without any intervening instrument."

Another proof of the correctness of this interpretation is the fact that Christ'a preaching to " the spirits in prison " was imev/xaTi, only. The total ^edi/dpconos did not preach. The (rdp^, or human nature, of Christ had no part in the act. But Christ's personal and local preaching in Hades would require his whole Divine-human person ; as much so as his preaching in Galilee or Jerusalem. The Formula Concordiae (IX. 2) so understands and teaches : " Credimus quod tota persona, deus et homo, post sepulturam, ad inferos descenderit, Satanam devicerit, etc," Christ's preaching through Noah — "a preacher of righteousness " (3 Pet. 2 : 5), and therefore an " ambassador of Christ " (3 Cor. 5 : 20) — might be done through his divinity alone. See Eph. 4 : 20, 21 ; Acts 2G : 23 ; John 10 : 16, for instances in which Christ's preaching by others is called his preaching. It is objected that the phrase, he, " wew^ and preached " (Tropev^els eK-l]pv^ev), in 1 Pet. 3 : 19, would not apply to a preaching that was instrumental and spiritual. But the same use is found in Eph. 2:17. Christ -^ came and preached {iA^div evayytXicraTo) to you which were afar off." The reference is to Christ's preaching to the Gentile world by his apostles. Christ, in his own person, did not preach to them which were "afar off; " and he forbade his disciples to do so until the time appointed by the Father, Matt. 10 : 5 ; Acts 1 : 4. The objection that actually living men upon earth would not be called "spirits" is met by Rom. 13 : 1 ; 1 John 4:1, 3 ; and by the fact that at the time of Peter's writing the persons meant are disembodied spirits.

The passage 1 Pet. 4 : 6, sometimes cited in proof of the descensus ad inferos, refers to the preaching of the gospel to the spiritually " dead in trespasses and sins." This is Augustine's interpretation (Ep. ad Euodium, VI. 31). lu Eph. 4 : 9, Ta KarojTepa fiepr) t^s yrjs, to which Christ " descended " from " on high," signifies this lower world of earth. St. Paul is speaking here of the incarnation. The incarnate Logos did not descend from heaven to hades, nor ascend from hades to heaven. Compare Isa. 44:33, " Shout, ye lower parts of the earth." This is the opposite of the "heavens," wliich are bidden to 'sing." In

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 611

Gen. 49 : 33, '• Jacob yielded up the gliost, and was gatliered unto his people." Job 10 : 18, " Oh that I had given up the ghost." Job 11 : 20 ; 14 : 20. Jer. 15 : 9, " She liath given up the ghost." Eccl. 8:8, "There is no man that hath power over the spirit to retain the spirit ; neither liath he power in the day of death." Eccl. 12:7, " Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was ; and the spirit shall return to God who gave it." Matt. 27 : 50, " Jesus, when he had cried again with a loud voice, yielded up the spirit." Luke 23 : 4G, " When Jesus had cried with a loud voice he said, Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit; and having said this, he gave up the spirit." Acts 7 : 59, " Stephen called upon God, saying, Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." 2 Cor. 5:8," We are \x^lling rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord." 2 Cor. 12 : 2, "I knew a man in Christ about four years ago, whether in the body or out of the body, I cannot tell." 2 Cor. 5:2, 3, "We groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven : if so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked." 2 Pet. 1 : 14, " Knowing that shortly I must put off this my tabernacle, even as our Lord Jesus Christ hath showed me." Rev. 20 : 4, " I saw the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus." Rev. 6 : 9, " I saw under the altar the

Acts 2 : 19 this world is called ^ yrj k«£tw. Hades would be ri Kardnara fiepr)

TTJs yrjs. In Rom. 10: 7, Christ's descent " into the deep," (&fiu(r(Tov) is shown by the context to be his descent into the grave.

Whatever be the interpretation of 1 Pet. 3 : 18-20, such a remarkable doctrine as the descent to Hades should have more foundation than a single disputed text. The doctrine it.self is .so obscure that it has had five different forms of statement. 1. Christ vtrttially descended into Hades, because his death was efficacious upon the souls there. 2. Christ actually descended into Hades. 3. Christ's descent into Hades was his suffering the torments of hell. 4. Christ's descent in^o Hades was his burial in the grave. 5. Christ's descent into Hades was his remaining in the state of the dead, for a season. The Westminster Larger Catechism (50) combines the last two : " Christ's humiliation after his death consisted in his being buried, and continuing in the state of the dead, and under the power of death, till the third day, which hath been otherwise expressed in these words, "He descended into heU.' "

612 ESCHATOLOGY.

souls of thein that were slain for the word of God." In accordance with this, the prayer for the burial of the dead in the Episcopal Order begins as follows : " Forasmuch as it hath pleased Almighty God, in his wise providence, to take out of this world the soul of our deceased brother, we therefore commit his body to the ground." And God is addressed as the One " with whom do live the spirits of those who depart hence in the Lord ; and with whom the souls of the faithful, after they are delivered from the burden of the flesh, are in joy and felicity."

Belief in the immortality of the soul, and its separate existence from the body after death, was characteristic of the Old economy, as well as the Xew. It was also a pagan belief. Plato elaborately ^irgues for the difference, as to substance, between the body and the soul, and asserts the independent existence of the latter. Pie knows nothing of the resurrection of the body, and says that when men are judged, in the next life, " they shall be entirely stripped before they are judged, for they shall be judged when they are dead; and the judge too shall be naked, that is to say, dead ; he with his naked soul shall pierce into the other naked soul, as soon as each man dies." Gorgias, 523.

That the independent and separate existence of the soul after death was a belief of the Hebrews, is proved by the prohibition of necromancy in Deut. 18 : 10-12. The " gathering " of the patriarchs " to their fathers " implies the belief. Death did not bring them into association with nonentities. Jehovah calls himself " the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," and tliis supposes the innnortality and continued existence of their spirits ; for, as Christ (Luke 20 : 38) argues in reference to this very point, " God is not the God of the dead, but of the living ; " not of the unconscious, but the conscious. Our Lord affirms that the future existence of the soul is so clearly taught by " Moses and the prophets," that if a man is not convinced by them,

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 613

neither would he be " though one should rise from the dead," Luke 16 : 29.

Some, like Warburton, have denied that the immortality of the soul is taught in the Old Testament, because there is no direct proposition to this effect, and no proof of the doctrine offered. But this doctrine, like that of the Divine existence, is nowhere formallj demonstrated, because it is everywhere assumed. Most of the Old Testament is nonsense, upon the supposition that the soul dies with the body, and that the sacred writers knew nothing of a future life. For illustration, David says, " My soul panteth after thee." lie could not possibly have uttered these words, if he had expected death to be the extinction of his consciousness. The human soul cannot long for a spiritual communion with God that is to last only seventy years, and then cease forever. Every spiritual desire and aspiration has in it the element of infinity and endlessness. No human being can say to God, " Thou art my God, the strength of my heart, and my portion, for threescore years and ten, and then my God and portion no more forever." When God promised Abraham that in him should " all the families of the earth be blessed " (Gen. 12 : 3), and Abraham " believed in the Lord, and he counted it to him for righteousness " (Gen. 15 : 6), this promise of a Kedeemer, and this faith in it, both alike involve a future existence beyond this transitory one. God never would have made such a promise to a creature who was to die with the body ; and such a creature could not have trusted in it. In like manner, Adam could not have believed the protevangelium, knowing that death was to be the extinction of his being. All the Messianic matter of the Old Testament is absurd, on the supposition that the soul is mortal. To redeem from sin a being whose consciousness expires at death, is superfluous. David prays to God, " Take not the word of truth out of my mouth ; so shall I keep thy law continually /br

614 ESCHATOLOGY.

Testament implies the immortality of the person praying. " My flesh faileth, but God is the strength of my heavi forever,'''' Ps. 73 : 26. " Trust ye in the Lord /orevet^ for in the Lord Jehovah is everlasting strength," Isa. 26 : 4. The nothingness of this life only leads the Psalmist to confide all the more in God, and to expect the next life. " Behold, thou hast made my days as an handbreadth ; and mine age is as nothing before thee : verily, every man at his best state is altogether vanity. And now. Lord, what wait I for? my hope is in thee," Ps. 39:5, 7. As Sir John Davies says of the soul, in his poem on Immortality •

•' Water in conduit pities can rise no higlier

Tliau the well-liead from whence it first doth spring : Then since to eternal God she dotli aspire, She cannot be but an eternal thing."

That large class of texts which speak of a " covenant " which God has made with his people, and of a " salvation" which he has provided for them, have no consistency on the supposition that the Old Testament writers had no knowledge and expectation of a future blessed life. The following are examples. Gen. 17 : 7, " I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee, in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee." Gen. 49 : 18, '-I have waited for thy salvation, O Lord." Ex. 6:7, "I will take you to me for a people, and I will be to you a God." Dent. 33 : 3, 29, " Yea, he loved the people ; all his saints are in thy hand. Happy art thou, O Israel : who is like unto thee, O people saved by the Lord." Job 13 : 15, " Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him." Isa. 33 : • 22, "For the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the Lord is our king ; he will save us." Hab. 1 : 12, " Art thou not from everlasting, O Lord, m}^ God, mine Holy One? we shall not die." Ps. 31:5, "Into thine hand I

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 615

commit my spirit ; thou hast redeemed me, O Lord God of truth."

It is impossible to confine this " covenant " of God, this "love "of God, this " salvation " of God, this "trust" in God, and this " redemption " of God, to this short life of threescore years and ten. Such a limitation empties them of their meaning, and makes them worthless. The words of St. Paul apply in this case : " If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable," 1 Cor. 15:19. Calvin (Inst., II., x., 8) remarks that "these expressions, according to the common explanation of the prophets, comprehend life, and salvation, and consunnnate felicity. For it is not without reason that David frequently pronounces how ' blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord, and the people whom he hath chosen for his own inheritance ; ' and that, not on account of any earthly felicity, but because he delivers from death, perpetually preserves, and attends with everlasting mercy, those whom he hath taken for his people." In the same reference, xVugustine (Confessions, YI. xi. 19) says: "I^ever would such and so great tilings be wrought for us by God, if with the death of the body the life of the soul came to an end." AVhen God said to Abraham, " Thou shalt go to thy fathers in peace " (Gen. 15 : 15), he meant spiritual and everlasting peace. It was infinitely more than a promise of an easy and quiet physical death. When Jacob, on his death-bed, says : " I have waited for thy salvation, O Lord " (Gen. 49 : 18), he was not thinking of deliverance from physical and temporal evil. What does a man care for this, in his dying hour.

The religious experience delineated in the Old Testament cannot be constructed or made intelligible, upon the theory that the doctrine of immortality was unknown, or disbelieved. The absolute trust in God, the unquestioning confidence in his goodness and truth, the implicit submission to his will, the fearless obedience of his commands

616 ESCHATOLOGY.

whatever they might he, whether to exterminate the Cauaauites or slay the beloved child, and the hopeful serenity with which they met death and the untried future, would have been impossible, had the belief of Enoch, Abraham, Moses, Samuel and the prophets, concerning a future existence, been like that of Hume, Gibbon, Voltaire, and Mirabeau.

Another reason why the Old Testament contains no formal argument in proof of immortality and a spiritual world beyond this, is, because the intercourse with that world on the part of the Old Testament saints and inspired prophets was so immediate and constant. God was not only present to their believing minds and hearts, in his paternal and gracious character, but, in addition to this, he was frequently manifesting himself in theophanies and visions. "We should not expect that a person who was continually communing with God would construct arguments to prove his existence ; or that one who was brought into contact with the unseen and spiritual world by supernatural phenomena and messages from it, would take pains to demonstrate that there is such a world. The Old Testament saints "endured as seeing the invisible." '

2. The Scriptures teach that the intermediate state for the believer is one of blessedness. The disembodied spirit of the penitent thief goes with the disembodied liedeemer directly into Paradise. Luke 23 : 43, " To day shalt thou be with me in paradise." Paradise has the following marks: {a) It is the third heaven. 2 Cor. 12:2,4, "I knew a man caught up to the third heaven. He was caught up into paradise, and heard unspeakable words which it is not lawful for a man to utter." Rev. 2:7, " To him tliat overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of God." {h) It is " Abraham's bosom." Luke 16 : 22, " The beggar died,

1 Compare Mozley : Essay on Job.

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 617

and was carried by the angels into Abraham's bosom." Matt. 8 : 11, " Many shall ccjiiie from the east and west, and shall recline {avaKki^rjo-ovTat) with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven." {c) It is a place of reward and happiness. Luke 16 : 25, " Remember that thou in thy lifetime receivedst thy good things, and likewise Lazarus evil things : but now he is comforted." 2 Cor. 5 : 8, " To be absent from the body, is to be present with the Lord." Phil. 1 : 23, " I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart and to be with Christ ; which is far better." Phil. 1 : 21, " For me, to die is gain." 1 Thess. 5 : 9, 10, " Christ died for us, that whether we wake or sleep, we should live together with him." Acts Y : 59, " They stoned Stephen, calling upon God, and saying, Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." According to Luke 9 : 30, 31, Moses and Elijah coming directly from the intermediate state " appear in glory," at the transfiguration.

The Old Testament, with less of local description, yet with great positiveness and distinctness, teaches the happiness of believers after death. Gen. 5 ; 24, " Enoch walked with God: and he was not; for God took him." Num. 23 : 10, " Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his." Gen. 49 : 18, The dying Jacob confidently says, " I have waited for thy salvation, O Lord." Ps. 16 : 9-11, " My flesh shall rest in hope. For thou wilt not leave my soul in hell ; neither wilt thou suffer thine holy one to "see corruption. Thou wilt show me the path of life; in thy presence is fulness of joy; at- thy right hand there are pleasures forevermore." Ps. 17:15, "As for me, I shall behold thy face in righteousness. I shall be satisfied, when I awake with thy likeness." Ps. 49 : 15, " God will redeem my soul from the power of the grave ; for he shall receive me." Ps. 73 : 24-26, " Thou shalt guide me with thy counsel, and afterward receive me to glory. Whom have I in heaven but thee ? and there is none upon earth that I desire beside thee. My flesh and

G18 ESCHATOLOGY.

my heart faileth ; but God is the strength of my heart, and nij portion forever." Ps, 116 : 15, " Precious in tlie siglit of the Lord is the death of his saints." Isa. 25 : 8, "He M'ill swallow up death in victory.'' Tliis is quoted bj St. Paul, in 1 Cor. 15 : 54, to prove the resurrection of the body. Hosea 13 : 14, " I will ransom them from the power of the grave : I will redeem them from death. O death, I will be thy plagues ; O grave, I will be thy destruction." This also is cited by St. Paul, in 1 Cor. 15 : 55. Dan. 12 : 2, 3, " Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake to everlasting life. And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament ; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars forever and ever." Job 19 : 25-27, "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth. And though, after my skin, worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God ; whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold." ' St. Paul teaches that the Old Testament saints, like those of the IS^ew, trusted in the Divine promise of the resurrection. " I stand and am judged for the hope of the promise made of God unto our fathers : unto which promise [of the resurrection], our twelve tribes, instantly serving God day and night, hope to come. For which hope's sake, king Agrippa, I am accused of the Jews. Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should raise the dead ? " Acts 26 : 6-8 ; comp. 23 : 6. " These all died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them, and confessed that they were sti-angers and pilgrims on the earth. For they that say such things declare plainly that they seek a country. And, truly, if they had been mindful of that

1 The common opinion of the church, ancient, mediaeval, and modern, is, that this passage teaches both immortality and the resurrection. De Wette, Ewald, and even Renan find the doctrine of immortality in it. See Perowne : On Immortality. Note III.

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 619

country from whence they came out, they might have had opportunity to have returned. But now they desire a better country, that is, an heavenly," Heb. 11 : 13-16. These bright and hopeful anticipations of the Old Testament saints have nothing in common with the pagan world of shades, the gloomy Orcus, where all departed souls are congregated.

3. The Scriptures teach that the intermediate state for the impenitent is one of miseiy. The disembodied spirit of Dives goes to Plades, which has the following marks : {a) Hades is the place of retribution and woe. Luke 16: 23, 25, " In Hades he lifted his eyes, being in torments. And Abraham said. Son, remember that thou in thy lifetime receivedst thy good things, and now thou art tormented." Christ describes Dives as suffering a righteous punishment for his hard-hearted, luxurious, and impenitent life. He had no pity for the suffering poor, and scpandered all the " good things " received from his Maker, in a life of sensual enjoyment. The Redeemer of mankind also represents Hades to be inexorably retributive. Dives asks for a slight mitigation of penal suffering, " a drop of water." He is reminded that he is suffering what he justly deserves, and is told tliat there is a " fixed gulf " between Hades and Paradise. He then knows that his destiny is decided, and his case hopeless, and requests that his brethren may be warned by his example. After such a description of it as this, it is passing strange that Hades should ever have been called an abode of the good.*

{b) Hades is the contrary of heaven, and the contrary of

' MuUer regards it as so unquestionable, from the description in the parable of Dives and Lazarus, that Hades is not a place for repentance and salvation, that he places future redemption after the day of judgment. He asserts that " those theories of airoKaTcitTTaats which represent it as taking place in the interval between death and the general resurrection directly violate the New Testament eschatology. If, therefore, the idea of an aTroKardcrraari^ irivToov is to be maintained, it must be referred to a period Ijing beyond the general resurrection." Siu. II. 4:2(5.

020 ESCHATOLOGY.

heaven is hell. Matt. 11 : 23, " Thon Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be brought down to hades." This is explained by our Lord's accompanying remark, that it shall be more tolerable in the day of judgment for the land of Sodom than for Capernaum : " showing that to " be brought down to hades " is the same as to be sentenced to hell.

(e) Hades is Satan's kingdom, antagonistic to that of Christ. Matt. 16 : 18, " Tlie gates of hades shall not prevail against my church." An underworld, containing both the good and the evil, would not be the kingdom of Satan. Satan's kingdom is not so comprehensive as this. Nor would an underworld be the contrary of the church, because it includes Paradise and its inhabitants.

{d) Hades is the prison of Satan and the wicked. Christ said to St. John, " I have the keys of hades and of death," Rev. 1:18; and describes himself as " He that openeth, and no man shutteth, and shutteth, and no man openeth," Rev. 3 : 7. As the supreme judge, Jesus Christ opens and shuts the place of future punishment upon those whom he sentences. "I saw an angel come down from heaven having the key of the bottomless pit, and a great chain in his hand, and he laid hold on the dragon, that old serpent, which is the devil, and Satan, and bound him a thousand years, and cast him into the bottomless pit, and shut him up," Rev. 20 : 1-3. All modifications of the imprisonment and suffering in Hades are determined by Christ. " I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God ; and the books were opened, and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in those books ; and deatli and hades gave up the dead which wei-e in them, and tbey were judged every man according to their works ; and death and hades were cast into the lake of iire," Rev^ 20 : 12-14. Tliis indicates the difference between the intermediate and the final state, for the wicked. On the day of judgment, at the command of incarnate God,

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 621

IlaJes, the intermediate state for the wicked, surrenders its inhabitants tliat they may be re-embodied and receive the final sentence, and then becomes Gehenna, the final state for them. Hell without the body becomes hell with the body.'

(e) Hades is inseparably connected with spiritual and eternal death. " I have the keys of hades and of death," Hev. 1 : 18. " Death and hades gave up the dead which were in them," Rev. 20 : 13. " I saw a pale horse ; and his name that sat upon him was Death, and hades followed him," Rev. 6 : 6. Hades here stands for its inhabitants, who are under the power of (" follow ") the " second death " spoken of in Rev. 2:11; 20:6, U; 21 : 8. This is spiritual and eternal death, and must not be confounded with the Ji'rst death, which is that of the body only. This latter, St. Paul (1 Cor. 15 : 26) says was " destroyed " by the blessed resurrection of the bod}', in the case of the saints but not of the wicked. See p. 638. The " second death " is defined as the " being cast into the lake of fire," Rev. 20 : 14. This " death " is never " destroyed ; " because those who are " cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, with the devil that deceived them, shall be tormented day and night forever and ever," Rev. 20: 10.

(/) Hades is not a state of probation. Dives asks for an alleviation of penal suffering, and is solemnly refused by the Eternal Arbiter. And the reason assigned for the refusal is, that his suffering is required by justice. But a state of existence in which there is not the slightest abatement of punishment cannot be a state of probation. Our Lord, in this parable, represents Hades to be as immutably retributive as the modern Hell. There is no relaxation of penalty in the former, any more than in the latter. Abraham informs Dives that it is absolutely impossible to get from Hades to Paradise. " Between us and you there is a

1 If Hades in this passage means an underworld, it would include Paradise,

and thus Paradise would be cast into the lake of lire.

622 ESCHATOLOGY.

great gulf fixed, so that tliej which would pass from hence to you cannot ; neither can they pass to us that would come from thence." After this distinct statement of Abraham, Dives knows that the case of a man is hopeless, when he reaches Hades. " Then, said he, I pray thee, therefore, father, that thou wouldst send Lazarus to my father's house : for I have five brethren ; that he may testify unto them, lest they also come to this place of torment," Luke 16 : 27. The implication is, that if they do come to it, there is no salvation possible for them. Abraham corroborates this, by' afiirming that he who is not converted upon earth, will not be converted in Hades. " H they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead," Luke 16 : 31.

In the nine places from the New Testament which have been cited in this discussion, the connection shows that Hades denotes the place of retribution and misery. There are three other instances in the received text (two in the uncial) in which the word is employed, and denotes the grave : namely. Acts 2 : 27, 31 ; 1 Cor. 15 : 55. In 1 Cor. 15 : 55, 55 A B C D, Lachm., Tisch., Llort, Rev. Ver., read

In Acts 2: 27, it is said : "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hades, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption." The soul, here, is put for the body, as M'hen we say, " The ship sank with a hundred souls." The same metonymy is found frequently in the Old Testament. Lev. 21 : 1, " There shall none be defiled for a dead body:" Heb. "for a soul." Lev. 19:28, "Ye shall not make any cuttings in your flesh for the dead : " Heb. "for a soul." iSTum. Q:Q, "He shall come at no dead body;" Heb. " dead soul." Comp. Lev. 5:2; 22 : 4 ; Xnm. IS : 11, 13 ; Hag. 2 : 13. See p. 637, for Pearson's proof of this metonymy.

That soul is put metonymically for body, and that Llades means the grave, in Ps. 16 : 10, is proved by the following

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 623

considerations: {a) St. Peter sajs that "David being a prophet spalve of the resurrection of Christ, that liis soul was not left in hades, neither did his flesh see corruption," Acts 2:31. But there is no resurrection of the soul^ in the ordinary literal use of the word. The use here, therefore, must be metonyniical. Soul, as in the Old Testament passages cited above, must therefore stand for body. (J) Christ's resurrection could not be a deliverance of hoth soul and body from Hades, because both of them together could not be in Hades. Whichever signification of Hades be adopted, only one of the two could be in Hades, and consequently only one of the two could be delivered from Hades, If Hades be the underworld, then only Christ's soul was in Hades, not his body. If Hades be the grave, then only Christ's body was in Hades, not his soul. Accordingly, if Hades be the underworld, then " not to leave Christ's soul in hades " was, to take his soul out of the underworld. But to call this a resurrection of his body, as St. Peter does in Acts 2 : 81, is absurd. If Hades be the grave, then " not to leave Christ's soul in hades " was, to take his body out of the grave. To call this a resurrection of his body is rational. The choice must be made between the two explanations ; because, to take both the soul and body of Christ out of Hades is an impossibility, (c) The connection shows that " to leave Christ's soul in hades " is the same thing as " to suifer the Holy One to see corruption." David's reasoning, as stated by St. Peter in Acts 2 : 25-27, implies this. David " foresaw the Lord," that is, the Messiah. Respecting this Messiah, David argues that " his flesh shall rest in hope," hecause his " soul shall not be left in hades, nor he be suffered to see corruption." Xow, unless " soul " is here put for " flesh " and Hades means the grave, there is a non-sequitur in David's reasoning. That Christ's soul was not left in an underworld, would be no reason why his body should rest in hope and not see corruption.

62-± ESCHATOLOGY.

Again, St. Peter's own reasoning (Acts 2 : 22-27) proves the same thing. After saying that " God had raised up Jesus of Nazareth, having loosed the pangs of death," he shows that this event of Christ's resurrection w lis promised, by quoting the words of David, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hades, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption." That is to say, the promise " not to leave Christ's soul in hades " was fulfilled by " raising up Jesus of Nazareth, and loosing the pains of death." And yet again, St. Paul's quotation, in Acts 13 : 35, of this passage from David, shows that he understood soul to be put for body, and hades to mean the grave. Because he entirely omits the clause, " Thou wilt not leave my soul in hades," evidently regarding the clause, '' Thou wilt not suffer thine Holy One to see corruption," as stating the whole fact in the case : namely, the resurrection of Christ's body from the grave. In Acts 2 : 31, the uncials, Lachmann, Tischendorf, Hort, and P. Y. omit ^ '^v)(i] avrov.

The Old Testament term for the future abode of the wicked, and the place of future punishment, is Sheol (^bisip). This word, which is translated by Hades (aS^?) in the Septuagint, has two significations : {a) The place of future retribution, (b) The grave.

Before presenting the proof of this position, we call attention to the fact that it agrees with the explanation of Sheol and Hades common in the Early-Patristic and Peformation churches, and disagrees with that of the Later-Patristic, the Mediaeval, and a part of the Modern Protestant church. It agrees also with tlie interpretation generally given to these words in the versions of the Scriptures made since the Reformation, in the various languages of the world.'

1 In committing themselves, as the authors of the Revised Version of the English Bible do in their Preface to the Old Testament, to the position that Sheol and Hades, in the Scriptures, " signify the abode of departed spirits, and correspond to the Greek Hades or the underworld," and that neither term deINTERMEDIATE STATE. 625

1. That Slieol in the Old Testament signifies the place of future punishment, is proved by the following considerations :

{a) It is denounced against sin and sinners, and not against the righteous. It is a place to which the wicked are sent, in distinction from the good. " The wicked in a moment go down to sheol," Job 21 : 13. " The wicked shall be turned into sheol, and all the nations that forget God," Ps. 9:17. "Her steps take hold on sheol," Prov. 5 : 5. " Her house is the way to sheol, going down to the chambers of death," Prov. 7 : 27. " Her guests are in the depths of sheol," Prov. 9 : 18. " Thou slialt beat thy child with a rod, and shalt deliver his soul from sheol," Prov. 23 : 14. " A fire is kindled in my anger, and it shall burn to the lowest sheol," Deut. 32 : 22. "If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there ; if I make my bed in sheol [the contrary of heaven], behold thou art there," Ps. 139 : 8. '• The way of life is above to the wise, that he may depart from sheol beneath," Prov. 15 : 24. " Sheol is naked before him, and destruction [Abaddon, R. V,] hath no covering," Job 26 : 6. " Sheol and destruction [Abaddon, R. Y.] are before the Lord," Prov. 15 : 11. " Sheol and destruction [Abaddon, R. V.] are never satisfied," Prov. 27 : 20.

notes either the place of punishment, or the grave, they have placed themselves in doctrinal opposition, on a very important subject, to James's translators, to Luther and the authors of the principal European versions, and to the missionary translators generally. In all these versions, Sheol and Hades are understood to mean either hell, or the grave, and never an underworld containing all spirits good and bad. The view of the Reformers, upon this point, is stated in the following extract from the Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia (Article Hades) : " The Protestant churches rejected, with purgatory and its abuses, the whole idea of a middle state, and taught simply two states and places — heaven for believers, and hell for unbelievers. Hades was identified with Gehenna, and hence both terms were translated alike in the Protestant versions. The English (as also Luther's German) version of the New Testament translates Hades and Gehenna by the same word 'hell,' and thus obliterates the important distinction between the realm of the dead (or nether-world, spirit-world), and the place of torment or eternal punishment ; but in the Revision of 1881 the distinction is restored, and the term Hades introduced." Vol. 11—40.

626 ESCHATOLOGY.

If in these last three passages the revised rendering be adopted, it is still more evident that Sheol denotes Hell ; for Abaddon is the Hebrew for Apollvon, who is said to be "the angel and king of the bottomless pit," Rev. 9 : 11. There can be no rational doubt, that in this class of Old Testament texts the wicked and sensual are warned of a future evil and danger. The danger is, that they shall be sent to Sheol. The connection of thought requires, therefore, that Sheol in such passages have the same meaning as the modern Hell, and like this have an exclusive reference to the wicked. Otherwise, it is not a warning. To o-ive it a meanino; that makes it the common residence of the good and evil, is to destroy its force as a Divine menace. If Sheol be merely a promiscuous underworld for all souls, then to be " turned into sheol " is no more a menace for the sinner than for the saint, and consequently a menace for neither. In order to be of the nature of an alarm for the wicked, Sheol must be something that pertains to them alone. If it is shared with the good, its power to terrify is gone. If the good man goes to Sheol, the wicked man will not be afraid to go with him. It is no answer to this, to say that Sheol contains two divisions. Hades and Paradise, and that the wicked go to the former. This is not in the Biblical text, or in its connection. The sensual and wicked who afe threatened with Sheol, as the punishment of their wickedness, are not threatened with a part of Sheol, but with the whole of it. Sheol is one, undivided, and homogeneous in the inspired representation. The subdivision of it into heterogeneous compartments is a conception imported into the Bible from the Greek and Roman classics. The Old Testament knows nothing of a Sheol that is partly an evil, and partly a good. The Biblical Siieol is always an evil, and nothing but an evil. When the human body goes down to Sheol in the sense of the " grave," this is an evil. And when the human soul goes down to Sheol in the sense of " hell and retribution," this

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 627

is an evil. Both are threatened, as the penalty of sin, to the wicked, but never to the righteous.

Consequently, in the class of passages of wliich we are speaking, " going down to sheol " denotes sometliing more dreadful than going down to the grave, or than entering the so-called underworld of departed spirits. To say that " the wicked shall be turned into sheol," implies that the righteous shall not be ; just as to say that " they who obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ shall be punished with everlasting destruction " (2 Thess. 1 : 8, 9), implies that those who do obey it shall not be. To say that the "steps" of the prostitute " take hold on sheol," is the same as to say that "• whoremongers shall have their part in the lake which burnetii with fire and brimstone," Rev. 21 : 8. To " deliver the soul of a child from sheol " by parental discipline, is not to deliver him either from the grave, or from a spirit-world, but from the future misery that awaits the morally nndiseiplined and rebellious. In mentioning Sheol in such a connection, the inspired writer is not mentioning a region that is common alike to the righteous and the wicked. This would defeat his purpose to warn the latter.' Sheol, when denounced to the wicked, mnst be as peculiar to them, and as much confined to them, as when "the lake of fire and brimstone" is denounced to them. All such Old Testament passages teach that those who go to Sheol suffer from the wrath of God, as the eternal judge who punishes iniquity. The words, " The wicked is snared in the work of his own hands. The wicked shall be turned into sheol, and all the nations that forget God," Ps. 9 : 16, 17, are as much of the nature of a Divine menace against sin, as the words, " In the day thou eatest thereof, thou

' " The meaning of the Hebrew word Sheol is doubtful, but I have not hesitated to translate it hell. I do not find fault with those who translate it grave, but it is certain that the prophet means something more than common death ; otherwise he would say nothing else concerning the wicked, than what would also happen to all the faithful in common with them." Calvin : On Ps. 9 : 17

628 ESCHATOLOGY.

slialt surely die," Gen. 2 : 17. And the interpretation which eliminates the idea of endless punishment from the former, to be consistent, should eliminate it from the latter.

Accordingly, these texts must be read in connection with, and be explained by that large class of texts in the Old Testament which represent God as a judge, and assert ?k future judgment, and even a future resurrection for this purpose. " Shall not the judge of all the earth do right ? " Gen. 18 : 25. " To me belongeth vengeance, and recompense ; their feet shall slide in due time," Deut. 32 : 35. "Enoch the seventh from Adam prophesied of these, saying, Behold the Lord cometh with ten thousand of his saints to execute judgment upon all, and to convince all that are ungodly among them of all their ungodly deeds which they have ungodly committed," Jude 14: 15. " The wicked is reserved to the day of destruction ; they shall be brought forth to the day of wrath," Job 21 : 30. " The ungodly shall not stand in the judgment; the way of the ungodly shall perish," Ps. 1 : 5, 6. " Verily, he is a God that judgeth in the earth," Ps. 58 : 11. "Vho knoweth the power of thine anger ? even according to thy fear, so is thy wrath," Ps. 90 : 11. " O Lord God, to whom vengeance belongeth, shew thyself. Lift np thyself, thou judge of the earth : render a reward to the proud," Ps. 94:1,2. " There is a way that seemeth right unto a man, but the end thereof are the ways of death," Prov. 16 : 25. " God shall judge the righteous and the wucked : for there is a time for every purpose, and every work," Eccl. 3 : 17. " Walk in the ways of thine heart, and in the sight of thine eyes ; but know thou that for all these things God will bring thee into judgment," Eccl. 11:9. "God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil," Eccl. 12 : 14. " The sinners in Zion are afraid ; fearfulness hath surprised the hypocrites. Who among us shall dwell wdtli devouring fire ? who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnINTERMEDIATE STATE. 029

ino;s?" Is. 33:14. Of "the men that liave transo-ressed against God," it is said tliat their "worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched," Is. 6Q : 24. " I belield till the thrones were cast down, and the Ancient of days did sit. His throne was like the fiery flame, and his wheels like burning fire ; thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him; the judgment was set, and the books were opened," Dan. 7 : 9, 10. " Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt," Dan. 12 : 2. " The Lord hath sworn by the excellency of Jacob, Surely I never will forget any of their works," Amos 8 : 7. "They shall be mine, saith the Lord of hosts, in the day when I make up my jewels," Mai. 3 : 17.

A final judgment, unquestionably, supposes a place where the sentence is executed. If there is a day of doom, there is a world of doom. Consequently, these Old Testament passages respecting the final judgment throw a strong light upon the meaning of Sheol, and make it certain,, in the highest degree, that it denotes the world where the penalty resulting from the verdict of the Supreme Judge is to be experienced by the transgressor. The "wicked," when sentenced at the last judgment, are " turned into sheol," as " idolaters and all liars," when sentenced, " have their part in the lake which burnetii with fire and brimstone," Kev. 21:8.

(5) A second proof that Sheol signifies the place of future punishment, in the Old Testament, is the fact that there is no other proper name for it in the whole volume : for Tophet is metaphorical, and rarely employed. If Sheol is not the place where the wrath of God falls upon the transgressor, there is no place mentioned where it does. But it is utterly improbable that a final sentence would be announced so clearly as it is under the Old dispensation, and yet the place of its execution be undesignated. lu

630 ESCHATOLOGY.

modern theology, Judgment and Hell are correlates ; eacli implying the other, each standing or falling with the other. In the Old Testament theology, Judgment and Sheol sustain the same relations. The proof that Sheol does not signify Hell would, virtually, be the proof that the doctrine of Hell is not contained in the Old Testament ; and this would imperil the doctrine of the final judgment. Universalisra receives very strong support from all versions and commentaries which take the idea of retribution out of the term Sheol ; because no texts that contain the word can be cited to prove either a future sentence, or a future suffering. They only prove that there is a world of disembodied spirits, whose moral character and condition cannot be inferred from anything in the signification of Sheol ; because the good are in Sheol, and the wicked are in Sheol. When it is merely said of a deceased person that he is in the world of spirits, it is impossible to decide whether he is holy or sinful, happy or miserable.

(c) A third proof that Sheol, in these passages, denotes the dark abode of the wicked, and the state of future suffering, is found in those Old Testament texts which speak ■of the contrary bright abode of the righteous, and of their :state of blessedness. According to the view we are combating. Paradise is in Sheol, and constitutes a part of it. But there is too great a contrast between the two abodes of the good and evil, to allow of their being brought under ■one and the same gloomy and terrifying term Sheol. When " the Lord put a word in Balaam's mouth," Balaam said, " Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his," Num. 23 : 5, 10. The Psalmist describes this " last end of the righteous " in the following terms: "My flesh shall rest in hope. Thou wilt show me the path of life ; in thy presence is fulness of joy ; at thy right hand, there are pleasures for evermore," Ps. 16 : 11. " As for me, 1 will behold thy face in righteousness ; I -shall be satisfied when I awake with thy likeness," Ps. 17:

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 631

15. " God will redeem my soul from the power of slieol ; for he shall receive me," Ps. 49 : 15. " Thou shalt guide itie with thy counsel, and afterwards receive me to glory. Whom have I in heaven but thee ? " Ps. 73 : 24. In like manner, Isaiah (25:8) says respecting the righteous, that '• The Lord God will swallow up death in victory, and will wipe away tears from all faces ; " and Solomon asserts that ''the righteous hath hope in his death," Prov. 14:32. These descriptions of the blessedness of the righteous when they die have nothing in common with the Old Testament conception of Sheol, and cannot possibly be made to agree with it. The " anger " of God " burns to the lowest sheol;" which implies that it burns through the whole of Sheol, from top to bottom. The wicked are " turned " into Sheol, and " in a moment go down," to Sheol ; but the good are not " turned " into " glory," nor do they " in a moment go down " to " the right hand of God." The " presence " of God, the " right hand " of God, the " glory " to which the Psalmist is to be received, and the " heaven" which he longs for, are certainly not in the dreadful Sheol. They do not constitute one of its compartments. If between death and the resurrection the disembodied spirit of the Psalmist is in " heaven," at the " right hand " of God, in his "presence," and beholding his "glory," it is not in a dismal underworld. There is not a passage in the Old Testament that asserts, or in any way suggests, that the light of the Divinj countenance, and the blessedness of communion with God, are enjoyed in Sheol. Sheol, in the Old Testament, is gloom, and only gloom, and gloomy continually. Will any one seriously contend that in the passage, " Enoch walked with God : and he was not ; for God took him," it would harmonize with the idea of " walking with God," and with the Old Testament conception of Sheol, to suppl}' the ellipsis by saying that " God took him to Sheol?" Was Sheol that "better country, that is, an heavenly^'' which the Old Testament saints " desired," and

632 ESCHATOLOGY.

to attain which they " were tortured, not accepting deliverance ? " I-Ieb. 11 : 16, 35.

{d) A fourth proof that Sheol is the place of future retribution, is its inseparable connection witli spiritual and eternal death. The Old Testament, like the jSTew, designates the punishment of the wicked by the term ''death." And spiritual death is implied, as well as physical. Such is the meaning in Gen. 2 : 17. The death there threatened is the very same Bdvaro

Sheol is as inseparably associated with spiritual death and perdition, in the Old Testament, as Hades is in the ISTew Testament, and as Hell is in the common phraseology of the Christian Church. " Sheol is naked before him, and destruction hath no covering," Job 26 : 6. " Sheol and destruction are before the Lord," Prov. 15:11. "Sheol and destruction are never full," Prov. 27 : 20. "Her house is the way to sheol, going down to the chambers of death," Prov. 7 : 27. " Her house inclineth unto death, and her paths unto the dead," Prov. 2:18. "Her feet go down

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 633

to death ; her steps take hold on slieol," Prov. 5 : 5. The sense of these passages is not exliausted, by saying that licentiousness leads to physical disease and death. The " death " here threatened is the same that St. Paul speaks of, when he says that " they wliich commit such things are worthy of death," liom. 1 : 32 ; and that " the end of those things is death," Rom. 6 : 21. Eternal death and Sheol are as inseparably joined in Prov. 5 : 5, as eternal death and Hades are in Pev. 20 : 14. But if Sheol be taken in the mythological sense of an underworld, or spiritworld, there is no inseparable connection between it and " death," either physical or spiritual. Physical death has no power in the spirit-world over a disembodied spirit. And spiritual death is separable from Sheol, in the case of the good. If the good go down to Sheol, they do not go down to eternal death.

2. That Sheol, in one class of Old Testament passages, denotes the grave, to which all men, the good and evil alike, go down, is clear from the following citations. Before proceeding, however, to this citation, it is to be remarked that this double signification of hell and the grave, is explained by the connection between physical death and etei'nal retribution. The death of the body is one of the consequences of sin, and an integral part of tlie total penalty. To go down to the grave, is to pay the first instalment of the transgressor^s debt to justice. It is, therefore, the metonymy of a part for the whole, when the grave is denominated Sheol. As in English, " death " may mean either physical or spiritual death, so in Hebrew, Sheol may mean either the grave or hell.

When Sheol signifies the " grave," it is only the hody that goes down to Sheol. But as the body is naturally put for the whole person, the man is said to go down to tlie grave, when his body alone is laid in it. Christ '' called Lazarus out of his grave," John 12 : 17. This does not mean that the soul of Lazarus was in that srrave. When a

634 ESCHATOLOGY.

sick person savs, "I am going down to the grave," no ono understands liim to mean that his spirit is descending into a place nnder the earth. And when the aged Jacob says, " I will go down into slieol, unto my [dead] son mourning*' (Gen. 37 : 35), no one should understand him to teach the descent of his disembodied spirit into a subterranean world. " The spirit of man goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast goeth downward," Eccl. 3 : 21. The soul of the animal dies with the body ; that of the man does not. The statement that "the Son of man shall be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth " (Matt. 12 : 40) refers to the burial of his body, not to the residence of his soul.' When Christ said to the penitent thief, " To-daj' shalt thou be with me in Paradise," he did not mean that his human soul and that of the penitent should be in " the heart of the earth," but in the heavenly paradise. Christ is represented as dwelling in heaven between his ascension and his second advent. " Him must the heavens receive, till the time of the restitution of all things," Acts 3 : 21. " The Lord shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God," 1 Thess. 4:16. "Our conversation is in heaven, from which we look for our Saviour the Lord Jesus," Phil. 3 : 20. But the souls of the redeemed, during this same intermedi1 That " the heart of the earth " mer.ns the grave, Witsius (Apostles' Creed, Dissertation XVII. ) argues in the following manner : "Jonah says, that while he was in the bowels of the fish, he was ' in the belly of hell,' or of the grave, and ' in the midst (Heb., heart) of the sea : ' and in this respect he was a figure of Christ placed in the heart of the earth. This does not mean the hell of the damned, which, as Jerome says, is commonly said to be ' in the midst of the earth ; ' but an earthen receptacle, which has earth above, below, and on every side ; or more briefly, which is within the earth. As the Scripture places Tyre ' in the heart of the sea,' that is, surrounded by the sea ; as ' the way of a ship is in the heart of the sea,' when it is surrounded on all sides by the sea ; as Absalom was ' alive in the heart of the oak,' that is, in the oak, within its branches — so the grave is ' the heart of the earth.' Chrysostom remarks that ' the sacred writer doth not say in the earth, but in the heart of the earth, thaf the expression might clearly denote the grave, and that no one might suspect a mere appearance [of death].'"

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 635

ate period, are represented as being with Christ. " Fatlier,

1 will that they whom thou hast given me be with me where I am, that they may behold my glory which thou hast given me,'' John 17 : 24. " We desire rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord,''

2 Cor. 5 : 8. AYheri, therefore, the human bod}' goes down to Sheol, it goes down to the grave, and is unaccompanied with the soul.

The following are a few out of many examples of this signification of Sheol. " The Lord killeth, and maketh alive : he bringeth down to sheol, and bringeth up," 1 Sam. 2 : G. " Thy servants shall bring down the gray hairs of thy servant our father with sorrow to sheol," Gen. 44 : 31.'

' This text, and Gen. 42 : 38, are parallel to Gen. 37 : 35, and explain Jacob's words, " I will go down mourning into sheol, unto my son." "Gray hairs" are matter, and cannot go into a world of spirits.

It is objected that Sheol does not mean the " grave," because there is a word r~l];p ) for grave. A grave is bought and sold, and the plural is used ; but Sheol is never bought and sold, or used in the plural. The reply is, that " grave" has an abstract and general sense, denoted by ^"itU.") and a concrete and particular, denoted by "^^ip,. All men go to the grave; but not all men have a grave. When our Lord says that " all that are in their graves (mi'^JM^^o'^) shall come forth " (John 5 : 28), he does not mean that only those shall be raised who have been laid in a particular grave with funeral obsequies. A man is "in the grave," in the general sense, when his soulis separated from his body and his body has "returned to the dust," Gen. 3 : 19. To be " in the grave," in the abstract sense, is to have the elements of the body mingled with those of the earth from which it was taken. Eccl. 12 : 7. The particular spot where the mingling occurs is unessential. Moses is in the grave; but "no man Icnovveth of his sepulchre unto this day." We say of one drowned in the ocean, that he found a watery- grave. These remarks apply also to the use of ciStjs and i.LvniJ.i'iov. According to Pearson TCreed, Art. V.), the Jerusalem Targum, with that of Jonathan, and the Persian Targum, explain blitw' in Gen. 37 : 8.5 ; 42 : 3S, by "l*p . To the objection that Jacob knew, or supposed, that his son had been devoured by wild beasts, and consequently had no grave, and, therefore, meant to say that he should go down to the world of spirits to meet him, Rivetus (Exercitatio CLI., in Gen.) replies as follows: "Per aepidcfirum non intelligiraus stricte, id de quo apud jurisconsultos disputatur, cum agunt de sepulchro violato, sed id referiraus ad rationem humationis in genere, quandocumque modo terra reddatur terrae, juxta sententiam divinam, ' Pulvis es, et in pulverem reverteris.' Sepeliri enim dicuntur quicunque terrae redduntur, etiam qui sepeliuntur ' sepultura asini,' quod de Joachimo pronuntiavit Jeremias (22 : 19). Igitur verba Jacobi ' Descendam ad filium mexim lugens in infernum,

G36 ESCHATOLOGY.

" O that thou wouldest liide me in sheol," Job 14 : 13. " Sheol is my house ; I have said to corruption, Thou art my father : to the worm, Thou art my mother, and my sister," Job IT : 13, 14. " Our bones are scattered at the mouth of sheol," Ps. 141 : 7. Ivorah and his company " went down alive into sheol, and tliey perished from the congregation," Kum. 16 : 33. " In sheol, who shall give thee thanlvs ? " Ps. G : 5. " There is no wisdom in sheol whither thou goest," Ecel. 9 : 10. " I will ransom them from the power of sheol ; O sheol, I will be thy destruction," Hosea 13 : 14. "My life draweth nigh unto sheol," Ps. 88 : 3. " What man is he that liveth, and shall not see death ? Shall he deliver his soul from the hand of sheol ? " Ps. 89 : 48. " The English version," says Stuart, " renders Sheol by grave in thirty instances out of sixty-four, and might have so rendered it in more."

Sheol in the sense of the grave is invested with gloomy associations for the good, as well as the wicked ; and this under the Christian dispensation, as M^ell as under the Jewish. The Old economy and the New are much alike in this respect. The modern Christian believer shrinks from the grave, like the ancient Jewish believer. He needs as much grace in order to die tranquilly as did Moses and David. It is true that " Christ has brought immortality to light in the gospel ; " has poured upon the grave the bright light of his own resurrection, a far brighter light than the Patriarchal and Jewish church enjoyed ; yet \n?in''Q faith is as weak and wavering as ever, and requires the support of God.

Accordingly, Sheol in the sense of the grave is represented as somethino; out of which the righteous are to be

id est, in sepwlchrum, non possumiis melius explicate quam verbis Albini, qui sic ingemiscentis patris exponit querelam : ' In luctu permanebo, donee me t>?rra snscipiat, lit filium meum sepulchrum jam suscepit.' Id ipse Jacobus etiam intellexit, qui per vocem sheol locum denotat ' quo senum cani cum dolore deducuntur.' "

mTERMEDIATB STATE. 637

delivered by a resurrection of the body to glory, but the bodies of the wicked are to be left under its power. " Like sheep, the wicked are laid in sheol ; death shall feed on them. But God will redeem my soul [me = my body] from the power of sheol," Ps. 4:9 : 14, 15. " Thou wilt not leave my soul [me = my body] in sheol ; neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption," Fs. 16 : 10.' This

1 In support of this interpretation of these words, we avail ourselves of the unquestioned learning and accuracy of Bishop Pearson. After remarking that the explanation which makes the clause, "He descended into hell," to mean "that Christ in his body was laid in the grave," is "ordinarily rejected by denying that ' soul' is ever taken for ' body,' or ' hell ' for the ' grave,' " he proceeds to say that "this denial is in vain: for it must be acknowledged, that sometimes the Scriptures are rightly so, and cannot otherwise be, understood. Fir.st, the same word in the Hebrew, which the psalmist used, and in the Greek, which the apostle used, and we translate 'the soul,' is elsewhere used for the body of a dead man, and rendered so in the English version. Both UJQD and yf/vxh i^re used for the body of a dead man in the Hebrew, and Septuagint of Num. 6:6; 'He shall come at no dead body' ( Ti'H ti;D3\. The same usage is found in Lsv. 5:2; 19 : 28 ; 21 : 1, 11 ; 22 : 4 ; Num. 18 :'ll, 13 ; Haggai 2 : 13. Thus, several times, Tj;53 and ^vxh ^^^^ taken for the body of a dead man ; that body which polluted a man under the Law, by the touch thereof. And Maimonides hath observed, that there is no pollution from the body till the soul be departed. Therefore 1132p and \pvx^ did signify the body after the separation of the soul. And it was anciently observed by St. Augustine, that the soul may be taken for the body only : ' Animae nomine corpus solum posse significari, mode quodam locutionis ostenditur, quo significatur per id quod continetur illud quod continet.' Epist. 157, al. 190, ad Optatum ; De animaruni engine, c. .5, § 19. Secondly, the Hebrew word bis^'^I^i which the psalmist used, and the Greek

word oStjs, which the apostle employed, and is translated ' hell ' in the English version, doth certainly in some other places signify no more than the ' grave,' and is translated so. As when Mr. Ainsworth followeth the word, ' For I will go down unto my son, mourning, to hell ; ' our translation, arriving at the sense, rendereth it, ' For I will go down into the grave, unto my son, mourning, ' Gen. 37 : 35. So again he renders, ' Ye shall bring down my gray hairs with sorrow unto hell,' that is ' to the grave,' Gen. 42 : 38. And in this sense we say, ' The Lord killeth and maketh alive : he bringeth down to the grave, and bringeth up,' 1 Sam. 2:6. It is observed by Jewish commentators that those Christians are mistaken who interpret those words spoken by Jacob, ' I will go down into sheol,' of hell [in the sense of underworld] ; declaring that Sheol there is nothing but the grave." Pearson, On the Creed, Article V. The position that T1,"D!3 is sometimes put for a dead body, and that Sheol in such a connection denotes the grave, was also taken by Usher (as it had been by Beza, on Acts 2 :

638 ESCHATOLOGY.

passage, wliile Messianic, has also its reference to David and all believers. " I will ransom tbein from the power of sheol. O death, I will be thy plagues ; O sheol, I will be thy destruction,'' Hosea 13 : 14. St, Paul quotes this (1 Cor. 15 : 55) in proof of the blessed resurrection of the bodies of believers — showing that " sheol " here is the '' grave," where the body is laid, and from which it is raised. The bodies of the wicked, on the contrary, are not delivered from the power of Sheol, or the grave, by a blessed and glorious resurrection, but are still kept under its dominion by a " resurrection to shame and everlasting contempt," Dan. 12 : 2. Though the wicked are raised from the dead, yet this is no triumph for them over death and the grave. Their resurrection bodies are not " celestial " and " glorified," like those of the redeemed, but are suited to the nature of their evil and malignant souls. " Like sheep they are laid in sheol ; death shall feed upon them," Ps. 49 : 14. Respecting sinful Judah and the enemies of Jehovah, the prophet says, " Sheol hath enlarged herself, and opened her mouth without measure, and their glory shall descend unto it," Isa. 5 : 14. Of the fallen Babylonian monarch, it is said, " Sheol from beneath is moved for thee to meet thee at thy coming. Thy pomp is brought down to sheol : the worm is spread under thee, and the worms cover thee," Isa. 14 : 9, 11. To convert this bold personification of the " grave," and the " worm," which devour the bodies of God's adversaries, into an actual underworld where the spirits of all the dead, the friends as M'ell as the enemies of God, are gathered, is not only to convert rhetoric into logic, but to substitute the mythological for the

27. before him), and is supported with his remarkable philological and patristic learning. See his discussion of the Limbus Patrum and Christ's Descent into Hell, in his Answer to a Challenge of a Jesuit in Ireland. Works, Vol. III.

This metonymy of " soul " for " body" is as natural an idiom in English, as it is in Hebrew and Greek. It is more easy for one to say that "the ship sank with a hundred souls," than to say that it '' sank with a hundred bodies." Aaid yet the latter is the real fact in the case.

INTERMEDIATE STATE. 639

Biblical view of the future life. " Some interpreters," sajs Alexander, on Isaiah 1-1 : 9, " proceed upon the supposition, that in this passage we have before us not a mere prosopopoeia or poetical creation of the highest order, but a chapter from the popular belief of the Jews, as to the locality, contents, and transactions of the unseen world. Thus Gesenius, in his Lexicon and Commentary, gives a minute topographical description of Sheol as the Hebrews believed it to exist. With equal truth a diligent compiler might construct a map of hell, as conceived by the English Puritans, from the descriptive portions of the Paradise Lost." The clear perception and sound sense of Calvin penetrate more unerringly into the purpose of the sacred writer. " The prophet," he says (Isa. 14 : 9), " makes a fictitious representation, that when this tyrant shall die and go down to the grave, the dead will go forth to meet him and honor him." Theodoret (Isa. 14 : 9j explains in the same waj'. He remarks on tJie words, "Hell from beneath is moved for thee, to meet thee," etc., that, " it is the custom of Scripture sometimes to employ a figure, in order to state a thing more clearly. In this place the prophet introduces death as endowed with mind and reason, and expostulating with the king of Babylon."

From this examination of texts, it appears that Sheol, in the Old Testament, has the same two significations that Hades has in the New. The only difference is, that in the Old Testament, Sheol less often, in proportion to the whole number of instances, denotes "hell," and more often the " grave," than Hades does in the Xew Testament. And this, for the reason that the doctrine of future retribution was more fully revealed and developed by Christ and his apostles, than it was by Moses and the prophets.

If after this study of the Biblical data, there still be doubt whether Sheol and Hades denote sometimes the place of retribution for the wicked, and sometimes the grave, and not an underworld, or spirit-world, common to

640 ESCHATOLOGY.

both the good and evil, let the reader substitute eitlier spirit-world or underworld in the following passages, and say if the connection of thought, or even common-sense, is preserved : " The wicked in a moment go down to the spirit-world." " The wicked shall be turned into the spiritworld, and all the nations that forget God." " Her steps take hold on the spirit-world." " Her guests are in the depths of the spirit-world." " Thou shalt beat thy child with a rod, and shalt deliver his soul from the spiritworld." " The way of life is above to the wise, that he may depart from the spirit- world beneath." "In the spirit- world, who shall give thee thanks ? " " There is no wisdom in the spirit-world, whither thou goest." "I will ransom them from the power of the spirit-world ; O spiritworld I will be th}^ destruction." " Like sheep the wicked are laid in the spirit-world ; death shall feed upon them. But God will redeem my soul fi'om the power of the spiritworld." " The gates of the spirit-world shall not prevail against the church." "Thou Capernaum which art exalted unto heaven shalt be brought down to the spirit-world." " Death and the spirit-world were cast into the lake of fire." "I saw a pale horse, and his name that sat upon him was Death, and the spirit-world followed him."

CHAPTER 11.

Augustine : City of God, XX. Aquinas : Summa, III. (Supplement), xc. Ursinus : Christian Religion, Q. 52. Pearson : Creed, Art. VII. Browne : On the Second Advent. Cunningham : Second Advent of Christ. Alford : Commentary on Kev. 19 and 20. Wordsworth : Commentary on Rev. 19 and 20. Craven : Lange's Commentary on Rev. 19 and 20. Duffield : Second Coming of Christ : Millenarianism Defended. Crosby : The Second Advent. Merrill : The Second Coming of Christ. Lee : Scripture Doctrine of the Coming of our Lord. Strong : Theology, 566-574.

The teaching of Scripture is explicit, that Jesns Christ sliall come again from heaven to earth, in a visible bodily form. " While the apostles looked steadfastly towards heaven as he went np, behold two men stood by them in white apparel, which also said, Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing np unto heaven 'i This same Jesns, which is taken from you into heaven, shall so come, in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven,"" Acts 1 : 10, 11. Christ himself, being solemnly adjured by the high priest to say whether he was " the Christ the Son of God," replies " Thou hast said. Hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven," Matt. 26 : 63, 64. St. John, seeing the event in ecstatic vision, says, " Behold he cometh with clouds, and every eye shall see him, and they also which pierced him," Rev. 1 : 7.

The passages of Scripture which must chiefly be relied upon, in constructing the doctrine of the Second Advent, Vol. II.— 41

G42 ESCHATOLOGY.

are Matt. 25 ; Matt. 26 : Gi ; 1 Cor. 15 ; 2 Tliess. 2 ; Eev. 20 and 21.

The doctrine which the Church very early derived from the Scriptures respecting Christ's second coming, is found in the statement of the Apostles' creed : " The third day Christ rose from the dead ; he ascended into heaven ; and sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty ; from thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead." According to this statement, there is no corporeal advent of Christ upon earth after his resurrection, until he leaves his session with the Father and comes directly " from thence " to the last judgment.

The doctrinal statement in the Apostles' creed, consequently, precludes a premillennial advent of Christ. According to this theory, there are two corporeal resurrections ; the first, of the righteous alone, supposed to be taught in Rev, 20 : 4, 5 ; the second, that of both the righteous and the wicked at the end of the world, taught in Matt. 25 : 31-46. There is an interval of a thousand years between the two, and during this period Christ reigns in corporeal presence upon the renovated earth.

Premillenarianisni was the revival of the pseu do- Jewish doctrine of the Messianic kingdom, as this had been formed in the later periods of Jewish history by a materializing exegesis of the Old Testament. See Neander : History, I. 650 sq. Its most flourishing period was between 150 and 250. Its prevalence in the church at that time has been much exaggerated. That it could not have been the catholic and received doctrine, is proved by the fact that it forms no part of the Apostles' creed, which belongs to this period, and hence by implication is rejected by it. " Chiliasm," says Neander (I. 651), " never formed a part of the general creed of the church. It was diffused from one country [Phrygia], and from a single fountain-head." In the preceding period of the Apostolic fathers, 100 to 150, it had scarcely any currency. There are no traces of

SECOND ADVENT. 64:3

it in Clement of Rome, Ignatius, and Poljcarp. In Barnabas, Hernias, and Papias it is found ; but these are much less influential names than the former. The early Apologists, Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus do not advocate it. Alford (On Rev. 20 : 4, 5) is greatly in error, in saying that " the whole church for three hundred years fi-om the apostles understood the two resurrections in the literal premillenarian sense."

Rev. 20 : 4-6, is the chief and nearly the sole support of the doctrine of two corporeal resurrections. In explaining it, reference must be had to other passages of Scripture, especially Matt. 25. Christ himself here gives an account of his own final advent, and he speaks of only one corporeal resurrection.

In order to harmonize Matt. 25, with Rev. 20 : 4-6, the term " resurrection," in the latter passage must have a tropical signification. And this is supported by the phraseology employed by St. John. "I saw the souls (^v%a?) of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and they lived (e^rjaav) and reigned with Christ a thousand years. This is the first resurrection." The "living and reiirnins:" is the " resurrection." Had St. John intended a literal resurrection, he would have said, " I saw the bodies of them that were beheaded : " and would have employed the verb aviaTrjfjii, as is the case in the New Testament generally, and not the verb ^co, or ava^co. The Revelator, in vision, sees the martyrs and other witnesses for Christ as disembodied spirits dwelling in paradise, and describes them not as 7'isinff, but as "living and reigning" with Christ for a thousand years. This " living and reigning," he calls " the first resurrection." They lived with Christ by their faith in him, and this spiritual life was a spiritual resurrection from " death in trespasses and sins," Eph. 2 : 1. Having thus " risen with Christ " (Coloss. 3 : 1), they sought " those things which are above where Christ sitteth on the riffht hand of God," and as the reward of their eminent

G44 ESCHATOLOGY.

spirituality and devotion, even to martyrdom, reign in the heavenly paradise with Clirist in his spiritual reign, during that remarkable period of the triumph of the gospel npon earth which is denominated the millennium. Special honor in heaven, granted to particular persons for extraordinary service and suffering in Christ's cause upon earth, is spoken of elsewhere. To the apostles our Lord says, "When the Son of man shall sit on the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel," Matt. 19 : 28. This certainly is to be interpreted metaphorically, not literally.

The tropical use of " resurrection " to denote regeneration is a characteristic of St. John, as well as of St. Paul. In John 5 : 25-29, our Lord speaks of two resurrections, the first of which is spiritual, and the second is corporeal. "Verily, verily, I say unto you. The hour is coming, and noio is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God : and they that hear shall live." The reference, here, is to tlie regeneration of the human soul, which is often called a resurrection, as the following passages show : John 5 : 24:, " lie that believeth on me is passed from death unto life." John 11 : 25, 26, " Lie that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live, and whosoever liveth and believeth in mo shall never die." Kom. 6:4, "As Christ was raised from the dead, even so we also should walk in newness of life." Eph. 5 : 14, " Arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee life." Col. 3 : 1, " If ye be risen with Christ, seek those things that are above." Eph. 2 : 6, "When we were dead in sins, God quickened us, and raised us up, and made us sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus." Col. 2 : 12, " Entombed with him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him through the faith of the operation of God."

After speaking of regeneration as a spiritual resurrection, our Lord proceeds to speak of another resurrection which he describes as corporeal. " Marvel not at this : for the

SECOND ADVENT. 645

lioiu- is coming [he docs not sa}', "and now is"], in the whicli all tliat are in their graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth, they tliat have done good unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation." This is the literal resurrection of the body ; and this is the '' second resurrection," in relation to the first tropical resurrection. The regeneration of the soul, according to St. Paul, results in the resurrection of the body. " If the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his spirit that dwelleth in you," Rom. 8 : 11. It should be noticed, that while Christ, in John 5 : 25-29, mentions directly both resurrections, St. John, in Rev. 20 : 5, 6, directly mentions only one, namely, the " first resurrection." He leaves the " second resurrection," uamely, that of the body, to be inferred. That the "first resurrection," in Rev. 20:6, is spiritual, is proved still further by the fact that those who have part in it are " blessed and holy," and not " under the power of the second death," and are "priests of God." The literal resurrection is not necessarily connected with such characteristics, but the tropical is.

In Rev. 20 : 5, it is said that " the rest of the dead lived not again until tlie thousand years were finished." ' The remainder of the believing dead do not " live [and reign with Christ] " until the final consummation at the end of the world. The martyrs are honored above the mass of believers, by a co-reign with the Redeemer during the millennium. The church generally does not participate in the triumph of its Head until after the millennium and final judgment.

Augustine (City of God, xx. 6-10) gives this explanation of the two resurrections. The binding of Satan, he says,

' Tischendorf, Hort, A B, Vulg., read eQqaav, instead of dve^ria-ay, in Receptus. The Revised version omits "asain."

64:6 ESCHATOLOGY.

is spiritual, and the reign of Christ on earth is also spiritual. The martyrs, as disembodied spirits, reign spiritually with their Lord. Augustine (City, XX. vii.) mentions the opinion of some who believed that the saints will rise on the completion of six thousand years from the creation, and will live upon the earth to celebrate the millennial sabbath. "This opinion," he adds, " would not be objectionable, if it were believed that the joys of the saints in that sabbath shall be spiritual, and consequent on the presence of God, for I myself, too, once held this opinion. But as they assert that those who then rise again shall enjoy the leisure of innnoderate carnal banquets, furnished with an amount of meat and drink such as not only to shock the feeling of the temperate, but even to surpass the measure of credulity itself, such assertions can be believed only by the carnal. They who do believe them are called b}'^ the spiritual, Chiliasts ; which we may literally reproduce by the name of Millenarians." See Wordsworth : On John 5 : 24-29.

CHAPTER in.

Athenagoras : On the Resurrection. Justin Martyr : On the Resurrection. TertuUian : On the Resurrection. Augustine : City of God, XX. XX. xxi. Aquinas : Summa, III (Supplement) Ixxv.Ixxxvii. Calvin : Institutes, III. xxv. Pearson : On the Creed, Art. XI. Witsius : Apostles' Creed, Dissertation XIX. Ursinus : Christian Religion, Qu. 57. Cudworth : System, III. 314r-319 (Ed. Tegg). Howe : Blessedness of the Righteous, X. Horsley : On the Resurrection. South: On the Resurrection (Sermon LIL). Rawlinson : Egypt, X. Speaker's Commentary : On Dan. 12 (Excursus). Goulburn : On the ResuiTection. Landis: On the Resurrection.

The doctrine of the resurrection of the body was from the first a cardinal and striking tenet of Christianity. Tiie resurrection of Christ made it such. Perhaps no article of the new religion made greater impression, at first view, upon the pagan. When the philosophers of Athens " heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked, and others said. We will hear thee again of this matter," Acts IT : 32. The immortality of the soul and its disembodied existence were familiar to them. Socrates, in the Phaedrus (245), argues that " the soul is immortal, for that is immortal which is ever in motion ; but that which is moved by another, in ceasing to move ceases to live." And in the Phaedo (114), after his description of the underworld, he adds, " I do not mean to affirm that the description which I liave given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true — a man of sense ought hardly to say that. But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, he may ventCAS ESCHATOLOGY.

ure to think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of the kind is true." " As for thy body," says Marcus Aurelius (Meditations, X.), " it is but a vessel or case that conipasseth thee about. It is but an instrument, like a carpenter's axe. Without the soul, which has power to use it, the instrument is of itself of no more use to us than the shuttle is of itself to the weaver, or the pen to the writer, or the whip to the coachman."

The doctrine of the transmigration of the soul is wholly different from that of the resurrection. In this case, the soul goes into another body than its own. " The Egyptians believed in the transmigration of souls, so that the soul in a destined cycle wandered through the bodies of every species of animals, till it returned to a human body ; not to the one it had formerly occupied, but to a new one." Heeren : Egyptians, 11. According to Rawlinson (Egypt, X.), " the good soul, having just been freed from its infirmities by passing through the basin of purgatorial fire, re-entered its former body, rose from the dead, and lived once more a human life upon earth. This process was reiterated, until a certain mystic cj'cle of years became complete, when finally the good soul attained the crowning joy of union with God, and absorption into the Divine essence." The soul of the evil, according to Lenormant, goes through transmigrations, until it is finally annihilated. " This latter point is not, perhaps, universally allowed," says Rawlinson (I. 318).

The early fathers maintained the doctrine of the resurrection of the body with great earnestness and unanimity against the objections of the skeptics ; of whom Celsus was acute and scoffing in his attack. Most of them believed in the resurrection of the very same material body. Justin Martyr, according to Ilagenbach, teaches that cripples will rise as cripples, but at the instant of resurrection, if believers, will be made physically perfect. In his tract on the Hesurrection (IV.), he argues that the miracles of Christ

THE RESURRECTION. 649

wrought upon tlie bodj prove the fact of its resurrection. " The same power that could say, Arise, take up thy bed and M^alk, could say to the dead body. Come forth. If on earth Christ healed the sicknesses of the flesh, and made the body whole, much more will he do this in the resurrection, so that the flesh shall rise perfect and entire." The Alexandrine school, alone, adopted a spiritual theory of the resurrection. Origen went so far as to assert that a belief in the resurrection of the body is not absolutely essential to the profession of Christianity, provided the immortality of the soul were maintained.

The Patristic view of the resurrection passed into the Middle Ages with little modification, excepting that in connection with the materialism of the Roman Christianit}' it naturally became more materialistic. The poetry of Dante, and the painting of Angelo powerfully exhibit it. In the Protestant system, a real body, and one that preserves the personal identity, is afiirmed ; but the materialism of the Papal, and to some extent of the Patristic church, is avoided by a more careful attention to St. Paul's distinction between the natural body {aoifia -yfrv^^^LKov) and the spiritual body {aco/jLa 7rvev/j,ariK6v).

Respecting the probability of a i-esurrection of the body, it may be remarked that it is no more strange that the human body should exist a second time, than that it has existed the first time. That a full-formed human body should be produced from a microscopic cell, is as difficult to believe, upon the face of it, as that a spiritual resurrection-body should be produced out of the natural earthly body. The marvels of embryology are, a priori, as incredible as those of the resurrection. The difPerence between the body that is laid in the grave, and the body that is raised from the grave, is not so great as the difference between the minute embryonic ovum and the " human form divine," represented by the Antinous or the Apollo Belvidere. If the generation of the body were, up to this time, as rare an event as

650 ESCHATOLOGY.

tlie resurrection of the body, it might be denied witli equal plausibility. The question of St. Paul, in Acts 26 : 8, applies here : " Why should it be thought a thing incredible that God should raise the dead ? " The omnipotence that originated the body can of course re-originate it. Even if the extreme view be adopted, that there must be the \Q\-y same material particles in order to the identity of the body, this is not an impossibility for God. For as Pearson (Article XL) remarks : " Though the parts of the body of man be dissolved, yet they perish not, they lose not their own entity when they part with their relation to humanity ; they are laid up in the secret places, and lodged in the chambers of nature, and it is no more a contradiction that they should become the parts of the same body of man to which they did belong, than that after his death they should become the parts of any other body, as we see they do." Only in this case, a particle of matter that had once been a constituent in two or more human bodies, could not be a constituent of two or more resurrection-bodies, because this would involve the simultaneous presence of an atom in two or more places.

The resurrection of the body was taught in the Old Testament, and for this reason it was the common belief of the Jews in the time of Christ. John 11 : 24; Mark 6 : 16 ; 12 : 23. Passages that teach it are : Isa. 26 : 19, " Thy dead men shall live; together with my dead body shall they arise." Ezekiel 37 : 1-14, where the parable of a spiritual resurrection implies a bodily resurrection. Ps. 16: 9, "My flesh also shall rest in hope." Dan. 12:2, " Many that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake." The majority of commentators find the resurrection in Job 19:23-27. The translation of Elijah, and the reappearance of Samuel at Endor, favor the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. The careful sepulture of the body by Abraham and the Old Testament saints proves the expectation of the resurrection. Gen. 49 : 29.

THE RESURRECTION. 651

The apocrypha teaches the resurrection. 2 Maccabees 7 : 0, 23.

The principal points in the Scripture representation are the following :

1. Christ suddenly and unexpectedly descends from heaven accompanied by angels, and reproduces the bodies of all the dead. Matt. 25 : 31, 32. John 5 : 28, 29. Acts 24 : 15. 1 Thess. -4 : 16. The generation living upon earth at the time of the resurrection will instantaneously be re-embodied. 1 Thess, 4 : IT, compared with 1 Cor. 15 : 51. In the Westminster Confession (XXXII. ii.) it is said that " such as are found alive shall not die, but be changed." The meaning is, that they will not die gradually like men generally ; not that they will altogether escape the penalty of death. All in Adam must die. Says Augustine (City, XX. XX.), " Neither do we suppose that in the case of these saints, the sentence ' Earth thou art, and unto earth shalt thou return,' is null, though their bodies do not on dying fall to the earth, but both die and rise again at once, while caught up into the air. For not even the saints shall be quickened to immortality unless they first die, however briefly."

2. The body thus reproduced is a " spiritual body," for both the good and the evil. 1 Cor. 15 : 44, 53. By aw^a 'TTvevfjiaTLicov is meant a spirit-like body : that is, a body adapted to the future spiritual world. It is antithetic to the (rSifia ■^v')(^iK6v, or the "flesh and blood" spoken of in 1 Cor. 15 : 50, by which is meant the present earthly body suited to the present sensuous world. The body is not converted into spirit ; " aliud est corpus fieri spirituale quoad qualitates ratione claritatis, agilitatis, subtilitatis, et similium; aliud vcro fieri spiritum, sen mutari in naturam spiritus." Turrettin, Institutio, XIII. xix. 19.

In denominating the present body yjrvxi-Kov, and the future body irvevfiaTLKov, St. Paul distinguishes between •

652 ESCHATOLOGY.

5 : 23, and Ileb. 4 : 12. The latter denotes the higher side of the human soul: the "rational soul;" and the former its lower side: the "animal soul." Usually, the two are not distinguished in this way, either by St. Paul, or by the other Xew Testament writers, since they constitute one soul {'^v')(^) in distinction from the body {acofia) ; and are sometimes designated in their unity by irvevfia, and sometimes by -^vxv- Commonly, the sacred writers speak of man as constituted of " body and soul," or " body and spirit," and not of " body, soul, and spirit." But in 1 Cor. 15 : 44, as in 1 Thess. 5 : 23, and Heb. 4 : 12, St. Paul requires the distinction between the " animal " and the " rational " soul for the purposes of his discussion, and accordingly makes it.' Shedd : On Komans 8 : 10.

The (Tcbfia xpvxi-icov, or " natural " body, is marked by the qualities of the '^vxv, or " animal " soul : namely, by physical appetites and passions, such as hunger, thirst, and sexual appetite. These are founded in " flesh and blood," or that material substance of which the present human body is composed. The resurrection, or " spiritual " body, on the other hand, will be marked by the qualities of the 'TTvevjxa or "rational soul." It will not be composed of flesh and blood, but of a substance which is more like TTvevixa than like '*^v)(ri ; more like the rational than the animal soul.

That the resurrection-body of both the good and the evil will have the common characteristic of being destitute of fleshly appetites and passions, and will be a " spiritual " in distinction from a " natural " body, is proved by Matt. 22 : 30, " They neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God ; " 1 Cor. 15 : 50, " Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God ; " Eev. T : 16, " They hunger no more, neither thirst any more."

■ The trichometry in Heb. 4 : 12 is one of the coincidences mth Paul's usage in his undoubted epistles, which go to prove that he is the author, directly or indirectly, of Hebrews.

THE RESURRECTION. 653

But while alike in this particular, the spiritual body of the redeemed differs in several important respects from the spiritual body of the lost. Dan, 12 : 2, " Some shall awake to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." John 5 : 28, 29, " All that are in the graves shall come forth, they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation." (a) The spiritual body of the redeemed is a " celestial " body, 1 Cor. 15 : 40. That of the lost is not. (5) It is a " glorified " body, 1 Cor. 15 : 43 ; Phil. 3 : 21. That of the lost is not. (c) It is a " resplendent -' body ; " the righteous shall shine forth as the sun," Matt. 13 : 43. That of the lost is not. The difference between the blessed and the miserable resurrection is also marked by e^avdaraai^, instead of dvdaraai

The spiritual body is not wholly a new creation ex nihilo, as the Manichaeans asserted, but is the old body transformed. 1 Cor. 15 : 44, 53, " It is sown a natural body ; it is raised a spiritual body. This corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality." When Christ raised Lazarus in Bethany, the body raised was identical as to the very particles. It was not a spiritual body, because there was no transformation. It had been sown a natural body, and it was raised a natural body. This resurrected body of Lazarus will require to be changed, before it can be the spiritual body of the final resui-rection.

The resurrection-body is an identical body. An identical body is one that is recognized by the person himself, and by others. No more than this is required in order to bodily identity. A living man recognizes his present body

654 ESCHATOLOGY.

as the same body that he had ten years ago ; yet the material particles are not the same identically. " We shall rise again with the same bodies we have now as to the substance, but the quality will be different." Calvin : Institutes, III. XXV. 8. " The dead shall be raised up with the self-same bodies, and none other, although with different qualities." Westminster Confession, XXXIII. ii. In saying that the substance is the same, but the quality is different, Calvin does not mean that all the qualities will be different. This would be incompatible with sameness of substance. But some of the qualities are changed. Calvin explains his statement iu the following words: "Just as the very body of Christ which had been offered as a sacrifice was raised again, but with such new and superior qualities as though it had been altogether different." Certain qualities of the " natural " body will still belong to the " spiritual," such as extension, figure, etc. The difference will be in the secondary, rather than in the primary properties of the natural body.

That the spiritual body is recognized, is proved by Luke 9 : 30-33. Moses and Elijah were recognized by Christ, and pointed out to the disciples. Luke 13 : 28, " Ye shall see Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and all the prophets in the kingdom of God." John 14 : 3 ; 20 : 16, 17, 20. Christ prepares a place for liis people and receives them individually. 2 Sam. 12 : 23, " I shall go to him, but he shall not return to me." Gen. 49 : 33, " Jacob was gathered unto his people." Gen. 25 : 8, " Abraham died and was gathered to his people."

That the spiritual body does not consist of the very same particles of matter with the natural body, no more, no less, and no different, is proved by St. Paul's illustration in 1 Cor. 15 : 35-40. " Thou sowest not that body that shall be ; but God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him. All flesh is not the same flesh, but there is one flesh of men, another of fishes, and another of birds. There are also celestial

THE RESURRECTION. 655

bodies, and bodies terrestrial." The ten or more grains of wheat that are produced by germination and growth from the single grain sown, are not composed of exactly the same atoms of matter that constituted the seed-kernel. There are many more atoms in them, which have been collected from the soil and the atmosphere. And yet there is the perpetuity, in each of these ten or more new grains, of something that existed in the single seed -grain. The vegetable life in this latter has passed into the former, and become the constructive principle in each of the ten or more grains. When Paul says that " that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die," he does not mean the death of everything in the seed-kernel. Should the germ in the kernel die, there would be no quickening and no new individual grains. That which dies, is the integument, or cov^ering of the germ. This dies and rots ; but some part even of this reappears in the new grains of wheat. The growing plant is nourished by the decaying integument, similarly as the ovum is nourished by the yolk. Yet the particles of the decaying integument do not make up the total sum of the particles in the new grain. Still other particles have to be gathered, by the transmitted vital principle, from the soil and atmosphere, in order to make out the whole amount required for the new individuals.

It should be carefully observed, that St. Paul does not mean that the resurrection of the body is the same in every particular with the reproduction of grain by germination. It is only an illustration, and not an explanation. In the case of germination, one grain becomes ten or twenty grains. But in the case of resurrection, one body becomes only one body. The transformation in the first instance, is of one individual into many individuals ; in the latter instance, of one individual into one individual. The special point in the illustration is, that the transformation in the instance of the seed-grain does not entirely destroy the old

C56 ESCHATOLOGY.

substance ; so that there is some sameness of substance between the old and the new. But the sameness between the spiritual body and the natural body is much closer tliau that between the ten grains of new wheat, and the one grain from which they were produced. It is evident that the apostle intended, by the illustration, to teach that while the resurrection of the body is a supernatural and creative act, it is not such in the sense of originating all the materials from nothing. The resurrection-body is founded upon, and constructed out of, the previously existing earthly body.

Employing St. Paul's threefold distinction in 1 Thess. 5 : 23, man is a synthesis of Trvevfia, '^v)(rj, and acofia. The brute is a synthesis of only "^v^v and acofia. Man is composed of a rational soul, an animal soul, and a body ; the brute is composed of an animal soul, and a body. An animal soul has intelligence in its lower forms, but not reason, or the power of intuitive perception in mathematics, (morals, and religion. The difference between the rational soul and the animal soul is marked in Gen. 2 : 7, and Gen. 1 : 20, 21, 24. In the first passage, a living soul (nijn msp) is attributed to Adam, but it is inbreathed by God. In the latter passages, a living soul is attributed to the lower animals, but it is merely created, not inbreathed by God. The death of an animal, is the death of both the body and the incomplex animal soul ; not the separation of the latter from the former, and the continued life of the latter. The death of a man, is the separation of the complex rational-animal soul from the body, or the departure of the Trveu/u.a-^lrvx^] from the acafia, the continued conscious existence of the former, and the decomposition of the latter. The substance of the a-Mfia is mortal, and dissolves and " returns to dust as it was." The substance of the Trvev/xa-yjrvxv is immortal, and is not changed in the least by being separated from the aatfia. In this TTveviia-'y^vx/j, or rational soul, is the nucleus, or, to use St. Paul's illustration from the grain of M'heat, tlie

THE RESURRECTION, 657

germ of the resurrection-body. The "^v^V' which is united with the iri^ev/xa and constitutes one indivisible prin-' ciple with it, is tlie inner reality of the body, the crco/ia; standing for, and representing it in the interval between death and the resurrection/ Though the aSjua is scattered to the four winds, and like Wyckliffe's ashes, has been cast into the Avon, and floated into the Severn, and finally into the sea, yet the ■^Jrv^v^ the organific and constructing principle of the (Tcofia, is still united with the jrvevfia. And in the instance of the believer, the Trvev/jLa-y^v^ij is united with Christ; so that thus it may be said (Westminster L. C, 86) that the believer's " hod>/ is still united to Christ " between death and the resurrection, although the material particles that composed it are " scattered at the grave's mouth, as when one cutteth and cleaveth wood upon the earth," Ps. 141 : 7. Says Poor (Lange, On 1 Cor. 15 : 35-40), " The rational soul, the Trvev/na-^jrvxi], is the true substance of the body : that which stands under the outward visibility of a corporeal form, and imparts to it its reality. If this be so, it is easy to see that when by death the materials of our present bodily structure are all dissolved and scattered abroad, this vital organic principle, through the supernatural agency of God at the sounding of the last trump, may gather to itself and assimilate new materials of a different nature from ' flesh and blood,' and build up a spiritual body suited to the new condition of thino-s." Compare a similar statement in Hodge : Theology, III. 779.

In the instance of the unbeliever, the 'n-vev/ia--\lrv)(ij is not united to Christ by faith, and therefore it is not said that his " body is still united to Christ " between death and the resurrection. The rational soul of the unbeliever is preserved for "the resurrection of damnation" (John 5:29),

> Howe (Vanity of Man, as mortal) denominates the soul, " the slatique individuating principle " of the body. Vol. II.— 43

658 ESCHATOLOGY.

by the omnipotence of God in the exercise of his providence mereh', not of liis redeeming grace.'

» In 1 Cor. 3 : 14, fallen man is denominated avbpdnus ij/t;x"c«s, because he is ruled by the animal rather than the rational sonl. In saying that "that was not first which was spiritual, but that which is natural" (1 Cor. 15 : 46), the order as it noro exists after apostasy, and not the original order, is given. Sin is prior to salvation, and is presupposed by redemption. But by creation, man is first "spiritual" and holy, and afterward becomes " natural," and sinful.

CHAPTEE lY.

Augustine : City of God, XX. xxi.-xxx. Aquinas : Summa, III. (Supplement) Ixxxix. xc. Calvin : Institutes, III. xxxv. 7. Ursinus: Christian Religion, Qu. 52. Bates : On Eternal Judgment. Newton: On the General Judgment. Jeremy Taylor: Christ's Advent to Judgment (Sermons).

The doctrine of the Final Judgment was, from the first, immediately connected with the resurrection of the body. Mankind " must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his Ijody^'' 2 Cor. 5 : 10. The fathers founded their views of the day of doom, upon the representations and imagery of Scripture. They believed that a general conflagration will immediately follow the last judgment, which some said will destroy the world ; while others ascribed only a purifying agency to it. Augustine (City, XX. xvi. xxiv.) holds that this world is to be changed, not destroyed, and is to be the "new earth" spoken of in the apocalypse. Some, like Tertullian and the more rhetorical of the Greek fathers, enter into minute details; while others, like Augustine, endeavor to define dogmatically the facts couched in the figurative language of the Bible. In the Middle Ages, representations varied with the bent of the individual theologian. One popular opinion was, that the judgment will be held in the valley of Jehoshaphat. Aquinas maintained that the last judgment will be mental, because the oral trial of each individual would require too much time. In the Modern

C60 ESCHATOLOGY.

cliurcli, the course of tliinking has been simiLir to that in the Ancient and Mediaevah The symbols of the different Protestant denominations explicitly affirm a day of judgment, at the end of the world. Individual speculations, as of old, vibrate between the extremes of materialism and idealism.

According to Scripture, there is a jprtvate judgment at death, and a J9?^W^6' judgment at the last day. 1. The private judgment is proved by the following particulars: {a) The Bible teaches that the human soul when it leaves the body meets God directly, as it never has before. Eccl. 12 : 7, " The dust shall return to the earth as it was ; and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it." This implies self-consciousness in the immediate presence of God ; and this implies self-knowledge in that presence. 1 Cor. 13 : 12, " iS"ow I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known." Compare Ps. 139 : 1-6. But this selfconsciousness and self-knowledge at death is a private individual judgment. Every man when he dies knows his own moral character ; and knows it accurately. Consequently, at death every man either acquits or condemns himself. What St. Paul says is done in the public judgment of the last da}-, is also done in the private judgment on the day of death : " The conscience bears witness, and the thoughts accuse or else excuse one another," Horn. 2:15. Consequently, the private judgment at death indicates the moral state of the soul. " It is appointed unto men once to die, but after this, jndgment," Ileb. 9 : 27.' (J)) The private judgment at death and the public judgment at the last day coincide, because in the intern)ediate state there is no alteration of moral character, and consequently no alteration of the sentence passed at death. We have presented the proof from Scripture, that Sheol or

• In this passage, Kpitris is anarthrous. The writer does not say that the judgment immediately succeeds the death of the body, but that a judgment does.

THE FINAL JUDGMENT. 661

Hades is a state of retribution and misery, and Paradise a state of reward and blessedness. The parable of Dives and Lazarus teaches that the impenitent spirit goes to Hades at death, and that Hades is Hell without the body. Consequently, the destiny of the impenitent is known and determined at death. The same parable teaches that the penitent spirit goes to Paradise at death, and that Paradise is Heaven without the body. Consequently, the destiny of the penitent is also known and determined at death. Penitence or impenitence at death is therefore the state of mind that settles the everlasting condition of the individual. Christ teaches that " to die in sin," is to be hopelessly lost. John 8 : 21, 24. Every man who has the publican's feeling when he dies, and cries, " God be merciful to me a sinner," is forgiven through the blood of Christ. " To this man, saith the Lord, will I look, even to him that is poor and of a contrite spirit," Isa. 66 : 2. " Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven," Matt. 5 : 3. Every man who at death is destitute of the publican's feeling, is unforgiven. Ps. 138 : 6, " The proud he knoweth afar off." Isa, 2 : 12, "The day of the Lord of hosts shall be upon every one that is proud and lofty." Every penitent pagan is saved ; every impenitent nominal Christian is lost.

2. That there is, secondly, a day of judgment and a public judgment, is distinctly and often asserted by our Lord. Matt. 11:22, 24, "It shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment." Matt. 12 : 41, "The men of Nineveh shall rise in the judgment with this generation." Matt. 25:34-41, contains a detailed account of the day of judgment. Matt. 5 : 22, " Whosoever shall say. Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire." John 6 : 39, 40, 44, " I will raise him up at the last day." Acts 17 : 31, " He hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousness." Rom. 2 : 16, " The day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ." MaiCG2 ESCHATOLOGY.

aclii 3 : 17, " That day when I make up my jewels." Eccl. 11 : 9, " For all these things God will bring thee into judgment." Eccl. 12:14, "God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing." Gen, 18 : 25 ; Deut. 32 rSo ; Job 21 : 30 ; Ps. 1 : 5, G ; 58 : 11 ; 90 : 11 ; 94 : 1, 2 ; Prov. 16 : 25 ; Eccl. 3 : 17 ; Is. 34 : 14 ; 66 : 24 ; Dan. 7 : 9, 10; 12:2; Jude 14, 15.

The Biblical representations of the Last Judgment are as follows: {a) The preparation. Christ with the angelic host unexpectedly descends in bodily presence, and the throne of judgment is set. Matt. 25 : 31 ; llev. 21 : 11. Acts 1 : 11, " This same Jesus that is taken np from you into heaven shall come in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven." His human nature is one reason why the Son of God is the judge. John 5 : 27. {b) The congregation of all men before the throne of judgment. Matt. 25 : 32; Pom. 14 : 10 ; Pev. 21 : 12. (c) The separation of the evil from the good. Matt. 25 : 32, 33. Plato (Republic, X. 614) represents the judges as bidding " the just to ascend by the heaveidy way on the right hand, and the unjust to descend by the lower way on the left hand." {d) The disclosure of character and conduct, so that the grounds of the judgment to be passed upon both classes may be clearly known. Matt. 25 : 34-46. Pom. 2 : 16, " God shall judge the secrets of men, by Jesus Christ." Heb. 4 : 13, " All things are naked, and opened {TeTpa)(r)\i(T/.ceva) unto the eyes of him with whom we have to do." 1 Cor. 4: 5, "The Lord will brino; to lio-ht the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts." In particular, the temporal good which the evil have enjoyed in this life, and the temporal evil which the good have experienced, will be explained. See Augustine : City of God, XX. ii.

Pespecting the last judgment, Augustine (City of God, XX. xiv.) saj'S that there will not be an angel for each man to recite to him the deeds he has done, but we must

THE FINAL JUDGMENT. 663

understand by the phrase, " anotlier book was opened," that by divhie power " every one shall recall to memory all his own works, whether good or evil, and shall mentally survey them with a marvellous rapidity, so that this knowledge will either accuse or excuse, and thus all and each shall be simultaneously judged."

AugiTstine : City of God, XI. xii. Aquinas : Summa III. (Supplement) xcii.-xcvi. Calvin : Institutes, III. xxv. 11. Ursinus : Christian Religion, Qu. 58. Dante: Paradise, xxx.-xxxiii. Baxter: Saints' Everlasting Eest. Howe : Blessedness of the Eighteous. Bates : On Heaven. Owen : Person of Christ, XIX.

That the blessedness of the redeemed is endless, has been the uniform faith of the Church. Representations concerning the nature of this happiness vary with the education and intellectual spirit of the age or individual. Justin Martyr regarded the blessedness of heaven as consisting, mainl}^, in the continuation and increase of the happiness of the millennial reign. Origen held that the blessed dwell in the aerial regions, and pass from one heaven to another as they advance in holiness. At the same time, he condemns those who expect any sensuous enjoyment. The Greek theologians Gregory Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa, follow Origen. Augustine believed that the heavenly happiness consists in the enjoyment of peace which passes knowledge, and the beatific vision of God. One important element in it consists in indefectibility : the deliverance from all hazard of apostasy ; the noii posse peccare et mori. The schoolmen held the patristic views, but with an endeavor to systematize. Tliey divided heaven into three parts : the visible heavens or the firmament ; the spiritual heaven, where saints and angels dwell ; and the intellectual heaven, wOiere the beatific vision of the Trinity is enjoyed. See Dante : Paradise, xxx.-xxxiii. The

HEAVEN. 665

Modern church maintains the doctrine of the everlasting blessedness, but in a more spiritual form than prevailed in either the Ancient or the Mediaeval church. The more common opinion is, that this world is not to be either annihilated or destroyed, but renovated for the abode of the redeemed. Turrettin defends this view. Institutio, XX. V. Anselm (Ciir deus homo, 1. 18) says : " We believe that the material substance of the world must be renewed, and that this will not take place until the number of the elect is completed, and that happy kingdom be made perfect, and that after its completion there will be no change."

The Scripture representation of the heavenly state is as follows :

1. It is marked by sinless perfection. Eph. 5 : 27, " A glorious church, without spot or wrinkle." Rev. 19 : 14, The "armies" of heaven are "clothed in fine linen, white and clean." Rev. 19 : 8, " The Lamb's wife is arrayed in fine linen, which is the righteousness of saints." Rom. 8 : 21, "The creature shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God." Heb. 12 : 23, "The spirits of just men made perfect" are in the " heavenly Jerusalem." 2. It is marked by impeccability, or indefectibility. Rom. 8 : 35-39. 1 Thess. 4 : IT, "We shall ever be with the Lord." Heb. 4: 9, "A rest remaineth to the people of God." 1 John 3:2," We shall be like him." Indefectibility, or the absence of that possibility of apostasy which was connected with man as created, renders his state as redeemed more blessed because of the sense of security. Eden was uncertain ; heaven is certain. This is the absolute rest into which he enters. There is to be no probation, nor temptation, internal or external, "Every man who not merely supposes but certainly knows that he shall eternally enjoy the most high God, in the company of angels and beyond the reach of ill— this man, no matter what bodily torments afflict him, is more blessed than was he who, even in that great felicity of paradise,

666 ESCHATOLOGY.

was uncertain of his fate." Augnstine : City of God, XI. xii. Compare De Dono Perseverantiae. 3. It is chieliy mental happiness ; tlie vision of the Divine perfections and delio-ht in tliem. 1 Cor. 13 : 12, " Then shall we see face to face." 1 John 3:2," We shall see him as he is." Job 19 : 27, " Whom I shall see for myself." Rev. 4 : 10, 11 ; 5 passim; 7 : 9 sq. ; 21 : 3 sq. ; 22 : 4. Ps. 17:15, "I shall behold thy face in righteousness." Ps. 16 : 11, "In thy presence is fulness of joy." 4. It is the personal presence of the Mediator with his redeemed people. Rev. 14:4, "They follow the Lamb whithersoever he goeth." John 17 : 24, " Father, I will that they whom thou hast given me be with me where I am ; that they may behold my glory." This is an element in the heaven of redeemed man that does not enter into that of the angels. See Owen : Person of Christ, XIX.

Augustine : City of God, XXI. Aquinas : Summa IIL (Supplement) xcvii.-xcix. Dante : Inferno, Calvin : Institutes, III. xxv. 12. Howe : Redeemer's Tears over Lost Souls, Bates : On Hell. Pearson : Creed, Art. VII. Newton : The Final State. Bunyan : Sighs from Hell, Edwards : Eternity of Hell Torments ; Sinners in the Hands of God. Edwards : Against Chauncy. Hopkins : Future State, Stuart : Exegetical Essays (Sheol and Aion). Alexander : On Universalism. Mailer: Sin, IL 191, 418-431. Bartlett : Life and Death Eternal, Goulburn : Everlasting Punishment, Farrar : Eternal Hope. Pusey : Everlasting Punishment (Historical). Fisher : Discussions (History of the Doctrine of Future Punishment). Edersheim : Life of Jesus, II., Appendix xix. (Jewish views). Eiemensnyder : Doom Eternal. Mead : The Soul Here and Hereafter. Eice : On Immortality. Davidson : Doctrine of Last Things. Hovey : State of the Impenitent Dead, Hudson : Debt and Grace. Lewis: Ground and Nature of Punishment, Cheever : Capital Punishment, Woolsey : Political Science, II. viii. Morris : Is there Salvation after Death ?

§ 1. THE HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE.

TirR common opinion in the Ancient church was, that the Future Punishment of the impenitent wicked is endless. This was the catholic faith ; as much so as belief in the Trinity. But as there were some church fathers who deviated from the creed of the church respecting the doctrine of the Trinity, so there were some who dissented from it in respect to that of eternal retribution. The deviation in eschatology, however, was far less extensive than iu trinitarianism. The Semi-Arian and Arian heresies in66S ESCHATOLOGY.

volved and troubled the Ancient church much more seriously than did the Universalism of that period. Long controversies, ending in oecumenical councils and formulated statements, were the consequence of the trinitarian errors, but no oecumenical council, and no authoritatis^e counterstatement, was required to prevent the spread of the tenet of Restoration. Having so little even seeming support in Scripture and reason, it gradually died out of the Ancient church by its own intrinsic mortality. Neander (History, II. 737), speaking of the second period in his arrangement (312-590), when there was more liestorationism than in the first, says : " The doctrine of eternal punishment continued, as in the preceding period, to be dominant in the creed of the church. Yet, in the Oriental church, in which, with the exception of those subjects immediately connected with the doctrinal controversies, there was greater freedom and latitude of development, many respectable church teachers still stood forth, without injuring their reputation for orthodoxy, as advocates of the opposite doctrine, until the time when the Oi'igenistic disputes caused the agreement with Origen in respect to this point also [viz., Restoration ism] to be considered as something decidedly heretical." Hagenbach (History of Doctrine, § 78) , says of the period down to A.D. 250 : " ^Notions more or less gross prevailed concerning the punishment of the wicked, which most of the fathers regarded as eternal."

The principal deviation from the catholic doctrine of endless retribution was in the Alexandrine school, founded by Clement and Origen. The position taken by them was, that " the punishments of the condemned are not eternal, but only remedial ; the devil himself being capable of amelioration." Gieseler, I. 21-i. Thus early was the question raised, whether the suffering to which Christ sentences the wicked is for the purpose of con-ecting and educating the transgressor, or of vindicating and satisfying the law he has broken : a question which is the key to the whole conHELL. 669.

troversj. For if the individual criiniiical is of greater consequence than the univ^ersal law, tlien the suffering must refer principally to him and his interests. But if the law is of more importance than any individual, then the suffering must refer principally to it.

Origen's Restorationism grew naturall}^ out of his view of human liberty. He held that the liberty of indifference and the power of contrary choice, instead of simple self-determination, are the substance of freedom. These belong inalienably and forever to the nature of the finite will. They cannot be destroyed, even by apostasy and sin. Consequently, there is forever a possibility of a self-conversion of the will in either direction. Free will may fall into sin at any time ; and free will may tui"" to God any time. This led to Origen's theory of an endless alternation of falls and recoveries, of hells and heavens ; so that practically he taught nothing but a hell. For, as Augustine (City of God, XXI. xvii.) remarks, in his refutation of Origen, heaven with the prospect of losing it is misery." ' " Origen's theory," says Neander (I. 656), " concerning the necessary mutability of will in created beings led him tr infer that evil, ever germinating afresh, would still continue to render necessary new processes of purification, and new worlds destined for the restoration of fallen beings, until all should again be brought back from manifoldness to unity, so that there was to be a constant interchange between fall and redemption, between unity and manifoldness."

Traces, more or less distinct, of a belief in the future restoration of the wicked are found in Didymus of Alexandria, the two Gregories, and also in Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia : the leaders of the Antiochian school. All of these were more or less under the influence of Origen. Origen's opinions, however, both in trinitari• "Qui existimabat posse se miserura esse, beatus nou erit." Cicero: De Pinibus, 11. 37.

670 ESCHATOLOGY.

anisin and escliatologj, were strongly combated in his own time by the great body of contemporary fatliers, and subsequently by the church, under the lead of Epiphanius, Jerome, and Augustine.

The Mediaeval church was virtually a unit in holding the doctrine of Endless Punishment. The Reformation churches, both Lutheran and Calvinistic, adopted tiie historical and catholic opinion.

Since the Reformation, TJniversalism, Restorationism, and Annihilation, have been asserted by some sects, and many individuals. But these tenets have never been adopted by those ecclesiastical denominations which hold, in their integrity, the cardinal doctrines of the trinity and incarnation, the apostasy and redemption, although they have exerted some influence within these denominations. Is^one of the evangelical churches have introduced the doctrine of Universal ism, in any form of it, into their syuibolical books. The denial of endless punishment is usually associated with the denial of those tenets which are logically and closely connected with it: such as original sin, vicarious atonement, and regeneration. Of these, vicarious atonement is the most incompatible of any with universal salvation ; because the latter docti-ine, as has been observed, implies that suffering for sin is remedial only, while the former implies that it is retributive. Suffering that is merely educational does not require a vicarious atonement in order to release from it. But suffering that is judicial and punitive can be released from the transgressor, only by being inflicted upon a substitute. He, therefore, who denies personal penalty must, logically, deny vicarious penalty. If the sinner himself is not obliged by justice to suffer in order to satisfy the law he has violated, then, certainly, no one needs suffer for him for this purpose.

Within the present century, Universalism has obtained a stronger hold upon German theology than upon any other,

HELL. 671

and has considerably vitiated it. It grew up in connection with the rationalism and pantheism which have been more powerful in Germany than elsewhere. Rationalism lias many of the characteristics of deism, and is vehemently polemic toward evangelical truth. That it should combat the doctrines of sin and atonement, is natural. Pantheism, on the other hand, has to some extent been mingled with evangelical elements. A class of anti-rationalistic theologians, in Germany, whose opinions are influenced more or less by Spinoza and Schelling, accept the doctrines of the trinity, incarnation, apostasy, and redemption, and assert the ultimate salvation of all mankind. Schleiermacher, the founder of this school, whose system is a remarkable blending of the gospel and pantheism, has done much toward the spread of Restorationism. The following are the objections which this theologian (Glaubenslehre, § 163, Anhang) makes to eternal damnation : "(«) Christ's words in Matt. 25 : 46 ; Mark 9 : 44 ; John 5 : 29, are figurative. {li) The passage 1 Cor. 15:25, 26, teaches that all evil shall be overcome, (c) Misery cannot increase, but must decrease. If it is bodily misery, custom habituates to endurance, and there is less and less suffering instead of more and more.' If, on the other hand, it is mental suffering, this is remorse. The danmed suffer more remorse in hell than they do upon earth. This proves that they are better men in hell than upon earth. They cannot, therefore, grow more wretched in hell, but grow less so as they grow more remorseful, (d) The sympathy which the saved have with their former companions, who are in hell,

' Satan, in Milton's Paradise Lost (II. 274-278), suggests that custom may mitigate the pains of hell.

" Our torments also may, in length of time, Become our elements ; these piercing fires As soft as now severe ; our temper changed Into their temper ; which must needs remove The sensible of pain."

672 ESCHATOLOGY.

will prevent the happiness of the saved. The world of mankind, and also the whole nniverse, is so connected that the endless niiserj of a part will destroy the happiness of the remainder." ' These objections appeal mainly to reason. But the two assnmptions, that hell is abolished by becoming used to it, and that remorse is of the nature of virtue, do not commend themselves to the intuitive convictions.

Besides the disciples of Schleierraacher, there are trinitarian theologians standing upon the position of theism, who adopt some form of TJniversalism. Nitzsch (Dogmatics, § 219) teaches Restorationism. He cites in support of it only two passages out of the entire scriptures : namely, 1 Pet. 3 : 19, which speaks of the " preaching to the spirits in prison ; " and Heb. 11 : 39, 40, " These received not the promises." These two passages l^itzsch explains as teaching that " there are traces of a capacity in another state of existence for comprehending salvation, and for a change and purification of mind ; " and upon them, solely, he founds the sweeping assertion that " it is the Apostolical view, that for those who were unable in this world to know Christ in his truth and grace, there is a knowledge of the Redeemer in the other state of existence which is never inoperative, but is either judicial or quickening."

Rothe (Dogmatics, II. ii. 46-49, 124-131) contends for the annihilation of the impenitent wicked, in the sense of

' Respecting this very common objection, Muller (Sin, I. 239) makes the following remark : " The primary meaning of Kplcris is discrimination and separation, and implies that the main contrast between man and man in relation to the future state is made manifest by the cessation of intercourse between those who obey God, and those who resist him. Beings whose relations to God are diametrically opposite, and persistently so, differ co greatly from each other that other ties of relationship become as nothing in comparison. Bonds of union among men arising out of the relationships of natural life mnst give way of themselves, if the tie which binds man's spiritual consciousness and will to his Creator be on either side wholly severed. For those bonds have not in themselves an eternal significance, save so far as they are included in that relation to God which is of everlasting importance."

HELL. 673

the extinction of self-consciousness. Yet he asserts that the aim of penalty is requital, and the satisfaction of justice: an aim that would be defeated by the extinction of remorse. Julius Mailer (Sin, II. 418-425) maintains that the sin against the Holy Ghost is never forgiven, because it implies such a hardness in sin as is incapable of penitence. But he holds that the offer of forgiveness through Christ will be made to every human being, here or hereafter. "Those w^lio have never iu this life had an opportunity of knowing the way of salvation will certainly be placed in a position to accept and enter upon this way of return, if they will, after their life on earth is ended. We may venture to hope that in the interval between death and the judgment many serious misconceptions, which have hindered men from appropriating truth in this life, will be removed." ' The use of the term " misconception " would seem to imply that some who had the offer of salvation in this life, but had rejected it, will have the opportunity in the next ]\t^ to correct their error in this. Dorner (Christian Doctrine,. IV. 416-428), after giving the arguments for and against endless punishment, concludes with the remark, that " we must be content with saying that the ultimate fate of individuals, namely, whether all will attain the blessed goal or not, remains veiled in mystery." His further remark that " there may be those eternally damned, so far as tlie abuse

1 In placing the time of repentance "between, deatli and the judgment" (II. 425), Miiller appears to contradict what he says in II. 420, 429 : " It is clear that those theories of an dwoKaTacTTacns which represent it as taking place in the interval between death and the general resurrection, directly violate the New Testament eschatology. If the idea, therefore, is to be maintained, it must be referred to a period lying beyond the general resurrection. The aldi' n^Wui' ['world to come'] does not mean the time and state immediately ensuing upon death, but the period when the kingdom of the Messiah shall be fully realized and revealed : the period which follows thp resurrection and the judgment. Christ's words [Matt. 12; 32], therefore, inspire the glorious hope that in ' the world to come,' in far distant aeons, they who here harden their hearts against God's rerelation, and can expect only a verdict of condemnation in the day of judgment, shall find forgiveness and salvation." Vol. II.— 43

674 ESCHATOLOGY.

of freedom continues eternally, but in this case man has passed into another class of beings," looks in the direction of annihilation : suggesting that sin may finally destroy the humanity of man, and leave him a mere brute. Respecting the future offer of mercy, Dorner asserts that "the final judgment can take place for none before the gospel has been so addressed to him that free appropriation of the same was possible." Christian Doctrine, III. 77.

Universalism has a slender exegetical basis. The Biblical data are found to be unmanageable, and resort is had to human sentiment and self-interest. Its advocates quote sparingly from scripture. In particular, the words of Christ relating to eschatology are left with little citation or interpretation. Actual attempts by the Kestorationist to explain what the words, " Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels," really mean, are rare. The most common device is to dismiss them, as Schleiermacher does, with the remark that they are figurative. Some words of St. Paul, on the other ihand, whose views upon sin, election, and predestination, 'Jiowever, are not especially attractive to this class, are made fto do yeoman's service. Texts like Rom. 5 : 18, "As judg'Haent came upon all men unto condeinnation, so the free ;gift came upon all men unto justification;" and 1 Cor. 15 : 22, " As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made :alive;" are explained wholly apart from their context, and by emphasizing the word " all." When St. Paul asserts •that " the free gift came upon all men unto justification," this is severed from the preceding verse, in which the " all " are described as " those wdiich receive abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness." And when the same apostle affirms that " in Christ shall all be made alive," no notice is taken of the fact mentioned in the succeeding verse, that not all men are " in Christ " — the clause, " they that are Christ'* at his coming," implying that there are fSome whoarewQ^-^' Christ's at his coming."

HELL. 675

§ 2. THE BIBLICAL ARGUMENT.

The strongest support of the doctrine of Endless Punishment is the teaching of Christ, the Kedeemer of man. Though tlie doctrine is plainly taught in the Pauline Epistles, and other parts of Scripture, yet without the explicit and reiterated statements of God incarnate, it is doubtful whether so awful a truth would have had such a conspicuous place as it always has had in the creed of Christendom. If, in spite of that large mass of positive and solemn threatening of everlasting punishment from the lips of Jesus Christ which is recorded in the four Gospels, the attempt has nevertheless been made to prove that the tenet is not an integral part of the Christian system, we may be certain that had this portion of Revelation been wanting, this attempt would have been much more frequent, and much more successful. The Apostles enter far less into detailed description, and are far less emphatic upon this solemn theme, than their divine Lord and Master. And well they might be. For as none but God has the right, and would dare, to sentence a soul to eternal misery for sin ; and as none but God has the right, and would dare, to execute the sentence; so none but God has the right, and should presume, to delineate the nature and consequences of this sentence. This is the reason why most of the awful imagery in which the sufferings of the lost are described is found in the discourses of our Lord, and Saviour. He took it upon himself to sound the note of warning. lie, the judge of quick and dead, assumed the responsibility of teaching the doctrine of Endless Petribution. "I will forewarn you M'hom ye shall fear: Fear him who after he hath killed hath power to cast into hell ; yea, I say unto you, Fear him." " Nothing," says Dr. Arnold, " is more striking to me, than our Lord's own description of the judgment. It is so inexpressibly

676 ESCHATOLOGY.

forcible, coming from his very own lips, as descriptive of what he himself would do." Stanley : Life of Arnold, I. 176.

Christ could not have warned men so frequently and eai-nestly as he did against " the lire that never shall be quenched," and " the worm that dieth not," had he known that there is no future peril fully corresponding to tbem. That omniscient Being who made the statements respecting the day of judgment, and the final sentence, that are recorded in Matt. 25 : 31-46, could neither have believed nor expected that all men without exception will eventually be holy and happy. To threaten with " everlasting punishment" a class of persons described as "goats upon the left hand " of the Eternal Judge, while knowing at the same time that this class would ultimately have the same holiness and happiness with those described as "sheep upon the right hand " of the judge, would have been both falsehood and folly. The threatening would have been false. For even a long punishment in the future world would not have justified Christ in teaching that this class of mankind are to experience the same retribution with " the devil and his angels ; " for these were understood by the Jews, to whom he spoke, to be hopelessly and eternally lost spirits.' And the threatening would have been foolish, because it would have been a brutum fulmen, an exaggerated danger, certainly in the mind of its author. And for the persons threatened, it would have been a terror only because they took a different view of it from what its author did —

1 Edersheim (Ldfe of Jesus, II. 789) asserts that the schools of Shammai and Hillel both taught the doctrine of eternal punishment. "These schools represented the theological teaching in the time of Christ and his Apostles, showing that the doctrine of Eternal Punishment was held in the days of our Lord, however it may liave been afterwards modified." Edersheim adds, that "the doctrine of the eternity of punishment seems to have been held by the Synagogue throughout the whole first century. In the second century, there is a decided difference in Rabbinic opinion ; some denying the doctrine of endless retribution. In the third century, there is a reaction and a return to former views."

HELL. 677

they believing it to be true, and he knowing it to be false !

The mere perusal of Christ's words when he was upon earth, without note or comment upon them, will convince the unprejudiced that the Redeemer of sinners knew and believed, that for impenitent men and devils there is an endless punishment. We solicit a careful reading and pondering of the following well-known passages. " When the Son of man shall come in his glorj, and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory ; and before him shall be gathered all nations, and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats. And he shall set the sheep on his right liand, but the goats on the left. Then shall he say unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels. And these shall go away into everlasting punishment," Matt. 25 : 31-33, 41, 46. "If thy right hand offend thee cut it oif: it is better for thee to enter into life maimed than having two hands to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched ; where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched. And if thy foot offend thee, cut it off : it is better for thee to enter halt into life, than having two feet to be cast into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched ; where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched. And if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out : it is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into hell fire ; where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched," Mark 9 : 43-48. " What shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? What is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and be cast away ? " Mark 8 : 36 ; Luke 9 : 25. " The rich man died and was buried, and in hell he lifted up his eyes being in torments," Luke 16 : 22, 23. " Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul : but rather

678 ESCHATOLOGY.

fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in liell," Matt. 10 : 28. " The Son of man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity, and shall cast them into a furnace of fire : there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth," Matt. 13 : 41, 42. "Many will say to ine in that day. Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name ? Then will I profess unto them, I never knew you : depart from me, ye that work iniquity," Matt. 7 : 22, 23. " He that denieth me before men shall be denied before the angels of God. Unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Ghost, it shall never be forgiven," Luke 12 : 9, 10. " Woe unto you, ye blind guides. Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how can ye escape the damnation of hell ?" Matt. 23 : 16, 33. " Woe unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed ! it had been good for that man if he had not been born," Matt. 26 : 24. " The Lord of that servant wall come in a day when he looketh not for him, and at an hour when he is not aware, and will cut him in sunder, and appoint him his portion with unbelievers," Luke 12 : 46. " He that believeth not shall be damned," Mark 16 : 16. "Thou Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, Shalt be brought down to hell," Matt. 11:23. "At the end of the world, the angels shall come forth and sever the wicked from among the just, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire," Matt. 13 : 49, 50. " Then said Jesus again to them, I go my way, and ye shall seek me, and shall die in your sins : whither I go ye cannot come," John 8 : 21. " The hour is coming in which all that are in their graves shall hear my voice, and shall come forth ; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life ; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation," John 5 : 28, 29.

To all this, add the description of tlie manner in which Christ will discharge the office of tlie Eternal Judge. John the Baptist represents him as one " whose fan is in his

HELL. G79

hand, and he will throughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into the garner, but will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire," Matt. 3 : 12. And Christ describes himself as a householder who will say to the reapers, " Gather ye together first the tares, and bind them in bundles to burn them," Matt. 13 : 30 ; as a fisherman " casting a net into the sea, and gathering of every kind, which when it was full he drew to the shore, and sat down and gathered the good into vessels, but cast the bad away," Matt. 13 : 47, 48 ; as the bridegroom who took the wise virgins " with ]iim to the marriage," and shut the door upon the foolish, Matt. 25 : 10 ; and as the man travelling into a far country who delivered talents to his servants, and afterwards reckons with them, rewarding the "good and faithful," and " casting the unprofitable servant into outer darkness, wliere there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth," Matt. 25 : 19-20.

Let the reader now ask himself the question : Do these representations, and this phraseology, make the impression that the future punishment of sin is to be remedial^ and temjporary f Are they adapted to make this impression ? "Were they intended to make this impression ? Is it possible to believe that that Holy and Divine Person who uttered these fearful and unqualified warnings, eighteen hundred years ago, respecting the destiny of wicked men and devils, knew that a time is coming when there will be no wicked men and devils in the universe of God, and no place of retributive torment % Did Jesus of Xazareth hold an esoteric doctrine of hell : a different view of the final state of the wicked, from that which the common and natural understanding of his language would convey to his hearers, and has conveyed to the great majority of his readers in all time ? Did he know that in the far-off future, a day will come when those tremendous scenes which he described — the gathering of all mankind, the separation of the evil from the good, the curse pronounced upon the

680 ESCHATOLOGY.

former and the blessing upon the latter — will be looked back upon by all mankind as " an unsubstantial pageant faded," as a dream that is passed, and a watch in the night ?

Jesus Christ is the Person who is responsible for the doctrine of Eternal Perdition. He is the Being with whom all opponents of this theological tenet are in conflict. Neither the Christian church, nor the Christian ministry are the authors of it. The Christian ministry never would have invented the dogma ; neither would they have preached it in all the Christian centuries, like Jeremiah, with shrinking and in tears, except at the command of that same Lord God who said to the weeping prophet, " Whatsoever I command thee, thou shalt speak," Jer. 1 : 7.

Havino- o-iven, in the discussion of the Intermediate State, the proof from Scripture that Sheol and Hades signify the place of punishment for the wicked, we proceed to consider the nature and duration of the suffering inflicted in it.'

The Old Testament is comparatively silent upon these particulars. Sheol is represented vaguelj^ as an evil to be dreaded and avoided, and little description of its fearfulness is given by the " holy men of old who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." The 'New Testament makes a fuller revelation and disclosure ; and it is principally the Redeemer of the world who widens the outlook into the tremendous future. The suffering in Hades and

I There is no dispute that Gehenna denotes the place of retributive suffering. It is employed seven times in Matthew's Gospel, thrice in Mark's, and once in Luke's. In every one of these instances, it is Christ who uses the term. The only other person who has used it is James (3 : 0). It is derived from CSH ^'^^ valley of Hinnom ; Chaldee, fiSH^ = Teevfa, Sept. 'Evvon. It was a valby southeast of Jerusalem, in which the Moloch worship was practised. 2 Kings 2.3:10; Ezek. 33 : 37, 39. It was called Tophet, "abomination." Jer. 31:32. King Josiah caused the filth of Jerusalem, to be carried thither and burned. 3 Kings 33 : 10. Robinson asserts that there is no evidence that the place was used in Christ's day for the deposit and burning of offal. "Gehenna," at the time of the Advent, had become a technical term for endless torment ; as " Paradise " and " Abraham's bosom " had for endless blessedness.

HELL. 681

Gehenna is described as " everlasting (aloovwi) piinisliment," Matt. 25 : 46 ; " everlasting (alcovios:) fire," Matt. IS : 8 ; "the fire that never shall be quenched," Mark 9 : 45 ; " the worm that dieth not," Mark 9 : 46 ; " fiaming fire," 2 Thess.l : 8 ; " everlasting (aiSto?) chains," Jude 6 ; " eternal (atwVto9) fire," Jude 7; " the blackness of darkness forever," Jude 13 ; "the smoke of torment ascending up forever and ever," Eev. 14: 11 ; 19 : 3 ; " the lake of fire and brimstone," in which the devil, the beast, and the false prophet " shall be tormented day and night, forever and ever," Rev. 20 : 10.

Sensible figures are employed to describe the misery of hell, as the}^ are to describe the blessedness of heaven. It cannot be inferred from the mere use of metaphors, that the duration of either is temporary. Figures are employed to describe both temporal and eternal realities. The Psalmist describes God as a " rock," a " fortress," a " shield," etc.; and man as a "vapor," a "flower," etc. A figure by its "form," as the rhetoricians call it, indicates the intention of the writer. No one would employ the figure of a rock to denote transiency, or of a cloud to denote permanence. Had Christ intended to teach that future punishment is remedial and temporary, he would have compared it to a dying worm, and not to an undying worm ; to a fire that is quenched, and not to an unquenchable fire. The ghost in Hamlet (I. v.) describes the "glow-worm's fire" as "ineffectual," that is, harmless. None of the figures employed in Scripture to describe the misery of the wicked are of the same rhetorical "form" with those of the "morningcloud," the "early dew," etc. They are invariably of the contrary "form," and imply fixedness and immutability. The "smoke of torment" ascends forever and ever. The "worm" of conscience does not die. The "fire" is unquenchable. The " chains " are eternal. The " blackness of darkness" overhangs forever. Had the sacred writers wished to teach that future punishment is for a time only, even a very long time, it would have been easy to liave

682 ESCHATOLOGY.

chosen a different species and form of metaphor that would Lave conveyed tlieir meaning. And if the future punishment of the wicked is not endless, they were morally bound to have avoided conveying the impression they actually have conveyed by the kind of figures they have selected. " It is the wilful deceit," says Paley, " that makes the lie ; and we wilfully deceive, when our expressions are not true in the seuse in which we believe the hearer to apprehend them."

The epithet alcovio^ (" everlasting ") is of prime importance. In order to determine its meaning when applied to the punishment of the wicked, it is necessary, first, to determine that of the substantive from which the adjective is derived. Aloov signifies an " age." It is a time-word. It denotes " duration," more or less. Of itself, the word "duration," or " age," does not determine the length of the duration, or age. God has duration, and angels have duration. The Creator has an alcop, and the creature has an alwv ; but that of the latter is as nothing compared with that of the former. " Behold thou hast made my days as an handbreadth ; and mine age is as nothing before thee," Ps. 39 : 5.

In reference to man and his existence, the Scriptures speak of two, and only two aloave^, or ages ; one finite, and one infinite ; one limited, and one endless ; the latter succeedino- the former.' An indefinite series of limited aeons

' The common phrase, " Here, and hereafter," denotes that human existence divides into only two sections. When Faust sells his soul to Mephistopheles, both parties understand that there are only two worlds : the temporal and the eternal. The latter covenants with the former as follows :

" I to thy service here agree to bind me, To run and never rest at call of thee ; When over yonder thou shalt find me, Then thou shalt do as much for me."

The same tremendous truth, that after the temporal the endless follows, is taught in the " mighty line " of Marlowe, in which he describes the emotions of Faustus as " the clock strikes eleven."

HELL. 683

with no final endless aeon is a Pagan, and Gnostic, not a Biblical conception. The importation of the notion of an endless series of finite cycles, each of which is without finality and immutability, into the Christian system, has introduced error, similarly as the importation of the Pagan conception of Hades has. The misconceiving of a rhetorical figure, in the Scripture use of the plural for the singular, namely, roi"? alwvas rwv alcovcov for top aloova, has also contributed to this error.

The two aeons, or ages, known in Scripture, are mentioned together in Matt. 12 : 32, "It shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world {alcov), nor in the world {alcov) to come ; " in Mark 10 : 30, " lie shall receive an hundredfold now in this time {Kcupo'i), and in the world {alcov) to come, eternal life;" in Luke 18:30, ''He shall i-eceive manifold more in this present time {icaLp6

" Ah, Faustus, Now hast thou but one bare hour to live, And then thou must be damn'd perpetually ! Stand still, you ever-moving spheres of heaven, That time may cease, and midnight never come ; Fair Nature's eye, rise, rise again, and make Perpetual day ; or let this hoar be but A year, a month, a week, a natural day, That Faustus may repent and save his soul ! O lente, lente currite, noctis equi ! The stars move still, time runs, the clock will strike, The devil will come, and Faustus must be damned."

1 It is relative, not absolute eternity ; eternity a parte post, not a parte ante. The future aeon, or age, has a beginning, but no ending. This is the meaning,

684 ESCHATOLOGY.

1. The present finite and limited age, or aeon, is denominated in Scripture, "this world" (6 aloiv ovro<;, ^j^^ ^\'^^\ Matt. 12 : 32 ; 13 : 22 ; Luke 16:8; 20 : 34 ; Rom. 12 : 2 ; 1 Cor. 1 : 20 ; 2 : 6, et alia. Another designation is, " this present world " (6 vvv alcov, or o eveo-rw? alcov), 1 Tim. 6 : 17 ; 2 Tim. 4 : 10 ; Titns 2 : 12 ; Gal. 1 : 4. Sometimes the present limited age, or aeon, is denoted by alcap without the article : Luke 1 : TO, " Which he spake by the mouth of his hoi}'' prophets, which have been since the world began " {aTT aloovo

For rhetorical effect, the present limited age, or aeon, is sometimes represented as composed of a number of lesser ages or cycles, as in modern phrase the sum total of finite earthly time is denominated "the centuries," or "the ages." The following are examples : 1 Cor. 2:7, " The hidden wisdom which God ordained before the ages " (7rp6 t6)v aldoucov). Compare Eph. 3:9; Col. 1 : 26. In 1 Tim. 1:17, God is denominated /SacriXeu? ruiv alcavoyv, king of the ages of titne, and therefore " the king eternal " (A. V.). In Rom. 16:25, a "mystery" is said to have been kept secret xpovoi'i al(oviot

HELL. 685

sages, "aeonian times " is equivalent to " the centuries," or the " long ages." ' This rhetorical plural does not destroy the unity of the limited age, or aeon. To conceal a mystery from the past "aeonian ages," or the past centuries and cycles of finite time, is the same as to conceal it from past finite time as a whole."

2. The future infinite and endless age, or aeon, is denominated, in Scripture, "the future world," A. V. and H. V, "the world to come" (alcov 6 fxeWwv, ^'^~ ^V^)? Matt. 12:32; Heb. 2:5; 6:5. Another designation is, "the world to come " {alcop 6 ip')(pvevo

The same use of the plural for rhetorical effect, employed in the case of the limited aeon, is also employod in that of the unlimited. The future infinite alcov is represented as made up of lesser al(M)V€

' The Revisers make the reference to be to the unlimited aeon, or to eternity. Their rendering of Titus 1 : 3, by, "before times eternal,'''' involves the absurdity that a Divine promise is made prior to eternity ; and of Rom. 16 : 25, by, " through times eternal,'" represents the mystery as concealed during eternitj' : that is to say, as forever concealed.

^ The phrases, " end of the ages " (reKr) roiv alwvuv), 1 Cor. 10 : 11 ; " fulness of the time," Gal. 4:4; "fulness of times," Eph. 1:10; "these last days" (fffxarr; rCov Tjfj.epcei' tovtoiv)^ Heb. 1:1; denote the time of the Messiah's first advent : that epoch in the temporal aicoc when the incarnation occurred. Hodge : Ou Eph. 1 : 10.

686 ESCHATOLOGY.

25, " the creator is blessed forever" (etV rov<; amva^) ; Roin. 9 : 5 ; 11 : 30 ; 16 : 27 ; 2 Cor. 11 : 31 ; Phil, -t : 20 ; Gal. 1 : 5 (ei9 Tov<; alu)va<; TOiv alcovcov) ] 1 Tim. 1 : 17; Rev. 1 : 6, IS ; 4 : 9, 10 ; 5 : 13 ; 7 : 12, et alia. The phrases, et? tol»9 alcova

Since the word aeon [alcov), or age, in Scripture, may denote either the present finite age, or the future endless age, in order to determine the meaning of " aeonian " (alcovLoi;). it is necessary first to determine m which of the tioo aeo?is, the limited or the endless, the thing exists to which the epitliet is appHed ; because anything in either aeon may be denominated "aeonian," Tlie adjective follows its substantive, in meaning. Onesimus, as a slave, existed in this world (alcov) of " time," and when he is called an aeonian, or "everlasting" [alcovios;) servant (Philemon 15), it is meant that his servitude continues as long as the finite aeon in which he is a servant ; and this is practically at an end for him, when he dies and leaves it. The mountains are denominated aeonian, or "everlasting" {alcovia), in the sense that they endure as long as the finite world (alcov) of which they are a part endures. God, on the other hand, is a being that exists in the infinite alcov, and is therefore alcovLo^ in the endless signification of the word. The same is true of the spirits of angels and men, because they exist in the future aeon, as well as in the present one. If anything belongs solely to the present age, or aeon, it is aeonian in the limited signification ; if it belongs to the future age, or aeon, it is aeonian in the unlimited signification. If, therefore, the punishment of the wicked occurs in the jjresent aeon, it is aeonian in the sense of temporal ; but if it occurs in the future aeon, it is aeonian in the sense of endless. The adjective takes its meaning from its noun.'

' " Kldiv de quocunque temporis spatio ita dicitur, ut, quale sit, judicari debeat in singulis locis ex orationis serie et mente sciiptoris, rebus adeo et personis de quibus sermo est." Schleusner, in voce.

HELL. 687

The English woi-d " forever " has tlie same twofold meaning, both in Scripture and in common use. Sometimes it means as long as a man lives upon earth. The Hebrew servant that had his ear bored with an awl to the door of hie master, was to be his servant " forever," Exod. 21 : 6. Sometimes it means as long as the Jewish state should last. The ceremonial laws were to be statutes " forever," Lev. 16 : 34. Sometimes it means, as long as the world stands. " One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh ; but the earth abideth forever," Eccl. 1 : 4-. In all such instances, "forever" refers to the temporal aeon, and denotes finite duration. But in other instances, and they are the great majority in Scripture, "forever " refers to the endless aeon ; as when it is said that "God is over all blessed forever." The limited signification of " forever " in the former cases, does not disprove its unlimited signification in the latter. That Onesimus was an "everlasting" {aLcovto<;) servant, and that the hills are " everlasting" {alcovLa), no more disproves the everlastingness of God, and the soul ; of heaven, and of hell ; than the term " forever " in a title-deed disproves it. To hold land " forever " is to hold it " as long as grass grows and water runs ; " that is, as long as this world, or aeon, endures.

The objection that because alcovio'i, or " aeonian," denotes " that which belongs to an age," it cannot mean endless, rests upon the assumption that there is no endless aloov, or age. It postulates an indefinite series of limited aeons, or ages, no one of which is final and everlasting. But the texts that have been cited disprove this. Scripture speaks of but two aeons, which cover and include the whole existence of man, and his whole duration. If, therefore, he is an immortal being, one of these must be endless. The phrase " ages of ages," applied to the future endless age, does not prove that there is more than one future age, any more than the phrase " the eternities '' proves that there is more than one eternity ; or the phrase " the infinities" proves

688 ESCHATOLOGY.

that there is more than one infinity. The phiral in these cases is rhetorical and intensive, not arithmetical, in its force.

This examination of the Scripture use of the word alwVLO'i refutes the assertion, that " aeonian " means " spiritual " in distinction from " material " or " sensuous," and has no reference at all to time or duration ; that when applied to "death," it merely denotes that the death is mental and spiritual in its nature, without saying whether it is long or short, temporary or endless. Beyond dispute, some objects are denominated " aeonian," in Scripture, which have nothing mental or spiritual in them. The mountains are "aeonian." The truth is, that alwv is a term that denotes time only^ and never denotes the nature and quality of an object. All the passages that have been quoted show that duration, either limited or endless, is intended by the word. "Whenever this visible world in the sense of the matter' constituting it is meant, the word employed is Koafj,6

In by far the greater number of instances, alcov and aloovio<; refer to the future infinite age, and not to the present finite age ; to eternity, and not to time. Says Stuart (Exegetical Essays, 13, 16), "atcoyto? is employed 66 times in the New Testament. Of these, 51 relate to the future happiness of the righteous ; 7 relate to future punishment : namely, Matt. 18 : 8 ; 25 : 41 ; 46 ; Mark 3 : 29 ; 1 Thess. 1:9; Heb. 6:2; Jude 6 ; 2 relate to God ; 6 are of a miscellaneous nature (5 relating to confessedly endless

HELL. 689

tilings, as covenant, invisibilities ; and one, in Philemon 15, to a perpetual service). In all the instances in which alcovoof refers to future duration, it denotes endless duration ; saying nothing of the instances in which it refers to future punishment. The Hebrew 'ob'iy is translated in the Septuagint by alwv, 308 times. In almost the whole of these instances, the meaning is, time unlimited ; a period without end. In the other instances, it means alcop in the secondary, limited sense; it is applied to the mountains, the Levitical statutes, priesthood, etc." The younger Edwards (Reply to Chauncy, XIY.) says that " aloov, reckoning the reduplications of it, as alu)ve

An incidental proof that the adjective ala)vio<; has the milimited signification when applied to future punishment, is the fact that the destiny of lost men is bound up with that of Satan and his angels. " Then shall he say unto them on the left hand. Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels," Matt. 25 : 41. These are represented in Scripture as hopelessly lost. " Tlie devil that deceived them shall be tormented day and night forever and ever," Rev. 20 : 10, The Jews, to whom Christ spoke, understood the perdition of the lost angels to be absolute. If the positions of the Restorationist are true in reference to man, they are also in reference to devils. But Scripture teaches that there is no redemption for the lost angels. " Christ took not on him the nature of angels," Heb. 2 : 16.

Respecting the nature of the " everlasting punishment,'^' it is clear from the Biblical representations that it is accompanied with consciousness. Dives is " in torments," Vol. II.— 44

690 ESCHATOLOGY.

Luke 16 : 23. " The smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and ever," Rev. 14:11. "Fear hath torment," 1 John 4: 18; and the lost fear " the wrath of the Lamb," Eev. 6: 16. The figures of the "fire," and the "worm" are intended to denote conscious pain. An attempt has been made to prove that the punishment of tlie wicked is the extinction of consciousness. This doctrine is sometimes denominated Annihilation. Few of its advocates, however, have contended for the strict annihilation of the substance of the soul and body. The more recent defenders maintain the doctrine of Conditional Immortality. According to tliis view, the soul is not naturally immortal. Some of this class contend that it is matei'ial. It gains immortality only through its redemption by Christ.' All who are not redeemed lose all consciousness at the death of the body, and this is the " spiritual death " tlireatened in Scripture. As the death of the body is the extinction of sensation, so the death of the soul is the extinction of consciousness. The falsity of the theory of Annihilation, in both of its forms, is proved by the following considerations : {a) Death is the opposite of birth, and birth does not mean the creation of substance. The conception and birth of an individual man is the uniting of a soul and a body, not the creation ex nihilo of either ; and the physical death of an individual man is the separation of a soul and body, not the annihilation of either. Death is a change of the mode in which a Substance exists, and supposes tliat the substance itself continues in being.

" Ne, when the life decays and forme does fade, Doth it consume and into nothing goe, But chaunged is and often altered to and froe. The substaunce is not chaunged nor altered, But th' only forme and outward fashion."

Faikt Queen, III. vi.

' This theory was presented by Dodwell : Epistolary Discourse, that the Soul is a principle naturally mortal Immortalized by the pleasure of God. Loudon, 1706.

HELL. 691

The death of an animal substance makes an alteration in the relations of certain material atoms, but does not put them out of existence. Dead matter is as far from nonentity as living matter. That physical death is not the annihilation of substance, is proved by 1 Cor. 15 : 36, " That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die." Compare John 12: 2-1. In like manner, the death of the soul, or spiritual deatli, is only a change in the relations of the soul, and its mode of existence, and not the annihilation of its substance. In spiritual death, the soul is separated from God ; as in physical death, the soul is separated from the body. The union of the soul with God is spiritual life ; its separation from God is spiritual death. " He that hath the Son hath [spiritual] life, and he that hath not the Son hath not [spiritual] life," 1 John 5: 12. (J) The spiritually dead are described in Scripture as conscious. Gen. 2 : 7 compared with Gen. 3:8. "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die;" Adam and Eve "hid themselves." After their fall they were spiritually dead, and filled with shame and terror before God. The "dead in trespasses and sins walk according to the course of this world," Eph. 2:1, 2. " She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth," 1 Tim. 5:6. " You being dead in your sins hath he forgiven," Coloss. 2:13. "Thou livest, and art dead," Rev. 3:1. Spiritual deatli is the same as the " second death," and the second death " hurts," Rev. 2 : 11 ; and its smoke of torment " ascends forever and ever," Rev. 19 : 3. (c) The extinction of consciousness is not of the nature of punishment. The essence of punishment is suffering, and suffering is consciousness. In order to be punished, the person must be conscious of a certain pain, must feel that he deserves it, and know that it is inflicted because he does. All three of these elements are required in a case of punishment. To reduce a man to unconsciousness would make his punishment an impossibility. If God by a positive act extinguishes, at death, the remorse of a hardened villain, by extinguishC92 ESCHATOLOGY.

ing his self-consciousness, it is a strange nse of language to denominate this a punishment. Still another proof that the extinction of consciousness is not of the nature of punishment is the fact that a holj and innocent being might be deprived of consciousness bj his Creator, but could not be punished by him. God is not obliged, by his justice, to perpetuate a conscious existence which he originated ex nihilo. For wise ends, he might suffer an unfallen angel not only to lose consciousness, but to lapse into his original nonentity. But he could not, in justice, inflict retributive suffering upon him. {d) The extinction either of being, or of consciousness, admits of no degrees of punishment. All transgressors are " punished " exactly alike. This contradicts Luke 12 : 47, 48 ; Eom. 2 : 12. [e) According to this theory, brutes are punished. In losing consciousness at death, the animal like the man incurs an everlasting loss. The Annihilationist contends that the substance of punishment is in the result, and not in its being felt or experienced. If a transgressor is put out of conscious existence, the result is an everlasting loss to him, though he does not know it. But the same thing is true of a brute. And if the former is punished, the latter is also, {f) The advocate of Conditional Immortality, in teaching that the extinction of consciousness is the "eternal death " of Scripture, implies that the continuance of consciousness is the " eternal life." But mere consciousness is not happiness. Judas was conscious, certainly, when he hung himself, even if he is not now. But he was not happy, {g) The extinction of consciousness is not regarded by sinful men as an evil, but a good. They substitute the doctrine of the eternal sleep of the soul, for that of its eternal punishment. This shows that the two things are not equivalents. When Mirabeau lay dying, he cried passionately for opium, that he might never awake. The guilty and remorseful have, in all ages, deemed the extinction of consciousness after death to be a blessing; but the advocate of Conditional Immortality exHELL. 693

plains it to be a curse. " Sight, and hearing, and all earthly good, without justice and virtue," says Plato (Laws, II. 661), " are the greatest of evils, if life he iniiiiortal j but not so great, if the bad man lives a very short time." (A) The fact that tlie soul depends for its immortality and consciousness upon tlie upholding power of its Maker does not prove either that it is to be annihilated, or to lose consciousness. Matter also depends for its existence and operations upon the Creator. Both matter and mind can be annihilated by the same Beino; who created them from nothing-. Whether he will cease to uphold any particular work of his hand, can be known only by revelation. In the material world, we see no evidence of such an intention. We are told that " the elements shall melt with fervent heat," but not that they shall be annihilated. And, certainly, all that God has said in revelation respecting creation, redemption, and perdition, implies and teaches that he intends to uphold, not to annihilate the human spirit ; to perpetuate, not extinguish its self-consciousness.

The form of Universalism which is the most respectable, and therefore the most dangerous, is that which concedes the force of the Biblical and rational arguments respecting the guilt of sin, and its intrinsic desert of everlasting punishment, but contends that redemption from it through the vicarious atonement of Christ is extended into the next world. The advocates of this view assert that between death and the final judgment the application of Christ's work is going on ; that the Holy Spirit is regenerating sinners in the intermediate state, and they are believing and repenting as in this life. This makes the day of judgment, instead of the day of deatli, the dividing line between " time " and " eternity ; " between 6 amv ovro^, and alcov 6 /xeWcov. And this makes the intermediate state a third aeon by itself, lying between "time" and "eternity;" between " this world " and " the world to come."

That the "intermediate state" is not a third aeon, but a

694 ESCHATOLOGY.

part of the second endless aeon, is proved by the following considerations :

1. First, by the fact that in Scripture the disembodied state is not called "intermediate." This is an ecclesiastical term which came in with the doctrine of purgatory, and along with the exaggeration of the difference between Paradise and Heaven, and between Hades and Gehenna. 2. Secondly, by the fact that in Scripture death is represented as the deciding epoch in a man's existence. It is the boundary between the two Biblical aeons, or worlds. Until a man dies, he is in " this world " (o vuv al(ov) ; after death, he is in " the future world " {aloov 6 fieWcov). The common understanding of the teaching of Scripture is, that men are in " time," so long as they live, but when they die, they enter " eternity." " It is appointed unto men once to die, but after that judgment," Heb. 9 : 27. This teaches that prior to death man's destiny is not decided, he being not yet sentenced ; but after death his destiny is settled. When he dies, the "private judgment," that is, the immediate personal consciousness either of penitence or impenitence, occurs. Every human spirit, in that supreme moment when it "returns to God who gave it," knows by direct self-consciousness whether it is a child or an enemy of God, in temper and disposition ; whether it is humble and contrite, or proud, hard, and impenitent ; whether it welcomes or rejects the Divine mercy in Christ. The article of death is an event in human existence which strips off all disguises, and shows the person what he really is in moral character. He " knows as he is known," and in this flashing light passes a sentence upon himself that is accurate. This "private judgment" at death, is reaffirmed in the "general judgment" of the last day.

Accordingly, our Lord teaches distinctly that death is a finality for the impenitent sinner. Twice in succession, he says with awful emphasis to the Pharisees, "If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins," John 8 : 21,

HELL. 695

24. This implies, that to " die in sin," is to be hopelessly lost. Again, he says, " Yet a little while is the light with 3'^ou. Walk while ye have the light, lest darkness come upon you : for he that walketh in darkness knoweth not whither he goeth. While ye have light, believe in the light, that ye may be the children of light," John 12 : 35, 36. According to these words of the Redeemer, the light of the gospel is not accessible in the darkness of death. " The night cometh, wherein no man can work," John 9 : 4. The niglit of death puts a stop to the work of salvation that is appointed to be done in the daytime of this life. St. Paul teaches the same truth, in 1 Thess. 5 : 5-7, " Ye are all the children of light, and the children of the day : we are not of the night, nor of darkness. Therefore let us not sleep, as do others ; but let us watch and be sober. For they that sleep, sleep in the night ; and they that be drunken, are drunken in the night." " God said unto him. Thou fool, this night thy soul shall be required of thee : then whose shall those things be which thou hast provided ? So is he that layeth up treasure for himself, and is not rich towards God," Luke 12 : 20, 21. The end of a man's life on earth is often represented as the decisive moment in his existence. " He that endureth to the end, shall be saved," Matt. 10 : 22 ; 24 : 13. " Jesus Christ shall confirm you unto the end," 1 Cor. 1:8. " Whose house are we, if we hold fast the confidence, and the rejoicing of the hope firm unto the end," Ileb. 3:6. " We are made partakers of Christ, if we hold the beginning of our confidence steadfast unto the end," Ileb. 3 : 14. " We desire that every one of you do shew the same diligence to the full assurance of hope unto the end," Heb. 6 : 11. " He that overcometh, and keepeth my \vorks unto the end, to him will I give power over the nations," Rev. 2 : 26. In these passages, the end of life, or of this world is meant. 'No one would think of the end of the intermediate state, or of eternity, as the reXo'i, or TeXov

696 ESCHATOLOGY.

With tliese Xew Testament teachings agrees tlie frequent affirmation of the Old Testament, that after death nothing can be done towards securing salvation. " The wicked is driven away in his wickedness [at death] ; but the righteous hath hope in his death," Prov. 14 : 33. " When a wicked man dieth, his expectation shall perish," Prov. 11 : 7. " In death there is no remembrance of thee : in the grave who shall give thee thanks ? " Ps. 6:5. " Wilt thou show wonders to the dead ? Shall the dead arise and praise thee ? Shall thy loving-kindness be declared in the grave?" Ps. 88 : 10, 11. " The dead praise not the Lord, nor any that go down into silence," Ps. 115 : 17. " To him that is joined to all the living, there is hope : for the living know that they shall die ; but the dead know not anything, neither have they any more a reward," Eccl. 9 : 4-6. These passages do not teach the utter unconsciousness of the soul after death, in flat contradiction to that long list already cited (p. 613 sq.) which asserts the contrary, but that there is no alteration of character in the next life, " In death, there is no [happy] remembrance of God" [if there has been none in life]. "The dead shall not arise, and praise God " [in the next world, if they have not done so in this world]. "Shall God declare his loving-kindness [to one] in the grave" [if he has not declared it to him when upon earth] ?

The parable of Dives proves that death is the turningpoint in human existence, and fixes the everlasting state of the person. Dives asks that his brethren may be warned hefore they die and enter Hades; because after death and the entrance into Hades, there is an impassable gulf between misery and happiness, sin and holiness. This shows that the so-called "intermediate" state is not intermediate in respect to the essential elements of heaven and hell, but is a part of the final and endless state of the soul. It is "intermediate," only in reference to the secondary matter of the presence or absence of the body.

HELL. 697

The asserted extension of redemption into the endless aeon, or age, is contradicted by Scripture. Salvation from sin is represented as confined to the limited aeon, by the covenant between the Father and the Son. The most important and explicit passage bearing upon this point is 1 Cor. 15 : 24-28, " Then cometh the end, when Christ shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father, when he shall have put down all [opposing] rule, and all [opposing] authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet." St. Paul here states the fact, disclosed to him by revelation from God, that the redemption of sinners will not go on forever, but will cease at a certain point of time. The Mediator will carry on his work of saving sinful men, until he has gathered in his church, and completed the work according to the original plan and covenant between himself and his Father, and then will surrender his mediatorial commission and office {^aaCkelav). There will then no longer be any mediation going on between sinners and God. The redeemed will be forever united to their Divine Head in heaven, and the wicked will be shut up in the " outer darkness." That Christ's mediatorial work does not secure the salvation of all men during the appointed period in which it is carried on, is proved by the fact that when " the end cometh," some men are described as the " enemies " of Christ, and as being " put under his feet," 1 Cor. 15 : 24, 25. All of Christ's redeemed " stand before his throne," Rev. 14 : 3 ; 19 : 4-7 ; 21 : 3. They are in the " mansions " which he has " prepared " for them, John 14 : 2, 3.

The reason assigned for Christ's surrender of his mediatorial commission is, " that God may be all in all," 1 Cor. 15 : 28 ; not, that " God even the Father may be all in all," 1 Cor. 15 : 24. It is the Trinity that is to be supreme. To Christ, as an incarnate trinitarian person, and an anointed mediator, " all power is [temporarily] given in heaven and upon earth" (Matt. 28:18), for the purpose of saving sin698 ESCHATOLOGY.

Tiers. As such, he accepts and holds a secondary position of condescension and humiliation, when compared with his original unincarnate position. See p. 354 sq. In this reference, he receives a "commandment" (John 10 : 18), and a "kino-dom" (1 Cor. 15 : 24). In this reference, as believers " are Christ's," so " Christ is God's," 1 Cor. 3 : 23 ; and as " the head of the woman is the man," so " the head of Christ is God," 1 Cor, 11 : 3. But when Christ has finished his work of mediating between the triune God and sinful men, and of saving sinners, this condition of subjection to an office and a commission ceases. The dominion (jSaaiXecav) over heaven and earth, temporarily delegated to a single trinitarian pei'son incarnate, for purposes of redemption and salvation, now returns to the Eternal Three whence it came, and to whom it originally belongs. The Son of God, his humanity exalted and glorified, and his Divine-human person united forever to his church as their head, no longer prosecutes that work of redemption which he carried forward through certain ages of time, but, with the Father and Spirit, Three in One, reigns over the entire universe : over the holy " who stand before the throne," and over the wdcked who are " under his feet," and " in the bottomless pit."

The confinement of the work of redemption to the limited aeon, which terminates practically for each individual at the deatli of the body, is taught in many other passages of Scripture, " My spirit shall not always ["for ever," R, V.I strive with man, for that he also is [sinful] flesh ; yet his days shall be an hundred and twenty years," Gen. 6 : 3, This teaches that the regenerating agency of tl'ie Divine Spirit in the sinner's heart was to be restricted to the hundred and twenty years which for a time was the average length of human life, " O that they were wise, that they would consider their latter end," Dent. 32 : 29. " Teach us so to number our days, that we may apply our hearts unto wisdom," Ps. 90 : 12, " Every one that is godly shall pray

HELL. 699

unto tliee in a time when thou niajest be found," Ps. 32 : 6. " Because I have called, and ye refused ; I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded ; but ye have set at naught all my counsel, and would none of my reproof ; I also will laugh at your calamity ; I will mock when your fear comcth. Then shall they call upon me, but I will not answer ; they shall seek me early, but they shall not lind me," Prov. 1 : 24-28. " Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might ; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave whither thou goest," Eccl. 9 : 10. " Seek ye the Lord while he may be found; call ye upon him while he is near," Isa. 55 : 6. " Take heed to yourselves lest at any time your hearts be overcharged with surfeiting, and drunkenness, and cares of this life, and so that day come upon you unawares : for as a snare shall it come on all them that dwell on the face of the earth," Luke 21 : 34, 35. " Watch, therefore, for ye know not what hour your Lord cometh. The Lord of that servant shall come in a day when he looketh not for him, and shall cut him asunder, and appoint him his portion with unbelievers : there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth," Matt. 24 : 42, 50. " If thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace ! but now they are hid from thine eyes," Luke 19 : 42. " Strive to enter in at the strait gate : for many, I say unto you, will seek to enter in, and shall not be able. When once the master of the house is risen up, and hath shut to the door, and ye begin to stand without, and to knock at the door, saying, Lord, Lord, open unto us, he shall answer, and say unto you, I know you not whence ye are," Luke 13:24,25. "We beseech you that ye receive not the grace of God in vain. For he saith, I have heard thee in a time accepted, and in the day of salvation have I succored thee : behold now is the accepted time ; behold now is the day of salvation," 2 Cor. 6:2. " To-day if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts," Heb. 3 : 7. The argument

700 ESCHATOLOGY.

in Ileb, 3 : 7-19 is to the effect, that as God swore that those Israelites who did not believe and obey his servant Moses during the forty years of wandering in the desert should not enter the earthly Canaan, so those who do not " wdiile it is called. To-day " — that is, while they are here in time — believe and obey his Son Jesus Christ, shall not enter the heavenly Canaan. " Take heed lest there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief. But exhort one another daily, while it is called, To-day,*' Heb. 3 : 12, 13. " God liniiteth a certain day, saying in David, To-day, after so long a time [of impenitence], To-day, if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts," Heb. 4 : 7. Hebrews 10 : 26 speaks of a time when " there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a fearful looking-for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the adversaries of God." " Behold I come quickly ; and m}' reward is with me, to give to every man according as his work shall be. He that is unjust, let him be unjust still ; and he which is filthy, let him be filthy still ; and he that is righteous, let him be righteous still ; and he that is holy, let him be holy still," Rev. 22 : 11, 12.

If sinners are redeemed be^'ond the grave, man must be informed of the fact by God himself. There is no other way of finding it out. He has not been so informed, but, if language has any meaning, has been informed of the contrary. Bishop Butler (Analogy, I. ii.) states the case with his usual conciseness and clearness. "Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should finally be well with the righteous, and ill with the wicked ; but it could not be determined upon any principles of reason whether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through other states of life and being, before that distributive justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us that the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this justice; that it shall no longer be delayed, but the mystery of God, the great mystery of his

HELL. YOl

suffering vice and confusion to j9r5'y«^7, shall tlien be finished ; and he will take to him his great power, and will reign, bj rendering to every one according to his works."

The asserted extension of redemption into the period between death and the resnrrection cannot be placed upon the ground of obligation and justice ; and the only other ground possible, that of the Divine promise so to extend it, is wanting. Oar Lord teaches that men prior to his coming into the world are "condemned already," John 3:18. His advent to save them supposes that they are already lost ; and they are lost by sin ; and sin is man's free self-determination.' Consequently, man the sinner has no claim

1 The strange position has recently been taken, that the rejection of Christ is the only sin that brings eternal death. "No one," says Dorner (Christian Doctrine, IV., 167), "will be damned merely on account of the common sin and guilt. But every one is definitely brought to [guilty] personal decision only through the gospel." Says a writer in the Andover Review (Dec, 1885, p. 574) : "No one can be lost without the knowledge of Christ." This implies that man's sin against the moral law is not sufficient to condemn him to eternal death. He must sin against the gospel, before he can be so condemned. Neither original sin nor actual transgression, neither evil inclination nor outward disobedience, both of which are sins against the law, expose a man to hell.

This is an entirely new position, not to be found in the past history of eschatology, and invented, apparently, to furnish a basis for the doctrine of a future offer of redemption. The objections to it are the following : {a) It contradicts the whole tenor of scriptiire. Christ teaches that he came to call actual and guilty sinners to repentance (Luke 5 : 33) ; that he came to seek and save that which was really and trulj' lost (Luke 19 : 10) ; that he did not come into the world to condemn the world, because it was already condemned, but to save the world (John 3:17, 18). St. Paul affirms that the whole world, prior to redemption, and irrespective of it, are guilty before God (Rom. 3 : 19). St. John asserts that the whole world. Gentile and Jewish, unevangelized and evangelized, lieth in wickedness (I John 5 : 19). To quote all the passages in which the Bible teaches that men are exposed to eternal death on account of their transgression of the law of God, would be to quote a large part of the Bible. The rejection of the gospel adds a new sin, and a very aggravating one, to the already existing sin against the divine law (John 15 : 23), but it is not the primary and original ground of condemnation. Men are punished, first of all, because they "have sinned, and come short of the glory of God," Rom. 3 : 23. (6) Unless man has first sinned against the law, he cannot sin against the gospel. If he has not previously committed a damning sin for which Christ has atoned, he cannot reject Clirist's atonement any more than an innocent angel can. The rejection of salvation is meaningless, if no damnation has been incurred. If there is no disease, there can be no cure, nor rejection of a cure, (c) If nc human soul is in

702 ESCHATOLOGY.

upon God for redemption. Forgiveness is undeserved, whether offered here or hereafter. The exercise of niercj is optional witli God. "I will have njerey on whom I will have mercy," Eom. 9 : 15. It follows from this, that the

danger of perdition until it has rejected Christ, then if Christ had never been offered to man no man would be lost. For if he were not offered, he could not be rejected. In this case, it would have been infinitely better for mankind had Christ never come into the world on an errand of salvation. Had he remained unincarnate, as he had been from eternity, no one could have refused belief in him, and as unbelief is the only damning sin no one could have been damned. (cZ) If "no man can be lost without the knowledge of Christ," then none of the past heathen world who died without this knowledge incurred perdition for the " deeds done in the body," and none of the existing heathen world ■who are destitute of this knowledge are liable to perdition from this cause. In this case, it is matter of rejoicing that the past generations of pagans never heard of the Redeemer, and it should be an earnest endeavor of the Church to prevent all of the present generation of pagans from hearing of him.

Dorner's theory, that "no one will be damned merely on account of the common sin and guilt," is full of inconsistency and self-contradiction. First, he holds that man is in a state of •'common sin and guilt," but it is a species of sin and guilt that does not deserve endless punishment, and is not in danger of it. Secondly, he holds that man needs "salvation" from such an unendangered state. Thirdly, he holds that God is bound in justice to provide " salvation" from, such an unendangered state. "The gospel," he says (IV. 1G7), "repentance, and forgiveness of sins, is to be preached to all nations. This cannot refer merely to nations as unities, but must refer also to every individual ; for otherwise the universality of the gracious purpose would not be sincerely meant ; and if God refused what in irulLspensable to salvation to the individual^ condemnation would be impossible.''^ Fourthly, he holds that God exhibits mercy, when he does what he is obligated to do.

To aU this self-stultifying soteriology, the principle enunciated by St. Paul (Rom. 11 : 6) is a conclusive reply : " If by grace, then it is no more of works ; otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then it is no more grace ; otherwise work is no more work." If man's " common sin and guilt" is not damning, then it is no more sin and guilt ; otherwise sin and guilt are no more sin and guilt. If Christ's salvation is not from death and hell, then it is no more salvation ; otherwise salvation is no more salvation. And if God's mercy is justly due to man, then it is no more mercy ; otherwise mercy is no more mercy.

Julius Midler, though holding (upon the ground of Matt. 12 : 83) " the glorious hope that in the world to come, in far distant aeons, some who here harden their hearts against God's revelation, and can expect only a verdict of condemnation in the day of judgment, shall find forgiveness and salvation " (Pin, IL 4'J9), denies and combats Dorner's position that sin against the gospel is the only damning sin (Sin, II. 400). For a very able argument in proof that both evil inclination and outward transgression are damning, see Sin, I. 19S-214.

HELL. 703

length of time during which the offer of mercy is made to transgressors is liivcwise optional with God. It may be long or short, according to the Divine will. Should God say to a sinner : " I will pardon your sin to-day, if you will penitently confess it, but not to-morrow," this sinner could not complain of injustice, but would owe gratitude for the mercy thus extended for a limited time. It cannot be said, that unless God offers to pardon man forever and ever, he he is not a merciful Being. jSTeither can this be said, if he confines redemption to this life, and does not redeem sinners in the intermediate state.'

It is here that the logical inconsistency of such theologians as Miiller and Dorner appears. Lessing, the first of German critics, makes the following remark respecting the German mind: "We Germans suffer from no lack of systematic books. No nation in the world surpasses us in the faculty of deducing from a couple of definitions wdiatever conclusions we please, in most fair and logical order " (Preface to the Laocoon). The truth of this remark is illustrated by some of the systems of theolog}^ and philosophy constructed in Germany. The reasoning is close, consecutive, and true, in some sections ; but loose, inconsequent, and false, as a whole. The mind of the thinker when movincr in the limited sphere, moves logically ; but moving in the universe, and attempting to construct a philosophy or theology of the Infinite, fails utterly. Many of the trains of reasoning in Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre are profound, closely reasoned, and correct, but the system as a Mdiole has fatal defects. No one will deny the rigor of Hegel's logical processes in segments, but the total circle of his thinking is pantheistic, and full of inconsistency.

Lessing's remark applies to that type of Univcrsalism of which Miiller and Dorner are the best representatives, and the ablest advocates. In the first place, upon " a couple " of

1 Shedd: Sermons to the Natural Man. (Sermon XVIII.)

704 ESCHATOLOGY.

obscure and dubious scripture texts, they rear the whole great fabric of a future redemption, in direct contradiction to some scores of perfectly plain texts that teach the confinement of redemption to this life. And, secondly, after laying down a theory of sin which represents it as pure selfdetermination and guilt, sin is then discussed as an evil that is entitled to the offer of a pardon, and a remedy. Mliller and Dorner, both alike, explain sin as originating in the free and guilty agency of the finite will, and as requiring an atonement in order to its remission,' And yet both alike, when they come to eschatology, assume tacitly, but do not formally assert, that the Divine Perfection requires that the offer of forgiveness be made, sooner or later, to every sinner ; that there will be a defect in the benevolence, and a blemish in the character, of the Supreme Being, if he does not tender a pardon to every transgressor of his law. Their eschatology thus contradicts their hamartiology.

The extension of the work of redemption into the future world is made to rest very much, for its support, upon the cases of the heathen and of infants. Respecting the former, it is certain that the heathen are voluntary transgressors of the moral law, and therefore have no claim upon the Divine mere}'. Scripture teaches that they perish because of their sin, and impenitence in sin. It is wicked to sin, and still more wicked not to repent of it. The heathen are chargeable with both. St, Paul describes them as those " who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them," Rom. 1 : 32, "There is no respect of persons with God, For as many as have sinned without [written] law sliall also perish without [written] law," Rom. 2:11, "The Gentiles show the

' The merit of Miiller, in particular, in respect to a profound and true view of sin is very great. No theological treatise of this century has more value upon this subject, than his.

HELL. 705

work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness, and their thoughts accusing, in the day M'hen God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ," Horn. 2 : 14, 15, " The Gentiles walk in tlic vanity of their mind, having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignoi-ance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart, who being past feeling have given themselves over unto lasciviousness to work all uncleanness with greediness," Eph. 4: 17. " Remember that ye being in time past Gentiles, were at that time without hope, and without God in the world," Eph. 2:11, 12. " Murderers, .whoi-emongers, and idolaters, shall have their part in the lake of fire and brimstone : which is the second death," E,ev. 21 : 8. Jesus Christ said from heaven to Saul of Tarsus, that he had appointed him to be " a minister and witness to the Gentiles, to open their eyes, to turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins and inheritance among them that are sanctified by faith," Acts 26 : 16-18. There is, consequently, no ground for asserting that justice and obligation requirethat the pardon of sins be tendered to the heathen in the next life.'

' " The distinction," says Mulier (Sin, L 207), " between superable and insuperable ignorance will affect our calculation of the degree of guilt. A man cannot be reproached on account of ignorance regarding things accidental and changeable ; but to be ignorant of those fundamental truths whereof conscience ia~ forms him, and of their bearing upon conduct, is the sign of a sinful perversion of the inner life. If, from the moment when he first heard the voice of conscience, his aim always had been simply and solely to know what that voice tells him, and unconditionally to obey, there would be no sins of ignorance to be laid to his charge. But the sinfulness of human nature, in this respect, prevents our exculpating him thus from the guilt of particiilar sins. It is the unrighteousness of man that hinders the development of truth in his consciousness. Rom. 1 : 18. And hence we find that savages, when they have been converted from the abominations of idolatry — from lust and murder, and unbridled selfish impulse — to the faith of Christ, never excuse themselves on the ground of ignorance, but in deep humiliation feel the reproaches of an awakened conscience. St. Paul recognizes the mitigation of guilt in the case of the heathen, when he says regarding the xp^i'oi t^x dyvoias. (Acts IT: oO), 'God ovetVOL. 11—45.

706 ESCHATOLOGY.

It does not follow, however, that because God is not obliged to offer pardon to the unevangelizcd heathen, either here or hereafter, therefore no unevangelized heathen are pardoned. The electing mercj of God reaches to the heathen. It is not the doctrine of the Church, that the entire mass of pagans, without exception, have gone down to endless impenitence and death. That some unevangelized men are saved, in the present life, by an extraordinary exercise of redeeming grace in Christ, has been the hope and belief of Christendom. It was the hope and belief of the elder Calvinists, as it is of the later.' The

looked them.' But he by no means considers the sinful heathen to be free from guilt." For a powerful description of heathen depravity, see Thucydides : History, II. .53 ; III. 82. And for a powerful .specimen of human depravity, see the " Plebeian's Speech," in Machiavelli : History of Florence, III. iii.

' The following extract from Witsius (Apostles' Creed, Dissertation II). exhibits the hopeful view which the elder Calvinism took of the possible extent to which God's dacree of election reaches : " Doctrines may be said to be necessary, either to salvation, or to religion, or to the church. A doctrine, without .the knowledge and belief of which God does not save persons who have come to years of moral consciousness, is necessary to salvation ; a doctrine, without the profession and practice of which no one can be considered religious, is necessary to religion ; and a doctrine, without which no one is admitted to the communion of the visible church, is necessary to the church. There may be articles without which persons ought not to be admitted to the fellowship of the church, that should not, for that reason, be regarded as absolutely essential either to religion Ofto salvation. Although we might not dare to pronounce a sentence of condemnation against a particular man, we ought not, in defiance of order and discretion, to receive him forthwith into the bosom of our church, whatever sentiments he might hold, and to whatever sect he might belong. And with respect to religion, what falls within the sphere of duty is manifest. But how far it may please a gracious God, or how far it may be possible for him in consistency ■with his perfections and character, to extend his forbearance to anyone, and save his soul, notvsdthstanding his errors and sins ; or, in short, what are the lowest attainments without which no man is saved — who can tell ? For this distinction in doctrines, I am indebted to the celebrated Hornbeck (Socinianismi Confutatio, tom. I. p. 209).

" Again, the knowledfje of those doctrines which are necessary to salvation admits of various degrees. It is in different measmes of clearness, abundance, and efiicacy, that divme revelation, the means of grace, and the communications of the Spirit are enjoyed ; and a corresponding diversity takes place in the degrees of knowledge which the saints attain. In some it is clear, distinct, steady, and accompanied with a very firm and decided assent ; in others it is more confused, :inore implicit and latent, subject to occasional wavering, and attended with an

HELL. 707

Second Helvetic Confession (I. 7), after the remark that the ordinary mode of salvation is by the instrumentality of the written words, adds : " Agnoscimns, interim, deuin illnmiiiare posse homines etiam sine externo ministerio, quo et quando velit : id quod ejus potentiae est." The Westminster Confession (X. 3), after saying that " elect infants dying in infancj^ are regenerated and saved by Christ tlirough the Spirit, who worketh when and where and how he pleaseth." adds, " so also are all other elect persons [regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit] who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the word." This is commonly understood to refer not merely,

assent that is yielded with difficulty. The command of God indeed lays an indispensable obligation upon all men to make every possible effort to attain a most clear, distinct, and assured knowledge of divine truth. It cannot, however, be questioned, that the Deity, in his unbounded goodness, receives many to the abodes of bliss whose knowledge even of the principal articles is very indistinct, and such as they are hardly capable of expressing in their own words. The smallest measure of the requisite knowledge appears to be this, namely that when an article of faith is explained, the mind so far at least apprehends it, as to recognize and embrace it as true.

" Furthermore, times must be distinguished. It admits of no doubt that under the bright dispensation of the Gospel, a more extensive and explicit knowledge is necessary to salvation than was required under the Old Testament economy ; for it is reasonable that both knowledge, and the necessity of knowledge, should increase in proportion to the measure of revelation afforded. Under the Old dispensation, nay, during the time of our Saviour's abode on the earth, it loas poitsible for a m.an to be a true believer, and jm a state of grace, who was ignorant of the sufferings, the death, and the resurrection of Christ, and who even presumed to object to the testimony of Christ himself respecting these momentous topics, as is clear from the instance of Peter (Matt. 16 : 21-33) ; or, who, though he believed in general in the Messiah, yet knew not that Jesus is the Christ, as appears from the history of Cornelius the centurion (Acts 10 : 2-4). No one, however, I suppose, would now acknowledge any person [in Christendom] as a true believer, who should discover ignorance of these truths respecting the Lord Jesus ; and still less a person who should contradict them when represented to him. On this subject, the remark of Thomas Aquinas (Secunda Secundae, I. 7) deserves to be quoted : ' The articles of faith,' says he, ' have increased with the lapse of time, not indeed with respect to the faith itself, but with respect to explicit and express profession. The same things which are believed explicitly, and under a greater number of articles by the saints in latter days, were all believed implicitly, and under a smaller number by the fathers in ancient times.'"

708 ESCHATOLOGY.

or mainly, to idiots and insane persons, but to sucli of the pagan world as God pleases to regenerate withont the use of the written revelation. One of the strictest Calvinists of the sixteenth centnry, Zanchius, whose treatise on predestination was translated by Toplady, after remarking that many nations have never liad the privilege of hearing the word, says (Ch. IV.) that "it is not indeed improbable that some individuals in these unenlightened countries may belong to the secret election of grace, and the habit of faith may be wrought in them." By the term " habit " (habitus), the elder theologians meant an inward disposition of the heart. The " habit of faith " involves penitence for sin, and the lono-ing for its forgiveness and removal. The " habit of faith " is the broken and contrite heart, which expresses itself in the prayer, " God be merciful to me a sinner." It is certain that the Holy Ghost can produce, if he please, such a disposition and frame of mind in a pagan, without employing, as he commonly does, the written word. The case of the blind man, in John 9 : 36-38, is an example of the "habit of faith," though produced in this instance through tlie instrumentality of the written law. " Jesus saith unto him. Dost thou believe on the Son of God? He answei'ed and said, Who is he, Lord, that I might believe on him ? And Jesus said unto him. Thou hast both seen him, and it is he that talketh with thee. And he said. Lord, I believe. And he worshipped him." Here was sorrow for sin, and a desire for redemption from it, wrought in tlie heart by the Divine Spirit, prior to the actual knowledge of Christ as the Saviour of sinners. The cases of the centurion Cornelius, and the Ethiopian eunuch, are also examples of the " habit of faith." These men, under the teaching of the Spirit, were conscious of sin, and were anxiously inquiring if, and how, it could be forgiven. That there is a class of persons in unevangelized heathendom who are the subjects of gracious inlluences of this kind, is implied in St. Paul's affirmation, that " they are not all Israel,

HELL. 709

which are of Israel," Rom. 9:6; and that " they which are of faith, the same are the children of Abraham," Gal. 3 : 7. It is taught also in Matt. 8:11; Luke 13 : 30 : " Many shall come from the east and west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven, but the children of the kingdom [those who have had the written word] shall be cast out. And, behold, there are last which shall be first, and there are first which shall be last." This affirmation of Christ, was called out by the "habit of faith, or disposition to believe, in that Gentile centurion, respecting whom he said, " I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel," Matt. 8 : 5-10.'

The true reason for hoping that an unevangelized heathen is saved is not that he was virtuous, but that he was penitent. A penitent man is necessarily virtuous ; but a virtuous man is not necessarily penitent. Sorrow for sin produces morality ; but morality does not produce sori'ow for sin. A great error is committed at this point. The Senecas, the Antonines, the Plutarclis, and such like, have been singled out as the hopeful examples in paganism. It is not for man to decide what was the real state of the heart ; but the writings of these men do not reveal the sense of sin ; do not express penitence ; do not show a craving for redemption. There is too much egotism, selfconsciousness, and self-righteousness in them. The man,

> " It is a very significant fact that the subject of the book of Ruth is a heathen woman ; she is, indeed, the third heathen woman in the genealogy of David and Christ, being preceded by the Canaanitess Tamar (Gen. 38) and the Canaanitess Rahab. Ruth is the most noble of all; a consecrated flower of paganism turning with a longing desire to the light and salvation of Israel. The fact that these three females are brought forward and ingrafted on the chosen line or family, conveys a very expressive lesson to the Israelites, abases their national pride, and V>ears testimony (by being both a fulfilment and a type) to all that had been promised to Abraham respecting his seed, namely, that in him should '■all families of the earth be blessed,' Gen. 12:3. Of these who are blessed in the seed of Abraham, Naomi represents the people of God who are to proceed from the ancient people of the covenant, and Ruth represents those proceeding from the heathen world." Kurtz : Sacred History, §66.

710 ESCHATOLOGY.

judged by his books, is moral, but proud. He is virtuous, but plumes himself upon it. This is not a hopeful characteristic, when we are asking what are the prospects of a human soul, before the bar of God, " To this man will I look, saith the Lord, even to him that is poor, and of a contrite spirit, and trembleth at my word," Isa. 66 : 2. *' Blessed are the poor in spirit ; for theirs is the kingdom of heaven," Mat. 5 : 3.

This line of remark holds good in Christendom, as well as in Heathendom. There is a class of men in modern society marked by morality, and lofty self-respect, but by no consciousness of sin, and no confession of it. And judged by jS^ew Testament principles, no class of mankind is farther off from the kingdom of heaven. There is no class that scorns the publican's cry, and spurns the atoning blood, with such decision and energy as they. To them, the words of Christ, in a similar case, apply : " The publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of heaven before you," Matt. 21 : 31. The Magdalen is nearer the Divine Pity than the Pharisee. And upon the same principle, those benijyhted children of io-norance and barbarism who feel their sin and degradation, and are ready to listen with docility to the missionary when he comes with the tidings of the Infinite Compassion, are nearer to heaven, than the children of a gilded and heartless civilization, who have no moral unrest, and turn a deaf ear to all the overtures of mercy.'

This extraordinary work of the Holy Spirit is mentioned by the Redeemer, to illustrate the sovereignty of God in the exercise of mercy, not to guide his church in their evangelistic labor. His command is, to " preach the gospel to every creature." The extraordinary work of God is

1 The passage, "In every nation, he that feareth God and vrorketh righteousness is accepted with him," Acts 10 : 35, is often explained as teaching that there are in every nation some who live virtuous and exemplary lives, and upon this jjround obtain tlie rewards and blessedness of the future. This would be

HELL. 711

not a thing for man to expect and rely upon, either in the kingdom of nature or of grace. It is his ordinary and established method which is to direct him. The law of missionary effort is, that "faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God," Rom. 10 : 17.

salvation by works, which is impossible, according to St. Paul. This is the error in the question put by Dante to the " eagle " (Paradise, xix. 66 sq.) :

" A man Is born on Indus' banks, and none is there Who speaks of Christ, nor who doth read nor write ; And all his inclinatiotis and his acts, As far as human reason sees, are good ; And Jic offendeih not in word or deed : But unbaptized he dies, and void of faith. Where is the justice that condemns him ? "

This is an imaginary case of perfect obedience. There is no such man.

It is with reference to such an interpretation of this text, that the Westminster Confession (X. 4) asserts, that " men not professing the Christian religion cannot be saved in any other way whatever, be they never so diligent to frame their lives according to the light of nature and the law of that religion which they do profess," because their "diligence" is a, failure. The Thirty-nine Articles assert that no man, either in Christendom or Heathendom, can be saved by his moralit}' and virtue. ' ' They also are to be had accursed that presume to say, that every man shall be saved by the law or sect which he professeth so that he be diligent to frame his life according to the law, and the lit^ht of nature. For Holy Scripture doth set out unto us only the name of Jesus Christ, whereby men must be saved." Article XVIII. In the passage above cited, the phrase "fearer of God," and " worker of righteousness," is employed technically, by St. Peter, to denote a man inquiring after the way of salvation : somewhat as it was among the Jews, to signify a proselyte of the gate. Guericke : Church History, p. 29. This is evident from the fact, that to this "devout " Cornelius who " feared God with all his house," Acts 10 : 2, the apostle preached Christ as the Saviour ofsi?iners, " through whose name, whosoever believeth in him shall receive remission of sins," and that Cornelius believed and was baptized. Acts 10 : 3G-48. He would not have done this, had he expected that his "fearing God" and "working righteousness," in other words his own morality and virtue, would save him. In Acts 13 : 26, the "fearers of God " (ot (pofiov/xefoi rhv ^ehv) are distinguished from " the stock of Abraham," or native-bom Jews. They were the proselytes of the gate. Into this class of " fearers of God," fall the " devout Greeks " (ci crefiofxevoi E\\-f}i'es\ Acts 17 : 4 ; the "devout persons" (ol ffe^6fj.fvot). Acts 17: 17; and Lydia, "a worshipper of God " (o-e^o^ej/Tj rhv Stihv), Acts 16:14. Lydia went to the Jewish oratory (irpoffivxn), in which the audience was divided into Jews and proselytes, each class occupying seats by themselves. As examples of inquirers after salvation, take Augustine, and his friends Alypius and Nebridius. Confessions, VI. x.

712 ESCHATOLOGY.

Two errors, therefore, are to be avoided : First, that all men are saved ; secondly, that only a few men are saved. Some fifty years ago, Schleiermacher surprised all Lutheran Germany with a defence of the Calvinistic doctrine of election ; but the surprise was diminished, when it appeared that he held that God has elected, and will save, every human creature without exception. This cannot be squared with Scripture. On the other hand, some Calvinists have represented the number of the reprobated as greater than that of the elect, or equal to it.' Tliey found this upon the words of Christ, " Many are called, but few are chosen." But this describes the situation at the time when our Lord spake, and not the final result of his redemptive work. Christ himself, in the days of his flesh, called many, but few responded to the call from his gracious lips. Our Lord's own preaching was not as successful as that of his apostles, and of many of his ministers. This was a part of his humiliation, and sorrow. But when Christ shall have " seen of the travail of his soul," and been " satisfied " with what he has seen ; when the whole course of the gospel shall be complete, and shall be survej'ed from beginning to end ; it will be found that God's elect, or church, is " a great multitude which no man can number, out of all nations, and kindreds, and peoples, and tongues," and that their voice is as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of mighty thunderings, saying, " Hallelujah, for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth," Rev. 7:9; 19:6. The circle of God's election is a great circle of the heavens, and not that of a treadmill.

Respecting the more diflicult case of infants: the Scriptures do not discriminate and except them as a class from the mass of mankind, but involve them in the common sin and condemnation. "Suffer little children to come unto me [their Redeemer]," Luke 18:16. "The promise [of salva* Compare Augustine : City of God, XXI. xii.

HELL. 713

tion] is imto yon, and to yonr children," Acts 2 : 39, The fall in Adam explains their case. Adopting the AngnstinoCalvinistic statement of this fall, it can then be said that infants, like all others of the human family, freely and responsibly "sinned in Adam, and fell with him in his first transgression." Westminster Shorter Catechism, 16. This is no more impossible, and no more of a mystery, in the case of infants tiian of adults. If it be conceded that the whole race apostatized in Adam, infants are righteously exposed to the punishment of sin, and have no claim upon the Divine mercy. The sin which brings condemnation upon them is original sin, and not actual transgressions. But original sin is the sinful inclination of the will. An infant has a rational soul ; this soul has a will ; this will is wrongly inclined ; and wrong inclination is self-determined and punishable.' If sinful inclination in an adult needs to be expiated by the atoning blood of Christ, so does sinful inclination in an infant. Infants, consequently, sustain the very same relation to the mercy of God in Christ that the remainder of the human race do. They need the Divine clemency, like the rest of mankind. Tlie "salvation" of infants supposes their prior damnation. Whoever asserts that an infant is "saved," by implication concedes that it is "lost." The salvation of an infant, like that of an adult, involves the remission and removal of sin, and depends upon the unmerited and optional grace of God. Tliis being so, it cannot be said, that God would treat an infant unjustly, if he did not offer him salvation in the intermediate state. And upon the supposition, now common in the evangelical churches, that all infants dying in infancy, being elect, are "regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when, and where, and how he pleaseth " (West' " Quaravis infantes non sinfc legis capaces quoad actum, sunt tamen quoad habitum, utpote creaturae rationales, quibus lex praescribit omnimodam sanctitatem, tam habitualem quam actualem." Turrettin : lustitutio, IX. i. 9.

714 ESCHATOLOGY,

minster Confession, X, 3), there is no need of any such offer.'

§ 3. THE RATIONAL ARGUMENT.

The chief objections to the doctrine of Endless Punishment are not Biblical, but speculative. The great majority of students and exegetes find the tenet in the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures. Davidson, the most learned of English rationalistic critics, explicitly acknowledges that " if a specific sense be attached to words, never-ending misery is enunciated in the Bible. On the presumption that one doctrine is taught, it is the eternity of hell torments. Bad exegesis may attempt to banish it from the Xew Testament Scriptures, but it is still there, and expositors who wish to get rid of it, as Canon Farrar does, injure the cause they have in view by misrepresentation. It must be allowed that the I^ew Testament record not only makes Christ assert everlasting punishment, but Paul and John. But the question should be looked at from a larger platform than single texts: in the light of God's attributes, and the nature of the soul. The destination of man, and the Creator's infinite goodness, conflicting as they do with everlasting punishment, remove it from the sphere of rational belief. If provision be not made in revelation for a change of moral character after death, it is made in reason. Philosophical considerations nnist not be set aside even by Scripture." Last Things, 133, 136, 151.

1 Toplady, one of the highest Calvinists of the Church of England, remarks as follows, respecting the salvation of all infants dying in infancy : " The rubric of the Church of England declares that ' it is certain by God's word that children which are baptized, dying before they commit actual sin, are undoubtedly saved.' I believe firmly the same. Nay, I believe more. I am convinced that the souls of all departed infants whatever, whether baptized or unbaptized, are with God in glory. And I think my belief warranted by an authority which cannot err: Matt. 18:14." Church of England Vindicated. The elder Alexander remarks on this point : "As the Holy Scriptures have not informed us that any of the human family departing in infancy will be lost, we are permitted to hope that all such will be saved." Life, 5b5.

HELL. 715

Consequently, after presenting the Biblical argument, for Endless Punishment, it becomes necessary to present the rational argument for it. So long as the controversy is carried on by an appeal to the Bible, the defender of endless retribution has comparatively an easy task. But when the appeal is made to human self-love and sentiment, or to ratiocination, the demonstration requires more effort. And yet the doctrine is not only Biblical, but rational. It is defensible on the basis of sound ethics and pure reason. Xothing is requisite for its maintenance but the admission of three cardinal truths of theism : namejy, that there is a just God; that man has free will; and that sin is voluntary action. If these are denied, there can be no defence of endless punishment — or of any other doctrine, except atheism and its coi-ollaries.

The Bible and all the creeds of Christendom affirm man's free agency in sinning against God. The transgression which is to receive the endless punishment is voluntary. Sin, whether it be inward inclination or outward act, is unforced human agency. This is the uniform premise of Christian theologians of all schools. Endless punishment supposes the freedom of the human will, and is impossible without it. Could a man prove that he is necessitated in his murderous hate, and his murderous act, he would prove, in this very proof, that he ought not to be punished for it, either in time or eternity. Could Satan really convince himself that his moral character is not his own work, but that of God, or of nature, his remorse would cease, and his punishment would end. Self-determination runs parallel with hell.'

* Many of the arguments constructed against the doctrine of endless punishment proceed upon the supposition that original sin, or man's evil inclination, is the work of God : that because man is horn in sin (Ps. 51 : 5), he was created in sin. All the strength and plausibility of John Foster's celebrated letter lies in the assumption that the moral corruption and impotence of the sinner, whereby it is impossible for him to save himself from eternal death, is not self-originated and self-determined, but infused by his Maker. "If," says he,

716 ESCHATOLOGY.

Guilt, then, is what is punished, and not misfortune. Free and not forced agency is what feels the stroke of justice. What, now, is this stroke? "What do law and justice do when they punish? Everything depends npon the right answer to this question. The fallacies and errors of Universalism find their nest and hiding-place at this point. The true definition of punishment detects and excludes them.'

Punishment is neither chastisement nor calamity. Men suffer calamity, says Christ, not because they or their parents have sinned, " but that the works of God should be made manifest in them," John 9 : 3. Chastisement is inflicted in order to develop a good, but imperfect character already formed, " The Lord loveth whom he chasteneth," and " what son is he whom the earthly father chasteneth not?" Heb. 12:6,7. Punishment, on the other hand, is retribution, and is not intended to do the work of either calamity or chastisement, but a work of its own. And this work is to vindicate law ; to satisfy justice. Punishment, therefore, as distinguished from chastisement, is wholly retrosjpective in its primary aim. It looks back at what has been done in the past. Its first and great object is requital. A man is hung for murder, principally and before all other reasons, because he has voluntarily transgressed the law forbidding murder. He is not hung from a prospective aim, such as his own moral improvement, or for the purpose of deterring others from committing murder. The remark of the English judge to the horse thief, in the days

"the very nature of man, as created by the Sovereign Power, be in such desperate disorder that there is no possibility of conversion and salvation except in instances where that Power interposes with a special and redeeming efficacy, how can we conceive that the main portion of the race, thus morally impotent ^that is, really and absolutely impotent), will be eternally punished for the inevitable result of this moral impotence V " If this assumption of concreated depravity and impotence is correct. Poster's objection to eternal retribution is conclusive and fatal.

' For a discriminating and thorough statement of the aim of punishment, and its distinction from chastisement, see Muller : Sin, I. ;244-~51.

HELL. 717

when sncli theft was capitally punished, " You are not hung because you have stolen a horse, but that horses may not be stolen," has never been regarded as eminently judicial. It is true that personal improvement may be one consequence of the infliction of penalty. But the consequence must not be confounded with the purpose. Cum hoc non ergo propter hoc. The criminal may come to see and confess that his crime deserves its punishment, and in genuine unselfish penitence may take sides with the law, approve its retribution, and go into the presence of the Final Judge, relying upon that great atonement which satisfies eternal justice for sin ; but even this, the greatest personal benefit of all, is not what is aimed at in man's punishment of the crime of murder. For should there be no such personal benefit as this attending the infliction of the human penalty, the one sufiicient reason for inflicting it still holds good, namely, the fact that the law has been violated, and demands the death of the offender for this reason simply and only. " The notion of ill-desert and punishableness," says Ivant (Praktisclie Vernunft, 151. Ed. Rosenkranz), "is necessarily implied in the idea of voluntary transgression ; and the idea of punishment excludes that of happiness in all its forms. For though he who inflicts punishment may, it is true, also have a benevolent purpose to produce by the punishment some good effect upon the criminal, yet the punishment must be justified, first of all, as pure and simple requital and retribution : that is, as a kind of suffering that is demanded by the law without any reference to its prospective beneficial consequences ; so that even if no moral improvement and no personal advantage should subsequently accrue to the criminal, he must acknowledge that justice has been done to him, and that his experience is exactly conformed to his conduct. In every instance of punishment, properly so called, justice is the very first thing, and constitutes the essence of it. A benevolent purpose and a happy eifect, it is true, may be con718 ESCHATOLOGY.

joined with pnnishinejit ; but the criminal cannot claim this as his due, and he has no right to reckon upon it. All that he deserves is punishment, and this is all that he can expect from the law which he has transgressed." These are the words of as penetrating and ethical a thinker as ever lived.'

]SI either is it true that the first and principal aim of punishment, in distinction from chastisement, is the protection of society, and the public good. This,, like the personal benefit in the preceding case, is only secondary and incidental. The public good is not a sufficient reason for putting a man to death ; '' but the satisfaction of law is. This view of penalty is most disastrous in its influence, as well as false in its ethics. For if the good of the public is the true reason and object of punishment, the amount of it may be fixed by the end in view. The criminal may be made to suffer more than his crime deserves, if the public welfare, in suppressing this particular kind of crime, requires it. Ilis personal desert and responsibility not being the one sufficient reason for his suffering, he may be made

1 Beccaria and Bentham are the principal modern advocates of the contrary theory, viz. : that punishment is founded on utility and expediency. Beccaria's position is, that the standard of crime is the injury which it does to society. He refers exclusively to the public good, and never appeals to the moral sentiment. Penny Cyclopaedia, Art. Beccaria. Bentham takes the same view, connecting it with the utilitarian ethics. From these writers, this theory has passed considerably into modem jurisprudence. Austin, a popular writer on law, follows Beutham. Hobbes (Leviathan, ii. 38) maintains it.

The theory which founds morality upon righteousness, and punishment upon justice, is historical. Plato (Laws, X. 904, 905) held that punishment is righteous and retributive. Cicero (De Legibus. I. 14 sq.) contends that true virtue has regard to essential justice, not to utility. Grotius defines penalty as " the evil of suffering which is inflicted on account of the evil of doing." The great English jurists. Coke, Bacon, Selden, and Blackstone, explain punishment by crime, not by expediency. Kant, Herbart, Stahl, Hartenstein, Rothe, and Woolsey, define punishment as requital for the satisfaction of law and justice. Woolsey's Political Science, II. viii. Compare C^oleridge : Works, V. 447.

- Hence, those who found punishment upon utility, and deny that it is retributive, endeavor to abolish capital punishment. And if their theory of penalty is true, they are right in their endeavor.

HELL. 719

to suffer as much as the public safety requires. It was this tlieory of penalty that led to the multiplication of capital offences. The prevention of forgery, it was once claimed in England, required that the forger should forfeit his life, and upon the principle that punishment is for the public protection, and not for strict and exact justice, an offence against human property was expiated by human life. Contrary to the Noachic statute, which punishes only murder with death, this statute weighed out man's life-blood against pounds, shillings, and pence. On this theory, the number of capital offences become very numerous, and the criminal code very bloody. So that, in the long run, nothing is kinder than exact justice. It prevents extremes in either direction: either that of indulgence or that of cruelty.'

This theory breaks down, from whatever point it be looked at. Suppose that there were but one person in the universe. If he should transgress the law of God, then, upon the principle of expediency as the ground of penalty, this solitary subject of moral government could not be punished : that is, visited with a suffering that is purely retributive, and not exemplary or corrective. His act has not injured the public, for there is no public. There is no need of his suffering as an example to deter others, for there are no others. But upon the principle of justice, in distinction from expediency, this solitary subject of moral government could be punished.

The vicious ethics of this theory of penalty expresses itself in the demoralizing maxim, " It is better that ten guilty men should escape than that one innocent man should suffer." But this is no more true than the converse, "It is better that ten innocent men should suffer than that one guilty man should escape." It is a choice of equal evil and equal injustice. In either case alike, justice is tram1 See the remarks of Graves (Pentateuch, II. ii.), upon the excellence of the Mosaic code in this particular.

720 ESCHATOLOGY.

pled down. In the first supposed case there are eleven instances of injustice and wrong; and in the last supposed case there are likewise eleven instances of injustice and wrong. Unpunished guilt is precisely the same species of evil with punished innocence. To say, therefore, tliat it is better that ten guilty persons should escape than that one innocent man should suffer, is to say that it is better that there should be ten wrongs than one wrong against justice. The maxim assumes that the punishment of the guilty is not of so mucli consequence as the immunity of the innocent. But the truth is, that both are equally required by justice.

The theory that punishment is retributive, honors human nature, but the theory that it is merely expedient and useful degrades it. If justice be the true ground of penalty, man is treated as a person ; but if the public good is tlie ground, he is treated as a chattel or a thing. "When suffering is judicially inflicted because of the intrinsic gravity and real demerit of crime, man's free will and responsibility are recognized and put in tlie foreground ; and these are his highest and distinguishing attributes. The sufficient reason for his suffering is found wholly within his own person, in the exercise of self-determination. He is not seized by the magistrate and made to suffer for a reason extraneous to his own agency, and for the sake of something lying wholly outside of himself — namely, the safety and happiness of others — but because of his own act. He is not handled like a brute or an inanimate thing that may be put to good use ; but he is recognized as a free and voluntary person, who is not punished because punishment is expedient and useful, but because it is just and right ; not because the public safety requires it, but because he owes it. The dignity of the man himself, founded in his lofty but hazardous endowment of free will, is acknowledged.

Supposing it, now, to be conceded, tliat future punishment is retributive in its essential nature, it follows that it must be endless from the nature of the case. For, suffering

HELL. T21

must continue as long as the reason for it continues. In this respect, it is like law, which lasts as long as its reason lasts: ratione cessante, cessat ipsa lex. Suffering that is educational and corrective may come to an end, because moral infirmity, and not guilt, is the reason for its infliction ; and moral infirmity may cease to exist. But suffering that is penal can never come to an end, because guilt is the reason for its infliction, and guilt once incurred never ceases to be. The lapse of time does not convert guilt into innocence, as it converts moral infirmity into moral strength ; and therefore no time can ever arrive when the guilt of the criminal will cease to deserve and demand its retribution. The reason for retribution to-day is a reason forever. Hence, when God disciplines and educates his children, he causes only a temporary suffering. In this case, " He will not keep his anger forevei'," Ps. 103 : 9. But when, as the Supreme Judge, he punishes rebellious and guilty subjects of his government, he causes an endless suffering. In this case, " their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched," Mark 9 : 48.

The real question, therefore, is, whether God ever jpunishes. That he chastises, is not disputed. But does he ever inflict a suffering that is not intended to reform the transgressor, and does not reform him, but is intended simply and only to vindicate law, and satisfy justice, by requiting liim for his transgression ? Revelation teaches that he does. " Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord," Rom. 12 : 19. " Vengeance belongeth unto me, I will recompense, saith the Lord," Heb. 10 : 30. Retribution is here asserted to be a function of the Supreme Being, and his alone. The creature has no right to punish, except as he is authorized by the Infinite Ruler. " The powers that be are ordained of God. The ruler is the minister of God, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil," Rom. 13 : 1, 4. The poAver which civil government has to punish crime — the private person having no such power — is only a deleVoL. II.— 46

722 ESCHATOLOGY.

gated riglit from the Source of retribution. Natural religion, as well as revealed, teaches that God inflicts upon the voluntary transgressor of law a suffering that is purely vindicative of law. The pagan sages enunciate the doctrine, and it is mortised into the moral constitution of man, as is proved by his universal fear of retribution. The objection, that a suffering not intended to reform, but to satisfy justice, is cruel and unworthy of God, is refuted by the question of St. Paul : " Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance ? God forbid : for how then shall God judge the world % " Rom. 3 : 5, 6. It is impossible either to found or administer a government, in heaven or upon earth, unless the power to punish crime is conceded.

The endlessness of future punishment, then, is implied in the endlessness of guilt and condemnation. When a crime is condemned, it is absurd to ask, " How long is it -condemned?" The verdict "Guilty for ten days" was Hibernian. Damnation means absolute and everlasting ^damnation. All suffering in the next life, therefore, of which the sufficient and justifying reason is guilt, must continue as long as the reason continues ; and the reason is everlasting. If it be righteous to-day, in God's retributive justice, to smite the transgressor because he violated the law yesterday, it is righteous to do the same thing to-morrow, and the next day, and so on ad infinitum ; because the state of the case ad infinitum remains unaltered. The guilt incurred yesterday is a standing and endless fact. What, therefore, guilt legitimates this instant, it legitimates every instant, and forever.

The demand that penal suffering shall stop when it has once begun, is as irrational as the demand that guilt shall stop when it has once begun. The continuous nature of guilt necessitates the endlessness of retribution. A man, for illustration, is guilty of profanity to-day. God, we will suppose, immediately begins to cause him to suffer in his mind, as the righteous requital for his transgression of the

HELL. 723

third commandment. The transgressor immediately begins to feel remorse for his sin. Why, upon principles of justice, should he feel remorse for liis pi-ofanitj to-day, and not feel it to-morrow ? Why should he feel it to-morrow, and not feel it a million years hence ? Why should he feel it a million years hence, and not feel it forever? At what point should remorse stop ? If we suppose the state of the case to be unchanged ; if we suppose no penitence for the profanity, and no appropriation of the only atonement that cancels guilt ; then the mental suffering which the profanity deserves and experiences now, it always must deserve and experience. The same reasoning will apply to whatever suffering besides remorse enters into the sum-total of future punishment.'

Again, the endlessness of punishment follows from the iiidivisihility of guilt. The nature of guilt is such that it cannot be divided up and distributed in parts along a length of time, and be expiated in parts, but is concentrated whole and entire at each and every point of time. The guilt of the sin of profanity does not rest upon the transgressor, one part of it at twelve o'clock, and another part of it at half -past twelve, and another part of it at one o'clock, and so on. The lohole infinite guilt of this act of sin against

> The intrinsic endlessness of guilt is vividly described by Carlyle. '•From the purpose of crime to the act of crime there is an abyss ; wonderful to think of. The finger lies on the pistol ; but the man is not yet a murderer: nay, his whole nature staggering at such a consummation, is there not a confused pause rather — one last instant of possibility for him '? Not yet a murderer ; it is at the mercy of light trifles whether the most fixed idea may not yet become unfixed. One slight twitch of a muscle, the death-flash bursts ; and he is it, and will for Eternity be it ; and Earth has become a penal Tartarus for him ; his horizon girdled now not with golden hope, but with red flames of remorse; voices from the depths of Nature sounding. Woe, woe on him ! Of such stuff are we all made; on such powder-mines of bottomless guilt and criminality — 'if God restrained not,' as is well said — does the purest of us walk? There are depths in man that go to the length of lowest Hell, as there are heights that reach highest Heaven — for are not both Heaven and Hell made out of him, made by him, everlasting miracle and mystery as he is ? " French Revolution, III. i. 4.

724 ESCHATOLOGY.

God lies upon the sinner at each and every instant of time. He is no more guiltj of the supposed act, at halfpast twelve, than at twelve, and equally guilty at both these instants. Consequently, the whole infinite penalty can justly be required at any and every moment of time. Yet the whole penalty cannot be paid at any and every moment by the suffering of that single moment. The transgressor at any and every point in his endless existence is infinitely guilty, and yet cannot cancel his guilt by what he endures at a particular point. Too long a punishment of guilt is thus an impossibility. The suffering of the criminal can never overtake the crime. And the only way in which justice can approximately obtain its dues, is by a never-ceasing infliction. "VVe say approximately, because, tested strictly, the endless suffering of a finite being is not strictly infinite suffering; while the guilt of sin against God is strictly infinite. There is, therefore, no over-punishment in endless punishment.'

It will be objected that though the guilt and damnation of a crime be endless, it does not follow that the suffering inflicted on account of it must be endless also, even though it be retributive and not reformatory in its intent. A human judge pronounces a theft to be endlessly a theft, and a thief to be endlessly a thief, but he does not sentence the thief to an endless suffering, though he sentences him to a penal suffering. But this objection overlooks the fact

1 It must be remembered, that it is the degree, together with the endlessness of suffering, that constitutes the justice of it. We can conceive of an endless suffering that is marked by little intensity in the degree of it. Such, according to Augustine, is the suffering of unbaptized infants (mitissima omnium). It is negative banishment, not positive infliction. An evil that is inflicted in a few hours may be greater than one inflicted in endless time. One day of such torment as that of Satan would be a greater distress, than a slight physical pain lasting forever. The infinite incarnate God suflFered more agony in Gethsemane, than the whole finite human race could suffer in endless duration. Consequently the uniformity in the endlessness must be combined with a variety in the intensity of suffering, in order to adjust the future punishment to the different grades of sin. See Soteriology, pp. 4G1, 403.

HELL. 725

that human punisliment is only approximate and imperfect, not absolute and perfect like the Divine. It is not adjusted exactly and precisely to the whole guilt of the offence, but is more or less modified, first, by not considering its relation to God's honor and majesty ; secondly, by human ignorance of the inward motives ; and, thirdly, by social expediency. Earthly courts and judges look at the transgression of law with reference only to man's temporal relations, not his eternal. They punish an offence as a crime against the State, not as a sin against God. Neither do they look into the human heart, and estimate crime in its absolute and intrinsic nature, as does the Searcher of hearts and the Omniscient Judge.* A human tribunal punishes mayhem, we will say, with six months' imprisonment, because it does not take into consideration either the malicious and wicked anger that prompted the maiming, or the dishonor done to the Supreme Being by the transgression of his commandment. But Christ, in the final assize, punishes this offence endlessly, because his allseeing view includes the sum-total of guilt in the case : namely, the inward wrath, the outward act, and the relation of both to the infinite perfection and adorable majesty of God. The human tribunal does not punish the inward anger at all ; the Divine tribunal punishes it with hell fire : " For whosoever shall say to his brother, Thou fool, is in danger of hell fire," Matt. 5 : 22. The human tribunal punishes seduction with a pecuniary fine, because it does not take cognizance of the selfish and heartless lust that prompted it, or of the affront oifered to that Immaculate Holiness which from Sinai proclaimed, " Thou shalt not commit adultery." But the Divine tribunal punishes se' " Human laws," says Paley (Moral Philosophy, L iii.), " omit many duties, such as piety to God, bounty to the poor, forgiveness of injuries, education of children, gratitude to benefactors. And they permit, or, which is the same thing, suffer to go unpunished, many crimes, such as luxury, prodigality, caprice in the disposition of property by will, disrespect to parents, and a multitude of similar e.xamples. ''

726 ESCHATOLOGY.

duction with an infinite suffering, because of its more comprehensive and truthful view of the whole transaction. And, in addition to all this imperfection in human punishment, the human tribunal may be inliuenced by prejudice and sefishness.

"In the coritTpted currents of this world, Offence's gilded hand may shove by justice ; And oft 'tis seen, the wicked prize itself Buys out the law. But 'tis not so above. There is no shuffling, there the action lies In his true nature ; and we ourselves compelled Even to the teeth and forehead of our faults. To give in evidence." — HamijETj III. iv.

Again, human punishment, unlike the Divine, is variable and inexact, because it is to a considerable extent reformatory and irrotective. Human government is not intended to do the work of the Supreme Ruler. The sentence of an earthly judge is not a substitute for that of the last day. Consequently, human punishment need not be marked, even if this were possible, with all that absoluteness and exactness of justice which characterizes the Divine. Justice in the human sphere may be relaxed by expediency. Human punishment may sometinies be more severe, and sometimes less severe, than exact requital demands, but Divine punishment may not be. The retributive element must, indeed, enter into human punishment ; for no man may be punished by a human tribunal unless he deserves punishment : unless he is a criminal. But retribution is not tlie sole element when man punishes. Man, while not overlooking the guilt in the case, has some reference to the reformation of the offender, and still more to the protection of society. Here, in time, the transgressor is capable of reformation, and society needs protection. Hence civil expediency and social utility modify exact and strict retribution.

HELL. 727

For the sake of reforming the criminal, the judge sometimes inflicts a penalty tliat is less than the real guilt of the offence. For the sake of shielding society, the court sometimes sentences the criminal to a suffering greater than his crime deserves. Human tribunals, also, vary the punishment for the same offence : sometimes punishing forgery capitally, and sometimes not ; sometimes sentencing those guilty of the same kind of theft to one year's imprisonment, and sometimes to two.

But the Divine tribunal, in the last great day, is invariably and exactly just, because it is neither reforinatory nor jyrotective. In eternity, the sinner is so hardened as to be incorrigible, and heaven is impregnable. Hell, therefore, is not a penitentiary. It is righteous retribution, pure and simple, unmodified by considerations either of utility to the criminal, or of safety to the universe. In the day of iinal account, penalty will not be unjustly mild for the sake of the transgressor, nor unjustly severe for the sake of society. Christ will not punish incorrigible men and devils (for the two receive the same sentence, and go to the same place. Matt. 25 : 41), for the purpose of reforming them, or of screening the righteous from the wicked, but of satisfying the broken law. His punishment at that time will be nothing but just requital. The Redeemer of men is also the Eternal Judge ; the Lamb of God is also the Lion of the tribe of Judah ; and his righteous word to wicked and hardened Satan, to wicked and hardened Judas, to wicked and hardened pope Alexander VI., will be : " Vengeance is mine ; I will repa3\ Depart from me, ye cursed, that work iniquity," Rom. 12:19; Matt. 25 : 41 ; 7 : 23. " The Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven, with his mighty angels, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel," 2 Thess. 1 : 7, 8. The wicked will receive their desert, and reap according as they have sown. The suffering will be unerringly adjusted to the intrinsic o;uilt : no o-reater and no less than the sin

728 ESCHATOLOGY.

deserves. " That servant which knew his lord's will [clearly], and did not according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes ; but he that knew not [clearly], and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. As many as have sinned without [written] law, shall also perish without [written] law ; and as many as have sinned under [written] law, shall be judged by the [written] law," Luke 13 : 47, 48 ; Eom. 2 : 12.

It is because the human court, by reason of its ignorance both of the human heart and the true nature of sin against a spiritual law and a holy God, cannot do the perfect work of the Divine tribunal, that human laws and penalties are only provisional, and not final. Earthly magistrates are permitted to modify and relax penalty, and pass a sentence which, though adapted to man's earthly circumstances, is not absolute and perfect, and is finally to be revised and made right b}^ the omniscient accuracy of God. The human penalty that approaches nearest to the Divine, is capital punishment. There is more of the purely retributive element in this than in any other. The reformatory element is wanting. And this punishment has a kind of endlessness. Death is a finality. It forever separates the murderer from earthly society, even as future punishment separates forever from the society of God and heaven.

The difference between human and divine punishment is well stated by Paley (Moral Philosophy, YI. ix.) : " The proper end of human punishment is not the [exact] satisfaction of justice, but the prevention of crimes. By the satisfaction of justice, I mean the retribution of so much pain for so much guilt; which is the dispensation we expect at the hand of God, and which we are accustomed to consider as the order of things that perfect justice requires. Crimes are not by any government punished in pi'oportion to their [exact] guilt, nor in all cases ought to be so, but in proportion to the difficulty and the necessity of preventing them. The crime must be prevented by some means or

HELL. 729

other ; and consequently whatever means appear necessary to this end, whether they be proportionable to the [exact] guilt of the criminal or not, are adopted rightly. It is in pursuance of this principle, which pervades indeed the whole system of penal jurisprudence, that the facility with wdiich any species of crime is perpetrated has been generally deemed a reason for aggravating the punishment. This severity would be absurd and unjust, if the [exact] guilt of the offender was the immediate cause and measure of the punishment.

On the other hand, from the justice of God we are taught to look for a gradation of punishment exactly proportioned to the guilt of the offender. When, therefore, in assigning the degrees of human punishment we introduce considerations distinct from that of guilt, and a proportion so varied by external circumstances that equal crimes frequently undergo unequal punishments, or the less crime the greater, it is natural to demand the reason why a different measure of punishment should be expected from God: M'hy that rule which befits the absolute and perfect justice of the deity should not be the rule which ought to be preserved and imitated by human laws. The solution of this difficulty must be sought for, in those peculiar attributes of the Divine nature which distinguish the dispensations of Supreme wisdom from the proceedings of human judicature. A Being whose knowledge penetrates every concealment ; from the operation of whose will no act or flight can escape ; and in whose hands punishment is sui-e : such a Being may conduct the moral government of his creation in the best and wisest manner, by pronouncing a law that every crime shall finally receive a punishment proportioned to the guilt which it contains, abstracted from any foreign consideration whatever, and may testify his vei-acity to the spectators of his judgments, by carrying this law into strict execution. But when the care of the public safety is intrusted to men whose authority over their fellow-creatures

730 ■ ESCHATOLOGY.

is limited bj defects of power and knowledge; from whose utmost vigilance and sagacity the greatest offenders often lie hid ; whose wisest precautions and speediest pursuit may be eluded by artifice or concealment ; a different necessity, a new rule of proceeding results from the very imperfection of their faculties. In their hands, the uncertainty of punishment must be compensated by the severity. The ease with which crimes are committed or concealed, must be counteracted by additional penalties and increased terrors. The very end for which human government is established requires that its regulations be adapted to the suppression of crimes. This end, whatevei' it may do in the plans of Infinite Wisdom, does not, in the designation of temporal penalties, always coincide with the proportionate punishment of guilt." Blackstone, also (Com. lY. i.), alludes to the same difference in the following words : " The end, or final cause of human punishments, is not atonement or expiation for the crime committed ; for that must be left to the just determination of the Supreme Being."

The argument thus far goes to prove that retribution in distinction from correction, or punishment in distinction from chastisement, is endless from the nature of the case : that is, from the nature of guilt. We pass, now, to prove that it is also rational and right.

1. Endless punishment is rational, in the first place, because it is supported hy the human conscience. The sinner's own conscience will "bear witness" and approve of the condemning sentence, " in the day \vlien God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ," Rom. 2 : 16. Dives, in the parable, when reminded of the justice of his suffering, is silent. Accordingly, all the evangelical creeds say with the Westminster Larger Catechism (89), that " the wicked, upon clear evidence and full conviction of their own consciences, shall have the just sentence of condemnation pronounced against them." If in the great day there are any innocent men who have no accusing conHELL.

P ' 7 Tp '''"^' '""• ^^^^ ""^y ''^commodate St.

Pau » words (Rom. 13: 3, 4;, and say: "The final jud... .nent ,s not a terror to good works, but to evil. Wilt thou then, not be atra.d of tbe final judgment? Keep the lavJ of God perfectly u.thout a single slip or failure, inwardly or outwardly and thou shalt have praise of the sJme. But

that IS justiiied by the highest and best part of the human eonsftutron „,„st be founded in reason, justice, and truth I IS absurd to object to a judicial decision that is confirn.ed bi the man s own immediate consciousness of its rio-hteousness. °

"For what, my small philosopher, is hell' ■Tis uothiug bat toll knowledge of the truth, y hen truth, resisted long, is .sworn our foe • Ana call., eternity to do her right. "-Yomjo.

The opponent of endless retriI,ution does not draw his argnments fron, the impartial conscience, but from the bias

no etlucal, but sentnnental. They are not seen in the drv ght of pure truth and reason, but through the colored u.ed.uni of self-mdulgence and love of ease and sin

Agam, a guilty con.science e.xpects endless punishment There .s m ,t what the Scripture denominates "the fearfui ookn.g- or of judgment, and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries" of God, Ileb. 10:27 This "s the awful apprehension of an evil that is to last foreverohe,-w,se,u would not be so "fearful.-' The knowledge'

oli V tl '■' T^ ■"" ""^ ^'' "'''" ^""''1 """.ediateTv rclIe^ e the apprehension of the sinner. A guilty conscience

s m Us very nature hopeless. I„,peniten° ,nen, in the .emorse "sorrow as those who have no hope," 1 Thes

o„'t r„ J^^'Z ?'"'''"' " ''^™ "° ''"P'^' "'"' -e withont God „, he world," Eph. 2 : 12. "The hope of the

wicked shall be as the giving np of the ghost," Job 11 • 20

732 ESCHATOLOGY.

" The hypocrite's hope sliall perish," Job S : 13. Consequently, the great and distinguishing element in hell-torment is despair, a feeling that is impossible in any man or fallen angel who knows that he is finally to be happy forever. Despair results from the endlessness of retribution. Ko endlessness, no despair.' JSI^atural religion, as well as revealed, teaches the despair of some men in the future life. Plato (Gorgias, 525), Pindar (Olympia, II.), Plutarch (De sera vindicta), describe the punishment of tlie incorrigibly wicked as eternal and hopeless.

In Scripture, there is no such thing as eternal hope. Hope is a cliaracteristic of earth and time only. Here in this life, all men may hope for forgiveness. " Turn, ye prisoners of hope," Zech. 9 : 12. " Xow is the accepted time'; now is the day of salvation," 2 Cor. 6 : 2. But in the next world, there is no hope of any kind, because there is either fi-uition or despair. The Christian's hope is converted into its i-ealization : " For what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for it ? " Eom. 8 : 24.

"Soon shall close thine earthly mission, Soon shall pass thy pilgrim days ; Hope shall change to glad fruition, Faith to sight, and prayer to praise."

1 " If," says Pearson (Creed, Art. V.), " we should imagine any damned soul to have received an express promise of God, that after ten thousand years he vi^ould release him from those torments and make him everlastingly happy, and to have a true faith in that promise and a firm hope of receiving eternal life, we could not say that that man was in the same condition with the rest of the damned, or that he felt all that hell which they were sensible of, or all that pain which was due unto his sins; because hope, and confidence, and relying upon God, would not only mitigate all other pains, but wholly take away the bitter anguish of despair." It is obvious, that if God makes any such promise in his word, either expressly, or by implication, despair is not only impossible to the believer of Scripture, but is a un. No man should despair. And if God does not make any such promise, but man makes it to his fellow-sinner, in saying, as Satan did to Eve, " Thou shalt not surely di'5," and the human promise is believed, the effect will be the .same. There will })e no despair, until the reckless human falsehood is corrected by the awful demonstration at death.

HELL. 733

And the impenitent sinner's liope of heaven is converted into despair. Canon Farrar's phrase " eternal hope " is derived from Pandora's box, not from the Bible. Dante's legend over the portal of hell is the truth : " All hope abandon, ye who enter here.'" '

That the conscience supports endless retribution, is also evinced bj the universality and steadiness of tlie dread of it. Mankind believe in hell, as they believe in tlie Divine Existence, by reason of their moral sense. Notwithstanding all the attack made upon the tenet in every generation, by a fraction of every generation, men do not get rid of their fear of future punishment. Skeptics themselves are sometimes distressed by it. But a permanent and general fear among mankind cannot be produced by a mere chimera, or a pure figment of the imagination. Men have no fear of Rhadamantiius, nor can they be made to fear liim, because they know that there is no such being. " An idol is nothing in the world," 1 Cor. 8 : 4. But men have " the fearful looking-for of judgment " from the lips of God, ever and always. If the Biblical hell were as much a nonentity as the heathen Atlantis, no one would waste his time in endeavoring to prove its non-existence. What man would seriously construct an argument to demonstrate that there is no such being as Jupiter Ammon, or such an animal as the centaur? The very denial of endless retribution evinces by its spasmodic eagerness and effort to disprove the tenet, the firmness with which it is entrenched in man's moral constitution. If there really were no hell, absolute indifference toward the notion would long since have been the

» The words of Paul, in 1 Cor. 13 : 13, are sometimes cited to prove the eternity of hope, because it "abides." But in this passage, "faith, hope, and charity " are contrasted with the supernatural chari.smata of chapter 12. These latter are transitory, but the former "abide," because they are essential to the Christian life here upon earth. But in respect to the eternity of " faith," St. Paul teaches that it is converted into '' sight," 2 Cor. 5:7; and that " hope " is converted into " fruition." Rom. 8 : 24. Charity is " greater " than faith and hope, because it is not changed into something else, but is eternal.

734: ESCHATOLOGY.

inood of all mankind, and no arguments, either for or against it, would be constructed.

And fiuallj, the demand, even here upon earth, for the punishment of the intensely and incorrigibly wicked, proves that retribution is grounded in the human conscience. When abominable and satanic sin is temporarily triumphant, as it sometimes has been in the history of the world, men cry out to God for his vengeance to come down. " If there were no God, we should be compelled to invent one," is now a familiar sentiment. "If there were no hell, we should be compelled to invent one," is equally true. When examples of depravity occur, man cries : " How long, O Lord, how long ? " The non-infliction of retribution npon hardened villany and successful cruelty causes anguish in the moral sense. For the expression of it, read the imprecatory psalms and Milton's sonnet on the Massacre in Piedmont.

2. In the second place, endless punishment is rational, because of the endlessness of sin. If the preceding view of the relation of penalty to guilt be correct, endless punishment is just, without bringing the sin of the future world into the account. Man incurs everlasting punishment for "the things done in his body," 2 Cor. 5:10. Christ sentences men to perdition, not for what they are going to do in eternity, but for what they have already done in time. It is not necessary that a man should commit all kinds of sin, or that he should sin a very long time, in order to be a sinner. "Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all," Jas. 2 : 10. One sin makes guilt, and guilt makes hell.'

But while this is so, it is a fact to be observed that sin is

■ O fearful thought ! one act of sin Within itself contains The power of endless hate of God, And everlasting pains."

Faber : Hymn on Predestination.

HELL. 735

actually being added to sin, in the future life, and the amount of guilt is accumulating. The lost spirit is '• treasuring up wrath," itom. 2 : 5. Hence, there are degrees in the intensity of endless suffering. The difference in the grade arises from the greater resoluteness of the wicked self-determination, and the greater degree of light that was enjoyed upon earth. He who sins against the moral law as it is drawn out in tlie Sermon on the Mount, sins more determinedly and desperately than the pagan who sins against the light of nature. There are probably no men in paganism who sin so wilfully and devilishly as some men in Christendom. Profanity, or the blaspheming of God, is a Christian and not a Heathen characteristic' They are Christian peoples who force opium and rum on helpless pagans. These degrees of sin call for degrees of suffering. And there are degrees in future suffering, because it is infinite in duration only. In intensity, it is finite. Consequently, the lost do not all suffer precisely alike, thougli all suffer the same length of time. A thing may be infinite in one respect and finite in others. A line may be infinite in length, and not in breadth and depth. A surface may be infinite in length and breadth, and not in depth. And two persons may suffer infinitely in the sense of endlessly, and yet one experience more pain than the other.

The endlessness of sin results, first, from the natui-e and energy of sinful self-determination. Sin is the creature's act solely. God does not work in the human will when it wills antagonistically to him. Consequently, self-determination to evil is an extremely vehement activity of the will. There is no will so wilful as a wicked will. Sin is stubborn and obstinate in its nature, because it is enmity and re' It is related of Dr. Scudder, that on his return from his mission in India, after a long absence, he was standing on the deck of a steamer, with his son. a youth, when be heard a person using loud and profane language. "See, friend," said the doctor, accosting the swearer, " this boy, my pon, was born and brought up in a heathen country, and a land of pagan idolatry ; but in all his life he never heard a man blaspheme his Maker until now."

736 ESCHATOLOGY.

bellion. Hence, wicked will intensifies itself perpetually. Pride, left to itself, increases and never diminishes. Enmity and hatred become more and more satanic. " Sin," says South, " is the only perpetual motion which has yet been found out, and needs nothing but a beginning to keep it incessantly going on." Upon this important point, Aristotle, in the seventh book of his Ethics, reasons with great truth and impressiveness. He distinguishes between olkq\aaia and aKpaaca ; between strong will to wickedness, and weak self-indulgence. The former is viciousness from deliberation and preference, and implies an intense determination to evil in the man. He goes wrong, not so much from the pull of appetite and passion, as purposely, knowingly, and energetically. He has great strength of will, and he puts it all forth in resolute wickedness. The latter quality is more the absence than the presence of will ; it is the weakness and irresolution of a man who has no powerful self-determination of any kind. The condition of the former of these two men, Aristotle regarded as worse than that of the latter. He considered it to be desperate and hopeless. The evil is incurable. Repentance and reformation are impossible to this man ; for the wickedness in this instance is not mere appetite ; it is a principle ; it is coldblooded and total depravity.

Another reason for the endlessness of sin is the bondage of the sinful will. In the very act of transgressing the law of God, there is a reflex action of the human will upon itself, whereby it becomes unable to perfectly keep that law. Sin is the suicidal action of the human will. A man is not forced to kill himself; but if he does, he cannot bring himself to life again. And a man is not foi'ced to sin, but if he does, he cannot of himself get back where he was before sinning. He cannot get back to innocency, nor can he get back to holiness of heart. The effect of vicious habit in diminishing a man's ability to resist temptation is proverbial. An old and hardened debauchee, like Tiberius or

HELL. 737

Louis Fifteenth, just going into the presence of Infinite Purity, lias not so much power of active resistance against the sin that lias now ruined him, as the youth has who is just heginning to run that awful career. The truth and fact is, that sin, in and by its own nature and operation, tends to destroy all virtuous force, all holy energy, in any moral beino;. The excess of will to sin is the same thino; as defect of will to holiness. The human will cannot be forced and ruined from without. But if we watch the influence of the will upon itself ; the influence of its own wrong decisions, and its own yielding to temptations; we shall find that tlie voluntary faculty may be ruined from within ; may surrender itself with sucli an absorbing vehemence and totality to appetite, passion, and selfishness, that it becomes unable to reverse itself and overcome its own inclination and selfdetermination. And yet, from beginning to end, there is no compulsion in this process. The transgressor follows liimself alone. He has his own way, and does as he likes. Neither God, nor the world, nor Satan, foi'ces him either to be, or to do, evil. Sin is the most spontaneous of selfmotion. But self-motion has consequences as much as any other motion. And moral bondage is one of them. "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave of sin," says Christ, John 8 : 34.

The culmination of this bondage is seen in the next life. The sinful propensitj", being allowed to develop unresisted and unchecked, slowly but surely eats out all virtuous force as rust eats out a steel spring, until in the awful end the will becomes all habit, all lust, and all sin. "Sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death," Jas. 1 : 15. In the final stage of this process, which commonly is not reached iintil death, when "the spirit returns unto God who gave it," the gnilty free agent reaches that dreadful condition whei'e resistance to evil ceases altogether, and surrender to evil becomes demoniacal. The cravings and hankerings of long-indulged and unresisted sin become organic, and drag Vol. II.— 47

^38 ESCHATOLOGY.

the man ; and "lie goetli after them as an ox goetli to the slauo-hter. or as a fool to the correction of the stocks, till a dart strike through his liver," Prov. 7: 22, 23. For though the will to resist sin may die out of a man, the conscience to condemn it never can. This remains eternally. And when the process is complete ; when the responsible creature, in the abuse of free agency, has perfected his moral ruin, and his will to good is all gone ; there remain these two in his immortal spirit : sin and conscience, " brimstone and fire," Rev. 21 : 8.

Still another reason for the endlessness of sin, is the fact that rebellious enmity toward law and its Source is not diminished, but increased, by the righteous punishment experienced by the impenitent transgressor. Penal suffering is beneficial only when it is humbly accepted, is acknowledged to be deserved, and is penitently submitted to; when the transgressor says, " Father, I have sinned, and am no more worthy to be called thy son ; make me as one of thy hired servants," Luke 15 : 18, 19 ; when, with the penitent thief, he says, " We are in this condemnation justly ; for we receive the due reward of our deeds," Luke 23 : 4:1. Bat when in this life retribution is denied and jeered at ; and when in the next life it is complained of and resisted, and the arm of hate and defiance is raised against the tribunal ; penalty hardens and exasperates. This is impenitence. Such is the temper of Satan ; and such is the temper of all who finally become his associates. This explains why there is no repentance in hell, and no meek submission to the Supreme Judge. This is the reason wliy Dives, the impenitent sensualist, on discovering that tliere is no reformation in Hades, asks that Lazarus may be sent to warn liis five brethren, "lest they also come into this place of torment." '

' Muller (Sin, I. 246) exposes the error of supposing that punishment is remedial in its nature, and adapted to produce penitence and reformation, in the following terms : " The distinctive purpose of divine puuiahment cannot be the

HELL. 739

3. In the tliird place, endless punishment is rational, because sin is an infinite evil : infinite, not because committed by an infinite being, but against one. We reason invariimprovement of the person punished, because this is the object of redemptioti. If punishment were the means appropriate to this end, there would be no need for redemption ; or ratlier, if this object is attained by redemption, of what use is the severity of punishment ? Are we to suppose that when redemption proves ineffectual for the improvement of man, punishment must be resorted to, to attain the object ? It would then follow that punishment is more effectual for man's regeneration than redemption. The conflict between the sphere of punishment and that of redemption becomes all the more perplexing, when we recollect that the main feature of redemption is the doing awaj' with punishment by the forgiveness of sins. If punishment be remedial, is it a kindness to free man from it before it has accomplished its work ? And how is it possible that redemption, which is the removal of punishment, should renovate, if punishment itself does so also '? And yet the influence of punishment in preserving, and re-establishing the power of moral goodness in the sufl'erer, must not be wholly denied. Punishment, on the one hand, acts as a barrier against the desolating inroads of sin by reasserting the fixed ordainments of the law ; and, on the other hand, it bears witness to the sinner of the crushing power wherewith evil recoils upon himself, and makes him tremble when he surrenders himself to it. In these two ways, it prepares man for the work of redemption. But in its own distinctive nature, it is not adapted or calculated to produce a true improvement, an inward renovation of the sinner. On the contrary, the two spheres, that of redemption, which alone can accomplish a true renewal, and that of punishment, mutually exclude one another. Whenever a living participation in the blessings of redemption begins, punishment, properly so called — 5//c7j, t/tSt/cij(Tis, Ti/LLCDp'ta — ceases ; but, so long as man continues to be the subject of God's righteous punishment, he is excluded from those blessings, John 3 : 36."

Twesten (Dogmatik, Th. II. § 39) argues in the same manner. "Punishment is not a proper means of reformation ; for true reformation can issue only from free self-determmation. It is voluntary in its nature. But a self-determination that is brought about by the fear of pain would not be moral, and of the nature of virtue. Any reformation effected from a selfish motive is not genuine reformation. Furthermore if true reformation could be produced bj' punishment, why should not the legal and punitive method of the Old Testament have been the only one ? The old economy was full of threatenings and penalties, and of fearful examples of their actual execution. Why did God send his ^on, and make a new covenant and economy of mercy ? Of what use is redemption, or the remission of punishment, if punishment is in itself healing and remedial ? The Scriptures never represent punishment as reformatory. The proper punishment of sin is death. Rom. 6 : 33. As temporal death, which is the extreme penalty in human legislation, is not intended to reform the criminal, and reinstate him in human society, but forever cuts him off from it, so eternal death, in the Biblical representation, is not intended to be a means of educating the sinner and fitting him for the kingdom of heaven, but forever banishes and excludes him from it. "

740 ESCHATOLOGY.

ably upon this principle. To torture a dumb beast is a crime ; to torture a man is a greater crime. To steal from one's own mother is more heinous than to steal from a fellowcitizen. The person who transgresses is the same in each instance; but the different worth and dignity of the objects upon whom his action terminates makes the difference in the gravity of the two offences. David's adultery was a finite evil in reference to Uriah, but an infinite evil in reference to God. "Against thee only have I sinned," was the feeling of the sinner in this case. Had the patriarch Joseph yielded, he would have sinned against Pharaoh. But the greatness of the sin as related to the fellow-creature is lost in its enormity as related to the Creator, and his only question is : " How can I do this great wickedness and sin against God." '

■ Those who deny the position that sin is an infinite evil forget that the principle upon which it rests is one of the commonplaces of jurispruilence ; the principle, namely, that crime depends upon the object against whom it is committed as well as upon the subject who commits it. The merely subjective reference of an act is not sufficient to determine whether it is a crime. The act may have been the voluntary act of a person, but unless it is also an offence against another pet-son, it is no crime. To strike is a voluntary act ; but to strike a post or a stone is not a culpable act. Furthermore, not only crime, but dcgi'ees of crime depend upon the objective reference of a personal act. Estimated only by the subjective reference, there can be not only no culpability, but no difference in culpability. Killing a dog is no worse than killing a man, if merely the subject who kills, and not the object killed, is considered. Both alike are voluntary acts, and of one and the same person. If, therefore, the gravity of the act is to be measured solely by the nature of the person comnutting it, and not by that of the thing against whom it is committed, killing a dog is as heinous as killing a man.

Now this principle of jurisprudence is carried into theology by the theologian. The violation of the moral law is sin and guilt, only when viewed objectively in reference to God primarily, and to man secondarily. Viewed merely and wholly in reference to the trangressor himself, it is not sin and guilt at all. It is sin only as committed against God, or man. Again, it is only the objective reference that will yield degrees of sin. One and the same act may be simultaneously an offence against an individual, a family, a state, and God. Measured by the nature and qualities of the offender himself, it has no degrees. But measured by the nature and qualities of these moral objects against whom it is committed, it has degrees of turpitude. As the first three are only finite in worth and dignity, the culpability is only certain degrees of the finite. As the last is infinite in worth and dignity, the culpability is infinite also. Compare Edwards : Justice of God, Works, IV. 328.

HELL. 741

The incarnation and vicarious satisfaction for sin by one of the persons of the Godhead, demonstrates the infinity of the evil. It is incredible that the Eternal Trinity should have submitted to such a stupendous self-sacriiice, to remove a merely finite and temporal evil. The doctrine of Christ's vicarious atonement, logically, stands or falls with that of endless punishment. Historically, it has stood or fallen with it. The incarnation of Almighty God, in order to make the remission of sin possible, is one of the strongest arguments for the eternity and infinity of penal suffering.

The objection that an offence committed in a finite time cannot be an infinite evil, and deserve an infinite suffering, implies that crime must be measured by the time that was consumed in its perpetration. But even in human punishment, no reference is had to the length of time occupied in the commission of the offence. Murder is committed in an instant, and theft sometimes requires hours. But the former is the greater crime, and receives the greater punishment.

4. In the fourth place, that endless punishment is reasonable, is proved by the preference of the wicked themselves. The nnsubmissive, rebellious, defiant, and impenitent spirit prefers hell to heaven. Milton correctly represents Satan as saying : " All good to me becomes bane, and in heaven much worse would be my state ; " and, also, as declaring that "it is better to reign in hell than to serve in heaven." This agrees with the Scripture representation, that Judas went "to his own place," Acts 1 : 25.

The lost spirits are not forced into a sphere that is un suited to them. There is no other abode in the universe which they would prefer to that to which they are assigned, because the only other abode is heaven. The meekness, lowliness, sweet submission to God, and love of him, that characterize heaven, are more hateful to Lucifer and his angels, than even the sufferings of hell. The wicked would

74:2 ESCHATOLOGY.

be no happier in heaven than in hell. The burden and anguish of a guilty conscience, says South, is so insupportable, that some " have done violence to their own lives, and so lied to hell as a sanctuary, and chose damnation as a release." This is illustrated by facts in human life. The thoroughly vicious and ungodly man prefers the license and freedom to sin which he finds in the haunts of vice, to the restraiuts and purity of Christian society. There is hunger, disease, and wretchedness, in one circle ; and there is plenty, health, and happiness, in the other. But he prefers the former. He would rather be in the gamblinghouse and brothel than in the Christian home. " Those that, notwithstanding all gracious means, live continually in rebellion against God ; those that impenitently die in their sins ; those that desire to live here forever, that they might enjoy their sweet sins; those that are so hardened and naturalized in their vices, that if they were revived and brought again into this world of temptations, would certainly return to the pleasures of sin ; is it not right that their incorrigible obstinacy should be punished forever ? " Bates, On Eternal Judgment, III.

The finally lost are not to be conceived of as having faint desires and aspirations for a holy and heavenly state, and as feebly but really inclined to sorrow for their sin, but are kept in hell contrary to their yearning and petition. They are sometimes so described by the opponent of the doctrine, or at least so thought of. There is not a single throb of godly sorrow, or a single pulsation of holy desire, in the lost spirit. The temper toward God in the lost is angry and defiant. "They hate both me and my father," says the Son of God, "without a cause," John 15: 24, 25. Satan and his followers " love darkness rather than light," hell rather than heaven, " because their deeds are evil," John 3 : 19. Sin ultimately assumes a fiendish form, and degree. It is pure wickedness without regret or sorrow, and with a deliijlit in evil for evil's sake. There are some

HELL. 743

men who reach this state of depravity even before they die. "Some men's sins are evident (R. Y.) beforehand, going before to judgment," 1 Tim. 5 : 24. They are seen in the callous and cruel voluptuaries portrayed by Tacitus, and the heaven-defying atheists described by St. Simon. They are also depicted in Shakespeare's lago. Tlie reader knows that lago is past saving, and deserves everlasting damnation. Impulsively, he cries out with Lodovico: "Where is that viper? bring the villain forth." And then Othello's calmer but deeper feeling becomes his own : " I look down towards his feet — but that's a fable : If that thou be'st a devil, /cannot kill thee." The punishment is remitted to the retribution of God.'

• It ought to be noticed, that the "hatred" of Himself, and of his Father, which Christ attributes to "the world," John 15 : 18, 19, and which is a distinguishing element in impenitence, does not necessarily imply sensuality and vice. Sin may be wholly intellectual: what St. Paul denominates "spiritual wickedness," Eph. 6 : 12. The most profound of Shakespearean critics calls attention to "the passionless character of lago. It is all will in mtellect." Coleridge: Works, IV. 180. The "carnal mind" manifests itself in two ways. The proud spirit of the moralist is one phase of it ; the self-indulgent spirit of the voluptuary is the other. The Pharisee represents the first ; Dives the last. Both alike confess no sin, and implore no forgiveness. In illustration of the former, consider the temper of a certain class of intellectual men toward the cross of Christ. They are perhaps austerely moral. By temperament, taste, study, and occupation, they have even an antipathy to sensuality. They "scorn delights, and live laborious days." But present for their acceptance those truths of the New Testament which involve the broken and contrite heart, and their whole inward being rises in vehement recoil. Of the effect of the doctrine of election, Calvin remarks that "when the human mind hears of it, its irritation breaks all restraint, and it discovers as serious and violent agitation as if alarmed by the sound of a martial trumpet." Inst., III. xxii. 1. So, too, when the authoritative demand of Jesus Christ, to confess sin, and beg remission through atoning blood, is made to David Hume, or David Strauss, or John Stuart Mill, none of whom were sensualists, it wakens intense mental hostility. Now without asserting which theory in religion is true, that of the New Testament, or that of the .skeptic, is it not clear, that if there be another life, and if the teaching of the New Testament shall prove to be the absolute truth, the latter person must be classed with the "haters of God ? " Will not the temper of this imsensual and intellectual man towards what is found, in the end, to be eternal verity, be as thoroughly of the nature of enmity, as that of the most immoral and hardened debauchee ?

Muller alludes to unscnsual and intellectual sin in the following terms;

T44 ESCHATOLOGY.

5. In the fifth place, that endless punishment is rational, is proved by the history of morals. In the records of human civilization and morality, it is found that that age which is most reckless of law, and most vicious in pi-actice, is the age that has the loosest conception of penalty, and is the most inimical to the doctrine of endless retribution. A virtuous and religious generation adopts sound ethics, and reverently believes that "the Judge of all the earth will do right," Gen. 18 : 25 ; that God will not " call evil good, and good evil, nor put darkness for light and light for darkness," Isa. 5 : 20 ; and that it is a deadly error to assert with the sated and worn-out sensualist: "All things come alike to all ; there is one event to the righteous and the wicked," Eccl. 9 : 2.

"That which makes sin to be siu, and which is the evil of evil, is the selfish isolatioJi of the man which it involves. There are cases ; with some it is the rule of life ; where a man keeps himself free from wild ungovernable passions, and only seldom is guilty of overt acts which conscience recognizes as sins ; yet in his inmost heart ' the /, that gloomy despot,' rules supreme ; he stands alone in the world, shut up within himself, and in a chaos of selfish endeavors, preferences, antipathies, without any true participation in the joys and sorrows of mankind, estranged from God. In such a state, the principle of sin, though shut up within, rules with no less real power than where its dominion is manifest in glaring wickedness and vice, and a wild disorder of the outward life." Sin, I. 136. He also notices that mere intellectuality is no certain preservative against sensuality and vice. "A superficial observation of life has led to the conclusion that immorality decreases in proportion as the growth of the intellectual nature increases, and the ' children of this generation ' pride themselves in no small degree upon the discovery that culture and not Christianity is the means of true freedom, and the panacea for all the disorders of the world. But a single unbiassed and penetrating glance at life will suffice to dissipate these illusions. We oftentimes find the deepest moral degradation and disorder in the very highest stages of culture, a frivolity of mind resolving all the relations of life into rottenness, and utter insensibility to every impulse of holy love, and a cold, calculating, self-conscious egotism, which puts from it the call to sacrifice an}' one of its own interests as something altogether absurd — the men with whom it comes in contact being regarded merely as ciphers, by whose help its own aggrandizement may be attained. Mental culture does not eradicate a single tendency of moral depravity ; it only veils and refines them all ; and so far from redeeming the man, if it be not sanctified by a higher principle, it really confirms within him the dominion of sin." Sin, I. 306, 307. In corroboration of this, see tne discriminating remarks of Thomas Arnold on the character of Sylla. Encyclopaedia Metropolitana : Roman Ilepublic, Ch. XXI.

HELL. T45

Tlie French people, at the close of the last century, were a very demoralized and vicious generation, and there was a very general disbelief and denial of the doctrines of the Divine existence, the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will, and future retribution. And upon a smaller scale, the same fact is continually repeating itself. Any little circle of business men who are known to deny future rewards and punishments are shunned by those who desire safe investments. The recent uncommon energy of opposition to endless punishment, which started about ten years ago in this country, synchronized with great defalcations and breaches of trust, uncommon corruption in mercantile and political life, and great distrust between man and man. Luxury deadens the moral sense, and luxurious populations do not have the fear of God before their eyes. Hence luxurious ages, and luxurious men, recalcitrate at hell, and "kick against the goads." No theological tenet is more important than eternal retribution to those modei'n nations whicb, like England, Germany, and the United States, are growing rapidly in riches, luxury, and earthly power. Without it, they will infallibly go down in that vortex of sensuality and wickedness that swallowed up Babylon and Rome. The bestial and shameless vice of the dissolute rich, that has recently been uncovered in the commercial metropolis of the world, is a powerful argument for the necessity and reality of " the lake which burnetii with fire and brimstone."

A single remark remains to be made respecting the extent and scope of hell. It is only a spot in the universe of God. Compared with heaven, hell is narrow and limited. The kino-dom of Satan is insignificant in contrast with the kingdom of Christ. In the immense rano-e of God's dominion, good is the rule, and evil is the exception. Sin is a speck upon the infinite azure of eternity ; a spot on the sun. Hell is only a corner of the universe. The Gothic etymon (Hohle, Holle) denotes a covered-up hole. In

74:0 ESCHATOLOGY.

Scripture, hell is a "pit," a "lake;" not an ocean. It is " bottomless," but not boundless. The Gnostic and Dualistic theories, which make God, and Satan, or the Demiurge, nearly equal in power and dominion, find no support in Revelation. The Bible teaches tliat there will always be some sin, and some death, in the universe. Some angels and men will forever be the enemies of God.' But their number, compared with that of unf alien angels and redeemed men, is small. They are not described in the glowing language and metaphors by which the immensity of the holy and blessed is delineated. " The chariots of God are twenty thousand, and thousands of angels," Ps. 68 : 17. •'The Lord came from Sinai, and sinned forth from mount Paran, and he came with ten thousands of his saints," Dent. 33 : 2. " The Lord hath prepared his throne in the

» "There is this certainty," says Hooker (Polity, V. xlix.), "that life and death divide between them the whole body of mankind. What portion either of the two hath, God himself knoweth ; for us he hath left no sufficient means to comprehend, and for that cause hath not given any leave to search in particular who are infallibly the heirs of the kingdom of God, and who are castaways. Howbeit, concerning the state of all men with whom we live, we may till the world's end always presume that as far as in us there is power to discern what others are, and as far as any duty of ours dependeth upon the notice of their condition in respect to God, the safest axioms for charity to rest itself iipon are these : ' He which believeth, already is the child of God ; and be which believeth not as yet, may become the child of God.' It becometh not us, during life, altogether to condemn any man, seeing that for anything we know there is hope of every man's forgiveness, the possibility of whose repentance is not cut off by death. And therefore charity, which 'hopeth all things,' prayeth also for all men."

To the same effect says Zanchius (Predestination, III.) ; "I grant that there are some particular persons mentioned in the Divine word, of whose reprobation 110 doubt can be made ; such as Esau and Judas. But now the canon of scripture is completed, we dare not, we must not pronounce any man living to be non-elect, be he at present ever so wicked. The vilest sinner may, for aught we can tell, appertain to the election of grace, and be one day wrought upon by tae Spirit of God. This we know, that those who die in unbelief, and are finally unsanctified, cannot be saved : because God in his word tells us so, and has represented these as marks of reprobation. But to say that such and such individuals,' whom perhaps we now see dead in sins, shall never be converted to Christ, would be a most presumptuous assertion, as well as an inexcusable breach of the charity which hopeth all things."

HELL. 747

lieavens, and his kingdom ruletli over all," Fs. 103 : 19. '• Thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glorj," Matt. 6 : 13. The Lord Christ " must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet," 1 Cor. 15 : 25. St. John '•heard a voice from heaven as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of a great thunder," Rev. 1-1:2. The New Jerusalem " lieth four-square, the length is as large as the breadth ; the gates of it shall not be shut at all by day ; the kings of the earth do bring their honor into it," Rev. 21 : 16, 24, 25. The number of the lost spirits is never thus emphasized, and enlarged upon. The brief, stern stateinent is, that " the fearful and unbelieving shall have their part in the lake that burnetii with fire and brimstone," Rev. 21 : 8. Ko metaphors and amplification are added, to make the impression of an immense " multitude which no man can number." *

We have thus presented the rational argument for the most severe and unwelcome of all tlie tenets of the Christian religion. It must have a foothold in the human reason, or it could not have maintained itself against all the recoil and opposition which it elicits from the human heart. Founded in ethics, in law, and in judicial reason, as well as unquestionably taught by the Author of Christianity, it is no wonder that the doctrine of Eternal Retribution, in spite of selfish prejudices and appeals to human sentiment, has always been a belief of Christendom. From theology

1 Calvin, explaining the elect " seven thousand," in Rom. 11 : 4, remarks that "though this stands for an indefinite number, it was the Lord's design to specify a great multitude. Since, then, the grace of God prevails so much in an extreme state of things, let us not lightly give over to the devil all those whose piety does not openly appear to us." Zwingle thought that all who died in early childhood are regenerated and saved. Edwards (Against Chauncy, XIV.) denies that it is an article of his faith, that ' ' only a small part of the human race will finally be saved." Hopkins (Future State, V.) asserts that "there is reason to believe that many more of mankind will be saved than lost ; yea, it may be many thousands to one." Hodge (Theology, IIL 879) says that " we have reason to believe that the number of the finally lost, in comparison with the whole number of the saved, will be very inconsiderable."

748 ESCHATOLOGY.

and philosophy it hcas passed into human literature, and is wrought into its finest structures. It makes the solemn substance of the Iliad and the Greek Drama. It pours a sombre light into the brightness and grace of the iEneid. It is the theme of the Inferno, and is presupposed by both of the other parts of the Divine Comedy. The epic of Milton derives from it its awful grandeur. And the greatest of the Shakespearean tragedies sound and stir the depths of the human soul, by their deliueation of guilt intrinsic and eternal.

In this discussion, we have purposelj^ brought into view only the righteousness of Almighty God, as related to the voluntary and responsible action of man. We have set holy justice and disobedient free-will face to face, and drawn the conclusions. This is all that the defender of the doctrine of retribution is strictly concerned with. If he can demonstrate that the principles of eternal rectitude are not in the least degree infringed upon, but are fully maintained, when sin is endlessly punished, he has done all that his problem requires. Wliatever is just is beyond all rational attack.'

But with the Christian Gospel in his hands, the defender of the Divine justice finds it difficult to be entirely reticent, and say not a word concerning the Divine mercy. Over ao-ainst God's infinite antagonism and righteous severity toward moral evil, there stands God's infinite pity and desire to forgive. This is realized, not by the highhanded and unprincipled method of pardoning without legal satisfaction of any kind, but by the strange and stupendous method of putting the Eternal Judge in the place of the human criminal ; of substituting God's own satisfaction for that due from man. In this vicarious atonement

' Said one of the deepest and most profoundly penitent of human spirits : "I have had more than a glimpse of what is meant by death and outer darkness, and the worm that dieth not— and that all the hell of the reprobate is no more ijiconsistent with the love [benevolence] of God, than the blindness of one who has occasioned loathsome and guilty diseases to eat out his eyes, is inconsistent with the light of the sun." — Cottle: Reminiscences of Coleridge, 283.

HELL. 749

for sin, the Triune God relinquishes no claims of law, and waives no rights of justice. The sinner's Divine Substitute, in his hour of voluntary agony and death, drinks the cup of punitive and inexorable justice to the dregs. Any man who, in penitent faith, avails himself of this vicarious r method of setting himself right with the Eternal Nemesis, will find that it succeeds ; but he who rejects it, must through endless cycles grapple with the dread problem of human guilt in his own person, and alone.

The Christian Gospel — the universal offer of pardon through the self-sacrifice of one of the Divine Persons — ■ should silence every objection to the doctrine of Endless Punishment. For as the case now stands, there is no necessity, so far as the action of God is concerned, that a single human being should ever be the subject of future punishment. The necessity of hell is founded in the action of the creature^ not of the Creator. Had there been no sin, there would have been no hell ; and sin is the product of man's free will. And after the entrance of sin and the provision of redemption from it, had there been universal repentance in this life, there would have been no hell for man in the next life. The only necessitating reason, therefore, for endless retribution that now exists, is the sinner's impenitence. Should every human individual, before he dies, sorrow for sin, and humbly confess it, Hades and Gehenna would disappear.

For the Scriptures everywhere describe God as naturally and spontaneously merciful, and declare that all the legal obstacles to the exercise of this great attribute have been removed by the death of the Son of God " for the sins of the whole world," 1 John 2:2. In the very midst of the holy revelations of Sinai, Jehovah proclaimed it to be his inherent and intrinsic disposition to be " merciful and gracious, long-suffering, forgiving iniquity and trangression," Ex. 34 : 6, 7. Nehemiah, after the exile, repeats the doctrine of the Pentateuch : " Thou art a God ready to par750 ESCHATOLOGY.

don, gracious and merciful, and of great kindness," Nehem. 9 : 17, The Psalmist declares that " the Lord is ready to forgive, and plenteous in mercy unto all that call upon him," Ps. 86 : 5. " The Lord taketh pleasure in them tliat fear him, in those that hope in liis mercy," Ps. 147 : 11. From the twilight of the land of Uz, Elihu, feeling after the promised Redeemer if haply he might find him (Job 33 : 23), declares that " God looketh upon men, and if any say, I have sinned, and perverted that which was right, and it profited me not ; he will deliver his soul from going down to the pit, and his life shall see the light," Job 33: 27, 28. The Bible, throughout, teaches that the Supreme Being is sensitive to penitence, and is moved with compassion and paternal yearning whenever he perceives any sincere spiritual grief. He notices and welcomes the slightest indication of repentance. " The eye of the Lord is upon them that fear him, upon them that hope in his mercy," Ps. 33:18. "Whoso confesseth and forsaketh his sins shall have mercy," Pro v. 28 : 13. The Heavenly Father sees the pi-odigal when he is " yet a great way oif." He never " breaks the bruised reed," nor " quenches the smoking flax." If there be in any human creature the broken and contrite heart, the Divine Pity speaks the word of forgiveness and absolution. The humble confession of un worthiness operates almost magically upon the Eternal. Incarnate Mercy said to the heathen " woman of Canaan " who asked for only the dogs' crumbs, " O woman, great is thy faith ; be it unto thee even as thou wilt," Matt. 15 : 28. The Omnipotent is overcome, whenever he sees lowly penitential sorrow. As " the foolishness of God is wiser than man," so the self-despairing helplessness of man is sti'onger than God, When Jacob says to the Infinite One, " I am not worthy of the least of all thy mercies," yet wrestles with him "until the breaking of the day," he becomes Israel, and " as a prince has power with God," Gen. 32 : 10, 24, 28. When Jehovah hears Ephraim " bemoaning himHELL. Y53

self," and saying, " Turn thou me, and I shall be turned',ve he answers, " Ephraim is my dear son. I will surely have mercj' upon him," Jer. 31 : 18, 20.'

Now the only obstruction, and it is a fatal one, to the exercise of this natural and spontaneous mercy of God, is the sinner's hardness of heart. The existing necessity for hellpunishment is not chargeable upon God. It is the proud and obstinate man who makes hell. It is his impenitence that feeds its perpetual fires. For so long as the transgressor does not grieve for sin, and does not even acknowledge it, it cannot be pardoned. Almightiness itself cannot forgive impenitence, any more than it can make a square circle. Impenitence after sinning is a more determined and worse form of sin, than siiming is in and of itself. For it is a tacit defence ioxd justification of sin. If after trangression the person acknowledges that he has transgressed, and asks forgiveness for so doing, he evinces that he does not excuse his act, or defend it. On the contrary, he renounces his act, condemns it, and mourns over it. But if after trangression the person makes no acknowledgment, and asks no forgiveness, he is repeating and intensifying his sin. He justifies himself in his act of rebellion against authority, and thus aggravates the original fault. It is for this reason, that impenitence for sin is more dreadful than sin itself. A penitent sinner can be forgiven ; but an impenitent sinner cannot be. The former God pities, and extends the offer of mercy to him. To the latter God holds out no hope, because he cannot.

This is what gives to human existence here upon earth its dark outlook. All the gloom, discontent, and anxiety of

' Beatrice expresses the same truth to Dante, in the words :

" Whene'er the sinner's cheek Breaks forth into the precious-streaming tears Of self -accusing, in our court the wheel Of justice doth run counter to the edge."

Purgatory, xxxi. 36.

752 ESCHATOLOGY.

human life grow out of this. This is what makes " all the uses of this world so weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable." Men are impenitent. They give no heed to the voice of conscience ; know little of remorse, nothing of genuine sorrow. They are stolid and lethargic in sin ; or else angrily deny the fact. They bend no knee in self-abasement before the All-Holy ; they do not cry, " O Lamb of God that takest away the sins of the world, grant me thy peace." Human life is wretched and despairing, not because there is no mercv in the sweet heavens, but because there is no relenting, no softening, in the human heart. One is weary of hearing the incessant wail of the agnostic and the cynic over the " mystery " of this existence ; the monotonous moan of the pessimist that life is not worth living. A sincere confession of what the consciousness of every man will tell him is the absolute truth respecting his character and conduct, when tried by a spiritual and perfect standard, would drive away this false view of earthly existence as the miasmatic fog is blown by the winds. But instead of confessing sin, and imploring its forgiveness, men stand complaining of its punishment, or employing their ingenuity in endeavoring to prove that there is none ; and then wonder that the heavens are black and thunderous over their heads. Not by this method, will the sky be made clear and sunny. Whoever will cast himself upon the Divine Compassion will find life to be worth living ; but he Mdio quarrels with the Divine Justice will discover that he had better not have been born.

"What the human race needs is — to go to the Divine Confessional. The utterance of the Prodigal should be that of everv man, " Father, I have sinned." The utterance of the Psalmist should be that of every man : "Otlion that hearest prayer, unto thee shall all flesli come. Iniquities prevail against me : as for our transgi-essions, thou shalt purge them away." " God commandeth all men everywhere to repent," Acts 17 : 30. But so long as man glosses over,

HELL. Y53

or conceals, the cardinal fact in his history, he mnst live under a cloud, and look with anxiety and fear into the deep darkness beyond. It is useless to contend with the stubborn fact of moral evil by the ostrich-method of ignoring, and denying. The sin is here, in self-consciousness, terrible and real, the lancinating sting of pain and the deadly sting of death, in this generation and in all generations. Kant, the ethical and the metaphysical, is rigiit when he affirms that the noumenon of sin is the dark ground under the phenomenon of life. Confession, therefore, is the only Avay to light and mental peace. The suppression of any fundamental form of human consciousness necessarily results in unrest. Man's words about himself must agree with liis true character and condition ; otherwise he becomes insincere, miserable, and false. The denial of moral evil is the secret of the murmuring and melancholy with which so much of modern letters is filled. Eousseau made a confession, but not truthful, not humble : and hence it brought him no repose. Augustine made a confession, genuine, simple, thoroughly accordant with the facts of human nature ; and the outpouring of his confidences into the ear of Eternal Purity and Mercy brought the peace that passes all understanding, and the immortal life that knows no melancholy, and no dissatisfaction. These historic persons are types of the two classes into which all men fall : the penitent and the impenitent.

The king in Shakespeare's Ilamlet, writhing with selfish remorse but destitute of unselfish sorrow, in liis soliloquy exclaims :

" Try what repentance can : what can it not ? Yet what can it, when one cannot repent ? O wretched state ! O bosom black as death ! O limed soul ; that struggling to be free Art more engaged ! "

Bunyan's man of Despair, in the iron cage, when assured by Christian that " the Son of the Blessed is very pitiful," Vol. IL— 48

754 ESCHATOLOGY.

replies : " I have so hardened my heart, that I cannot repent."

In these powerful delineations, these profound psychologists of sin bring to view a peril that environs free will. Pardon may be proffered by God, hut penitence may become i7nj)ossihle through the action of man. " There are some sins," says Augustine, " that follow of necessity, fi-om foregoing sins that occurred without necessity." The adoption of atheism is a sin without necessity. It is the voluntary action of man. But the hardness of heart that results from it, results of necessity. No man is forced to be an infidel ; but if he is one, he onust be an impenitent man. A luxurious and skeptical age should remember this. That man cannot repent, who drowns himself in pleasure, and never seriously reflects upon his accountability to his Maker. That man cannot repent, wlio expends the energy of his mind in the endeavor to prove tliat all human action is irresponsible, and the threatenings of Revelation an idle tale. They who have " eyes full of adultery cannot cease from sin," 2 Pet. 2 : 14. Absorption in worldliness, and adoption of infidel opinions, make repentance an impossibility. Sensuality and atheism harden the human heart, and render it impervious to the Christian Religion.